Country Advice China – CHN35911 – Gangsters – Local organised crime – State protection – Internal

relocation 15 January 2010

1. Please advise whether it is plausible that an individual selling vegetables at a local market would have to pay protection money to gangsters?

The payment of protection money to a criminal gang by a local market vendor is a plausible scenario in China. In recent years hundreds of farmers markets “owned” by underground criminal organisations have been “shut down” by police in China,1 and cases of criminal gangs collecting rent and using extortion, blackmail, and violence to control farm produce markets and vendors have been reported in the Chinese media.2 Criminal groups can often be found in rural areas, and serious organised crime may be more prevalent in small and medium-sized cities where the economy is underdeveloped. The difficulty of local authorities to control mafia-like organised crime in rural areas has in fact been a particular concern of the Public Security Bureau in recent years.3

A number of other general characteristics of organised crime in China suggest that local market vendors may be forced by criminal groups to pay protection money. Organised crime in China tends to be made up of a small group of individuals no greater than 200 people, who operate in an extremely localised area – such as townships – and who rely on local corrupt politicians, authorities and police. Growth beyond a localised area is restricted as it receives greater attention from the central government authorities.4 A recent Stratfor publication points out that conditions at a township level (such as Shangjing) encourage this type of organised crime:

1 Chao, Leon 2008, ‘The Resurgence of Organized Crime in China’, Chinascope website, 14 March http://chinascope.org/main/content/view/326/123 – Accessed 5 May 2009 – Attachment 1. 2 Huazhong, W. 2009, ‘Chongqing dragnet claims new mob boss’, , 6 November http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2009-11/06/content_8921384.htm - Accessed 19 January 2010 – Attachment 2. 3 ‘Improved Public Security in Rural Areas Urged’ 2006, China.org.cn website, 7 November, source: http://www.china.org.cn/english/GS-e/188197.htm - Accessed 19 January 2010 – Attachment 3; Schloemhardt, A. 2008, Submission to Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Crime Commission Inquiry into the legislative arrangements to outlaw serious and organised crime groups, Parliament of Australia website, p.49 http://www.aph.gov.au/SENATE/committee/acc_ctte/laoscg/submissions/sub01.pdf - Accessed 19 January 2010 – Attachment 4; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2006, CHN101062.E – China: Organized crime or black society activity, particularly in Guangdong and Fujian, including links with government officials, repercussions associated with failing to meet demands of criminal gangs, and government efforts at tackling organized crime (2005 – 2006), 5 May http://www.irb- cisr.gc.ca/en/research/rir/index_e.htm?action=record.viewrec&gotorec=450166 – Accessed 14 June 2007 – Attachment 5. 4 ‘Organised Crime in China’ 2008, Stratfor Today, 19 August – Attachment 6; Chen, A. 2005, ‘Secret Societies and Organized Crime in Contemporary China’, Modern Asia Studies, vol. 39, no. 1, p.81 – Attachment 7. Organized crime in China largely takes place with the cooperation of local politicians. The conditions in township governing councils encourage corruption, given that officials are poorly paid, they are expected to meet quotas for economic growth and employment and they largely control the information that gets passed from the local level to the central government. This means local officials must get creative to fund local services such as police and fire departments, and must ensure that economic growth continues along at breakneck speed. All too often, politicians rely on shadow governments — the local power brokers not necessarily tied to the CPC and most likely plugged into an organized criminal network — to make ends meet.5

Organised crime in Fujian

Fujian is considered one Chinese province where organised crime is concentrated.6 A 2006 study on organised crime in Fujian based on interviews with former police officers who are now professors, current police officers, gangsters, a village head and businessman, concluded that criminal gangs and groups operate in all counties and towns around Fuzhou City area. While the report is silent on the specific activities of groups in these counties and towns, groups in Fuzhou City are involved in extortion alongside violent crimes such as murder, assault and robbery:

In all the counties and towns around the Fuzhou area, there are several powerful groups active in each and every town or county. For example, a gangster in Putian, a county about a hundred miles from Fuzhou City, said, “Of course there are many ‘big brothers’ in this county. They are all businessmen and they are involved in all kinds of businesses. They also have a bunch of street fighters under their command. Moreover, they enjoy a very good relationship with people in the criminal justice system. So, nobody dares to touch them. A few years ago, there was a strikehard campaign against organized gangs, but the authorities only went after the small flies. The big fishes were left alone.” A police station chief in the county echoed the gangster’s assessment as follows. “We don’t have organized gangs here but we do have several wealthy businessmen who are involved in all kinds of lucrative businesses. They are very low key, and their activities are secret. After we arrested some of their little soldiers, we tried to arrest the men behind them, and often we found that there was another layer of followers of the big bosses. The real bosses are all behind the scene and way up there. We know who the big bosses are, but we are not able to investigate them. Besides, many of them are elected deputies and they have the authority to monitor us. How can we touch them?”7

2. What level of state protection is available in Fujian for individuals in this situation?

The level of state protection available in Fujian for individuals threatened by local criminal gangs is likely to be low.

Articles 26 and 294 of China’s Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China provide prohibitions on criminal gang activities. Article 294 in particular refers to “criminal activities in an organized manner through violence, threat, or other means, with the aim of playing the tyrant in a locality”; and provides penalties of between 3 and 10 years for government officials who “harbour” or “connive” with a criminal organisation. Articles 26 and 294 state:

5 ‘Organised Crime in China’ 2008, Stratfor Today, 19 August – Attachment 6. 6 ‘Organised Crime in China’ 2008, Stratfor Today, 19 August – Attachment 6. 7 Chin, K.L., & Godson, R. 2006, ‘Organized Crime and the Political-Criminal Nexus in China’, Trends in Organized Crime, vol. 9, no. 3, pp.13, 14-15 – Attachment 8. Article 26

A principal offender is one who organizes and leads a criminal group in conducting criminal activities or plays a principal role in a joint crime.

A crime syndicate is a more or less permanent crime organization composed of three or more persons for the purpose of jointly committing crimes.

The head who organizes or leads a crime syndicate shall bear criminal responsibility for all the crimes committed by the syndicate.

A principal offender other that the one stipulated in the third paragraph shall bear criminal responsibility for all the crimes he participated in, organized, or directed….

Article 294

Whoever organizes, leads, or actively participates in an organization with characteristics of a criminal syndicate, which carries out lawless and criminal activities in an organized manner through violence, threat, or other means, with the aim of playing the tyrant in a locality, committing all sorts of crimes, bullying and harming the masses, and doing what has seriously undermined economic and social order is to be sentenced to not less than three years but not more than 10 years of fixed-term imprisonment. Other participants are to be sentenced to not more than three years of fixed-term imprisonment, criminal detention, control, or deprivation of political rights.

…State organ personnel who harbor an organization with characteristics of a criminal syndicate, or who connives at the organization’s lawless and criminal activities is to be sentenced to not more than three years of fixed-term imprisonment, criminal detention, or deprivation of political rights; when the circumstances are serious, the sentence is to be not less than three years but not more than 10 years of fixed-term imprisonment.8

The authorities have implemented these legislative measures to reduce criminal gang activities in Fujian province in the past ten years. In 2001 a strike-hard campaign dismantled large numbers of organised gangs in Fuzhou especially those connected with government officials, arresting 374 underworld figures from 19 gangs. As a result 13 gangsters were executed and some officials were jailed.9 In 2005, the leader of a prominent criminal gang in Fuzhou City was sentenced to death, and in January 2010 sentences against 19 gang members ranging from the death penalty to fines and jail terms were handed down by a court in Fujian.10 At the national level the Chinese government initiated a nationwide campaign against gang related crimes in early 2006. For the period to September 2009 this resulted in:  1,200 gang crime cases being investigated  8,900 being people arrested; and  approximately 16,000 mafia-style and “less-organised” groups being closed down by police.11

8 Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, (Promulgated 14 March 1997 & Effective 1 October 1997), AsianLII website – Attachment 9. 9 Chin, K.L., & Godson, R. 2006, ‘Organized Crime and the Political-Criminal Nexus in China’, Trends in Organized Crime, vol. 9, no. 3, p.14 – Attachment 8. 10 ‘3 sentenced to death in Fujian gang trial’ 2010, China.org website, source: Xinhua, 4 January http://www.china.org.cn/china/2010-01/04/content_19173602.htm - Accessed 29 January 2010 – Attachment 10. 11 ‘Gang-busting unit set to expand’, 2010, China.org website, source: China Daily, 11 January http://www.china.org.cn/china/2010-01/11/content_19213164.htm - Accessed 29 January 2010 – Attachment 11; In addition the Ministry of Public Security has recently enlarged its national division devoted to investigating gang-related crimes and aims to create special units devoted to this at the provincial and city-level. Officials are currently targeting gangs based at markets. In January 2010, a senior MPS official said gangs “based at markets and bus/train traffic stations, as well as new types of gang-related crimes such as illegal debt collection and “underground policing” will be a major target in crackdowns”.12

State protection from criminal gang activity is seriously limited in China by the strong association that can exist between criminals and officials, increasing the likelihood that police may not act against gangsters. This association can take many forms, including what is referred to as a ‘protective umbrella’ where a government official takes bribes from criminals and in turn gives protection to criminals and their activities.13 Numerous sources point to links between criminal gangs and government officials and police as limiting the government’s ability to control criminal activities. For example, in 2008 Stratfor concluded that the organised crime that occurs in China does so largely with the cooperation of local politicians.14 In 2005 The Economist reported on the “gangsterisation” of Chinese villages on account of the increasing incidents of rural communities falling under the control of “thugs”, often with the support of local officials. The report concluded that “authorities in Beijing rail from time to time against village-level thuggery, but their ability to control it is clearly limited” because of the close connection at the local level between officials and criminals.15 The extent of police involvement is evidenced by the fact that in the nine years to 2006, just over 10,000 policemen were suspended on account of affiliation with organised crime. At this time, one low-level police officer in Fuzhou indicated that the police department there was in disarray because “all the outstanding police officers are now in jail for their affiliation with gangsters.”16

3. Would an individual in this situation be able to relocate elsewhere in China?

Internal migration/relocation within China

The ability of citizens to relocate in China is primarily determined by the type of or household registration currently possessed and the local hukou regulations in the destination city. Permanent relocation within China for someone with hukou from the administrative areas of a small town or city is probably limited to another rural area or small urban centre, a town or county level city. The most practical relocation is to another rural area, town or county level city within the province.

‘7 executed for gang crimes in N. China’ 2010, China.org website, source: Xinhua, 8 January http://www.china.org.cn/china/2010-01/08/content_19200157.htm - Accessed 29 January 2010 – Attachment 12. 12 ‘7 executed for gang crimes in N. China’ 2010, China.org website, source: Xinhua, 8 January http://www.china.org.cn/china/2010-01/08/content_19200157.htm - Accessed 29 January 2010 – Attachment 12; ‘Gang-busting unit set to expand’, 2010, China.org website, source: China Daily, 11 January http://www.china.org.cn/china/2010-01/11/content_19213164.htm - Accessed 29 January 2010 – Attachment 11. 13 Chin, K.L., & Godson, R. 2006, ‘Organized Crime and the Political-Criminal Nexus in China’, Trends in Organized Crime, vol. 9, no. 3, p.6, 30 – Attachment 8; ‘Organised Crime in China’ 2008, Stratfor Today, 19 August, ‘Politics, Security and Corruption’ – Attachment 6. 14 ‘Organised Crime in China’ 2008, Stratfor Today, 19 August – Attachment 6. 15 ‘Democracy Chinese-style - Protest in China’ 2005, The Economist, 15 October – Attachment 13. 16 Chao, Leon 2008, ‘The Resurgence of Organized Crime in China’, Chinascope website, 14 March http://chinascope.org/main/content/view/326/123 – Accessed 5 May 2009 – Attachment 1; Chin, K.L., & Godson, R. 2006, ‘Organized Crime and the Political-Criminal Nexus in China’, Trends in Organized Crime, vol. 9, no. 3, p.31 – Attachment 8. Local entry conditions or regulations of larger cities across China generally exclude rural peasant migrants, generally favouring the wealthy, educated, those with state employment, or those with immediate family members (spouses, children) who are urban residents. While millions of workers in China migrate to large cities each year, those who relocate in this manner are usually restricted to temporary, non-official residence, face discrimination and had limited access to social services.17 Few restrictions seem to apply to relocation to rural areas.

Safe relocation would also depend on the extent of the area in which the criminal gang operated and whether this extends beyond the confines of the person’s town. In addition relocation may be more difficult if the local police are cooperating with the gangsters. Permanent relocation may be ruled out in such instances as official hukou conversion requires formal notification to and approval from the local public security bureau.

Hukou Registration

The Chinese hukou registration – a type of internal passport – and the system which governs it regulates and restricts population mobility within the country. Each citizen is allowed one permanent hukou at only one hukou zone. Permanent movement outside one’s hukou zone requires application/notification through the local PSB in the new and old hukou zone. The regulations governing the hukou are now less controlled by the central government and more by local cities and towns. Each town or city has its own local entry conditions for gaining permanent residence and can issue its own hukou entitling only registered residents to complete access to certain social benefits. These local regulations are subject to frequent change.18

The US State Department emphasises that while hukou regulations have been relaxed and the ability of most citizens to move within the country to work and live continued to expand, official (permanent) change of residence to economically developed urban areas in general remained difficult for many from rural areas:

Although the government maintained restrictions on the freedom to change one’s workplace or residence, the national household registration system (hukou) continued to change, and the ability of most citizens to move within the country to work and live continued to expand. Rural residents continued to migrate to the cities, where the per capita disposable income was more than four times the rural per capita income, but many could not officially change their residence or workplace within the country. Most cities had annual quotas for the number of new temporary residence permits that could be issued, and all workers, including university graduates, had to compete for a limited number of such permits. It was particularly difficult for peasants from rural areas to obtain household registration in more economically developed urban areas.

The household registration system added to the difficulties rural residents faced even after they relocated to urban areas and found employment. The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (MOHRSS) reported that there were approximately 230 million migrant workers from rural areas engaged in wage employment in urban areas. These economic migrants lacked official residence status in cities, and it was difficult for them to gain full access to social services, including education, despite laws, regulations, and programs meant to address their needs. Furthermore, law and society generally limited migrant workers to types of work

17 Scheineson, Andrew 2009, ‘China’s Internal Migrants’, Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, 14 May http://www.cfr.org/publication/12943/ - Accessed 2 February 2010 – Attachment 21. 18 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2005, China: Reforms of the Household Registration System (Hukou) (1998-2004), February, Sections 2 & 7.1 – Attachment 15. considered least desirable by local residents, and such workers had little recourse when subject to abuse by employers and officials. 19 The ability of migrants within China to change their hukou – a process known as nongzhuanfei – in light of recent (post 2005) reforms, has been discussed in detail by Chan and Buckingham in their 2008 paper ‘Is China Abolishing the Hukou System?’ They conclude that as a result of the change to localised hukou regulations, rural migrants do have the possibility of gaining local permanent residence in small urban centres, mostly towns but also some county-level cities. They point out that between 1997 and 2002, 1.39 million new hukou were granted in these small towns and cities nationwide:

The System of Approving Hukou Migration and the Nongzhuanfei Reforms

In the realm of (rural-to-urban) migration, it is imperative to differentiate hukou and non- hukou migrants based on whether or not local hukou is conferred by the receiving city or town as a result of the move. There are broadly two categories of migration: that entailing a formal transfer of local residency (hukou migration); and that with no hukou change and thus no formal right of residency in the destination (non-hukou migration). In China, only hukou migration is officially considered as qianyi (迁移 migration). Anything else is merely renkou liudong (人口流动 population movement or ‘‘floating’’), implying a low degree of expected permanence. The non-hukou migrants are considered transients who are not supposed (and are legally not entitled) to stay at the destination permanently, and therefore they are often termed ‘‘temporary’’ migrants, although many have been at their destination for years. They are also outside state welfare obligations at the destination. Hukou migrants, on the other hand, are provided with state resources and fall into the ‘‘planned’’ migration (jihua qianyi 计划迁移) category.

… Localization means practice can vary from place to place. As expected, many large cities where there are more government-provided benefits (including better public schools) tend to put up the most stringent entry conditions, whereas small towns with far fewer or almost no social benefits have the lowest threshold of entry. A very small gain rural migrants may have under this round of initiatives is the possibility of obtaining a hukou in a small urban centre (mostly towns but also some county-level cities). This has been made substantially easier since the late 1990s. But small urban centres are not where most peasant migrants want to go, because of the relative lack of job opportunities and social welfare and amenities in comparison with major urban centres. Moreover, those accepting a hukou in small towns are required to give up their entitlement to land in their home village, a potentially huge financial loss in some areas. Despite the apparent ease of migrating to small urban centres under the initiative in 1997, the official account indicates that until 2002, just 1.39 million new hukou were granted in these small towns and cities nationwide.

… In fact, nongzhuanfei is now replaced by locally determined ‘‘entry conditions’’ which are geared to attracting the wealthy or the highly-educated, and which are hardly relevant to the great majority of the rural migrant workers. It is true that restrictions for permanent migration have been reduced, but they are relevant only for the rich, the educated and family members of existing urban residents. The reading of the nongzhuanfei abolition as a new nationwide policy to allow peasant migrants from, say, a village in Sichuan to get urban status in Guangzhou is completely erroneous.20

19 US State Department 2009, 2008 Human Rights Report: China (includes , , and ), 25 February, ‘2d. Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of Refugees, and Stateless Persons’ – Attachment 16. 20 Chan, Kam Wing and Will Buckingham 2008, "Is China Abolishing the Hukou System?", The China Quarterly, September, pp. 590, 596, and 605 – Attachment 17. A professor of international affairs indicated to the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada in 2005 that receiving approval for permanent relocation is “relatively easy” outside major cities:

Permanent relocation outside of the hukou zone can be approved by authorities in cases of new employment, post-secondary school enrolment, family reunification, or the “recategorization of rural residents as urban residents” (Wang 2005, 70). Major urban centres such as Shanghai, Beijing and the special economic zones are “highly controlled cities” that retain local hukou quotas (ibid., 92). According to the professor of international affairs, outside of the larger cities, receiving approval for permanent relocation is “relatively easy” (30 Apr. 2005). In general, there are greater possibilities of migration for the wealthy, the educated, and those who obtain state employment or are retired or demobilized military officers.21

Hukou regulations in Fujian and relocation Practical relocation seems most possible within Fujian province. As in many places across China, cities and towns in Fujian now have the power to set their own admission criteria and numbers for new permanent residents and hukou, independent of quotas previously imposed by the central government.22 In Fujian since 2001 the distinction between agricultural and non-agricultural hukou has been abolished: every citizen in the province is registered under the categories of either resident or temporary hukou.23 While the provincial capital Fuzhou and the large city of Xiamen impose restrictions on in-migration related to education and skills, “cities at the county level, such as Jianou and Jianyang, have always been much more open to rural residents and other migrants attempting to settle in them”.24

The location of Shandou village (山兜村) (山兜/shān dōu meaning a mountain chair; 村 meaning village) in relation to Shangjing town/zhen is indicated in the attached map25. Shandou village is labelled “Mt Doucun” and located approximately 6kms south-east of “Shangjingzhen”.

List of Attachments:

1. Chao, Leon 2008, ‘The Resurgence of Organized Crime in China’, Chinascope website, 14 March http://chinascope.org/main/content/view/326/123 – Accessed 5 May 2009.

21 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2005, CHN43520.E – China: The possibility for an adult male returning from overseas, who was abused as a child by his father in China, to relocate to a new residence of his own and obtain a new hukou, or to move to another city to start working, if his father objects to either move (2003-2005), 2 May – Attachment 18. 22 Chan, Kam Wing and Will Buckingham 2008, "Is China Abolishing the Hukou System?", The China Quarterly, September, p. 594 – Attachment 17. 23 Wang, F.L. 2005, Organising Through Division and Exclusion: China’s Hukou System, Stanford University Press, Stanford, p. 193 – Attachment 19; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2005, China: Reforms of the Household Registration System (Hukou) (1998-2004), February, Section 5.2: Regional Reforms – Attachment 15. 24 Chen, A. 2006, ‘ and the case of Fujian province’ Modern China, vol 32, no. 1, pp.99- 130, p. 122 – Attachment 20. 25 ‘Shandou village (山兜村)’ Google Maps – Attachment 14. 2. Huazhong, W. 2009, ‘Chongqing dragnet claims new mob boss’, China Daily, 6 November http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2009-11/06/content_8921384.htm – Accessed 19 January 2010.

3. ‘Improved Public Security in Rural Areas Urged’ 2006, China.org.cn website, 7 November, source: Xinhua News Agency http://www.china.org.cn/english/GS- e/188197.htm – Accessed 19 January 2010.

4. Schloemhardt, A. 2008, Submission to Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Crime Commission Inquiry into the legislative arrangements to outlaw serious and organised crime groups, Parliament of Australia website, p.49 http://www.aph.gov.au/SENATE/committee/acc_ctte/laoscg/submissions/sub01.pdf – Accessed 19 January 2010.

5. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2006, CHN101062.E – China: Organized crime or black society activity, particularly in Guangdong and Fujian, including links with government officials, repercussions associated with failing to meet demands of criminal gangs, and government efforts at tackling organized crime (2005 – 2006), 5 May http://www.irb- cisr.gc.ca/en/research/rir/index_e.htm?action=record.viewrec&gotorec=450166 – Accessed 14 June 2007 .

6. ‘Organised Crime in China’ 2008, Stratfor Today, 19 August.

7. Chen, A. 2005, ‘Secret Societies and Organized Crime in Contemporary China’, Modern Asia Studies, vol. 39, no. 1. pp. 77-107.

8. Chin, K.L., & Godson, R. 2006, ‘Organized Crime and the Political-Criminal Nexus in China’, Trends in Organized Crime, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 5 – 44.

9. Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, (Promulgated 14 March 1997 & Effective 1 October 1997), AsianLII website http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/clotproc361/ – Accessed 4 January 2010.

10. ‘3 sentenced to death in Fujian gang trial’ 2010, China.org website, source: Xinhua, 4 January http://www.china.org.cn/china/2010-01/04/content_19173602.htm – Accessed 29 January 2010.

11. ‘Gang-busting unit set to expand’, 2010, China.org website, source: China Daily, 11 January http://www.china.org.cn/china/2010-01/11/content_19213164.htm – Accessed 29 January 2010.

12. ‘7 executed for gang crimes in N. China’ 2010, China.org website, source: Xinhua, 8 January http://www.china.org.cn/china/2010-01/08/content_19200157.htm – Accessed 29 January 2010.

13. ‘Democracy Chinese-style – Protest in China’ 2005, The Economist, 15 October. (FACTIVA)

14. ‘Shandou village (山兜村)’ Google Maps.

15. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2005, China: Reforms of the Household Registration System (Hukou) (1998-2004), February. 16. US State Department 2009, 2008 Human Rights Report: China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 25 February.

17. Chan, Kam Wing and Will Buckingham 2008, “Is China Abolishing the Hukou System?”, The China Quarterly, September.

18. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2005, CHN43520.E – China: The possibility for an adult male returning from overseas, who was abused as a child by his father in China, to relocate to a new residence of his own and obtain a new hukou, or to move to another city to start working, if his father objects to either move (2003- 2005), 2 May. (REFINFO).

19. Wang, F.L. 2005, Organising Through Division and Exclusion: China’s Hukou System, Stanford University Press, Stanford, p.193. (RRT Library Sydney)

20. Chen, A. 2006, ‘Urbanization in China and the case of Fujian province’ Modern China, vol 32, no. 1, pp.99-130.

21. Scheineson, Andrew 2009, ‘China’s Internal Migrants’, Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, 14 May http://www.cfr.org/publication/12943/ - Accessed 2 February 2010.