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"Horses for Courses" and "Thin Blue Lines": Community Policing in Transitional Society Mike Brogden Police Quarterly 2005; 8; 64 DOI: 10.1177/1098611104267328

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Downloaded from http://pqx.sagepub.com at SAGE Publications on November 10, 2008 10.1177/1098611104267328Brogden / COMMUNITY POLICING POLICE QUARTERLY (Vol. 8, No. 1, March 2005) “HORSES FOR COURSES” AND “THIN BLUE LINES”: COMMUNITY POLICING IN TRANSITIONAL SOCIETY

MIKE BROGDEN Queen’s University Belfast

The export of policing models from the West has a long history. Current export processes are dominated by the transfer of community policing (COP) models from Anglo-American jurisdictions to societies currently regarded as undergoing a transitional process. The latter are frequently characterized by rising recorded crime rates and a delegitimation of their own police institutions. Consequently, COP appears to offer a welcome respite, especially when encouraged not just by policing missionaries from the West and donor cash but also by a variety of nongovernmental organizations that see COP effectiveness as a human rights resolution to police abuse. Using secondary data from a range of failed and transitional societies, this article challenges the motives, processes, and consequences of the export of such a Western policing model. The end result, from the preliminary evidence, seems to be one of deepening social schism in the country of import. COP is irrelevant to many such societies.

Keywords: community policing; transitional societies; police export

Two emerging philosophies—community-oriented policing and problem-solving policing . . . such notions as police-community reciprocity, decentralisation of command, re-orientation of patrol, and generalised rather than specialised policing are commending themselves to police executives around the globe. At first thought, this is rather surprising. Why should police executives with such different cultures, different economies, and different traditions as Oslo, Tokyo, Lon- don, New York, and Santa Ana be advocating similar reforms? —Skolnick and Bayley (1986, p. 17)

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The thin blue line thesis1 in police studies has a long history. Often implicit rather than explicit, its central theme is that in a period of rapid social change, when major state structures and agencies are suffering from varying degrees of stress and illegitimacy, it is crucial to develop and sustaina strong police institution. Whereas those other agencies recover and reestab- lish public support and appropriate resources, policing is the key institution that can guarantee social order and legitimacy. In the short term, a competent police institution has to be developed to give other agencies breathing space. Nowhere has this thesis seen more of an apparent revival than in Western approaches to failed and transitional societies. Policing is a priority export. At one level, such exports are a rational response to high levels of crime and social disorder in the so-called failed societies of the former Soviet Union2 to so-called transitional societies of parts of Africa, the Indian subcontinent, and in South America, the West Indies, and central Asia. At another level, policing is portrayed as the key stabilizing device from which good government can flow, investment opportunities can be safeguarded, and social stability can be guaranteed. Many types of police procedure and practice are involved in that export process. But, within that overall package, the key strategy proposed by the West is the hugger-mugger of practices that lie under the rubric of community policing (COP). Such a legalistic strategy of stimulating social change has a long history outside policing. In the 1960s and 1970s, the law and development movement involved many liberal Western jurists and legal scholars concerned about the social and political stability of the so-called developing world. The general assumption of that movement was that law was central to the development process. Social change could not occur in a desired direction without appropriate legal provisions. Law was a key instrument of social reform with lawyers and jurists acting as social engineers. In law, as laterin policing exports, a gap between the ideal of law and of law in action was widely noted as characterizing social and political affairs in the developing societies. One partial resolution was to educate lawyers and judges from those countries in the values and procedures of Western legal systems. To mix metaphors, law would be the catalyst, the lubricant, and the rock on which social change in other state structures could be based in the developing societies. That movement eventually foundered on several key reservations. Crit- ics argued that the law and development movement did not take account of the importance of traditional laws, customary codes, and local, indigenous,

Downloaded from http://pqx.sagepub.com at SAGE Publications on November 10, 2008 66 POLICE QUARTERLY (Vol. 8, No. 1, March 2005) legal structures. The movement’s major failure was its lack of understand- ing of legal pluralism. It failed to recognize the essential diversity of legal codes and agencies. Critics noted, inter alia, other reasons for that failure. There was too little participation by lawyers and others in the target country who would carry out the roles or be affected by them. External experts drew up the plans for legal reform, supervised their implementation, and evalu- ated their effectiveness according to Western legal criteria. Second, the reform movement focused on the formal legal system to the exclusion of custom and other informal ways in which developing societies order their affairs. In particular, critics argued that the most significant reason for the failure of the law and development enterprise was the naive belief that the American legal system (and American legal culture generally) could be easily transplanted to developing countries (Trubek & Galanter, 1974). Policing export in the present era is often driven by the same naive, liberal motives. Where failed and transitional societies are characterized by rising recorded crime rates, a delegitimation of existing policing and other criminal justice structures, and where economic investment is handicapped by foreign investors’fears of social instability, police reform is perceived as the essential bedrock of social and economic progress. In that process, COP is cast to play a key role. Of course, locating all the disparate schemes that utilize the rubric of COP is subject to immediate disclaimers.3 COP is used generically rather than specifically. Extreme examples from the South Pacific demonstrate the breadth of that rubric. The Fijian community police warn locals about the new green shoots of marijuana plantations. The Australian Federal Police in the Christmas and Cocos Islands include hurricane watching and a myriad of unique ancillary services under the heading of COP. In the Solomon Islands, COP is equated with peacekeeping as one (temporary) resolution to internal schism. In Papua New Guinea, the Bougainvillea local constabulary is building up a system of COP under the guidance (and financed by) the Australian and New Zealand governments. In East Timor, after the destruction left by the Indonesian-sponsored militia, COP is being constructed under a United Nations Civilian Police (CIVPOL) mandate. But, in practice, COP in that export process is often reduced to three easily recognized procedures: watch schemes, police community forums, and problem-solving policing. That basic model is fashioned in the West for easy implant in failed and transitional societies in response to problems of rising crime, public expectations of a response, and the collapse and delegitimation of local policing structures.

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EXPORTING POLICING

Despite the enormous sums spent on this COP export process, we have little evidence of its impact or, indeed, of the effect of international exchange and trade in police values, ideologies, policies, and technologies (Marenin, 1998). Apart from a few pathbreaking pieces (e.g., van der Spuy, 1997), there is little evidence of the motives of the often misnamed donor countries, the nature of the commodity, the conditions of delivery, the processes of installation in the host society, the reactions of the recipient institutions and their agents, and the consequences of installation. There is, however, one unique study of the export of COP to Kenya (i.e., Ruteere & Pommerolle, 2003). There are also several briefer accounts appearing that increasingly problematize the acceptance of external ideas on policing by local agencies in eastern Europe. Of course, exporting policing to non-Western societies is not a new practice, as the long legacy of colonial policing instructs us (Anderson & Killingray, 1991, 1992; Brogden, 1987) and in the post–World War II attempts to transplant U.S. policing to the defeated Axis powers. But, in the last decade, policing strategies and materials have become a major part of the export drive from the West to so-called failed and transitional societies. In a replay of colonial days when the police institution was often the first to be implanted to safeguard imperial trade, new policing is being driven by donor interest and also—and this is new—customer demand. The motives of the former are mixed. They include versions of the thin blue line thesis as apparent in the law and development movement. The police institution is seen as the key to stability in a period of rapid social change while new legit- imacies are created for other state institutions. There are other well-meaning motives, with COP perceived as the elixir to solve human rights issues. Police export is also a profitable business in which private multinational corporations as well as individual entrepreneurs straddle the world in quest for a market share of law enforcement commodities. Several types of agency are involved in this process. Individuals contribute, as do policing agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), national governments, and private corporations.

The motivation for the involvement of individual police forces can vary from the practicalities of having to cooperate with the recipients of assistance in the future on common crime problems, to individual police officers perceiving such helpasanop- portunity to provide philanthropic assistance to “fellow” police officers. (Beck, 2002)

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Rank-and-file police officers from the West apparently spend vacations in transitional societies delivering COP training with missionary zeal. Forex- ample, Captain John Deangelis (of the U.S. Egg Harbour Police) has been entrepreneurially selling domestic violence and COP courses in Lithuania and Estonia. In this process, former police officers and old apparatchiks are reincarnated in a new guise as COP missionaries. Thus, the consultancy of George Fivaz and Associates aimed to contribute to COP development at an international conference in Bangkok sponsored by the U.S. government. Fivaz, the former head of the South African police (SAP) Criminal Investi- gation Department (CID) and Mandela’s choice for transitional commissioner, was described as an international expert on COP with fellow board members consisting of old members of the apartheid SAP establishment (“Community Policing Institute,” 2002). Second, bilateral police exchanges—sometimes state sponsored sometimes not—convey the message. Foreign policy programs with wider concerns support COP schemes, often promoted through training schemes by Western host academies. For example, Fijian and Jamaican police officers attend COP courses at the British Bramshill Police College. Russian police officers undertake tuition at police academies in the United States. The St. Petersburg Academy draws on the Metropolitan Police’s expertise on COP. The Dutch police exchange COP experience on a routine basis with officers from Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic. Among many other ventures, staff members from Washington State Spokane Community Policing Institute cross the North Pacific to develop COP on Russia’s Sakhalin Island. The British police are aiming to develop COP in Bulgaria’s city of Plovdiv.4 The Toronto Police have been encouraging COP in Lithuania. The United States’ International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) has promoted COP as part of a larger police reform program in countries as diverse as Ghana, El Salvador, and Indonesia. Typically, the city of Novgorod is twinned with Rochester, New York, police. In a 2-year program, Rochester acted as COP host for Russian officers while sending COP trainers to the Russian city (variously offering a menu of neighborhood empowerment teams, crime stoppers, restorative justice, and a truancy program). Similarly, the Greenfield, Wisconsin, police are linked with Simferopol, encouraging community-based policing initiatives. In a separate program, Michigan State University is linked with L’viv, aiming to develop a community police center as a resource base in western Ukraine. The University of South Carolina hosted several senior Muscovite police for the same purpose. In the late 1990s, COP trainers

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(financed by the U.S. State Department) went to Poland to teach Polish police Chicago’s COP model: “Poland’s police force is a national force— one hundred thousand officers strong, and despite the differences, officials feel that what works in Chicago can work in Poland” (Chicago Police Department, 1999).5 Such COP exchanges, of course, are not limited to relationships between Western and failed and transitional societies. There are glossy accounts of intra-Western exchanges over COP. French police visiting their colleagues in Surrey reportedly commended the way that British communities are involved in the COP process through the neighborhood watch scheme (NWS) and community forums—unlike in France. Other French police officers hosted by the Kent police were apparently impressed by the fact that the Canterbury police “had an additional 35,000 pairs of keen Neigh- bourhood watch eyes and ears to alert them to anything untoward” (“Friends From France,” 2002, p. 2). Merseyside Police boast of the export potential for their neighborhood policing after a visit by two German community constables that included “the opportunity to go out on evening patrols with Huyton’s Neighbourhood team as they undertake a Knowsley- wide operation to tackle youth disorder on Mischief Night” (Merseyside Police, 2002). Well-intentioned NGOs promote COP internationally. The New York– based Vera Institute has a long, legitimate history in developing democratic policing and has been foremost in encouraging COP in transitional societies. COP elixirs have been adopted in human rights discourse—the answer to human rights problems in transitional society is invariably COP. Thus, a recent United Nations conference on human rights in southern Europe portrayed COP as the human rights response to the treatment of Roma minori- ties (e.g., Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 2002). An otherwise highly competent report on crime and the problems of policing transitional societies (International Council on Human Rights Policy, 2003) recommends New York–style COP as the solution for countries as varied as the Ukraine and Argentina. The University of Ottawa Human Rights Centre promotes COP as the antidote to the appalling level of police and civilian death rates in Sao Paulo. In Nigeria, a polyglot group of donors, including NGOs, encouraged COP. For example, in August 2001, the United States Agency for Interna- tional Development (USAID) commenced work with the British Depart- ment for International Development (DFID) to help develop COP and police reform. The South African NED Bank donated $25,000 to develop

Downloaded from http://pqx.sagepub.com at SAGE Publications on November 10, 2008 70 POLICE QUARTERLY (Vol. 8, No. 1, March 2005) that program. In Kenya, COP was launched with NGO assistance (including Vera), multinational and local business inputs, and professional contributions from the Ford Foundation to British police and academic staff members (Ruteere & Pommerolle, 2003) in liaison with the Nairobi Central Business District Association (NCBDA). This project was encouraged and supported by the NGO Saferworld in tandem with the Kenya Institute of Public Administration. Policing for profit is also a major contributor to the process—whether sold by local entrepreneurial agencies or by private corporations. David Brodie, of Brodie Consulting Services in Maryland, sells COP from Brazil to Hungary: “Reducing the level of crime will benefit the officer and the communities he or she serves by making communities more liveable. The solution to enhancing the communities and officers’ way of life is COP” (Chicago Police Department, 1999). A former Metropolitan Police officer and his partner established themselves as COP advisors in South Africa, on the basis of U.K. experience, before later locating themselves in Northern Ireland as experts on COP in South Africa! At a more commercial level, the American DynCorp, in an initiative that remains curious to many Europe- ans, includes COP in its CIVPOL mandate in the former Yugoslavia. Private companies sell and promote COP like they sell other goods. The international conglomerate ITT promotes a COP award to countries where the schemes are reportedly a success (sic!).6 Policing export and import occurs frequently within a commercial ideology in which, in South Africa and elsewhere, there is a “redesignation of the community as customers” (Oppler, 1997, p. 5). Finally, and critically, COP policing is being undertaken by international organizations such as the United Nations and the European Union. In part, this stems from these organizations’ wider remits—as with transnational cooperation under the umbrella of bodies such as Interpol, Europol, and CIVPOL. Functionally specific organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund increasingly require transitional societies to either develop or reform policing in a COP direction to receive economic assistance. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe undertakes many such ventures—for example, encouraging COP in Croatia by sending Croatian officers to observe COP in the Sussex force (Organiza- tion for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 2004). National policing may be determined by agencies over and beyond the nation-state. But, the key problem of such unilateral policing export is illustrated by local police officers in a central Asian republic. Generalized police

Downloaded from http://pqx.sagepub.com at SAGE Publications on November 10, 2008 Brogden / COMMUNITY POLICING 71 packages—from COP to antiterrorism priorities—often suit sellers rather than consumers. The Kyrgyz police are used to international organizations offering training, and there is a lot of cynicism toward such offers. One former senior policeman said,

International organisations love to do training in drug trafficking. . . . We don’t need training in drug trafficking. We need training in how to solve social conflicts. . . . Training is necessary ...butitmust be focused on the needs of the police and society, and not on the interest of the donors. (International Crisis Group, 2002)

As Beck (2002) commented,

The problem with many of these forms of assistance . . . (include) ...“Wehavethis available so you can have it.” Potential recipients with very few resources are highly unlikely to refuse any offer but there is a real danger with such an approach that the agenda for assistance is set more by what is available rather than by what is needed. (p. 237)

Dixon (1999) has described as a “criminal justice cringe” (p. 16) the assumption that transitional and failed societies, among others, should neces- sarily follow the Anglo-American path in terms of policing and wider criminal justice issues. The process has occurred irrespective of local needs. Fruhling (2002), commenting on South American police imports from the United States, has noted the major problems that occur when Western models of policing are superimposed on countries with quite different social, economic, and political realities. Whatever its actual content, the tripartite structures of NWS, community forums, and problem-solving policing— like many other policing strategies—are promoted irrespective of local exi- gencies and realities. The West determines the policing programs to be adopted.

THE GLOBALIZATION OF COP

As an export, COP has a unique appeal. It resonates as a value-free commodity, unencumbered by the trappings of economical and political interest. Otherwise critical commentators on policing reform by donor agencies suspend their faculties over COP. COP is portrayed as devoid of the kind of cultural impediments that characterize other policing models. For example, Call and Barnett (2001) acknowledged the dangers of trying to transplant a single model without attention to local traditions and circumstances. But,

Downloaded from http://pqx.sagepub.com at SAGE Publications on November 10, 2008 72 POLICE QUARTERLY (Vol. 8, No. 1, March 2005) they simultaneously view COP as sundered from such petty impediments. COP is an emblematic international creed. A globalization of elements of ill-considered COP is occurring (Bayley & Shearing, 2001) within the larger process of police export and import. For example, at an Abu Dhabi conference (February 19, 2000), experts from Arab countries, Singapore, Taiwan, France, Britain, the United States, and Canada recommended the implementation of COP within Sharia and local cultural values to reduce crime. Similarly, “Even South Africa and Brazil are amongst jurisdictions seeking Ontario Provincial Police expertise on community policing” (Community Policing Development Centre, 2001). A September 1999 seminar (Japan-Singapore Partnership Programme for the 21st Century, 2001) selling Singapore-style COP was attended by police officials from South Africa, Bangladesh, Brunei, China, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, the Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam. Senior officers such as Superintendent Roy Fleming of the former Royal Ulster Constabulary flit from advising on community police development between countries as far apart as Mongolia, Sri Lanka, and Macedonia. A retired London Metropolitan police officer talked of his mission to amelio- rate the conditions of the Roma people in Bulgaria through COP, embody- ing the real basis of the British bobby on the beat as the core of that project. Bulgarian officers came to London to observe the policing of Afro- Caribbean and Bangladeshi communities—apparently on the assumption that they were the nearest peoples that Britain could find to the Bulgarian Roma (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2003). In Nepal, a country with few telephones and a looming Maoist guerrilla war, the DFID, supported by agencies from Singapore and Japan, funds a policing solution with a detailed COP program including police community groups of public safety, community forums, lay visitors, and problem- solving policing under the guidance of a retired senior officer of the Metro- politan Police, as well as elements of the British Police and Criminal Evidence Act (see Males, Singh, & Shesrestha, 1999)! There are many idiosyncratic attempts to implant COP in apparently alien contexts. In the Indian province of Tamil Nadhu, Prateep (1996) has attempted to implant a variant of COP, the Friends of the Police concept, to “help to project the right image of police” (p. 1). Perhaps the most remarkable and pertinent example of this process has been the attempt by the Soros-funded Constitutional and Legal Policy Institute (Constitutional and Legal Policy Institute, 1999) to promote COP in Mongolia through the ex-

Downloaded from http://pqx.sagepub.com at SAGE Publications on November 10, 2008 Brogden / COMMUNITY POLICING 73 pertise of two senior Royal Ulster Constabulary officers. Support for police reform is a major program in the Constitutional and Legal Policy Institute’s work.

An encouraging example is the community policing project in Mongolia, which has already gained international recognition, and which has resulted in remarkable changes in the Mongolian Police department. It has led to a substantive change in rela- tion between the public and the police. Thanks to the new way of policing, the Mongo- lian police have achieved some remarkable successes in preventing and solving crime. (Constitutional and Legal Policy Institute, 1999)7

Simultaneously, the U.S. Justice Department’s Community Policing Con- sortium was attempting—in a series of seminars—to sell COP to the apparently barren COP field of northern Ireland! Remarkably, after a short period (according to COLPI), Mongolian COP had been an extraordinary success (judged on falling recorded crime rates). Similarly, in Rio de Janeiro where,

on average, seven civilians and two policemen are killed every week . . . one man is trying to change things . . . Major Antonio Carballo’s quest to introduce community policing in areas where he and his men must put their lives at risk every day. (LLoyd- Roberts, 2001)8

In that diffusion process,9 spurious claims are made about success elsewhere. For example, in Nairobi COP was sold by trainers from the U.K.’s National Police Training College who bizarrely claimed a major success in Belfast!

I was able to share my practical experience of consultation and partnership policing programmes in North Belfast. The students quickly discovered that even though Nai- robi and Belfast seem worlds apart, the problems facing the police and the community in both cities are very similar. . . . Belfast was written off as a no-hope scenario. But this really can work. (Turner, 2001)

Kenyan police officers and human rights activists have traveled to learn about COP from their compatriots in India and in South Africa who reportedly claim—despite substantial evidence to the contrary—COP successes. In El Salvador, a USAID-funded COP project was adopted nationwide in 2003. Similarly, the Washington Office on Latin America is promoting COP in Brazil and El Salvador (Neild, 2000). Sometimes, there is a reverse form of missionary work: “The cosy koban, Japan’s answer to community policing, may be small but its potential is

Downloaded from http://pqx.sagepub.com at SAGE Publications on November 10, 2008 74 POLICE QUARTERLY (Vol. 8, No. 1, March 2005) great—as America is discovering” (Aldous & Leishman, 1998, p. 115). The Milton Eisenhower Foundation promoted the development of the Japanese koban in the United States as early as 1988 with koban schemes established in Boston, Chicago, Memphis, Little Rock, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and San Juan. Individual policing entrepreneurs established those COP agencies after visits to Japan—for example in Columbia, South Carolina (“Fighting Crime,” 1999).

The koban idea slipped into America largely unnoticed in the 1990s along with a boatload of other Japanese imports. It was carried in by American police officials who had journeyed to Japan in search of some explanation for the island’s low crime rate (“Fighting Crime,” 1999, p. 24)10 and funded by the Eisenhower Foundation and Japanese corporations. But, generally, COP diffusion is a one-way process from Anglo-American societies to those countries deemed to have failed or to be in a process of transition—societies facing critical social and security problems.

COP IN AFRICA AND IN THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT

The attraction for the new policing at both the state and popular level is obvious. In the face of major internal security problems, the choices for failed11 and transitional societies are limited. Traditional deterrence approaches to crime have not worked. Imposing heavier sentences simply fills the jails to overcapacity. Existing paramilitary policing structures have little legitimacy and are often underpaid, corrupt, and grossly inefficient. The criminal justice system can do little more than furnish short-term relief through strategies of mass arrests, incarceration, and incapacitation. Ortho- dox crime prevention practices have been largely unsuccessful.

THE ARRIVAL OF COP IN AFRICA

In transitional and failed societies, as well as in the decaying urban metropolises of the West, COP is portrayed as the only alternative. COP has become the antidote to the most severe community ills. Where, as in several recent Africa studies (Hills, 1996, 2000), state policing is viewed as main- taining a narrowly conceived public order on behalf of dominant elites, a dramatic shift in police models is regarded as the only alternative. COP is popular by default. There appears to be no alternative for societies under popular and investment pressure. In its many forms, COP is the rubric for a

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Band-Aid plaster for local crime crises and for replacing corrupt paramilitary policing that appears to do more harm than good. Although, of course, “For some chief (police) officers, external assistance is simply a means of obtaining hardware, without serious attention to change the style of policing towards something more democratic and service oriented” (Clegg, Hunt, & Whetton, 2000, p. 12), COP was welcomed in Kenya, as elsewhere, as a solution to the increasing problem of crime and social disorder.

Ours is country ravaged by crime. The numerous victims of robberies, carjacking and other forms of violent crime in the towns and rural area will no doubt welcomea programme that provides a mechanism to deal with this menace. With Britain’s assistance, a new concept, a community policing and safety programme will be launched in Nairobi tomorrow. (Ruteere & Pommerolle, 2003)

Kenya seems to be heading along a path pioneered by South Africa. A detailed Habitat victim survey argued that crime in Nairobi would escalate if immediate remedial measures were not taken (UN-Habitat, 2001). Police incompetence (and consequent absence in public support) contributed to that failure—that euphemism for a politically directed, underpaid, and corrupt police institution. The COP missionaries followed as part of a larger crime prevention strategy (“Tourism Police,” 2004).12 In Nigeria, as elsewhere, local elites saw it as the obvious solution instead of makeshift policies that simply respond by enhancing police numbers and firepower (Alemika & Chukwuma, 2000). The Nigerian Centre for Law Enforcement Education promoted COP through community forums but against a calamitous backdrop where the state police have been used by the government to execute opponents, detain suspects without trial, and earn part of their wages from roadblocks. In Sierra Leone, with its civil war background, the police are paid a pit- tance and, hence, rely on checkpoint corruption and secondary occupations. The British advisor, Keith Biddle, described the condition of the police and of the police stations as appalling (Andersen, 2001). In Zambia, transition from socialism to capitalism created opportunities for serious violent crime—liberalizing the economy resulted in increased unemployment and casual opportunistic crime (Tembo, 2003). In both countries, COP was signaled as the answer. There are modernization claims for the development of COP. Other Nigerians (Igbinovia, 2001) assume that COP is a logical component of political and economic development. Nigeria should follow the lead of

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Britain —proposing a replication of the untried district police partnerships recommended by the Northern Ireland Patten Commission Report (Inde- pendent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland, 1999)—and expect appropriate technical and financial assistance, just as the francophone countries of Africa would inevitably follow a French policing tradition. COP for Nigeria was perceived as part of an inexorable process of modernization. Diffusion in Nigeria was based on training in the West, just as in Swaziland, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Zambia. However, even countries outside the British colonial orbit have developed COP schemes (e.g., Burkina Faso; Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers, 2002). As in the West, official discourse describes both the intent and the practice of COP in golden terms, especially structures such as neighborhood watch. In Kenya, as elsewhere, NWS were described as having had a major impact on crime in Britain (Turner, 2001). From Tanzania to Malawi, Gam- bia to Zambia, official rhetoric has disguised the realities and confusions of the new strategy. Among many other national examples, Namibia adopted COP as part of its policing policy at independence in 1990. Police forums were encouraged in many areas to share information and to discuss policing matters, and a Windhoek NWS was established to promote dialogue between officers and the members of the community (Namibia Institute for Democracy, 1995). In Lesotho, the government developed a COP package as a means of improving relations between the police and the community. Zimbabwe (formally, at least) has community liaison officers (CLOs) at each police station. The British have sponsored COP in Malawi since 1995 (with later inputs from South Africa) as the basis for other police reforms. New crime prevention panels are portrayed as the reinstatement of traditional peacekeeping structures destroyed under British colonialism and by the former President Banda. Malawi has prioritized lay visitor schemes and an independent police complaints commission. Donor cash has paid for bicycles and whistles for the new community constables (Wood, 2000).13 In Ghana, an ICITAP initiated COP in 1998. It focused on COP to promote crime prevention partnerships between the police and the public, improve the police academy (incorporating community police training), and enhance the public’s opinion of the Ghana Police Service (U.S. Department of Justice, 2003). In Sierra Leone, COP (known as local needs policing) was launched with the support of the DFID in 1998 (“Editorial,” 2001). Under a police corporate development plan in Botswana, COP was introduced in the year 2000. Plans included the establishment of a toll-free telephone number to facilitate the reporting of rape and violent crimes against women and the

Downloaded from http://pqx.sagepub.com at SAGE Publications on November 10, 2008 Brogden / COMMUNITY POLICING 77 development of NWS and business and farm crime prevention schemes (Botswana Police Service, n.d.). Tanzanian contributions to COP appear to have been limited to the development of the new Dar es Salaam City Auxiliary Police Force in 2002. COP has been largely introduced as an antidote to crime problems together with a fatalistic view that the history requires an inexorable path of police reform. But it is often difficult to relate the official intentions of many of these schemes to their practical reality.

COP IN PRACTICE IN AFRICA

In the English parts of Africa, there are many examples of the import and application of key elements of COP. Kenya provides a glaring example of the misuse of COP. It is also a context in which we have access to a rare academic study of its impact. In that country, local reaction to COP has hardly been uncritical (Ruteere & Pommerolle, 2003). Little preparatory adminis- trative and financial planning had occurred, “nor has the force proved thatit is not merely copycatting forms of policing practiced elsewhere. The information about COP success in the West has been distorted” (“Community Police on Trial,” 2001, p. 3). Nairobi women’s groups claimed that all COP may mean is simply the harassment of women falsely accused of loitering with intent to solicit (Ruteere & Pommerolle, 2003). A squatters’ leader argued that COP practice entailed the control of

refugee and migrant communities who are required to carry identity papers at all times because of harassment. Currently this could be a poisonous situation—giving the impression that the city should be reserved for the privileged. Police have been en- ticed to work for a few rich people. (“Community Police on Trial,” 2001, p. 3)

His organization had charted COP-based harassment of ordinary citizens in town after dark. The Kenyan police replied, “When people look suspicious, the police have a duty to stop them and ask them to identify themselves. They have a duty to answer” (“Community Police on Trial,” 2001, p. 4). In a criticism that runs to the core of the COP debate, one local commentator stated that the real need for COP security practices was in squatter areas rather than for the privileged (Brogden, 2004). The Nairobi Kenyan police unilaterally decided to introduce COP with limited discussion with the marginalized communities that now expected to cooperate with the state police: “Thus far, the NCBDA-police community policing project seems to have had a smooth ride. This is understandable, given the shared interests of

Downloaded from http://pqx.sagepub.com at SAGE Publications on November 10, 2008 78 POLICE QUARTERLY (Vol. 8, No. 1, March 2005) the association with the police” (Ruteere & Pommerolle, 2003, p. 11). Mar- ginal groups, from small business to taxi drivers to street hawkers, were not considered to be part of the communities with whom the police should interact and engage. Elsewhere in Kenya, Ruteere and Pommerolle (2003) noted other partisan practice under the COP umbrella. In Zambia, the NWS system appears to have largely disintegrated. Although some official commentators had viewed COP elements as a positive contribution to crime reduction, others described it as mob justice. In an effort to develop community relations, the Zambian police had established mini–police posts. However, some of these posts later featured human rights abuses by police officers—they were often manned by junior police (many recorded as inebriated) who maltreated civilians. Accountability and oversight were minimal. Wealthy suburbs are the sole location of the renaming NWS and of COP night patrols (Siyauya, 2002). Organizational resistance to COP, reflecting the impossibility of reform- ing policing when officers are grossly underpaid as well as undertrained, is reported in several countries. For example, in Uganda, a female CLO claimed,

Some colleagues of ours are not supportive and not interested in community policing because it is assisting the public to become aware of the law and their rights. Some do not wish the public to know about community policing issues such as bond and bail. They say community policing is spoiling our things. (Raleigh et al., 2000, p. 87)

She noted pressure from her colleagues not to “take the food from their mouths by informing the public of their rights to release on bond” (Raleigh et al., 2000, p. 86). In Malawi, it appears that COP consolidation has been largely reserved for prosperous communities. In one case, a local newspaper claimed that police had misappropriated money given by a local Asian community to introduce COP in Limbe. Although versions of COP have been around from 1995, the organizational structure of the Malawi police was a major impedi- ment, as were other factors—arms smuggling across the Mozambique bor- der, poorly paid police living in squalid conditions, and a legacy of distrust from local communities. Private security has proliferated because of a lack of police strength and resources. COP has been promoted in rural areas by a variety of imaginative devices, but the result has been a resurrection of traditional village policing styles under COP rubric. In Swaziland, community police have been criticized for treating suspects brutally. The unit’s status, mandate, and powers are unclear, and they

Downloaded from http://pqx.sagepub.com at SAGE Publications on November 10, 2008 Brogden / COMMUNITY POLICING 79 do not appear to have received any proper training. In Namibia, the community forums were jettisoned in 1996 because of flagging public interest. There is one rare evaluation study of COP in a former British colony in Africa (Raleigh et al., 2000). COP was initially introduced in Uganda in 1989. An existing British training mission became the core of the project. They introduced the idea of sensitizing the public to policing. Local community police officers were appointed and provided with bicycles to enable them to mobilize the community, operating as beat officers to interact with the public and to discuss with them issues related to crime, security, and welfare. This initiative faltered when the divisional head was transferred. In turn, this project was replaced with a larger British commitment when Uganda was emerging from the troubles of the Idi Amin years. During the first phase, “community policing was pursued by the UPF [Uganda police force] on its own initiative in two or three districts of Kampala but this faltered after only a few months” (Raleigh et al., 2000, p. 38). But all this had been conducted “in an uncoordinated fashion largely responding to the needs of an institution in a state of collapse following the troubles of the l970s and 1980s” (Raleigh et al., 2000, p. 20). In the Ugan- dan press, the police were widely portrayed as corrupt, inefficient, and bru- tal. It was also a dangerous occupation—in 1999, 307 police officers were killed (Muhanga, 2004). Against a background of corruption by senior officers and in the CID, bizarre attempts were made to improve police community relations.14 The new COP project emphasized its function as one of introducing COP and other policing elements to ensure the social stability necessary for external investment. The key Ugandan officers on the new project had been trained in COP in the United Kingdom and believed those practices could readily be applied to Uganda.15 The new development was the institutionalization of COP within the UPF by means of a national system of CLOs. The initial mandate was optimistic:

The social impact will come from the improved public confidence in the police; the greater incidence of crime prevention and detection resulting from a more efficient force and partly from the planning, expansion, and improvement of community policing schemes; and the improved capacity for economic and social development. (Raleigh et al., 2000, p. 38)

The UPF saw COP as a promising way to bridge the gap between itself and the public and to establish a new approach to policing based on mutual trust and cooperation, but no direct resources were committed.

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DFID’s subsequent report was blunt: “It seems doubtful if Community Policing, as currently practiced, has yet led to any substantive change in the public image of the UPF” (Raleigh et al., 2000, p. 39). The report cited serious criticisms of the rural COP project. The CLOs had no transport. It was wrong to couple the development of a criminal intelligence system in tandem with COP.In a traditional critique of many such COP projects, the UPF tended to regard COP primarily as a means of instructing local populations rather than listening to them—in effect, failing at intelligence gathering while doing little to mitigate its authoritarian image. The UPF saw members of the public’s role exclusively in terms of the help they could provide in the prevention of crime: “The focus has been on sensitising the public on their role and what they can do to contain crime. There has been much less emphasis on listening to public priorities and concerns (p. 39). Urban COP requirements were quite different from those of the rural areas. But, the same model was adopted in both contexts. COP in Kampala, with easily patrolled beats and a dense concentration of people (DFID noted the absurdity of community-friendly officers carrying AK-47s), required very different processes from COP in the scarcely populated rural areas of the northern and southern regions. Like criticisms of other COP projects, the DFID report noted the contradictions faced by a COP process that aimed to use a crime clear-up rate as an index of success. Inevitably, the recorded crime rate also increased. There was a deep contradiction between the functions of COP as perceived by the seconded staff from England and the local communities. The first saw COP as being crime focused whereas the second perceived its function as enhancing the image of the UPF. An earlier evaluation had simply relied on the crime clear-up rate as an index of success for the project, a criterion that failed to reflect the whole range of COP activities and which was, in itself, fallible. Resources both material and with regard to salaries completely under- mined any individual motivation (e.g., the local CLOs were not selected on the basis of training or commitment). Police salaries were very low and often late in arriving. Officers could not survive on their pay and, hence, relied on bribes. Police housing was described as appalling with one room often being shared with other officers’ families. Pensions were low and often paid 2 or 3 months in arrears. So, it is hardly surprising if many feel that they “must make their pension while they are at the desk” (Raleigh et al., 2000, p. 105). Indeed, after the first injection of funds from Britain, there had been no finance directed at sustaining COP.

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A military structure of control was maintained with little local discretion. District COP priorities were centrally directed from police headquarters. There was no local community consultation. Finally, DFID pointed to the major issue undermining this and other exported COP projects. Quite insuf- ficient thought had been given to the relevance of the U.K. model of COP to Ugandan circumstances:

Little consideration seems to have been given to differing community needs and priorities or to local conditions, customs and traditions. This was true both between Brit- ain and Uganda and also within Uganda itself. Training for the different local conditions and values seems to have been simply based on British determination of what was appropriate. (Raleigh et al., 2000, p. 54)

The evaluators of the Uganda project completed their absolute critique of COP in Uganda with mild irony:

Whether the concept of community policing fostered by the project will take root in a way that genuinely enhances public perceptions of the role of the police remains for us an open question. Indeed the obstacles to a full realisation of the benefits of community policing in Uganda remain formidable. In discussion with police and non- police sources alike we found clear signs that the police regard community policing primarily as a means of instructing local populations, rather than of listening to them. They thus learn less than they might while doing little to mitigate their authoritarian image. (Raleigh et al., 2000, p. 17).

Although COP might be popular in local rhetoric, delivery of it had little actual substance.16 Nevertheless, COP policing is still fashionable in official discourse in Uganda (Mendy, 2003). The almost total failure of COP in South Africa has now been adequately documented (see Brogden, 2003; Pelser, Schnetler, & Louw, 1999; Scharf, 2000).17 Overtaken by a vox pop demand for instant solutions to counter the society’s perceived rising crime rate, the community enthusiasm and radical logic for community control of the police at the end of apartheid has largely disappeared. All that remains are a range of COP forums in prosperous White areas and rhetorical discourse within some Black townships. The forums seem to have simply reinforced schism rather than harmony (Scharf, 2000). The story of COP in South Africa is one of dramatic, well-funded failure. What the African experience suggests is that although donor countries may direct their resources in developing policing in a transitional society, the preference is clearly for COP. COP is both a Band-Aid for transitional

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IMPORTING COP TO SOUTH ASIA

Finally, there is almost identical evidence from the Indian on the failure to learn the lessons from the legal reform movement—to recognize the local context of COP and the legitimacy of local practices. In South Asia, generally—especially in the former colonies and imperial territories—the community-oriented policing system is patchily becoming the alternative to the paramilitary inheritance of the former British colonial police. The latter is repeatedly noted in local commentaries as the scapegoat for the need to change to COP. As a response to rising, recorded crime rates, one late- colonial policing system is rapidly being replaced with versions of a second. Local elites, supported by key politicians and police officers trained in the West, portray COP as a response to the crime problem. In Faisalabad, Pakistan (“New System,” 2001), as in Uttar Pradesh, the (new) system would help bridge the gap between the police and the public as a major break from the British colonial inheritance of paramilitary policing (UP Police, 2000). Failures in crime control determined the new dawn of COP in the subcontinent:

The police system is based upon antiquated systems and ideas of crime control, and has neglected the opportunities of systematic methods and technologies of crime analysis, of scientific investigation and documentation, of information processing, and of law and order mapping, projection and prediction. The sheer gap between con- temporary policing practices in the West and those that prevail in India is astonishing. Primitive policing practices are reflected in poor rates of conviction, in deteriorating efficiency and effectiveness, and consequently in a declining respect for the law. (Sharma, 2001b, p. 3)

Initial, official discourse and optimism reflected that of African societies with regard to the onset of COP. The official discourse was fulsome. In Chennai, crime prevention through community problem solving rather than through traditional reactive policing was to be the new solution. According to the chief minister, COP would

indeed be a pleasurable experience. Imagine yourself being received by smiling plainclothes police personnel who will be manning the reception desk. No unneces- sary talk or pleading with the “para” constable holding the 303 rifle in front of the sta-

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tion. Hard to believe. But that’s just what the city police are planning as part of an am- bitious community policing scheme. (Sharma, 2001a, p. 5)

Citizens were to become consumers—telephone numbers of officials to be contacted in case of complaints against the police were to be displayed prominently at police stations. Visitors to the police commissioner’s office were to be received by reception officials. Grievances would be addressed speedily. Station-house officers had been directed to interact with the office- bearers of residents associations and enlist their cooperation in crime control. Community problem-solving contacts would be enhanced. Similarly, in Delhi

the officers who attended the workshop will now be referred to as “agents of change” as they have been entrusted with the job of improving the day-to-day functioning of the police. The stress would be on informing and educating the public about crime, its causes and effects within society. It would also seek to mobilise individuals, families and various sections of the community—grassroots organisations, public and private bodies and other government agencies—in crime elimination, prevention and control— getting the community involved in self-policing, reducing petty crimes and disorder, and Community (forums) Liaisoning Groups formed, which will function in this area. (Sharma, 2001a, p. 5)

As elsewhere, British policing missionaries were critical to the process. Among many other examples of British commitment to COP in India, a chief superintendent from the West Midlands Police lectured in the Punjab on the benefits of community police structures such as the Community Safety Bureau (“MoU on Community Policing,” 2001). British provincial forces have played a similar role, with the South Yorkshire Police sending a group of its officers to Delhi in March 2002 to, inter alia, persuade their In- dian colleagues of the benefits of COP. COP in India also has international commercial sponsors—for example, a police department in Tamil Nadhu recently won ITT’s Night Vision Community Policing Award. The British Council organized seminars on COP for police officers in Calcutta and Chennai. The director general of the Punjab Police Service inaugurated a social orientation program on COP with the primary function of dealing with the increasing crime threat. In Uttar Pradesh, the provincial government announced it was adopting a COP system drawing on the practices in Singapore and Japan (while recognizing problems of local adaptation). A team of officials had visited Singapore and Japan.18 A Sri Lankan account provides both the critique of the failure of the colonial policing past along with an antidote based on the mythology of the

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Tythingman (Brogden, 1998) and conveys the British myth of policing by consent. But, “they never were citizens in uniform under community control as they were in Britain proper” (Wickremasuriya, 1997, p. 6). Similar myths about the nature of policing in the West are replicated elsewhere in the subcontinent in the greetings given to COP.19 In Delhi, the new director general of police welcomed the development of COP to replace the old paramilitary style: “It is time to police by consent rather than police by coer- cion” (“Community Policing in Delhi,” 2003, p. 3). In Uttar Pradesh, the senior police officer (recently returned from British COP training) stated,

The police have tried many methods at solving crime. The vital thing lacking is the community’s support . . . with the community’s help, desirable results can be obtained in solving crime. The concept of people’s policing is based on the British view “Every policeman is a citizen and every citizen is a policeman.” (“Community Policing in Delhi,” 2003, p. 3)

The British citizen-in-uniform myth is a common theme as repeated by an innovating detective inspector in Himachal Pradesh when launching a COP scheme: “The schema was based on the concept that every policeman was a citizen and every citizen was a policeman without a uniform” (“HP to Com- puterise Police Stations,” 2002, p. 2), a view that completely ignored the lack of common-law powers of arrest and prosecution in India. Not all senior Indian police officers subscribed to this COP legitimating legend. One senior officer in Orissa—where the rural constable beat system was based on its British precedent—noted the lack of common-law powers of the beat constable in India (as compared with Britain.) Community consultation and problem solving were to be the cornerstones of the new policing. Well- meaning injunctions are combined with a spurious claim to a British golden experience. Occasionally, caveats are attached. In Kerala, “community policing has proved a success in the U.S., Britain and Japan. But in these countries, the police are not politicised. But in our country they are. To forget this crucial difference while implementing the scheme will be foolhardy” (“In the Morgue,” 2000, p. 2). In Kerala, the provincial government had argued that community support for the police was possible because of the high rate of literacy, greater social mobility, high degrees of urbanization, and increased level of transportation and communication. But, there were local criticisms that challenged the rul- ing communist party’s claim that it would simply and desirably replicate the COP schemes in the West: “The scheme will follow the high techniques of the Guardian Angels, the Portland burglary prevention programme, the Se-

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In a country like the United States, the police force is a highly professional and competent body and the people are law-abiding and socially conscious. That is why the neighbourhood watch scheme is a success in the U.S. [sic!].20 People in a state like Kerala do not have much regard and respect for law. (“In the Morgue,” 2000, p. 2)

Two features dominate Indian (and, for that matter, Pakistani and Bangladeshi) provincial reaction to COP. Crime control is, of course, the raison d’etre. But, more important, COP may sometimes be adapted through the development of police-community relations schemes within traditional structures. Sometimes, however, these adaptations are more genuine than others. In Andhra Pradesh, the community police forums (CPFs) are incorporated within traditional Maithri committees consisting of 50 to 100 people nominated by the local station officer. In Pakistan, senior officers proposed to incorporate the mohallah chowkida system in Karachi as part of the COP system (“Karachi,” 2000). Orissa proposed a more specific and directed use of such forums: “A committee would be set up in each village and during violent incidents, police would consult the committee to nab culprits and restore normalcy in the area” (“Orissa to Develop,” 1999). The Himachal Pradesh authorities had no doubt about the functions and proceedings of such forums (“Community Policing to Begin,” 2001). The schisms noted in Nairobi would be repeated with local notables and the police controlling the community forums of

six respectable, non-political persons, and two police officers [with a police officer as Secretary].21 The [policeman acting as secretary] would be the key person in effect and would move around the sector at least one in three days and also organise night patrolling by the residents. He would win over the confidence of the residents by actively participating in social functions and make it a point to attend funeral ceremonies in the sector. He would maintain the record of each household in the sector and register all complaints received by him in writing—he would also maintain a beat patrol book of useful information in the area. The people’s committee would collect information about illicit distilling, bootlegging, drug trafficking, criminal elements, accident- prone spots, assist the police in night patrolling, verification of antecedents, arranging watch over the house of residents who have gone out, and check on suspicious persons moving around the area. (New Initiatives of Himachal Police, n.d.)

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In Bangalore, one commentator expressed appropriate skepticism:

The manner in which members of the neighborhood watch committees have been selected and the behaviour of some of them have raised questions about the success of community policing [especially] the lack of interest shown by the jurisdictional police in enlisting the support of the people to these committees. (“Community Policing Leaves Much,” 2001, para. 1)

In Chennai, in the case noted above, there was little public interest in the new schemes. Most projects had allegedly failed because of lack of public participation. Many of the new CLOs had complaints pending against them. In all such cases, the use of CPFs was simply to serve as an adjunct to traditional police goals and had little in common with the critical lessons learned in the West about community involvement. In Delhi, for example, the Nai- robi pattern was again followed, making the forums simply an adjunct of central business interests:

The Inspector General said the experiment in community policing is being run successfully with the cooperation of the Defence Resident’s Society, Delhi Mercantile Society, Chamber of Commerce and Industries, and other business communities and the problems are being resolved expeditiously. (“Community Forums Initiated,” 2001, p. 6)

In Surat, a city with a large migrant population (“dangerous classes!”), a friends of the police forum was expected to keep a watch on its neighborhood and keep the police informed about groups and individual needs in their areas.22,23 In Hyderabad, under the COP umbrella, village defense par- ties (Samitees) were formed to patrol, evict encroachers from pavements, and conduct house-to-house surveys of tenants in the detection of crime. Community liaison groups (CLGs) were formed of eminent and nonpoliti- cal persons. Inevitably, the CLGs came to regard their primary function as correcting what they saw as a misrepresentation of policing in the local press rather than overseeing the police on behalf of the community (“Police Form Community Liaison Groups,” 2000). Criticisms of the Western (and Japanese imports) have not been lacking. One sardonic senior police officer noted of the Kerala scheme that the provincial government derived inspiration from the success of the NWS schemes in the United States, but it failed to learn from its neighbors like Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, and Uttar Pradesh (“In the Morgue,” 2000, p. 2).

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The United Nations Development Programme has promoted COP in Delhi:24

A new community policing model will be introduced to the Delhi police which will aim at bring[ing] the police closer to the common man (despite the fact that previ- ous initiative in developing police community liaison schemes have now become defunct—partly because they did not allow for a turnover in citizen members). (Sharma, 2001b, p. 3)

The Times of India commented on the practice of imports and the experience of those imported schemes:

The Delhi Police’s favourite pastime seems to be Community Policing, at least if you go by the number of schemes that have been launched in the past. Some ten community schemes aimed at improving interaction between the police and citizens had been initiated over the past two decades.25 (Sharma, 2001b, p. 2)

A retired senior officer dryly commented that there was little purpose in the international contact given the contrasting literacy level and disciplinary structures of the different societies. Other schemes launched by the Delhi police in the past years “have failed miserably” (Sharma, 2001b, p. 2). “Most schemes appeared to be good on paper but could not be implemented with much success” (Sharma, 2001b). Other spokesmen agreed, adding “whether it was the ‘neighbourhood watch scheme’ or the ‘senior citizens scheme’ or even the highly publicised ‘servant verification scheme,’ Delhiites have never benefited” (Sharma, 2001b, p. 3). Hardly unique to India, many such senior police officers have been skep- tical about the importation of COP. In Uttar Pradesh, senior officers regarded COP as irrelevant to the Indian context—Indian society was much different and the rate of literacy lower. The criticisms of COP proposals in Pakistan were identical to those by informed observers and police officers in India, although often for more conservative reasons. COP was perceived as an infringement and interference in the domain of policing. Senior officers argued that the existing unpopular image of the police was a major and probably insurmountable handicap:

Any genuine attempts in this regard would be seen as a new method of spying in a particular community, and that the quality of existing officers was so low and their expo- sure to police culture so great that they could not conduct the . . . sensitive and socially responsible tasks required by community-oriented policing. (“Karachi,” 2000)

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In the Indian subcontinent, official euphoria welcomed COP.British support in particular—often repetitively—encouraged the myths of policing in Britain. But, in practice, there seems to have been no more success for COP than in Africa.

DISCUSSION: WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

The lesson from the law and development movement was that local legal structure must take into account indigenous practices and forms of legitimacy, no matter how repugnant to liberal Western jurists. You cannot impose a Western legal ideology and structure in a context that perceives that import as simply reinforcing the rule of neocolonial elites irrespective of present local failings. The COP movement—to use that terminology— has largely not yet woken up to that simple lesson from development theory. Whatever the existing problem of crime, disorder, and police malpractice, implanting COP and ignoring present state-police illegitimacies will compound the problem. In considering the implications of these varying critiques, we need to be careful. On one hand, there are organizational explanations of the failures— mainly in terms of the mode of implementation (as in much of the DFID report on Uganda). The implication of those aberrational criticisms is that COP will work only if the correct procedures and resources are ensured. Conventionally, such an approach is characterized by the caveat for continuing evaluations. Effective monitoring and guidance, given appropriate resources, will produce good COP. But, it is important to note that the failings of NWS, community forums, and problem-solving in Western societies are not news to those who have read the research in the West. What is curious is that the evidence of such COP failings has not been conveyed in the sales literature to the recipient countries! The core argument in this article, however, is that the problem is systemic. Whatever the many problems of COP in its countries of origins (the dictate is clear—small, White, wealthy, homogeneous communities with little crime), it is clearly better than a coercive, violent, nonaccountable, paramilitary police. The question is, how much better? The answer in Afri- can and Asian destinations where elements of COP have been transplanted is not very much. COP, as designed in the West, is simply largely irrelevant to most African societies, not simply a product of ineffective implementation.

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The systemic criticisms of the export of COP are clear. The three primary components of COP in the West that are most evident in the export drive— community forums, neighborhood watch schemes, and problem-solving policing—have not worked anything like as successfully as appears in the international sales literature. In particular, where such schemes have been established by the police and by local business elites in Africa and in the India subcontinent they have simply exacerbated social schisms. For the most part, COP materials are shoddy goods with few health warnings attached. Dishonesty is evident in the selling of COP to Africa and to the Indian subcontinent. Second, those charged with that export process have repeatedly failed to take account of the local context. In that failure, the policing missionaries and their state and NGO paymasters have invariably failed to tailor the schemes to the particular needs of African and Asian localities and have been abetted by the exhortations of local politicians des- perate for a solution to rising crime and local police officers recently returned from secondments to Western training establishments. In practice, of course (in several African domains), local officials and representatives have rightly sought to take COP away from the official police and to make it a citizen affair by enlisting local communities under guidelines of varying worth to develop crime control in their own areas. For example, in Swaziland the term community policing has been used since the mid-1990s to describe civilians who undertake certain duties in policing local crime. They are linked to the regular Swami police through crime prevention officers stationed at both headquarters and the regional level. In Zambia, under the Police Act 1999, which established COP in law, any community may establish a crime prevention and control association with the power to arrest suspects. In Lesotho, civilian members of community police councils are allowed to do some policing work, including making arrests. A similar pilot scheme was developed in Mozambique: At the end of 2001, a residents group was given powers to arrest under the aegis of a neighborhood council (itself based on the civil war structure inherited from the Front for Liberation of Mozambique). But, these are local exceptions and often subject to major problems of accountability. Criticisms are very easy for the uninvolved. It may be as Amnesty Inter- national (2002) reported (its substantive evidence is sparse), that there has been some praise for these experiments. In South Africa, Malawi, and Bot- swana they have apparently successfully demonstrated that local communities and police can cooperate in developing and implementing crime reduc-

Downloaded from http://pqx.sagepub.com at SAGE Publications on November 10, 2008 90 POLICE QUARTERLY (Vol. 8, No. 1, March 2005) tion services for victims of crime, particularly rape and domestic violence. One interesting, radical view makes a significant point:

The poorest communities are unable to play a significant part in community policing, unless major efforts are made to provide them with the basic necessities of survival and development. This, of course, is a task involving many agencies of government as well as NGOs, rather than police. Community policing reform is not an independent variable but must be located within a wider mesh of social and political change supported by the sponsoring states, with regard to the elimination of social inequalities. (Clegg et al., 2000, p. 9)26

The thin blue line thesis was always nonsense! Cain (2000), reflecting on her own initial criticism of the implantation of COP in Trinidad and Tobago, argued that Western critics may simply fail to recognize how, in practice, notions of community may have a different meaning in other countries. Where communities have never before been given some accountability powers for the state police, such developments must be positive (Sita, Kibuka, & Ssamula, 2002). In Cain’s Trinidad study, most of the Western-initiated NWS soon disappeared from official (and police) view; but, many of them remained relatively intact. The crucial difference from their early stages was now they had assumed many other community functions, and crime control was only a marginal activity. Further- more, in African cities such as Dar es Salaam, informal structures of neighborhood watch may develop and be regarded as effective, independently of state police participation (Robertshaw, Louw, & Mtani, 2001). In practice, COP, whatever the local official discourse, may be translated and adapted within local traditional structures. If different foci and different measures of success are used to those that have been utilized in the West, COP can work. COP practices have largely perceived policing as the state police’s business. They have frequently ignored, discredited, or denounced policing by local communities when it did not occur under the formal control of the state policing agency. Despite the importance of traditional structures in such societies, there are good reasons for this delegitimation of nonaccountable, local, self-policing agencies. Lack of legal status and absence of accountability are good reasons for denying a measure of legal pluralism. But, to criticize such indigenous practices as nonaccountable is to assume that the state police agency is itself accountable and legally bound. Ruteere and Pommerolle (2003) phrased it in this way:

Vigilantism and the so-called Jeshi (private militia often bankrolled by political fig- ures) have been condemned for working outside of the legal framework and employ-

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ing senseless violence. ...Ontheother hand, government responses, especially to violent crime, have involved the use of special squads with the sole aim of killing off suspects rather than investigating and preventing crime. This has often left a trail of deaths, often of innocent people . . . destroying the little remaining public trust in the police force. (p. 17)

Arguing that COP in its very broadest sense would be under the final control of the state police in such societies is a little like the pot calling the kettle black. There are several—although again from qualified popular and/or official sources—accounts that suggest that a rather different style of COP can work well when such issues of the legal status and of accountability of the informal policing structures are not confronted directly. The U.K. Carib- bean Regional Police Administrator Paul Matthias conducted a more limited COP evaluation in Guyana. Although recognizing accountability and legal status problems of self-policing, Matthias claimed that in Guyana

the longevity of the community policing schemes, the clear ownership by the communities of these schemes, as well as the leadership and drive by individuals, contra- dicted the research findings on community policing schemes in Europe and in the United States. (“Community Policing a Real Success Story,” 2001, p. 1)

Community ownership, not state—central or local state—policing control, appeared to be the primary criterion for success. There is also a limited DFID report from Malawi that suggested a similar conclusion:

In both urban and rural areas the poor rely on the state police for security and are bene- fiting from the fact that the MPS and its community policing strategy is utilising and organising traditional and customary structures to establish local systems of security and crime prevention.27 (Raleigh et al., 2000, p. 7)

In both Indian subcontinent and English-speaking Africa (with all the caveats because of such data sources), the only schemes that appear to have been greeted with a measure of sustained popular support are those that have not been limited by such contrivances.28 But, the key lesson is one we argued for in our text on the late SAP a decade ago (Brogden & Shearing, 1993). Something has to be done in the face of major problems of social disorder and criminality. Barring changes to the major structural and economic factors, which give rise to those conditions, there has to be a policing contribution. But, the key requirement must be that the initiative is local in character. It must draw on local experiences

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NOTES

1. The thin blue line denotes the final barrier that stands between our citizens and chaos (http://www.thinblueline.org). 2. This article is primarily concerned with community policing (COP) in the transitional societies of Africa and Asia, not the so-called failed societies of the former Soviet Union. However, a note on the latter is pertinent. The major effort to implant COP in the later context was that of the Chicago Police and its associates with regard to Poland. Despite major investment and commitment by many individuals and organizations, the final report on the project concluded, “In January 2003, The Polish National Police decided to revert to its centralised structure and abandon many of the concepts identified in this report, concepts that were orig- inally based on the ideas of Community-Oriented Policing” (Haberfeld, Walancik, Uydess, & Bartels, 2003, p. 192). 3. It is not possible here to characterize all the different tactics that use the COP rubric, but they can vary between the extremes of the instant arrest of petty vagrants to campaigns on behalf of the homeless (e.g., Heymann, 2000). 4. British-Bulgarian policing projects seem to have an infinite trajectory (e.g., Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2000). 5. For the first major evaluation of such a development in a failed society, the Chicago Police–sponsored development of COP in Poland, see Haberfeld et al. (2003). 6. The Soros Institute, which financed a COP initiative in Mongolia, claimed a success for the project within 12 months. That claim is very curious (see Center for International Legal Cooperation, 2002). 7. It is clearly difficult to assess claims such as this from the Constitutional and Legal Policy Institute. But, no matter what the reputation of the Institute behind them, they lend themselves to a high degree of incredulity. How does a brief visit by a few nonspecialist Royal Ulster Constabulary officers almost spontaneously transform the Soviet-inherited Mongolian police? O. Marenin (personal communication, October 3, 2004) made the important point that this evaluation, like many more local COP evaluations, was an evaluation of a process rather than of a result. 8. “Major Carballo wants to introduce the bobby on the beat—community policing—to Rio de Janeiro” (LLoyd-Roberts, 2001). 9. Eric Monkkonen’s (1981) Weberian account of police diffusion did not, of course, recognize that such diffusions may stem from other sources than the London Metropolitan Police.

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10. The quote is from a Maryland police chief. 11. Although this article is not centrally concerned with failed societies, the most detailed account of the situation in one such country that initially welcomed COP is furnished in Haberfeld et al. (2003). 12. See Integrated Regional Information Networks (2002) for the most recent critical views on community policing in Nairobi. 13. However, an Amnesty International (2002) report noted that neither community police forums (CPFs) nor the lay visitor procedures had a legal basis and were simply based on police determination. 14. Harmony Cares, a nongovernmental organization offering counseling services, organized a community appreciation function for the Uganda police force in March 2003. 15. The Department for International Development (DFID) report complained that their specialist knowledge was in fact rarely utilized in Uganda. 16. DFID concluded, remarkably, by suggesting that the Ugandans might learn from the experience of the Western Cape in South Africa (Raleigh, Biddle, Male, & Neema, 2000)! 17. It is noteworthy that South Africa appears to have had substantially more influence, as a recipient, over policing strategies encouraged by donors than have other transitional countries (see van der Spuy, Geerlings, & Singh, 1998). 18. It is important to recognize the Singapore neighborhood police posts and Japanese koban influence in South Asia from Goa to Nepal. 19. The myth of the British bobby appears everywhere from Madhya Pradesh to the favelas of Rio de Janeiro as the basis of COP (e.g., see the critical report from LLoyd- Roberts, 2001). The bobby myth is almost as common as the notion that Sir Robert Peel founded community policing, and such an account even appeared in Kyrgyzstan. These COP myths and others are discussed in Brogden (2004). 20. Including, of course—as an indication of such a law-abiding society—one of the highest imprisonment rates in the world. 21. Similar police control of appointees to CPFs is noted in many other countries from the United Arab Emirates to Thailand to Bangalore. 22. The subsequent massacres of migrant Muslim workers in 2002 appear to have been led by those same community-friendly officers. 23. Across in Dubai, as elsewhere, community forums were organized by the police, not by citizen groups: “The superintendents of the police stations, who will head the councils, would choose members of the public for each of the eight police stations” (“Developments in Police-Community Relations,” 1999, p. 5). 24. A curious footnote in history is that Delhi appears to have had a local system of COP some time before the arrival of the COP (and koban) imports. According to the training commissioner of the Delhi Police in 1981, “I created 126 beats, each of which had a box. It was more than a mere grievance address system, it was more of a minor police station where people could go with their complaints and get heard by the beat constable at fixed hours” (Bhanagar, 2001, p. 2). 25. Among several such examples, similar comments are noted by local commentators on the continuing reintroduction of COP in Taipei, Delhi, and Dhaka. 26. Contrast this thesis with the example from Malawi where the U.K. high commissioner donated bicycles and 300 whistles to a typical community police forum as a means of combating gun trafficking and violence (Wood, 2000).

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27. There are, of course, contrary accounts of such independent structures (e.g., see Amnesty International, 2002, on the brutality of civilian community police in Swaziland). 28. Many of these local commentaries are contradictory. For example, the Madhya Pradesh police reportedly recognize a parallel structure of home guards and night watchmen accountable not to the state police but to the local community, who pay for them. But, the par- adox of that commentary is the statement that it is also an important step away from class rule and from the British Raj oppression. However, it ends by suggesting that the future of such a development is to become like the British bobby.

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Mike Brogden is visiting professor of criminal justice in the School of Applied Social Science at the University of Lancaster. He has extensive experienceof societies in the process of transition from South Africa to Northern Ireland. He has written extensively on policing internationally. His books on policing range from The Police: Autonomy and Consent (Academic Press, 1982) to the forthcoming text from Willan Publishing, Community Policing: Interna- tional Perspectives.

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