The Russian-Georgian August War of 2008 in the Context of Georgia’s External Security
David Matsaberidze
Introduction
The Russian Georgian August War of 2008 could be seen both as an out come of overt militarization of the Caucasus region, and of Georgia prop er, as well as a result of the transformation of the security complex in the South Caucasus area, to which the first aspect was ahead. The US assis tance provided to Georgia after the Rose Revolution of 2003, both, finan cial, as well as military, ultimately could be seen as a part of the US attempt to reconfigure the existing security matrix in the Caucasus; whereas the Russian led activities in the separatist enclaves of Georgia – Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia – were efforts to maintain the existing status quo , established back in the early 1990s .
Thus, the present paper aims to explore the following aspects of the re gional security: whether the developments of the August, 2008 were an attempt from the side of Georgia to recover its control over the South Ossetia? (as argued by some scientists) or as a [defensive] response of the Russian Federation to protect its own citizens? (as it claims); apart from this, another set of legitimate questions do arise: should we comprehend this precedent of war as an attempt of a regime change in Georgia initiated by the Russian Federation to stop the pro-western orientation of the country? Or was it a contradiction between Russia and the US/West over the zones of influences in the [South] Caucasus region, in which Georgia was a key player?
Arguably, the truth might lie somewhere in between of all these [legitimate] claims, but, evidently, all of them definitely comprise lines of security axis of the region. Thus, firstly, the paper will reconstruct the process of milita rization of the region before the August War; then it will explore the inter nal and external repercussions of the Post August War 2008 in terms of changing security balance in the region; and finally, it will deal with some misperceptions of security assistance of George W. Bush’s government to Georgia and explore the reconsideration of the US led security support of
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Georgia after the August War of 2008. Therefore, the study will draw the entire picture of internal and external security matrix of the region, in which Georgia is represented as a leading actor or bargaining piece.
Militarization of Abkhazia before/during the August War of 2008
The preconditions of the August War of 2008 have been created consid erably earlier than actual start up of the war. It could be argued with some evidence that Russia could have planned the August War well ahead, though it could be equally claimed that it spun off from the military train ing of the Kavkaz 2008 field exercises. Anyway, whatever might be the truth, the fact is that ‘Russians and their separatist allies in Abkhazia and South Ossetia prepared and executed in August 2008 a war which the Georgians did not predict or expect’ (Felgenhauer, 2009, 162). Indeed, in spite of the range of preceding activities, the developments of 8 12 August 2008 came as a surprise, both to Georgia, as well as for its Western allies. This is quite surprising, as a great deal of Russian supported provocations preceded the August War of 2008. On 14 June 2006, a special summit was held in Sokhumi, bringing together the leaders of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria, who signed a Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Support . The meeting drew comments from Vladimir Putin, who stated that ‘Russia would keep its peacekeeping troops in these regions in spite of provocations’ (Illarionov, 2009, 61). Russia provided not only for the strengthening of peacekeeping forces on the territory of Abkhazia (and South Ossetia), but the actual military support to the secessionist elites was also envisioned by the Russian political establishment. As a demonstration of its support to the Abkhazian secessionist authorities, on 6 March 2008, Russia unilaterally withdrew from the sanctions regime against Abkhazia that had been imposed at the CIS Summit in January 1996. Thus, the way was cleared up for intensive military and other sorts of contacts with the de facto Abkhazian authorities. Therefore, on April 16, President Putin ‘ordered the Russian government to establish direct relations with the gov ernments in Sokhumi and Tskhinvali’ (Illarionov, 2009, 67).
It is noteworthy that this was not a one off action from the side of Mos cow, but was followed by a chain of similar developments. Thus, Nilsson rightly mentions that ‘the Georgian government pushed relentlessly to change the status quo in Abkhazia and South Ossetia’ (cited in Cornell and
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Starr, 2009, 6) and this move was conditioned by unilateral activities of the Russian Federation, therefore the Georgian efforts were a responsive measure to the former.
Military confrontation over Abkhazia is one of the most hotly debated and sensitive issues in the mainstream literature. Numerous studies deal with the distribution of armaments among ethnic groups and their role in the promotion and emergence of inter ethnic rivalry. 1 However, few discuss the ‘channels inherited from Soviet Communist Party structures, through which the Abkhaz elites had access to the military personnel in the former Soviet military forces that were crucial in securing support for the struggle’ (Cornell, 2002, 266), which was crucial in the outbreak of war in the early 1990s. And none discuss the case of entering military units of the Soviet Union the territory of Abkhazia on 22 23 February 1991 to reconstruct the site of Ministry of Interior Affairs, which was a violation of sovereignty and territorial supremacy of Georgia (Apkhazetis Khma, 1991). A comparative analysis of Russia’s military involvement in Georgia after the dissolution of the Soviet Union is offered by Ghia Nodia (1998, 34), who argues that ‘by the time of dissolution of the Soviet Union, the military were extremely influential in defining Russian policy in the near abroad ’; whereas, I’d add, a radically different picture of the Russian military involvement in Abkhazia could be witnessed after 2006. A more premeditated, well planned and well organized Russian military provision on the territory of Abkhazia, which was demonstrated above, culminated in the August War of 2008.
The pre war scenario was not different in 2008 from that of the early 1990s. Immediately before the August War of 2008, a Russian military logistical unit entered the territory of Abkhazia (Georgia) for reconstruc tion of the railway link from Leselidze to Ochamchire region. Hence, these two developments (those of early 1990s and the developments of the Spring, 2008) can be assessed as the comparable events due to their far reaching consequences: both of them laid the ground for intervention of the Russian Federation on the territory of Georgia. Through these infra structural preparations, Russian military support to the local Abkhazian guerrilla forces was secured, which was instrumental in each case – in the success of the Abkhazian military actions (in taking control of the Abkhazi
1 See Gurr and Harff (1994).
107 an AR down to the Enguri River in 1993 and the capture of the Kodori Gorge, that is taking control over the entire territory of the then Abkhazian autonomous region, in 2008).
The above mentioned narrative should be contextualized through the two wider sketches of the Abkhazian military build up in the region after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Firstly, the Transcaucasian Military Oblast (later on known as the Russian Army in the Transcaucasus) was not dis solved and remained as a huge bureaucratic institution, with its military staff in close relations with the local autonomous governments (Devdari ani, 2006, p. 218). Additionally, the provision of the separate Abkhazian military formations with ammunition was easily solved through Soviet in herited channels. On 29 December 1991, the presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Abkhazian ASSR issued a resolution on the transfer of the property, heavy ammunition and artillery of (Soviet) Military Units #5482 and #3697 to the direct ownership and subjugation of the Abkhazian ASSR (Diasamidze, 2005, 95 96).
Moreover, on the same day, the resolution of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Abkhazian ASSR, and Order #57 of the same structure, es tablished a temporary Military Council for the management and coordina tion of military and police forces located on the territory of the Abkhazian ASSR after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Military units #5482 and #3697 were transferred under the supervision of the newly created Military Council (Diasamidze, 2005, 96). In addition, the property of Military Unit #68087 located in the city of Sokhumi was declared as the property of the Republic of Abkhazia (Diasamidze, 2005, 112 113). Thus, various instances of open military preparation on the part of local authorities of the Abkhazian autonomous region were staged after dissolution of the Soviet Union.
These military preparation activities justify the claim that in both cases, in 1992 93 2 and in 2008, the local actions were not the spontaneous reactions, but rather well -planned and premeditated military confrontations with the
2 Several published reports on the issue mention that the Russian military units provided the Georgian and Abkhazian sides with direct and indirect military support in 1992 94. See Lakoba (2001); Zverev (1996); Chervonnaya (1994).
108 central authorities of Georgia. In contradiction to the above mentioned statements, in their discussions of the military developments of the 1992 93, Abkhazians experts and politicians point to the close links between the Russian colonels and the Georgian warlord Tengiz Kitovani. Citing Trenin, Akaba (2011, 9) argues that the ‘special relationship between Russian Gen eral Pavel Grachev and Georgian warlord Tengiz Kitovani is a well known fact’. This is not surprising though, as in the Caucasus, in the early 1990s ‘weapons came in very large quantities from the storehouses of the disinte grating Soviet Army. Both the newly independent states and challenging rebel formations had no problems in arming themselves with cheaply bought or easily stolen Soviet weapons’ (Koehler and Zürcher, 2003, 253).
From the 2000s Russia found another pretext for maintaining its military presence in Abkhazia through policies on the distribution of Russian pass ports to the inhabitants of Abkhazia. Vladimir Socor (2008, 2) argues that ‘the fact that the Russian passports are widely distributed among the resi dents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Russian government claims a right of intrusive protection, including military presence in the two areas’. Socor adds that the Russian peacekeepers, who were in reality a party to the conflict, like Russia itself, transformed the Georgian Abkhazian conflict in 1992 1993 into a Russian Georgian conflict from 1993 1994 and points to the fact of ‘Russia’s military intervention and its subsequent, overt support for Abkhaz secessionist authorities’. The Russian military provision of the Abkhazian secessionist elites gained new force after the deterioration of relations between Moscow and Tbilisi with the emergence of Mikheil Sa akashvili as a president of Georgia in 2004. After the Rose Revolution, the militarization of Georgia’s separatist territories continued apace: ‘the strong facilities in Ochamchire and Gali bases were designed to provide military equipment, armament and fuel for 100 000 people,’ Illarionov (2009, 59, 60) claims. The Russian arms deliveries to the conflict regions of Georgia exceeded to the total military capacities of Georgia proper, and the break away regions owned twice the military equipment possessed by Georgia, he argues.
Russia even went on to violate the CIS agreement on peacekeeping opera tions. In April, 2008 Moscow relocated paratroopers from the Novorossi ysk Airborne Division to Abkhazia; the military equipment of these forces testifies open and extensive militarization of Abkhazia by the Russian Fed
109 eration. The military capabilities of Abkhazia were increased by: ‘three Buk anti aircraft complexes, fourteen additional D 30 self propelled cannons, ten 122mm BM 30 multi rocket launchers, 20 anti tank cannons, 120 anti tank rockets, 2 helicopters and 180 Russian technical specialists to service this equipment. Besides this, Moscow increased its troops in Abkhazia from 1997 to 2542 servicemen (Illarionov, 2009, 69). In addition, as Pop janevski (2009, 146) notes, on 31 May 2008, the Russian Ministry of De fence announced the deployment of an additional 400 military personnel in Abkhazia with the task of repairing the railway infrastructure between Sok humi and Ochamchire. Officially, these measures were classed as humani tarian assistance to Abkhazians, although the real essence of these types of military activities was not hidden. Subsequently, on 20 July 2008, an infan try battalion with fourteen Armoured Personnel Carriers entered the lower part of the Kodori Gorge.
This was followed by promises to the separatist authorities of a further increase in military capabilities on the separatist territories of Georgia. In terestingly, after the August War of 2008, in September 2009, a treaty of military cooperation was signed promoting Russia’s military role in Abkha zia. The new treaty ‘granted Russia access to military facilities and bases in Abkhazia (including the airbase at Gudauta and naval facilities at Ocham chire) for a period of 49 years’ (Cooley and Mitchell, 2010, 64).
Stephen Blank (2009, 108 109) provides a somewhat broader contextualiza tion of the pre August 2008 Russian military build up in the region. Ac cording to Blank, this was an endorsement of the anti Western and anti NATO strengthening of the military position on the territory of Georgia, i.e. the part of creation of the wider anti NATO Eurasian military platform – the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), on the one hand, and the desire of the military officers to regain influence in the newly struc tured Russian defence policy, on the other. The first of his claims appears valid for the presidency of Saakashvili, who became actively anti Russian and pro western and pro EU oriented. The second part applies to the both eras, as it is hard to imagine that the interests of the Russian military would have disappeared after 1990s. De Waal (2010) is somewhat neutral with regard to the Russian involvement in the developments over Abkhazia. Contrasting Georgian claims that they fought against Russia in Abkhazia, and the Abkhazian claim that there was a Georgian Abkhazian conflict
110 proper and Russia helped both sides, De Waal suggests that ‘the truth lies somewhere in between’ (2010, 159).
Ron Asmus (2010, 20 21, 166), through his personal links, provides data which testifies to the initial Russian military build up in Abkhazia and South Ossetia before the start of the August War: ‘the intercepts also men tioned the name of the colonel who commanded the 693 rd regiment of the 19 th division of the Russian 58 th army. That unit was not authorized to be in Georgia. Subsequent reports confirmed that elements of the 135 th regiment were also there’. Asmus particularly refers to the military exercise Kavkaz 2008 held in the North Caucasus shortly before the August War, which included some 700 combat vehicles, fighter aircraft, and part of the Black Sea fleet. In addition, by the evening of 5 August, nearly 12000 soldiers, along with their armour and artillery, were deployed and ready to strike against Georgia. Asmus cites some Georgian informants who claimed that the Georgian state agencies observed ‘the shipment of a large number of BMP/BTR armoured vehicles, D 30 type howitzers, SA 11 Buk antiaircraft systems, BM 21 Grad rocket systems and ZSU02304 Shilka antiaircraft sys tems’ to Abkhazia by the late Spring of 2008. 3
Assessing the post August War situation in Abkhazia, on the basis of the various international monitoring reports, O’Loughlin, Kolossov and Toal (2011) point to the fact that on 15 September 2009, ‘the Russian and de facto Abkhazian authorities signed a military cooperation treaty that enables the Russian military to use, build and upgrade military infrastructure and bases in Abkhazia’ (p. 6). That is to say that even if the Russian military involve ment was either hidden or constrained through the force of international agreements in the 1990s and during early 2000s, just before and after the August War Russia openly followed a path of total militarization of the region. Evidently, this led to the change of the regional security complex and balance, which now favours the Russian Federation. In fact, what should have been reached according to the agreement of the OSCE Istan bul Summit of 1999 – withdrawal of the Russian military bases from the territory of Georgia – and what has been fulfilled partially until August 2008 was reversed in favour of the Russian Federation as a result of the war. In addition, it should be also mentioned that no international monitor
3 For further information see: Asmus (2010); Cornell and Starr (2009); De Waal (2010).
111 ing on the fulfilment of the Istanbul Summit obligations of the Soviet era military bases in Gudauta and Ochamchire – on the territory of Abkhazia – has ever been implemented.
The Post-August War Regional Challenges and International Com- petition in the Context of Open Russian Revisionism
Whatever the direct or indirect causes of the August clash between Russia and Georgia, evidently, it was neither a purely defensive action from the side of the Russian Federation in support of the Abkhazian and South Os setian communities, nor Georgia’s drive for territorial integration. None of them could be at stake in the August 2008 from either side. But it is obvi ous that this crisis generated new sources of instability in the entire post Soviet space, which, I’d argue, could be termed as a new form of the Rus sian revisionism, bringing some limits to western policies in the region, an area which is seen by the Kremlin as its sphere of influence. Meanwhile, the US and European responses to Russia have been firm in rhetoric but com promising in reality. Russia made it clear that it has its own claims over the South Caucasus, whereas the West showed its inability to prevent Russia from moving aggressively to restore its primacy over the former Soviet Union’s territory.
Asmus (2010, 12) claims that ‘Moscow had little interest in a resolution of these conflicts which could have allowed Georgia to go to the West even faster’. These words nicely sum up the essence of start up of the conflict, its transformation under Russian peacekeeping and its culmination in the August War. The openly declared pro Western, pro EU and pro NATO course of the Rose Revolution government was particularly alarming for Moscow. Russia could not tolerate its ‘encirclement’ by NATO member states. The prospective involvement of Georgia in the Membership Action Plan (MAP) seemed like the first step on this path. The idea that Russia resisted Georgia’s aspirations to the west through the conflict zones of Georgia in August 2008 is partially shared by Khintba (2011b, 31). Accord ing to him, Abkhazian experts agree that ‘August 2008 symbolized Russia’s renaissance, affirming Russia capacity to take crucial decisions unilaterally, without the approval of other states’. Thus, this can be taken as a direct proof of the claim that the August War might be considered as open Rus sian revisionism.
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In this line, De Waal (2010, 221) claims that through strengthening its pres ence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, ‘Russia reasserted its sphere of influ ence across the former Soviet Union and blocked the ambitions of any neighbors to join NATO… two breakaway territories were less important themselves than as an instrument of influence against Georgia and the West. (Whereas Suny points out those opportunities which make the Cau casus a highly strategic area for Moscow; the region is a key for Russia to:
• Bolster its strategic interests in the North Caucasus; • Exert a degree of influence on the newly independent South Cauca sus states; and • Maintain a regional influence in competition with other key actors: Iran, Turkey, and the Arab world (Zverev, 1996, 95 96).
Although, according to Sharashenidze and Sukhov (2011), Moscow’s belief that it controls the situation in the North Caucasus may be mistaken. Thus, the Abkhazian and South Ossetian precedents are likely to increase separa tist sentiments in the North Caucasus, although these independence movements cannot pose a meaningful challenge to Russian armed forces in the short to medium term. Unsurprisingly, the Russian Federation is facing increased difficulties with the Northern Caucasus adjacent to Georgia, be cause of the activities of armed Islamic and fundamentalist groupings. In a situation like this it would be too risky to stake on an increased confronta tion and tension with Georgia. For this reason, Russia will probably make further efforts to change the attitude of Georgian public and political cir cles towards itself, even though these kinds of attempts have not been very successful so far.
Asmus (2010, 4) claims that the war was not only planned against Georgia or targeted at regime change in this country, but it was aimed at undermin ing European security: ‘an increasingly nationalist and revisionist Russia was also rebelling against the European system that it felt no longer met its interests and had been imposed on it during a moment of temporary weak ness.’ Under such conditions, it is interesting how the EU and the US could engage with the region more intensively, thus how they should redefine their strategy towards Russia. Moreover, it should be also taken into ac count that many European states share with Russia common interests,
113 which they are not willing to sacrifice. Meanwhile, this strategic change might come at the expense of further destabilization in the South Caucasus. Undoubtedly, from the Russian perspective, the Black Sea is critical for the Russian naval force, allowing it to expand its influence into the Mediterra nean.
De Waal (2010, 97) identifies Russia’s interests in the South Caucasus as the main precondition of the start of the August War. He argues that ‘[i]n the age of Putin and Medvedev, it [Russian Federation] employs as instru ments its presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, its military alliance with Armenia, and its gas pipelines to all three countries’ whereas for Pop janevski (2009, 145), the actual battle for Abkhazia started not in August 2008, but rather in April 2008, following the NATO Bucharest Summit. According to Popjanevski the situation showed the first signs of deteriora tion on April 16, 2008, when ‘outgoing President Putin signed a presiden tial decree instructing Russian state agencies to establish official ties with the Abkhaz and South Ossetian de facto administrations; to institutionalize trade relations between Russia and the two entities; and to provide consular assistance to residents of the two regions’ De Waal (2010, 209) concurs that after the NATO Bucharest Summit, ‘Russian authorities duly took their next step, announcing they were authorizing direct governmental rela tions with Abkhazia and South Ossetia’. Thus, it could be equally claimed, that not only the militarization, but the [vital] geopolitical interest of Russia in the Caucasus region should be also mentioned as one of the precondi tions of the August War in 2008.
In conclusion, it could be argued that the passive reaction(s) of the West in time of the need of active action(s) in the Caucasus, most notably in the August 2008, led to the change of military balance in the security network in favour of the Russian Federation. The present reality of having occupied territories at the periphery of Europe, without any real tool at hand to counterweight the Russian expansion and policy in this respect, ultimately raises questions on the viability of existing tool of the European security, in the form of the OSCE, and poses some dangers in terms of unpredictable future scenarios, which might emerge as a challenge to the European secu rity.
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Georgia: Negative Effects of Militarization, but Still in Need of Military Support
Michael D. Mihalka and Mark R. Wilcox (2010, 25) argue that ‘the large increase in security assistance to the South Caucasus actually decreased regional stability’ and point to the Russian Georgian War of 2008 as a proof of this statement. 4 They claim that the Georgian attempt to recover South Ossetia in August 2008 raises real questions about the unintended consequences that security assistance brings to the region. Although the United States argues that Washington’s supported military training was strictly limited to counter terrorism operations, neither Georgia nor Russia share that interpretation. The 2006 Georgian National Security Concept makes the following claim Georgia’s defense capabilities have significantly increased as a result of assistance programs conducted by the United States. The Georgia Train and Equip Program initiated by the U.S. has proved to be a major success in the process of building the modern Georgian Armed Forces. The new Sustainment and Stability Operations Program is advancing Georgia’s defense capabilities to a higher level. Units trained under these programs constitute the core of the Georgian Army’ (Mihalka and Wil cox, 2010, 29). In relation to this clause, the Report of the Independent International Fact Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia made a veiled critique of secu rity assistance to the region: The supply of arms and military equipment as well as the provision of military training to the conflict region were and continue to be a sensitive issue. Even when done within the limits established by international law or by political commitments of a non binding nature, military support must stay within the boundaries set by
4 US European Command has had several initiatives to train Georgian troops. From 2002 to 2004, the United States spent $64 million in the Georgia Train and Equip Program to train Georgian security forces to fight terrorists, protect pipelines, and further internal stability. Following this, the United States launched the Sustainment and Stability Opera tions Program to train four battalions of Georgian troops to support the US led coali tion in Iraq. Sixty million dollars was spent in FY 2005 and another $30 million was budgeted for FY 2006. Before the Russian Georgian war in 2008, the United States was preparing to train the 4th Brigade for operations in Iraq. Source: Michael D. Mihalka and Mark R. Wilcox. Unintended Strategic Consequences of Security Assistance in the South Cauca- sus, in Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ) / Issue 57, 2 nd Quarter, 2010. http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq 57/Mihalka Wilcox.pdf [accessed on 22.12.2013].
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common sense and due diligence, keeping in mind both intended and unintended use of the arms and equipment supplied (Mihalka and Wilcox, 2010, 30). Whereas Antonenko (2006, 307) argues that the US military support to Georgia was instrumental in paving way towards the Russian Georgian War of August 2008. She refers to the March 2002 statement of then Presi dent of Abkhazia, Vladislav Ardzinba, to the US and Western states, that ‘military support provided to Georgia could entail some undesired conse quences and escalation of the conflict … the military units trained with the support of the US could be used in the military activities against Abkhazia.’ Nevertheless, it could not be claimed reasonably that military aid to Geor gia unilaterally pushed the country to the military clash in the August 2008 in its separatist enclave without serious consideration of the above described Russian military and political activities in the separatist regions of the country.
This criticism of the US security aid to Georgia has not led to the dimin ishment of Georgia’s security assistance after the August War of 2008, but it remained high on the agenda both in Georgia, as well as in the US. Im mediately after the August War of 2008, ‘Saakashvili placed the issue of military aid at the top of the agenda with Washington. What Georgia really needs is something that it cannot get from anywhere else [besides the US] and that’s anti air and anti tank [weapons] and that’s completely obvious,’ he said in a 2011 interview with Foreign Policy magazine. ‘That’s where should be the next stage of the cooperation’ but ‘Saakashvili soon accepted a more modest level of military aid’ (Security Assistance Monitor, 2013).
Still, many would argue that while Washington may have viewed its post Rose Revolution assistance to Georgia narrowly, the Georgians themselves clearly viewed it as a strong political support and a means to recover lost territory. As Cox and Mihalka (2010, 31) stress that …utmost care should be taken by providers of military aid to refrain from giving their support, even unintentionally or indirectly, to any actions or developments detrimental to the stability of the region. In reality, the August war destabilized the situation in the South Caucasus, exacerbated long standing tensions in some republics, created new threats to stability in others and the possible emergence of new secessionist im pulses. Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in fact has cre
116 ated a dangerous precedent in the region; opening Pandora’s Box of ethnic and territorial claims in the North Caucasus. 5
The future of the US security provision to Georgia is deliberately ambigu ous. On the one hand, since the war there have been no government to government deliveries of any military hardware or export licenses granted for commercial sales. Senior officials have cited the Georgian military’s need for training, and US non hardware related military assistance nearly doubled after the war on the principle of ‘brains before brawn’ (Charap and Welt, 2011, 56 57). While on the other hand, some high ranking US offi cials insisted that as there was no ‘formal embargo’ against Georgia, Assis tant Secretary of State Philip Gordon stated that the US should pursue se curity cooperation with Georgia; Georgia is making a very significant contribution in Afghanistan, which we value. … and we are helping them with training for that mission [...] Georgia’s a sover eign, independent country [...] we’ve said that all sovereign, independent countries in Europe and elsewhere have the right to self defence (Charap and Welt, 2011, 57). Charap and Welt (2011, 58) even argued for the necessity of the US military provision to Georgia to increase its defence capacity, as this was also a re gional matter for the US and pointed to the extent of Russia’s deployments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which could not be justified on defensive grounds.
Thus, it could be argued that the US military support to Georgia did not lead to the improvement of country’s security. The misperception of the support provided, directed mainly to the rise of military capabilities of Georgia, erroneously led the country into a defensive war against the Rus sian Federation, which ended up with devastating results for both – in terms of the future solution of the conflict, as well as in terms of external and internal security of the country. On the other hand, the outcome of the war signalled the diminishment of the US strategic positions in the entire Caucasus region. Therefore, re modelling and re structuring of the US sup
5 Interestingly, after the August War of 2008 the US Senate discussed the need of provi sion defensive arms to Georgia. See: Nichol, J. (2013). Georgia [Republic]: Recent Develop- ments and U.S. Interests. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, June 21. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/97 727.pdf [accessed on 24.12.2013].
117 port to Georgia, for the improvement and upgrade of defensive capacity of Georgia, became an urgent task after the end of the August War of 2008.
Conclusion
The preceding analysis of the case of Georgia in terms of the post August War security situation in the region demonstrates that a broader internal and external contextualization of the pre and post August War 2008 de velopments is necessary. Arguably, these developments might have some crucial effects on the regional development in the South and North Cauca sus, as well as on the Central Asia in general, and over Georgia, in particu lar. It is evident that the Russian Georgian August War confirmed once again that the EU and US do not have sufficient means (or willingness) to protect Georgia/South Caucasus from Russia, even though it is one of the crucial areas for their Middle East and remote Asian (Afghanistan) opera tions. This precedent has caused some serious concerns and doubts among the Eastern European and Baltic States in terms of effective provision of their security guarantees from NATO. Meanwhile, Russia gained a funda mentally new geopolitical situation in the region, expressed in Medvedev’s words; ‘we are able to defend our national interests.’
With the August War Russia managed to restore and even strengthen its military presence in the region, after the withdrawal of its military bases from Georgia according to the OSCE Istanbul Summit of 1999. In addi tion, it is not a secret that through the August War Moscow paid back to the US and the West for the recognition of Kosovo, which in Kremlin’s mind destroyed the foundations of European security and neglected Rus sia’s interests. It is also evident that promotion of liberal democracy in the South Caucasus brought some unintended consequence in terms of in creased political instability and through greater likelihood of internal and external violence. This pattern is readily observed in the region and is most apparent in the August War of 2008. As Mihalka and Wilcox (2010, 31) rightly mention, ‘external actors promoting such reforms offer no accept able regional solutions to the endemic internal and external security prob lems.’
Thus, the post August War reality led to ‘marginalization and diminishment of politics and public sentiment in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia: these
118 regions are constituted externally, first and foremost, as strategic objects’ (O’Loughlin et al. 2011, p. 4). Therefore, there is an urgent need from the side of the EU and US stakeholders to devise the new security assistance and cooperation framework for Georgia, which will not only increase de fence capacities of the country, but also will provide some tools to balance the overwhelming Russian presence in the [conflict] regions. And last, but not least, the August War of 2008 demonstrated that the provision of only hard security mechanisms is not a panacea for the regional stability; rather, it should be effectively combined with soft security mechanisms, specifi cally devised for the region.
References
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Official Documents Resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Abkhazian ASSR on Changes in the Relocation and Functioning of the Military Units, Navy and Military Units of Interior Affairs, (December 29, 1991), in Regional Conflicts in Georgia – South Ossetian AO. Abkhazian SSR (1989 2005). A Collection of Political and Legal Acts, ed. Tamaz Di asamidze, Tbilisi, 2005, p. 95 96. Resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Abkhazian ASSR on the Creation of the Temporary Military Council at the Head of the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia for the Subjugation and Coordination of the Military and Police Units Located on the Territory of Abkhazia (December 29, 1991) in Regional Conflicts in Georgia – South Ossetian AO. Abkhazian SSR (1989 2005). A Collection of Political and Legal Acts, ed. Tamaz Diasamidze, Tbilisi, 2005, p. 96. Resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Abkhazia on the Transfer of the Property of the Military Unit #68087 Located in the City of Sokhumi into the Ownership of the Republic of Abkhazia, (May 28, 1992), in Regional Conflicts in Georgia – South Ossetian AO. Abkhazian SSR (1989 2005). A Collection of Political and Legal Acts, ed. Tamaz Diasamidze, Tbilisi, 2005, pp. 112 113. Order #57 of the Head of the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia (December 29, 1991), in Regional Conflicts in Georgia – South Ossetian AO. Abkhazian SSR (1989 2005). A Collection of Political and Legal Acts, ed. Tamaz Diasamidze, Tbilisi, 2005, p. 96.
Newspapers ‘Declaration of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Georgia,’ in Ap khazetis Khma, #43 (13400), 01.03.1991.
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