Handbook on CSDP Missions and Operations the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union

HANDBOOKAND OPERATIONS ON MISSIONS

Jochen Rehrl, Galia Glume (eds): Rehrl, Jochen HANDBOOK

MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

ISBN: 978-3-902275-42-4

Handbook on CSDP Missions and Operations The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union

edited by Jochen Rehrl and Galia Glume

with forewords by

H. E. Federica Mogherini High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission and H. E. Gerald Klug Federal Minister of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria Disclaimer:

Any views or opinions presented in this handbook are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the European Union or the Austrian Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports.

Imprint:

Publication of the Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria

Editors: Jochen Rehrl and Galia Glume

Published by: Directorate for Security Policy of the Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria Rossauer Lände 1, 1090 Vienna/Austria

Photo credits for the front page: European Union/EUTM Somalia, European Union/EUCAP Nestor, European Union/ EUPM, European Union/EUNAVFOR Somalia, European Union/EUFOR Althea, Sonia Khoudja

Layout: Axel Scala, Armed Forces Printing Centre

Printed and bound by: Printed according to the Austrian Ecolabel for printedmatter, Armed Forces Printing Centre, Vienna/Austria, 2015 Austrian Federal MinistryofDefence and Sports/ BMLVS 15-9999 Armed Forces Printing Centre, UW-Nr. 943

ISBN: 978-3-902275-42-4

2 Contents

1 BACKGROUND

1.1. The rationale for CSDP...... 12 1.1.1. Development of CFSP/CSDP (Jochen Rehrl)...... 12 1.1.2. Je parle donc je suis? The raison d’être of the CSDP (Sven Biscop)...... 18

1.2. CSDP structures and procedures...... 21 1.2.1. Crisis management structures (Jochen Rehrl and Galia Glume)...... 21 1.2.2. Crisis response system and management procedures (Jochen Rehrl)...... 27 1.2.3. Chain of command – command and control for CSDP engagement (Galia Glume)...... 32 1.2.4. EU Conflict Early Warning System...... 35 1.2.5. SIAC – The Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity within the European Union (Józef Kozłowski and Jose-Miguel Palacios-Coronel)...... 40

1.3. Cooperation and coordination...... 43 1.3.1. The EU comprehensive approach (Jean-Philippe Scherer)...... 43 1.3.2. CSDP/FSJ link (Michał Narojek)...... 50 1.3.3. Fragility, development and security...... 56 1.3.4. CSDP and partners (Helena Bogusławska)...... 63 1.3.5. Transition strategies (Snowy Lintern)...... 68

1.4. EU crisis prevention/management tools...... 73 1.4.1. The EU’s diplomatic engagement (Simon Duke)...... 73 1.4.2. Conflict prevention (Andrew Byrne and Joëlle Jenny)...... 77 1.4.3 The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (Martin Albani)...... 81 1.4.4. Humanitarian aid and civil protection (Florika Fink-Hooijer)...... 86 1.4.5. Election Observation (Emanuele Giaufret and Radek Khol)...... 91 1.4.6. EU support for mediation and dialogue (Eldridge Adolfo and Canan Gündüz)...... 95 1.4.7. Sanctions (Kees Smit Sibinga)...... 99 Annex: EU restrictive measures in force...... 103

2 CSDP Missions and Operations

2.1. From EUPM Bosnia to EUMAM RCA (Arnold Kammel)...... 106

2.2. Basic principles, concepts and policies...... 112 2.2.1. Peaceful resolution of conflicts (Eva Gross)...... 112

3 2.2.2. Human rights and rule of law (Richard Winkelhofer)...... 116 2.2.3. Strategic Communication – Crisis Response Information Activities (CRIA) (Vicente Diaz de Villegas)...... 120 2.2.4. Law of armed conflict and rules of engagement (Michael Pesendorfer)...... 126 2.2.5. International criminal law and transitional justice (Sari Kouvo and Christian Behrmann) ...... 133 2.2.6. Protection of civilians (Vincenzo de Benedictis)...... 137 2.2.7. Anti-corruption (Raluca Stefanuc)...... 141 2.2.8. Public diplomacy (Victor Reuter)...... 148 2.2.9. Gender and the UNSCR 1325 Women, peace and security agenda (Sari Kouvo)...... 153 2.2.10. Conflict sensitivity – Why and how do I need to engage differently in a situation of conflict and fragility?...... 158

2.3. Scope of missions and operations...... 162 2.3.1. Civilian CSDP missions (Mercedes Garcia-Perez and Galia Glume)...... 162 2.3.2. Military missions and operations (Giovanni Ramunno)...... 169 2.3.3. Supporting Security Sector Reform (Victoria Walker)...... 175

2.4. Benchmarking and lessons learnt...... 181 2.4.1. The importance of benchmarking and impact assessment in CSDP operations (Annemarie Peen Rodt)...... 181 2.4.2. Benchmarking and impact assessment for civilian CSDP missions (Birgit Loeser)...... 186 2.4.3. Lessons learnt and best practices (Giovanni Cremonini)...... 188 2.4.4. The conceptual background for EU crisis management (Morten Knudsen)...... 190

2.5. Challenges...... 192 2.5.1. Cyber security and defence (Wolfgang Röhrig)...... 192 2.5.2. Private Military and Security Companies in CSDP Missions (Anne-Marie Buzatu)...... 200 2.5.3. Local ownership and cooperation with civil society (Maria Fihl)...... 205 2.5.4. Public health engagement in CSDP operations and missions – enhancing personnel sustainability (Bastian Bail and Evert-Jan Slootman)...... 208

2.5.5. Counter-terrorism (Sofie Rafrafi)...... 215 2.5.6. Climate security (Marcus Houben)...... 220 2.5.7. Maritime security (Marcus Houben and Fredrik Lindblom)...... 225 2.5.8. Hybrid warfare (Gabor Iklódy)...... 229 2.5.9. Sustainability: a key factor in ensuring successful results, lasting changes and CSDP credibility (Sofie Rafrafi)...... 231

4 3 Capabilities

3.1. Capability Development ...... 236 3.1.1. Military capability development (Paul van der Heijden)...... 236 3.1.2. Civilian capability development (Nina Antolovic Tovornik)...... 241

3.2. Rapid Reaction/Response...... 244 3.2.1. Military Rapid Response (Jerónimo Domínguez Barbero and Tomas Abrahamsson)...... 244 3.2.2. Civilian Rapid Reaction/Response (Birgit Loeser)...... 250

3.3. Building Human Resources via Training ...... 254 3.3.1. The European Security and Defence College (Jochen Rehrl)...... 254 3.3.2. Training for the CSDP missions (Petteri Taitto)...... 260

4 Conclusions and Way ahead

4.1. EU-UN cooperation in regional conflict management: beyond the horizon (Michel Liégeois)...... 264

4.2. Emerging security challenges (Gustav Lindstrom) ...... 268

4.3. The EU’s unique strength in preventing conflicts and managing crises(Gabor Iklódy)...... 272

4.4. The challenges of CSDP Command and Control(Wolfgang Wosolsobe)...... 276

4.5. Mission Delivery (Kenneth Deane)...... 280

ANNEXES

Authors...... 284 List of abbreviations...... 295

5 Foreword

Peace and stability, respect for fundamental rights and the rule of law are the cornerstones of our society. They are the foundations upon which our Union is built. Today, more than ever, we are aware that we cannot take peace on our continent for granted. We need to live up to our commitment to be a provider of security. A Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is an essential prerequisite to achieving this aim. No one country alone can tackle the immense challenge Jacquemart Service/Jennifer EC - Audiovisual we face. Together we can make a difference. The European Union has a unique contribution to make in confronting new and complex threats. will go hand in hand with concrete steps we can Today, the distinction between internal and exter- take to step up our common response to security nal threats has become ever more blurred. This is threats. why our common security and defence policy is Terrorism, cyber threats and piracy cannot be deeply integrated with other aspects of our exter- countered without state-of-the-art equipment. nal relations. We provide security by stabilising Working more closely together on defence will crises around Europe, promoting human rights allow us to invest in the modern technology and and democracy, as well as assisting countries in well-equipped forces we urgently need to react need. rapidly and effectively to the threats before us. Since 2003 more than 30 CSDP missions and For 10 years, the European Security and Defence operations have been conducted in three conti- College has been a crucial partner in this aim, pro- nents, advancing peace and stability, not only in viding first-class training. Thanks to the hard work the host country, but often for the wider region of the College, our forces are not only better pre- in question. The innovative forms of EU engage- pared for the challenges they face, they are also ment – training and advisory missions and institu- developing a common European security culture. tion building – have become trademarks that are This handbook makes an important contribu- valued around the world. What is more, demand tion to explaining the European Union’s Common from our partner countries to work hand in hand Security and Defence Policy. Apart from being an with our missions keeps growing. invaluable resource for trainers and trainees of the This is an important year for the CSDP. As the European Security and Defence College, it is a world around us is changing rapidly, we also need one-stop shop for anyone in search of a full pic- to change. That is why I have launched a reflection ture of the EU’s security and defence policy. process to take a fresh look at what the changed global environment means for how we approach Federica Mogherini security challenges in the future. These reflections High Representative of the Union will involve Member States, national parliaments, for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy the European Parliament and think tanks and and Vice-President of the Commission

6 Foreword

We need to recognise that new international security crises are characterised by increasingly complex dynamics in terms of their drivers, stakeholders and scope. In addition, they unfold with little warning, at great speed and, more often than not, concurrently. The EU commands a broad range of tools and instruments to prevent and manage crises. The Union is therefore well equipped to provide coordinated and comprehensive responses across Parliament/Wilke Direction of the Austrian the civilian and military spectrum. In fact, the potential of this comprehensive approach is the unique selling point of the Common Security and antee the efficient implementation of CSDP tasks Defence Policy. and challenges. For the CSDP success story to continue, it This year, the European Security and Defence needs to be backed by the capacity to anticipate College is celebrating its tenth anniversary. The future developments and crises, by decision-mak- college provides basic, advanced, pre-deploying structures that can match the pace of inter- ment and in-mission training for personnel to be national events, by capabilities that are ready and deployed in crisis management areas. It relies on available, by clear financial commitments, and by the institutional knowledge held by the EU insti- the political willingness of the EU Member States tutions, in particular the EEAS, the EU Mem- to incur the risks and costs of contributing to mis- ber States and various international partners. sions and operations. Through their training work, the college and the Since 2003, the European Union has been more than 80 partners in its network make a real ready to go abroad within the framework of the contribution to making the EU more operational CSDP and make its contribution to security and and coherent in its approach to conflict preven- stability worldwide. In more than 30 missions tion and crisis management. and operations, some 150 000 personnel have I feel honoured to present another contribu- been deployed, serving under the European ban- tion from the Austrian Ministry of Defence and ner. Sports to achieving this mission objective. This A strong Europe needs a common identity. handbook is the latest in a series of training mate- In order to strengthen this identity in the area rials. I am convinced that it will assist future mis- of CSDP, a common security culture is needed. sion personnel and staff at headquarters. It will This includes developing a common perception of also contribute to enhancing the common Euro- threats, a common approach to solving conflicts, pean security culture. and a common understanding of solidarity. It therefore requires a “European mind-set”, which Gerald Klug can only be achieved through education and Federal Minister of Defence and Sports training and which, once established, will guar- of the Republic of Austria

7 Foreword by the editors

The European Security Strategy of 2003 states In mid-2014, when we launched the process that that culminated in the publication of this handbook, we were able to call upon a wide range of “Our task is to promote a ring of well governed able and willing contributors from the EU institu- countries to the East of the European Union and tions and academia. Over time, we increased the on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom number of articles and authors so as to provide we can enjoy close and cooperative relations.” an even more comprehensive and up-to-date overview and, as a result, we have ended up with 57 In the light of the current circumstances – the contributions from 54 different experts (33 male aftermath of the Arab Spring, in particular the and 21 female). Owing to their different profes- difficult situation in Libya, the Syrian crisis and sional backgrounds, we were able to cover topics the rise of ISIL/ISIS, the Ukrainian conflict and such as counter-terrorism, hybrid warfare, stra- the resulting frictions with Russia – do we now tegic communications and maritime security, all have to admit that we have failed in our efforts to issues which are currently on the agendas of high- achieve our strategic objectives? level meetings. The present handbook was put together at a Specific emphasis has been placed on operational time of geopolitical tsunamis in Europe and on its aspects of the Common Security and Defence doorstep, including the ongoing terrorist threat, Policy, which will ensure added value for our col- financial austerity in the EU Member States and leagues working in theatre. Such work would not global health crises (e.g. Ebola). Each generation be possible without the help and assistance of many faces its own challenges, and we can only confront individuals and departments working behind the those challenges by keeping our feet firmly on the scenes: We are therefore delighted to be able to ground, accepting cultural differences, following a publicly thank the following for their support: step-by-step approach, and strongly engaging with • the English editing service of the General Secre each other in a spirit of “solidarity”. The CSDP tariat of the Council for providing us with edi- and the other EU crisis management instruments torial suggestions and for carrying out a final have a crucial role to play in tackling crises and linguistic check on the text, in particular Shauna conflicts; together they can provide the key, in Doherty, Serena Dyer-Meenenga, Sophie Etse, the context of the EU’s long-term endeavour to Andy Flower, Roger Greenwood, Maurice promote peace, stability and security, to finding Hannon, Michael Harris, Laura Hayes, Jane solutions in a way that is collaborative, fitted to Keates, Tim Nicolas, Úna O’Connor, Melanie the circumstances and comprehensive. Saville, and William Spurgeon;

8 • the Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports • all other colleagues who, through their advice of the Republic of Austria, in particular the and support, made this project possible – both Directorate for Security Policy headed by from the field and at headquarters, especially Brigadier Dr. Johann Frank; Oliver Rentschler, Bert Versmessen, Laura Di • the Austrian Armed Forces Printing Centre for Rosa, Julia De Clerck-Sachsse, Thomas Fronek, its continued support in relation to layout and Walter Matyas, Alin Bodescu, Mercedes Gar- administration, especially Mr Axel Scala and cia-Perez, Birgit Loeser, Gilles Janvier and Ms Eva Kutika; Kęstutis Jankauskas; • our colleagues at the European Security and • finally our families, in particular Bernadeta, Defence College, in particular Charlotta Ahl- Julia and Maximilian. mark, Pavlina Gorenc, Mario Marmo, Valen- We hope that this handbook will help spread the tina Reynoso, Petteri Taitto, Symeon Zambas, word about the Common Security and Defence Hans-Bernhard Weisserth (outgoing Head of Policy of the European Union and thereby con- the ESDC) and Dirk Dubois (incoming Head tribute to deepening our common European se- of the ESDC); curity culture. Photo: Harald Minich/Federal Ministryand Sports of Defence Minich/Federal Harald Photo: Paternoster/Laboriver Mathieu Photo: Jochen Rehrl Galia Glume National Expert at the Reporting Officer in the European Security and Defence College EU’s Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability

1 BACKGROUND

11 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

1.1. The rationale for CSDP 1.1.1. Development of CFSP/CSDP

by Jochen Rehrl

To write about history is always difficult, par- In 1986, the Single European Act (SEA) codi- ticularly when it comes to finding the right entry fied European Political Cooperation. That cooper- and exit points. One must, of course, mention ation was the forerunner of the European Union’s important politicians, thinkers and visionaries Common Foreign and Security Policy, which such as Konrad Adenauer, Joseph Bech, Johan entered into force through the Treaty of Maas- Willem Beyen, Winston Churchill, Alcide De tricht on 1 November 1993. With this treaty, the Gasperi, Walter Hallstein, Sicco Mansholt, Jean goal proclaimed in 1957 of an “ever closer Union” Monnet, Robert Schuman, Paul-Henri Spaak and was achieved, although not entirely as envisaged Altiero Spinelli. One of their visions was an “ever by the founding fathers, whose model of Euro- closer Union”, which would include security and pean Integration was more supranational. defence aspects. This idea was manifested in the With the Treaty of Maastricht, both the “Com- plan to establish a “European Defence Commu- mon Foreign and Security Policy” and “Justice and nity” (EDC), which failed in 1954. Home Affairs” remained intergovernmental, hence Nevertheless, the development of an economic, led by the Member States. In the foreign and security financial, political and security community in policy, reality on the ground – in this case the process Europe was driven by of Yugoslavia’s disintegration – was the driving force • a step-by-step approach, taking into account that deepened cooperation. In 1997, the so-called national sensitivities; “Petersberg tasks”, an exemplary list of possible mis- • a process of continuous enlargement; sion scenarios, were incorporated in the Amsterdam • the geopolitical environment with its obstacles, Treaty. But at that time, the underlying idea was still challenges and windows of opportunity; to rely on the Western European Union (WEU) • the political will of the EU Member States. to further develop a common security and defence Another milestone in the development of a com- policy. Mutual assistance was to be “granted” via the mon foreign and security policy was the so-called obligation resulting from the NATO Treaty. Davignon report of the late 60s. The report, Amsterdam also created a very important and which was written by a council chaired by Étienne forward-looking position, which would be instru- Davignon of the Belgian Foreign Office, included mental in the development of security and defence proposals on political cooperation between the policy: The High Representative for the Common Member States. The recommendations stated that Foreign and Security Policy. Javier Solana, former the Member States should “try to speak with a sin- Spanish minister for Foreign Affairs and former gle voice on international problems”. Nowadays this Secretary General of NATO, held this post from paradigm has slightly shifted and the focus is on 18 October 1999 until 1 December 2009 (when “delivering one message”. the Lisbon Treaty entered into force).

12 1 BACKGROUND

Photo by Ulrich Baumgarten via Getty Images Photo: Austrian Armed Forces Austrian Photo:

In October 1998 at the informal European Council in Pörtschach/Austria, the then new UK Prime Minister Tony Blair made a first official statement favoring a European Security and Defence Policy In the picture, 1st row: Antonio Guterres (PT), Tony Blair (UK), Jacques Santer (EU), Martti Ahtisaari (FI), Viktor Klima (AT), Jacques Chirac (FR), Gerhard Schröder (DE), Paavo Lipponen (FI), Lionel Jospin (FR); 2nd row: Jean-Claude Juncker (LU), Bertie Ahern (IE), Constantine Simitis (GR), José Maria Aznar (ES), Göran Persson (SE), Jean-Luc Dehaene (BE), Poul Nyrup Rasmussen (DK), Massimo D’Alema (IT), Wim Kok (NL)

After the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1998 position on this subject, which was summarised in (Kosovo crisis) and facilitated by a political change a press conference after the meeting as follows: in the United Kingdom, the EU Member States “…in respect of common foreign and security pol- decided to establish an independent “Common icy, there was a strong willingness, which the UK European Security and Defence Policy” (known obviously shares, for Europe to take a stronger for- at the time by the acronym ESDP, which changed eign policy and security role. This will arise partic- to CSDP with the Lisbon Treaty). At a NATO ularly because we are going to be appointing two summit in 1998, the then US Secretary of State, people to common foreign and security positions in Ms Madeleine Albright, contributed to the dis- the European Union in the next few months so it cussion about an autonomous European security is something that is very much on our minds but and defence policy with her famous “three D’s”: we are all agreed it was important that Europe no diminution of NATO, no discrimination and should be able to play a better, more unified part no duplication; the latter was understood by the in foreign and security policy decisions … A com- Europeans as no “unnecessary” duplication, as mon foreign and security policy for the European clearly stated in the Helsinki Conclusions of 1999. Union is necessary, it is overdue, it is needed and Nevertheless, during the Austrian EU Presidency it is high time we got on with trying to engage in the second half of 1998, the informal European with formulating it and I think that people were Council in Pörtschach, Southern Austria, on 24 pleased that Britain came to this with an open and 25 October gave the former UK Prime Minis- mind and was willing to participate in the debate ter Tony Blair the possibility to state Britain’s new and I think it is important that we do that.”

13 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS Photo: Austrian Armed Forces Austrian Photo:

Informal EU Defence Ministers meeting in Vienna, 3-4 November 1998 Tony Blair, Jacques Chirac and Lionel Jospin during a press conference in the margins of the In the picture, 1st row: José da Veiga Simão (PT), Eduardo Serra Rexach (ES), Frank de Grave (NL), Anneli Taina (FI), Franco-British summit in Saint Malo, 3-4 December 1998 José Cutileiro (Secretary-General WEU), Werner Fasslabend (AT), Carlo Scognamiglio Pasini (IT), Alex Bodry (LU), George Robertson (UK); 2nd row: Michael Smith (IE), Jean-Pol Poncelet (BE), Rudolf Scharping (DE), Hans Hækkerup (DK), Akis Tsochatzopoulos (GR), Alain Richard (FR), Björn von Sydow (SE)

Only one week later, on 3 and 4 November, the • comprehensive: “military and non-military crisis defence ministers of the European Union con- management capability”; vened for an informal meeting in Vienna. Both • based on the principles of the United Na- events paved the way for the bilateral meeting of tions Charter and recognising the primary France and Britain in Saint Malo, which is seen by responsibility of the United Nations Security many scholars as the birth of the European Secu- Council; rity and Defence Policy. • autonomous capacity to take decisions and to Various European Council meetings after the launch and conduct EU-led military opera- turbulent second half of 1998 started to establish tions in response to international crises. the Common European Security and Defence The latter was modified from a reactive measure Policy. The first meeting with clear guidance on (“in response”) to a preventive tool through the ESDP was held on 3 and 4 June 1999 in Cologne. European Security Strategy in 2003. The magic In the Council conclusions, emphasis was given sentence for describing the relationship between to the “the Union’s and Member States’ non-military EU’s autonomous military capabilities and crisis response tools” besides the military aspects. NATO’s crisis management ambitions concluded On 10 and 11 December 1999, the European “where NATO as a whole is not engaged”. But to Council in Helsinki underlined the – still valid – date, cooperation between the CSDP and NATO basic principles underpinning the European structures has been limited – although not so understanding of an autonomous security and much between their respective staff, but more on defence policy for the EU: a political level.

14 1 BACKGROUND Photo: Frederic de La Mure/Ministry for Foreign Affairs, de La Mure/Ministry Foreign France for Frederic Photo:

Tony Blair, Jacques Chirac and Lionel Jospin during a press conference in the margins of the Franco-British summit in Saint Malo, 3-4 December 1998

The European Council in Helsinki also stated a a level of ambition for the civilian side of crisis level of ambition for the military aspects, namely management, focussing on police capabilities: by “to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 2003, the EU Member States should be able 1 year military forces of up to 50 000-60 000 per- “to provide up to 5 000 police officers for interna- sons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks”. tional missions across the range of conflict preven- These capabilities should be ready to use by 2003. tion and crisis management operations [… and] The European Council further agreed that to be able to identify and deploy up to 1 000 “new political and military bodies and structures police officers within 30 days”. will be established within the Council”. The Nice Treaty of 2000 legitimised the newly And finally, new emphasis was given to the non- established crisis management structures within military crisis management in order the Council, in particular the Political and Secu- “to coordinate and make more effective the various rity Committee, the EU Military Committee and civilian means and resources […] at the disposal the EU Military Staff. Additionally, the former of the Union and the Member States”. WEU agencies were transformed via Council Joint On 19 and 20 June 2000, the European Coun- Actions in 2001 into EU agencies: EU Institute for cil in Feira set four priority areas for the civilian Security Studies in Paris and EU Satellite Centre in aspects of the EU’s crisis management: (1) Police, Torrejon. In 2004, the European Defence Agency (2) Rule of Law, (3) Civil Administration and (4) in Brussels was created in order to facilitate the Civil Protection. Later, these four areas were sup- process of developing military capability. This complemented by (5) Monitoring and (6) Support to pleted the structure of agencies currently in place to EU Special Representatives. Feira also formulated support the Common Security and Defence Policy.

15 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS NATO Photo NATO NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson (left) and Dr. Javier Solana, European Union High Represen tative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, announcing the Berlin plus arrangement in late 2002

During the Laeken Summit from 14 to between the EU Member States, Javier Solana 15 December 2001, the Heads of State or Gov- took the initiative to reunite the European coun- ernment declared that tries by providing a European Security Strategy. “the Union is now capable of conducting some The ESS was first presented and discussed at the crisis-management operations.” Council meeting in Thessaloniki during Greece’s However, the launch of the first ESDP mission EU presidency. In December 2003, the document (EU Police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina) was agreed by all EU Member States. In 2008, a took another year and the military had to wait “Report on the Implementation of the European until the Berlin plus arrangement with NATO Security Strategy” with the subtitle “Providing was finalised on 17 March 2003. Security in a Changing World” updated the ESS In the same year, the US administration, spe- to a certain extent, but did not replace or revise it. cifically the then Secretary of Defence Donald The report mentioned new threats such as piracy Rumsfeld, tried to separate the Europeans by and cybercrime, complementing the strategic dividing them into a new and an old Europe. basis for the EU’s activities. The trigger was the dispute over the invasion During the disputes in 2003, four EU Mem- of Iraq, which was not UN-mandated and was ber States (Germany, France, Belgium and Lux- disapproved of in particular by Germany and embourg) met and discussed options to further France. In the US’ view, the old Europe was rep- improve the functioning of the European Union. resented by the countries against the war and the One famous outcome was the discussion on an new Europe constituted by the supporters of the “EU military Headquarters” in Tervuren, Bel- US intervention. gium. This plan was immediately rejected by the Faced with what was a severe strategic dispute United Kingdom and a few other countries. Nev-

16 1 BACKGROUND Photo: European Communities, 2009/ Georges Boulougouris European Photo: Photo: European Union European Photo:

The three High Representatives: Javier Solana 1999-2009; Catherine Ashton 2009-2014; Federica Mogherini since 2014

ertheless, as a compromise, an operations centre flag, but also genuinely effective in managing cri- was created within the EU Military Staff, which ses. Several new headline goals, an improved capa- could grow into a fully fledged OHQ if agreed bility development plan for both the military and unanimously among EU Member States. Another the civilian side, the creation of a civilian head- point for consideration was the establishment of quarters (CPCC) in August 2007 and the estab- a European Security and Defence College, which lishment of a Crisis Management and Planning actually happened in July 2005. Directorate (CMPD) in 2009 showed that inno- In 2004, the work on a “Treaty establishing vation and speed can – to a certain extent – over- a Constitution for Europe” was finalised and come a political deadlock. the EU Member States signed the document With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 29 October 2004 in Rome. This document on 1 December 2009, the ten-year-era of Javier brought with it some important new elements Solana ended and the five-year-era of Catherine for CFSP/CSDP, including a “Union Minister Ashton started. She was the first High Represent- for Foreign Affairs” and a “mutual assistance ative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Secu- clause”. rity Policy and at the same time Vice-President However, the Treaty was rejected by France of the Commission. With the European External and the Netherlands; hence, it was never ratified Action Service, she had a valuable and compe- and never entered into force. The “mutual assis- tent tool at her disposal to significantly enhance tance clause” survived unchanged the following the coherence and consistency of the EU’s for- debates, the “Union Minister for Foreign Affairs” eign affairs and security policy work. was renamed “High Representative of the Union To date, the European Union counts around for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy”. 140 EU Delegations, around 35 terminated or The failure to ratify the “Treaty establishing a ongoing CSDP missions and operations, work- Constitution for Europe” was followed by a long ing structures, good policy frameworks (e.g. the period of reflection, which only came to an end in comprehensive approach), various partnerships 2009. During this time, there was little movement and useful intra- und inter-institutional com- on the foreign and security policy. But thanks to munication with some room for improvement. the personal engagement of the High Representa- Federica Mogherini took office in 2014 as the tive, the security and defence policy became a new High Representative and Vice President. priority area within the second pillar. Several suc- With a new head, a good staff and functioning cessful missions around the world proved that the structures, new and positive developments in the EU’s crisis management was not only able to show area of CFSP and CSDP lie ahead of us.

17 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

1.1.2. Je parle donc je suis? The raison d’être of the CSDP

by Sven Biscop

Does anyone remember the original reason end, the European Council defined the Headline why the European, now Common Security and Goal: the ambition to deploy up to a corps-size Defence Policy (first ESDP, now CSDP) was cre- formation (50 000 to 60 000 troops), within one ated? or two months, and to sustain it for at least one It was certainly not so that the European Union year. However, the Headline Goal was last heard (EU) could have just one or two battlegroups on of during the 2008 French EU Presidency and stand-by. Ever since the battlegroup scheme was has been completely overshadowed by the battle- launched, it has been a dominant theme in the groups. But even if the battlegroup scheme worked deliberations on the CSDP. And it risks remaining as desired, would that really greatly increase the so for a long time, for it presents a problem that EU’s capacity to act? In which of the crises going cannot be solved. No matter how much the EU on at the time of writing (Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, tries to perfect the scheme, the actual deployment Libya, Mali …) would deploying a battalion-size of a battlegroup will always be a matter of coin- battlegroup make a difference? cidence: when a crisis occurs, does it fit the inter- Clearly, the original raison d’être of the CSDP ests and political will of the Member States whose needs to be brought back to the attention of forces happen to be on stand-by? Unless com- today’s political, diplomatic and military deci- mand authority over the battlegroups on stand-by sion-makers. is transferred to the Council, which could then Unfortunately, ambiguity about the raison decide on deployment by a majority vote, this is d’être was precisely the mechanism that made an insoluble conundrum. And thus the debate can the CSDP possible in the first place. The CSDP go on and on – the perfect excuse not to have to is a Franco-British creation (something which the talk about the actual objective of the CSDP. latter need to be reminded of more than the for- At the inception of the CSDP, Member States mer). In 1998, at their annual bilateral meeting, were much more ambitious. “To develop an held that year in Saint-Malo, the UK and France autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where agreed to try and stimulate capability develop- NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and ment by launching a European scheme. For Brit- conduct EU-led military operations in response to ain, the primary framework in which strategy international crises”: this was the purpose agreed would be set and decisions made on when and upon by the European Council in Helsinki in where to use those capabilities, remained NATO. 1999. The definition of the “Petersberg Tasks” in France believed that European capability develop- the Treaty on European Union made clear that ment should also lead to autonomous European this included peace enforcement, i.e. war, along- operations, outside the framework of NATO. side classic peacekeeping, military assistance, Rather than eventually resolving itself, that evacuation, and humanitarian support. To this fundamental ambiguity has continued to handi-

18 1 BACKGROUND

cap the CSDP, which has never enjoyed the full be needed to translate excellent intelligence and support of all Member States. The end result is awareness into policy options for the full range that it has never reached its full potential in either of EU external action, civilian and military. The dimension: capability development or operations. result is a decision-making structure that certainly An elaborate process was conceived to fulfil works for operations planned long in advance and the Headline Goal, and the European Defence even, if Member States want it to, for rapid reac- Agency (EDA) was set up to urge Member States tion. But that structure’s lack of planning capacity to invest in collective solutions for the prior- means that it is not in itself systematically proac- ity shortfalls. But by depriving the EDA of the tive enough to make the EU the platform of choice budget to initiate projects itself, capitals have for addressing urgent security crises. Indeed, when ensured that capability development remains force has to be used, Member States, even those an almost entirely bottom-up process, nearly who regularly stress that the CSDP covers the full completely reliant on national initiative and spectrum of military operations, rarely choose to hence protective of national industrial interests. deploy under the EU flag, but systematically opt Even so, the CSDP remains the most promis- for NATO or coalitions of the willing when fighting avenue for collective European capability ing is expected. development. The European Commission can In the end, it boils down again to the issue of be increasingly involved, certainly in research the raison d’être: What do the nations of Europe but even in actual (dual-use) projects. Today really want to be able to do in security and though that is evident more because nations’ defence? And how much of that do they want to performance in other frameworks is even more do through the CSDP? meagre than because of the CSDP’s own achieve- While Europeans themselves may remain ments. Collective capability development has undecided, the United States does not. Seen from never been NATO’s forte. Instead, the NATO Washington, there is only one potential strategic Defence Planning Process (NDPP) generates competitor for the US: China. Hence the “pivot” national targets, while the organisation’s Smart of American strategy. That pivot hinges on Europe: Defence initiative never really took off. Pooling the more Europeans can take care of their own and Sharing between Member States in regional business, the more confidently the US can focus clusters complements but cannot replace the on Asia. And there is no want of business, as both EDA’s efforts, for no cluster can achieve the criti- Europe’s eastern and southern neighbourhood are cal mass required to develop strategic enablers. in turmoil. Therefore the US does not only want EDA projects have started (on air-to-air refuel- Europeans to contribute to conventional deter- ling, satellite communication, drones and cyber rence under NATO’s Article 5 and to American- defence), but for these to produce new platforms led crisis management operations. In non-Article and more capability, many more Member States 5 scenarios around Europe, Washington expects will have to invest a lot more money – and these Europeans themselves to initiate and lead crisis are just some of the priority shortfalls. management in their periphery, preferably at an Elaborate institutions were also established to early stage, when a crisis has not yet escalated and allow the EU to launch military operations and can still be contained without relying too heavily civilian missions – but not an operational head- on American assets. In other words, those Mem- quarters, hence command and control of the ber States that are still seeking to please the US military operations has to be outsourced to either by curbing the development of the CSDP would NATO or a Member State. Nor has the EU been be well advised to note that Washington is now endowed with even sufficient planning capacity actively promoting European strategic autonomy, for the permanent prudent planning that would i.e. crisis management without the US. Under

19 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

which flag they do it, the US doesn’t care, as long and to forge the coalition that can do it. When as they do it. So whether it be NATO, the CSDP military action is decided upon, more often than or an ad hoc coalition that takes charge, it will not the NATO command structure will then be increasingly have to be Europeans who take the called for to conduct the operation. initiative. The military capabilities which these responsi- The strategic situation thus ought to compel bilities for non-Article 5 scenarios require should Europeans to revive their original ambition for also be defined by the EU. The CSDP mecha- autonomy and to reassess the role of the various nisms are more than fit for that purpose. At the foundations of the European security architecture: very least, Europeans ought to be able to achieve the EU and its CSDP, NATO, and the nations. the Headline Goal autonomously within their Ultimately there is only one security architecture neighbourhood, i.e. to be able to deploy up to a and the issue is not which part of it does what, corps relying on European enablers only. Incor- but whether what has to be done gets done, with porating this European level of ambition into the maximum effectiveness and efficiency. NDPP will allow the European Allies and part- The EU is best placed to answer the big strate- ners/EU Member States to design a capability gic question: which responsibilities does Europe mix that enables them to meet both their collec- want to assume as a security actor outside its tive defence obligations and their expeditionary borders? For that is a function of overall foreign requirements. These capabilities can be developed policy, including trade, development and diplo- and acquired through collective European projects macy as well as defence, which only the EU’s under the aegis of the EDA (certainly for the stra- Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), in tegic enablers, which will in turn enable a viable close coordination with the Commission, covers European defence industry) in combination with in a comprehensive manner. This much is certain: radical pooling of assets in regional clusters so as Europeans must take the lead in stabilising their to eliminate all redundancies. Ensuring operabil- own broad neighbourhood, stretching out into ity among Europeans and between European and the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, and even the other Allies and partners through manoeuvres is Gulf, and into the Caucasus and perhaps Central again a task for NATO. Asia – for if they don’t, nobody else is likely to do Finally, NATO’s collective defence of course it for them. That includes their maritime borders, remains the ultimate guarantee of Europe’s secu- but as a global trading power Europe must also rity. But it should be seen as such: an ultimate contribute to global maritime security, notably guarantee. Before considering what reassurance in Asia. And as a defender of rules-based interna- they can seek from the US, Europeans ought first tional order, it must contribute when the United to think of what contribution they can make to Nations decide to act if the rules are broken. For global security. All of this will require a profound the same reason – the comprehensiveness of its strategic debate among Europeans. But the world external action – the EU ought to be the default will not stop while they deliberate. Ultimately, the platform for crisis management in an actual con- raison d’être of the European security architecture tingency: to assess what is happening, to decide and of the CSDP in particular is not its ability to how important it is, to settle what has to be done, talk about security, but to deliver security.

20 1 BACKGROUND

1.2. CSDP Structures And procedures 1.2.1. Crisis management structures

by Jochen Rehrl and Galia Glume

Since the European Union was declared oper- The crisis management structures of the EU ational at the Laeken Council in 2001, crisis rely on both: management structures in support of the Com- • bodies composed of representatives from the mon Security and Defence policy (CSDP) have EU Member States, and developed significantly. The increasing recourse • CSDP structures and other entities within the to CSDP missions and operations – 34 were EU organisation. launched since 2003 – demanded further institutional development, to support the planning and conduct of missions and operations, but also to Bodies composed of support decision-making at the political and stra- representatives from EU tegic level. The structures initially provided at the Member States outset of CSDP (namely the Political and Secu- rity Committee, the EU Military Staff and the EU The European Council consists of the Heads Military Committee – but also the Committee for of State or Government of the EU Member States Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management) were com- and defines the general political direction and plemented by the establishment of advisory bod- priorities of the European Union. It is chaired ies and Council working groups, integrated stra- by a president who is elected for 2.5 years. Mr tegic planning, and further command and control Donald Tusk, former prime minister of Poland, options – including a permanent headquarters for currently holds the post, having succeeded Mr civilian CSDP missions. The establishment of the Herman Van Rompuy, former prime minister of European External Action Service in 2011 gave Belgium. greater coherence to the EU’s external action, In December 2013, the European Coun- both by bringing together these structures and cil met to discuss specifically on security and by linking them to EU external policies – nota- defence issues and a follow up is envisaged for bly through the thematic and geographic man- June 2015. aging directorates. One key feature is that when Legally, there is only one Council. Neverthe- it comes to CSDP missions and operations, the less, there are ten different Council configurations final word rests with Member States. They define depending on the subject to be discussed. These the general orientations of the Common Foreign are referred to as the Council of the European and Security Policy (CFSP), and exercise political Union and are where the Member States’ govern- control and set the strategic direction of CSDP ment representatives sit (in general at ministerial missions and operations. level).

21 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

Photo: Council of the EU/Mario Salerno

EU Heads of State and Government meet at the European Council on 12 January 2015, in Brussels. The main topics are the conflict in Ukraine, counter terrorism and the economic situation

The “Foreign Affairs Council” (FAC) is specif- Coreper divides the ministerial agenda into ically relevant for CFSP and CSDP. This Coun- three categories: cil configuration has two distinguishing features • “I” points which are for information and no compared to the other nine: a) The High Rep- ministerial decision is needed; resentative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and • “A” points, where the decision can be made Security Policy chairs it; and b) Only the FAC and without debate; the General Affairs Council are explicitly men- • “B” points where debate is needed and the de- tioned in the Treaty of Lisbon. cision may not be known in advance. The Foreign Affairs Council can meet in the for- Council Decisions related to CSDP missions and mat of ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence and/or operations are – in general – categorised as “A” Development. These ministers attend meetings to points. discuss foreign policy, trade, security, defence and ThePolitical and Security Committee (PSC), development matters, meeting on a monthly basis which usually meets twice a week at ambassado- and as the international situation demands. rial level, is the highest Council body to prepare Nevertheless, due to the fact that the Council is decisions on CFSP/CSDP. a single EU institution, all Council configurations The Committee monitors the international situ- can decide on all issues. For example, in 2003 ation in the areas covered by CFSP and contributes the military CSDP operation ARTEMIS was for- to the definition of policies by delivering opinions mally decided (adopted as a Joint Action) by the to the Council. It also monitors the implementa- ministers of justice in their Council configuration tion of agreed policies, without prejudice to the “Justice and Home Affairs” (Council Joint Action powers of the High Representative. It exercises 2003/423/CFSP of 5 June 2003). political control and strategic direction of the EU’s In preparation for Council meetings, Member crisis management operations, under the responsi- States’ ambassadors meet in the Permanent Rep- bility of the Council and of the High Representa- resentatives Committee (or Coreper, for Comité tive. The PSC plays a key role for CSDP by adopt- des représentants permanents), which convenes in ing relevant conclusions, recommendations and two formats. The one relevant for the Common decisions1. Missions and operations are discussed Security and Defence Policy is Coreper II. in particular when their six-monthly reports are

22 1 BACKGROUND Photo: European Union/Christos Dogas Dogas Union/Christos European Photo: Federica Mogherini and EU Ministers for Foreign Affairs meet on 9 February 2015, in Brussels, to discuss Ukraine, EU-Africa relations and counter-terrorism

issued, when their strategic reviews are conducted, provide advice and recommendations on all mili- and when the Head of Mission/Operation Com- tary matters within the EU. The EUMC moni- mander is to be appointed. The PSC also plays a tors the proper execution of the military mis- key role in preparing a coherent EU response to sions/operations. crises and prompting discussion with the relevant The Chairperson of the EUMC acts as the EEAS crisis management bodies, when deemed primary point of contact with the EU Missions/ necessary or the situation so demands. The PSC is Operations Commander. chaired by an EEAS representative. The Politico-Military Group (PMG) is a civil- Three advisory bodies are responsible for giving ian/military meeting format that prepares and sup- advice and recommendations to the ambassadors ports the work of the PSC. It covers the political in the PSC, particularly in relation to CSDP mis- aspects of EU military and civil-military issues, pre- sions and operations: pares Council conclusions, provides recommenda- The European Union Military Committee tions for the PSC, contributes to the development (EUMC) is the highest military body within the of (horizontal) policy and facilitates exchanges of Council. It is composed of the Chiefs of Defence information. The PMG is chaired by an EEAS rep- of the Member States, who are represented by resentative. their permanent military representatives. They

1 According to Article 38 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, “the Council may authorise the PSC, for the purpose and for the duration of a crisis management operation, as determined by the Council, to take the relevant decisions concerning the political control and strategic direction of the operation”.

23 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS Photo: Council of the EU/Mario Salerno Photo:

The EU Military Committee is the highest military body within the Council (in the picture: the Austrian Mili- tary Representative to the EU, Lieutenant General Günter Höfler, and the Chief of Defence Staff, General Othmar Commenda)

On the civilian side, the Committee for Civil- It prepares the Council Decisions and related ian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) financial instruments allowing the deployment takes responsibility for formulating recommen- of CSDP engagements before submitting them dations and giving advice on civilian aspects of to the Council for adoption. This is done in close crisis management to the PSC. In particular, it cooperation with the Foreign Policy Instrument exercises its role with regards to civilian CSDP (FPI) – the Commission service implementing missions’ planning and periodic reports as well the CFSP budget working under the authority as the development of concepts for civilian cri- of the High Representative. RELEX is chaired sis management. The Committee helps ensure a by a representative of the rotating presidency of high degree of coherence in the civilian aspects of the Council. EU crisis management, and promotes improvements in the crisis response capabilities of the EU. The CIVCOM is chaired by an EEAS rep- Entities within the EU resentative. structures In addition, the Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors (RELEX) is responsi- The European External Action Service ble for discussing the legal and financial aspects (EEAS) was created with the Treaty of Lisbon. of CFSP and all of its instruments, including One of the key tasks of the EEAS is to ensure that CSDP. As part of this work, it considers the all the different activities and policies that the EU institutional, legal, logistical and budgetary conducts abroad – the EU’s external action – are dimensions of CSDP missions and operations. consistent and effective. This is particularly impor-

24 1 BACKGROUND

tant because while there is one external action, decision to refocus, extend or terminate a given many of the EU’s external policies are organised mandate. The CMPD is also in charge of devel- across the EEAS and different divisions of the oping partnerships, policies, concepts, capabilities European Commission. Since late 2014, Federica and training for both civilian and military missions Mogherini has headed the European External and operations. It works under the political control Action Service. She succeeded Catherine Ashton, and strategic direction of the Member States in the who was the first High Representative and Vice PSC, acting under the responsibility of the Council President of the European Commission after the of the EU and of the High Representative. entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Within her The EU Military Staff (EUMS)is the source service, there are specific entities responsible for of collective military expertise within the EEAS. It crisis management, called “Security Policy and works under the direction of the Chair of EUMC CSDP structures”. The European Parliament has and under the authority of the High Representa- the right to scrutinise the CSDP and to take the tive. The EUMS coordinates the military instru- initiative of addressing the HR/VP and the Coun- ment as part of the EU comprehensive approach, cil on it, in addition to exercising authority over with a particular focus on military missions and the CFSP budget2. operations, as well as the creation of military capabilities. Its enabling activity includes early warn- Crisis Management and Planning Directorate ing, situation assessment, strategic planning, com- (CMPD) munications and information systems, concept development, training and education, and sup- Director port to partnerships through military-to-military relationships.

EU Military Staff (EUMS) Senior Coordination Military Advisor Director General EU Military Staff Capabilities, Integrated CSDP Policy, Concepts, and Strategic Partnerships Exercises Planning & Agreements Deputy Director General EU Military Staff The Crisis Management and Planning Direc- ACOS ACOS External torate (CMPD) is in charge of strategic, integrated Synchronisation Relations civilian-military planning within the EEAS. It ensures coherence and effectiveness of the CSDP Concepts & Communications & Operations missions and operations as part of the EU’s com- Capabilities Information Systems prehensive approach. This work is conducted through both the strategic planning of new CSDP missions and operations and the strategic review of Intelligence Logistics existing ones – which results in the Member States’

2 Twice a year, the European Parliament holds debates on progress in implementing the CFSP and the CSDP, and adopts reports: one on the CFSP, drafted by the Committee on Foreign Affairs and including elements relating to the CSDP where necessary; and one on the CSDP, drafted by the Subcommittee on Security and Defence. Members of the European Parliament also play an external role by conducting visits and fact finding missions, and in relation to election observation missions.

25 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

The Civilian Planning and Conduct Civilian Planning and Capability (CPCC), the permanent head- Conduct Capability (CPCC) quarters for civilian CSDP missions, assists the Civilian Operations Commander (CPCC direc- Civilian tor) in the operational planning and conduct Operations Commander of civilian CSDP missions. The CivOpsCdr is mandated by Member States to exercise com- Chief of Staff/ Conduct of Mission mand and control at strategic level for all civil- Operations Deputy CivOpsCdr/ Horizontal Coordi- Support Division ian CSDP missions, under the political con- Division nation Division trol and strategic direction of the PSC and the overall authority of the High Representative. Assisted by the Chief of Staff, who is also dep- EEAS Crisis Management Board, geographical, uty CivOpsCdr for the purposes of maintaining multilateral and global EEAS managing directo- continuity of command and control, he/she is rates, the Security Policy and Conflict Prevention the overall commander of all civilian Heads of Directorate (Dir K), the EU Intelligence Analy- Mission and has a duty of care to the personnel sis Centre (INTCEN) and the European Union deployed in the field. CPCC supports CSDP Operations Centre (EU OPCEN) supported by advance planning, in cooperation with CMPD, the EUMS. and leads the operational planning of civilian missions. It also ensures adequate support is provided to the missions and supervises man- CFSP agencies date implementation and mandate delivery. Other entities within the EEAS which are rele- Additionally, three CFSP agencies support the vant for crisis management and CSDP include the Common Security and Defence Policy. • The EU Satellite Centre, whose tasks include supporting CSDP operations, Member States and external partners with imagery analysis and other products; • The EU Institute for Security Studies, providing analyses and policy recommendations to contribute to the wider public debate on foreign affairs, security and defence matters; • The European Defence Agency, supporting the Member States and the Council in their effort to improve European defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the Common Security and Defence Policy as it stands now and develops in the future. Within this intergovernmental structure, the European Security and Defence College has a very specific task, which is to facilitate the creation of a

Photo: EU2015.LV Photo: European security culture. Informal Defence ministers meeting in Riga, March 2015

26 1 BACKGROUND

1.2.2. Crisis response system and management procedures

by Jochen Rehrl

In crisis management, in which the manage- Decisions in a lifecycle ment principle of “learning by doing” should be of missions/operations avoided, the planning processes must be standardised and harmonised; however, the procedure Within the crisis management system and pro- should also remain flexible enough to be adapted cedures, there are four decisive points: to the specific situation and environment. a) Decision on which tools/instruments of the In the aftermath of the Lisbon Treaty, the Euro- crisis management toolbox should be used; pean Union established the EU’s crisis response [involves a number of decision-making bodies, system. This system takes into account the main including relevant Commissioners, Member task of the double-hatted High Representative States and the High Representative] and Vice-President, Federica Mogherini, “to make b) Decision to establish a mission/operation; external action more consistent, more effective and [Council through PSC] more strategic”. When it comes to CSDP action, c) Decision to launch a mission/operation; the crisis management procedures developed sug- [Council through PSC] gestions and guidelines which facilitate the plan- d) Decision to extend, refocus or terminate a mis- ning processes. sion/operation. [Council through PSC] Systems and procedures are put in place in These decisions build upon a broad and compre- order to facilitate a common understanding and hensive understanding of the crisis/conflict/dis- agreement on how things should be done. With aster, including short-, mid- and long-term per- regard to the crisis management toolbox, systems spectives; hence, an overall EU approach to the and procedures ensure that the right tool is used, crisis. The decisions should be based on a com- the best instruments applied and the most effi- mon understanding, shared situational awareness, cient political message sent. The toolbox of the and early and indicative coordinated transition. Union includes diplomatic, political, financial, The above-mentioned points (b), (c) and (d) are development, military and civilian tools. specific decisions to be taken in the context of the The EEAS crisis response system covers crises Common Security and Defence Policy. They will which may affect EU security and interests occur- only apply if CSDP is chosen as the or one of the ring outside the EU, including those which have options to address a crisis. an impact on EU Delegations or any other EU The common understanding of a crisis or a asset or citizen in a third country. It also covers conflict environment is again important when crises occurring inside the EU if they have an it comes to decision-making in the margins of external dimension. [The EU crisis platform has CFSP/CSDP. CSDP remains an intergovern- a coordination function and provides the EEAS mental policy, which means that decisions must and the Commission services with clear political be taken unanimously, i.e. by consensus. This and/or strategic advice for the management of a consensus can be reached positively (‘who is in given crisis.] favour’) or negatively (‘is anyone against’). The Treaty also provides for the possibility for “con-

27 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

stant monitoring influences the advance planning within the security policy structures of the EEAS (CMPD, EUMS, CPCC). When a crisis occurs, the PFCA should help visualise clear political and/or strategic guidance. Relevant EEAS (the geographic desks being in the lead) and Commission services, together with other available expertise, draft this comprehensive document. The outcome of the PFCA is a broad range of options available to the EU on how to tackle a given crisis situation. The options can include financial aid, development assistance, diplomatic means, sanctions and civilian/police/ military actions within the Common Security and Defence Policy. As soon as the Political and Security Commit- Graphic: Jochen Rehrl EU’s options for the Political Framework for Crisis Approach tee (PSC) considers that “CSDP action may be (“EU’s CA-flower) appropriate” (= starting point for CSDP planning), the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) prepares the Crisis Man- structive abstention”. Constructive abstention agement Concept (CMC). This document will is the provision which allows a Member State analyse and propose strategic policy options. to abstain on a vote in Council under the com- The other crisis management structures (CPCC, mon foreign and security policy (CFSP), without EUMS, DepK) as well as the Commission are blocking a unanimous decision. If abstention is involved in the whole planning process. Based on accompanied by a formal declaration, the Member the recommendations of the PSC, the Council State in question is not obliged to apply the deci- adopts a decision to establish the CSDP mission/ sion but must accept that it commits the Union. operation. The Member State must then refrain from any Simultaneously, the informal force sensing action that might conflict with the Union action starts. At this point, Member States are informally based on that decision. In this case, the Member asked for indicative offers which do not represent State does not have to contribute financially to the formal commitments. CSDP action.

Decision to establish a mission/ Decision on the overall EU operation approach On the basis of the Council Decision (legal The Political Framework Crisis Approach act), negotiations start on the Status of Forces (PFCA), which builds the basis for an overall EU Agreement (military SOFA) and/or the Status of approach, assesses the tools/instruments which Mission Agreement (civilian SOMA). Addition- can be used to prevent or resolve a crisis situa- ally, a list of countries that could be invited to tion. It is preceded by a continuous monitoring contribute to the EU-led crisis will be prepared and analysis of the various situations in the world, by CMPD. When the invited third country has which contributes to early warning. This con- not yet signed a “Framework Document” for par-

28 1 BACKGROUND

ticipation in EU-led crisis management missions/ Staff, directed and approved by the EUMC, will operations”, arrangements for their participation provide an “Initiating Military Directive”, which will be defined in a participation agreement. gives the Operation Commander clear guide- This decision is also the starting point for the lines concerning the conduct of the operation. strategic-operational planning, in which the crisis The operation plan, which describes in detail the management structures within the EEAS may draft intent, conduct, strength and organisation of the option papers. These papers illustrate the various mission or operation, is approved by the Council military, civilian or police options, how best the (the RoE and RUoF are thereby authorised), and mission can be accomplished. At that stage, the mil- the decision to launch the mission/operation is itary Operation Commander should be appointed taken by the Council. Between these two Coun- and integrated into the planning process. cil Decisions, a “core team” or “initial mission Due to the permanent function of the CPCC capacity” may be sent to the theatre to prepare the as the operational headquarters for all civilian ground for the deployment of the full mission/ missions, no specific appointment needs to take operation. place. The CPCC director is the Civilian Opera- tions Commander. In this regard, the civilian side has a compara- Decision to launch tive advantage vis-à-vis the military side, because a mission/operation civilian missions have their permanent command and control structures within the CPCC As soon as the mission/operation is launched, (although with a limited number of planners the deployment can start. Ideally well in needed at the operational stage of planning). On advance, the force generation (same expres- the military side, this task is somehow more dif- sion for both civilian and military) process will ficult as the EU has various leadership options; have been conducted. In this process, Member they can make use of the five available national States and partner countries are involved in headquarters from France, Germany, Greece, filling personnel and capability gaps/require- the United Kingdom or Italy. Under the Berlin+ ments. On the military side, one or more force arrangements, the EU bodies can also make use of generation conferences will be held by the the permanent NATO headquarters in Mons/Bel- Operation Headquarters selected. The process gium. Another two options include the activation of filling the posts in the headquarters is called of the Operation Centre within the EUMS or the “force manning”. On the civilian side, the force merger of Operation HQ with the Force HQ to generation is conducted via “calls for contribu- a Mission HQ, as happened with both training tions”. This mechanism was created for adver- missions in Mali and Somalia. tising and requesting applications for mission The Operation Commander establishes the posts from EU Member States and partner concept of operations (CONOPS) and develops countries. an operation plan (OPlan), keeping the Head Under the responsibility of the Council and of of Mission/Force Commander closely involved. the High Representative, the Political and Secu- The military operation plan will also include the rity Committee exercises political control and request for defined “rules of engagements” (RoE). strategic direction of the CSDP mission/opera- The same procedure applies to the civilian mission- tion. The comprehensive approach is imple- specific rules on the use of force (RUoF), if need mented via regular contacts and cooperation. On be, which will be an integral part of the OPLAN. the military side, the Chairman of the EUMC In order to facilitate the process for the devel- acts as the primary point of contact with the EU opment of an operation plan, the EU Military Mission/Operation Commander.

29 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

During the conduct phase of a mission and operation, the CSDP engagement will be constantly assessed. Reporting systems allow a situational awareness at all times and at all levels; lessons learnt processes are put in place and strategic reviews ensure the timely refocus or even termination of CSDP missions/ operations. This review is conducted when the strategic context of the mission/operation changes, halfway through the mandate or when the mandate is nearing its end. Member States remain in the lead and therefore have the final word. The process is led by the crisis management structures. The CSDP missions and operations are assessed in relation to the whole EU engagement in the country or region, in line with the comprehensive approach.

Decision to refocus or

Photo: EU2015.LV Photo: terminate a mission/operation The Crisis Management and Planning Directorate plays a crucial role in drafting the crisis management concept Any change in the mission mandate requires a (in the picture: HR/VP Federica Mogherini and Director new Council Decision. A mission can be termi- CMPD, Gabor Iklódy) nated through a Council Decision or when the mandate expires and is not extended. This political decision is taken on the basis of the strategic review and bearing in mind possible transition strategies.

Althea EUFOR EUNAVFOR EUCAP EUAM EUCAP Artemis (Berlin +) RD Congo Atalanta NESTOR Ukraine Sahel Mali PFCA ✓ ✓ CMC ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ MSOD CSOD ✓ ✓ IMD ✓ ✓ ✓ CONOPS ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ OPLAN/ ROE-RUoF ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

3 weeks 9 months 5 months 6 months 10 months Graphic: European External Action Service Action External Graphic: European Planning in Reality

30 1 BACKGROUND

The Adequate, flexible, coherent “Suggestions for procedures and iterative for coherent, comprehensive EU crisis management” Although the crisis management system and distinguish five phases: procedure seem – at first glance – bureaucratic and slow, they have proven to be adequate, flex- Phase 1: Identification of a crisis and ible, coherent and iterative. development of an overall EU a) Adequate: the crisis management procedures in approach the margins of the CSDP conclude by deploying civilian or military forces abroad. Therefore, Phase 2: Development of the CMC and an adequate procedure was established which establishment of the mission compensates the democratic deficit within the or operation intergovernmental structures of the European Union. Phase 3: Operation planning of the b) Flexible: the system and the procedure remain CSDP mission or operation as flexible as possible. “Fast Tracks”, merger of and decision to launch documents and adjustable meeting formats enable rapid reaction as soon as the political will Phase 4: Deployment of the CSDP mis- exists. sion or operation c) Coherent: in order to keep the planning process consistent and coherent, a core planning Phase 5: Strategic review of the CSDP team will follow the process from the beginning mission or operation – exten- (PFCA) to the end (operation plan). This small sion, refocusing and/or termi- team will be reinforced by other experts from nation the relevant levels (strategic/operational/tactical). An optional fast-track procedure for d) Iterative: the process follows a logical step-by- rapid deployment makes it possible to step approach. An equilibrium must be found speed up the process during phases between political will and what is feasible in 1–3, with the minimal decision-making practical terms, between the intergovernmen- steps, specifically: tal (‘secure the national interest’) and func- • the approval of the CMC, tional logic (‘achieve the mission’), between • the Initiating Military Directive for the political ambition and the budgetary/person- military, nel resources. • the adoption of the Council Decision With regard to more than ten years of experience establishing the mission/operation in the field of crisis management planning, and and bearing in mind the new institutional setting after • the approval of the OPLAN. the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU is well equipped to face the challenges of tomorrow. For more details, see Yves de Kermabon: Crisis Nevertheless, it must be stressed that the political Management Procedures. In: Rehrl (ed.): Handbook for Decision Makers. will is the most important factor in all phases of 2014. pp 43–47. planning.

31 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

1.2.3. Chain of command – command and control for CSDP engagement

by Galia Glume

Member States in the Political and Security Since 2007, the Civilian Planning and Con- Committee (PSC) exercise the political control duct Capability (CPCC) has been the perma- and strategic direction of both civilian and mili- nent headquarters for civilian CSDP missions. tary crisis management missions and operations, The CPCC comprises about 70 staff, mostly EU under the responsibility of the Council and of the civil servants and Seconded National Experts High Representative. They are on top of the chain from EU Member States. The CPCC director is of command. the CivOpsCdr, and is therefore mandated by the Thechain of command is the structure through Council to exercise command and control at stra- which command instructions flow down from the tegic level for the operational planning (Concept political to the strategic, operational and tactical of Operations and Operation Plan) and conduct levels, and through which control is exercised by of all civilian CSDP missions, under the politi- specified procedures and feedback. In particular, cal control and strategic direction of the PSC and command and control (C2) structures define the the overall authority of the High Representative. authority, responsibilities and activities of Heads Assisted by the Chief of Staff, who is also dep- of Mission/Military Commanders in the direc- uty CivOpsCdr for the purposes of maintaining tion and coordination of personnel/forces and in continuity of command and control, he/she is the execution of their respective mandates. the overall commander of all civilian Heads of Although the EU has developed several options Mission and has a duty of care to the personnel for command and control of CSDP missions and deployed in the field. operations, each has a single and identifiable chain As the permanent Operations Headquarters of command for its safe and efficient conduct. (OHQ), the CPCC plays a crucial role in carry- In the field, the Force/Mission Commander ing out operational planning to conceive and set (for military operations/missions) and the Head up civilian CSDP missions up to initial operational of Mission (for civilian missions) exercise com- capability. It later provides continued support and mand and control at theatre level. The Head of follows up on mandate delivery, including by car- Mission (HoM) is directly responsible to the rying out assessments and making any readjust- Civilian Operations Commander (CivOpsCdr). ments required at mission level. In practice, desk The HoM assumes responsibility and leadership officers in the Conduct of Operations Division are of the mission, which he/she represents, in thea- the first point of contact for the ongoing missions tre; they exercise command and control over per- and the first recipients of their reporting products; sonnel, teams and units from contributing States they act as a focal point for the mission in Brussels as assigned by the CivOpsCdr. They also have and assist and advise the CivOpsCdr in the over- administrative and logistical responsibility for sight of the day-to-day conduct of civilian CSDP the assets, resources and information put at the missions. The CPCC Mission Support Division disposal of the mission. For military operations/ ensures the missions are provided with appropriate missions, the Chairman of the EU Military Com- support in their human resources, procurement, mittee acts as the primary point of contact. financial, legal and logistics aspects; the CPCC pre-

32 1 BACKGROUND

pares the draft mission budget in coordination with the Commission (Foreign Policy Instrument) and is associated to related debates in RELEX Working Group. The CPCC also assists the CivOpsCdr in preparing instructions for issuance to the HoMs, and supports the standardisation of civilian CSDP operational procedures through the preparation of operational guidelines, concepts and methodologies to facilitate the planning and conduct of the missions at HQ and field level. The CPCC ensures the mission reporting to Member States (and third contributing States) and coordination with the EEAS management (and Latvia Andrejs Terentjevs, Photo: other stakeholders as appropriate) for the pur- Walter Stevens, Chair of the Political and Security poses of CSDP civilian missions, and supervises Committee, and Patrick de Roussier, Chair of the EU Military Committee, in Riga/Latvia, February 2015 the implementation of political and operational guidance. While this demands constant liaison with the Member States in CivCom, RELEX and other regional working parties of the Council, it is A third option can be activated when the EU the CivOpsCdr and Head of Mission who report decides to draw on the collective capacity of the to the PSC, at regular intervals, regarding progress EU Military Staff: it is the activation of the EU towards mission objectives. ‘Operations Centre’ in the EU Military Staff to For military operations, in the absence of a plan and conduct an autonomous EU operation, permanent Operations HQ (OHQ, at strategic in particular for an operation which requires a level), there are four options for command and civilian as well as a military response and where control. no national OHQ has been identified. The per- First, if a military operation uses NATO assets manent facilities in Brussels (premises and equip- and capabilities under the Berlin-Plus arrangement, staffed by a small core team of eight officers) ments, the preferred option is to establish a EU are designed to enable the Council to establish, at Operations Headquarter in the NATO Allied very short notice, a fully-fledged Operations Cen- Command Operations (ACO) at SHAPE (Mons, tre for a particular operation. Like other OHQs, Belgium). This is for instance the case of EUFOR the military component of the EU OPSCEN will Althea. be organised in divisions (personnel, intelligence, The second option relies on the Member States’ operations, logistics, plans, communications, assets and capabilities and their commitment to training, finance, CIMIC and medical support), provide a suitable EU OHQ: an existing national which will conduct planning under the authority HQ is “multinationalised” to plan and command of the Operation Commander. the EU-led military operation. Five Member States The fourth option was chosen for the two train- have declared that their national OHQs are avail- ing missions in Africa (EUTM Somalia, EUTM able for an autonomous EU operation – France, Mali). In these specific cases, the OHQ and Force Germany, Greece, Italy, and the UK. Respectively Headquarters (FHQ) were merged to form a located in Paris, Potsdam, Larissa, Rome and “mission headquarters” located in theatre. This Northwood, they can provide the EU with the nec- option means that the Mission Commander must essary premises and technical infrastructure to run shoulder the additional burden of covering both a military operation with a fully multinational staff. strategic and operational/tactical aspects.

33 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

Under the responsibility of the Council and of the High Representative Political and Security Committee shall exercise the political control and strategic direction

EU Military Committee Committee for Civilian Aspects shall monitor the proper execution of the military of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) mission/operation and the Chairperson EUMC shall is NOT included in the chain of act as the primary point of contact with the EU command of civilian CSDP missions Mission/Operation Commander

Operation Headquarters (OHQ) Civilian Operation Headquarters (OHQ)

Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) NATO SHAPE EU OHQ EU OpsCen is the permanent headquarters Berlin plus offered by integrated in the for ALL civilian CSDP missions EU Member States EUMS EU Mission HQ merger of OHQ and FHQ

FHQ FHQ FHQ MHQ MHQ MHQ MHQ Graphic: Jochen Rehrl Civilian and military Command and Control Options

The military OHQ is chosen by a PSC deci- on the ground. Each of the five military OHQ sion: Member States in the PSC identify both have been activated to date: Potsdam (EUFOR the future military OHQ and the Operation RDC), Mont Valerien (EUFOR Tchad-RCA), Commander. The OHQ directs the Force Head- Rome (EUFOR Libya1), Northwood (EUNAV- quarters (FHQ, operational level) provided by a FOR Somalia – Operation Atalanta) and Larissa Member State, which carries out the operation (EUFOR RCA). EU Special Representatives (if appointed) and Heads of EU Delegations are not in the chain of command of CSDP missions and operations; however, HoMs can receive from them – without prejudice to the chain of command – local political guidance, especially for the matters in which EUSRs have a particular or stated role. The Head of EU Delegation represents the EU in country, and promotes overall EU political coordination and helps ensure the coordination and coherence of the EU instruments in theatre Photo: European Union European Photo: to attain the political objectives set out by the Videoconference with all ongoing CSDP missions and Council. In some rare cases, especially at the out- operations on 18 December 2014 set of CSDP, EUSRs have been integrated in the (l.t.r: Kenneth Deane, Civilian Operations Commander; Chain of Command until Member States agreed Federica Mogherini, HR/VP of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy; General Patrick De Rousiers, Chair of the on establishing a permanent OHQ for civilian EUMC) CSDP missions.

1 In this particular case, the Council decided on a military operation in support of humanitarian assistance in Libya in April 2011 and OHQ was activated but not implemented.

34 1 BACKGROUND

1.2.4. EU Conflict Early Warning System

Compilation of EU open source1

The 2011 Council conclusions on conflict pre- EU APPROACH TO EARLY WARNING vention building on the Treaty of Lisbon (Article FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION 21c) have provided the strongest mandate yet for the EU to engage in conflict prevention. The EU Conflict Early Warning System (EWS) A shift in emphasis away from reacting to cri- is a tool for EU decision-makers to manage risk ses towards conflict prevention preserves lives and factors and prioritise resources accordingly. The livelihoods that might otherwise be destroyed goal is not ‘prediction’. It will always be difficult when violent conflict erupts. As well as the severe to pinpoint the exact trigger for the eruption of human costs of violent conflict, the World Bank violence in the future. What we do know is that 2011 World Development Report showed that there are certain factors and indicators that fre- civil wars destroy decades of gross domestic prod- quently correlate with violent conflict. If we can uct (GDP) growth on average and it takes coun- identify these and assess the structural, underly- tries years to get back on to a sustainable growth ing risks of violent conflict in a country, we can path. more easily pursue early preventive actions before In order to prevent the emergence, re-emer- situations escalate into crises. gence or escalation of violent conflict, early warn- This is, in essence, upstream conflict preven- ing is indispensable. It is about systematically pro- tion. Moreover, country-risk assessments enable viding the right information to the right people decision-makers to take decisions on preven- at the right time – connecting the dots between tion (and crisis response) based on evidence relevant actors in the field and at headquarters. and a deeper understanding of the underlying It encompasses the systematic collection and causes and dynamics of violence in countries and analysis of information coming from a variety regions. The resulting system has been designed to of sources in order to identify and understand operationalise this approach using a methodology the risks of violent conflict in a country and to and analysis tools tailored to the EU institutional develop strategic responses to mitigate those risks. context and the needs of EU decision-makers.

The EWS ► puts early, upstream conflict prevention on theEU political agenda ► strengthens overall EU coherence on conflict prevention actions ► contributes to strategic planning & programming across the EU ► provides an evidence-base for EU-wide external action in “at risk” countries ► facilitates risk management for EU in conflict affected countries ► stimulates creative thinking on potential EU preventive actions ► promotes relations between EU staff working in and on the countries

1 Source: http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/conflict_prevention/docs/201409_factsheet_conflict_earth_warning_en.pdf

35 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

The EWS methodology exemplifies the EU EWS PROCESS comprehensive approach to External Conflict and Crises (2013). It involves the EU External Action Step One scans for high risk and deteriorat- Service, the European Commission, Member ing situations globally combining a quantitative States and civil society organisations; including index developed by the European Commission those in-country and in headquarters. Joint Research Centre and qualitative input from an EU staff review and expert country analysis. Step Two identifies ‘at risk’ countries that WHY DEVELOP AN EU CONFLICT require further EU analysis and action for preven- EARLY WARNING SYSTEM? tion or to capitalise on peacebuilding opportunities, through inter-service meetings of decision- The Early Warning System seeks to address makers as well as input from Member States. the warning-response gap that is often observed. Step Three consists of analysis (see also sepa- Therefore, the emphasis has been firmly placed on rate Factsheet on Conflict Analysis) that aims to operationalising analysis for more effective pre- combine input from EU staff in the field and at ventive responses. headquarters. This step includes setting explicit objectives in preparation for early preventive or peacebuilding actions. HOW DOES IT WORK? Step Four monitors the resulting actions in terms of their impact on the identified conflict It focuses on the highest global conflict risks, risks or peacebuilding opportunities and feeds ongoing extremely violent situations over a into the next cycle of assessment and analysis. 4-year time frame; communicates the risks or The EWS also directly responds to the Euro- peacebuilding opportunities, and generates com- pean Parliament’s calls for the EU to move away prehensive options for EU-wide actions, which from predominantly reactive responses to crises are monitored as part of the system’s bi-annual towards earlier conflict prevention and to present cycle. a sound basis for decision-making on complex The methodology was designed for the com- conflict situations. plex context of EU external action, which comprises a number of institutions and services. Moreover, it builds on and reinforces existing ADDED VALUE FOR EU EXTERNAL EU tools, for example the InfoRM index for ACTION humanitarian and disaster risk supported by DG ECHO, which enhances synergies between the The EWS is designed to close the gap between two models. early warning and early action by engaging EU staff The development of the EWS has engaged in a shared assessment and analysis process that is academics, analysts, civil society organisations, tied to follow-up action. It supports evidence-based as well as country and conflict experts from decision-making on resource allocation and other Member States and from across the world. This prevention and peacebuilding tools for staff work- collaboration has generated innovations such as ing in and on countries at risk of violent conflict. increasing the focus on changes over time, and It has been pilot-tested in two regions so far. As trend directions, rather than purely static risk. a result, diplomatic initiatives as well as thematic The result is a system that builds on existing projects and conflict analysis have been carried out knowledge and good practice in the early-warn- in these countries according to the identified risks. ing community. The EWS is being rolled out on a global scale.

36 1 BACKGROUND

Step 1 Step 2 Global Conflict Risk Scan Identifying (quantitative & qualitative) “at risk” countries

EU-wide awareness of conflict risks and potential for EU preventive actions

Step 4 Step 3 Reporting on Analysis Early Preventive Action for Early Preventive Action

Visualisation of the four steps of the EU Conflict Early Warning System

COMPLEMENTARY EU-FUNDED EARLY WARNING ACTIVITIES: CIVIL SOCIETY

Through the Instrument contributing to Stabil- flict analysis and the development of response ity and Peace (IcSP), the EU is supporting early- strategies; nurturing collaborative relationships warning capabilities of civil society actors around among in-country actors engaged in early warn- the world. ing; promoting the generation and use of early warning information by in-country actors; and ‘Strengthening Early Warning and Mobilis- by disseminating lessons learnt on early warning ing Early Action’ – International Crisis Group capacity and processes. in partnership with the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office This project aims to strengthen the links “The costs of not preventing war are between early warning, conflict analysis and enormous. The human costs of war in- early response with a view to contributing to bet- cludes not only the visible and immedi- ter conflict analysis and early warning combined ate – death, injury, destruction, displace- with creative but practical recommendations and ment – but also the distant and indirect a more coherent and systematic use of informa- repercussions for families, communities, tion. local and national institutions and economies, and neighbouring countries.” ‘Capacities for Peace’ – Saferworld in partnership with Conciliation Resources Kofi A. Annan This project aims to enhance in-country actors’ Prevention of Armed Conflict capacity and opportunity to engage effectively in Report of the Secretary-General the whole ‘chain’ of early warning. In particular, February 2002, United Nations by strengthening in-country actors’ skills in con-

37 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

OVERVIEW: OTHER SYSTEMS

Since 2007, the EU has cooperated with regional partners on the development of crisis response and early warning as part of EU external action. For example, in 2007, cooperation began with the African Union to enhance the Continental Early Warning System based in Addis Ababa, followed in 2010 by cooperation with the League of the Arab States (LAS) on developing a Regional Crisis Response Centre in Cairo, which was inaugurated by High Representative/Vice-President Catherine Ashton in November 2012. Support has also been provided to the Organisation of American States (OAS), ASEAN, and will soon be extended to the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). These activities have been financed under the EU’s Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace.

African Union (AU) Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) The Continental Early Warning System of the AU is designed to advise the Peace and In the framework of its Mechanism for Security Council on potential conflicts and Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolu- threats to peace and security in Africa. It con- tion, Peacekeeping and Security ECOWAS has sists of an observation and monitoring cen- established its own Early Warning System. It tre, also called ‘the Situation Room’ as well as consists of the Observation and Monitoring Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Centre at the Commission as well as four Zonal Management and Resolution units. Bureaus located in Member States. Based on (http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/28- open-source information, the system is respon- continental-early-warning-system-cews) sible for observing and monitoring sub-regional peace and security indicators, providing timely reports with recommendations to the Office of Southern African Development the President. (http://www.comm.ecowas.int/ Community (SADC) dept/stand.php?id=h_h2_brief&)

In July 2010, SADC launched its Regional Early Warning Centre. The centre is designed European Commission and Inter-Agency to strengthen the SADC mechanisms for con- Standing Committee Task team for flict prevention, management and resolution. It Preparedness and Resilience Index for Risk does so by compiling strategic assessment and Management – InfoRM analysis of data collected at regional level, sharing information on threats to the security and InfoRM presents the first global, objective stability of the region and proposes ways to deal and transparent tool for understanding the with such threats. It is expected to link up with risk of humanitarian crises and disasters. The National Early Warning Centres in all SADC Index identifies countries that are at very high, Member States and the Continental Early high, medium and low levels of risk with regard Warning Centre at the African Union. to emergencies and disasters and explains the (http://www.sadc.int/sadc-secretariat/services- underlying factors causing this risk, based centres/regional-early-warning-centre/) on three dimensions: hazard and exposure;

38 1 BACKGROUND

vulnerability; and lack of coping capacity. It is League of Arab States (LAS) a collaboration of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Task Team for Preparedness and The headquarters of the LAS in Cairo is Resilience and the European Commission led equipped with a crisis room, which extends by ECHO and JRC, but developed in a wide training to Arab diplomats from the Gen- partnership, including OCHA, DFID, WFP, eral Secretariat of the LAS as well as those WHO, FAO, UNICEF, UNISDR, World from Member States. The crisis room is also Bank and others. The index provides a common intended to contribute to an anticipated pan- data set that can be used as a wider support Arab Early Warning System. (http://lasportal. tool across the disaster management field for org/wps/wcm/connect/62fb54804d6d3833 disaster risk reduction and resilience, as well as 8bf29f4eaeef6d81/EU-LAS+Cooperation. for emergency response actions, civil protection pdf?MOD=AJPERES) activities and potentially for other areas such as This project aims to strengthen the links development and climate adaptation (http:// between early warning, conflict analysis and inform.jrc.ec.europa.eu/). early response with a view to contributing to better conflict analysis and early warning combined with creative but practical recommenda- Organisation for Security and Cooperation tions and a more coherent and systematic use in Europe (OSCE) of information.

The Early Warning Mechanism of the OSCE is built into the Conflict Prevention ‘Capacities for Peace’ – Saferworld in Centre, created in 1990 to help reduce the risk partnership with Conciliation Resources of conflict. It collects and analyses information from different sources and offers advice to the This project aims to enhance in-country Secretary-General and the Chairmanship on actors’ capacity and opportunity to engage possible responses to emerging crises. effectively in the whole ‘chain’ of early warn- (http://www.osce.org/secretariat/107485) ing. In particular, by strengthening in-country actors’ skills in conflict analysis and the development of response strategies; nurturing collaborative relationships among in-country actors engaged in early warning; promoting the generation and use of early warning information by in-country actors; and by disseminating lessons learnt on early warning capacity and processes.

39 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

1.2.5. The Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity within the European Union

by Józef Kozłowski and Jose-Miguel Palacios-Coronel

Strategic intelligence focuses on issues at the macro level, while retaining links to tactical and operational issues and outcomes. It is, first of all, a manager’s tool. It is all about decision-making on important and overarching issues. No leader or manager can be expected to be fully effective without factual data. No-one can hope to properly progress further ideas and projects without a high degree of understanding of relevant issues. Strategic intelligence is key to providing this the intelligence input to crisis response planning enhanced level of understanding. Strategic intelli- and assessment for EU military operations, civil- gence, intelligence at tactical and operational lev- ian missions and exercises worldwide. els are all complementary – not competitive. They The EUMS INT Directorate is organised into need to closely interact and preferably, where cir- three branches: Policy, Support and Production. cumstances permit, integrate. This structure was adopted from the very beginning of its existence. The Policy Branch is responsible for developing intelligence-related concepts in EU Intelligence Structures close coordination with relevant EU civilian bodies. It also contributes to the planning of EU military The European Union Military Staff Intelli- operations/civilian missions and prepares scenarios gence Directorate (EUMS INT) and European and intelligence specifications for exercises. Union Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INT- Intelligence Support Branch is in charge of fos- CEN) are the only European External Action tering relations with EU Member States’ DIOs. It Service (EEAS) bodies capable of delivering all- also manages the flow of information and intelli- source intelligence. Their production processes gence between EUMS INT and DIOs, cooperates are based mainly on the support provided by the with the EU Satellite Centre (EU SATCEN), and Member States (MS) Civilian Intelligence / Secu- performs a coordinating role for future develop- rity Services and Defence Intelligence Organisa- ments in the domain of intelligence. tions (DIO), which allows both the civilian and Production Branch is the key component of military dimensions to be covered. EUMS INT. Analysts working in this branch EUMS INT provides intelligence input to early are grouped into thematic and regional sections. warning and situation assessment. It contributes to This entity works in close cooperation with EU the EU Military Staff (EUMS) planning through INTCEN within the Single Intelligence Analysis the provision of intelligence and intelligence plan- Capacity (SIAC) framework to develop together ning expertise. In addition, EUMS INT provides joint, all-source intelligence products.

40 1 BACKGROUND

The SIAC is an internal EEAS arrangement between the EU INTCEN and EUMS INT to bring together the EEAS intelligence analysis capacity into a single functional arrangement (see graphic). EU INTCEN is the most recent name for an entity that was created in 2002 as the EU Joint Situation Centre. It monitors events in order to provide intelligence analysis, early warning and situational awareness to the High Representative/ Vice-President. It focuses particularly on sensitive geographical areas, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other global threats. EU INTCEN is currently composed of two divisions. The Analysis Division – divided into http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/structures-instuments-agencies/eu-military-staff/images/Source: impetus_springsummer_14.pdf sections – provides strategic analysis based on General EU Intelligence Landscape input from the security and intelligence services of the EU Member States. The General and Exter- nal Relations Division deals with legal, adminis- The above-mentioned HR/VP Decision defines trative and Information Technology (IT) issues “intelligence” as information that has been col- and provides open-source support. lected, processed and disseminated for use by decision-makers and other customers and ISA as structures, processes and activities related to intel- EEAS Intelligence Support ligence. It aims to optimise the intelligence func- Architecture tion within the EEAS and encourages close cooperation and coordination across EU institutions In parallel with the establishment of the EEAS and between intelligence stakeholders. and against the existing environment, EU intelli- The ISA includes two central structures – the gence elements have initiated the development of Intelligence Steering Board (ISB) and Intelligence guidelines for intelligence support for the EEAS. Working Group (IWG). The Secretariat function The idea was to take into account all relevant for both ISB and IWG is provided jointly by EU developments and design an intelligence support INTCEN and EUMS INT. The ISB defines intel- package: ligence requirements and priorities at the strategic • to define responsibilities; level and endorses structural, organisational and • to provide direction and guidance; policy measures required to improve the Architec- • to create provisions for effective production ture. It also provides guidance to address deficien- and fast, secure and reliable dissemination of cies in the field of security. The Board is chaired intelligence products. by the HR/VP or the EEAS Executive Secretary- The outcome of this whole process was the HR/ General (ESG). VP Decision from 2012 establishing the organi- The IWG further defines, specifies and adjusts sation and functioning of the EEAS Intelligence EEAS intelligence requirements and priorities. In Support Architecture (ISA). The ISA also includes particular, it proposes the strategic intelligence provisions on coordination and liaison with the direction and Prioritised Intelligence Require- MS intelligence organisations, the European ments (PIR) for the intelligence. The IWG syn- Commission and international organisations. chronises the tasking of the Single Intelligence

41 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

Analysis Capacity (SIAC), defines SIAC product However, since the end of 2010 and the transfer range, and develops and monitors a feedback of EU SITCEN and EUMS to EEAS, production mechanism. The IWG is co-chaired by the has grown by about 40 % annually. This can be Director EU INTCEN and Director EUMS attributed to an increase in the number of intel- INT. ligence customers and a continued increase in the demand for intelligence products.

Intelligence Dimension of the EU Comprehensive Approach What the Future Holds for EU Intelligence In 2006, based on the framework of the follow- up to the Hampton Court process, the Secretary- With the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty General/High Representative (SG/HR), Javier and the establishment of the EEAS, new chal- Solana, proposed the establishment of a more lenges emerged for the EU intelligence commu- effective situation and risk assessment capacity. nity. New organisational structures, new actors The idea at that time was to bring together, in a and new customer requirements must take into functional way, analytical capacities from both the account a re-focused intelligence support. In a EU Situation Centre (EU SITCEN, now renamed rapidly changing strategic environment, the need EU INTCEN) and EUMS INT, thus benefiting for accurate and timely intelligence products has from a wide EU knowledge base for producing also become even more visible. enhanced and reliable intelligence. This resulted To meet all these challenges, further systemic in the SIAC arrangement initiated by directors transformation is needed. At this stage, it is essen- of EUMS and EU SITCEN at the beginning of tial to revise and optimise processes, change the 2007. In addition, and in line with the compre- information-sharing intelligence culture within hensive approach concept, the EU intelligence the EU, adopt suitable technology and adjust community intensified its efforts to widen the the conceptual approach to the intelligence sup- scope of access to and utilisation of all the infor- port function. In short, promote intelligence mation and data already available within the EU. within the EU, as well as produce intelligence for In this way, EU INTCEN and EUMS INT the EEAS with a more operational and dynamic embarked on a comprehensive approach at a very approach. early stage. They have become one of the EU To this end, the enhancement of cooperation forerunners in the field of producing synergies between EU INTCEN and EUMS INT will be by a joint civilian-military approach. However, constantly examined and focused on streamlin- it is necessary to note that irrespective of internal ing/harmonising working processes, and provid- arrangements, the quality of the SIAC products ing additional synergetic effects. This also com- still depends predominantly on the value of the prises the development and implementation of a contributions from Member States. Although future secure EU intelligence domain within the some hurdles have yet to be overcome, the wider EEAS IT systems support architecture as a enhanced effect of the SIAC approach to intelli- vital prerequisite for exploiting fully the potential gence has already been widely recognised by most of enhanced intelligence support. actors within the EU. Between 2007 and 2010 production was relatively stable and EU INTCEN and EUMS INT worked in close cooperation to generate together the whole range of all-source intelligence products.

42 1 BACKGROUND

1.3. COOPERATION AND COOrdination 1.3.1. The EU comprehensive approach

by Jean-Philippe Scherer

For decades the European Union and Member ades ago, is a glaring example of today’s crises. The States have been working together on solutions for EU is still actively supporting the new federal gov- major crises over the world. The EU is the largest ernment on the road to recovery, after several wars economy on earth and a area where people have and crises. The events in Ukraine in 2014 also been living in peace for 70 years. But it is also the reminded the EU how a fragile situation can rap- largest donor of development aid, actively engaged in idly turn into violent conflict, right on its borders. supporting countries in trouble. EU external action, One year later, Europe is still engaged in difficult based on the vision of 28 nations, encompasses a mediation to reach an agreement between the par- wide range of activities in the area of diplomacy, ties. Nevertheless, the wounds left by the conflict humanitarian aid, cooperation and security and will have serious consequences and deserve special defence. attention in the future. Despite Europe’s significant resources and Nowadays there is remote contamination extensive experience, supporting fragile states between fragile countries, as crises are spread- remains a very tough challenge. Poverty, crimi- ing fast through media and social networks. The nality, corruption, famine and violence, amongst expansion of Da’esh in Iraq has invigorated sup- many other factors, are often interlaced in modern porters of radical Islam elsewhere, and has also crises. It is increasingly difficult to address each stimulated other extremist organisations in the problem separately, and the EU is gradually try- Horn of Africa or in the Sahel. This spill-over ing to synchronise all civilian and military instru- has a concrete impact on societies. External and ments in a single inclusive approach. internal factors of instability are now dynamically This combined effort, also called the compre- connected through the internet, causing or nour- hensive approach, aims to increase the efficiency ishing new crises. Today’s threats are much more of our response to the complexity of crises. The diffuse, unpredictable and difficult to contain concept is continuously being improved and now than in the past. promotes a better integration of local capacities Therefore a continuous analysis of crises and and the early involvement of regional actors in the conflicts is essential to understand the problems pursuit of solutions. and identify options for action. The comprehensive approach addresses four essential questions: What precisely is this crisis? What should we do? Do we Explosive crises need long-term have the response capacity? How can we do it suc- therapies cessfully? Of course, any answer has to be realistic, meaning that the EU and its partners should Crises come fast, but they may last a long time. have sufficient resources and the ability to ensure The conflict in Somalia, which began three dec- implementation.

43 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

the fUll range of eU structures, and the fi rst missions and operations instrUments were launched in 2003. Th e entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009 was also a Over years, the EU has adopted essential tools decisive step. It established the External Action to support fragile states and tackle confl icts and Service (EEAS) and gave greater resources and crises around the world. Th e European Devel- coherence to CSDP through a new institutional opment Fund (EDF) was established under the framework. Th e EU now acts as a global political Treaty of Rome in 1957, and has continuously player to maintain international security through improved so that the EU is today the world’s larg- diplomatic, political, economic, civilian and est donor of development aid. European devel- military operational actions with an across-the- opment policy has also undergone important board approach to crises. Since 2003, CSDP has reforms since 2000 to more eff ectively reduce deployed 35 missions and operations all over the poverty worldwide. world; 17 are currently active in Africa, the Mid- Th e EU is also widely engaged in emergency dle East, Asia and Eastern Europe. assistance through its Humanitarian Aid and Civil EU external action is not limited to develop- Protection department (DG ECHO) established ment, humanitarian aid and security. Th e Euro- in 1992. Funding from the offi ce reaches over pean Commission and the various European 120 million people in 90 countries. ECHO spends agencies are also engaged in international coop- EUR 800 million a year of its initial budget on eration in various domains such as environment, humanitarian projects through over 200 partners trade, migration, justice, fi shery, or research. All such as the Red Cross, NGOs or UN agencies. these external activities receive the active support Th e Common Security and Defence Policy of European diplomacy through the EEAS direc- (CSDP) is another very important element of torates, the EU Special Representatives in priority EU external action. In 2000, the EU offi cially regions and a remarkable network of 140 Delega- created civilian and military crisis management tions all over the world.

■ Environment protection ■ Health ■ Rule of law ■ Private Sector Development ■ Countering terrorism ■ Development ■ EC Flight ■ Security Sector Development ■ Recovery ■ Education ■ Governance, security and support to civil society ■ Water, sanitation and energy ■ Maritime security ■ Infrastructure ■ Support to civil society ■ Rural development and food security ■ Governance, reconciliation and security ■ Security and defence Graphic: Jean-Philippe Scherer Current EU engagement in the Horn of Africa (€m)

44 1 BACKGROUND

Today, the EU is probably the most inclu- their actions. One of the priorities is to maximise sive organisation in terms of instruments and civilian-military synergies. In the field of infor- capacity, so it is comprehensive by nature. As an mation, the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity example, it is currently funding over 150 differ- (SIAC) combines civilian intelligence (EU INT- ent activities in the Horn of Africa, covering all CEN) and military intelligence (EUMS Intelli- identified areas of fragility. gence Directorate) and has been producing joint The EU is continuously improving its instru- assessments since 2007. In 2012, Member States ments to meet the challenge of fast-moving cri- also activated the EU Operations Centre in the ses. In the last few years the EEAS has created Horn of Africa to support CSDP missions and to several early warning and response systems to facilitate better interaction with the Commission. better anticipate and manage the risks, while the Its mandate has been extended to the Sahel region European Commission has developed sophisti- and two liaison officers are currently deployed in cated tools to better assess and evaluate the pro- DG DEVCO to enhance the exchange of infor- gress of beneficiaries. mation and establish synchronisation mecha- The comprehensive approach also means that nisms between CSDP and development activities. there is no discontinuity in the proposed solu- The EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs tions, and most EU structures are combining and Security Policy and Vice-President of the both geographic and thematic branches to cover European Commission (HR/VP) has affirmed the both the specific elements and the horizon- intention to reduce the gap between short- and tal issues of a crisis. Ultimately, the full range long-term instruments, including CSDP and of instruments provides the EU with a unique development or humanitarian aid, through more external capacity, but of course these numerous effective cooperation between services. lines of development and the players involved A second priority for the EU is to integrate need permanent coordination. its action in the local, regional and international efforts. This hard work applies mainly to the EU diplomacy efforts through the different contact We do better in concert groups, meetings, and conferences. Mobilising international partners and empowering regional Like in an orchestra, each EU instrument has or local actors is paramount to engendering effec- its own operation and technique. As the score tive third parties’ commitment to work in concert drives the music, strategy and plans usually pro- with the EU’s initiatives. The EU is already work- vide consistency to the EU approach. But this is ing closely in this direction with partners such not enough, and coordination between the differ- as the UN, NATO or the African Union – and ent players is necessary to achieve a rounded per- national civil societies. formance. Both internal and external coordination efforts Typically, there are four levels of internal need to be actively supported by a joint communi- coordination (tactical, operational, strategic and cation plan, with the objective of explaining the role political) and three levels of external coordination of each actor in the comprehensive approach. Imple- (local, regional and international). The number of menting organisations work better when their con- EU actors and partners in a theatre can be very tribution is clearly defined and acknowledged by large, so it is always extremely complex to syn- others. Communication is also essential in order to chronise all the activities of all stakeholders at all convince all EU actors and their partners that the levels. collective result critically depends on all individual The EU measures the challenge daily through efforts, and that each instrument plays a key role in operating many instruments and coordinating the overall crisis resolution process.

45 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

EU Commissioners International cooperation, EUSR Horn of Africa Transport, Development EU Delegations: & Humanitarian aid, Maritime affairs, Kenya, Djibouti, Somalia, Tanzania, Trade, Research … Ethiopia, Eritrea, Seychelles, Political & Security Committee Comoros, Mauritius, Uganda … PMG, CIVCOM and EUMC EEAS Directorates MD II Africa, CROC, K, CCT … DIPLOMACY

POLICY

STRATEGY

ACTIVITIES

EDG DEVCO, ECHO, EU OPCEN MARE, MOVE, HOME, CPCC RTD CSDP Missions FPI and Operations: CMPD EUNAVFOR Atalanta, EUMS EUTM Somalia, EUCAP Nestor EU Partners UNICEF, FAO, Interpol, UNODC, FEI, IGAD, AFD, IOC, COMESA, EAC, Care … Graphic: Jean-Philippe Scherer The EU comprehensive approach to the Horn of Africa

Managing priorities is the key cooperation can hardly address these two problems before the violence is reduced to a certain A paradox of the comprehensive approach, level. In contrast, military action cannot stabilise and probably one of the major challenges, is to a situation for long if the root causes of a conflict be inclusive and selective at the same time. The or a crisis have not been addressed. multiplicity of instruments inevitably raises the In other words, all instruments are interde- sensitive question of priorities. Each crisis has a pendent. They must be implemented simultane- specific profile and requires a well-planned and ously but in harmonised plans of action. tailored response over time. Violent phases typi- Short- and long-term activities are also inter- cally require short-term actions in the form of active because they operate in the same environ- CSDP missions/operations or humanitarian aid, ment at the same time. However their duration while periods of relative calm usually present the and start and end dates are not identical, so syn- best opportunities to develop long-term activities chronisation and transition between activities is such as cooperation or education. essential for the coherence and efficiency of the However, the reality is usually more complex, EU’s external action. because the combination of instruments can The continuity of actions ensures consistency create an induced effect, and there are always and is a key factor for success. The course of events many possible dosages of efforts throughout a should not totally jeopardise the EU’s strategy, but crisis. ignoring some changes can challenge its activities. Tailored solutions are never easy to implement The real difficulty is to maintain a balance between and require a solid plan. Although the origin of a the reaction to events and a coherent plan. Crisis crisis is often related to poverty and corruption, management structures are perfectly aware of this

46 1 BACKGROUND

Crisis Level

Total EU Effort

Humanitarian Aid

Security & Defence

Diplomacy

Cooperation & Development Peace Fragility Escalation Confl ict Stabilisation Relapse Recovery Peace Graphic: Jean-Philippe Scherer EU efforts throughout a crisis

and breaking news will inevitably generate new durable solutions. Th is is why both short- and pressures. long-term instruments are necessary and the EU A possible response to fast-changing situations must implement them simultaneously through- is to secure key activities but also to adjust priori- out the spectrum of a crisis. Patience, pugnacity ties and budget allocations more frequently. In any and adaptability are usually the three fundamental case, strategic and operational planners must keep factors in crisis management. in mind that modern crises are usually lengthy, and sacrifi cing long-term activities to short-term reaction will usually degrade the fi nal result. learning and improving Today the EU is considered to use soft power, as it usually favours long-term eff ort. Some may Th e EU is facing a changing international consider this approach to show a lack of reac- environment and has to adapt its instruments tion, but they should also recognise the EU’s per- on a continual basis. Financial and management severance and stability of commitment in tough optimisation is always sought, and each structure situations. Th e EU has made notable progress in is regularly required to do better with less. Th is adapting its procedures, inter alia by transferring exercise is necessary but it also has some limits, funds from cooperation to humanitarian aid in and carried to excess it could degrade the effi - the event of emergencies, for example in the Sahel ciency of EU as a whole. An alternative is to region in response to the dramatic impact of Boko optimise the coordination between structures in Haram. order to identify and use synergies. Th is princi- A rapid response is sometimes necessary in the ple is not new and is applied every day in team face of an explosive situation, but it rarely off ers sports such as football or rugby.

47 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

Fragmented Interaction Coordination Cooperation Synergies Activities Comprehensive Exchange Joint Combined Resources Approach Information Planning Activities Sharing Graphic: Jean-Philippe Scherer Improving the EU comprehensive approach

It is not easy to apply it to large organisations and operations are sensibly benefiting economic for many reasons. The number of EU actors is cooperation and development programmes. As an much higher than in a sports team, the objective example, piracy has been dramatically reduced in is not as simple as to score a goal and there is the Indian Ocean thanks to the combined efforts not a unique coach or captain to drive the play- of civilian and military commitment including the ers. The more complex EU decision mechanisms operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta and the civilian become and leadership is diluted, the more inter- CSDP mission EUCAP Nestor. But in order to nal coordination will be essential. address the root causes of piracy in Somalia, the The EU still has significant room for improve- EU is investigating how to secure positive results ment in many directions. The first area of pro- by promoting the fishing economy and eradicating gress concerns shared analysis, common strate- poverty along the Somali coast. gic vision and joint planning. These factors have The EU is currently making significant pro- been seriously improved in recent years and the gress on synergies and synchronisation across effort is ongoing and accelerating. Today the EU its external action instruments. The increasing institutions are using common strategic frame- number of initiatives between the EEAS and works for their external actions. During plan- the European Commission agencies, but also ning phases, consultation between EU services between the EU and its Member States, is a has become the rule to foster common under- positive sign. Wide consultations, comprehen- standing (of the crisis, of the course of action sive platforms and workshops, common key proposed) from the starting phase of a crisis or leader engagement at regional level, coordina- in view of preventing it. New crisis management tion meetings in Delegations, and the appoint- procedures in 2013 have supported this process, ment of coordinators or liaison officers – joint with for instance the introduction of the ‘Politi- programming efforts are positive elements con- cal Framework for Crisis Approach’ – an inter- tributing to the improvement and optimisation service endeavour contributing to the enhance- of EU efforts to tackle crises and conflicts world- ment of shared analysis. Planning documents wide. This effort will undeniably continue in the integrate more detailed provisions about coordi- future with a common information strategy and nation and mutual support. more cross-fertilisation between EU actors. In One of the most important challenges for the the same logic, the EU has recently defined the comprehensive approach today is probably to plan “Train & Equip” concept, with the aim of better and to manage the transition between short-term synchronising the training and capacity-building and long-term instruments, but here, too, progress efforts of CSDP missions with Commission- is ongoing. Transition strategies for CSDP missions sponsored projects and the equipment provided

48 1 BACKGROUND

by donors in order to maximise the effects for beneficiary countries. This initiative is to result in a comprehensive approach to capacity-building. It is also anticipated that this modernisation will grow further through the restructuring of the EEAS in 2016-2017. In the spirit of the comprehensive approach, crisis management structures should be strengthened and simplified in order to become more efficient. The aim will not only be to become more responsive, but will also focus on prevention whenever possible.

Photo: EEAS/EUFOR RCA Conclusion

The EU comprehensive approach is a way of flict situations. However it does not dictate any understanding the requirements of fragile coun- particular approach for specific areas or regions, tries, crises and conflicts, proposing realistic solu- and respects the methodology and imperatives of tions and coordinating actions for better results. the different actors. The large number of European instruments and The EU instruments have been improving over actors make this synchronisation a complex exer- the years with just one objective: doing more, cise, but it is also a fantastic opportunity for the doing it right, and doing it better. In practice this development of synergies and innovative solu- effort is reflected in greater information-sharing, tions. a joint consultation before planning and increas- In terms of policy, the basic principles of the ingly, a culture of coordination. The ongoing comprehensive approach remain clear – it is about work on the operationalisation of the comprehen- working better together, and enhancing the coher- sive approach will further support the optimisation ence, effectiveness and impact of the EU’s policy of the EU’s – and Member States’ – engagements and external action, in particular in crisis and con- in favour of peace and security worldwide.

Key steps towards the comprehensive approach

In December 2013, the High Representative and the European Commission presented a new policy paper on the EU comprehensive approach in the form of a Joint Communication: Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, The EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises, 11.12.2013 JOIN(2013). In the spring of 2014, these policies and priorities were discussed with EU Member States, following consultations with a broad spectrum of Council stakeholders from the political, development, military and humanitarian domains. In May 2014, the Foreign Affairs Council gave its full support to this concept and agreed a set of ambitious Council conclusions on the subject matter, including on the way forward. See the Council conclusions on the EU’s comprehensive approach, Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 12 May 2014.

49 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

1.3.2. CSDP/FSJ link

by Michał Narojek

European Security Strategy (“Europe is a prime target for organised crime. This internal threat to our security has an important external dimension”). Council conclusions on possible cooperation mechanisms between civilian ESDP missions and Europol as regards the mutual exchange of information (“Exchanges of information, which ensure continuity in the fight against organised crime, can help to reinforce security and stability, both in the areas where ESDP missions are deployed, in accordance with their role, and in the EU”). Comprehensive Concept for ESDP Police Strengthening Missions (“When planning ESDP police missions, consideration should be given in each

Photo: EUROPOL, Alun John EUROPOL, Photo: case to inclusion in the mandate of the operations, Europol’s Operations Centre – experts supporting an inter- from the outset, of assistance to the host country in national investigation in real time, November 2012 fighting Organised Crime, in particular when the organised crime is originating from or transiting through that host country affects the EU Member States.”) Strategic perspective – Internal Security Strategy (“A concept of internal key EU documents security cannot exist without an external dimension, since internal security increasingly depends to a large Freedom, Security and Justice (FSJ) and the extent on external security”.) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Commission Communication on the latter are distinct policy areas governed by different Strategy (“Internal security cannot be achieved in rules and implemented by different EU entities. isolation from the rest of the world, and it is therefore However, it is clear that strong links between the important to ensure coherence and complementarity two are necessary, as key security problems faced between the internal and external aspects of EU secu- by the EU are of a global nature. Proper coordi- rity”.) nation and the coherent use of tools available in Europol too, in the conclusions and future stra- both areas seem indispensable. tegic considerations of its EU Organised Crime Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union Threat Assessment 2011, stated that “the distinc- explicitly states that both the Union’s security and tion between the external and internal security of the the rule of law need to be safeguarded and sup- EU has been blurred”. ported by external actions. The Council, in its conclusions on setting The links between the two spheres are reflected the EU’s priorities for the fight against serious in many strategic EU documents: and organised crime between 2014 and 2017,

50 1 BACKGROUND Photo: Kristian Berlin, Sweden Photo: stresses that “the external dimension of internal It also calls for linking policies and internal and security (…) ought to be taken into account in external action, stating that implementing the Council priorities and the EU “the emergence beyond Europe’s borders of organ- policy cycle.” ised crime, terrorism, or mass migration associated The Council instructs COSI1 to “liaise with the with violent conflict can have a direct impact on relevant Council preparatory bodies to ensure that the security, stability and interests of the EU, its the implementation of these crime priorities is coor- Member States and EU citizens”. dinated with other policy areas, particularly in the The document gives a specific example of al- Union’s external action”. Qaeda destabilising Somalia and states that The Communication on the EU’s comprehen- “terrorist organisations can act to transmit the ter- sive approach to external conflict and crises men- rorist threat directly back into the EU”. tions a number of global challenges that affect the It also calls for EU’s internal security, such as illicit trafficking, “better use of the diplomatic and external rela- cyber security, maritime security, radicalisation tions means at the disposal of the EU project and and terrorism. It calls for shared analysis and pro- defend its interests linked to internal policies and poses, inter alia, the following action: global issues.” “Strengthen early, pro-active, transparent and Another measure provided for is to regular information-sharing, co-ordination and “seek to identify and raise awareness of policies team-work among all those responsible in the EU’s and instruments that have both an internal and Brussels headquarters and in the field (including external dimension and highlight potential in EU Delegations, CSDP missions and operations, both directions.” Member States and EU Special Representatives, The Executive Secretary-General of the EEAS EU agencies as appropriate).” made the following suggestions for crisis manage-

1 Standing Committee on Internal Security established under Article 71 TFEU.

51 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

ment procedures for CSDP crisis management nal and internal security. The document provides operations to the PSC: a good explanation of the EU’s policy and gives “CSDP advance planning by CMPD, supported valuable guidelines for future action: by CPCC and EUMS, will engage with other “(…)The interdependence between internal and Services, such as Geographic, Conflict Preven- external security is constantly growing and the tion/Peace-building/Mediation, EEAS Security, renewed EU’s Internal Security Strategy should Human Rights and Democracy, EU Delega- take into account the external security dimension, tions, the Commission (FPI, ECHO, DEVCO, and vice versa, the Union’s external and develop- HOME, ELARG), EU Agencies (EUROPOL, ment policies should take into account the relevant FRONTEX, EUROJUST), Member States principles of the EU’s Internal Security Strategy. embassies, and NGOs as required. Where appro- a) Internal security should be more systemati- priate the EEAS will consult with international cally addressed as part of the EU external rela- organisations (UN, AU, NATO etc.), and third tions policies, and strong coherence should be states that may have a role/interest in the resolu- ensured in any foreign policy with regard to tion of the crisis.” security-related issues. Migration and refugee Communication of the Commission “An open policies and cooperation with third countries and secure Europe: making it happen” also indicates in tackling criminal phenomena, including close links between external and internal security facilitating illegal immigration and trafficking aspects. It states the following: in human beings, should be seen as an integral “In an ever increasingly interdependent world, part of the Union’s external and development Home Affairs issues need to be embedded in the policies. Special attention should be placed on EU’s overall external policy, allowing for rein- establishing an effective common return policy forced dialogue and cooperation with third coun- and enforcing readmission obligations in agree- tries. Consistency and coherence with the external ments with third countries. policy will help in anticipating challenges, better b) Relations with third countries should enhance reaching the EU’s objectives (…).” cooperation, including operational coopera- Moreover, in a subchapter entitled “Building inter- tion, on the EU policy cycle’s current and future nal security in a global context” it states that priorities as well as cooperation on addressing “European internal security also means acting radicalisation, and recruitment to terrorism beyond EU borders and in cooperation with third and foreign fighters and returnees phenomena. country partners. Radicalisation, fight against (…) The European External Action Service is trafficking of human beings and fight against drug invited to play a strong role in ensuring links trafficking for example require such cooperation”. between EU internal and external security are The European Council in its conclusions of 26/27 recognised and acted upon. June 2014 stated the following: c) When developing external relations strategies, “The answer to many of the challenges in the area due consideration should be given to the princi- of freedom, security and justice lies in relations with ples of the EU’s Internal Security Strategy. third countries, which calls for improving the link d) The cooperation between all actors involved in between the EU’s internal and external policies.” internal and external security in combating the The Justice and Home Affairs Council in its Con- challenges identified above calls for stronger coor- clusions on the development of a renewed Euro- dination on security issues, in particular between pean Union Internal Security Strategy adopted on EU Delegations and Member States’ embassies. 4 December 2014 builds on the above-mentioned Particular emphasis should be given to the better guidelines of the European Council and empha- use of and interconnection between EU agen- sises the need to forge a proper link between exter- cies, and with regard to their role in external

52 1 BACKGROUND

relations. Specific efforts are required to enhance coherence of action between civilian missions with a security related mandate, EC instruments and Member States’ bilateral initiatives. The principles contained in the CSDP/FSJ road map on strengthening ties between the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the area of freedom, security and justice (FSJ) need to be implemented and fully exploited.” The need for stronger links between external and internal security was clearly expressed by High Representative/Vice-President (HRVP) Federica Mogherini in her remarks made after the Foreign Affairs Council of 19 January 2015. “As you know, we started our work with the point on terrorism, reacting not only to what happened in Paris earlier this month but also to a common Photo: Marcin Kwarta, Marcin Poland Photo: threat that is there not only for Europeans but also countries and people in the Arab world, in Africa, in Asia. I have to say that, probably for the first time, there was a real deep awareness of the need to work together and – I was surprised to know for home affairs) and act under different legal regimes. the first time – the Foreign Affairs Council had a Cultural differences and traditional separation of discussion with our EU Counter terrorism coordi- competences also play a role. Still, good progress nator Gilles de Kerchove.” is being made. Regular joint meetings of the two In her remarks, the HRVP also stated that the EU main committees dealing respectively with exter- plans nal and internal security (Political and Security “to have security attachés in the European Union Committee (PSC) and Standing Committee on Delegations in relevant countries. This means reg- Internal Security, (COSI)) that started in June ular contact among professionals on our side and 2011 mark the strengthening of institutional and on the country that is hosting the Delegation’s side operational links between the two areas. to develop cooperation on security issues and coun- The EEAS, in order to translate strategic con- terterrorist issues.” cepts into concrete actions, developed a docu- This must be seen as a very practical step towards a ment “Strengthening Ties between CSDP and more coherent security policy and stronger opera- FSJ – Draft Road Map” that covers, amongst tional links between FSJ and external action. other things, planning and information exchange. It supports closer cooperation between CSDP and Freedom, Security and Justice actors, Europol and Operational coordination and Frontex in particular. cooperation Numerous examples of operational cooperation could be given. Frontex cooperated closely with the Strengthening ties between FSJ and CSDP is a EEAS on the use of space imagery, via the EU Sat- gradual process as the services involved have differ- ellite Centre, under the Copernicus framework. ent competences and objectives. They are governed The agency contributed to the strategic and oper- by different stakeholders (military, diplomatic or ational planning of the EU-led Border Assistance

53 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

Secure Information Exchange need for close CSDP-FSJ cooperation. The mis- Network Application (SIENA) sion, although conducted with military means, has obvious police functions and fights piracy, SIENA is a state-of-the-art tool designed to enable which is a criminal activity. It collects personal swift, secure and user-friendly communication data “with a view to prosecution”. In accordance and exchange of operational and strategic crime- with its mandate, the mission forwards personal related information and intelligence, including data of suspects to Interpol. For many years there classified information. were no equivalent provisions facilitating the More than 600 000 SIENA messages were ex- exchange of information between the mission changed in 2014. Currently there are approximate- and Europol, although the agency has a dedicated ly 4 700 users in 573 competent authorities. team of experts dealing with piracy, and it supported an international joint investigative team tacking this very phenomenon. This was partially Mission in Libya (EUBAM). This may serve as supplemented by an indirect exchange of infor- an example of the EU effectively using an agency’s mation facilitated by the UK, which acted as a unique expertise for designing a CSDP mission. voluntary intermediary, as well as by Interpol. Many CSDP missions deal with law enforce- From the operational perspective, where timing is ment and thus have access to valuable law essential, this was not an optimal solution. This enforcement information relevant to the EU’s was changed by Council Decision 2008/851/ internal security. In exceptional cases, such as CFSP of 21 November 2014, which explicitly EULEX Kosovo, missions have executive pow- mentions Europol as a recipient of Atalanta’s data. ers, and hence gather highly relevant operational Cooperation in strategic analysis is also an area of intelligence that could be used at the EU level, importance. The EEAS’ IntCen already cooper- in particular by Europol. Cooperation between ates with Europol on counter-terrorism issues and Europol and EULEX is based on an agreed pro- both entities contribute to each other’s reports and cedure which defines details of the information assessments. Europol’s annual TE-SAT3 may serve exchange and identifies Member States which vol- as an example. This cooperation should develop unteered to facilitate communication, namely the further – a comprehensive picture of threats, based Europol National Units of Finland, Sweden and on different points of view (military, intelligence, the UK. In practice, however, the information police) could greatly contribute to a better, more exchange is facilitated by Sweden only. Europol’s consistent response. secure communication system SIENA2 is used for The links and the need for greater consist- the exchange of operational information. ency between FSJ and CSDP are well reflected in Since October 2011 when the procedure was numerous EU strategic documents, which rightly implemented, about 700 SIENA messages have identify many areas that require cooperation, such been exchanged. A steady increase in the number as planning, information exchange and strategic of messages exchanged can be observed. analysis. While there are good examples of work- Europol also supports EULEX’ witness protec- ing level cooperation between FSJ and CSDP tion programme, facilitating the necessary coop- actors, much remains to be done. As the general eration with Member States’ services. strategic framework is in place, much depends Atalanta, the EU mission against piracy off the on the pro-activeness and initiative of the experts Somali coast, offers another example showing the involved, including the readers of this handbook.

2 Secure Information Exchange Network Application. 3 EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report.

54 1 BACKGROUND

The policy cycle

In 2010, the EU established a multi-annual policy cycle. Its aim is to ensure that the fight against serious international and organised crime is coherent and properly coordinated. The Council selects priorities for the fight against serious and organised crime based on Europol’s EU Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA). The following priorities were chosen for the period between 2014 and 2017: • To disrupt organised crime groups (OCGs) involved in the facilitation of illegal immigration and operating in the source countries at the main entry points to the EU on the main routes and, where evidence-based, on alternative routes. To reduce OCGs’ abuse of legal channels for migration, including the use of fraudulent documents as a means of facilitating illegal immigration. • To disrupt OCGs involved in intra-EU human trafficking and human trafficking from the most prevalent external source countries for the purposes of labour exploitation and sexual exploitation; this includes those groups using legal business structures to facilitate or disguise their criminal activities. • To disrupt OCGs involved in the production and distribution of counterfeit goods violat- ing health, safety and food regulations and those producing sub-standard goods. • To disrupt the capacity of OCGs and specialists involved in excise fraud and Missing Trader Intra Community (MTIC) fraud. • To reduce the production of synthetic drugs in the EU and to disrupt the OCGs involved in synthetic drugs trafficking. • To reduce cocaine and heroin trafficking to the EU and to disrupt the OCGs facilitating the distribution in the EU. • To combat cybercrimes committed by OCGs which generate substantial criminal prof- its, e.g. online and payment card fraud, cybercrimes which cause serious harm to their victims such as online child sexual exploitation, and cyber-attacks which affect critical infrastructure and information systems in the EU. • To reduce the risk posed by firearms to the public, including combating illicit trafficking in firearms. • To combat organised property crime committed by mobile organised crime groups. Member States are also encouraged to take into account, among other factors, regional dimensions such as the Western Balkans and West Africa, money laundering and asset recovery. It is important to underline that these are EU priorities: they are not restricted merely to home affairs. Thus, they should be taken into account in other policy areas too. The EEAS is a relevant actor in a number of priority areas, in particular illegal migration, counterfeit goods, trafficking in human beings (THB), synthetic drugs, cocaine and heroin and firearms. The service participated in the drafting of certain operational action plans that translate strategic priorities into concrete actions. The EEAS is considered to have unique expertise and resources that can be shared and utilised, for example in the fight against THB. EEAS’ active contribution would also be sought in cases that require engagement with key third states. The above-mentioned priorities should also be considered when planning and designing CSDP missions so that they address key criminal threats faced by the EU.

55 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

1.3.3. Fragility, development and security

Compiled from the EU staff handbook: Operating in situations of conflict and fragility, December 20141

The European Union (EU) engages with over conflict, such as trade, investment, global eco- 50 countries affected by conflict and fragility. nomic governance and financial regulation, en- • The EU has Delegations in the 50 or so coun- ergy, the environment and regional integration. tries that can be considered in situations of • In 2012, the EU’s development cooperation conflict or fragility. Beyond the Delegations, with countries in situations of conflict and fra- there are 12 EU Special Representatives (as of gility represented EUR 4.9 billion (a budget January 2014). Nearly all Special Representa- managed by the Directorate-General for De- tives work in fragile and conflict-affected coun- velopment and Cooperation), or 59 % of total tries or regions, or on fragility-related themes. EU assistance. This makes EU institutions the • The EU’s engagement in situations of conflict second-largest provider of assistance in situa- and fragility spans a wide range of interventions tions of conflict and fragility – after the United (see graphic). The engagement also involves States and before the World Bank. The top other issues that can directly affect fragility and three recipients of such assistance in 2012 were

Prevention of Capacity building Shuttle diplomacy/ recurrence of violence mediation Political dialogue/ Development Long-term Conditionality/ Crisis intervention mediation peace sanctions (e.g. CSDP mission) State building and stability Election Humanitarian assistance observation Security sector reform LRRD Institutional reform

Hot conﬂict Peace making Peace-building decade Generational Immediate action Short- to medium- Thinking vision (0–6 months) range planning and (5–10 years) (20+ years) action (1–2 years)

Note: CSDP = Common Security and Defence Policy; LRRD = linking relief, rehabilitation and development. in EEAS and EC (no date). Lederach, as cited J.P. from Adapted Source: A wide range of interventions

1 European Commission: Operating in situations of conflict and fragility. An EU staff handbook. Tools and Methods Series. Reference Document No 17. December 2014. To be found on http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/public-fragility/document/operating-situations-conflict-and-fragility-eu-staff-handbook

56 1 BACKGROUND

Egypt, the Occupied Palestinian Territories and of violent conflict, affecting more than 131 mil- Bosnia and Herzegovina. Taking a longer view, lion people. over 2000-2012, the top three recipients were Fragility and conflict can also affect territories the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Afghani- beyond national borders – for example, the belt of stan and Ethiopia. instability that stretches from the Horn of Africa • The EU is also engaged in situations of con- to the Sahel, due to al-Qaeda, al-Shabab and flict and fragility through electoral observation related groups. missions and Common Security and Defence Situations of conflict and fragility are influ- Policy (CSDP) missions. There were 16 CSDP enced by local, national and global factors. Local missions in July 2014, civilian and military, factors of conflict and fragility include weak or representing over 7 000 personnel. exclusionary local governance, limited or unequal There are distinguishable types of situations of access to land and water, etc. National factors conflict and fragility, each calling for a different include tense social relations, unequal access to set of responses. There are many ways to distin- jobs and services; and weak rule of law, etc. Global guish between such types of situation, but one of factors include the following: the most useful is the security-capacity-legitimacy • international trade (e.g. barriers to exports and model proposed by Charles Call (2010), which vulnerability to shocks); classifies country fragility according to deficien- • transnational organised crime and illicit trade; cies or gaps involving three sets of issues. • the existence of a global and poorly regulated • Security issues. The state has a good degree of market for private security services; capacity and legitimacy, but has limited reach • economic and financial liberalisation processes; and suffers from illegal trafficking and/or • migration to and from fragile states and the chronic violence; spread of radicalism through new technolo- • Capacity issues. The state has legitimacy (e.g. gies; through regular elections), but low capacity to • internationally networked non-state armed deliver services; groups; • Legitimacy issues. The state has some capacity • climate change. to deliver services but suffers from weak legiti- These global factors are often ignored in political macy, resulting from, for example, the violation economy analysis, yet globalisation makes them a of agreed rules, poor public service delivery, central set of forces to take account of – especially beliefs shaped by tradition and religion, or in- in contexts of weak institutions, high poverty, ternational action undermining national sover- high levels of violence and structural exclusion. eignty. Additionally, local, national and global factors Countries can have gaps in one, two or all of these interact, as the spread of Boko Haram in Nigeria areas. and the explosion of drug-related violence in sev- Besides countries, sub-national and transna- eral Central American countries illustrate. tional areas can be in fragile or conflict-affected The EU has a track record of contributing to situations. Some countries that are not usually conflict mitigation, stabilisation, reconstruction thought of as being fragile contain large swaths and rehabilitation. For example, it has made ‘sig- of territory that exhibit all the attributes of fragil- nificant contributions to development, peace and ity; examples include Northern Uganda, Khyber stability’ in Ethiopia (2012); it has ‘succeeded Pakhtunkhwa in Pakistan, Mindanao in the Phil- in implementing the support to the Palestin- ippines, North-East Nigeria and Southern Thai- ian Authority in difficult circumstances’ (2013); land. In Asia, sub-national conflict is considered and in the East and South Neighbourhood Policy the most deadly, widespread and enduring form Regions, ‘EU support stimulated regional policy

57 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

C A P A C I T Y G A P : weak states

Bangladesh Zimbabwe L E G I M A C Y G A P : Malawi EquatorialGuinea repressiveautocracies Afghanistan Burundi DemocraticRepublic of Côte d’Ivoire NorthKorea Congo Turkmenistan East Timor Iraq Haiti Somalia Uganda Sudan Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Guatemala, Tajikistan S E C U R I TY GA P : war-torn states Source: Adapted from Call (2010), as cited in Grävingholt, as cited Call (2010), from Adapted Source: Ziaja and Kreibaum (2012). Three dimensions of fragility and country examples from 2010

dialogue and contributed to stability’ (2013). Relevance of EU support Regarding justice and security reform, the EU ‘has substantially increased its engagement glob- Evaluations generally find EU support as being ally though funding, development of its concept highly relevant to situations of conflict and fragil- and utilisation of a wide range of financial and ity, with high respect for national ownership. The non-financial instruments’ (2011). With regard EU is recognised as having made a positive contri- to integrated border management and organised bution to conflict mitigation, stabilisation, recon- crime, one of the EU’s ‘major successes was the struction and rehabilitation in countries includ- contribution to fostering international border ing Angola, Bolivia, the Central African Republic, management policy exchange and inclusive coop- Liberia, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste. eration between countries that until recently had EU support is most relevant when objectives been involved in conflict or dispute’ (2013). And, are realistic and shared across actors. Defining in the EU’s support of human rights and funda- what is meant by ‘success’ in situations of con- mental freedoms, ‘evidence of results and positive flict and fragility helps to ensure that the goals of impacts has been identified in relation to both EU support, and its modalities, are suitable for the promotion and protection of human rights’ the purpose. (2011). Evaluations of both the EU and other major Evaluations point to recurrent strengths aris- actors that engage in situations of conflict and ing from the EU’s comparative advantages, but fragility almost always find that objectives were also to areas for improvement. These strengths overly ambitious in too short a time frame. include the high relevance of EU support, respect Objectives and time horizons are better defined for national ownership and a multi-sector/holis- in conjunction with the local stakeholders – state, tic approach. The EU’s comparative advantages non-state, national and local, and when societies include (i) its long-standing presence, making it are divided, preferably all of these if possible – a reliable partner, (ii) its critical mass in terms of and with other international actors. It is also best financial support, (iii) its wide range of instru- to factor in from the start the constraints associ- ments and (iv) its recognised thematic experi- ated with fragility and conflict – notably secu- ence in sectors. However, evaluations also point rity, which limits fieldwork and adds to overhead to areas for improvement — notably increasing costs – and limited national capacities. Expecta- low efficiency, improving the quality of political tions regarding timeliness and disbursement of dialogue and setting more realistic time frames. funds need to be realistic.

58 1 BACKGROUND

Effectiveness of EU support

EU support is most effective when it is tailored to the specific context, the analysis of which can be continuous. Pathways to recovery are rarely obvious, especially when the context is fast changing. For example, there are often trade-offs between the need to manage the effects of an ongoing crisis and the need to address the root causes of conflict: doing both can prove difficult when security, capacity and trust are in short supply. There are cases, however, where the EU has managed to do both. For instance, in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, evaluations indicate that stakeholders generally recognised that on top of providing ADE (2011). Source: life-saving humanitarian assistance, the EU made Comprehensive approach to support situations the right choice of priorities to support towards of conflict and fragility preparing a two-state solution (2006) and that its contribution had been critical. Where the EU has conflict prevention and peacebuilding, justice and been able to foresee crisis situations, it has been security, and human rights, working through mul- able to undertake analysis in advance. tiple sectors, with state and non-state actors, and In this way, when the time came for action, it using a wide range of financial and non-financial was ready – for example, in Niger in 2012 where instruments. fighters from Libya threatened to destabilise large EU programmes increasingly focus on the parts of the country. Analysis does not need to security and justice system as a whole, rather hinder action if it is continuous from design to than supporting individual parts, and increas- implementation. On the contrary, monitoring can ingly anchor them in national security and justice serve as a management tool to correct the course strategies. Commission assistance helped in many as and when needed. Analysis that feeds into pro- cases to enhance institutional capacities within gramme implementation is particularly important state security and justice bodies to deliver public in the transition from relief to rehabilitation and services. For instance, the Commission’s support development, which remains a challenge for the to the criminal justice reform process in Georgia EU. through the Sector Policy Support Programme EU support is also most effective when it is (2009–2013) has contributed to a shift in Geor- rooted in a comprehensive approach, integrating gia’s criminal system from a punitive to a more different activities, actors, timing and geographi- liberal one. These and other experiences, however, cal dimensions. The EU increasingly applies it, for reveal two issues that need constant attention. example, in supporting the Occupied Palestinian • Planning: coordination between actors needs to Territories where efforts were made to continu- go beyond the exchange of information and begin ously adjust approaches according to the latest at the planning stage: What are the shared goals? information on the conflict situation, implement What are the unique strengths of each actor? support through a multi-sector approach, involve • Programming and implementation: the con- all the major actors concerned and target geo- cept of a comprehensive approach can easily graphically vulnerable areas. The EU has also get lost in operational translation: What are made progress in taking a systemic approach to the activities best carried out jointly? Indepen-

59 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

dently? What level of operational coordination EU’s comparative advantages enable it to add is required? value to the efforts of others by drawing on its: While in some cases, the costs of operational coor- • credibility as an intergovernmental entity, with dination can outweigh its benefits (for example if a negligible political profile and no ties to na- it slows down the response to an emergency situational interests; tion), coordination at the planning stage is essen- • reliability, in terms of its continued presence tial to effectiveness. and capacity to establish long-term partnerships; • representation of a critical mass of financial Efficiency of EU support support; • wide array of policies and instruments, includ- EU support is most efficient when it builds on ing its position as a major trading partner with pro-activity, creativity and coordination. Evalu- many fragile states; ations generally rate the efficiency of EU support • in-depth thematic experience in a range of in situations of conflict and fragility as low, with fields that are pertinent to fragility and conflict- much room for improvement. Improving support related issues. efficiency requires first and foremost a recogni- The EU can add considerable value by empha- tion that each situation is different. Also, creativ- sising these strengths, notably by playing a greater ity is needed in seeking solutions. A good starting role than currently as a convener or co-convener point is for staff to put coordination arrangements in liaising with Member States to engage with one in place that bridge the fragmented responsibilities voice in political and policy dialogue with govern- among donors – and even within EU institutions – ment, setting the policy agenda and/or coordinat- in responding to fragility and conflict. Situations of ing priority sectors. conflict and fragility also demand thinking ‘outside of the box’; in this regard, good practices among EU Delegations note the following. ISSN 1830 - 8198 Harnessing both financial and non-financial support (e.g. political and policy dialogue; technical assistance) can be valuable. There is value in engaging at different geo- Tools and Methods Series graphical levels of intervention (local, national, Reference Document No 17 regional) – sometimes, the best entry points are not necessarily within the central government. Engaging with both state and non-state actors, preferably together, can provide opportunities for change. Situations of conflict and fragility require addi- Operating in situations of tional resources and continuous development of conflict and fragility more appropriate tools for support. The EU at An EU staff handbook Headquarters is investing in knowledge manage- December 2014 ment, notably through training and Capacity4dev. It is also developing monitoring frameworks with indicators for operating in fragile contexts.

Directorate-GeneralDirectorate-General EU support is most efficient when it leverages for forDevelopment Development and and CooperationCooperation – EuropeAid – EuropeAid

the EU’s recognised comparative advantages. The http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/public-fragility/document/operating-situations-conflict-and-fragility-eu-staff-handbook Source:

60 1 BACKGROUND

What is the EU approach?

The 2007 Lisbon Treaty and the 2011 Agenda engagement in situations of conflict and fragility, for Change (EC, 2011) sharpened the EU’s focus the key elements of which are summarised here: on situations of conflict and fragility. The Lisbon • Coordinate and cooperate broadly and appro- Treaty directs the EU to ‘preserve peace, prevent priately to ensure a comprehensive response. conflicts and strengthen international security’. • Enhance resilience. The Agenda for Change charges it to ‘allocate • Use the right mix of financial instruments and more funds than in the past to the countries most tools. in need, including fragile states’. And a 2013 com- • Develop, safeguard and support human re- munication sets out the case for a comprehensive sources. approach to external conflict and crisis (EC and • Ensure consistent, integrated Headquarters High Representative, 2013). In response to this support. guidance, and based on the lessons learnt, the EU • Make best use of EU comparative advantag- has fashioned a successful and cogent approach to es. Source: http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/public-fragility/document/operating-situations-conflict-and-fragility-eu-staff-handbook Source:

61 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

Eu council and EEas DEVco Echo Leads EU policy and security and Leads EU development program- Leads EU humanitarian assistance peacekeeping efforts ming and implementation efforts efforts

Overall policy direction policy framework and tools for humanitarian assistance and fragile or crisis situations civil protection Council and Political Affairs Dept Fragility & Crisis Management Unit Directorates A (Strategy, Policy ● Define policies and International Co-operation) ● Formulates EU development ● Exercise political control of & B (Humanitarian and Civil policy on situations of conflict civilian crisis management and Protection Operations) and fragility CSDP military operations Humanitarian aid ● Contributes to knowledge ● Provide humanitarian aid Crisis response management ● Develop and implementspolicy MD VII ● Develops guidance and tools frameworks ● Activates and harmonises EU ● Focal point in DEVCO crisis response activities Civil protection policy, management and ● Encourage cooperation between ● Provides global monitoring and guidance (thematic) the 31 states participating current situation awareness in the Union Civil Protection Directorates B & C Mechanism Intelligence analysis ● Formulate sectoral policies in ● Ensure disaster response and INTCEN various fields (e.g. governance, enhance disaster prevention ● Provides intelligence analysis, gender, food security, climate and preparedness early warning, situational change, etc.) awareness ● Manage EIDHR, IcSP, food security & food facility programmes security policy and council Entity conflict prevention ● Ensure quality support, policy EUMC: EU Military Committee coherence and elaborate tools Security and CSDP structures EEas Entities policy, management and CMPD: Crisis Management and ● Enhance security policy consist- Planning Directorate ency and liaise with appropri- guidance (geographic) CPCC: Civilian Planning and ate services: (i) EU policies in Directorates D, E, F, G & H non-proliferation, disarmament Conduct Capability and arms export control; (ii) ● Provide guidance on definition of EUMS: EU Military Staff operational support, promotion policy framework for cooperation INTCEN: Intelligence Analysis Centre of mediation, coordination of with countries in fragile or JAES: Joint Africa-EU Strategy SSR policy, and programming of crisis situations and on tools IcSP; (iii) focal point on external to effectively and coherently MD II: Africa Department security threats and sanctions manage major crisis situations MD VI: Global and Multilateral Issues Department Crisis management ● Strengthen analysis and follow-up by country and region MD VII: Crisis Response & Council & Security & CSDP structures Operational Coordination Department ● Direct military activities (EUMC) DEVco Directorates ● Coord. military instrument (EUMS) FpI B: Human and Society ● Plan & follow up on civilian & Bridges EC and Council/EEAS Development military CSDP operations (CMPD) Works alongside EEAS C: Sustainable Growth and ● Civilian CSDP crisis manage- Operations management Development ment operations (CPCC) D: East and Southern Africa ACP ● Handles financial management Coordination & implementation of operational Coordination budgets for CFSP, IcSP & Election MD VI and MD II E: West and Central Africa Observation Mission F: Neighbourhood ● EEAS contact point for develop- ● Implements sanctions and ment policy matters Kimberley Process G: Latin America and Caribbean ● JAES strategic political objectives H: Asia, Central Asia, Middle East/ Gulf and Pacific Source: ADE (2014); organisation is as of 15 September 2014. September organisation is as of 15 ADE (2014); Source: Who does what at EU Headquarters on operating in situations of conflict and fragility?

62 1 BACKGROUND

1.3.4. CSDP and partners

by Helena Bogusławska

Common challenges call for shared responsibility in addressing them. Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has been an open project from the outset. As early as 2003, the European Security Strategy recognised that little can be achieved alone, and this is all the more true now. A comprehensive approach means not only drawing on all EU strengths, but also working closely with international and regional organisations, such as the UN, NATO, the OSCE, the African Union and ASEAN, as well as with non-EU countries. The EU and these partners can reciprocally benefit from each other’s knowledge, expertise and specific capabilities. This draws partners closer to the EU. The European Union is developing CSDP Mauricio Orjuela MDN Photo: partnerships in four main areas: Signature of Framework Agreement for participation of 1. International organisations and regional and Colombia in EU crisis management operations, August 2014 international fora 2. Participation in CSDP missions and opera- logue, including the EU-UN Steering Committee tions on Crisis Management twice a year, regular visits 3. Security and defence (CSDP) dialogues of Ambassadors from the EU Political and Secu- 4. Capacity building rity Committee (PSC) to New York, the participation of the UN Under-Secretary General in charge The EU cooperation with the United Nations of Peacekeeping Operations in high level meet- has become a “way of life” as put by UN Under- ings of the EU Member States (informal Defence Secretary General Herve Ladsous. Operational Ministerial, Political and Security Committee cooperation in crisis areas – such as in Mali, and Chiefs of Defence). The EU Action Plan in Central African Republic, Democratic Republic support of UN Peacekeeping launched in 2012 of Congo, Somalia and Afghanistan – includes came to an end in December 2014. It allowed, ‘bridging operations’ (as in Central African inter alia, for the establishment of modalities for Republic where the EU deployed a mission first coordination on planning procedures, concepts, and the UN subsequently took over), parallel training and exercises and lessons learnt between complementary deployment, or support to the the two organisations. A follow-up initiative is other organisation’s activities. Operational coop- planned to define future strategic priorities and eration is accompanied by a regular high level dia- keep the excellent momentum going.

63 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

The strong transatlantic relationship remains dynamics, fostering further complementary and of fundamental importance to Europe. The prac- mutually reinforcing actions, for example on mili- tical cooperation between the EU and NATO tary capability development. Both the EU and has expanded significantly in the past few years, NATO share the assessment that the crisis in the within the agreed framework of their strategic Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods signifi- partnership and respecting the decision-making cantly altered the security reality for Europe and autonomy of each organisation. Apart from the the broader transatlantic community. Since the already on-going operational cooperation and beginning of the Ukrainian crisis the good coop- coordination (e.g. in Kosovo, Horn of Africa, eration and coordination with NATO and the Afghanistan), there is potential for strengthened OSCE has proved invaluable. interaction on maritime security, defence and Following the establishment of the African security capacity building and cyber security. Union and the prospect of the African Peace The “intertwining summits” – from December and Security Architecture (APSA), the EU estab- 2013 (European Council discussion on CSDP), lished the African Peace Facility in 2004 in order through the NATO Summit in Wales in 2014, to financially support (logistics, transportation, the June 2015 European Council up to the 2016 medical, communication and personnel costs) NATO Summit in Warsaw – bring additional the deployment of African-led peace support operations (e.g. AMIS, AMISOM, MISCA, AFISMA). The EU also supports APSA in terms of logistics, planning, and operational training (e.g. the AMANI Africa training cycle for the operationalisation of the African Standby Force). This relationship was put on a new strategic foot- ing with the signing in 2007 of the Joint Africa- EU Strategy which made peace and security a priority among the eight thematic partnerships that the EU and Africa should develop in a comprehensive manner. In parallel, at the UN’s request, the EU started deploying its own crisis management operations under CSDP in Africa. Of the 31 completed or still ongoing CSDP missions and operations since 2003, 16 have been deployed on the African continent. The current EU Chairmanship of the Con- tact Group on Piracy off the Somali coast provides ample opportunities for global engagement. The EU took over this role from the US in 2014 and will continue in 2015 until a new Chair has been selected. It involves coordinating the work of more than 80 stakeholders: sovereign States, international organisations, the private sector and NGOs. The EU Maritime Security Strategy and the Maritime Security Action Plan, both adopted

Photo: European Union European Photo: in 2014, provide further incentives for reaching Chilean soldier in EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina out to non-EU partners.

64 1 BACKGROUND

Treaty on European Union

Art. 21: “The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations which share the [same] principles. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations.”

European Council, December 2013

“The Union remains fully committed to working in close collaboration with its global, transatlantic and regional partners. Such collaboration should be further developed in a spirit of mutual reinforcement and complementarity.”

European Council, November 2013

The Council “stresses the importance of working with its partners, in particular the UN, NATO, OSCE, and African Union, as well as strategic partners and partner countries in its neighbourhood, with due respect to the institutional framework and decision-making autonomy of the EU.”

In November 2013, the European Council Iceland, Montenegro, the Republic of Moldova, adopted a comprehensive set of conclusions on New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea, CSDP partnerships in which it fostered “contrib- Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine and the USA. Non-EU uting partners support to CSDP, with a focus on NATO allies and candidate countries are amongst non-EU NATO Allies, strategic partners, partner the most active contributors to CSDP activities, countries in the neighbourhood, notably the Medi- and were the first to develop close cooperation terranean and Eastern partners (…) and other indi- with the EU in this respect. vidual partner countries”. The Council also noted The Union regularly invites third countries to that “priority should be given to cooperation with participate in specific missions and operations. partners who share with the EU common values and To give a practical example – recently launched principles and are able and willing to support EU CSDP missions and operations enjoyed wide crisis management efforts”. political and practical support from several part- The EU concludes Framework Participation ners. In 2014 Georgia joined EUFOR RCA with Agreements with selected partner countries to a light infantry company as the second largest facilitate their participation in CSDP missions contributor; Turkey and Serbia also contributed and operations and foster long-term cooperation. to this mission; Montenegro, the Republic of Until now 16 such legally binding international Moldova, Switzerland and Serbia participate in agreements have been signed, notably with: Alba- EUTM Mali; Australia joined EUCAP Nestor nia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, the Former Yugo- (for the first time participating in a CSDP mis- slav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Georgia, sion); Ukraine supported EUNAVFOR Atalanta

65 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS Photo: European Union European Photo: Ukrainian frigate heading home after having completed its tour of duty with EUNAVFOR Somalia/Operation Atalanta

with a frigate (the largest Ukrainian contribution experience with Canada’s financing of a project ever) and New Zealand contributed a reconnais- run by EUTM Mali. Beyond US participation sance aircraft. All this was in addition to continued in CSDP missions in Kosovo and DRC, flexible participation in other CSDP missions and opera- informal cooperation with the US continues in tions. Altogether in 2014, fifteen partner coun- the Horn of Africa/Somalia, and at the military- tries (Australia, Albania, Canada, Chile, FYROM, to-military level with EUCOM and AFRICOM. Georgia, Montenegro, New Zealand, Norway, the Some partners are also joining the Battlegroups Republic of Moldova, Serbia, Switzerland, Turkey, (FYROM, Norway, Turkey and Ukraine) and Ukraine and the US) contributed to ten CSDP train with the EU (China and Japan held naval missions and operations, accounting for approxi- exercises with Atalanta). mately 8 % of the total personnel deployed. In 2013-2014, network of CSDP partnerships In parallel, the EU explores innovative ways of further expanded to Asia and Latin America with cooperation that do not require a legally binding the signature of Framework Agreements on par- agreement. For example: support from China in ticipation in EU-led crisis management operations the escort of World Food Programme vessels off with Chile and Colombia (the first partners in the Somali coast, sharing the burden with the EU Latin America) and the Republic of Korea (the first naval operation Atalanta; financial support from in Asia, and the second in Asia-Pacific after New Japan for specific projects in Niger, in line with Zealand). Entry into force of those agreements will EUCAP Sahel Niger objectives. It is now regularly open new avenues for dialogue and concrete opera- possible for new CSDP missions and operations tional cooperation. The EU’s willingness to step up to establish project cells in order to gather paral- cooperation with its Asian partners also translates lel support from potential donors among Member into multilateral activities, for example within the States and partner countries, following excellent ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF): from autumn

66 1 BACKGROUND Photo: European Union European Photo: Turkish Infantry Company takes part in Field Training Exercise of EUFOR Althea

2013 until spring 2014 the EU co-chaired with In the South the EU remains forthcoming, Myanmar the ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group inter alia in CSDP contacts with Morocco, Jordan on Confidence Building Measures and Preven- and the League of Arab States. tive Diplomacy and the related Defence Officials The EU has developed regular dialogues in the Dialogue. The EU also regularly participates in field of CSDP with several countries and organi- ARF-driven exercises in Humanitarian Assistance sations. As “one size does not fit all”, their level, and Disaster relief and workshops on issues such as frequency, topics and format are adapted to EU’s Maritime Security and Mediation. and partners’ respective expectations and interests. In the East, the CSDP Partnership with East- Beyond dialogue and operational cooperation, ern Partners dates back several years – to 2004 it is worth underlining the role of the European with Ukraine and to 2012–2013 with, increas- Security and Defence College in highly appreci- ingly, Georgia, Moldova and other Eastern Part- ated training provided to and undertaken with ners. Georgia and Ukraine are both contributors partner countries. to CSDP operational activities, while at the same Security challenges have to be tackled by those time hosting EU missions (EUMM Georgia and and with those most affected, in a spirit of part- EUAM Ukraine respectively). The multilateral nership. The EU is therefore increasingly engaged cooperation under the Eastern Partnership CSDP in building capacities of partner countries and Panel, launched in 2013, complements bilateral organisations in volatile regions. The long-term relations and allows the involvement of all six East- objective is to enable them to take responsibility ern Partners (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Geor- for their own security so that they can increasingly gia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine) in numer- prevent and manage crises by themselves. It is in ous workshops, seminars, field visits and training that context that the flagship initiative of ‘Train activities through this multilateral platform. and equip’ was initiated.

67 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

1.3.5. Transition strategies

by Snowy Lintern

Whilst the clear focus at the operational level size of development budgets compared to CSDP: will be delivery of effect in-theatre, it is impor- for the time period 2014–2020 the Common For- tant to keep in mind how you will eventually eign and Security Policy (CFSP) budget, including transition away from the Common Security and the civilian CSDP budget, is EUR 2 338 million, Defence Policy (CSDP). This chapter will cover compared to the International Cooperation and the concept of how this is done in Headquarters, Development DG DEVCO (EuropeAid) budget how the Head of Mission contributes, and the of EUR 74 217 million1. options that can be considered for transition. In particular, when launching CSDP in a cri- The European Union uses the term “transi- sis management situation, the EU is dealing with tion strategy” rather than “exit strategy” as the complex environments, and fragile states are usu- end of CSDP action will not be the end of the ally wicked problems2. The 28 EU Member States EU’s involvement in the host country. By using will launch a mission to deal with a problem that Transition strategies are important when considering that CSDP is not designed to be a long-term instrument “exit strategies” the EU can inadvertently give the may not be well understood, with incomplete (in the picture: Handover ceremony in Tchad from the EU to the UN) impression to the host country that the Union is information, and with a clear need for multi- ending its support. Clearly that will not be the dimensional cooperation. Common experiences case; ending CSDP engagement is not the same as in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya – going far beyond ending EU involvement. EU action – highlight the challenges of bringing Transition strategies are important when consid- together different actors in the planning process, ering that CSDP is not designed to be a long-term particularly in situations which are highly politi- instrument; it is a crisis management tool that can cal. Synchronisation of CSDP planning with the be fundamental in providing short- to medium- programming of development and other coopera- term activity in order to assist in stabilising a situ- tion instruments is difficult, given that they usu- ation. Development, particularly in fragile states, ally pursue different primary objectives and are is a generational endeavour; this allows time for subject to different approval mechanisms. This specialisation and focus, and it allows for longer also relates to both EU institutions and EU Mem- interventions, with less variance and more adap- ber State development processes. Timing and tation, monitoring and feedback. Development early engagement/agreement of all relevant actors instruments are also funded to allow for long-term is key for any option to transition from/to CSDP interventions. This is clearly demonstrated by the activity.

1 DG DEVCO budget is broken down into: Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) of EUR 19 662 million, Euro- pean Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) of EUR 15 433 million, Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) of EUR 7 058 million, European Development Fund (EDF) of EUR 30 506 million, EU Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) of EUR 1 333 million, and the instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (NSC) of EUR 225 million. Source: http://ec.europa.eu/budget/mff/programmes/ 2 Conklin, Jeff; Wicked Problems & Social Complexity, Chapter 1 of Dialogue Mapping: Building Shared Understanding of Wicked Problems, Wiley, November 2005.

68 1 BACKGROUND Photo: European Union European Photo:

Transition strategies are important when considering that CSDP is not designed to be a long-term instrument (in the picture: Handover ceremony in Tchad from the EU to the UN)

Once launched, the regular review of CSDP A good example of this is Niger, where the Com- missions through the Strategic Review process mission-funded national programme of Counter will allow a reflection on whether we are doing Terrorism-Sahel ceased, and elements of that pro- the right things and whether those things are gramme were “taken over” by the CSDP mission being done well. This not only gives the oppor- EUCAP Sahel. Adaptability must be both ways in tunity to refocus a CSDP mission, but also pro- order to achieve a “win-win” situation. vides an indication of when transition could be Transition from CFSP/CSDP to support from considered likely. The Head of Mission, inputting Development or other EU cooperation instru- through the Civilian Operations Commander, ments also requires a fundamental change in has an important role to play. Their assessment of mind-set, notably as we will be moving from a how they are delivering against their mandate, an primarily foreign and security policy objective indication of time likely to be required to com- (e.g. crisis management) towards a developmental plete the mandated tasks, and their opinion as to or other EU cooperation objective (e.g. long-term what the future of the mission is likely to be, are institution building). It must be clear that one EU all fundamental to the review process. instrument cannot “replace” another; each instru- While other EU instruments may not need to ment has its own clearly-defined purpose, but an “take over” the task of a CSDP mission or opera- instrument could be used to sustain elements of tion in the classical sense of “transition”, CSDP success achieved by another. In particular, the activity can very well be an enabler for future transition from a military CSDP operation to work under other instruments. Similarly, CSDP non-military instruments can, however, be espe- tasks can benefit and help reinforce ongoing cially problematic. It has to be recognised that activities managed under other EU instruments. political control, strategic direction, and the deci-

69 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

sion-making process must also transition from sudden drawdown or closure; adaption of the CSDP to another internal EU-lead so that there is mission in its final stages could be considered. no ‘impingement’ on CFSP competences, or vice b. Transition to host country. The ideal, and de- versa, as mandated by Article 40 TEU. sired, transition where possible. This is current- Transition strategies have to consider, in addi- ly (early 2015) being considered for EUTM tion: Mali, where the host country is foreseen as be- • the full, inclusive and transparent participa- ing able to conduct the majority of tasks that tion of all actors (EU institutions and Member are being undertaken by the mission. This is States) on the ground and in Brussels, with par- also partly anticipated in the cases of EUSEC ticular emphasis on the need for a strong role and EUPOL RDC. As there may be concerns for the EU Delegation; that the host country is not ready to sustain • the existence of coordination mechanisms the progress made by the CSDP mission, im- aligned with the strategic vision and objectives; pact assessments and evaluations should sup- • the ownership of the partner country, under- port this option. DG DEVCO’s experience pinned by the political and policy dialogue; with aid effectiveness principles (including the • output, performance and impact indicators and New Deal for working in fragile and conflict- the necessary processes to measure the progress affected states) and how national capacity can on mandate delivery, in order to better guide be supported and built in order to support such the transition. a transition can be very useful with this option. Last but not least, transition must be understood c. Transition to a third party (the United Nations, as a two sided process, and not a “translation” or African Union, etc.). This is where CSDP ac- linear succession of CSDP to other instrument. tivity is designed as a “bridging” capability and The process of the Strategic Review is a key step partners are prepared or preparing to sustain when adjustments may need to be made to allow the CSDP role. Two examples are EUFOR better synergies and coordination with other Tchad/RCA and, more recently, the Central instruments. African Republic, where it is envisaged that the operation will transition to the UN. Transition to the UN (UNIOGBIS) was also explored for Options for Transition from the EUSSR Guinea-Bissau mission. CSDP d. Transition to Member States’ bilateral activity or to another EU instrument. Transition to a. No transition is required or possible. There are Member States’ bilateral activity was an avenue circumstances, especially related to confidence explored for the transition of EUAVSEC South building, where there is no requirement or pos- Sudan and EUPOL and EUSEC RDC. It re- sibility to transition to other means. Examples mains a critical area for development, includ- could include EUMM Georgia and EUBAM ing with third parties. Transition to another Rafah. For EUMM Georgia, the monitoring EU instrument has historically been the most of a ceasefire agreement is specifically a CSDP common transition strategy, and examples in- task (Art. 43(1)). For EUBAM Rafah, if the clude Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, and DRC. mission is unable to monitor the border cross- A range of options is available, principally de- ing point at Rafah (as agreed in the Agree- velopment programmes, but this could also ment on Movement and Access of 2005) due include other forms of CFSP support, possi- to broader political constraints, then it will bly used under Article 28 (including through be likely that no other instrument would be Member States funding), dedicated teams able to do that. However, this may not mean a within the EU Special Representative (EUSR)

70 1 BACKGROUND Photo: EEAS Photo: HRVP Federica Mogherini with Prime Ministers Aleksandar Vučić and Isa Mustafa on 10 February 2015 in Brussels, finalising the agreement on justice. Facilitated by the EU since October 2012, this high-level dialogue aims at normalising relations and promoting cooperation between Belgrade and Pristina

office, and/or strengthening either the local is an option to significantly drawn down the Delegation or EUSR with relevant expertise. mission in the country and retain a small cell to Agreement has to be reached with the other EU assess/monitor the situation and surge capac- instrument that they will take on the transition ity into the country if required. The funding activity, and a clear coherent strategy from the for this would come from the CSDP budget as outset can be instrumental in this. Understand- the mission would either not close or it would ing, and agreement, as regards likely CFSP be reconstituted as a small CSDP monitoring timelines and objectives must be provided, not- mission. ing that this may impinge on Member States’ b. Short-term bridging capability. If, as hap- desire to have very broad objectives and short, pened with DRC, the planning assumption politically driven, timelines. The failure of tran- for transition changes due to events on the sition in EUAVSEC South Sudan has provided ground, then Article 28 could be considered a clear lesson in this regard. so as to guarantee sustainment whilst develop- In practice, there are a number ways to facilitate ment programmes are finalised and put into transition, and in reality CSDP transition strate- place. The practical difficulty of ensuring that gies will often include elements of more than one the transition starts while development activi- of these options. ty may not be fully planned is recognised, and a. A mix of short-term extension and progressive using Article 28 (in this case as both short- reduction of CSDP activity. If the CSDP mis- term and clearly focussed) could prove useful sion is close to transition but there remains a if the political decision to close the mission concern about closing the mission fully, there has been taken.

71 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

How we plan for Transition

Steps have been taken to improve our collec- justment of their future planning to the new tive planning methodology, and these should have situation created by the CSDP effort. This ensured that the Crisis Management Concept could relate to new activities in parallel to (CMC) – the bedrock of further planning – has the CSDP action still ongoing (to support transition strategies articulated very early in the or complement or take advantage of it) and planning process: activities foreseen after closure of the mis- • A coherent strategy, such as using a Politi- sion/operation. Such timelines can then be cal Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA), incorporated in CSDP planning and review agreed through a consultative process between processes. the Commission, the External Action Service, • Collaborative planning should have continued and Member States, enhances understanding at the CMC stage, in particular between the and collaboration between different EU actors. Crisis Management and Planning Directorate, Overarching EU strategy documents, such as the EEAS geographical desks, and relevant ac- Joint Framework Documents or regional strat- tors in the European Commission as it may egies, can greatly assist in providing a common provide a better understanding of what, how vision for EU action. Shared conflict analysis and when CSDP will deliver, and more realistic helps enhance such understanding and collabo- mandate durations required for CSDP activity, ration; if we seek to transition to development means. • Collaborative planning before CSDP mission Planners/programmers will also require an un- launch between EEAS and relevant Commis- derstanding of Member States’ bilateral activ- sion services is instrumental as it may provide ity (active and planned) to make this coherent. better understanding of the (collective) tasks This will also be key during operational plan- to be achieved. To make this fully effective, an ning by the Civil or Military Operation Com- agreement on the EU’s objectives and instru- manders; ments should be in place in the PFCA, so that • At the Strategic Review stage, and as we get CSDP planners and development program- closer to understanding when CSDP objectives mers already have senior-level agreement on are likely to be achieved, then a Transition Road likely tasking and could start parallel plan- Map prepared in coordination with all relevant ning. In concrete terms this results in the fol- actors can be a useful tool for joint planning lowing: and programming. A dedicated Task Force 1. for CSDP: a planning process that attempts might usefully be established for that purpose. to link the CSDP effort to what is already This was utilised for DRC and EULEX Kosovo planned and/or ongoing by EU or other and proved to be of great value. partners. This should also allow “tighter” and clearly focussed objectives for CSDP; Thus, we have in place the conceptual and 2. for EU actors managing other instruments: planning methodology to allow early and broad to agree as part of the CSDP planning pro- discussion on transition. This will remain a live cess how they may adjust implementation of topic throughout the life cycle of a mission; and ongoing work in view of the CSDP action the operational level has both the ability and the and what the timelines are for possible ad- mechanisms to input.

72 1 BACKGROUND

1.4. EU crisis prevention/ management tools 1.4.1. The EU’s diplomatic engagement by Simon Duke

First of all, the fundamental distinction between likely to be part of a wider tapestry of crisis man- foreign policy and diplomacy is worth noting. agement tools (civilian and military). Foreign policy is the political process of deciding Diplomatic engagement is therefore an integral upon priorities and interests and, as such, is dis- part of any crisis prevention/management process tinct from diplomacy, which concerns itself with where the primary objective is to bring a peace- implementing foreign and security policy. The ful end to a dispute with the aim of contribut- two are obviously related in the sense that foreign ing to longer-term stabilisation. Different forms policy decisions will lay out the parameters and of diplomatic engagement are likely to be pre- mandates for any diplomatic engagement. Beyond sent throughout the crisis cycle, with some stages this, the actors involved in the making of foreign (mediation or the negotiation of agreements) policy and its implementation are often different. being more intensive than others. In addition to The former aspects are addressed elsewhere in this these more obvious aspects, diplomatic engage- volume, while the latter are of primary concern ment will also involve extensive coordination here. efforts with the local actors (including EU mem- The EU’s diplomatic engagement is not pre- bers), regional actors (like the AU or OSCE) and scriptive. The actual tools employed depend very often international organisations such as the UN. much upon the specifics of any given crisis sce- Given the scenario-dependent nature of the EU’s nario. The range of diplomatic tools that can be diplomatic engagement, the sections that follow employed is extensive. On the crisis prevention aim to give a broad overview of the mix of actors side (which has been a ‘fixed priority’ for the EU and the types of activity that could be involved in since 2001) this might involve exchanges with the support of the Union’s foreign and security policy pertinent interlocutors, either for fact-finding or goals, which provide the parameters for any diplo- aimed at mediation and/or crisis resolution. Vari- matic engagement. ous incentives can also be brought to bear in support of such diplomatic efforts, more often than not in the form of economic ‘carrots’ that may be tied to development aid and assistance or trade preferences, or even both. Persuasion can also take the form of ‘sticks’, including the application of economic sanctions. The same broad observation applies to any diplomatic engagement in crisis management Graphic: Wikimedia Commons situations, with a similar mix of people and instruments being employed. In this context the timeframe is likely to be appreciably shorter but, The EU’s 140 Delegations are at the forefront of the like crisis prevention, diplomatic engagement is EU’s diplomatic engagement

73 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

Analysis and task forces ment, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Manage- ment). Any diplomatic overtures will initially be based The principal role of the HR/VP is therefore on the available analysis of information derived that of coordination and ensuring the consistency from multiple sources, such as the analysis of of the EU’s external policies. She may, however, intelligence derived from civilian and military choose to involve herself directly in the negotia- sources. As a supplement to the available analysis tions (as in the case of Kosovo, Serbia and Iran) as the EU may also dispatch a task force in order the key EU diplomatic actor. If the HR/VP is not to provide on-the-ground reporting. This stage involved directly, she will certainly remain abreast therefore belongs more in the realm of foreign of all developments and will steer accordingly. policy, although it may involve key diplomatic actors, such as personnel from the proximate EU Delegation, the Special Representative, the local Special Representatives diplomatic representation of EU Member States, experts from the relevant parts of the EU head- The EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) sup- quarters and other EU institutions, in particular port the work of the HR/VP. They are appointed the European Commission, where many of the with a specific mandate relating to a crisis-prone relevant funding instruments are to be found. or post-crisis country or region (in places as This stage will also give those involved in any diverse as Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, foreseeable diplomatic engagement the chance to the Sahel and the southern Mediterranean). study their potential interlocutors. There are ten at the time of writing. Their individual mandates will differ according to the specific country or regional dynamics, but they share The HR/VP the common tasks of being a key coordination point for the EU representatives on the ground, The HR/VP is at the pyramid of any diplo- as well as other international partners. Many for- matic response. She will be thoroughly briefed mer SRs were senior national diplomats, while on developments and, in turn, will ensure that the tendency more recently has been to appoint the national foreign ministers are also briefed senior EEAS staff. The role of the EUSRs as the via the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC). The HR/ ‘face and voice’ of the EU obviously has to be VP will also chair the Crisis Platform, an ad hoc exercised sensitively, especially with regard to the body created specifically in response to an exter- EU’s Delegations and other EU staff present on nal crisis. The Crisis Platform draws together all the ground. those involved in the crisis response cycle, includ- The SRs may also play an important role in ing non-EU countries where relevant. Although mediation and negotiation, supported by the relatively new, the Platform has an important applicable EU Delegation and with a detailed role bearing in mind the HR/VP’s obligation to mandate provided via the headquarters. This ensure ‘the consistency of the Union’s external often demands considerable diplomatic tact and action’. Under the Juncker Commission, the discretion from the SR, as well as support from HR/VP (in her latter capacity) is also responsible the applicable Delegation, the headquarters and for coordinating and steering the project team other interested third parties. The question of the ‘Europe in the World’ (including, but not lim- longer-term utility of the SRs remains open, espe- ited to, the Commissioners for European Neigh- cially since Heads of Delegation and Delegation bourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, staff could potentially assume many of the tasks Trade, International Cooperation and Develop- currently performed by SRs.

74 1 BACKGROUND

The EEAS and the Delegations tiple dialogues spread across all policy sectors) as well as other important local actors (such as The headquarters plays a significant role in civil society organisations). The Delegations are assisting the HR/VP as well as the other principal also the source of information about the EU’s EU actors. The Service also includes many of the positions for the host country or region – this relevant crisis management response bodies (civil- information is provided in regular ‘lines-to-take’ ian and military) as well as the Crisis Platform (see briefings sent from Brussels on a daily basis. The above). The EU’s 140 Selegations, which are part overall emphasis is on offering a coordinated and of the EEAS, are at the forefront of the EU’s dip- ‘comprehensive’ approach to any given crisis. lomatic engagement. They are often best placed to assess the local conditions and they also share information with the diplomatic representations of The Member States the EU Member States. The number of Delegation staff varies considerably from country to country The Member States have already been men- but may swell considerably in crisis-torn countries, tioned on a number of occasions, thus already especially those hosting crisis management mis- indicating their important role. Much of their sions (for example the Democratic Republic of the diplomatic engagement occurs at the initial stages Congo, South Sudan and Tanzania). of the crisis response cycle, with intensive engage- The transition from Commission Delegations ment within and between the national capitals (pre-Lisbon) to EU Delegations (post-Lisbon) in order to ensure the necessary consensus on a has put far more emphasis on diplomatic engage- course of action at EU level. ment for a wide variety of foreign and security Most effective crisis responses, especially in a issues. One of the early challenges for the new- crisis management context, rely on Member State style Delegations involved the general quality support (in order to secure the necessary agree- of the political reporting to support the early ment to legitimise crisis intervention) and, more warning role, although national diplomats tem- often than not, the necessary resources and man- porarily assigned to the Delegations have greatly power. Hence, it is vital that Member State ‘buy boosted the quality, as have the growing confi- in’ is present from the very earliest stages. Under dence and experience of the Delegation staff in the treaties, the Union and the Member States foreign and security policy matters. A further must observe the ‘principle of sincere coopera- challenge was the frequent absence of special- tion’ – this includes refraining from any action ist security knowledge in Delegations to bolster which could jeopardise the attainment of the diplomatic efforts on the ground. In many cases Union’s objectives. this has been resolved by the temporary place- The Member States are involved at multiple ment of EU Military Staff personnel in Delega- levels. The analytical and fact-finding stages have tions where there is a demand for specific skills already been mentioned. The relevant working and advice (often those in the early stages of a groups in Brussels will also be actively involved CSDP mission or those with one underway) or and much of the drafting for any crisis manage- regional security advisers. The need for security ment mission will be done in this context. There specialists in Delegations is now widely recog- will be strong coordination with the national cap- nised, but has to be balanced against practical itals via the European Correspondents, who will considerations, such as the available budget and also liaise with the PSC, the working groups and human resources. other EU institutions such as the Commission. A The Delegations are at the forefront of dialogue dedicated group of External Relations (RELEX) with the host government (there are often mul- advisers will prepare the legal, institutional and

75 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

financial aspects of decisions to be made in the What does this mean in diplomatic terms? The CFSP/CSDP area. At the ambassadorial level, implications are twofold. First, any diplomatic both the PSC and the Committee of Permanent engagement should consider the full spectrum of Representatives, based in the various permanent tools and resources available for the crisis response representations in Brussels, will also be involved. cycle, with the objective of addressing the root Formal decisions on any CSDP mission are made causes of conflict. Second, successful coordination at the level of foreign ministers. and streamlining at all stages of the crisis response It is also worth noting that the Member States cycle must underpin any diplomatic engagement. are heavily involved in the work of the EU’s Del- If resources or expertise are not available when egations, with around 45 % of the administra- required, the legitimacy of any diplomatic engage- tive-level officials comprising national diplomats ment may be undermined. on temporary assignment. Their diplomatic experience (many of the political advisers are national diplomats) is of particular relevance for crisis Stocktaking and prospects response. The EU has acquired considerable experience in various facets of crisis prevention and man- The European Commission agement over the last few decades. As we look to the future and to ways of enhancing the Union’s The European Commission is an essential diplomatic engagement, it is evident that clearer actor when it comes to wider conflict prevention strategic guidance is needed in order to ascer- or post-conflict stabilisation. Very few crises are tain more clearly when and whether to intervene unidimensional and many will require the use and how any intervention would serve the EU’s of multiple tools and instruments over a period broader values and interests, especially with finite of time to address the crisis. This often involves resources. The EU is often criticised, with some thinking through the links between the crisis justification, for being cacophonous and slow. management aspects and the development-ori- Diplomatic efforts may be complicated by the ented ones (although progress has been made, the inability to bring some financial instruments to security-development nexus remains one of the bear in a timely manner, and by internal coordi- most challenging in terms of linking together the nation issues within and between the EU’s institu- different aspects, ensuring there are smooth hand- tions. The recent emphasis on the ‘comprehensive over mechanisms and the fundamental goals are approach’ has the benefit of focusing attention on understood and observed consistently). The Horn how to join up the three Ds (diplomacy, devel- of Africa and the Sahel are often quoted as exam- opment and defence) more effectively. Finally, ples of early application of the comprehensive introspection can also be helpful for diplomats approach. and others alike. In this regard there is a need Generally speaking, CFSP/CSDP measures to ensure that the ‘lessons learned’ at the end of are often aimed at shorter-term crisis avoidance any EU crisis involvement are properly extracted or stabilisation, while the Commission’s expertise and assimilated into a modified or refined crisis and instruments are employed for longer-term response cycle. Although these suggestions would stability. This may involve measures such as Secu- benefit the EU’s crisis response capacities more rity Sector Reform and Disarmament, Demobili- effectively in general, they would also strengthen sation and Reintegration. its diplomatic engagement.

76 1 BACKGROUND

1.4.2. Conflict prevention

by Andrew Byrne and Joëlle Jenny

Conflict prevention – by facilitating the reso- Within the EEAS, the Division for Conflict lution of underlying tensions and disputes – can Prevention, Peace-building and Mediation Instru- save lives, reduce suffering, and avoid the destruc- ments (within the Directorate for Security Policy tion of infrastructure and the economy. Peace- and Conflict Prevention) supports the geographi- building – itself a core tenet of Common Security cal services and Delegations, crisis response/ and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions – provides management services, as well as EEAS senior an important foundation to enable fragile and management, in taking real-time decisions in the conflict-affected countries to progress towards pursuit of peace and in anticipation of crises and wider development goals. Mediation and dialogue prevention of conflict. The division increasingly facilitation can be an effective and cost-efficient supports CSDP missions and operations, for means of preventing, transforming or resolving example through conflict analysis, as a basis for violent conflict. the development of a Political Framework for Cri- The importance of these aspects, therefore, sis Approach. Close cooperation with the Euro- is enshrined in Article 21 of the Lisbon Treaty pean Commission on these issues is also ensured which – for the first time at Treaty level – includes (notably, with the DEVCO Unit on Fragility and the goal ‘to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and Crisis Management and the Stability Instrument strengthen international security’ among the objec- Operations Unit in the Service for Foreign Policy tives of the EU’s external action. The general refer- Instruments). ences in Article 21 were further developed in the Specific tools of relevance for CSDP missions 2011 Council conclusions on conflict prevention. and operations are introduced below: In addition, the 2009 EU Concept on Media- • Early Warning System, tion and Dialogue Capacities advocates the use of • Conflict Analysis and mediation as a tool of first response to emerging • Justice and Security Sector Reform Support. or on-going crisis. More generally, further strengthening of the EU’s comprehensive approach to conflicts and The EU Conflict crises in third countries is increasingly high on the Early Warning System political agenda. Conflict prevention and mitigation efforts (notably, robust and perceptive early The EU’s Conflict Early Warning System is warning systems; sound and systematic conflict part of a shift in emphasis away from reacting to analysis; flexible mediation support capacities; crises towards conflict prevention. The aim is to and identifying EU early responses) constitute the preserve lives and livelihoods that might other- bed-rock of such a broad approach – which in fact wise be destroyed when violent conflict erupts. comprises a wide range of mechanisms and tools As well as the severe human costs of violent con- (including CSDP missions, as one among other flict, the World Bank’s 2011 World Development diplomatic, political dialogue, trade, and external Report showed that civil wars destroy decades of assistance measures). gross domestic product (GDP) growth on aver-

77 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

age and it takes countries years to get back onto a an interest and ability to take additional action, sustainable growth path. and In order to prevent the emergence, re-emer- 2. the EU early response = the development of gence or escalation of violent conflict, early warn- concrete early action proposals and subsequent ing is indispensable. It is about systematically monitoring of the various EU actions taken providing the right information to the right peo- forward for implementation. ple at the right time – connecting the dots across relevant actors in the field and at headquarters. It encompasses the systematic collection and analy- Conflict Analysis and the sis of information from a variety of sources, development of response 1. in order to identify and understand the risks for options violent conflict in a country, and 2. in order to develop strategic responses to miti- Past evaluations of EU assistance, as well as gate those risks. lessons learnt from CSDP missions, have shown that the EU has been investing heavily in conflict In the EU’s approach to early warning for con- contexts. Yet with insufficient conflict analysis to flict prevention the goal is not ‘prediction’. It will inform its strategy development and program- always be difficult to pinpoint the exact trigger for ming, the EU’s impact on addressing the causes the eruption of violence in the future. What we do and consequences of conflict has been limited. know is that there are certain factors and indica- Conflicts (and not only violent conflicts) are tors that frequently correlate with the emergence often complex and multifaceted, involving local of violent conflict. If we can bring together infor- populations, warring factions, state armies, rebel mation and analysis to better identify and assess movements, and regional and international play- these structural, underlying risks for violent con- ers. This constantly changing, complex web of flict, we can more easily pursue early preventive causes and actors, their interests, agendas, and actions before situations escalate into crises. This actions can make it difficult for decision makers is upstream conflict prevention in essence. More- and implementers to understand how, where and over, country risk assessments enable decision- when to intervene. makers to take decisions on prevention (and crisis To address this challenge, the EU has devel- response) based on evidence and a deeper under- oped a systematic approach to conflict analysis. standing of the underlying causes and dynamics It can be used by decision makers, practitioners of violence in countries and regions. and diplomats to make strategic and operational The Early Warning System is a consultative decisions. It is in line with the comprehensive process that in Brussels involves the EEAS, includ- approach, which calls for a ‘common methodol- ing CSDP actors, relevant services of the Com- ogy to conflict and crisis analysis.’ mission and Member States through the Political Conflict analysis is not only a product but also and Security Committee and geographical work- a process. This is important as it needs to be car- ing groups. At country level, EU Delegations, ried out, and shared, by those who need to apply CSDP missions and operations, EUSR teams and the results in their own work. The EU’s compre- Member State embassies are involved. The process hensive approach sets this out clearly: ‘A shared broadly consists of two parts: analysis should set out the EU’s understanding about 1. the EU ‘early warning’ = a scan of conflict risk the causes of a potential conflict or crisis, identify the around the world, leading to an EU prioritisa- key people and groups involved, review the dynam- tion of countries/regions where there is a sig- ics of the situation and assess the potential risks of nificant risk of escalation and where the EU has action, or non-action.’

78 1 BACKGROUND

Drivers of peace What helps resilience against violence and escalation? Institutions promoting peace. Causes Stakeholders What structural and proximate Who are the Stakeholders act- factors cause conflict? ing or affected by the conflict? (political, economic, Interests, goals, positions, social, security or other) Conflict dynamics capacities and relationships. What is driving conflicts and violence? Patterns and triggers for violence. What is the impact? Scenarios Options What are possible What are possible strategies? future developments? What are the options to realise them? Responses What has the EU done/is doing? And others? Assessment.

Elements of EU conflict analysis

Conflict analysis is a structured approach, right mix of people, combining the necessary addressing different elements of a conflict in turn. knowledge with those that need to ‘own’ the This is needed to complement the daily monitor- analysis when they take it forward in their own ing of events and political developments and gain work. Relevant outside experts may provide exter- a deeper understanding of underlying issues and nal perspectives and help avoid ‘group-think’. This dynamics. latter approach, called ‘light touch’ conflict analy- The diagram above shows the different ele- sis has proven to be very useful for responsive and ments of conflict analysis. It shows that in the flexible use within the EU (and where necessary EU approach, analysis goes beyond understand- followed up by deeper/continued analysis). Such ing what is going on and why, also assessing what conflict analysis workshops are particularly per- could happen (scenario building) and what has tinent in conflict-affected settings characterised been and is being done to help prevent or resolve by rapidly-moving developments, and they have the conflict (responses). On this basis, the analysis already been organised in a number of conflict process concludes by identifying specific objec- situations (Mali, DRC, Libya, Lebanon, Syria, tives or strategies to address key drivers of conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina, Nigeria). They result and specific options for how the EU could con- in short and structured conflict analysis reports tribute to these objectives. which combine analysis with a set of options to In concrete terms, conflict analysis can take address the core conflict issues that were identi- many forms, ranging from an in-depth field fied. As such, the results can serve as a common assessment or conflict-sensitive political economy point of departure to explore options to use the analysis to a two-day workshop that gathers the wide range of EU tools available in an effective

79 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS Photo: EUMM Georgia Photo: The Head of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia and the Special Representative of the OSCE chairmanship co-facilitate the 52nd meeting of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism in Ergneti, on 27 February 2015

way – thereby ensuring a solid basis for a com- than 100 countries. Moreover, CSDP missions are prehensive approach. The EEAS Conflict Preven- currently supporting justice and security institution, Peace-building and Mediation Instruments tions in countries such as Bosnia and Herzego- Division, often in partnership with DEVCO’s vina, Afghanistan, DRC, Mali and Somalia. Fragility and Crisis Management Unit can help An integrated EU approach to programming, organise and facilitate these events upon request. designing and implementing JSSR programmes will be crucial to cope with these challenges and the growing need for support. An EU Informal Justice and Security Sector Inter-service Group on Security Sector Reform – Reform (JSSR) managed by the Conflict Prevention, Peace-building and Mediation Instruments Division, in close The Arab Spring up risings – as well as recent association with relevant geographical and crisis events in a number of African countries – have management services from the EEAS and the underlined the continuing challenge faced by Commission (DG DEVCO) – aims to facilitate many countries regarding the provision of effec- such an approach. tive, legitimate and accountable justice and secu- This forum primarily aims to exchange infor- rity services. The EU has long supported JSSR mation between CSDP missions, crisis response programmes, through a wide range of diplomatic, actions and governance/development pro- crisis response, development and security mecha- grammes, on planned JSSR interventions from nisms. The EU, over the period 2001-2009, dis- the early stages onwards. It also promotes joint bursed approximately EUR 1 billion in funds for analysis as a basis for effective response and imple- development cooperation, targeting JSSR in more mentation.

80 1 BACKGROUND

1.4.3 The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace

by Martin Albani

The Instrument contributing to the EU to intervene rapidly before the traditional Stability and Peace in a nutshell programmable instruments can be mobilised. Sec- ondly, the IcSP is a global instrument that is not The Instrument contributing to Stability and limited to bilateral or regional approaches but can Peace (IcSP), with EUR 2.3 billion of funds in also implement multi-country and trans-regional the period 2014-2020, is one of the key external actions worldwide. Thirdly, the IcSP is not bound assistance instruments that enable the EU to take by the criteria for Official Development Assis- a lead in helping to prevent and respond to actual tance as laid down by the OECD’s Development or emerging crises around the world. The Euro- Assistance Committee (DAC). The only areas pean Commission’s Service for Foreign Policy of action explicitly excluded under the IcSP are Instruments (FPI), working in close collaboration humanitarian aid and actions of a military nature. with other services of the Commission and the The choice of making use of the IcSP is deter- European External Action Service (EEAS), mobi- mined by three main criteria: to begin with, it lises the IcSP to provide for: must be politically appropriate and a priority for • urgent short-term actions in response to situa- the EU to intervene in a particular crisis or peace- tions of crisis or emerging crisis (Article 3, with building context. Secondly, the area of interven- 70 % of overall IcSP funds dedicated to these tion must be eligible within the legal and thematic actions); and scope set out in the IcSP Regulation. And finally, • longer-term capacity building of organisations deployment of the IcSP must be feasible, which engaged in conflict prevention, peace-building means in particular that suitable implementing and crisis preparedness (Article 4, correspond- bodies must be available, and the required dura- ing to 9 % of overall IcSP funding). tion of intervention must be within the limits of In addition, Article 5 of the IcSP, which is man- what is possible under the IcSP. Continuity of aged by DG DEVCO, enables the EU to help the EU engagement through other instruments build long-term international, regional and should also be ensured where appropriate. national capacity to address global and trans- As demonstrated in the map below, the IcSP regional threats and emerging threats. and its predecessor, the IfS (Instrument for Sta- There are three main characteristics that set the bility), have been used to finance a large number IcSP apart from most of the other external finan- of crisis response and capacity-building projects cial instruments the EU has in its toolbox. First worldwide. To date, the largest share of funds of all, the crisis response measures (Art. 3) are was directed at projects in Africa and the Mid- not programmed but decided quickly in reaction dle East.1 IcSP actions are also often implemented to developments on the ground, hence enabling in the same crisis context as CSDP missions and

1 From 2007 to 2013, the geographic distribution of funds allocated under the IfS Crisis Response envelope (Art. 3) was 34 % to Africa, 34 % to Middle East and North Africa, 17 % to Asia and Pacific, 9 % to Latin America and the Carib- bean, 5 % to Central Asia and South Caucasus, and 1 % to Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans.

81 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS Graphic: European Commission Graphic: European

EU Instrument for Stability Measures in 2013 (also indicating locations of EU CSDP operations)

operations. Cooperation between the latter and Crisis Response under the IcSP the IcSP has included hands-on cooperation in (Art. 3) the field, such as the IcSP running reconciliation projects between communities in the very sectors Under Article 3 the IcSP can provide assis- of Bangui where the EUFOR mission in CAR tance in response to situations of crisis or emerg- was maintaining order. It has also included pro- ing crisis to prevent conflicts on a wide range of vision of non-military equipment to beneficiaries issues such as: support for mediation, confidence of CSDP operations (‘train and equip’) – but of building, interim administrations, security sec- course not to CSDP operations themselves. tor reform and strengthening the rule of law, The IcSP was established by Regulation (EU) measures to combat the illicit use of and access No 230/2014 of the European Parliament and to firearms, small arms and light weapons, demi- the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing an ning, reintegration measures for former com- Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace. It batants, threats to public health linked to pan- has a budget of EUR 2.3 billion, which amounts demics, transitional justice or the role of natural to 2.5 % of the EU’s entire external action portfo- resources in conflict. lio (Heading IV of the EU budget) for the period Even though crisis response measures account 2014-2020. This financial envelope is at the same for 70 % of all IcSP funding, Article 3 is still a level as that available for CSDP and marks a consid- relatively small but rapidly accessible and targeted erable increase from the EUR 1.6 billion allocated envelope that is mobilised when other EU instru- to its predecessor, the Instrument for Stability (IfS), ments cannot be deployed for reasons of timing or which was in force from 2007 until the end of 2013. the nature of the crisis. Crisis response measures

82 1 BACKGROUND

CASE STUDY IcSP Crisis Response Measure in support of Police Reform in Myanmar

This crisis response measure was initiated following a request by the Government of Myanmar and the opposition (Daw Aung San Suu Kyi) to the EU and the findings of an inter-service EU fact-finding mission. Its objective is to help prevent and reduce escalation of communal, inter-religious, and political conflict into violence by providing support to the reform of the Myanmar Po- lice Force (MPF) in the priority areas of community policing and crowd management, including capacity building on updating the corresponding legal framework and police vision, doctrine and manuals as well as improving police accountability towards the Parliament, civil society and the media. This project is funded with EUR 9.5 million and is being implemented by a consortium of European agencies from 2013 to 2015. Trainers and experts on the ground include a mix of civilians and serving and retired police officers from several EU Member States.

Implementation of the project has largely been successful so far, with strong buy-in from government authorities, the main opposition party in Parliament and civil society. More than 4 300 police officers have already been trained in best international practice in crowd management and an equal number of personal protective equipment sets have been delivered, which has led to observable partial change in the behaviour of the MPF in public order situations. In parallel more than 750 officers have been trained in community policing with a strong focus on ‘train-the-trainers‘ and, due to its success, an extension of the community policing pilot to three additional areas. Progress on drafting a new police vision and guidance manual has also been made. Despite profound initial reluctance on all sides, the first joint MPF-civil society and MPF-media workshops have been successfully implemented, helping to nurture a fragile trust-building process. In order to ensure the continuity of the EU engagement, a longer-term police reform support project is being developed under the geographic programme of the Development Cooperation Instrument.

usually act as a catalyst to prepare the ground for The key advantage of IcSP crisis response more sustained, long-term assistance and develop- measures is their speed and flexibility. As Arti- ment programmes of the EU, its Member States cle 3 is non-programmable, crisis response meas- or other donors. In the context of the EU’s com- ures do not require formal approval via standard prehensive approach, the IcSP therefore comple- EU ‘comitology’ procedures. Instead they are ments but does not replace humanitarian aid or presented for information to the Political and longer-term instruments. Security Committee of the Council, principally

83 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

quarters level, project management is typically devolved to EU Delegations located in the third countries concerned. FPI therefore has, in addition to its headquarters-based team of Crisis Response Planners and Programme Managers, dedicated IcSP personnel posted to EU Delega- tions worldwide to provide key support during real-time crises and to oversee and monitor implementation of crisis response measures. They work closely together with IcSP implementing partners on the ground, which include NGOs, the UN and other international organisations, EU Mem- ber State agencies and regional and sub-regional organisations. Photo: EUPST Photo: The EU’s Police Services Training Programme is part of the Peace-building Partnership of the IcSP The Peace-building Partnership of the IcSP (Art. 4) to ensure complementarity and consistency with CFSP measures. The European Parliament is The ‘Peace-building Partnership’ of the IcSP also informed. This and other special ‘fast-track’ (PbP, Article 4) was established to build and decision-making provisions applicable to IcSP strengthen the civilian expertise of the EU and crisis response measures enable the Commission its partners in the areas of conflict prevention, to respond to situations of crisis usually within peace-building and crisis preparedness. The PbP a period of two to three months from the first addresses, in particular, civil society organisations request to the start of implementation on the and think-tanks as well as international, regional ground. In exceptional cases of extreme urgency, and sub-regional organisations alongside agencies this response time may be further shortened. in EU Member States. It also serves to deepen the However this speed comes at a price: crisis dialogue between civil society and EU institu- response measures are limited to a maximum tions. duration of 18 months and a maximum amount As PbP measures are meant to provide more of EUR 20 million. In the event of unforeseen long-term capacity building, they do not ben- and objective obstacles to implementation, they efit from the special “fast-track” procedures of can be extended by a further six months. In cases IcSP crisis response measures under Article 3 (see of protracted crisis and conflict, a second measure above). can be put in place, which may extend the maxi- They are subject to the standard programming mum duration to 36 months. In situations where cycle of EU external financial instruments and, as further support is needed, a so-called Interim such, are not bound by specific time or funding Response Programme (IRP) can be financed limitations. under Article 3. However, IRPs do not benefit Two areas of particular interest in the CSDP from any special fast-track provisions and must be context are the PbP programmes to build the subject to standard ‘comitology’ decision-making capacity of civilians and police to take part in procedures. international crisis management missions, includ- Once IcSP crisis response actions have been ing CSDP missions and operations: ENTRi and planned, designed and politically agreed at head- EUPST.

84 1 BACKGROUND

CASE STUDY The IcSP’s Peace-building Partnership in support of International Crisis Management Missions – ENTRi and EUPST

Europe’s New Training Initiative (ENTRi) is an innovative programme to build the capacities of civilian experts to participate in civilian stabilisation missions of the EU, the UN and other international organisations. With a budget of EUR 3.3 million its current cycle runs from 2013 to 2016 and it is implemented by a consortium of 15 European Training Pro- viders. ENTRi offers pre-deployment courses for specific country contexts, in-country training for local staff of international missions as well as specialised courses on a wide area of subjects such as human rights, gender, rule of law or mission administration. In addition, ENTRi certifies EU civilian crisis management courses, has produced a handbook for civilian experts working in missions, and is currently developing e-learning possibilities.

The European Union’s Police Services Training Programme (EUPST) is currently entering its third phase, which will run from 2015 to 2018 with an overall budget of EUR 6.25 million. It is again planned to be implemented by the EUPST consortium, which is made up of police and gendarmerie services of several EU Member States. Like its predecessors, EUPST aims to build up the capacity of police officers from the EU, non-EU countries contributing to CSDP missions, as well as African Union countries taking part in international crisis management missions and projects with a police component. In line with the evolving mission reality on the ground, EUPST will aim to include more strengthening elements in both training and practical exercises. EUPST added value is threefold: i) an international learning context and the possibility to integrate operational and command-post elements into operational training and comprehensive live exercises, closely shadowing mission and project reality; ii) a focus on inter-operability, best practices and harmonisation of training approaches and the formulation of the resulting lessons learned, in close cooperation with the Eu- ropean Police College; and iii) stimulation of international linkages and exchange of best practices in international policing with partners outside the EU.

85 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

1.4.4. Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection

by Florika Fink-Hooijer

Introduction edness. While the main thrust of civil protection is within the European Union, for the purposes EU humanitarian aid and civil protection are of this handbook – which focusses on external not crisis management or crisis prevention tools as action – this chapter will only discuss civil protec- such, but very visible expressions of EU’s solidarity tion operations outside of the EU. In that context, (and sometimes even soft power) within the field the two instruments follow the same principles of its external action. In 2014 the world faced four and integrate into a wider, UN-coordinated inter- crises of very wide scope and extreme severity in national system. Syria, CAR, South Sudan and Iraq, alongside the various challenges posed by Ebola in West Africa. In 2015, 78 million people in 22 countries require Civil Protection urgent humanitarian assistance. Headquartered in Brussels with a global network of field offices, the Civil protection assistance is deployed at the European Commission’s department for humani- acute emergency phase of a crisis and tends to be tarian aid and civil protection (better known as of short duration, typically not lasting more than ECHO) ensures rapid and effective delivery of a few weeks. It is delivered by government in the EU relief assistance. Since bringing its two main immediate aftermath of a disaster or, increasingly, instruments, humanitarian aid and civil protection, as support for disaster risk reduction and prepar- under one roof in 2010, the Commission has built edness. It may take the form of in-kind assistance, up a robust and effective European mechanism deployment of specially equipped teams, or assess- for crisis response both inside and outside the EU. ment and coordination by experts sent to the field. The core mandate of ECHO is to save and pre- The European Union plays a supporting and serve life, prevent and alleviate human suffering and coordinating role in civil protection via the Union safeguard the integrity and dignity of populations Civil Protection Mechanism which was created in affected by natural disasters and man-made cri- 2001 and substantially reinforced in 2014 with ses. ECHO acts for the EU as one of the biggest the aim to foster cooperation among national civil global humanitarian donors. Via policy develop- protection authorities across Europe. Participat- ment and quality standard-setting ECHO also ing States1, much like in CSDP, remain in com- makes the EU a reference donor. In civil protec- mand and control of the assets deployed. All assets tion and disaster risk management ECHO acts as and in-kind assistance are owned and offered by a coordinator of Member States’ response action the participating states on a voluntary basis. in situations where a natural or man-made dis- A well-coordinated response at European level aster overwhelms the national capacity or where avoids duplication of relief efforts and ensures it offers important cost or network advantages, that assistance meets the real needs of the affected including in the fields of prevention and prepar- region. The European added value of civil pro-

1 EU Member States and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Iceland and Norway.

86 1 BACKGROUND Photo: EU/ECHO Hua Hin, Thailand Photo: Thailand: ECHO’s Vera Mazza watches an Asian Civil Protection exercise involving the use of helicopters to evacuate victims of a natural disaster tection assistance deployed outside of the EU Humanitarian aid therefore lies in coordination, co-financing, needs assessment and greater interoperability of the In 2013, the EU alone provided relief assis- assistance provided by participating states. The tance to more than 124 million people in Mechanism covers prevention (e.g. early warn- 90 countries outside the EU with a combined ing tools such as the Global Disaster Alert and value of EUR 1.35 billion. EU humanitarian Coordination System – GDACS2), preparation aid is a “shared parallel competence”: this means (through extensive exercises and training pro- that the Union conducts an autonomous policy, grammes) and response. Its core element is the which neither prevents the Member States from European Response Coordination Centre (ERCC), exercising their competences nor makes the which monitors and coordinates emergencies on Union’s policy merely “complementary” to those a 24/7 basis. The Mechanism has established a of the Member States. EU humanitarian aid is voluntary pool of wide-range response capacities mandated3 to provide assistance mostly at the and experts, available for immediate deployment peak of a crisis, but it can also provide aid before as part of a European operation. In addition to and after the immediate crisis through prepared- the coordination role and in-kind assistance to the ness and short-term rehabilitation. This is car- participating states, a limited budget is also avail- ried out with an annual budget of around EUR able, which can be used, inter alia, to co-finance 1 billion, amounting to less than 1 % of the EU (up to 85 %) the transporting of assistance. budget.

2 http://www.gdacs.org 3 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:31996R1257

87 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

crises” – situations where the affected populations are not receiving international attention and assistance. Besides its own engagement in such cases, ECHO also uses its leverage in international fora to raise the profiles of these crises and trigger more funding from other donors.

Relations with external action of the EU – the Comprehensive Approach Photo: EU/ECHO Jean-Pierre Mustin Photo: The European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Pro- The statements that EU humanitarian aid is tection department (ECHO) has organised much needed life- independent of political, military or economic saving humanitarian cargo from Europe to Bangui, the capi- objectives of the Union and that it is not a cri- tal of Central African Republic sis management tool often cause consternation among other EU actors that engage in external The Commission does not implement the EU’s action. Is it not naïve in a 21st century world with humanitarian aid itself but through pre-selected complex international relations to make such implementing partners: around 200 organisations, claims? Is it not hypocritical? What does it mean ranging from humanitarian NGOs to the Red for EU foreign policy? Cross/Red Crescent and the UN system, along The principled approach is derived from the with a number of Member States’ specialised Geneva conventions and is enshrined in the EU agencies, such as the German Federal Agency for Treaty as well as in the above-mentioned Euro- Technical Relief (THW). However, ECHO is also pean Consensus. It is also grounded in operational directly engaged in the field, thanks to its global necessity and logic, particularly in complex emergen- network of technical field experts. This field net- cies. In such situations, especially in conflicts, access to work provides ECHO with real time situational the most vulnerable people depends on there not being awareness and humanitarian needs assessments an association of EU humanitarian aid with military and it also monitors closely the implementation or political interests on the ground, not taking sides in of ECHO-funded projects. In addition, ECHO a conflict and helping all those in need, irrespective has developed sound humanitarian sector policies of their political views, religious beliefs or other per- (e.g. food security, nutrition, water and sanita- suasion. This independence and neutrality are also tion, gender) that allow it to influence and often crucial for the safety and security of ECHO’s own staff lead the international humanitarian system. and implementing partners. In other words, human- According to the European Consensus on itarian assistance in areas controlled by a party to Humanitarian Aid, to which all Member States the conflict would not be possible if the EU logo and EU institutions have subscribed, EU assis- coming with it were associated with another party tance is given on the basis of needs, in line with in the conflict, or even merely with vested interests. the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, In 2013, 454 humanitarian relief workers impartiality and independence. It is therefore not a were assaulted in a record number of attacks (see crisis management tool. Needs are assessed through graphic) and more than a third (155) were killed. an evidence-based, rigorous methodology, which For these reasons the humanitarian community also enables ECHO to compare needs with funding has to take care to avoid misperceptions and from other sources and establish a list of “forgotten strengthen its independent, neutral and impartial

88 1 BACKGROUND

role. The humanitarian community thus invests 300 in being accepted, which requires presence, time, 250 and sustained engagement with all relevant par- 247 ties, including non-state actors as well as influen- 200 tial political, military, or religious leaders on all 165 170 150 sides of a conflict. This is why ECHO as a donor 155 152 130 has an important role in maintaining dialogue 123 and the perception that its actions are principled. 100 107 In short, the principled approach encompassed 75 50 63 63 in humanitarian aid makes possible an EU presence in cases where other relations are impossible. 0

Graphic: Fink-Hooijer/scala 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Yet ECHO does not operate in a vacuum, but is In 2013, 454 humanitarian relief workers were assaulted in part of a broader EU structure. ECHO therefore a record number of 247 attacks and more than a third (155) works closely with other Commission services were killed (e.g. with DG DEVCO on resilience and linking relief, rehabilitation and development and solu- in internationally accepted guidelines4 and Host tions to protracted displacement) as well as the Nation Support agreements. Specific internal EU EEAS and other CFSP actors. documents approved by the PSC5 and further elab- As to information sharing, ECHO does provide orated between the EU Military Staff and ECHO selected information to help shape other policies, apply when ECHO draws on military support in but in such a way as to ensure it does not com- civil protection operations, which remain civilian in promise operational security and access of ECHO nature irrespective of the means deployed. staff and partners. For instance, regular situation In short, ECHO is “in but out” of the EU com- updates in the Council working groups bring prehensive approach. It is in to assess situations Member States up to speed on assessments from and ring alarm bells; to help formulate key mes- the field. An ECHO presence at the Crisis Plat- sages on issues like IHL; to help mobilise politi- form ensures that EU deliberations on EU foreign cal, development or military action when needed. policy are given a humanitarian reality check. There is also cooperation between civil protection Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA) and military assets when needed. But it is also and CSDP planning documents also benefit from out, as humanitarian aid cannot be put under any relevant ECHO input. Conversely, ECHO also political, military or economic objective or com- informs CFSP colleagues of situations that require mand. It needs to retain neutrality, impartiality stronger political or military attention – such as and independence to be able to operate in conflict compliance with International Humanitarian situations. The careful judgement call as to how Law (IHL) and protection of civilians – and may best to apply the “in-but-out” approach in each also plead for action as need be. crisis is the role of civil-military relations within For similar reasons, in the vast majority of cases, ECHO. ECHO therefore maintains close links civil protection as a form of governmental assistance with the crisis management structures within the is provided in non-conflict environments. The rules EEAS to allow ECHO to be “in” as much as pos- for the deployment of civil protection are laid down sible without compromising its independence.

4 Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief – “Oslo Guidelines” - Rev. 1.1 (November 2007). 5 General Framework for the use of Member States’ military or military chartered Transportation Assets and ESDP Coordi- nation tools in Support of EU Disaster Response; Military support to EU disaster response: Identification and coordination of available assets and capabilities.

89 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

Central African Republic

CSDP planning: ECHO contribution on exactions, vulnerable population, criminality; biweekly calls with OHQ (Larissa). CSDP mandate: Providing safe Central African Republic and secure environment, protecting Civilians, external secu-

rity to IDP camps, training on Bangui IHL and protection of civilians. Input: Advising on communica- Source: http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zentralafrikanische_Republik tion to ensure acceptance. Download on 10.02.15

But Out

Careful contacts in Bangui, mindful of at M’Poko airport, no “quick impact pro- perceptions (CMCoord). jects”. CSDP mandate: No direct assistance to Exit criteria not on humanitarian grounds humanitarian aid (except as last resort), (e.g. number of IDPs returning). not protecting humanitarians (but civil- No communication about humanitarian ians), no internal role in IDP camps, even effects of operation.

the comprehensive approach in guidelines are drawn up which describe the rela- practice tionship between armed counterparts, including EU CSDP operations, and humanitarians: does the Taking into account the prevailing param- security situation warrant the use of armed escorts eters in a given emergency or crisis situation and from UN or EU military forces? If so, how does through an appropriate coordination mechanism that aff ect humanitarian access in areas controlled and smart, context-dependent actions, the EU’s by the other forces? What is the division of labour humanitarian and civil protection actions make in protecting the population (humanitarian protec- an important contribution to the EU’s successful tion/protection of civilians)? Can military forces comprehensive external action. attend humanitarian protection cluster meetings? In the fi eld, this translates into context-dependent Th ere is no general yes-or-no answer to these ques- relations between EU humanitarian aid and EU tions, as the situation will be diff erent in each crisis, CSDP operations and missions, if present. With the and humanitarians have to take into consideration help of UN OCHA, the humanitarian community longer-term implications for how they are per- carefully assesses the potential infl uence that closer ceived and accepted. Th e extent of “in” and “out” relations with armed actors would have on its per- will therefore vary with each CSDP mission and ceived independence. Frequently, country-specifi c operation.

90 1 BACKGROUND

1.4.5. Election Observation

by Emanuele Giaufret and Radek Khol Photo: European Commission European Photo:

The EU Election Observation Mission in Senegal on 26 February 2012

Election Observation Missions (EOM) are a ing sustainable peace and stability. Elections key tool at the service of a fundamental objec- provide groups of citizens with an opportunity tive of the EU’s external action: the promotion of to express their political voice in competition democratisation processes and respect for human with their opponents without resorting to vio- rights across the world. The immediate goal is to lence, and thus enable the peaceful transfer of strengthen transparency, and hence confidence political power. In this regard, election observa- in the elections, deter fraud, and provide an tion activities conducted by the EU can comple- informed and factual assessment of the election ment and enhance other EU crisis management process that can also contribute to shaping the EU and peace-building initiatives in partner coun- political reaction to the process. The long-term tries. EU election observation activities can thus objective, however, is to improve the overall elec- contribute towards conflict prevention or resolution framework via the recommendations issued tion. by the EOMs which must be followed up by both In some cases EU election observation activities EU and domestic actors, hence promoting their will be taking place in the partner country where ownership of the process. CSDP Missions or Operations are also deployed The EU deploys every year on average ten at the same time, as was most recently the case in EOMs across the world, with the exception of the Mali, Kosovo and Afghanistan (see box). While OSCE region where the OSCE/ODIHR remains each EU instrument has its own distinct objec- responsible for deploying EOMs. The EU has tive, they are all deployed in the spirit of the EU’s become one of the main players in election obser- comprehensive approach, allowing for synergies vation and enjoys high credibility. of effort as they often impact the wider good gov- EU EOMs can, under certain circumstances, ernance and rule of law areas. also assist partner countries in overcoming crisis EOMs are not CSDP actions but rather a joint situations and facilitate democratic and/or endeavour of EU institutions and Member States, post-conflict transitions. A genuine and demo- acting under the High Representative’s (HR) cratic election process can contribute to ensur- political guidance and in line with the political

91 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

priorities of the EU. The policy framework for Afghanistan 2014 election observation missions was established together with Member States and the European The EU decided in 2014 to deploy EU Election Assess Parliament (EP) in 2000-2001; the methodology ment Team (EAT) to Afghanistan to assess the Presi- applied is inspired by the one used by OSCE/ dential election which was seen as a crucial step in ODIHR and is based on the principles of long- historic, first-ever peaceful transition of power. term presence, wide geographical coverage and In this context, preparations of EU EAT resulted in independence. Consistent application of the elec- an increase in contacts with EUPOL Afghanistan, in- tion observation methodology is key to preserving cluding its logistical support for Exploratory Mission EU credibility in election observation, as incon- deployed outside Kabul, to Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif. sistencies and short-term political considerations The second round of 14 June was contested and could undermine it. eventually both Presidential candidates, Dr Abdul- To respond with flexibility to political priori- lah Abdullah and Dr Ashraf Ghani, agreed on 12 July ties, the observation approach has been developed to a comprehensive audit of the results in order to and there are now several instruments in the EU’s determine the will of the voters. toolbox: The unprecedented full-scale audit of more than • The Election Observation Mission (EOM) is 22 000 ballot boxes presented unique challenges the standard and most complete tool. Prepared to all actors involved, including international ob- by an Exploratory Mission that assesses if con- servers and thus also the EU. ditions exist for meaningful elections and if se- In response to the urgent need to mobilise EU curity allows for the deployment of an EOM staff already in theatre the PSC agreed on 16 July which is deployed usually six weeks before that EUPOL Afghanistan mission members can par- election day and consists of a Core Team, with ticipate on a voluntary basis in the observation of long and short-term observers and is led by a the audit, under the auspices of the EU EAT. Member of the European Parliament (MEP) as Forty-three EUPOL mission members (both civil- Chief Observer. EOM has high visibility and ian and police) who volunteered were subsequently the Chief Observer makes public comments, trained by the EU EAT, accredited by the Independ- issues a preliminary statement after election ent Election Commission and acted as Locally Re- day and publishes a final report. The average cruited Short Term Observers (LSTOs), bound by the cost is EUR 3.5 million. Code of Conduct in accordance with the UN ‘Decla- • The Election Assessment Team (EAT) is a ration of Principles for International Election Obser- reduced format, mainly used when security vation’. conditions do not allow a wide deployment EUPOL mission staff filled in an important gap of observers. Prepared by an Exploratory Mis- prior to the mobilisation and deployment of 100 sion and deployed usually six weeks before the EU Long Term Observers arriving from Europe. election, EAT consists of a team of experts, if They were deployed together with their vehicles possible deployed also outside the capital. No and Close Protection Officers (CPO), retaining their short-term observers are deployed. EAT may chain of command. be, when advisable, led by an MEP as Chief EUPOL was able to sustain its contribution to the Observer. The latter makes public comments, audit observation efforts throughout the process, issues a preliminary statement and publishes which altogether lasted a month and half. a report. The EU deployed an EAT in Libya EU EAT commended EUPOL staff acting as LSTOs (2012) and Afghanistan (2014), to give two for the high quality and consistency of the reports examples. The cost is similar to an EOM, but submitted. varies because of security requirements.

92 1 BACKGROUND Photo: EU EOM Mali / Ezequiel Scagnetti EU EOM Mali / Ezequiel Photo: An European Union Observer monitors a polling station during election day. Bamako/Mali, 15 December 2013

• Election Expert Mission (EEM) is the less • Following the creation of the EEAS, Member costly option (maximum EUR 300 000), and States no longer participate in Exploratory is deployed in countries that are not regarded Missions; as among the main election priorities or when • The HR alone takes the decision, following the security conditions allow only a very limited Exploratory Mission, on whether or not to de- deployment. Consisting of two or more experts ploy an EOM; they have very limited visibility and issue no • The HR decides on the appointment of the public statement. The report is shared with the Chief Observer without consulting Member authorities and sometimes published on a case- States, whilst the EP, following the Declaration by-case basis. The EU deploys several EEM a of Political Accountability, has increased its year, such as recently in Thailand and Algeria prerogatives and is now consulted on the selec- (2014). tion of the Chief Observer. A decision to deploy an EAT or an EEM does not Nevertheless, Member States are closely associated automatically represent a negative judgment on with the various phases of the EOMs. The Politi- the pre-election situation, and they are therefore cal and Security Committee is consulted twice politically neutral. a year on the identification of election priorities The system has also evolved following the and it is often briefed by Chief Observer for the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty with a countries that regularly feature on its agenda. The stronger role of the HR. The main post-Lisbon views of Heads of Missions (HoMs) are an inte- innovations are: gral part of the Exploratory Mission report and • The HR has more leeway in setting the election once an EOM is decided on, the Council Work- priorities, while consulting Member States and ing Parties and HoMs on the ground are regularly the European Parliament; briefed. EOMs produce internal interim reports

93 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

that are shared with Member States and the EP Democracy and Election Group. There is indeed a variety of actors involved in setting up EOMs. Like the Member States, the EP is also consulted on the selection of election priorities; the Chief Observer is an MEP; Member States identify the long and short-term observers; the Commission is responsible for the budgetary, security and logistical aspects; Delegations on the ground are fully involved during the various stages; and the EEAS steers the whole process. Compendium of EOMs issue a final report containing a set of International Standards for Elections recommendations to improve the election framework before the next election cycle. To ensure a lasting impact on democratisation it is essential that the EU Delegations, the EEAS, the Euro- pean Commission, the EP and Member States follow up systematically on those recommendations through political dialogue and financial assistance and promote local ownership in their dialogue with the authorities, political parties and Second Edition civil society. The systematic follow-up of EU and OSCE/ODIHR EOMs recommendations has been included as a key action in the EU Action

Plan for Democracy and Human Rights. http://eeas.europa.eu/eueom/pdf/compendium-of-int-standards-for-elections_en.pdf Source:

EuropeAid EC Methodogical Guide on Electoral Assistance

Handbook for European Union Election Observation

Second Edition Source: http://eeas.europa.eu/eueom/pdf/handbook-eueom-en-2nd-edition_en.pdf Source: http://eeas.europa.eu/eueom/pdf/ec-methodological-guide-on-electoral-assistance_en.pdf Source:

94 1 BACKGROUND

1.4.6. EU support for mediation and dialogue

by Eldridge Adolfo and Canan Gündüz

Mediation efforts are an inescapable feature print, the EU has displayed this practice in its role of contemporary peacemaking. Since the end of as a third-party mediator. This is evident in the the Cold War, the use of mediation as a way to EU’s recent high-level mediation work in Kosovo- reach peace settlements between warring parties Serbia, Mali, South Sudan and Georgia, to name a has become a standard tool for the international few cases. The EU has also engaged in supporting community. Recognising the EU’s ambition and mediation and dialogue work at different levels, capacity in this area, the EU Concept for Strength- including grassroots, in the Philippines, Colom- ening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities, bia, Syria and Libya, for example. Currently, adopted by the Council in November 2009, states the EU is actively engaged in either conducting that mediation is to be established “as a tool of or supporting mediation and dialogue in most first response to emerging or ongoing crisis situa- regions of the world.3 tions”.1 It constitutes the policy basis for the EU’s involvement in international peace mediation. The post-Lisbon EU institutional set-up has What are mediation and given further visibility to the EU’s role as an inter- dialogue? national mediator. In particular, the creation of the position of High Representative of the Euro- In the 2009 Concept, mediation is defined in pean Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Pol- a broad sense, reflecting the great variety of ways icy/Vice-President of the European Commission in which the EU uses this tool at different levels (HR/VP) and, within the EEAS, the creation of and through different activities, including directly the Mediation Support Team (MST) in the Con- mediating and facilitating; funding or providing flict Prevention, Peacebuilding and Mediation political and financial leverage; providing tech- Instruments Division have enhanced the EU’s nical support; and promoting the wider use of capability to conduct and support mediation and mediation and dialogue by national and interna- dialogue. However, the extent to which the EU is tional actors. engaged in mediation is not yet fully recognised, In practical terms, mediation is only one aspect4 even within the EU institutions.2 of conflict prevention, management, resolution As a peace project itself, the EU has mediation, or transformation, where the parties to a conflict dialogue and negotiation as an integral part of its request the assistance of, or accept an offer of internal makeup: it has a long history and rich help from, a third party (an individual, organisa- experience of mediation and dialogue within its tion, group, or state), to help them find a mutu- own borders. As part of its foreign policy foot- ally acceptable solution to their conflict, without

1 Council of the European Union (2009), Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities, 15779/09. 2 Sherriff, A., Hauck, V. (2012), Glass Half Full: Study on EU Lessons Learnt in Mediation and Dialogue, ECDPM. 3 Ibid. 4 Mediation is only one tool for conflict resolution. Mediation is best seen as one part (albeit a very important part) of a larger peace process that starts before and continues after the signing of a peace agreement.

95 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

resorting to violence or physical force or invoking In most contexts where CSDP missions are the authority of law. The third party (mediator) deployed, mediated peace processes will either be should be impartial and accepted by the parties to ongoing, or just concluded, or the CSDP mission lead them through a fair and impartial process of will form a part of efforts to lay the ground for dialogue. The role of the mediator is to bring ideas, peaceful settlement, or may even directly oversee knowledge, resources and authority, and ideally to or implement parts of a peace agreement. Either orchestrate the multitude of actors, interests and way, these dynamics form a critical part of the interventions involved in a peace process.5 context in which a CSDP mission is designed and Mediation is an appealing conflict resolution planned and in which it operates. Mediation and mechanism because it is voluntary, which makes it dialogue skills are also seen as critical by CSDP less threatening for parties to a conflict than other mission staff in their day-to-day work. Many mis- possible options, such as arbitration or the use of sions engage in informal dialogue and sometimes force. Mediation ultimately leaves the final decisions dispute resolution at the working level.7 When of any outcomes to the conflicting parties them- engaged in mediation, the EU uses a range of selves. Furthermore, peace mediation has nowadays strategies that derive from the examples below: largely moved away from negotiating fairly limited Communication facilitation strategies allow ceasefire agreements, offering scope for more com- the mediator to adopt a fairly passive role, chan- plex, multi-issue, multi-stakeholder, long-term tran- nelling information to the parties and facilitating sition processes.6 Mediation today has the ambition cooperation, where she/he does not have control to address the root causes of conflicts and reduce the over the more formal process or substance of chances of any relapse into violence in the long run. mediation. This role can be effective in conflicts where the parties do not have direct channels of communication. An example is Aceh, where the The conduct of mediation EU gave financial support to the facilitation of the peace process by a Finnish NGO that had little Who mediates in the EU? What relevance leverage over the parties or the outcome.8 for CSDP missions? Procedural strategies enable the mediator to structure the mediation process and bring the par- The principal and most visible EU mediator ties together in a neutral environment, where the is the HR/VP, who in turn appoints EU Special mediator exerts some control over the mediation Representatives (EUSRs) and Special Envoys, process. The mediator may exercise control over who are empowered to mediate on the HR/VP’s timing, issues on the agenda, meeting place, fre- behalf in specific conflicts. Due to the nature of quency, media relations, and the formality or flex- their work, Heads of Delegations (HoDs) and ibility of the meetings. This is significant for parties Heads of Missions (HoMs) frequently find them- to a conflict who may not have had an opportunity selves mediating in the course of their daily work, to interact constructively. Former HR/VP Cath- playing different formal and informal roles in the erine Ashton’s conduct of the Serbia-Kosovo Dia- course of a wider peace process. logue is a classic example of this way of working.

5 Lanz, D. and Gasser, R. (2013), A Crowded Field: competition and coordination in international peace mediation, Cen- tre for Mediation in Africa, Mediation Arguments, no. 2. 6 Papagianni (2014), National Dialogue Processes in Political Transitions, Civil Society Dialogue Network Discussion Paper No.3, European Peacebuilding Liaison Office. 7 Gourlay, C. (2010), Mediation and Dialogue as Tools for EU CSDP Missions, Initiative for Peacebuilding. 8 Herrberg, A. (2008), ‘The Brussels Backstage to the Aceh Peace Process’, in Aguswandi and Large, J. (eds.), Reconfiguring Politics: The Indonesia Aceh Peace Process Accord Series, Conciliation Resources.

96 1 BACKGROUND

Directive strategies are the most intrusive former government representatives, acting in a form of intervention. The mediator actively personal capacity. shapes the content and nature of the final out- The outcomes of the various dialogues on the come by offering the parties incentives, promises different tracks are non-binding. However, they of support, threats of diplomatic or economic are channels used to explore options and build sanctions or even the use of force by outside par- networks. Coherence between the different tracks ties. The mediator confronts the parties with new (and particularly linking them all to the track 1 resources or the prospect of losing resources, if level) is crucial to their effectiveness. certain agreements are not made or actions are Working with the multi-track systems by default not taken. The idea is that this may change their ensures that the mediation process is inclusive and incentive structure, and induce them to reach a works with multiple stakeholders. It also allows resolution. In the strictest sense, directive strate- the process to address the root causes of conflict, gies leave the remit of mediation, and go more which is consistent with the EU’s comprehen- in the direction of power diplomacy. Yet they are sive approach. Nevertheless, special efforts must often utilised in the context of peace processes as be made to bring in specific stakeholders usually part of the ‘mediation repertoire’, especially when marginalised in conflict contexts, such as women conflicts are highly escalated, and directly threaten and youth. Other inclusive mechanisms include the interests of outside third parties, including the National Dialogue processes that try to engage the mediator(s).9 country as a whole in a more informal but recon- ciliatory process. For instance, the EU supported the National Dialogue in Yemen between 2013 An inclusive and comprehensive and 2014, inter alia by playing an important role in approach advocating and supporting the inclusion of youth, women, and groups from outside the capital. The 2009 Concept explicitly builds ‘multi- track’ approaches into the EU’s understanding of mediation, exemplifying the idea that peace EU institutional support for processes cannot be limited to top-level leaders, dialogue and mediation but need to reach deep and wide into the fabric of a society affected by violent conflict. In an effort to optimise the effectiveness and Track One refers to the official government professionalisation of mediation10, mediation decision-making bodies or elite. Track Two support aims to improve mediation practice and refers to mid-level elites who are influential and policy more widely, through various activities that linked to decision-makers; these include civil include training, research, policy development society organisations, think-tanks, religious and networking. leaders, etc. Track three refers to grassroots/ The hub for EU mediation support is the EEAS community based stakeholders. There is also the Mediation Support Team (MST), which provides increasing distinction of a Track One-and-a- ongoing and real-time technical advice to EUSRs, half, which focuses primarily on dialogue with Special Envoys, EU Delegations and Brussels-based influential individuals, including current and EU staff, as well as to third parties outside the EU.

9 The strategies discussed above derive from Bercovitch’s work on intractable conflicts. See Bercovitch, J. (2004), ‘Interna- tional Mediation and Intractable Conflict’, in Beyond Intractability. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Infor- mation Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. 10 See Lehman Larsen, S. (2014), Effectively Supporting Mediation: Developments, Challenges and Requirements, Oslo Forum Paper, HD Centre.

97 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

Support is provided on specific and relevant the- specific topics. These are available to the general matic topics and through deployment to the field, public via the EEAS website. including scoping missions. Complementary support is provided by colleagues across the institu- Partnerships: The EEAS has built close and tions, including the geographical Desks, Foreign constructive partnerships with key international Policy Instrument11, DEVCO and the Delegations. organisations – including the UN, the AU, The activities of the MST are as follows: ASEAN, the OSCE – dealing with mediation and dialogue, in order to create synergies and foster Operational support: The EU provides support cooperation. Outreach to Member States also for ongoing operations by deploying both internal forms part of this work. and external technical experts to support mediation processes around the world. Experts are deployed to help design and run processes, advise Conclusions the conflicting parties and mediators on a range of thematic topics such as constitutional reform, International peace mediation is an evolving ceasefire arrangements, power-sharing, human field. Most conflicts today are internal/civil wars, rights and gender issues. The EEAS has access, with multiple conflicting parties, which make through framework agreements, to two consortia them more complex, with a greater need to recon- which include ten of the most prominent media- cile the parties and affected populations that will tion and dialogue organisations in Europe and need to continue to co-exist side by side after the beyond. The MST can deploy experts to the field violence ends. This has brought about a greater at relatively short notice, even within two days. realisation that international third parties may be best placed to support – but never replace – the Mediation training and coaching: Training in critical, long-term peace work of local and national mediation and dialogue is available to all EU staff, individuals and groups. Furthermore, this chang- as well as external mediators and parties to con- ing landscape means that a reliance on mono conflicts. The MST provides two types of training flict resolution strategies, including classical diplo- for mediators: personal one-to-one peer coaching macy, is seldom the only answer. Instead, multiple for senior members of staff engaged in mediation efforts, with better links between a range of stake- and dialogue (EUSRs, Special Envoys, HoDs and holders on multiple tracks – crucially also non- HoMs). This is conducted by external experts state actors – are required to tackle contemporary who are often experienced mediators themselves crisis and conflicts. Given these trends and needs, in confidential sessions. The second type of train- mediation is gaining more visibility and traction ing is an interactive workshop based methodol- as a key conflict resolution mechanism, involving ogy, where mediation and negotiation skills are more funding, actors and tools than a decade ago. taught, through role plays and scenarios. The EU’s commitment to conflict prevention, as well as to the professionalisation and systematisa- Knowledge management: In an effort to improve tion of its own, and others’, mediation work, gives and professionalise the practice of mediation, the it a growing capacity and confidence in mediating MST captures lessons learnt from peace efforts conflicts. This positive trend can be expected to by debriefing EU mediators, commissions studies continue as the EU mainstreams its comprehen- and produces fact-sheets and guidance notes on sive approach to crises and conflict.

11 The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace works with the MST technical experts to provide mediation support through its European Resources for Mediation Support (ERMES) programme.

98 1 BACKGROUND

1.4.7. Sanctions

by Kees Smit Sibinga

Sanctions, also referred to as restrictive meas- not responsible for such policies and actions, in ures, against third countries, individuals or enti- particular the local civilian population, or regard- ties are an essential foreign policy tool of the EU ing legitimate activities in or with the country for pursuing its objectives in accordance with the concerned. The political objectives and criteria of principles of the Common Foreign and Secu- the restrictive measures should be clearly defined rity Policy. Certain EU measures are imposed in the legal acts. The types of measure will vary in implementation of Resolutions by the UN depending on their objectives and their expected Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN effectiveness in achieving these objectives under Charter. The EU may however decide to apply the particular circumstances, reflecting the EU’s autonomous measures that are more restrictive in targeted and differentiated approach. addition to the UN’s measures or, when adoption Restrictive measures must respect human rights in the framework of the UN is not possible, adopt and fundamental freedoms, in particular due pro- restrictive measures autonomously. cess and the right to an effective remedy in full In general terms, the EU’s restrictive meas- conformity with the case-law of the EU Courts. ures are imposed to bring about a change in The measures imposed must be proportionate to policy or activity by the targeted country, part their objectives. of a country, government, entities or individuals. The uniform and consistent interpretation and They are a preventive, non-punitive, instrument effective implementation of the restrictive meas- which should allow the EU to respond swiftly to ures is essential to ensure their effectiveness in political challenges and developments. Sanctions achieving the desired political objective. should be used as part of an integrated and comprehensive policy approach, in the framework of the European Union’s overall foreign policy strate- How are measures adopted? gies, involving political dialogue, complementary efforts and other instruments. The EU and its Sanctions measures can for example include Member States should actively and systematically export and import restrictions, including on arms communicate on EU sanctions, including with (‘arms embargo’), oil and gas and other goods and the targeted country and its population. items, restrictions on support for trade, measures The measures should target the policies or concerning the financial sector, measures regard- actions that have prompted the EU’s decision ing the transport sector and listings (for listings, to impose sanctions and the means to conduct see below). Proposals for restrictive measures, them and those identified as responsible for including proposals for listings or de-listings, in these policies or actions. Such targeted measures respect of country-specific EU autonomous sanc- should minimise adverse consequences for those tions should be submitted by the Member States

99 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

or by the EEAS. The political aspects and broader parameters of the proposals should then be discussed in the relevant regional working party, assisted by sanctions experts from the EEAS and experts from the Commission and the Council Legal Service. Where appropriate, the Political and Security Committee will discuss the proposals and provide political guidance to the working parties concerned, notably on the type of measures selected for further proceedings. The Heads of Missions (HoMs) located in the country(ies) concerned will be invited to provide, where appropriate, their advice on proposals for restrictive measures or additional designations. Equally, the Commission services will be invited to provide, where appropriate, their advice on specific measures which would fall within the remit of the Union. All the legal, technical and horizontal aspects of the proposed restrictive measures should be discussed in RELEX. The legal acts usually consist of a Council Decision introducing the restrictive measures and a Council Regulation defining the specific measures falling within the remit of the Union, in effect economic and financial measures such as asset freezes and export bans. These will be presented in RELEX for discussion, by the EEAS and the Commission respectively. Preferably, the two legal acts should subsequently be submitted to COREPER and formally adopted by the Council at the same time, or with minimum time delay between the two instruments. The Decisions concerning sanctions are adopted by the Council, consisting of the Mem- ber States, on the basis of unanimity (Articles 29 and 31 TEU). Upon adoption, the legal acts giving effect to the sanctions are published in the Official Journal of the European Union. The Official Journal is the only legally binding official record of the EU legal acts in force. To access the Official Journal please consult http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOIndex. do or http://eur-lex.europa.eu/. It is noted that the Regulation is directly binding on EU citizens

and businesses. http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2014/infographic_eu-sanctions-against-russia_en.htm Source:

100 1 BACKGROUND

Proposals for listing Notification of listing

Subjecting certain targeted persons and enti- The EU attaches much importance to ensur- ties responsible for the policies or actions that ing that the listing of targeted persons and enti- prompted the EU decision to impose sanctions to ties respects fundamental rights. In particular, a travel ban and asset freeze (‘listing’) is an instru- due process rights must be guaranteed in full con- ment often used in sanctions. Proposals for auton- formity with the case-law of the Court of Justice, omous listings should be clear and unequivocal. including with regard to the rights of the defence In particular, they must aim to include sufficient and the principle of effective judicial protection. details (identifiers) so that the listing decision, To this end, proper notification of the deci- once it has entered into effect, can be effectively sion and of the reasons justifying the listing must implemented by economic operators and national be ensured. This is achieved by means of a letter, authorities (e.g. banks, consulates). Identifying where appropriate, or through the publication of a information is also crucial to ensure that restric- notice in the Official Journal (C series) on the same tive measures do not affect non-targeted persons day as the publication of the legal act in question and entities. indicating that the Council will communicate the Proposals for autonomous listings should fur- reasons for listing on request. The notification will thermore include individual and specific reasons for inform the persons, groups and entities concerned each listing. The purpose of the reasons is to state, of their right to present observations and to request as concretely as possible, why the Council consid- a review of the decision taken by the Council, as ers, in the exercise of its discretion, that the person, well as of their right to challenge the Council’s deci- group or entity concerned falls under the designa- sion before the General Court in accordance with tion criteria defined by the relevant legal act, taking the relevant provisions in the EU treaties. into consideration the objectives of the measures as expressed in its introductory paragraphs. It is primarily the responsibility of those submit- Review of the measures ting the proposal to provide such reasons. Other Delegations should contribute to this process. The review of EU autonomous sanctions or EU Input from the HoMs located in the country(ies) additions to UN sanctions should take place at concerned will be requested, where appropriate. regular intervals and in accordance with the provi- The reasons for listings will be finalised by the sions of the relevant legal acts. Regular assessments RELEX working party on the basis of the ele- of sanctions regimes by the relevant working party ments discussed in the regional working party. If and RELEX, assisted by the EEAS, the Commis- needed, RELEX may request additional informa- sion and HoMs, should permit the adjustment of tion from the regional working party in order to the measures, as needed, depending on develop- ensure that listings are legally sound and properly ments with regard to the stated objectives and the substantiated. effectiveness of the measures in that respect. As the legal act adopting the designations will be published in the Official Journal, it should be possible to make these reasons public. In exceptional cases, where it is considered that the reasons for the listing are not suitable for publication because of privacy and security considerations, the reasons will need to be addressed separately to the person, group or entity concerned.

101 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

Implementation and application by the EU. In addition, the issue of uniform and of measures consistent interpretation and effective implementation of UN sanctions regimes should regularly The uniform and consistent interpretation and be included in consultations with key partners. effective implementation of the restrictive meas- EU Delegations should be fully involved in this ures is an essential element ensures their effective- process. ness in achieving the desired political objectives. The EU and its Member States should actively Member States must inform each other of the and systematically communicate on EU sanc- measures taken under the relevant legal acts and tions, in order to give them visibility and avoid supply each other with any other relevant infor- any misconceptions, in particular on the part of mation at their disposal in connection with these the local civilian population. Such communica- acts, in particular information in respect of vio- tion will also ensure that the measures have maxi- lation and enforcement problems and judgments mum political impact. Common messages should of national courts. With regard to the measures be discussed in the relevant geographical working within the remit of the Community, the Com- party in consultation with the RELEX working mission oversees the implementation of the meas- party with regard to the legal, technical and hori- ures by the Member States. At the EU level, the zontal consequences of the measures. Commission is also responsible for contacts with the private sector on issues of proper implementation of sanctions. Enforcement of the sanctions is entirely the responsibility of the Member States. By their very nature, sanctions are designed to have political effects in third countries. Neverthe- less, EU restrictive measures only apply within the jurisdiction of the EU.

Outreach and communication

The effectiveness of restrictive measures is directly related to the adoption of similar measures by third countries. In principle, therefore, it is preferable for sanctions to be adopted in the framework of the UN. Where this is not possible, the aim should be to bring as much as possible of the international community to exert pressure on the targeted country. When adopting autonomous sanctions, the EU should, through outreach, actively seek cooperation and, if possible, the adoption of similar measures by relevant third countries in order to minimise substitution effects and strengthen the impact of restrictive measures. In particular, candidate countries should be systematically invited to align themselves with the measures imposed

102 1 BACKGROUND

Annex

EU RESTRICTIVE MEASURES IN FORCE (February 2015)

The list of restrictive measures in force includes both measures applied in implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions and measures applied by the EU autonomously.

AFGHANISTAN (Taliban) EGYPT restrictive measures directed against certain restrictive measures directed against certain individuals, groups, undertakings and entities in persons, entities and bodies in view of the view of the situation in Afghanistan situation in Egypt

AL-QAEDA ERITREA restrictive measures against members of the al- restrictive measures against Eritrea Qaeda organisation and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them REPUBLIC OF GUINEA (CONAKRY) restrictive measures against the Republic of Guinea BELARUS restrictive measures against Belarus GUINEA-BISSAU restrictive measures directed at certain persons, BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA entities and bodies threatening the peace, security restrictive measures in view of the situation in or stability of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau Bosnia and Herzegovina HAITI CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC prohibition to satisfy certain claims in accord- restrictive measures against the Central African ance with UN Security Council Resolution Republic No 917(1994)

CHINA IRAN Madrid European Council Declaration, restrictive measures against Iran 27.6.1989 IRAN CRIMEA AND SEVASTOPOL restrictive measures directed against certain persons restrictive measures in response to the illegal and entities in view of the situation in Iran annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol IRAQ DEMOCRACTIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO restrictive measures on Iraq restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (NORTH KOREA) COTE D’IVOIRE restrictive measures against the Democratic restrictive measures against Côte d’Ivoire People’s Republic of Korea

103 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

LEBANON SUDAN prohibition on the sale or supply of arms and restrictive measures in view of the situation in related material and on the provision of related Sudan services to entities or individuals in Lebanon in accordance with UNSC Resolution 1701 SYRIA (2006) restrictive measures against Syria

LEBANON TERRORIST GROUPS specific restrictive measures against certain (FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS) persons suspected of involvement in the assas- application of specific measures to combat terrorism sination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri TUNISIA restrictive measures directed against certain persons LIBERIA and entities in view of the situation in Tunisia restrictive measures imposed against Liberia UKRAINE LIBYA restrictive measures in respect of actions under- restrictive measures in view of the situation in mining or threatening the territorial integrity, Libya sovereignty and independence of Ukraine

MOLDOVA UKRAINE restrictive measures against the leadership of the restrictive measures directed against certain Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine MYANMAR (BURMA) restrictive measures against Myanmar/Burma USA (extraterritoriality) measures protecting against the effects of the RUSSIAN FEDERATION extra-territorial application of legislation adopted restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions by a third country, and actions based thereon or destabilising the situation in Ukraine resulting therefrom

SOMALIA YEMEN restrictive measures against Somalia restrictive measures in view of the situation in Yemen SOUTH SUDAN restrictive measures in view of the situation in ZIMBABWE South Sudan restrictive measures against Zimbabwe

104 CSDP Missions 2 and Operations

105 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

2.1. From EUPM Bosnia to EUMAM RCA Snapshot of ongoing and past CSDP missions and operations

by Arnold Kammel

At the summit of Saint-Malo in 1998, France fight against terrorism, including by supporting and the United Kingdom insisted that the EU third countries in combating terrorism in their “must have the capacity for autonomous action, territories”. backed up by credible military forces, the means The first CSDP mission, EUPM Bosnia and Her- to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in zegovina, was deployed in 2003. Since then the EU order to respond to international crises”. has so far launched 35 civilian missions and mili- At that time the focus was on military crisis tary operations. Despite the tendency of military management, but the argument has since been operations to attract more attention, the major- applied to both the military and the civilian ity of CSDP interventions are civilian missions. dimensions of CSDP. In December 2001, the From a geographical perspective three regions can EUTM Somalia’s Security Support Element, 28 September 2014 European Council of Laeken declared the Euro- be identified as main theatres for CSDP action: pean Security and Defence Policy (ESDP, nowa- Europe and Eurasia, Africa and the Middle East/ days CSDP) operational, with some nuances in Asia. the various language versions (“the Union is now capable of conducting some crisis-management operations” versus “l’Union est Europe and Eurasia désormais capable de conduire des opérations de gestion de crise”). The Western Balkans and Eurasia have been Pursuant to Article 42(1) of the Treaty on Euro- focal points of EU external activities for different pean Union (TEU), reasons: geographical proximity, historical links “[T]he common security and defence policy […] and the perspective of European integration for shall provide the Union with an operational the states in the region as well as the self-interest capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. of having stability in its neighbourhood. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance Ongoing missions/operations with the principles of the United Nations Char- in Europe and Eurasia ter”. The missions are defined in Article 43 TEU in a Launched in 2008, the European Union Rule non-exhaustive list. The CSDP task catalogue of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) has been the “shall include joint disarmament operations, largest ever EU civilian rule of law mission that humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice trains police, judges, customs officials, and civil and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and administrators in Kosovo. peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis EUFOR Althea is a post-conflict stabilisation management, including peace-making and post- operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina that was conflict stabilisation”and may “contribute to the launched in December 2004 and conducted under

106 2 CSDP Missions and Operations Photo: EEAS Photo:

EUTM Somalia’s Security Support Element, 28 September 2014

the Berlin Plus agreement. Althea took over respon- Completed missions/operations sibility for stabilisation in BiH when NATO con- in Europe and Eurasia cluded the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) operation. Following the Russian-Georgian conflict in The first-ever CSDP mission was a civilian police 2008, the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) was mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina that launched and from 2009 it became the only inter- was launched in 2003 and focused on training and national monitoring presence in Georgia. This Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising (MMA). civilian mission is tasked with monitoring the EUPM concluded at the end of June 2012. parties’ compliance with the ceasefire agreement The EU conducted three CSDP missions in and its implementing measures, to contribute to FYROM. The EU’s first military mission, Con- stability, normalisation, and confidence-building cordia, was a military support and peacekeeping through facilitating communication between par- operation under Berlin Plus, conducted in 2003 ties on the ground. after the EU took over responsibility from the In 2005, the EU launched EUBAM1, which NATO mission Allied Harmony (2001-2003). aims to provide technical assistance and advice to Concordia was succeeded by a police training improve security and customs operations along mission (EUPOL Proxima) from 2003 to 2005, the Ukraine-Moldova border, thereby facilitating followed by a police advisory team (EUPAT) the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict. operation in 2005 and 2006. The latest mission launched in the Eurasian In 2004-2005, the EU carried out a rule of region is EUAM Ukraine to assist the country in law mission in Georgia, EUJUST Themis, at the the reform of the civilian security sector, including request of the Georgian government. The EU’s police and the rule of law, established in July 2014. first ever rule of law mission supported the Geor-

1 EUBAM Ukraine-Moldova was nevertheless not launched under the CSDP.

107 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS Photo: EUPOL Afghanistan Photo: Former Head of Mission Karl Ake Roghe greets the elders during visits to villages near EUPOL HQ, August 2013

gian authorities with a view to reforming Geor- a military training mission (EUTM Mali) in the gia’s criminal legislation and justice process. context of a French military operation fighting Islamist rebel groups in northern Mali. The objective of the EUTM mission is to train and advise Africa Malian armed forces in order to help restore nationwide law and order under constitutional, Half of CSDP missions and operations have democratic authorities. EUCAP is advising on so far taken place in Africa. The EU’s interest is internal security aspects. mainly linked to humanitarian aspects, geograph- In 2014, the EU decided to deploy a military ical proximity and the potential spill-over effects operation to contribute to a secure environment in of regional instability as well as the historical links the Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA). The between Europe and Africa. aim was to provide temporary support in achieving a safe and secure environment in the Bangui area by contributing to the international efforts to Ongoing missions/operations in protect the populations most at risk and also creat- Africa ing the conditions necessary to enable the provision of humanitarian aid. The operation was to be suc- Established in April 2014, EUCAP Sahel Mali ceeded by a UN peacekeeping operation. is an operational EU contribution to supporting Another CSDP mission was established in stability, institutional reform and the full restora- February 2015 in the country, the EU Military tion of state authority throughout the country. Advisory Mission in the Central African Repub- In February 2013, the EU had already launched lic, EUMAM RCA.

108 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

On 22 May 2013, the EU decided to launch EUBAM Libya to support the Libyan authorities in improving and developing their border management capacities, and hence the security of the country’s borders. The EU also launched a civilian training mission called EUCAP Sahel Niger in July 2012 to enhance the capacity of the Nigerien police and security forces to combat terrorism and organised crime, with the broader objective of reinforcing political stability, governance, and security in Niger and the Sahel region.

European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) COPPS Union/EUPOL European Photo: Somalia (Operation Atalanta) is an anti-piracy Palestine policewomen performing special drills in the operation off the coast of Somalia, which began Palestine Academy for Police Sciences, Jericho in March 2014 in 2008. Operation Atalanta is complemented by two additional CSDP operations. In 2010, allowing time for the UN to strengthen its own the EU launched EUTM Somalia, a military peacekeeping force, the United Nations Organi- training mission for Somali security forces. In sation Mission in the DRC (MONUC). EUFOR July 2012, the EU launched EUCAP NESTOR, RD Congo was a military operation conducted in a new civilian CSDP misison that aimed to help the second half of 2006 and also supported the build the maritime capacity of five countries in MONUC in securing the country during the elec- the region (Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya, the Sey- tions. Furthermore two police missions, namely chelles, and Tanzania) with a focus on the fight EUPOL Kinshasa and EUPOL RD Congo were against piracy, through training, advising, and conducted in the country. EUPOL RD Congo, encouraging regional cooperation in the area of launched in 2007, was a follow-on mission from maritime security and to train a Somali coastal EUPOL Kinshasa, the EU’s first civilian CSDP police force. mission in Africa. While EUPOL Kinshasa In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), focused on supporting the Integrated Police Unit the EU launched a security sector reform opera- of the Congolese National Police in Kinshasa, tion in the area of defence (EUSEC RD Congo) EUPOL RDC then supported the efforts of Con- in June 2005, which gives advice and assistance golese authorities to reform the national police to the Congolese authorities regarding reform and and enhance cooperation with the justice sector. modernisation of the Congolese army. It was completed in 2014. EUFOR Tchad-RCA was a military operation launched in January 2008 to stabilise the security Completed missions/operations in and humanitarian situation in eastern Chad and Africa northeastern Central African Republic. EUFOR Tchad-RCA was a temporary ‘bridging mission’ The EU has concluded four missions in DRC. ahead of the deployment of the UN-led mission Operation Artemis was the first military CSDP MINURCAT, which assumed responsibility in operation outside Europe. It took place between early 2009. EUFOR Tchad-RCA was the largest June and September 2003 and sought to stabilise CSDP military operation in Africa to date. the security situation and improve humanitarian From 2005 to 2007, the EU conducted a conditions in Bunia and the surrounding region, small hybrid civilian-military mission in support

109 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

Ongoing missions in the Middle East and Asia

The EU runs a police mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) that has been mentoring and training the Afghan National Police (ANP). The mission, launched in June 2007, continues supporting the professionalisation of the ANP, but also aims at enhancing the institutional reform and capacities within the Ministry of Interior (MoI) relevant for advancing civilian policing. Its rule of law component assists the Afghan authorities in developing justice- police cooperation and to reform police-related and

Photo: Jean Francois d‘Arcangues/EUFOR Tchad/RCA d‘Arcangues/EUFOR Jean Francois Photo: criminal legislation. The EU Police Mission in the Polish convoy during the operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) has been in 2009 deployed since 2006 to improve the law enforcement capacity of the Palestinian Civil Police. The aim of the mission is to contribute to the establish- of the African Union’s mission in Sudan/Darfur ment of sustainable and effective policing and crimi- (AMIS). This support included the deployment nal justice arrangements under Palestinian owner- of military observers, assistance with planning ship. In 2005, the EU has launched a small border and equipment and technical and financial sup- assistance mission to provide a third party presence port to the AMIS. It also helped with tactical at the Rafah Crossing Point and monitor the Pales- and strategic transportation, as well as training tinian Authority at the Terminal between Gaza and of African troops. The mission also included Egypt (EUBAM Rafah). The mission has suspended civilian police training and assistance. In 2007 most of its activities since the 2007 takeover of Gaza AMIS transferred responsibility to the new AU/ by Hamas and remains on standby; it continues to UN joint operation in Darfur (UNAMID). In contribute to capacity-building for the Palestinian addition, the EU conducted a civilian CSDP Authority in the field of border management. mission to strengthen airport security in South Sudan (EUAVSEC South Sudan) from Septem- ber 2012 to January 2014. Completed missions in the Middle From 2008 to 2010, the EU helped local East and Asia authorities in Guinea-Bissau to reform legal frameworks related to the military, police, and jus- The EU deployed an Integrated Rule of Law Mis- tice system by deploying a security sector reform sion for Iraq (EUJUST LEX Iraq) between 2005 and mission (EU SSR Guinea-Bissau). 2013 in order to train Iraqi police, prison officials, and judges. In 2005-2006, the EU deployed a civilian monitoring mission to Aceh-Indonesia (AMM). Middle East and Asia The mission helped to monitor the implementation of the 2005 peace agreement between the Indone- The EU has launched a number of missions to sian government and the Free Aceh Movement, foster peace and stability in the Middle East and including weapons decommissioning, military and Asia, namely in Afghanistan, in Iraq and in the police force relocation, and the human rights situ- Palestinian Territories, as well as in Indonesia. ation.

110 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

Overview of the missions and operations of the European Union April 2015

Civilian missions: ongoing/completed

Military operations and missions: ongoing/completed

EUFORALTHEA EUPOL PROXIMA Bosnia and Herzegovina, since 2004 Former Yugoslav Republic Troop strength: 600 of Macedonia (FYROM), 2004 - 2005 EUPAT Former Yugoslav Republic EUBAM (CSDP like Mission) EUPM of Macedonia (FYROM), 2006 Moldova and Ukraine, since 2005 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mission strength: 238 2003 - 2012 EUAM UKRAINE EULEX KOSOVO Ukraine, since: 2014 EUJUST THEMIS Since 2008 Mission strength: 54 (174 expected) Georgia, 2004 - 2005 Mission strength: 1600 EUMM GEORGIA Since 2008 CONCORDIA Mission strength: 413 Former Yugoslav Republic EUPOL COPPS of Macedonia (FYROM), 2003 Palestinian territories, since 2006 EUPOL AFGHANISTAN Mission strength: 105 since 2007 EUBAM Libya Mission strength: 390 Since 2013 Mission strength: 17 EUJUST LEX EUBAM Rafah EUCAP Sahel Niger Iraq/Brussels Palestinian territories, since 2005 Support to AMIS II 2005 - 2013 Niger, since 2012 Mission strength: 8 Sudan/Darfur, Mission strength: 91 2005 - 2006 EUCAP Sahel Mali Mali, since 2014 EUCAP NESTOR Mission strength: 50 (115 exp.) EUFOR Tchad/RCA Horn of Africa and Western Indian Ocean Since 2013, Mission strength: 111 EUTM Mali 2008 - 2009 Since 2013 EUNAVFOR SOMALIA Mission strength: 550 Since 2008 EUSEC RD Congo Troop strength: 1086 EU SSR Guinea-Bissau Since 2005 Mission strength: 97 EUFOR RCA 2008 - 2010 Central African Republic EUAVSEC ARTEMIS 2014 - 2015 South Sudan 2012 - 2014 RD Congo, 2003 EUPOL Kinshasa RD Congo, 2005 - 2007 EUMAM RCA AMM Monitoring Mission Central African Republic Aceh/Indonesia EUPOL RD Congo Since 2015 2005 - 2006 2007 - 2014 EUFOR RD Congo EUTM SOMALIA 2006 Since 2010 Troop strength: 130

Further Information

For each operational activity, detailed and updated information, including video presentations, can be found on the website of the European External Action Service: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/mission-and- operations/index_en.htm

111 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

2.2. Basic principles, concepts and policies 2.2.1. Peaceful resolution of conflicts

by Eva Gross

The peaceful resolution of conflicts constitutes capacities, including CSDP. Finally, the EU´s a fundamental principle underlying the Common strategic guidelines, whether general or focused Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) – but also on specific geographical regions, emphasise the represents the focal point of the EU´s overall com- link between the EU´s values, which include mitment to peace and security. human rights, democracy and the rule of law, on Brussels has made operational contributions the one hand, and the prevention and resolution to this end through various CSDP missions of conflicts, by means including regional integra- and operations over the past decade. The varied tion, on the other. nature of these contributions in terms of their The 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) tasks but also their civilian and military nature identifies regional conflict and state failure as key reflects the fact that the means of peaceful resolu- threats that both lead to and magnify the threat tion of conflicts are inherently multifaceted – but posed by extremism and organised crime. This also that operational contributions have evolved makes conflict intervention and contributing to in response to a changing international security effective and long-term conflict resolution both a environment. Thus, CSDP missions and opera- strategic and an operational objective. The 2008 tions provide assistance in the implementation report on the implementation of the ESS also of conflict settlements and deterrence of renewed highlights the need to engage in conflict reso- violence, but also engage in capacity-building and lution. Given the increasing urgency – due not training of security forces in weak state settings only to the increasing geographical proximity of where regional conflict and non-state actors pose conflict but also the ongoing occurrence of state challenges for government capacities to provide fragility, as well as the root causes of these phe- security to citizens. The latter in particular reflects nomena – the report also focuses on the security/ current trends in international security that call for development nexus and the need for a coherent European action in settings as diverse as Ukraine, and comprehensive approach to tackling conflict. the Levant and sub-Saharan Africa. Finally, the 2011 regional strategy for security and development in the Sahel mentions conflict resolution as a specific challenge for the region, An evolving strategic and its implementation roadmap includes specific framework lines of action in pursuit of conflict resolution, including mitigating internal tensions. The strat- The EU´s commitment to the peaceful resolu- egy also outlines the EU´s contribution, namely tion of conflicts is underpinned by a number of encouragement and support for internal politi- strategic documents. These reflect an adjustment cal dialogue in order to make possible sustainable to a changing global security environment but home-grown solutions to remaining social, politi- also the EU´s changing institutional set-up and cal and ethnic tensions; a focus on transparent

112 2 CSDP Missions and Operations Photo: EEAS/EUFOR RCA EEAS/EUFOR Photo: Community members of District 3 and 5 meet with Eufor RCA to discuss reconciliation, security and development

and locally accountable governance, the promo- By contrast, the contributions to conflict reso- tion of institutional capacity; and efforts to re- lution of civilian CSDP include police, rule of law establish and/or reinforce the administrative pres- and civilian administration – all designed to com- ence of the state, particularly in the north of Niger plement a focus on physical (military) security and Mali. While focusing on a specific region, the with long-term state capacities to provide law and 2011 Sahel strategy does reflect the increasingly order so as to make conflict resolution sustainable. diffuse nature of contemporary security threats, In practice, CSDP missions have supported the inextricable linkages between security, devel- police, judiciary and customs reforms and engaged opment and fragility and the merging of internal in capacity-building. In more immediate connec- and external security. tion to conflict resolution, CSDP missions have also ensured compliance with peace agreements and have helped stabilise conflict and/or fragile Operational tasks in a changing environments, in efforts to ensure the security of institutional framework civilians. In addition to these specific tasks, CSDP When it comes to operational contributions, also lends visibility to the contributions of EU the principles of EU engagement through the mil- Member States. This signals both EU ownership itary aspect of CSDP are enshrined in the ‘Peters- of operational contributions and their link to berg tasks’, which both contribute to the peaceful the EU´s collective political and developmental resolution of conflicts and help avoid their re- engagements. The entry into force of the Lisbon emergence. This applies in particular to conflict Treaty and the establishment of the European prevention and peace-keeping tasks, joint disar- External Action Service (EEAS) has adjusted the mament operations, military advice and assistance role of CSDP in the broader institutional archi- tasks, and post-conflict stabilisation tasks. tecture and placed a renewed focus on the coher-

113 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

Specific CSDP contributions to conflict resolution

Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the strategic and institutional developments sketched above, the EU´s track record when it comes to CSDP missions launched in pursuit of conflict resolution to date reflects variations in task, mission size, and length of commitment. While this may not lend itself to a neat typology of tasks, it does attest to the EU’s flexibility in responding to various geographical and operational needs and requirements along the continuum of conflict resolu-

Photo: Galia Glume Photo: tion. Individual CSDP missions and operations EUMM Georgia monitors parties’ compliance with the 2008 since the launch of the first missions in 2003 ceasefire agreement between Georgia and the Russian Fed- also reflect the changing institutional landscape eration. It contributes to stabilisation, normalisation, confi- in which missions operate as well as the circum- dence-building, and to informing European policy in support of a durable political solution for Georgia stances to which they are asked to respond. When it comes to intervening in an immediate post-crisis environment, the EU Monitoring Mis- ence of various EU instruments. In view of the sion (EUMM) in Georgia made an important financial crisis and its effect on defence spending contribution to the stabilisation of the situation as well as waning commitments to CSDP, the EU following the August 2008 war between Russia and its Member States have begun to engage in and Georgia. Its mandate included the monitor- a process to strengthen the policy and to make ing of the conflicting parties´ actions, including CSDP missions and operations more effective and full compliance with the six-point agreement of visible in the process. 12 August; cooperation with partners, including The conclusions of the December 2013 Coun- the UN and OSCE; immediate stabilisation and cil on Defence accordingly link CSDP to other long-term stability; normalisation, confidence- tools but also revisit the theme of sufficient and building and reporting. The EU, with a pre- appropriately trained capabilities and person- dominately civilian and European, as opposed to nel. The ongoing process aiming towards a more transatlantic, identity and membership, was well active, capable and coherent CSDP is part of a placed to engage in this particular contribution larger debate over integrating CSDP inside the to conflict resolution. comprehensive approach that connects all facets The EU contributed through civilian as well of EU external action. as military operations to the monitoring of peace The EU´s intention to more effectively invest agreements and assistance in their implementation in the comprehensive approach and to strengthen beyond EUMM Georgia. In Aceh, Indonesia, its ability to deploy the right civilian and military the 2005 Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) personnel on the whole spectrum of crisis man- contributed to monitoring the demobilisation agement operations also reflects its ongoing com- and reintegration of GAM as well as redeploy- mitment to conflict resolution, in recognition of ment of TNI, human rights, legislative change, the changing nature of conflicts and threats to violation of MOU but also to maintaining peace and stability in the EU’s neighbourhood cooperation between the parties. Its identity as and beyond. a niche – and, more importantly, neutral – actor

114 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

in this setting enabled the EU to take up this but it also has a role in the reform of the judici- particular task. On the other hand, EU engage- ary and in war crime investigations. ment in FYROM in 2003 through Operation But the EU has also engaged in comprehensive Concordia was made not only possible but also conflict resolution through its CSDP operations in necessary by the evolving enlargement prospects conjunction with broader political approaches. of the countries of the western Balkans. The EU In the Western Balkans, present and former operation, through its mandate to contribute to CSDP operations are and have been deployed a stable, secure environment in which to imple- with a view to the eventual accession of indi- ment the Ohrid Framework Agreement, thus vidual countries. That said, deterrence and the made possible a transition from military to civil- provision of a secure environment, and training ian assistance – and the eventual termination of activities, are also still aspects of the EU´s policy CSDP engagement in favour of economic and, towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, through Oper- more importantly, accession instruments. ation EUFOR Althea, which two decades after CSDP operations intervening in active con- Dayton remains mired in a post-conflict setting. flict or settings of insecurity have contributed to achieving a safe and secure environment, the protection of refugees and UN personnel with the aim Back to first principles of handing over to other institutional partners – be they the African Union (AU) or the United The peaceful resolution of conflicts remains Nations (UN), as in the case of EUFOR RCA in part and parcel of the EU´s engagement in inter- Central African Republic since 2014 and follow- national security, including through its CSDP. ing 2003’s operation Artemis. These operations In institutional terms, the creation of the EEAS can help lay the groundwork, or contribute to and, particularly, the upgrading of EU Delega- such groundwork, for further efforts in conflict tions in the field have given the EU a stronger resolution undertaken by the EU or its partners. framework in terms of concurrent political and The EU is further engaged in training, advis- development commitments. As Brussels moves, ing and mentoring of police and military forces in together with Member States capitals, to con- some post-conflict settings, and also in some set- solidate its CSDP and comprehensive approach, tings where conflict is still ongoing or where con- revisits its strategic orientation and reformulates ditions of regional fragility obtain. This includes its strategic priorities, the peaceful resolution of EUTM Somalia and EUTM Mali, where CSDP conflicts stands to remain at the centre of CSDP missions contribute to assisting governments activities. But a changing global security envi- in extending their reach (and presumably also ronment – which is more diffuse, while inse- services to their populations, including the curity and instability are moving ever closer to provision of security) throughout their territo- the EU´s Eastern and Southern borders – makes ries. As to civilian efforts, EUPOL Afghanistan the persistence of this particular basic principle as part of a broader international stabilisation not a luxury nor an option, but a fundamental effort focuses on the professionalisation of the requirement. police force, police-justice links and advising on reforms of the Mol. Similarly, the EU´s engagement through EULEX Kosovo, although with an executive mandate and an overall EU political lead in the region, forms an approach to conflict resolution through its contribution to multi-ethnic institutions and anti-corruption initiatives;

115 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

2.2.2. Human rights and rule of law

by Richard Winkelhofer

“The European Union is founded on the values strikes at home. Or, in the words of the European of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, Security Strategy (ESS): equality, the rule of law and respect for human “The best protection for our security is a world rights (…). The Union’s aim is to promote peace, of well-governed democratic states. Spreading its values and the well-being of its peoples (…). In good governance, supporting social and politi- its relations with the wider world, the Union shall cal reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of uphold and promote its values (…). It shall con- power, establishing the rule of law and protecting tribute to peace, security (…) (and) the protection human rights are the best means of strengthening of human rights (…). The Union’s action on the international order.” international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation (…) and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: Human rights democracy, the rule of law, (and) the universality and indivisibility of human rights (…). The Human rights are the basic rights and freedoms Union shall define and pursue common policies to which all people everywhere are considered to be and actions, and shall work for (…) cooperation entitled, protecting them from severe political, legal in all fields of international relations, in order to and social abuses. They commonly include civil and (…) support democracy, the rule of law, (and) political rights (such as the right to life, the prohibi- human rights (…).” 1 tion of torture, the right to a fair trial, freedom of thought and expression, and the rights of women, Respect for human rights and upholding the rule minorities and groups to be free from discrimina- of law have a twofold effect on the EU: As foundation), economic, environmental, social and cultural tional and common values (internal dimension), rights. Human rights norms are mainly enshrined and as guiding principles for international action in a number of international treaties and conven- (external dimension). These dimensions are, how tions2, and in customary international law. A good ever, inseparably intertwined: this is becoming many of them are reaffirmed by the binding provi- most obvious in the nexus between internal and sions of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, as external security, with the most worrying exam- annexed to the EU treaties, specifically addressing ple being that of armed conflicts outside Europe the EU’s and – when implementing EU law – its setting the scene for radicalisation and terrorist Member States’ actions, including external actions.

1 Articles 2, 3 (1) and (5), and 21 (1) and (2) of the Treaty on European Union, as amended by the Lisbon Treaty (TEU) (emphasis added). 2 Amongst them the rights conferred by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, established within the framework of the Council of Europe, which “shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law” (Art 6 [3] TEU).

116 2 CSDP Missions and Operations EULEX Kosovo/Enisa Rashlanin Kasemi EULEX Kosovo/Enisa An EULEX Kosovo presiding judge during the initial hearing of a case held at Pristina Basic Court (2013)

EU principles and concepts planning and conduct of CSDP missions and relating to human rights in CSDP operations, as developed in these concepts, are: missions and operations ensuring human rights expertise and gender balance in the missions/operations, awareness train- Over the last 10 years, numerous concepts have ing for their personnel, reporting mechanisms been developed to address priority areas of the EU’s for human rights issues and violations; improv- human rights policies in the CSDP domain: on ing child protection; developing instruments for the protection of civilians, particularly children, conflict prevention; cooperation and coordina- in armed conflicts, on international humanitarian tion with other EU instruments and actors, inter- law, on human rights defenders, on mainstreaming national partners, and civil society organisations; of human rights and gender in the CSDP mission/ supporting host countries in the fight against sex- operation cycle, on gender equality, women and ual and gender-based violence (SGBV), in revis- security, on generic standards of behaviour and dis- ing their legislation, encouraging the ratification ciplinary procedures for mission/operation person- of relevant international instruments, promoting nel, and on transitional justice.3 respect for human rights defenders, and political Amongst the main imperatives for the design, dialogue and public outreach.

3 Inter alia, ‘Mainstreaming Human Rights and Gender into ESDP – Compilation of relevant documents’ ([Council of the EU; further quotations also referring to Council documents] 11359/07), ‘Mainstreaming human rights across CFSP and other policies’ (10076/06), ‘Mainstreaming of Human Rights into ESDP’ (11936/4/06), ‘Human Rights and Democracy: EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan’ (11855/12), and instruments relating to the implementation of UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security (11932/2/05, 12068/06, 15671/1/08, 7109/12).

117 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

being above the law), with the aim that all vio- lators of the law be held accountable, even the state itself. It is deeply linked to the principle of justice, involving an ideal of accountability and fairness in the protection and vindication of rights and the prevention and punishment of wrongs. Against the backdrop of the link between the ‘rule of law’ and ‘justice’ (the latter also being applied in the sense of ‘justice system/judiciary’, or referring to the ‘justice chain’ – police, courts, prosecution services and the penitentiary), these terms have at times been used as synonyms.5

Photo: EUPOL Afghanistan/Christiane Buck Photo: Moreover, the initial emphasis within the rule of EUPOL Afghanistan advising on Community Policing law area was on justice, to address war crimes in Mazar-e Sharif and corruption that threatened the stability of countries emerging from conflict. With an independent judiciary still being at the heart of Rule of law delivering that justice, the modern – broader – concept of the rule of law, as defined above, also Rule of law is a principle of governance whereby encompasses the executive (mainly police) and all persons, institutions and entities, public and pri- the legislative branch of a state’s authority. vate, including the state itself, are accountable to Of the manifold elements and obligations cov- laws that are publicly promul gated, equally enforced ered by the overarching principle of the rule of and independently adjudicated, and which are con- law, a great many are set out by the above-men- sistent with international human rights norms and tioned international treaties and conventions on standards. It also requires measures to ensure adher- human rights: for instance, standards for judi- ence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality cial procedures to substantiate and guarantee the before the law, accountability to the law, fairness right to a fair trial. They are also set out by a large in the application of the law, separation of powers, number of resolutions and declarations of inter- participation in decision-making, legal certainty, national organisations and bodies, including the avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal UN General Assembly, the UN Security Coun- transparency.4 cil, the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the In essence, this principle has evolved as OECD, and by international case law, in par- opposed to the ‘rule of man’ (of an absolute ruler ticular that of the International Court of Justice,

4 See the ‘EU Concept for CSDP Justice Missions (within the Rule of Law Framework)’ 18173/10, adopting this definition of the rule of law as set out by the UN Secretary-General in his report ‘The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies’ (2004). 5 This was done by the EU, too, with the early ‘Comprehensive EU concept for missions in the field of Rule of Law in cri sis management, including annexes’ (14315/02 and 9792/03), actually addressing justice missions (only). This concept’s revised and reviewed version was then named ‘EU Concept for CSDP Justice Missions (within the Rule of Law Frame- work)’ (18173/10). Likewise, at the Feira European Council 2000 ‘Rule of Law’ was identified as one of four priority areas for civilian crisis management (alongside police, civilian administration, and civil protection), effectively equalling ‘justice (reform)’ in recent terminology. 6 See also the Council conclusions on fundamental rights and rule of law 10168/13, and on Ensuring Respect for the Rule of Law 16682/14: “(…) respecting the rule of law is a prerequisite for the protection of fundamental rights”.

118 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

the European Court of Justice and the European ent and impartial justice system, with unhindered Court on Human Rights. access to, capable of dealing – without impunity – As to the relationship between human rights with the legacies of the past and the needs of the and the rule of law, while human rights have to present, in coexistence with informal or alterna- do with the substance of rights and freedoms, the tive dispute-resolution mechanisms. rule of law has to do with their just and effective Missions must pursue a tailored, systemic and protection and promotion. Or, as stated in the comprehensive approach under local ownership, preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human and with a shared vision, in coordination with Rights of 1948, “human rights should be protected EU institutions and actors, and with the interna- by the rule of law.” 6 tional community, in particular the UN, OSCE, AU and NATO, subject to regular reporting, measuring, assessment and adjustment proce- EU principles and concepts dures, with a proactive communication strategy relating to the rule of law in vis-à-vis civil society in the host countries, and a CSDP missions clearly defined end-state and transition strategy. These imperatives apply equally to the two EU concepts for CSDP missions cover diverse generic types of CSDP missions in the area of state functions and policy fields in the broader rule of law: strengthening missions, supporting rule of law area, such as police and justice, civil- host countries by means of monitoring, mentor- ian administration, customs, border manage- ing, advising and training activities, and execu- ment, anti-corruption, human rights and gender. tive/substitution missions, delivering public The ‘core concepts’, to be read in conjunction services to (temporarily) replace dysfunctional with each other, comprise the above-mentioned local structures. Depending on their man- concept relating to CSDP justice missions, dates, missions may take on a combination of the ‘Comprehensive Concept for ESDP Police these generic types, and may address a variety Strengthening Missions (Interface with Broader of the state functions and policy fields outlined Rule of Law)’, the ‘Comprehensive Concept above. Under the current concepts, executive/ for Police Substitution Missions – Revised Ver- substitution missions would never stand alone, sion’, and the ‘EU Concept for ESDP Support but always be complemented by strengthening to Security Sector Reform (SSR)’.7 activities – see the example of EULEX Kosovo, Amongst the main imperatives for the design, the only current CSDP mission whose mandate planning and conduct of CSDP missions, as laid includes executive functions. down in these concepts are: ensuring sustainable, Promoting respect for human rights and the transparent, effective and accountable institu- rule of law in implementing their mandates, these tions in the host countries, set up in a democratic missions are at the heart of the EU’s contribution fashion, being free from corruption, upholding to restoring and maintaining international order human rights, in particular the rights of women, beyond its borders, in ever closer coordination children and other vulnerable groups, operating with the UN as its principal partner. As the ESS within a coherent legal framework, developed via says: “(…) establishing the rule of law and protect- due legislative process, and in line with interna- ing human rights are the best means of strengthen- tional norms and standards. ing international order”. The EU stands ready to These institutions should include an independ- play a vital part.

7 18173/10; 15031/09; 8655/5/02; 12566/4/05.

119 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

2.2.3. Strategic Communication – Crisis Response Information Activities (CRIA)

by Vicente Diaz de Villegas

The EU comprehensive approach to crisis man- According to one of the United States of agement intends to foster a culture of coordina- America’s official definitions: tion amongst EU actors to ensure overall coher- “Strategic Communication2 is the synchroniza- ence in the EU’s response. It also emphasises the tion of our words and deeds as well as deliberate need to work closely with partners. In modern efforts to communicate and engage with intended information societies, the factor ‘information’ audiences.” has evolved to become a decisive element for any security-related activity. Each and every action According to the Multinational Experiment 63, may affect the information environment. Strategic Communication consists of “focused [coalition] efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or What is Strategic preserve conditions favourable for the advance- Communication? ment of [coalition] interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated pro- There are many and varied definitions of what grams, plans, themes, messages, and products Strategic Communication is; the following are synchronized with the actions of all [coalition just some definitions: partner].”

NATO defines Strategic Communication1 as Another definition for Strategic Communica- “the coordinated and appropriate use of NATO tion4 is communications activities and capabilities – “a systematic series of sustained and coherent Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs (PA), Mili- activities, conducted across strategic, operational tary Public Affairs (MPA), Information Opera- and tactical levels, that enables understanding tions (InfoOps) and Psychological Operations of target audiences, identifies effective conduits, (PSYOPS), as appropriate – in support of Alli- and develops and promotes ideas and opinions ance policies, operations and activities, and in through those conduits to promote and sustain order to advance NATO’s aims”. particular types of behaviour.”

1 NATO Strategic Communications policy PO (2009)0141, 29 September 2009. 2 Strategic Communication National Framework for Strategic Communication, March 2010. 3 Multinational Experiment (MNE) is a forum led by the United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). MNE 6 was conducted with 18 nations plus the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allied Command Transformation (ACT). MNE 6 was a two-year multinational and interagency effort to develop and improve coalition capabilities to counter the activities of irregular adversaries and other noncompliant actors while incorporating a whole-of-government, comprehensive approach. 4 Strategic Communication: A Primer, CDR, Steven Tatham, PhD, December 2008.

120 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

EU Strategic Communication (STRATCOM)

Regional EU Info Strategy Who (Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, Public Information …) are we? in all areas

Economic Crisis Response Information Activities (CRIA)

Mil Mission/Operation Info Strategy What do we Security • Military Information Operation (Mil InfoOps) stand for? • Military Public Relations/Public Information (Mil PR/PI) …

The EU does not have a specific definition as EU Crisis Response Information such of what Strategic Communication in CSDP Activities is. This does not mean that this domain is not covered; on the contrary, the EU has adopted a All EU information activities related to a spe- more tailored definition when dealing with crisis cific crisis situation need to be harmonised and management, the so called Crisis Response Infor- synchronised at every level to ensure that the mation Activities (CRIA). CRIA are based on messages delivered are as coherent as possible the recognition that, while EU actors (Member and, finally, that the comprehensive nature of States, EU Institutions) carry out their respective the EU’s effort is adequately understood by all information activities, increased coordination audiences. has to be ensured so that the messages delivered The fundamental challenge that must be by the different EU actors are coherent. These tackled in order to invigorate this synchronisa- activities are related to a specific crisis situation tion is to think strategically in the way the EU and to the response which the EU is consider- communicates. Each crisis situation requires a ing or indeed conducting, and seek to enlist and tailored-made Information Strategy: a real plan maintain support for the EU’s aims and objec- conceived at the conceptual stage of any Crisis tives in the context of its crisis response. These Management Concept5 and, ideally, forming an activities may be simultaneously conducted in integral part of it. the following areas: However, this custom-made Information • policy/diplomacy; Strategy must fit into a broader one that is in • economic/humanitarian affairs; keeping with the overall EU regional approach. • priority civilian areas (police, rule of law, civil- The EU definition of Crisis Response Infor- ian administration, civil protection); mation Activities has a more reduced scope than • military. STRATCOM, as it is oriented to a specific crisis. Therefore the success of EU Strategic Communi-

5 Ideally from the Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA).

121 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

How are the EU Crisis Response Information Activities coordinated?

• EU Information Objectives

For each crisis there is an • Target Audiences “EU comprehensive • Main themes to be developed Information Strategy” • Means to reach them which details: • Master messages to convey • Themes to avoid and themes to emphasise

cations derives from the inclusion of those Infor- avoid and to emphasise, audiences of concern and mation Strategies in an overarching strategy. the means available to influence or bring about The particular case of the Horn of Africa (HoA) change. Only then, i.e. after that conceptual pro- is a clear example of the need for a comprehensive cess, can master messages be drafted with a clear strategy. Such a complex theatre, with military aim. operations, civilian missions, development projects and EU Delegations working side by side, in addition to the existing conflicts in the area, Social media demands synchronisation of communication to internal and external audiences and of engage- Of the different possible scenarios, hybrid ment with other stakeholders. Currently, there warfare6 is one in which social media have are separate Information Strategies in place for an enormous impact. It is therefore essential to EUTM SOMALIA, EUNAVFOR ATALANTA focus on effects, audiences and influence in order and EUCAP NESTOR. to select the most appropriate and effective social The EU Special Representative (EUSR) channel. requested an overall and comprehensive Infor- As observed in several crises, notably in Ukraine mation Strategy to harmonise all efforts in the and Syria/Iraq, news of any developments, area. Accordingly, in a report of 4 May 2012 on whether accurate or inaccurate, will often spread key actions for the HoA, the importance of hav- more rapidly by social media and micro blogging ing a clear and comprehensive EU communica- (e.g. ‘Facebook’ or ‘Twitter’) than by traditional tion and outreach strategy for the HoA region news outlets. was agreed and the EUSR was invited, in coordi- The EU has long noticed the growing impact nation with the EEAS and Commission, to take of these communication channels. Conse- this forward. quently, efforts are continuously being made A Crisis Information Strategy should not be to adapt CSDP structures to this new dimen- initiated as a compilation of master messages, but sion: from Brussels level down to the staff and should consider the EU’s broader engagement in resources allocated to social media in operations the region, the information objectives, themes to and missions.

6 Hybrid warfare: where coordinated, overt and covert use of a broad range of instruments, military and civilian, conventional and unconventional are employed ambiguously.

122 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

Build-up Process of an Information Strategy

Initial drafting by Core group (Info Strategy Team)

Information

Internal Strategy EEAS and staffing Initial Master Messages

Political approval by MS and distribution

The military dimension

Military operations affect the information envi- and in front of the cameras” are subject to local, ronment, and by doing so they influence the local regional and worldwide scrutiny. Therefore, there population’s perception and have an impact on is an exponential importance attached to shaping whether the conduct of an operation is deemed a the information environment, initially to influ- success or a failure. As described by General Kru- ence first impressions and manage expectations lak in the “Three Block War”, tactical incidents and later to achieve the EU information objec- can also have strategic effects7. tives. In the case of the EU, having united various With respect to EU CRIA in the military information and communication disciplines domain, the Crisis Information Strategy is imple- under the roof of Crisis Response Information mented through Military Public Information/ Activities (CRIA) in line with the comprehensive Public Relations8 (Mil PI/PR) and Military Info approach (CA), it is necessary to render seamless Ops9 (Mil Info Ops). cross-echelon support to the mission objectives Mil PR/PI and EU Mil Info Ops are separate by actively shaping the information environment but related functions that must remain closely on operations. Operations “within the population coordinated.

7 As described with the requested leadership of the ‘Strategic Corporal’ in isolated situations and the effects of his decisions in the upper levels. 8 EU Mil PI/PR supports the information objectives drawn from the Crisis Information Strategy at each level of the military chain of command, by reporting facts and assessing events in the most appropriate way. 9 EU military Info Ops is a military function that provides advice and coordination of military activities affecting information and information systems in order to create desired effects in support of the mission-specific Crisis Information Strat- egy and of the EU’s political and military objectives.

123 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

In CSDP military training missions (EUTM) This group of expert planners meet routinely to and military advisiory (EUMAM) type of mis- draft and review information strategies and mas- sions, information activities play an important ter messages and should be in a position to repre- role. The advisory, mentoring and training pil- sent their own areas of expertise. lars provide a great opportunity to support, in daily interaction, the nucleus of the future secu- EUMS rity forces in defining their future role, associated Within the EUMS, the Crisis Response Infor- capabilities and doctrine and policies. mation Activities are divided into two areas: Military Public Information/Public Relations and Military Info Ops11. Organisational structures EU Member States Regional and international organisations, such Inside the EU, Member States such as Ger- as NATO10 and the UN, place a lot of emphasis many (Operative Kommunikation der Bun- on the growing domain of STRATCOM. deswehr) and Italy (Comunicazione Operativa) Examples of this can be found in the docu- are supporting efforts in the area of information ments in which these two organisations define activities through investigation, experimenta- their approach to crisis management. tion and further development of capabilities. The Within the EU there are different organisations United Kingdom is one of the main providers of in charge of information activities at EU insti- the foundations on this domain12, particularly tutional level (European External Action Service when it comes to social media, and France also [EEAS] and EU Military Staff [EUMS]), at Mem- makes valuable contributions in this field. Other ber States’ level, and finally, at OHQ level: Member States are also developing capabilities in this area. In all cases, and as the EUMS does, EEAS: Information Strategy Team (IST) Member States differentiate between Public Infor- To draft an Information Strategy, a comprehen- mation/Public Relations activities and Informa- sive team (IST) is established. Strategic Communi- tion Operations activities. cations must be the business not only of a specific EEAS division but of all EEAS bodies involved. OHQ To assist here, relevant expert personnel from OHQs from the United Kingdom, Italy, each EEAS body (i.e. Regional Desks and Cri- Greece and Germany have a permanent part of sis Management Structures) and from other EU their nucleus structure dedicated to effects, par- instruments (e. g. ECHO, DEVCO) are recog- ticularly those related to information and influ- nised and selected to create the pillars of an “EU ence. Information Strategy Team”.

10 NATO STRATCOM Centre of Excellence (CoE) was inaugurated in Riga in 2014. 11 The EU Mil Info Ops function coordinates a broad range of activities performed by various military capabilities and functions, but it is not limited to them. These capabilities and functions are the following: Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) activities, Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), Electronic Warfare (EW), Computer Network Operations (CNO), Key Leader Engagement (KLE), Troop Information programmes, Operations Security (OPSEC), Deception, Physical destruction, Special Operations Forces (SOF), Troop Presence, Posture and Profile. 12 In April 2015 UK Army‘s 77th Brigade will be created to support operating “in the information age” with specialised capabilities for the information activities domain.

124 2 CSDP Missions and Operations Photo: EU/AFP-Services/Guenter SchiffmannPhoto:

Photo: European External Action Service

High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and European Commission Vice-President Federica Mogherini makes a press statement at the 51st Security Conference in Munich, 8 February 2015

Summary

The fundamental challenge when it comes to Only then, i.e. after that conceptual process, can invigorating EEAS Strategic Communications master messages be drafted with a clear aim. is for the EU to think strategically in the way it The challenge for the EU is to find the right communicates. Each crisis situation requires a way to convey its messages to the local audiences tailored-made Information Strategy – a real plan at the different theatres. All civilian missions and from the conceptual stage. military operations are dependent on the ability to Coordination among actors within the EEAS engage in culturally attuned communication with is essential to achieving a real comprehensive critical communities in theatre, besides our tradi- approach between the political and military/oper- tional domestic audiences. This requires capacity ational spheres and convergence between the dif- to carry out conceptual planning in advance. ferent levels of decision and action. The exponential growth of social media cannot A Crisis Information Strategy should not be ini- be ignored. Member States are using it as a sensor, tiated as a compilation of master messages but must but it is necessary to analyse its role as an effector. consider the information objectives, themes to Lessons from the Ukraine crisis and ISIL/Da’esh avoid and emphasise, audiences of concern and the must be analysed and ways to properly engage means available to influence or bring about change. with the social media arena must be found.

125 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

2.2.4. Law of armed conflict and rules of engagement

by Michael Pesendorfer

Introduction

The Common Security and Defence Policy conflict. The brigades crossing into Iraq were not provides the EU with an operational capacity in the least concerned about passports, visas and drawing on civilian and military assets to be used customs procedures. But when these brigades pre- on missions outside the EU for peace-keeping, pared themselves on other territories on their way conflict prevention and strengthening interna- to Iraq, these legal issues were key considerations. tional security in accordance with the principles All EU crisis management operations since of the United Nations Charter. Multinational 2003 have differed from war in that the law and military crisis management operations (CMO) jurisdiction of the host nations have not been dis- across virtually the entire spectrum specified in placed. In the absence of an agreement with the Article 42(1) of the Treaty on European Union host nation, the EU-led force and other EU per- (TEU) are playing an increasingly prominent role sonnel are basically subject to the laws and juris- in international security policy. diction, both criminal and civil, of the host nation However, the success of a multinational and its courts. Political settlement, not victory on operation depends to a great extent on the abil- the battlefield, is the ultimate measure of success ity of its members to work together effectively. in EU-led military crisis management operations. In line with this aim, legal support is necessary Experience of recent EU-led operations and to meet any future challenge and ensure opera- operations conducted by other international tions are conducted lawfully under the umbrella organisations has highlighted the increasing num- of the EU as a “cooperative security provider”. ber of situations in which legal support is a key The legal paradigm framing the envisaged joint factor to ensure that the military action taken disarmament operations, humanitarian and res- complies with the law. EU policymakers and mili- cue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, tary commanders alike need to understand the conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, and legal basis for the mission, the scope of author- tasks of combat forces in crisis management, ity for accomplishing the mission and the use including peace-making1 and post-conflict stabi- of force. They also need to be aware of status of lisation, is significantly different from that which forces agreements, the role of the International applies in war. Criminal Court, the applicability of international The 2003 invasion of Iraq led by the United humanitarian law and how human rights are to be States marked the start of a protracted armed safeguarded under the given circumstances.

1 The existing UN definition of peacemaking, as presented in UNSG’s Agenda for Peace, suggests that only diplomatic efforts, such as mediation and negotiation, be undertaken. It is submitted that at the time of Petersberg Declaration the interpretation of ‘peacemaking’ was closer to what relevant EU and WEU documents call ‘peace enforcement’ in this context. The term ‘peace enforcement’ describes the use of force to restore international peace and security in situations of coercive military action.

126 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

Legal Basis for EU-led Crisis statements and ensure their conduct is in keep- Management Operations ing with the CFSP. It affects the operation’s purpose, scope, timing, use of force, the status of The legal basis for CMO ultimately begins personnel, and the command’s relationships with with the TEU. The TEU provides a framework, military and non-military organisations. The EU resources and procedures for implementing the Operation Commander (OpCdr) must have been Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). granted specific authority for each action he or Further guidance is provided by the conclusions she takes in the course of executing his/her mis- published after European Council meetings. sion. Unless there is a specific prohibition on tak- CFSP decisions are generally taken unani- ing an action, a commander may take the action mously. This means that one Member State can under his own authority. The OpCdr’s national or block the adoption of a text. The Treaty, however, cultural background and his branch of military includes a number of measures intended to over- service are important factors that influence how come this obstacle. he or she approaches the mission. However, the Nevertheless, the United Nations Charter is the approach of an OpCdr is certainly influenced by overarching international legal authority for both factors such as rules of engagement, geographic the use of force and crisis management operations. limitations on the operation, obligations toward A fundamental tenet of international law, codi- refugees and displaced persons, and appropriate fied in the UN Charter, is the prohibition against relationships with NGOs, international organisa- intervention in the affairs of other sovereign states. tions, and contributing third states’ contingents. The use of military forces in ‘peace support operations’ derives from the Security Council’s desire to facilitate the adjustment or settlement of interna- Command and Control tional disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace. Command and control is one of the most Following up the principles of the UN Charter legally important and politically charged issues in and of the OSCE Charter for European Security, CMO. In CMO the military’s role, while essen- as well as the objectives of the EU, as outlined in tial, is most likely a supporting one. EU Opera- the TEU, the EU is active in stability promotion, tion Commanders and Force Commanders are early warning and conflict prevention. It cooper- supported by staff including political and legal ates with the UN, the OSCE, NATO, the Coun- advisors who advise them on how to conduct a cil of Europe and other international organisa- joint operation in full compliance with the appli- tions in a mutually reinforcing manner. cable provisions of international law, the EU legal Legal authorisation of any EU-led military cri- framework and the host nation’s law. sis management operation derives from a decision Coordination, interaction and liaison need of the Council of the European Union. Estab- always to be established between the EU-led lished political and military bodies and structures military force and its contacts in international within the Council enable the Union to ensure organisations, civilian authorities, NGOs and the the CMO is given the necessary political guidance civilian population to make use of synergies to and strategic direction, while respecting the single promote the mission. institutional framework. The point in time when operational control A clear understanding of the legal basis pro- shifts from a state to the commander of the EU motes the legitimacy of the operation, enabling led force is a critical juncture for the status of the commanders and crisis management structures forces, financial issues, logistics issues, and rules to better plan their missions, structure public of engagement.

127 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

Use of Force Rules of Engagement (RoE)

Generally, the military uses force in two situ- RoE are influenced by three considerations: ations: for self-defence and for mission accom- law, policy, and mission. The rationale for any plishment. During a CMO, when tactical given rule will be influenced by one or more of actions of a single soldier can have ‘strategic con- these considerations, but RoE are not used to sequences’, a proper understanding and applica- assign tasks or give tactical instructions. tion of the rules of engagement (RoE) are vital. RoE may further define the intensity or nature This implies that the success or failure of a CMO of the force to be used. Depending on the opera- may hinge on how well the use of force policy tion and the mission profile this instrument gives and the RoE are conceived, articulated, under- the OpCdr maximum flexibility to tailor the stood and implemented. Application of the rules potential use of force to his mission. of engagement is probably the most visible mil- RoE cannot be viewed separately from the itary-legal issue facing both the commander and operational planning process. They form a prod- soldiers in a CMO. uct of that process, which has identified all relevant All use of force – in self-defence and under the aspects of the mandate, the mission, the OpCdr’s RoE – in any CMO must always be in conformity intent and the means at his disposal. Hence, while with international standards, especially interna- the development of generic RoE in the context of tional law as defined in applicable international contingency planning may be appropriate, each agreements, customary international law and the operation will need tailor-made RoE. guiding principles of the EU, and limited to what RoE are used to ensure that military forces oper- is necessary. ate in accordance with the political goals set. They The authorisation of use of force is an essential provide the OpCdr with the required guidance on part of the political guidance and strategic direc- behalf of the competent authorities. RoE should tion for any CMO. take into account the political goals to be achieved, Although use of force is generally understood reflect military, political and other relevant capabil- to encompass armed force only, limitations in ities, and conform to the national and international international and national law affect all forms of legal requirements applicable to the operation. measures taken by military forces that encroach During international armed conflict, an adver- upon the freedoms of individuals. In addition to sary will be declared hostile. Elements of that the use of armed force, measures such as identity adversary’s forces may be engaged upon identifica- checks, searches, detention or retention need to tion, without first having to commit a hostile act be addressed in comprehensive guidance on the or demonstrate hostile intent. In CMO, groups use of force provided by the OpCdr. Such meas- are rarely declared hostile. Soldiers may, however, ures should respect human dignity and, as far use force in self-defence. as possible, local customs. These measures may Self-defence is a universally recognised inherent limit the exercise of individual freedoms guar- right of individuals to defend themselves using anteed under fundamental human rights. They necessary and proportional force against attack or therefore need an appropriate legal basis in order imminent attack. The law in Member States with to be legitimate. regard to the use of force in self-defence varies in scope and in nature. However, the general principles that any force used must be necessary and proportional are common to all Member States’ legal systems. Usually terminology is a critical issue in RoE development in multinational crisis

128 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

management operations. Therefore all participat- gees and displaced persons is likely to be involved ing national military contingents must share the in the civilian part of a CMO. However, com- same understanding of RoE terms. manders will need to know what exactly the mili- However, the various national contingents have tary’s obligation is toward refugees and displaced to reflect these provisions in accordance with their persons, whether the military will be expected to national legal limitations in the RoE cards (“sol- assist in return and resettlement, and if the mili- dier cards”) which they provide to their individual tary is expected to provide protection and other soldiers. humanitarian assistance to support in the return The classification of the RoE for a CMO will and resettlement process. be determined by the prevailing political and As long as the Rule of Law (RoL) is not work- operational circumstances. Every soldier from ing in an area of operations, the military could each national contingent must have access to and be asked to contribute to the functional spectrum understand the rules. Ideally, this would happen of policing, management and oversight of public sufficiently early in the CMO to allow the rules safety and security, thus providing for and main- to be distributed and training on their use to be taining a safe and secure environment. This might provided. The declassification of the RoE shows require new technologies and the use of less-than- openness to the population in the mission area but lethal means of crowd control or self-defence. could enable those seeking to frustrate the CMO There are new developments in technology that to place the military at a severe disadvantage. may be very useful in peace operations to control Past experience has proved that it is often diffi- a volatile situation without resorting to deadly cult for military forces to withdraw from a complex force or riot control agents like tear gas. peace support operation before the political and Finally, the use of information technologies civilian aspects of the mission are well under way in CMOs raises such issues as whether a “cyber- and succeeding. As a result, EU CMO scenarios attack” (non-kinetic attack) constitutes a “use allow for coordination and cooperation between of force” within the meaning of the UN Char- EU military and civilian components, possibly ter and whether the use of cyber-technology as a supported by other international organisations, weapon constitutes a hostile act. Another category agencies or non-governmental organisations, to of issues is the use of force against information meet the challenge of restoring law and order in sources within the operational area. The ‘EU use the crisis region. This may have an impact on the of force concept’, with its generic compendium RoE because the military is involved in support- of RoE, provides answers adapted to all scenarios. ing the civilian aspects of the operation, possibly through the use of force. The issue to be decided is this: against whom and to what extent will the Protection of Cultural military be authorised to use force to uphold law Property and order in an ostensibly sovereign state? Press- ing law enforcement and force protection matters The growing number of interreligious and typically include interaction with civilian police interethnic conflicts has implied not only attacks and civilian police checkpoints, freedom of move- against civilians but also, in many cases, the ment, prevention of crimes by civilians, and the destruction of civilian objects, in particular cul- detention of civilians. tural property. Acts of vandalism directed against The overarching aim is always to protect such objects or their destruction are particularly civilians and ensure unimpeded access to humani- common in such conflicts, as cultural property tarian aid, not necessarily only in situations of can be considered to symbolise the cultural iden- armed conflict. Return and resettlement of refu- tity and history of the adverse party.

129 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

Legal Protection of the Status Claims of EU-led CMO Forces Another important aspect of the SOFA is There are several international treaties which dispute resolution, or the settlement of claims, also may be invoked to protect the military force between the military and the local population. If while in the host nation. The Status of Forces handled well, claims settlements can have a very Agreement (SOFA) is a subject of immense politi- positive effect on public relations, establish good- cal, legal, military, and personal concern during will with the local population, and facilitate mis- a CMO for soldiers, commanders, and govern- sion accomplishment. ments. The SOFA defines the legal rights, obligations, privileges and immunities of all the parties, and facilitates the accomplishment of the International Humanitarian Law military’s mission. A SOFA may be concluded in Crisis Management Operations between the host nation and the EU, there may be individual agreements between participating The use of force by military personnel does states and the host nation, or both may be the not automatically entail the applicability of the case during an operation. An important aspect of ‘law of armed conflict’ or international humani- any SOFA for the commander is immunities and tarian law (IHL). Generally, IHL is triggered by jurisdictional waivers. The SOFA should contain international armed conflict and not merely by provisions on the following: military operations in which force may be used • scope of application and definitions; on a limited basis, as in peace support operations. • privileges and immunities; However, issues involving IHL that arise in either • claims and legal proceedings for non-contrac- a civil war or an international armed conflict are tual liability; often carried over to the post-conflict CMO. • identification; While technically IHL may not apply in a • deceased members; CMO, the principles of IHL do: considera- • entry and departure; transport; free and unre- tions of necessity, proportionality, unnecessary stricted passage; exemption from tax and du- suffering, unnecessary destruction of property, ties; and distinction apply whenever and wherever • legal capacity and payment of taxes; the military uses force. Furthermore, in CMOs • local personnel; that go beyond traditional peacekeeping,2 it is • premises, provisions, supplies, services and san- anticipated that combat operations or the use of itary arrangements; force beyond that employed for immediate self- • liaison; defence will occur. • disputes; It is EU policy that the EU-led force will com- • miscellaneous matters. ply with the applicable provisions of IHL during the conduct of all military operations and related activities in armed conflict. Commanders should also be aware that many other treaties and conventions apply across the entire spectrum of military operations, including CMOs.

2 The words ‘traditional peacekeeping’ refer to strict Chapter VI-style peacekeeping where there is a high degree of consent among the parties, a ceasefire agreement is in place, the force is small and lightly armed, the use of force is authorised only in self-defence, and there are no enforcement powers.

130 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

Aside from the applicability of the various con- Conclusion ventions and treaties comprising IHL in CMOs, the commander should be aware of two key issues The success of an EU-led force depends to a related to IHL which will almost certainly arise great extent upon the ability of its contributing during any CMO. The first relates to civilians. states to work together effectively. It almost goes Perhaps the first challenge in dealing with civil- without saying that commanders must know the ians in a peace operation is that of deciding who situations in which significant legal difficulty qualifies as a civilian and, subsequently, whether could be encountered, the issues likely to arise and any civilians receive special status (e.g. refugees). the questions to ask. There are many national and Caution is the key in making this second determi- EU resources – including all the EU Concepts nation, for the status given to a person can bring applicable to CMO – for commanders and staff with it legal rights and obligations. to consult prior to deployment in theatre. Famili- Other questions relate to determining the arity with the contents of the documents and con- military’s legal obligation toward civilians. Issues tact with those who have participated in complex concerning humanitarian assistance, detainment, peace support operations can help commanders and civilian property abound in CMOs. Dealing and staff to prepare for recurring challenges and to with civilians is the type of complex legal situation be alert to unexpected ones. The complexity and where issues of sovereignty, the legal basis for the variety of the issues raised by different aspects of operation, the RoE, and the SOFA all converge in any CMO make clear the importance of the law a tactical situation involving only a limited num- to commanders. ber of individuals that could have serious strategic consequences if not handled properly. Command- ers are advised to consult extensively with their legal and political advisors and civil affairs officers regarding the designation and treatment of civilians. This is one category of issues that the international media and international organisations watch very closely.

131 HanDBooK on CSDP MiSSionS anD oPerationS

Rules for the Use of Force

Th e term Rules of Engagement (RoE) used within which personnel and units deployed by the military derives from ‘engagement in with a mission may use force in accordance combat’, clearly originating from a war-like with the principles and purposes of the Char- scenario and thus legally bound by the law of ter of the United Nations, Human Rights, armed confl icts. the mandate assigned by the relevant Council On the other hand, civilian CSDP uses the Decision and all related principles of Interna- term Rules for the Use of Force (RUoF) and tional Law. refers to other scenarios: collective self-defence/ RUoF have to take into account the political mission protection and Rule of Law (RoL)/Law goals to be achieved, refl ect the civilian, politi- Enforcement. For this reason, the legal frame- cal and other relevant capabilities and com- work of RUoF consists of the more restrictive ply with the national and international legal provision for the protection of human rights requirements of the mission. Th ey provide the and related international standards for law Head of Mission (HoM) and mission person- enforcement. nel with the necessary guidance. For security reasons or to perform an execu- Competent authorities at international, tive mandate, civilian CSDP missions may also regional and national level must ensure that be armed. In broad terms, RUoF correspond the UoF policy and the mission-specifi c RUoF to the ‘Confi rmatory RoE’ for the part related do not jeopardise the execution of the man- to collective self-defence/mission protection. date or put lives at risk unnecessarily. On the Nonetheless, they may also include authorisa- other hand, the RUoF help to assist the HoM, tion to use force as ‘second responders’ – tem- as appropriate, when pursuing the mission’s porarily assuming an executive role – in sup- objectives in accordance with the assigned port of local police to ensure the maintenance mandate. of public order. Finally, when the mission is Luigi Bruno invested with executive powers, its armed personnel will be bound by the relevant, locally applicable penal legislation (provided that this complies with the principle of respect for human Policy rights). Also in the latter case, Capabilities the immunities from local juris- considerations diction of the Status Of Mission Agreement (SOMA) apply. ruof When civilian CSDP missions are to be armed, specifi c provisions will accordingly be included in the SOMA and the mission-specifi c RUoF annex will Legal be an integral part of the Operation Plan considerations (OPLAN) approved by the Council. Th e Rules for the UoF (RUoF) are required to provide clear and unequivocal parameters Graphic: Bruno/Scala

132 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

2.2.5. International criminal law and transitional justice

by Sari Kouvo and Christian Behrmann

The establishment of the International Criminal emphasised the importance of combining justice Court (ICC) through the adoption of the Rome and reconciliation efforts with “other public inter- Statute in 2000 strengthened the international law est objectives, such as the consolidation of peace and commitment so that there can be no amnesty for democracy and the need for economic development gross human rights violations and war crimes. The and public security”. That is, the concept note Rome Statute confirmed the increasing political clearly puts accountability, transitional justice and consensus that amnesty for those responsible for reconciliation at the heart of what has become the worst violations during conflict is not condu- CSDP and the EU’s comprehensive approach to cive to sustainable peace. However, accountability managing external crisis and conflict. is not the only way of dealing with legacies of con- In practice, very few CSDP missions and oper- flict-related violations. Contemporary transitional ations have dealt directly with ICC- and transi- justice mechanisms also include documentation tional-justice-related issues. However, through and truth-seeking, vetting and institutional reform, their engagement with security provision in crisis reparations and symbolic measures, such as memo- and conflict situations or security sector reform rials. It is also important to mention that Addi- in post-conflict situations, CSDP missions do tional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, in often find themselves balancing interests of peace its guidance to authorities after non-international and interests of justice: they may find themselves armed conflicts, encourages the broadest possible dealing with the challenges of joint patrols with amnesties. The Additional Protocol II reference to security forces with very different levels of edu- amnesties cannot include grave breaches of inter- cation, mentoring security-sector personnel with national humanitarian law, but it is an important records of human rights abuses and violations or reminder that re-establishing normal relations in training military and police personnel who have life and institutions after conflict also demands gone through Disarmament, Demobilisation and reconciliation. Ultimately, the aim of all these Reintegration (DDR) processes with very limited measures is to strengthen society’s ability to move focus on accountability or on vetting in human forward after conflict or other transitions, through rights terms. bringing those responsible for the worst crimes to justice, acknowledging the suffering of victims and building institutional resilience. The EU and the ICC The European Union is a strong supporter of the ICC and of transitional justice. The 2006 The ICC, for the purpose of preventing and concept note on transitional justice and ESDP curbing the commission of the serious crimes fall- (10674/06) defined transitional justice as a ing within its jurisdiction, is an essential means “framework for confronting past abuse as a com- of promoting respect for international humani- ponent of a major political transformation – from tarian law and human rights. Based on the Rome war to peace or from authoritarian rule to democ- Statute, the ICC has jurisdiction over genocide, racy”. Recognising that political will was often a crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime challenge to transitional justice, the concept note of aggression (Arts. 5-8). The ICC is established

133 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

on the basis of the principle of complementarity. cooperation with the Court and support the imple- The primary responsibility for bringing offenders mentation of the principle of complementarity. to justice lies with states themselves in conformity In accordance with the Council Decision, a with the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute. revised Action Plan was adopted on 12 July 2011. The successful implementation of this ‘comple- It consists of five sections: (i) coordination of the mentarity principle’ requires both political will Union’s activities to implement the objectives of and capacity. the Decision; (ii) universality and integrity of the The EU provides strong support – politically Rome Statute; (iii) independence of the Court and diplomatically, and logistically and finan- and its effective and efficient functioning; (iv) cially – to the ICC and other criminal tribunals, cooperation with the Court, and (v) implementa- for instance the ad-hoc international tribunals for tion of the principle of complementarity. the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the Special Moreover, according to the ‘EU Action Plan Court for Sierra Leone, the Extraordinary Cham- to follow up on the Decision on the International bers in the Courts of Cambodia, and the Special Criminal Court of 12 July 2011(12080/11)’ Tribunal for Lebanon. The entry into force of the endorsed by the EU Political and Security Com- Lisbon Treaty has contributed to steadier action in mittee, the “EU and its Member States will under- this area through its emphasis on strict observance take consistent action to encourage full cooperation of and development of international law (Articles 2 States with the ICC, including the prompt execution and 3 of the Treaty on European Union). of arrest warrants. The EU and its Member States The European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003 should avoid non-essential contacts with individu- states that one of the strategic objectives of the als subject to an arrest warrant issued by the ICC. EU is an international order based on effective They will monitor and address developments that multilateralism. Support for the ICC is high- may hamper the ICC’s work.” The EU’s response lighted as an example of the EU’s commitment to to non-cooperation with the ICC by third states a rule-of-law-based international order. In order focuses particularly on how the EU and its Mem- to enable Europe to contribute to a more effec- ber States can respond to impending instances of tive multilateral order around the world, the 2008 non-cooperation, to persistent or repeated cases of Report on the Implementation of the ESS states non-cooperation, and when to avoid non-essential that the ICC should grow further in effectiveness, contacts with individuals subject to arrest warrants alongside broader EU efforts to strengthen inter- issued by the ICC. national justice and human rights. All EU Mem- Given states’ primary duty to investigate ber States have ratified the Rome Statute and the grave international crimes, the EU is particu- Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the larly engaged in promoting and contributing to International Criminal Court (APIC). strengthening the capacity of national judicial As pledged at the Kampala Review Conference systems to investigate and prosecute these crimes. (2010), the EU updated its Common Position The European Commission and the European 2003/444/CFSP by Council Decision 2011/168/ External Action Service have developed a Joint CFSP, adopted on 21 March 2011 (this Deci- Working Document on Advancing the Princi- sion repealed and replaced Common Position ple of Complementarity. This Complementarity 2003/444/CFSP). The objective of the Council Toolkit aims to provide operational guidance for Decision is to advance universal support for the bridging the gap between international justice Rome Statute by promoting the widest possible and national justice systems, as effective and effi- participation in it, to preserve the integrity of the cient interaction between national justice systems Statute, support the independence of the Court and the ICC is pivotal to giving full effect to the and its effective and efficient functioning, support Rome Statute.

134 2 CSDP Missions and Operations Photo: EEAS/EUCAP NESTOR Photo: EUCAP NESTOR - ‘Judicial Protection Training Course’ held in Mogadishu

Accountability as part of transitional justice developed over the past decades the Broader Framework of seek equally to promote accountability, build insti- Transitional Justice tutional resilience and ensure reconciliation; the ultimate aim is sustainable peace. The EU Action Plan for Human Rights and Besides mechanisms for accountability pro- Democracy (2012–2014) emphasised the EU’s moted through national prosecutions, ad hoc or commitment to ensuring accountability and its sup- hybrid tribunals or the ICC, transitional justice port for the ICC, but it also called for the adoption mechanisms include: of an EU policy on transitional justice so as to help • acknowledging the suffering of victims, often societies to deal with the abuses of the past and fight through memory- or memorial-related initiatives; impunity (see action 27). Transitional justice deals, • documentation and truth-seeking, mostly pro- as noted in the ESDP concept, with addressing lega- moted through truth commissions; cies of violations after conflict in order to strengthen • criminal prosecution of those responsible for post-conflict institutions and peace. Or, as noted human rights violations; in the 2004 UN Secretary General’s report on the • vetting and institutional reform, often focused on rule of law and transitional justice in post-conflict removing former perpetrators from power and societies, transitional justice includes the “full range reforming justice and security-sector institutions; of processes and mechanism associated with a society’s • reparations to victims and victims’ families im- attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale plemented through either individual or collec- past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve tive reparations programmes. justice and achieve reconciliation”. Although transi- While the ICC and the Rome Statute promote tional justice is closely associated with the principles international standards for accountability and of accountability, the UN definition also empha- limit possibilities for amnesty, transitional justice sises reconciliation. The different mechanisms for measures are – and should be – adapted to the

135 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

needs of each specific context. The understand- be part of CSDP missions’ core mandates, but it ing that there can be no one-size-fits-all approach is important that CSDP missions, in their security to transitional justice is also at the heart of the provision and justice and security sector reform EEAS’s and the European Commission’s under- efforts, be aware of and where relevant support standing of conflict analysis, which should be other EU efforts that contribute to account- context-specific and victim-centred.1 ability and justice. This is particularly important when providing strategic advice on security sector reform and when supporting security sector vet- CSDP, ICC and transitional ting initiatives. For these reasons it will be impor- justice tant to continue operationalising guidance on the ICC and transitional justice with a specific focus As noted above, apart from the adoption of the on CSDP. This was already foreseen in the 2006 ESDP concept on transitional justice in 2006, ESDP concept note. there has so far been limited overlap between the Important elements for CSDP are furthering EU’s use of its CSDP tool and its commitment to knowledge about not only the EU’s commitment the ICC and transitional justice. This may seem to the ICC, but also the Rome Statute obligation surprising, as CSDP missions and operations are that states parties cooperate with the ICC (Art. deployed in several contexts where the ICC has 86 Rome Statute). This applies to various types initiated preliminary examinations or even formal of cooperation with the Court, including the investigations, including Afghanistan, the Central execution of arrest warrants. Non-cooperation by African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Repub- a Rome Statute state party not only undermines lic of Congo (DRC) and Libya, and that most of the Court but also constitutes a breach of a legal the countries where CSDP missions are deployed obligation and should be treated as such. Inte- grapple with legacies of past violations and war gral to – but also broader than – accountability crimes. The EULEX Kosovo mission is one of the issues are the EU’s commitment to ending sexual few missions which directly engages with these violence in conflicts. Gender-based and sexual issues. In the case of EULEX Kosovo, the mission violence in conflict are Rome Statute crimes, but itself draws upon an executive mandate within addressing legacies of gender-based and sexual the Kosovo justice sector, while prosecuting war violence after a conflict also needs victim-centred crimes (related to the Kosovo conflict in 1999) is and institutional responses. These are issues that at the core of its efforts. These efforts are comple- CSDP missions and operations supporting justice mented by the mission’s role in the establishment and security sectors are already tackling in several of a Specialist Court, which will deal with spe- contexts and will need to continue engaging with. cific allegations made in a Council of Europe Par- Also integral to CSDP missions’ engagement in liamentary Assembly Report of 7 January 2011 security and justice sector reform is support for against members of the Kosovo Liberation Army. vetting processes that are non-discriminatory and However, even when CSDP missions are not that also take account of legacies of human rights directly involved in supporting the ICC or tran- violations and war crimes. Civil society consulta- sitional justice, they can contribute as part of the tion is another obvious area for consulting about EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflict legacies of conflict and their impact on post- and crisis. Support for the ICC or more broadly conflict SSR and justice reform or institutional for transitional justice does not necessarily need to reform more broadly.

1 EEAS and EU Guidance Note on the Use of Conflict Analysis in Support of EU External Action.

136 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

2.2.6. Protection of civilians

by Vincenzo de Benedictis Photo: AAF/Peter Lechner.jpg AAF/Peter Photo: Protection of civilians in need of basic medical treatment in the margins of EUFOR Tchad/RCA

In this century, civilians continue to suffer as insurgency, etc. Some of the groups have politi- a result of armed groups – state and non-state – cal, strategic, ethnic, religious or ideological failing to abide by national and international law, aims; others seek new soldiers (often children) as we can observe in places such as the Central and forced labour (often women) or are organ- African Republic, Mali, Libya, Syria and Ukraine. ised criminal groups exploiting the lack of state In contemporary conflicts, civilians have increas- governance. Sometimes they may be proxies of ingly become the victims of the struggle for the host government, third-country governments power over populations, resources and territory or signatories to a peace agreement. The groups by competing armed groups. Terrorising civilians often present a combination of these characteris- through such means as sexual and gender-based tics, adjusting their behaviour and alliances to the violence, the threat of violence and/or killing, har- evolving conditions. assment, enslavement or inflicting serious injuries Targeted individuals and groups include refu- has become a frequently employed tactic in order gees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees, to achieve political goals. migrant workers, journalists, healthcare person- Multiple groups of perpetrators have been nel, human rights activists, missionaries (religious targeting civilians in many recent and ongo- or lay), humanitarian aid workers and volunteers, ing armed conflicts, as demonstrated by cases of women, children and ethnic and religious minori- genocide, ethnic cleansing, post-conflict revenge, ties. Today the situation is of concern in many

137 HanDBooK on CSDP MiSSionS anD oPerationS

Protection from imminent Access to Enjoyment of Enabling threats of basic necessities human rights conditions physical violence Graphic: Benedictis/Scala

countries where civilians (especially women and Protection of civilians is broadly understood children) continue to be subject to various forms of as all eff orts to reduce the eff ects of war or vio- extreme violence, often causing grave humanitarian lence on civilian life. Th ere are several ‘layers’ crises including forced migration. of protection of civilians: physical protection States have the responsibility to protect their from imminent violence, access to basic necessi- own citizens; lack of political will, capacity or ties (e.g. food, water, medical assistance), enjoy- governance mechanisms sometimes render them ment of human rights (e.g. freedom of speech) unable or unwilling to act. Sometimes atrocities and enabling the conditions for the above. Th e may even be state-sponsored. ‘protection onion’ above, which illustrates these layers, also explains the diff erent conceptual understandings of what protection may entail. iMportanCE and sCopE of poC It distinguishes between diff erent aspects of the protection agenda that fall under the responsibil- For the above reasons, protection of civilians ity of diff erent protection organisations, which (POC), in particular the protection of women include but are not limited to the following and children and the fi ght against sexual violence (both civilians and military) in a given area of in armed confl ict, has become increasingly impor- operation: the UN, the EU, the ICRC, other tant specifi cally in the margins of UN peacekeep- international organisations, humanitarian and ing operations or CSDP missions and operations. human rights organisations, multinational coali- Th ere is no common defi nition of POC, but there tion forces (with a clear POC mandate), the host is a general understanding that the entire spectrum country, and governmental and non-governmen- of those involved in confl ict and post-confl ict envi- tal organisations. ronments, both military and civilian, has an impor- In 2010 the UN produced an operational con- tant role to play in protecting civilians. Neverthe- cept on POC for peacekeeping operations, which less, the local or host government and its security represents a critical contribution to developing a institutions maintain the primary responsibility. common understanding of POC. Th e Concept

138 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

describes three non-hierarchical, mutually rein- A comprehensive and long-term forcing tiers of protection: effort • protection through political process; • providing protection from physical violence; Comprehensive and long-term POC requires and attention and action by many national and inter- • establishing a protective environment. national non-military organisations (e.g. the host The Concept serves as a basic organising frame- nation (HN), international organisations (IOs) work for how multiple lines of activity (at the and non-governmental organisations (NGO), political, military, and humanitarian and human who have primary responsibilities and capabili- rights levels, respectively) can support POC. They ties for many of the actions and efforts necessary must be appropriately coordinated, prioritised, to achieve the desired outcome: long-term POC. resourced and implemented as part of an over The military will usually act in support of these arching political strategy. Activities identified in organisations, primarily enabling their efforts the first tier relate to the facilitation and promo by maintaining a safe and secure environment tion of a peace process; activities in the second tier (SASE), which is characterised by freedom to pur- focus on preventing and responding to physical sue daily activities without fear of politically moti- violence; and activities in the third tier concern vated, persistent, or large-scale violence. supporting the rights of civilians through human- However, SASE achieved through a military itarian activity, legal protection and institution contribution is not the end-state, but only a building. temporary solution. Resurgence of violence will The EU has welcomed the UN concept and always remain possible, including during tran- later that same year, it updated its ‘Guidelines sition phases and the handing over of responsi- on Protection of Civilians in CSDP Missions and bilities between different POC stakeholders. The Operations’. end-state for POC will be achieved when both the POC may be the objective or an aim of a CSDP root causes of violence have been addressed and operation. Operations contributing to POC may local Rule of Law (RoL) is enforced, enabling the not be limited solely to monitoring and oversight administration to protect its local population. The of a ceasefire and respecting all the conditions EU’s comprehensive approach can duly contrib- of a peace agreement: they will usually require a ute to achieving long-term POC. deeper involvement of the EU military forces. POC includes both military and non-military The military will usually contribute to a safe aspects. A military operation will have to consider and secure environment (SASE) and they may and coordinate these aspects in order to ensure a be mandated to employ military force to provide successful POC effort; this may be viewed as a lay- protection from imminent threats of physical vio- ered set of issues. POC is inevitably a long-term lence towards the local population. effort across a broad front, usually requiring the POC is of particular importance due to its need to: moral, political, legal and strategic implications • protect civilians from physical violence; and potential consequences. • protect human rights; However, its significance in any particular • contribute to securing the rights of access to es- operation or mission will depend very much on sential services and resources; the extent to which POC is part of the mandate • contribute to a secure, stable and just environ- and tasks. ment.

139 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

POC in EU-led military to the civilian population that European mili- operations tary forces are mandated to protect; • Matching the mandated level of ambition with Thus military operations may include many the available resources and capabilities; tasks in support of POC, such as: ensuring free- • Preventing/avoiding/minimising Civilian Cas- dom of movement; providing safe areas, safe zones ualties (CIVCAS), as is the case in any military and safe havens; separating civilians from combat- operation, and using an ample range of Less ants; ensuring accountability and providing for Lethal Capabilities for this purpose, in par- detention; maintaining law and order; providing ticular in a military operation where POC is a show of force (deterrence); supporting con- an aim or the objective (CIVCAS could com- flict mediation; contributing to the peace pro- pletely delegitimise the military operation, and cess; peace mediation; promoting international concurrently other EU objectives).

humanitarian law and refugee law. The starting Failing to ensure POC during an operation could point will be the primary need to identify, track have strategic consequences due to the negative and coordinate, early on, with an enormous array impact of media coverage on public opinion. In of people in the field, which requires the military turn this could undermine the credibility and to be extremely flexible while shifting continu- ultimate success of a military intervention due ously from kinetic to non-kinetic actions. From to failed expectations and could result in reduced this perspective, POC is a relatively new job for public support. the military, fraught with many challenges, grey areas and diverging interests; at the same time, there is little or nothing in the way of military Conclusions doctrine, education, exercises, training, guidelines or lessons learned. For all of the above reasons, there is a specific The above challenges include the following: need to employ and coordinate an entire set of • Coordinating with many people in order to try particular capabilities within the military opera- and synergise POC efforts; tion and to coordinate in a timely manner with • Identifying the groups or individuals to be pro- others involved in protection. Education, training tected; and exercises must include POC in order to raise • Managing the protection expectations, which awareness and spread knowledge. the presence of a military operation inevitably In 2013, the EU Military Committee (EUMC) increases, by appropriate strategic communica- felt it was necessary to have a military concept on tions and Military Information Operations; “POC in EU-led military operations”. Adopted • Ensuring conflict sensitivity, including the in March 2015, this concept provides guidelines principle of ‘Do No Harm’, by gaining a deep for greater focus on the military aspects of POC understanding of the context, including civil- in all the phases of an EU-led military operation. ian population insecurities/security concerns and implications for the mission, avoiding in- advertent contributions to conflict dynamics and civilian insecurity, planning military efforts so as to build upon existing or pre-conflict civilian and military protection systems; • Making sure that the armed forces of the host nations, which the military operation will support, do not include elements that pose a threat

140 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

2.2.7. Anti-corruption

by Raluca Stefanuc

Over the past two decades, considerable efforts fore goes beyond the criminal law angle, touching have been made worldwide to raise awareness as upon a wide range of areas and measures which to the pervasive effects of corruption on economic impact on corruption risks and on the capacity to development and growth, social justice and rule of control corruption. law. Anti-corruption policies were placed higher on the political agenda by various leaders and organisations and all-encompassing international EU anti-corruption policies anti-corruption instruments such as the comprehensive United Nations Convention against Cor- General remarks ruption were adopted. Yet the road from declared intentions to actual reality still appears to be Whatever general remarks one may have on a long one. In many countries confronted with corruption, they also apply within the EU as well. endemic corruption affecting the very core of the Without a doubt, corruption is a complex phe- rule of law and democratic institutions, corrup- nomenon and against many of its trans-national tion remains, in spite of massive legislative and aspects action taken only at national level is not institutional changes, a very profitable business enough. Corruption is distorting the inner struc- and tangible results are not yet in evidence. ture of licit economies, by facilitating tax evasion, While a treasure trove of wisdom has already lowering investments levels, reducing competi- evolved regarding what worked and what did not tion and increasing the costs of doing business. work when promoting anti-corruption policies, For these reasons, corruption has received close there are very few examples of countries suffering attention from the EU for over a decade now, as from systemic corruption where anti-corruption reflected throughout the main instruments at its policies could be considered even relatively suc- disposal: legislation, policies and support pro- cessful. Therefore, the question of what does it grammes/agreements. really take to make anti-corruption policies deliver appears to be still valid. This article presents a brief overview of the Legislative framework main efforts undertaken by the EU to strengthen anti-corruption policies and the instruments at its Article 67 of the Treaty on the Functioning of disposal to achieve this objective. It also reflects on the European Union (TFEU) provides that the a number of key issues that can indicate whether Union “shall endeavour to ensure a high level of an anti-corruption policy is sufficiently solid to security, including through measures to prevent and bring about convincing results. combat crime”. Pursuant to Article 83 TFEU, cor- Mention should be made that in the context of ruption is one of the particularly serious crimes EU policies, corruption is defined in a broad sense, with a cross-border dimension for which mini- as any ‘abuse of power for private gain’. It there- mum rules on the definition of criminal offences

141 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

and sanctions may be established. The EU has recently been adopted at EU level, such as: the therefore been vested with the general right to act reformed Public Procurement Directives5 which in the field of anti-corruption within the limits contain strengthened anti-corruption safeguards, established by the Treaties. including specific provisions on conflict of inter- In terms of legal instruments, although the est; the Directive on the freezing and confiscation pieces of EU legislation primarily targeting cor- of proceeds of crime in the EU6; the revised Direc- ruption are rather scarce, the EU has taken some tive on disclosure of non-financial and diversity very important steps at an early stage in defining information by certain large companies7, whereby active and passive corruption and in requiring the companies concerned have to disclose infor- EU Member States to ensure an effective, pro- mation on policies, risks and outcomes as regards, portionate and dissuasive criminal penalties sys- inter alia, anti-corruption matters. tem for certain corruption offences, as well as to A new Accounting Directive was adopted in introduce the liability of legal persons for certain June 2013, introducing a new obligation for categories of corruption-related offences. These large extractive and logging companies to report were reflected in the Protocols to the Convention the payments they make to governments (coun- on the protection of the European Communities’ try-by-country reporting-CBCR).8 Reporting financial interests1, the Convention of 26 May would also be carried out on a project basis, 1997 on the fight against corruption involving where payments have been attributed to specific officials of the European Communities or officials projects. The Accounting Directive regulates the of Member States of the European Union2, and information provided in the financial statements the Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of all limited liability companies which are reg- on combating corruption in the private sector3. istered in the European Economic Area (EEA). In 2008, as an important step towards a In order to ensure a level playing field between stronger EU stance against corruption, the EU companies, the same disclosure requirements joined the most comprehensive international anti- were incorporated in the revised Transparency corruption legal instrument: the United Nations Directive9. This includes all companies which are Convention against Corruption.4 listed on EU regulated markets even if they are Some other important pieces of legislation not registered in the EEA and incorporated in a with relevance for anti-corruption policies have third country.

1 First Protocol of 27 September 1996 to the Convention of 26 July 1995 on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests (OJ C 313, 23.10.1996, p. 2). Second Protocol of 19 June 1997 to the Convention of 26 July 1995 on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests (OJ C 221, 19.7.1997, p. 12). 2 OJ C 195, 25.6.1997, p. 2. 3 OJ L 192, 31.7.2003, p. 54. 4 Council Decision 2008/201/EC of 25 September 2008 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Community, of the United Nations Convention against Corruption [Official Journal L 287 of 29.10.2008]. 5 Directive 2014/24/EU of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (OJ L 94/65, 28.03.2014); Directive 2014/25/EU of 26 February 2014 on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC (OJ L 94/243, 28.03.2014) and Directive 2014/23/EU of 26 February 2014 on the award of concession contracts (OJ L 94/1, 28.03.2014). 6 Directive 2014/42/EU of 3 April 2014 on the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the European Union (OJ L 127/39, 29.04.2014). 7 Directive 2014/95/EU of 22 October 2014 amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings and groups (OJ L 330/1, 15.11.2014). 8 Directive 2013/34/EU of 26 June 2013 on the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings, amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC (OJ L 182/19, 29.06.2013). 9 Directive 2013/50/EU of 22 October 2013 amending mending Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose

142 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

The Commission has also recently put forward tain central registers listing information on the a number of legislative proposals currently going ultimate beneficial owners of corporate and other through the adoption process with the Council legal entities, as well as trusts. This measure can and/or European Parliament and which are also also serve as an efficient anti-corruption tool. relevant in the context of anti-corruption policies, notably in relation to criminal law aspects. These concern: the proposal for a Directive on the fight Policy initiatives against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law10 and the proposal for a In terms of anti-corruption policy initiatives, Council Regulation on the establishment of the the first Commission Communication in this European Public Prosecutor’s Office11. field14 was issued in 1997 and was aiming at set- Mention should also be made of the upcoming ting the framework for a number of relevant meas- new Directive on the prevention of the use of the ures against corruption that would define an EU financial system for the purpose of money laun- strategy line. In 2003, the Commission adopted dering and terrorist financing (i.e. fourth Anti- a second far-reaching Communication on a com- Money Laundering Directive) and the Regulation prehensive EU policy against corruption15, call- on information accompanying transfers of funds. ing on the European Council to fully endorse the In February 2013, the Commission submitted conclusions and recommendations formulated a proposal for the fourth Anti-Money Launder- therein in a number of EU policy areas. ing Directive12 and a proposal for a Regulation In June 2011 the Commission adopted an anti- on information accompanying transfers of funds13. corruption package bringing a new approach to On 10 February 2015 the Council approved an addressing corruption at EU level. The anti-cor- agreement with the European Parliament on this ruption package of June 2011 consisted of a Com- package. This approval paves the way for adoption mission Communication on Fighting Corruption of the directive and regulation at second reading. in the EU16, an internal Commission Decision The package implements the recommendations of establishing an EU anti-corruption reporting the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), but also mechanism for periodic assessment (‘EU Anti- provides in some areas additional safeguards and Corruption Report’)17, a Report on modalities of higher standards as compared to FATF’s require- participation of the European Union in the Coun- ments. Among other things, the new rules will for cil of Europe Group of States against Corruption the first time oblige EU Member States to main- (GRECO)18 and a second implementation Report

securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market, Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and Com- mission Directive 2007/14/EC laying down detailed rules for the implementation of certain provisions of Directive 2004/109/EC (OJ L 294/13, 6.11.2013). 10 COM (2012) 0363 final. 11 COM (2013) 534 final. 12 Proposal of 5 February 2013 for a Directive on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing, COM(2013) 45 final. 13 Proposal of 5 February 2013 for a Regulation on information accompanying transfers of funds; COM (2013) 44 final. 14 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on a Union policy against corruption, adopted by the Commission on 21 May 1997 COM(97) 192 final. 15 COM(2003) 317 final. 16 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, and the European Economic and Social Committee on Fighting Corruption in the EU of 6 June 2011 (COM(2011) 308 final). 17 C(2011) 3673 final. 18 Report from the Commission to the Council on the modalities of the European Union participation in the Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) (COM(2011) 307 final).

143 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

of Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA pool of information available from a wide range on combating corruption in the private sector19. of sources, including existing monitoring mecha- The main novelty of the anti-corruption package nisms such as GRECO, OECD or UNCAC, consisted of the setting up of an EU anti-corrup- as well as civil society, researchers, experts, spe- tion reporting mechanism to assess on a periodic cialised networks, associations, bodies, agencies basis EU Member States’ efforts against corrup- and other stakeholders. It also aims to assess the tion. achievements, weaknesses and vulnerabilities of The 2011 Commission Communication on the EU Member States’ anti-corruption policies, Fighting Corruption in the EU also calls for a identify EU trends, stimulate peer learning and stronger focus on corruption in a range of relevant exchange of good practices and ultimately help external EU policies. Thus, it emphasised a rein- to frame and implement more effective policies forced focus on anti-corruption and the rule of law against corruption at EU and national level. The in the EU enlargement process, a strengthening of key concept underlining the EU Anti-Corruption the efforts to reinforce the capacity of neighbour- Report is ‘political will’ as it is intended to become hood countries to fight corruption, continuous a tool that can: be useful to all layers of society in support for strengthening good governance and the EU Member States, offer an overview of both democratisation in the context of cooperation and cross-cutting and country-specific corruption- development policies, as well as the promotion of related issues, look into possible solutions and specific anti-corruption or transparency-related focus on impacts of both corruption and anti- provisions in free trade agreements.20 The Com- corruption measures. mission support for global frameworks aimed at The first EU Anti-Corruption Report was setting up transparent systems for extracting and aimed at giving a frank assessment of how each trading natural resources and raw materials, such EU Member State tackled corruption, how exist- as the Forest Law Enforcement Governance and ing laws and policies work in practice, and it sug- Trade and the Extractive Industries Transparency gests how each EU Member States can step up the Initiative, is also mentioned in the 2011 Com- work against corruption. The first report included: mission Communication. These have been com- (1) a general part on overall corruption-related plemented by the legislative measures mentioned trends across the EU (based on the findings of the above as regards the Accounting and the Transpar- individual country assessments and a presentation ency Directives. of the results of the most recent Eurobarometer surveys on corruption); (2) a thematic part on selected cross-cutting issues of particular relevance Reporting mechanisms at EU level (in the case of this first Report: corruption in public procurement); (3) 28 country- On 3 February 2014, the Commission adopted specific chapters focusing on outstanding issues its first EU Anti-Corruption Report21. Subsequent specific to each EU Member State (not limited to reports will follow every two years. The EU anti- the matters covered by the thematic part). Good corruption reporting mechanism does not aim to practices were also presented all throughout the reinvent the wheel, but rather to streamline the report.

19 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council based on Article 9 of Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on combating corruption in the private sector (COM(2011) 309 final). 20 COM(2011) 308 final, pages 15-17. 21 Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – the EU Anti-Corruption Report of 3 Febru- ary 2014; COM (2014) 38 final.

144 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

Photo: IACA

The International Anti-Corruption Academy’s mission is to deliver and facilitate anti-corruption education and training for practitioners from all sectors of society and provide technical support and assistance to a wide variety of stakeholders

What makes or breaks an anti- into when prompting or assessing anti-corruption corruption policy? reforms. Also, aspects highlighted below would be more appropriate for countries or environments As noted above and also acknowledged by where corruption is widespread and where sub- the EU Anti-Corruption Report, major legisla- stantial anti-corruption reforms are required. tive and institutional changes pursued in coun- Therefore, looking at the types of problems tries undergoing substantial reforms often failed often encountered when implementing anti-cor- to deliver the expected tangible results. There is ruption policies, one could summarise the fol- indeed no one-size-fits-all solution, but neverthe- lowing ‘must-haves’ when promoting a solid anti- less some lessons could be learnt from a variety of corruption policy: anti-corruption reform processes that have been attempted or the few that have been implemented even relatively successfully around the globe. 1. Genuine political will While most, if not all, the points below have been made before, they only constitute a personal It is widely accepted that no anti-corruption reflection and a modest attempt to present, in a policy can be successful without genuine political very simple form, aspects that could be looked will. This could only arise in a favourable politi-

145 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

cal context where real power to change or reform 3. A tailor-made and problem-oriented approach is present. This would entail, inter alia: stability, that takes account of the specificities of each peace, unity in decision-making, awareness/rec- country, region, sector and context (i.e. no one- ognition of corruption problems at political level, size-fits-all) prioritising of resources to enforce anti-corruption policies, high-level tangible commitments, etc. Anti-corruption policies should consider the Other prerequisites are: political accountabil- realities of each country, region, sector, and cir- ity (i.e. clear checks and balances and account- cumstances. Solutions that worked well in one ability for actions and decisions taken by those place or context may not work as well in another in positions of power) and the tone taken at the place or context. This is because corruption is top (i.e. leaders committed to fighting corrup- interwoven with a wide spectrum of economic, tion should promote integrity through their own legal, historical and social aspects which vary actions and lead by example). greatly from one context to the other, both in An important part of political accountability is place and in time. related to the level of transparency and integrity of the interface between business and politics, including transparency, effective supervision and 4. Joint coordinated efforts and effective checks follow-up of wrongdoing concerning financing and balances in all policy areas (i.e. no isolated of political parties and electoral campaigns, con- measures) nections between public contracts and political financing, illegal lobbying, revolving doors, etc. As mentioned above, corruption is closely Political parties’ discipline may also contribute related to a wide range of factors, from economic considerably to ensuring political accountability. to social. This entails that an effective anti-cor- In this respect, integrity and anti-corruption ruption policy must reflect an all-encompassing should constitute influential elements in the approach and be linked to a range of cross- decisions taken within the political parties. cutting measures and sector-specific reforms which have a wider scope than anti-corruption. For example, an anti-corruption strategy target- 2. The right people appointed on their merits to ing the healthcare sector cannot work in isola- the right positions tion from or independent of a wider healthcare reform context which exceeds the mere purpose People matter most when starting or imple- of preventing and combating corruption. Also, menting a reform process. The legislative and insti- within anti-corruption policies themselves, a tutional settings are important and indispensable, very effective preventive response by a strength- but with these in place and the wrong people at the ened criminal justice system cannot on its own top little if any progress can be made. It is therefore address deeply-rooted corruption problems worth investing a lot in finding the most capable if not complemented by effective prevention people with the drive, profile and capability to policies, as well as internal and external control carry out top assignments and lead key institutions mechanisms across the board (including external that can propagate a wave of reforms. audit bodies and oversights). Supporting or investing in institutions which A high level of transparency of public spend- appear to have the right legal and administra- ing, including public procurement and imple- tive setting, but instead have a weak or incapable mentation of public contracts, as well as of deci- leadership, would likely achieve little in the way sions taken by public institutions, including of results. state-owned, state-controlled and state-regu-

146 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

lated companies, is also a key factor in ensuring Finally, mention should be made that, nota- proper accountability levels of those in power, bly in the context of EU external action, includ- as well as effectiveness of checks and balances ing the EU accession processes, and also in rela- in relation to areas or activities most exposed to tion to post-accession monitoring of certain EU corruption. Member States, external oversight and leverage, also through specific anti-corruption condition- alities linked to various financial, legal or policy 5. Public pressure from all sides of society (no instruments, often proved to be beneficial in driv- actual social tolerance for corrupt practices), in- ing reforms forward. This was particularly valid at cluding access to information, transparency and times when various reform processes were put at good quality education risk, for example through actions of political leaders threatening rule of law fundamentals or undue In the long run, this may produce the most tan- pressure threatening the existence and functioning gible results: i.e. a society that reacts to wrongdo- of key institutions or legislative measures putting ing, abuse of power or ineffective decision-making the anti-corruption framework at risk, etc. In such by leaders and which also has sufficient leverage instances, the external leverage acted as an enabler to make those in power and public services care for exerting political will or at least for mitigating about their reaction. To arrive at this situation, damage. There were also situations where leaders one needs to ensure proper access to education whose genuine political will to implement anti-cor- and proper quality of education; high levels of ruption reforms was questionable have nevertheless transparency from decision-makers, including pursued such reforms given a certain political con- through the opening up of databases containing text or the incentive of instruments or processes public interest information in a user-friendly for- with an external dimension. Nevertheless, external mat; ensuring adequate and timely access to infor- leverage cannot work on its own; in order to ensure mation, including through well-informed and sustainability of reforms, it must be balanced with easily accessible media (internet access has also an responsibility for and ownership of reforms at important role to play in this context). national level. This could also be achieved through A well-informed and powerful society would supporting the real national anti-corruption cham- be the ultimate guarantee of sustainability of pions and civil society who have the necessary drive anti-corruption reforms. Any coherent sustained and commitment and who can ensure that internal efforts in this regard would be rewarded in the checks and balances are in place and guarantee con- longer term. tinuity of reforms from within.

147 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

2.2.8. Public diplomacy

by Victor Reuter

Over the years the European Union has evolved local counterparts share that need and are likely to into a key player on the international security and be grateful for any support in meeting it. This new defence scene. Since the creation in March 2003 reality results in new tasks for the Press and Public of the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia Information Officer. and Herzegovina by a Council Joint Action, some Since no two scenarios are alike, a “one size fits 30 civilian and military missions and operations all” approach is not realistic, although the CSDP have been launched under the Common Security has its own philosophy and style that set it apart. and Defence Policy (CSDP). The EU is constantly Nevertheless, the strategies themselves vary from improving its crisis management capabilities, both one mission or operation to another. civilian and military. The CSDP engagement usually takes place in high visibility areas, creating a need for account- Phraseology ability, transparency and trust. This need can be met only if the mission or operation has a well A succinct version of the Commission’s under- thought-out and thoroughly planned communi- standing of public diplomacy was provided as part Press statement of HR/VP Mogherini in the margins of the ‘Gymnich’ meeting in Riga/Latvia, March 2015 cation strategy and policy. An increasing number of a booklet produced for the EU’s 50th anniver- of communication officers are therefore being sary celebrations in 2007: deployed in support of all our missions and operations. “Public diplomacy deals with the influence of In addition to the general public’s ever-growing public attitudes. It seeks to promote EU interests desire to communicate, new risk prevention meas- by understanding, informing and influencing. It ures must be taken into consideration. This leads means clearly explaining the EU’s goals, policies to new tasks for the communication specialists. and activities and fostering understanding of these The new communication technologies have not goals through dialogue with individual citizens, only increased the speed, scale, interactivity and groups, institutions and the media.”1 global reach of information flows, but have also opened the door wide to speculation and manipu- The tasking related to this very general descrip- lation. This means that public information analy- tion is found in a mission’s organigram as its Press sis has to be considered in a completely new light. and Public Information Office (PPIO). An analy- In terms of the information-driven process, the sis of the existing missions’ structures shows that operational level of a mission relies on a constant the set-up of the individual communication units supply of verified and accurate information to differs from almost every mission to every other, ensure the efficiency of its action. The mission’s depending on the mandate and environment.

1 European Commission, A glance at EU public diplomacy at work, The EU’s 50th anniversary celebrations around the world (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2007), p.12.

148 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

Photo: EU2015.LV

Press statement of HR/VP Mogherini in the margins of the ‘Gymnich’ meeting in Riga/Latvia, March 2015

The PPIO inside the mission The PPIO coordinates with and takes guidance structure: a service provider from the High Representative’s Brussels-based strategic communication unit within the EEAS. Usually the communication unit is adminis- In the mission area, close coordination with all tratively subordinate to the Chief of Staff and, as EU actors – particularly with the local EU Del- such, is part of the Chief of Staff’s Office. How- egation – is mandatory. ever, in its daily business it reports directly to the Head of Mission and, in any case, it supports the entire mission staff. Early deployment Operationally, the PPIO has a number of internal points of contact that it deals with on a daily When designing a mission it is highly recom- basis, particularly the political department and the mended to consider all possible communication key operational actors. Information exchange and issues right from scratch, i.e. during the fact find- public information analysis delivery are among its ing stage, and to deploy an embryo of the future daily tasks. unit at the start of the planning phase or with the The support provided to mission staff in gen- Crisis Response Team, as appropriate. The mis- eral boils down to daily analysis/media monitor- sion’s arrival on site usually generates major inter- ing, fact sheets, press lines, logistic support, train- est, commentaries, questions and very early media ing etc. requests. It is important to shape the mission’s

149 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

image right from the beginning. When it comes initial information material (e.g. fact sheets, to winning hearts and minds, the first impression CVs) have to be developed. Basic working tools matters. (e.g. camera, voice recorder, TV set, flags) have Building a communication structure takes to be provided. time. Once deployed, the press and public infor- • In terms of planning, the PPIO is involved in mation officer faces a long list of logistical, tech- drafting the concept of operations (CONOPS), nical and human resources challenges. The early the operation plan (OPLAN) and the Mission deployment period is the ideal time to compile Implementation Plan (MIP). At this point the the PPIO notebook and make important contacts communication policy and the communication that will be of inestimable value once the mission strategy have to be finalised, the communica- is up and running, especially if it becomes neces- tion budget has to be established and the first sary to resort to crisis communication at a given procurement procedures for equipment and moment. visibility support have to be launched. Dur- As all other mission departments, the PPIO ing this very intensive period the HR strategic works in close cooperation first with the Plan- communication unit and the CPCC expect as ning and Methodology Section and later on with much feedback as available. the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability • Finally, the PPIO dedicates a great deal of (CPCC). Their joint efforts will notably result in time to the first major public event, the of- the definition of initial master messages and an ficial mission launch, which is accompanied information strategy to be submitted to Member by the declaration of initial operational capa- States in Brussels. bility. As for all other mission components, staffing levels are low in the early days. Recruitment will take The start-up phase place much later. Be aware that at that point the staff selection procedures will take a lot of your The start-up of a mission is a critical stage for time. It is, however, crucial from the outset to shaping the future communicative action, as that have sufficient support from a minimum of trust- is when the basis is established for the final struc- worthy staff who are native speakers of the local tures, resources, procedures and tools. It is not language and are familiar with the environment only about putting up the flag and creating first and customs in the mission area. This will also awareness for the mission. A number of tasks that facilitate ‘local ownership’. will ensure the sustainability of communication have to be performed: • Exploring the local public information scene Policy and guidance (media, social media, public opinion, consumer habits, communication equipment landscape, The CSDP communication policy looks pretty technological issues and market prospection), much the same for every single mission. Basi- and identifying local stakeholders and opinion cally all missions have a positive, fully transparent leaders. relationship with the media and all other public • Contacting any existing EU presences and in- communication actors. Nevertheless, certain pro- ternational community partners, who are reli- cedural rules must be followed: able sources and generally a great support. • Public information is organised under the con- • Giving some thought to the corporate identity trol of the PPIO, which is to be informed about of the mission. Visuals (logo and letterhead), any public information contact or request ad- the website, the social media presence and the dressed to a mission member. It is up to the

150 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

PPIO to assess the communication opportu- media (TV, radio, print and web press) which nity and to check up on the reliability of the implicitly involve social gate keepers/journal- requester. ists. Both, however, need to be used. A profound • General press lines and lines to take in response knowledge of the local stakeholders and the habits to general, non-specific information requests of information consumers is needed to make the are to be made available to every mission mem- right choices. ber. In all other cases the PPIO has to be con- The same approach can be followed for the tacted and involved directly. choice of target audiences, although there is also • Conversely, the PPIO depends on information some common ground here among all missions in that every staff member can provide, particular- terms of the EU recipients (mainly the Member ly in relation to sensitive issues likely to arouse States and the institutions). Each mission needs public interest. to identify the civil society organisations, opinion • Finally, every mission must be able to regulate leaders, minority groups or other demographic its own and its staff’s social media behaviour. groups it wishes to communicate with. The same The mission’s social media user guide addresses applies to international communities, depending all procedures for professional and private use, on the nations and organisations (for example establishes sanctions and rules, and provides think tanks and non-governmental organisations) advice. operating in the mission area. The choice of communication tools is also dependent on the technological environment The public information strategy and consumption patterns in the theatre of operations. It has to be a mix of relevant press ele- The strategic approach varies from mission to ments (e. g. press releases, audio-visual materials, mission, although there are general communica- press conferences, interviews, background briefs, tion rules and principles that apply to all opera- op-eds, press visits) and PR/social media activi- tions in their everyday communication and, to ties (campaigns, delocalised events, road shows, some extent, crisis communication: billboards, brochures, promo items, advertising, • Ensuring accuracy, availability, pro-activity, civil society and social events, twitter, Facebook, bottom-up and one-channel communication, YouTube, website). Keep in mind that the use and having pre-selected talking heads are meas- of PR elements, in particular, is costly, labour- ures that can help avoid major trouble. intensive and requires considerable procurement • The communication action must be coherent effort. and coordinated with all players within and outside the mission. • The response has to be quick, but not hasty. Crisis communication • Language and wording play a crucial role in getting a clear message across. Crisis perception varies greatly from mission to • Do not forget the impact of audio-visual ele- mission, depending on the mandate, the physical ments, which have become central to consumer and psychological environment and the image of habits. the mission. All the above-listed strategic com- In addition to these general principles, every mis- munication principles apply. However, a crisis sion PPIO will have to configure its strategy to fit situation breaks with the normal communication the local circumstances. Choices have to be made workflow: on the balance between direct communication • The pressure is much more intense over a pro- (social media and public relations) and traditional longed space of time.

151 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

• Maximum communication coordination is Internal communication needed under the guidance of the Head of Mission (HoM) with all mission elements, the Staff come first: make sure that your people local counterparts and the EU actors (mainly are informed ahead of the public. While internal the EEAS HR strategic communications and communication is not an exclusive PPIO task, the the local EU Delegation communications PPIO contributes extensively to it, mainly in crisis unit). communication situations. Every single mission • The PPIO is part of the security management member is a spokesperson for the mission. Basic board and will be involved 24/7 in order to re- press lines and up-to-date lines to take therefore spond to all calls in a quick but non-hasty man- have to be available. The right balance must be ner, along clearly pre-drafted lines. Only facts struck between transparency and confidentiality: are to be delivered, no comments. A maximum need to know versus nice to know. Typical con- of care is required for off-the-record informa- tents cover the mission mandate, achievements, tion delivery. milestones, etc. • Be prepared to deny rumours and inaccurate In addition, care should be taken to keep the information, but make sure that your response workforce up to date on the important events is proportionate as regards the content, the within the mission, as well as outside the mission. publicity, the recipient and the publication The periodical in-house newsletter and the daily tool. media monitoring/analysis are excellent tools to • Intensive live media monitoring and analysis handle this challenge. Internal information can are crucial. It might be necessary to set up a be delivered through a range of other formats, dedicated temporary communication platform, including the intranet, bill boarding, social media, or even to open a crisis media centre. social events, HoM visits, town hall meetings, training and team building events. Ensuring the workforce maintains a high level of knowledge which is essential to performance, satisfaction and a good working atmosphere in general.

152 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

2.2.9. Gender and the UNSCR 1325 Women, peace and security agenda

by Sari Kouvo Photo: EUFOR Althea/ Herbert EUFOR Pendl Photo: Equality and non discrimination are fundamental principles integrated in CSDP missions/operations. Soldiers in EUFOR Althea display their united commitment to the mission (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2013)

The European Union (EU) currently deploys tal norms of equality and non-discrimination Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European missions in fifteen crisis and conflict situations. Union and in the EU Charter of Fundamental Most of the missions and operations are engaged Rights. It also draws on the EU’s commitment in security and justice sector reform efforts or to integrating UN Security Council Resolution directly in security provision through monitoring 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security and or deploying European military forces. Although several policy frameworks, including the EU’s not a dominant component in CSDP missions, Crisis Management Procedures. all missions in some way engage with issues of The EU, like other organisations engaging in women’s participation or with gender issues. The reform efforts in crisis, conflict and post-conflict focus on women’s participation and on integrat- situations, has had to realise that there is no one- ing a gender perspective draws on the fundamen- size-fits-all approach or silver bullet for success-

153 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

ful and sustainable reform. This is also true for employment and having proper and properly gender mainstreaming and efforts to implement implemented codes of conduct and disciplines. the women, peace and security agenda. Crisis An important element for the internal dimen- situations and transitions can provide opportu- sion is codes of behaviour that forbid discrimi- nities for renegotiating gender roles, but they nation, harassment and exploitation. In 2005 can also result in new challenges such as a rise the EU had already adopted Generic Standards in domestic violence, a rise in corruption and of Behaviour for ESDP Operations (8373/1/05) organised crimes, including sexual exploitation covering both civilian and military missions and and trafficking in women and children. The seeking to ensure that personnel in CSDP mis- influx of international organisations can itself sions and operations hold themselves to the high- be a poisoned gift for women, as the politically est possible standards. In addition, all CSDP mis- and culturally attuned approaches of local actors sions have mission-specific codes of conduct and are exchanged for sometimes too standardised behaviour and procedures for dealing with com- international approaches on gender and women’s plaints. As called for in the EU Action Plan for issues. Human Rights and Democracy 2012–2014, the The EU – and its CSDP missions – have over EU is currently revising its code of conduct and the years developed comprehensive policy frame- discipline for civilian missions. works that seek to guide and support practical The external dimension involves ensuring that approaches promoting equality and women’s CSDP missions and operations in their program- rights. Lessons from CSDP missions provide ming and activities also promote equal rights important guidance for continued work. This between women and men. This is done through article seeks to reflect both policy and practical an emphasis on integrating a gender perspective developments. (gender mainstreaming) and through seeking to implement UNSCR 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security. These concepts and policy Key conceptual and policy frameworks will be addressed below. frameworks

Equality and Non-discrimination Gender mainstreaming

Equality and non-discrimination are funda- The notion of gender refers to the different mental principles of international human rights social roles of women and men, which often dic- law. They are also fundamental values of the Euro- tate what possibilities and constraints women pean Union, enshrined in its normative frame- and men have in a given society. By analysing work (Article 2 Treaty on European Union and gender roles in a society or an institution, it is the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights). The EU possible to identify women’s and men’s different should also seek to uphold and promote its val- access to power, influence and resources. That ues and interests through its foreign policy (Arti- is, to identify the underlying causes of inequali- cle 5(3) TEU). ties and discrimination. Gender mainstreaming Equality and non-discrimination have internal seeks to ensure that this analysis – and the strate- and external dimensions. EU institutions, includ- gies adopted to counter inequalities and promote ing the CSDP structures, should ensure that they non-discrimination – are integrated into all pro- have relevant procedures in place to promote gramming and parts of an institution. In the EU equality and provide remedies for discrimination. and in CSDP missions and operations, gender This includes promoting equal opportunities in advisers or focal points ensure that the institution

154 2 CSDP Missions and Operations Photo: EUPOL Afghanistan Photo:

Promotion of female police officer at Kabul City Police HQ, 2014

has relevant knowledge and understanding about with mission management; and that CSDP women’s rights, equality and non-discrimination human rights and gender advisers should be issues and, for example, gender-based and sexual strategically placed within the mission, so that violence. Mainstreaming seeks to ensure that the they can provide timely input to mission man- whole institution benefits from this knowledge agement. Expertise should also be integrated and promotes equality. Key policy frameworks for into the operational aspects of the mission; gender mainstreaming include: human rights and gender elements should • Mainstreaming Gender and Human Rights into also be reflected in the EU’s comprehensive ESDP (11936/4/2006). This policy document approach to crisis management, including co- provides guidance for mainstreaming at the ordination and cooperation between all EU mission level. actors on the ground; • Lessons and Best Practices of Mainstream- • Crisis Management Procedures for CSDP Crisis ing Human Rights and Gender into CSDP Management Operations (7660/2/2013) inte- Military Operations and Civilian Missions grated some of these lessons, inter alia by em- (17138/1/2010) follows on the 2006 policy phasising the importance of mainstreaming hu- document. Key lessons include: that human man rights and gender and by including special rights and gender elements should be reflect- headings for human rights in crisis management ed throughout the planning, implementation, templates. The human rights headings ensure reporting and review cycle; that the ultimate that human rights information is reflected in all responsibility for mainstreaming needs to lie planning documents for CSDP missions.

155 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

UNSCR 1325 (2000) on women, women to gender-based and sexual violence, rec- peace and security ognising that although most victims of, especially, sexual violence are women and girls, sexual vio- The EU has been a strong promoter of the lence also affects men and boys. The UK-spon- UN Security Council’s thematic resolutions on sored Global Campaign for Ending Sexual Vio- women, peace and security. It has also sought to lence in Conflict (2014) has also resulted in new integrate especially UNSCR 1325 (2000) and EU initiatives to tackle sexual violence in con- 1820 (2008) on women, peace and security into flict, including its consequences for post-conflict its crisis management. The women, peace and peacebuilding and reforms. security agenda developed through the seven the- The EU’s approach to combating gender-based matic Security Council resolutions emphasises and sexual violence in conflict aims to be com- women’s participation, empowerment and pro- prehensive, i.e., it engages all EU institutions, tection. They also include a thematic focus on including CSDP. It is also based on an under- gender-based and sexual violence and establish a standing that conflict-related sexual violence and framework for implementation. Important policy its effects do not end when the conflict ends, but documents for implementing the women, peace that it is important to address issues of sexual vio- and security agenda within CSDP include: lence when engaging in justice and security sector • Comprehensive Approach to the EU Implemen- reform and with civil society. Key policy docu- tation of UNSCRs 1325 and 1820 on women, ments include: peace and security (15671/1/2008), which em- • EU Guidelines on Violence against Women and phasises women’s participation in CSDP mis- Girls and Combating all forms of Discrimination sions, that CSDP missions when planning their against them (16173/1/2008) activities must consult with local women’s or- • Non-Paper on Ending Sexual Violence in Con- ganisations and ensure that missions include a flict – a Guide to Practical Actions at EU Levels focus on human rights violations against wom- (155/2014) en, especially conflict-related sexual violence. The EU has also adopted 17 indicators that help monitor the progress made in integrating Women’s participation and the women, peace and security agenda; five of gender mainstreaming in CSDP the indicators focus specifically on CSDP. The missions and operations indicators are being revised in 2015. • Implementation of UNSCRs on women, peace As noted above, the EU does have a very well- and security into CSDP mission and operations developed policy toolbox for gender mainstream- (7109/2012) provides further guidance for in- ing and integration of UNSCR 1325. How are tegration of the 1325 agenda into CSDP. these policy frameworks implemented in CSDP missions? An important element in all equality work – Elimination of gender-based and whether internal or external – is women’s par- sexual violence in conflict ticipation. Within CSDP missions a critical mass of women is important for ensuring a positive Since the early 1990s, the elimination of vio- working environment for women. In many cri- lence against women has developed into an sis and conflict situations where the EU is pre- important sub-theme within the field of equality, sent through its CSDP missions and operations, non-discrimination and women’s rights. Over the the presence of women is a necessity in order to years, the focus has shifted from violence against gain legitimacy from local populations and reach

156 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

out to women. Women’s participation in CSDP basic principles of humanitarian law and on the missions and operations has, however, grown only protection of civilians, with components about slowly over the years. By January 2015, there had sexual and gender-based violence as war crimes. been only two female heads of civilian CSDP mis- In the Central African Republic, the EU has sions, and the percentage of female staff in mis- been deploying an executive military force to sions has remained at around 20-25 %. There are ensure some stability and security in the area of no regular statistics on women’s participation in the capital. Here the EU force has had to grapple military operations, but levels are considerably with protection issues, including how to ensure lower. that women’s organisations providing basic ser- All current CSDP missions and operations vices to women and children can continue to have human rights and/or gender advisers or focal operate. points. The term ‘adviser’ tends to be used for staff whose full-time occupation it is to deal with human rights and/or gender issues and who have Forward-looking strategies expertise/prior experience of dealing with these issues. The term ‘focal point’ tends to be used for Through the CSDP tool, the EU has been able staff who have been assigned to deal with human to engage in crisis and conflict situations and rights and/or gender issues in addition to their also to ensure that gender issues are integrated other tasks and who are not necessarily expected in the post-conflict justice and security sector to have specialised knowledge. The advisers and reforms. The EU by now has strong policies focal points tend to be responsible either for for gender mainstreaming and for integrating mainstreaming gender into the overall work of UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security, the mission or for undertaking specific gender- and has gained practical experience through the centred projects. These projects most often focus CSDP missions. The key task henceforth will be on women’s participation or on supporting insti- to ensure that the EU’s policies and knowledge tutional structures that seek to ensure women’s are turned into operational guidelines, so that empowerment or protection. gender and women, peace and security issues are Some examples of gender-centred activities fol- reflected systematically in the planning, imple- low. mentation and reviewing of CSDP missions, and The police mission in Afghanistan has been so that CSDP staff are helped in their everyday seeking to encourage women to join the Afghan work with gender and women, peace and secu- police force. The mission has also, very impor- rity issues. tantly, sought to establish safe and appropriate The commitment of mission management to working conditions in a context where violence gender and women’s rights issues is also impor- against women is rampant and where women tant, as is gender advisers’ and focal points’ who are working are still viewed with suspicion knowledge of the political and cultural context by much of society. The police mission in the in which they are working. Contemporary cri- Palestinian Territories has been supporting the sis management and post-conflict work is also adoption of a law prohibiting domestic violence about cooperation and the ability to coordinate and supporting the establishment of family with both international and national actors. An response units. important tenet of the UNSCR 1325 women, In Mali, where the EU has two missions, the peace and security framework is that women focus of the EU Training Mission has been on need to be represented and that their opinions supporting the rebuilding of the Malian armed need to be taken into account in all aspects of forces. Military training includes training on this cooperation and coordination.

157 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

2.2.10. Conflict sensitivity – Why and how do I need to engage differently in a situation of conflict and fragility?

Compiled from the EU staff handbook: Operating in situations of conflict and fragility, December 20141

Sensitivity to context is required in all frag- security. While it may be tempting to think that ile situations, not just crisis situations. The case only governance and security colleagues need to of Rwanda, where the international community worry about doing no harm and addressing fragil- was claiming progress in economic and develop- ity, roads, food security and agriculture, education ment terms just months before the 1994 geno- and energy programmes also have a direct bearing cide was unleashed, is evidence of the need for on fragility and conflict and thus must be pro- greater awareness of the political forces, social grammed with a conflict lens. dynamics and fundamental beliefs and values that Sensitivity to context may require adapting exist in society. As the study on lessons learned some of the principles of aid effectiveness, nota- from CSDP missions and operations states: ‘Post- bly ownership and alignment, as recognised in conflict settings require political savvy.’ Ethnic-, the Accra Agenda for Action. As stated in the clan- or regional-based exclusion; gender-based Organisation for Economic Cooperation and violence and discrimination; and youth exclusion Development’s (OECD) Principles for Good are often acute in situations of conflict and fragil- International Engagement in Fragile States and ity and require special attention. Situations, endorsed by the EU: Although it is easier to infer causal relations in “Where governments demonstrate political will hindsight than to detect them as events unfold, to foster development, but lack capacity, interna- all programming in a fragile or conflict-affected tional actors should seek to align assistance behind situation needs to be informed by context analy- government strategies. Where capacity is lim- sis and anticipation of what might be the impact ited, he use of alternative aid instruments – such – intended and unintended – of the programme as international compacts or multi-donor trust and its components. This analysis is often read- funds – can facilitate shared priorities and respon- ily available in well-documented contexts such as sibility for execution between national and inter- Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of the national institutions. Where alignment behind Congo. When such documentation is not avail- government-led strategies is not possible due to able, various tools exist for rapid ‘light’ analysis. particularly weak governance or violent conflict, Sensitivity to context is required in all pro- international actors should consult with a range of grammes, not just those involving governance and national stakeholders in the partner country, and

1 European Commission: Operating in situations of conflict and fragility. An EU staff handbook. Tools and Methods Series. Reference Document No 17. December 2014. pp 9-12. To be found on http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/public-fragility/ document/operating-situations-conflict-and-fragility-eu-staff-handbook

158 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

seek opportunities for partial alignment at the sectoral or regional level. Where possible, interna- Guidance for adopting a tional actors should seek to avoid activities which comprehensive approach undermine national institution-building, such • The OECD’s Principles for Good Interna- as developing parallel systems without thought to tional Engagement in Fragile States and transition mechanisms and long-term capacity Situations include the need to ‘recognise development. It is important to identify function- the links between political, security and ing systems within existing local institutions, and development objectives’ and highlight the work to strengthen these.” (OECD, 2007) fact that ‘there may be tensions and trade- offs between objectives’. For example, the A comprehensive approach is more conducive urgent need to deliver essential services to transformation. In stable contexts, a lack of may trump the important need to develop coherence across policies and related interven- local capacity to do so; the urgent need to tions can lead to limited results. In a fragile or re-establish security can undermine long- conflict-affected situation, lack of coherence can er-term stability, for example, if it requires easily lead to no results at all – or even do harm. recourse to non-state armed groups; and And a lack of progress in one area – be it politi- there can be a trade-off between focusing cal, security, economic or social – risks revers- on poverty reduction versus addressing ing the whole transition process. For example, in inequality, often a root cause of conflict. Niger, improving livelihoods in the short term The 10 principles call for ‘joined-up strat- was a condition for restoring security, and at the egies’ across the departments of each same time security was needed to improve liveli- administration while preserving the inde- hoods. pendence, neutrality and impartiality of By considering all the relevant and intercon- humanitarian aid. nected aspects of diplomacy, security, defence, • Joined-up analysis frameworks and mech- finance, trade, development cooperation and anisms facilitate common and coherent humanitarian aid, a comprehensive approach is understandings of fragile, conflict and conducive to both effectiveness and efficiency. post-conflict situations; see, for example, Guidance in adopting a comprehensive approach post-conflict needs assessments and is available globally and in the EU (see Box), and post-disaster needs assessments and the can be applied to jointly analyse the context, UN Integrated Mission Planning Process. agree on a strategic approach across these policy • ‘The EU’s comprehensive approach to areas and identify practical coordination mecha- external conflict and crises’ sets out nisms. several practical steps in carrying out A comprehensive approach does not mean that a comprehensive approach: everything must be done. Critical path thinking (i) develop a shared analysis, (ii) define is needed. This assessment needs to answer the a common strategic vision, (iii) focus on question of ‘what is a priority when everything is crisis prevention, (iv) mobilise the vari- a priority?’ and resist the temptation to overbur- ous strengths and capacities of the EU, den national counterparts with too many agendas (v) commit to the long term, (vi) link poli- in the face of limited capacity and narrow political cies and internal and external actions, (vii) space. Prioritisation and concentration are also in make better use of EU Delegations and line with EU programming instructions for the (viii) work in partnership with other inter- 2014-2020 period. national and regional actors.

159 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

Transitional results matrices (TRMs) are a tool that can help to identify priorities for the short Agreeing on priorities term (first 12 months), medium term (one to across sectors three years) and long term (three years and more). TRMs can be used in the following circumstances. Liberia’s Results-Focused Transition • If priorities are agreed upon across sectors – Framework identified the full range of es- diplomacy, defence and development, etc. sential actions needed to safeguard the (see Box). transition; for each priority outcome, it • If priorities are agreed upon across actors, in- identified the critical results required in cluding among international partners and with each time period. national counterparts. In this way, TRMs can For example, in order to produce govern- (i) serve as a catalyst for harmonisation among ment functions implemented through a donors, allowing for improved donor coordina- merit-based public service, the first step tion and articulating a compact between nation- was a census of civil servants, followed al and international actors; (ii) explicitly help by public safety and security for govern- to identify the links between political-security ment workers in key rural areas, removal matters and economic-social issues; (iii) articu- of persons absent from the payroll, the late a compact between national authorities and development of new regulations and the the population and provide a framework for piloting of a new system of oversight and demonstrating gains achieved and (iv) provide transparency. a management tool for national leadership and This framework helped in effectively international actors to focus on critical actions. identifying lags in both government ac- The greatest gains are achieved when TRMs are tion and donor support, facilitating a negotiated around the budget planning, voting structural discussion of actions to fix and execution process; this helps to strengthen these problems. domestic accountability (see Box). • If flexibility is built in to respond to challenges and opportunity. For example, the UK Depart- ment for International Development (DFID) annually reviews and adjusts its operational plans in countries that are fragile or conflict- Agreeing on priorities affected. across actors Risk (i.e. the possibility of harm) has to be acknowledged, calculated and managed. Specifi- In Timor-Leste’s post-crisis phase, 30 % cally, this entails the following. of the recurrent budget was supported • Acknowledging risk. “Dealing effectively with by a multi-donor trust fund that was guid- fragility involves taking risks and requires rapid- ed by the Transition Support Programme, ity and flexibility in adopting political decisions a TRM. and making them operational in the field, while Individual donor countries participated dealing simultaneously with partner countries’ fully in review missions; while individual constraints, often in terms of limited capacities” viewpoints and input often differ, stake- (Commission of the European Communities, holder consensus ensures continuing 2007). Risks in situations of conflict and fragil- support even when opinions differ on in- ity are (i) contextual, ranging from corruption, dividual items. weak governance and lack of aid absorption ca-

160 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

pacity to political and security risks; leading to and fragility can be managed by being more (ii) programmatic risks (failure to achieve pro- pro-active than in more stable contexts. If gramme goals and the risk of doing harm) and there is a high fiduciary risk, it might be both ultimately to (iii) fiduciary and reputational safer and have more of an impact to invest risks for the institution providing support. in strengthening the financial management • Calculating risk. Situations of conflict and fra- of receiving partners than to state conditions gility are usually higher risk than more stable that will probably not be met. To cite another contexts, but taking a zero-risk or low-risk ap- example, “combating corruption ought to be proach could lead to strategic failure (zero im- done within the framework of broader sup- pact). Rather, the calculation should (i) weigh port to strengthen good governance and de- the risk of action vis-à-vis the risk of inaction and mocratisation processes” (Commission of the the potential benefits of engaging, and (ii) com- European Communities, 2003). pare the risks involved with several courses of Risks in situations of conflict and fragility can action. In calculating risk, there is a need for also be managed though multi-donor efforts, greater realism (most recent evaluations identify including pooled funding; and/or by using spe- overly optimistic objectives and/or timelines for cial instruments, such as the EU Instrument con- EU support in situations of conflict and fragil- tributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP; formerly ity) and greater honesty about risk exposure be- the Instrument for Stability, IfS), for which there tween donors and receiving partners, and with- is higher tolerance (within agreed limits) than for in donor administrations between programme regular instruments if innovation and untested managers and financial controllers. approaches are not fruitful. • Managing risk. Risk in situations of conflict

161 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

2.3. Scope of missions and operations 2.3.1. Civilian CSDP missions

by Mercedes Garcia-Perez and Galia Glume

Since its inception at the Council of Helsinki Flexibility of the civilian in 1999, EU civilian crisis management has response become multifaceted. Building on four initial priority areas – policing, civil administration, civil Next to its military engagements, the EU protection and Rule of Law – civilian CSDP has has conducted civilian missions with mandates provided the EU with an operational capacity in directly contributing to peacekeeping in the ‘clas- a diversity of fields, from monitoring to maritime sical’ sense. The EU-led mission in Aceh, for security1. With a strong focus on capacity-build- example, supported the implementation of the ing, the EU’s contributions to conflict prevention peace agreement set out in the Memorandum of and crisis management worldwide have shown Understanding between the Government of Indo- Member States’ commitment to playing an opera- nesia and the Free Aceh Movement by monitor- tional role on the ground in support of EU exter- ing, inter alia, the decommissioning of the lat- nal action. ter’s armaments in 2005-2006. In Georgia, the While the geographical scope of civilian mis- EUMM has since 2008 been ensuring the civilian sions has broadened since the first engagements in monitoring of the parties’ compliance with the the Balkans, CSDP has also seen the very nature of EU-brokered six-point agreement that put an end civilian mandates developing in a constant man- to the 2008 armed conflict between Georgia and ner. With more than 20 civilian CSDP missions the Russian Federation. Both missions played an launched since 2003, it has proven to be a flex- important role in stabilising the situation in the ible instrument, supporting partners in address- aftermath of conflict and in building confidence ing security challenges. The ongoing operation- between security actors on the ground, in support alisation of the EU comprehensive approach has of high-level diplomatic efforts. Also in support of enabled civilian missions to better integrate in and an important EU political engagement, EULEX contribute to EU external policies. Drawing on Kosovo assists the implementation of the Kosovo- the set-up of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Serbia Dialogue facilitated by the HRVP, provid- Capability – the CPCC, permanent headquarters ing constant expertise on the ground that can for civilian CSDP missions – and the European verify the extent of implementation. External Action Service (EEAS), civilian missions Civilian CSDP engagement has also evolved also play a key role in CSDP development. Mean- comprehensively in the field of capacity-building. while, the increased recourse to civilian CSDP Starting with police missions focused on moni- missions calls for the enhancement of civilian toring, mentoring and advising (MMA), such as capabilities. EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) which

1 Civil protection has not been implemented under CSDP; the Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department of the Commission ensures cooperation and coordination across national civil protection agencies among EU Member States and partners (since 2010).

162 2 CSDP Missions and Operations Photo: EUMM Georgia Photo: EUMM Georgia contributes to preventing incidents and defusing tensions along the administrative boundary lines with the breakaway areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia sought to establish sustainable policing arrange- the benefit of all citizens, be it in Ukraine, in ments under BiH ownership, the scope of man- Africa or in the Balkans, is envisaged as a partic- dates has become wider. The support to civilian ular, critical contribution to national dialogues Security Sector Reform (SSR) and to other struc- and regional stability, among the wider efforts of tures in the realm of Rule of Law (RoL), such as the international community. Building on the the judiciary, has increasingly formed part of mis- added value of the EU’s expertise and standing, sion tasks. In Iraq, the CSDP contribution to the missions of very various sizes add to wider peace country’s transition focused on the criminal justice efforts. system. Through integrated training activities and the promotion of a culture of respect for human rights, it aimed at a consolidation of security by Support to State institutions: underpinning the system of RoL. More compre- top-down and bottom-up hensive from the outset (2008), EULEX Kosovo has enjoyed a far-reaching mandate, initially cov- Missions initially focusing on training and ering the police, justice and customs sectors with MMA have also adapted, over time, to further a view to assisting and supporting the Kosovo their assistance to partners willing to tackle over- authorities in the establishment of a sustainable, arching policies and inter-institutional coopera- accountable and multi-ethnic RoL system. tion. The support to the Palestinian Civil Police Recent missions have seen their lines of opera- carried out by EUPOL Copps has shifted, over tions specifically designed to have an impact at eight years, from training activities towards advice strategic level. EUAM, the EU advisory mission on institutional sets-ups and legislation in the field in Ukraine, provides strategic advice on civil- of security and justice. Current efforts range from ian SSR in support of the Ukrainian authorities the basic Law on Police to delineation of responsi- who have embarked on the path of reform. The bilities in the Ministries of Justice and the Interior. development of accountability mechanisms for Another example of such refocusing is EUPOL

163 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

The advisory role of many missions has stressed the importance of cooperation, ownership and acceptance of the host States and local stakeholders. Civilian missions are primarily built on invitations by host States or governments, at times backed by a UN Security Council resolution. Missions may carry out executive mandates, one example being EULEX Kosovo, which retains some executive responsibilities in specific areas such as the fight against war crimes, organised crime and corruption. Nevertheless, cooperation has been given precedence over substitution, and capacity-building efforts have also been defined by the level of readi- Photo: EULEX Kosovo/ Enisa Rashlanin Kasemi EULEX Kosovo/ Photo: ness of partners to engage in reform processes. This EULEX Kosovo supports the implementation of the Integrat- participatory approach has given CSDP a longer- ed border/boundary management agreement between Kos- term posture, with more sustainable achievements. ovo and Serbia at a crossing point (October 2012)

Afghanistan, henceforth advising not only the Seeking synergies on the Ministry of Interior on institutional reform and ground: implementing the EU capacities for advancing civilian policing, but also Comprehensive Approach the Attorney-General’s Office. In both missions, the need to rebuild law enforcement agencies Civilian missions have also developed around following a conflict situation was furthered by specific ‘niches’. Maritime security and counter- efforts to sustain the professionalisation of police, piracy for the Horn of Africa (EUCAP Nestor), through accompanying strategic reforms and by aviation security in South Sudan (EUAVSEC), addressing the police-justice linkage. and Integrated Border Management (EUBAM) in EUPOL RD Congo had a similar mandate Libya addressed new needs in the field of interna- assisting reform efforts in the sector of secu- tional security and in support of regional stability. rity and justice between 2007 and 2014, in the Incorporating a regional dimension has been wake of EUPOL Kinshasa which had previously a key aspect of recent mandates, with mission supported the operationalisation of the Inte- activities set within a more global approach. grated Police Unit of the National Congolese EUCAP Nestor is often presented as a case study Police. Whenever possible, SSR has framed civil- in this respect, sustaining the military endeavours ian CSDP actions. The training and mentoring of EUNAVFOR Atalanta and EUTM Soma- dimension remains an important component of lia. Assigned a regional mandate, it assists host CSDP; regardless of the willingness to engage in countries across the Horn of Africa and the west- broader reforms, they encourage best practices ern Indian Ocean in enhancing their maritime and international standards. Capacity-building capacities not only by advising on policy and legal missions with a more ‘bottom-up’ approach also frameworks, training and mentoring, but also by allow for the retention of critical successes for encouraging regional cooperation. The Mission advancing security on the ground. In Niger, the works with national coast guards, civilian coastal use of scientific evidence in criminal investiga- police, the navy, and with prosecutors and judges tions was first implemented by the prosecution in order to help developing the ‘maritime criminal office with the support of EUCAP. justice system’. Beyond immediate civil-military

164 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

efforts to secure maritime routes and tackle piracy, EUCAP Nestor’s activities feed into long-term development, governance and regional economic cooperation plans, in line with the EU strategy for the Horn of Africa2. Civilian CSDP, of course, benefits from the growing importance of the EU comprehensive approach to conflicts and crises. While aimed at building EU engagement on a common understanding from the outset at policy level, on the ground the comprehensive approach demands enhanced coordination and shared analysis between missions, other EU instruments, and

international stakeholders. Khoudja EUCAP Nestor/Sonia Photo: How do these synergies take shape at the opera- Basic training for Somali Coast Guard, Djibouti, May 2014 tional level? In Niger, talks with the EU Delega- tion, and also with Luxembourg and Japan, have resulted notably in the external funding of ‘joint Mali, the EU civilian mission EUCAP and the command posts’ in the countries’ regions, backed MINUSMA exchanged dedicated liaison officers; by structures and procedures which the Mission daily liaison is taking place between EUCAP and helped to set up. Based on their situational aware- the EU military mission EUTM, and EUCAP’s ness, missions are in a privileged position to work coordination unit will support international coor- hand in hand with the EU Delegations in identi- dination in the field of internal security. For the fying the needs of counterparts in their mandated Horn of Africa, EUCAP Nestor’s coordination areas. The establishment of the EEAS in 2011 has and regional outreach efforts have been backed been facilitating these synergies – while on the by a new EU structure, the Operations Centre, ground, the role of Head of Mission has become created in 2013 in support of both civilian and even more instrumental in reaching out exter- military missions and operations in the region. nally, and feeding back into decision-making and Also activated for the Sahel region the following policy development at Brussels level. year, it provides additional, targeted expertise to In the context of the comprehensive approach, the crisis management structures within the EEAS an international coordination dimension has and coordination resources with the Commission been integrated into lines of operation. Early on, (Devco, international cooperation and develop- EUPOL Copps was mandated to facilitate coor- ment DG) in Brussels. dination, providing guidance to match identified The ‘Train and equip’ initiative is another needs and donors’ readiness with the priorities attempt to put the EU comprehensive approach identified with the Palestinian Civil Police. More into practice. While various CSDP missions are recently, EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUAM Ukraine responsible for providing training to partners, and EUCAP Sahel Mali also have a strong coor- the latter are often faced with a lack of adequate dination mandate. Mission structures have been equipment in theatre – both for carrying out the adapted accordingly and increasingly specific training activities (training venues, training mate- resources have been allocated to coordination. In rial), and also for performing their tasks (vehicles

2 In the Horn of Africa and in the Sahel regions, the Council has adopted global frameworks or strategies to guide the various dimensions of its external action, in partnership with the regions and key international organisations.

165 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

and other types of basic equipment). To address authority of its director, the Civilian Operations this gap and more generally to improve support Commander (CivOpsCdr). The permanent civil- to partners in the field of capacity-building, fol- ian operations headquarters since 2007, CPCC lowing up on the December 2013 European monitors how missions deliver and ensures that Council and Foreign Affairs Council conclusions the missions’ activities and organisational set-ups of 17-18 November 2014, a joint exercise involv- are best suited to fulfilling mandated tasks. This ing the Commission, EEAS and Member States oversight and support to operational planning was launched in 2014; in this context several mis- require a constant dialogue with the Council and sions and operations were tasked with mapping the Political and Security Committee, through the equipment needs of the host country in their which Member States exercise the political con- mandate area. This work is expected to result in trol and strategic direction of CSDP missions a joint policy approach in relation to Train and and operations. Annual or bi-annual strategic Equip. From a CSDP point of view, this pilot reviews under the aegis of the Crisis Management initiative should help mitigating a recurring chal- and Planning Directorate (CMPD) also play an lenge to mandate implementation: the provision important role in refocusing mandates, missions’ of equipment, which CSDP missions cannot fully objectives and tasks – within the realm of EU address, is marked by procedural constraints (dif- external action and in the wider context. ferent programming cycles and timeframes for CPCC is the first point in the Heads of Mis- development and assistance programming versus sions’ reporting line to Brussels. The CivOpsCdr, limited lifetime of missions) and limits in terms who is the Commander at strategic level, issues of what can be funded through the the European regular instructions and advice to the missions Development Fund (under current Official Devel- in theatre. Concepts and thematic operational opment Assistance, military or dual-use equip- guidance also contribute to enhancing mission’s ment can hardly be funded). This ongoing work3 efficiency – building on mission expertise and will contribute to a comprehensive approach to lessons learnt. Mission reporting is instrumental capacity-building in practice, in order to optimise in informing the development of best practices EU efforts dedicated at enabling partners to pre- which, in turn, act as enablers for mandate imple- vent and manage crises by themselves. mentation. The planning phase of EUBAM Libya has prompted debates, at HQ level and among Mem- A catalyst for horizontal ber States, about integrated border management debates (IBM) – inter alia resulting in a EU Concept on CSDP support to IBM in 2013. Maritime secu- These examples show how reporting is critical rity is another example, with EUCAP Nestor. The to planning – both at operational and at policy work carried out by EULEX Kosovo to tackle level. Civilian CSPD missions constantly have to organised crime also contributed to increasing adapt to changing – or at times protracted – polit- cooperation between civilian CSDP missions and ical contexts and operational environments. On EU agencies in the area of Freedom, Security and a daily basis, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Justice. When deployed in new areas of security/ Capability (CPCC) in Brussels supervises the con- intervention, missions often function as a catalyst duct of civilian CSDP missions and ensures ade- for ‘horizontal’ debates (i.e. on issues pertain- quate support, as well as a duty of care, under the ing to missions overall), by putting them on the

3 A joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council will provide policy options in this respect, considering both the security and development policy areas.

166 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

agenda – resulting in conceptual development. The integration of cross-cutting issues as full objectives within mission mandates, such as the fight against sexual violence or the enhancement of the position of women in national police, has been advanced by missions such as EUPOL RDC and EUPOL Afghanistan. In many instances, non- governmental organisations play a crucial role in raising the alarm, underlining the value of the missions’ engagement with civil society actors. A strong dialogue with civil society contributes to bringing CSDP into line with realities on the ground, and to fostering ownership by advocating reforms. Photo: EUPOL Afghanistan/Christiane Buck Photo: ‘Cross-fertilisation’ also plays an important part in CSDP development. When the project A hands-on exercise on crime scene management course cells started, EUPOL RDC was seeking a project at the Crime Management College in Kabul. The Afghan-led programme was monitored by EUPOL Afghanistan implementation capacity in order to complement its activities in support of the reform of the Con- golese National Police and its interaction with the In order to ensure consistency in support of justice sector. The Mission was granted a project local partners, such operational functions within cell and dedicated funds under the CFSP budget the missions must complement the wider assis- in 2009, and this instrument was then progres- tance and development programmes led by the sively incorporated in the civilian missions’ toolkit EU Delegations in-country, the work of EU spe- as an operational function to identify and imple- cial representatives, EU Member States on the ment projects in support of lines of operations. ground, as well as third countries and interna- Project cells are now assigned to most new civil- tional organisations in theatre. They also make ian missions, and in some cases to those already the case for civilian missions, deployed in envi- set-up. They have a very different size and budget. ronments marked by crises or conflicts, needing EUPOL Afghanistan develops comprehensive a certain degree of flexibility in order to deliver projects with a significant budget, which aim at better and in a timely manner. supporting the mission activities, outcomes and the achievement of the mission objectives. This includes, amongst other things, the organisa- Level of ambition and tion of workshops and seminars and the provi- sustainability sion of training/pedagogical material, such as the police-prosecutor cooperation manual. In Niger, While the evolution of civilian missions and EUCAP has since 2012 carried out small-scale their variety highlight the flexibility of civilian projects, such as the refurbishment of local train- CSDP, they also imply different levels of ambi- ing facilities and operational centres, the provi- tion. Civilian CSDP missions have varied in sion of scientific equipment for criminal investi- scope, size, and lifetime. At its height, Kosovo gations, or the organisation of workshops on the comprised 3 000 staff, compared with 40 for management of equipment (e.g. vehicle fleet, fuel, EUAVSEC South Sudan. Nevertheless, the equa- maintenance). These supplemented the Mission’s tion between the size of missions and the level capacity-building activities by encouraging local of commitment can be misleading; operational buy-in and sustainability. engagements have to be understood in relation to

167 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

resented more than 3 000 personnel in the field. Enhancing capabilities essential to the development of an effective and credible CSDP has been an enduring priority for Member States. Despite the progress made, generating civilian capabilities remains a challenge, especially for EU rapid deployment. Constant investments in the field of training, as well as a series of mechanisms at national and EU level, have improved the readiness and deployability of well-trained personnel at short notice. To mitigate against a Photo: EUPOL Copps Photo: relatively high turn-over and to retain expertise, Addressing the police-justice linkage: strategic-level meeting on police-prosecution cooperation held between the Head the setting up of pools of experts (for police, jus- of EUPOL Copps, the Palestinian Attorney General and the tice, SSR) and rosters, and the concept of visit- Chief of the Palestinian Civil Police, August 2014, Ramallah ing experts (allowing for short-term reinforcement of missions) have been developed to help other EU external policies and the involvement of meet the staffing requirements stemming from the international community. ‘Smaller’ missions political commitments. Driven by the Civilian can bring a decisive added-value when designed to Capability Development Plan, discussions on complement concerted efforts of the UN system a Shared Service Centre are ongoing, as is the and of regional organisations such as NATO, the Goalkeeper software project which will facili- OSCE, the African Union or the ASEAN. tate the handling and management of rosters of Although mandates are generally set for one deployable personnel. Besides the high level of or two years initially, many civilian missions have expertise, the diversity of seconded staff is often been extended for longer periods in theatre. Since a guarantee that missions are able to embrace its inception, civilian CSDP has been grounded multi-faceted mandates. In this respect, gender on the notion of partnership and local ownership. balance remains an ongoing endeavour for civil- Today, missions are better equipped to increase ian CSDP. local absorption capacities and sustainability, Missions reflect the core values of the EU on but it remains a challenge and gives civilian mis- the ground. They often enjoy a significant vis- sions in the medium- or long-term position. This ibility in the theatres and societies where they are CSDP practice of has stressed the issue of transi- deployed, although their budgets cannot be com- tioning (to other instruments, actors, or the host pared to those of development, external assistance country itself) to secure mission achievements. It programmes or humanitarian aid. Between 2003 has also put a strain on resources availability. and 2013, CFSP budget was constantly rising. Staffing is indeed a key issue for civilian CSDP. With new missions launched almost every year, The vast majority of the missions’ international and with continued improvements in its imple- staff is seconded by Member States on a volun- mentation, civilian CSDP has gained ground as a tary basis, according to national procedures. With privileged operational instrument for the EU and tours of duty ranging from six months to several its Member States to work with partners towards years, thousands of civilian personnel have been security and peace. The diversity of civilian CSDP seconded since 2003. Third countries have also missions conducted since 2003 has brought added been supportive of CSDP efforts by contribut- value to the EU – underpinning the EU’s foreign ing to missions with personnel on the ground. In policy with concrete interventions and contribut- addition, numerous local staff provide a fair share ing to make it a credible actor in the field of crisis of mission support worldwide. In 2014, this rep- management and conflict prevention.

168 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

2.3.2. Military missions and operations

by Giovanni Ramunno

Since the inception of Common Security and approach” to enable an effective EU response. The Defence Policy1 (CSDP) interventions in 2003, European Union comprehensive approach is both a the European Union has become increasingly general working method and a set of specific meas- active abroad and has undertaken ever more cri- ures and processes to improve how the EU can sis management operations. The EU has progres- deliver more coherent and effective policies and sively become a global political actor and a secu- actions, drawing on a wide array of existing tools rity provider. and instruments. The regional strategies developed EU operations are undertaken on the basis of a to date for the Horn of Africa and the Sahel have UN mandate, which the EU would normally seek been valuable in framing the EU’s comprehensive in enforcement situations. On the other hand, response to new political developments and chal- EU missions, which are non-executive, are carried lenges. Policy coherence has also proven highly out in a non-coercive framework. Over the last beneficial for the sustainability of EU engagement year, five missions and operations involving mili- transitioning from CSDP operations to other tary instruments have been ongoing in two conti- forms of commitment. Perhaps the most remark- nents– four of them in Africa, one in Europe. In able characteristic of the CSDP planning system addition, at the time of writing, the Council of the is that it constitutes a process for planning civilian EU established the EU Military Advisory Mission as well as military operations. As a matter of fact, in the Central African Republic (EUMAM RCA). on the political-strategic level – at the start of the The new mission will follow on from the EU mili- planning cycle – the Crisis Management Concept tary operation EUFOR RCA, which contributed (CMC) is a jointly drafted ‘civ-mil’ document. to security in the capital Bangui and ended on Under CSDP, the EU conducts military mis- 15 March 2015. EUMAM RCA is meant to sup- sions worldwide. These missions perform a vari- port the Central African authorities in preparing ety of tasks and complement military operations, a reform of the security sector with respect to the taking into account confrontational politics and management of CAR armed forces. complex development; they are valuable operational instruments within the EU’s comprehensive approach. The EU’s concept of crisis management Military contribution to the has evolved and it has demonstrated its ability to comprehensive approach engage in a new type of missions, involving military training and an advisory role. But a precondition Conflicts or crises, as multifaceted problems, for such commitments is that these missions must require a strategically coherent use of the EU’s vari- be launched in countries where hostilities have ous instruments and policies to effectively address ceased and where some functioning governance is their root causes. They require a “comprehensive in place. Over the past ten years, the military have

1 European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) missions and operations became Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations through the Lisbon Treaty.

169 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

also become a tool contributing to capacity-build- Many missions with an SSR dimension take ing and state-building in host countries. place in Africa in support of the African secu- In this light, the EU’s crisis management oper- rity architecture, alongside the EU’s cooperation ations have seen the extension of their mandate and engagement with the AU and other African to feature new tasks, and training missions have regional organisations. This is because the EU morphed to have a new focus on Security Sec- endorses the principle of African ownership of tor Reform; they envisage programmes that take solutions to the continent’s problems. Therefore, more time to implement. rather than expanding its military presence there, For example, EUFOR’s mandate in BiH was the EU seeks to empower local and regional actors revised in 2005 and increasingly the operation has to cope with crisis management and conflict pre- carried out tasks related to capacity building or vention themselves. Training assistance, security an advisory role related to Security Sector Reform sector reform and capacity-building are the cor- programmes. nerstones of this endeavour – they can be con- Another illustration of CSDP evolutions is the ceived as preventive measures, with a view to the succession of EU military missions and opera- long-term stability of the affected region. tions in CAR. Assigned with a mandate to protect Given the EU’s commitment to multilateralism civilians and establish security in a limited area and support for the UN and regional organisa- of operation (restricted to the airport in the capi- tions like the AU, the EU aims to raise its profile tal of Bangui, as well as two districts in the city), through, inter alia, inter-organisational coopera- the EUFOR RCA is intended to serve a bridge tion. Such cooperation is viewed as a means of function, later handing over military control to constructively amplifying the EU’s impact. the UN peacekeeping operation. Chapter VII of the UN Charter authorises the mission to deploy all necessary means to maintain security. Indeed, Partnerships amid the precarious security situation in Bangui, EU troops have been required to use force to Article 21 of the Lisbon Treaty sets the scene protect civilians. Following a request by the UN for the EU’s cooperation with partner countries Secretariat and CAR’s interim president, Cath- and international organisations in crisis manage- erine Samba-Panza, Member States extended the ment. The EU commitment to multilateral coop- EU operation until MINUSCA is expected to be eration is based on its history and values. In the fully operational. The EUMAM, which is a (now framework of military CSDP, this occurs through typical) advisory mission, will be the successor of cooperation with host countries, regional organi- EUFOR RCA, representing a new phase of the sations and the United Nations. Partnerships are EU’s engagement in CAR under CSDP. an important component of CSDP, as shown by Furthermore, to support the approach adopted cooperation with third countries and regional in the Sahel and the decisions taken by EU Defence organisations, but also by CSDP cooperation Ministers at a meeting in Luxembourg, which were with the UN in the field of international crisis part of international efforts to stabilise Mali and management – where the EU supports UN peace- extend the state’s authority there, the EU recently keeping efforts through ‘bridging operations’ and agreed to extend by two years a mission to train ‘stand-by operations’. the army (EUTM) while sending civilian advisers Recalling the Conclusions from the European to train and advise Mali’s internal security forces Council of December 2013, the EU is ensur- (EUCAP Sahel Mali). EU experts will give advice ing the greatest possible coherence between the and training to the three internal security forces in Union’s and Member States’ actions to support Mali: the police, Gendarmerie and National Guard. partner countries and regional organisations,

170 2 CSDP Missions and Operations Photo: European Union European Photo: Common patrol in Bangui/Central African Republic during the handover phase from EUFOR RCA to MI- NUSCA, 13 November 2014 including in the context of security sector reform, approach. The engagement of the EU in wider by providing training, advice, equipment and peacekeeping efforts is demonstrated by the devel- resources where appropriate. opment of its Common Security and Defence The participation of different international, Policy (CSDP), in which Africa remains a centre regional, and non-governmental organisations of gravity, with 10 missions and operations con- towards one peace objective or mission has become ducted on the continent to date. a significant feature of contemporary international relations. Pioneering new ways to work together with the US, the UN, and the AU is perhaps the EU military Operations most tangible achievement of EUTM. An effective division of labour has emerged between the EUFOR ALTHEA EU, the AU, and the US, if we refer to EUTM Somalia, for example. More generally, EU train- The military operation European Union ing missions have become well known for their Force (EUFOR) Althea in Bosnia and Herzego- ability to establish enduring cooperation with key vina was launched in December 2004. As part stakeholders in the regions where they operate, of the EU’s comprehensive approach in Bosnia providing a multilateral dimension to global gov- and Herzegovina (BiH), Operation Althea pro- ernance. vides a military presence to contribute to a safe The EU focuses on policy frameworks, conti- and secure environment, prevent conditions for nental and regional structures, tools and mech- a resumption of violence and manage any resid- anisms to anticipate, prevent, manage, and ual aspects of the General Framework Agree- resolve crises, in line with its own comprehensive ment for Peace in BiH (the 1995 Dayton/Paris

171 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

EUFOR RCA

The European Union operation in the Cen- tral African Republic is a typical ‘bridging operation’ which aims to provide the UN with time to mount a new peacekeeping operation or strengthen an existing one. Such a model calls for the rapid deployment of appropriate EU military capabilities and for an agreed duration and end-state of the CSDP operation. It is meant to result, in a limited timeframe, in a handover to the UN force on the ground. The original authorisation for the operation is contained in paragraph 44 of resolution 2134 (2014).

Photo: EUFOR ALTHEA/Herbert Pendl ALTHEA/Herbert EUFOR Photo: Determining that the situation in the country Slovakian contingent in the margins of the exercise continued to constitute a threat to international “Quick Response 2” of EUFOR ALTHEA peace and security, and acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the UN Security Council unanimously extended the operation Agreement). In addition, EUFOR supports the until 15 March 2015 through Resolution 2181 Armed Forces of BiH in the areas of capacity- (2014). building and training. The Council acted following receipt of notes The launch of Operation ALTHEA followed from the President of the Transitional Authorities the decision by NATO to conclude its Stabilisa- in the Central African Republic and from the EU tion Force (SFOR) operation and the adoption High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Secu- by the UN Security Council of Resolution 1575 rity Policy. authorising the deployment of an EU Force The exit strategy from such an operation is the (EUFOR) in BiH. deployment of a UN force able to take over from In the framework of Operation Althea, the the EU force deployed and tailored to the mission. EU initially deployed 7 000 troops to ensure The EU force also provides technical assistance continued compliance with the General Frame- and exchanges information with the UN and the work Agreement for Peace in BiH and to con- UN troop-contributing countries to facilitate the tribute to a safe and secure environment. Opera- deployment of the UN forces and the hand-over tion ALTHEA was carried out with recourse to of responsibilities between the EU and UN forces. NATO assets and capabilities, under the ‘Berlin Early deployment of UN troops before the Plus’ arrangements. actual handover deprives hostile forces of an According to the EU-UN cooperation frame- opportunity to exploit and facilitates a smooth work, this is a typical case of the EU conducting transition by familiarising the UN force with a ‘stand-alone operation’ under a UN mandate2. the tactical situation on the ground, and the EU forces’ course of action. It also allows for the transfer of intelligence.

2 See paragraph 7 of ‘EU-UN co-operation in Military Crisis Management Operations: Elements of Implementation of the EU-UN Joint Declaration’, adopted by the European Council (17-18 June 2004).

172 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

EUNAVFOR ATALANTA

The Council of the EU launched the European Union Naval Force Atalanta (EUNAVFOR) on 10 November 2008 to deter and combat piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Operation Atalanta differs from previous EU crisis management or peacekeeping missions in its naval character. The Council Joint Action set two main objectives: to protect as a priority the vessels of the World Food Programme delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia, and to protect vulnerable vessels in the area and ensure ‘deterrence, prevention and repression’ of piracy and armed robbery at sea. The military operation was initially scheduled for a period of twelve months (until 13 December 2009) and 3 was extended by the Council until December Somalia EEAS/EUNAVFOR Photo: 2014. On 21 November 2014 the Council of the EUNAVFOR Somalia/Operation Atalanta patrolling EU extended the mandate of Operation Atalanta Indian Ocean until December 2016. Atalanta is a naval task force typically consisting of three to five ships territory in northern Mali from Islamist rebel and two or three patrol aircraft at a time, with groups. The objective of the EU mission is to train the operation headquarters located in North- and advise Malian armed forces in order to restore wood, United Kingdom. Part of the EU compre- nationwide law and order under constitutional, hensive approach to the Horn of Africa and the democratic authorities. Western Indian Ocean, it contributes to wider Headquartered in the city of Bamako, and with efforts by the EU and the international commu- training activities taking place 60 kilometres away nity to tackle piracy at sea and support maritime in the city of Koulikoro, EUTM Mali consists of security. approximately 200 instructors plus an additional 300 support staff and force protection personnel. Mission personnel are not intended to take part in EU Military Missions combat operations. The mission is training the sixth Groupement EUTM Mali Tactique Interarmes (GTIA) of the eight planned before the end of the mandate. Concerning the In February 2013, as part of its comprehensive reform process, the ‘military planning work 2015- approach to the Sahel, the EU launched a military 2019’ was presented and endorsed by President training mission in Mali (EUTM Mali), with an Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. The document is pend- initial mandate of 15 months. EUTM Mali was ing National Assembly approval. The Defence undertaken in the context of the French military Minister publicly thanked EUTM advisers for operation that began in January 2013 to take back their support.

3 Council Decision 2010/766/CFSP.

173 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

bat Life Support (CLS), and on Fighting in Built Up Areas (FIBUA) and Communications. This third mandate implied a significant change of focus for the mission, with the addition of strategic advisory and mentoring activities in addition to specialised training. The mission provides political and strategic advice to the Somali Ministry of Defence and the Chief of Defence Forces, advice on security sector development, as well as providing specialised military training and mentoring in the training domain. The new mandate focuses on developing Com- mand and Control, as well as the specialised (such as NCO, Administrative, Military Intelli-

Photo: European Union European Photo: gence, Military Police, Military Nurse) and self- EUTM Mali, combat training training capacities of the Somali National Secu- rity Forces. At the very beginning of 2014 all the training activities moved to Mogadishu. The EUTM Somalia training of the Somali National Armed Forces is focused on leadership-commander up to battal- On 7 April 2010, the EU launched4 the Mili- ion and company level, in addition to specialist tary Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM Soma- training in the areas of military police, weapon lia) in order to contribute to strengthening the handling, civilian-military cooperation, intelli- Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and gence, combat engineering, NCO and Combat the institutions of Somalia. The mission, which Life Saver. Modules on international humanitar- operated in Uganda until December 2013, is now ian law and human rights, and the protection of based in Mogadishu (Somalia). It is the EU’s first civilians, including specific protection needs of military training mission and is part of a wider, women and children, are also delivered. EU comprehensive approach to Somalia, working with the international community. EUTM trained 3 600 Somali military personnel, in two mandates from its inception to 2013. In its first mandate training was initially focused on infantry techniques at recruit and junior leader level. During the second mandate, the training was extended to full company level. The aim was to achieve well-structured, clan-balanced units, adequately staffed by trained NCOs, Pla- toon Commanders, Company Staffs and Com- pany Commanders. In addition, emphasis was placed on training-the-trainers programmes to foster sustainability and to increase awareness of mine and IED threats (MIEDA), improve Com-

4 Council Decision 2010/197/CFSP.

174 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

2.3.3. Supporting Security Sector Reform

by Victoria Walker

One of the increasingly common examples of SSR should, first and foremost, be a locally- how CSDP missions and operations are assist- owned process. This means that the support ing countries in improving the safety and security provided by missions and operations should of their populations is support to Security Sector be developed and implemented in partnership Reform (SSR). Security and justice actors in a frag- with the host authorities, be culturally and con- ile, post-conflict or transitional country are often textually appropriate, and support their vision more a source of insecurity than a means to make and strategies for security and justice. Such an the population feel safe: examples include extra-judi- approach allows missions and operations to help cial killings by the police, demands for bribes to pass build up national capacity in the skills required through border crossing points, inhumane custodial to develop plans for reform. This means factoring conditions, dysfunctional courts, or mob justice. the time and resources needed to build the strate- Stemming from the now-established under- gic approach with local partners in the planning standing that ‘security’ needs to be understood in process, notably in the Operation Plan, Mission terms of human security, whereby the security of Implementation Plan and other planning docu- the individual rather than just the state is placed ments. at the centre of decision-making, SSR refers to the Local ownership does not mean just support- process through which a country seeks to review ing the political elite, and therefore efforts can be and enhance the effectiveness and accountability made to support consultation processes to capture of its security and justice providers towards its cit- and feed in the views of wider sectors of society izens. This may involve a wide range of state and into the development of policies and their imple- non-state security and justice providers and gov- mentation. Participatory and community-based ernance institutions, examples of which are illus- approaches for information capture and analysis trated on p. 176. The services they deliver should are critical. Women are usually not represented meet the needs of all sectors of the population (in at political decision-making levels, and the same particular the most vulnerable), whilst operating is true of minorities and people with disabilities. within a framework of good governance, rule of Deliberate effort needs to be invested in reaching law and respect for human rights. out to them. The EU’s policy framework on SSR1, developed Another challenge is that local demands can in 2005-2006, outlines a number of core princi- often focus on unsustainable equipment and ples. These have been further enhanced by lessons infrastructure projects, rather than focusing on from EU CSDP missions and operations, support institution building. Support carried out by provided by other EU instruments and reflection EUPOL COPPS in the Palestinian Territories, and analysis from further afield. shown in Box 1, illustrates one approach taken

1 EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform. Council of the European Union, Brussels, 13 October 2005, 12566/4/05 REV 4. A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Brussels, 24 May 2006, COM(2006) 153 final. Council Conclusions on a Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform. 2736th General Affairs Council Meeting, Luxembourg, 12 June 2006.

175 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

Service Providers

• State security providers • Non-state security providers • Armed forces • Private military and security companies • Law enforcement agencies • Unofficial armed groups (militias, factions) • Intelligence and secret services • Self-defence groups • Border and customs services • Other informal security providers (customary) • State justice providers • Non-state justice providers • Courts (civil and military) • Defense Iawyers/Bar association • Prosecutions service • Legal aid bodies • Correction service • Informal justice providers (customary)

State Non State

• Legislature/parliamentary committees • Civil society actors (e.g. Human rights • Political oversight NGOs, media, victims‘ groups, unions, • Human rights institutions academia, religious groups, etc.) • Anti-corruption bodies • Village elders • Ministries (e.g. interior, justice, defence, • Citizens finance, etc.)

Governance Institutes

Box 1: Local ownership of SSR

The European Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS) has been mentoring and advising a small team from the Strategy, Development and Planning Unit (SDPU) of the Ministry of Interior (MoI), helping the MoI to develop a series of robust processes to implement the security sector strategy. Part of this involved developing a system to evaluate project proposals from the security services. Higher scores were to be given to projects that could demonstrate relevance, alignment and impact to the nationally-owned security sector strategy, as well as projects that considered sustainability and demonstrated a strong commitment from the agencies’ leadership to oversee the project. Projects that targeted specific priority issues such as institutional development, accountability and oversight, human rights and gender were given a relatively higher score. EUPOL COPPS support involved coaching and mentoring the SDPU to apply the criteria, and a series of workshops by the MoI with each of the security services to explain its evaluation of the proposed projects. The entire process was completely led by the MoI and endorsed by the Ministry’s leadership, and led to a locally-owned list of 140 projects, ranked according to their relevance to the strategic plan’s priorities, and shared with donors in line with their funding interests.

176 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

to help the Ministry of Interior to take greater human rights. Moreover, many of the challenges ownership of the development of the Palestinian in reforming security and justice providers and security sector. Ensuring local ownership remains setting up functioning democratic mechanisms a challenging issue. to control them are invariably related to power, In order to deliver good quality security and relationships and other political questions. This justice services to the population, actors in the means that CSDP missions and operations need security sector need to be both effective and to engage in political dialogue and understand accountable. If efforts are made solely to build the political ramifications of any technical sup- their technical capabilities, there is a risk that port they are providing. EUAM Ukraine (Box the result will be, for example, an army that is 3) provides a good snapshot of the importance more adept at oppressing citizens. If, conversely, of the issue. Coordination with the EU Del- all the support provided focuses on accountabil- egation in country and the wider international ity, the resulting institution is unlikely to be able community is vital to ensure common, coherent to deliver the services needed by the population. messaging, in line with the EU’s comprehensive However, whilst support is often concentrated approach. on technical training and equipment, improving SSR is a process that involves many different the accountability of security and justice actors is actors and institutions. Even if the mandate for a frequently overlooked, in part because it is more mission or operation focuses closely on a partic- difficult to measure results, harder to find entry ular security or justice provider it is nonetheless points and more likely to meet with resistance vital to understand the interconnected nature amongst the elite. The EUSEC mission in the of the different components within the security DRC, shown in Box 2, is a notable example of and justice sector. As an example, improving the the potential impact of focusing on issues of gov- capacity of the police to make arrests without ernance and the value of a balanced approach to also improving the ability of the courts to process SSR that looks at both accountability and capac- cases, or the accountability of detention facilities, ity building. can result in an overall increase in human rights SSR is an inherently political process. It violations. The graphic on p. 178 illustrates the touches on the state’s sovereignty, monopoly holistic nature of SSR, highlighting in addition on the use of force, its institutional architecture to the individual sectors the importance of the and societal values such as freedom, security and security and justice needs of the people as the

Box 2: Supporting greater accountability

By supporting a biometric census of all military personnel, EUSEC RD Congo helped to identify how many soldiers are in active duty and should remain on payroll. This exercise in itself uncovered roughly 70 000 ghost soldiers on payroll and helped to determine that the force strength was 120 000 active military personnel rather than the assumed 190 000. In addition, by providing technical assistance to map out the chain of payments for the salary system, and to assess the wage distribution modalities, the Mission was able to significantly reduce corruption within the top management of the DRC military while in turn increasing the real wages of soldiers. The impact could have been extended by long-term support to structural issues surrounding public finance management or human resource management.

177 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

Box 3: The political dimension of SSR

Established in July 2014, the EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) is currently fully engaged in the planning phase for supporting the elaboration of revised security strategies and the rapid implementation of reforms. One of the biggest challenges is identifying how to trigger the organisational cultural and behavioural change needed for the Ukrainian security providers to deliver better services, as well as the systems and frameworks to enable that change. This means that the mission needs to work very much through a political lens: analysing and understanding the underlying interests, relationships of power and drivers of behaviour, and engaging with multiple stakeholders. This is evident in the work the Mission is doing to help establish a coordinating centre, in a context where the division of constitutional powers between the President and government is still uncertain, and the concept of human security is still new. The Mission is also working to engage stakeholders at multiple levels by supporting mid- level reform amongst the traffic and patrol police in the Kyiv region, as well as legislative change to develop a more independent and more accountable judiciary.

STATE

National Security and Justice Strategy

Cust

omar

parliamentar

Priv Ex SSR-related processes

y security and justice pr

ecutiv

e security com

Pr Int Human rights

Def

osecut DDR

e, judicial and

Other

Cour

elligence

olice

Public ence SALW control

y ov

ts Gender

ersight Mine action

panies versight Financial management Transitional justice

vider Other Elections

s Other

Security and justice needs

PEOPLE

Holistic nature of SSR

foundation for all reform. States would ideally framework that is financially realistic, sensitisa- have a national security strategy that captures tion and communication processes, and develop- these needs and provides a policy framework for ing mechanisms for enabling successful imple- the individual institutional reform programmes. mentation (including monitoring). Support in this area is very important, involv- SSR is a technically complex process, requiring assisting a range of activities, such as under- ing a wide array of skills. Substantive knowledge taking broad consultations, creating a strategic and experience is core: deployed experts need to

178 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

have the thematic understanding of how the dif- Examples of ferent functions within the security and justice how to support SSR sector work, such as the judiciary, customs or the • Supporting a consultation process and advising military. on the development of new security and justice However, it is equally important to ensure laws by national actors that the mission or operation encompasses • Building in governance and accountability ele- skills in programme management (such as ments to technical capacity-building resource management, planning, monitoring • Working at a political level to facilitate politi- and reporting, coordination, etc.), change man- cal will and genuine commitment for change at agement processes (such as communications, highest government levels organisational restructuring, leadership, etc.) • Dedicating time, resources and capacities to and the soft skills of political dialogue, negotia- understand the local security system, identify- tion, and advising. ing where “it works” and building on it The ‘Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising’ • Aiming for realistic goals with long term impact (MMA) approach used in many CSDP mis- rather than unsustainable quick wins sions² outlines a number of basic principles to • Planning based on an understanding of how the help translate technical knowledge into capacity system works for women and men across all age building, including flexibility, awareness of the groups, where the gaps are and how to close context and culture, communications and coor- them dination. • Encouraging and supporting the inclusion of mi- There is often a tension between the planned norities and vulnerable groups in SSR short-term nature of CSDP engagements and the timescales required for successful transformation of a security sector, and therefore issues of sus- Examples of tainability for SSR support need to be explicitly how not to support SSR explored. • Importing laws from a Member State or drafting The capacity for the EU to link up its different the laws for the host nation crisis management and development instruments • Stand-alone training and equipping provides an important bridge, and means that the • Focusing solely on technical capacity-building EU can commit to long-term support. However, • Introducing SSR models that are not contextu- this also requires an integrated approach to plan- ally feasible ning, strong levels of coordination on the ground • Training not adapted to the local context and/or and a robust monitoring mechanism that tracks filled with unnecessarily complex language the extent to which outcome goals are being met • Creating parallel structures to those that al- by the missions and operations. In terms of plan- ready exist ning sustainable support to national SSR efforts, • Using measures of parity (quantity) as the main it is important to think beyond the projected life approach for rendering a security system more of the CSDP engagement and build in transition gender responsive strategies from the start. • Focusing solely on the political elite and just engaging with counterparts nominated by the authorities

2 Civilian Operations Commander’s Operational Guidelines for Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising in Civilian CSDP missions, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 7 November 2014, 15272/14.

179 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

SSR: Integrated Border Management

In very few conflicts and crises today are borders the line of separation or the frontline between warring parties. Nonetheless, borders are a priority for peace and security and when managed well they allow for state-building and socio-economic growth to take root. Efficient border control curtails unwanted elements which often increase when there is a break- down in the functioning of the security sector, EUBAM Libya Photo: namely drugs trafficking, trafficking in human EUBAM Libya delivering the ‘Introduction to beings, weapons proliferation, illegal migration Maritime Search and Rescue Planning’ course in Tripoli and smuggling of illicit goods. These activities rapidly become organised and when they infil- the legal and institutional frameworks regulate trate state structures, it can have severe implica- and support the core functions and interactions tions for the legitimacy of state authority, rule of the border agencies, enforcing cross-ministe- of law and human security. rial preparation and effective communication, Enhanced border control is often called for building capacity through a proper training in order to contain crises and prevent them system and mainstreaming the protection of from gaining a regional, or even international, human rights throughout all border manage- dimension. Well-managed borders not only ment functions. have a stabilising effect internally, regionally Each mission with a border management and internationally, they go further in ensur- element within its mandate has to start by ing profitable relations with neighbours by assessing the state of the border security sector facilitating trade of goods and the movement in the host country and the apply IBM princi- of people. ples in a way that best fits the host country and The EU has a distinct expertise in Integrated which has the full support and buy-in of the Border Management (IBM) as exemplified by local authorities. Individual experts in missions the establishment of the Schengen area and must refer to the Mission Implementation Plan the ‘European Agency for the Management (MIP) which sets out their tasks. The Guide- of Operational Cooperation at the External lines for Integrated Border Management in EC Borders of the Member States of the European External Cooperation (European Commission, Union’ (FRONTEX). However, there is not a 2009) may also come in handy when present- ‘one-size-fits-all’ model of IBM and the Euro- ing IBM to local counterparts. For the plan- pean model cannot be exported as such to third ning and conduct of CSDP missions, the EU countries by CSDP missions. There are certain Concept on CSDP Support to Integrated Border IBM principles, processes and mechanisms that Management (17868/13, 16 December 2013) undisputedly improve border control, risk anal- translates the principles of IBM into strategic ysis, and crime prevention and detection while and operational processes. The concept takes at the same time facilitating trade, movement into account lessons learned and best practice of people and neighbourly relations between from previous and current missions with a bor- countries. These include adopting a holistic der management aspect. approach to border management, ensuring that Kinga Devenyi

180 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

2.4. Benchmarking and lessons learnT 2.4.1. The importance of benchmarking and impact assessment in CSDP operations

by Annemarie Peen Rodt

Recent years have seen renewed interest in the ations. This would advance not only the theory potential role of the EU as a security provider. A but also the practice of such endeavours. recurring theme in this debate is whether the EU can play a meaningful part in conflict management beyond its borders. Since the Union estab- State of the art lished the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP – now CSDP) in 1999, its endeavours in Conceptual discussions of success in EU schol- military conflict management have developed rap- arship are limited at best. We tend to assume that idly. At the time of writing, the EU has launched success is obvious. One knows it when one sees military operations to help manage conflicts in it. Consequently, success in EU military conflict the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bos- management operations has been evaluated on an nia and Herzegovina, the Democratic Republic of ad-hoc basis rather than systematically examined Congo, Chad and the Central African Republic.1 according to sound criteria. This article suggests As operations have been undertaken in the field, that one evaluation framework for success in EU corresponding case studies have examined their military conflict management operations should achievements. Despite this interest, a theoretically be applied consistently. grounded understanding of how to define and In order to accurately evaluate, explain and pre- evaluate success in this kind of operation has all dict success in EU military conflict management, too often been missing. This contribution posits, what is meant by the term success must first be however, that it is important, because in order to clearly defined. Generally speaking, success means achieve success, it is crucial to know what it is. reaching a desirable outcome. The question is: Moreover, to accurately evaluate and explain suc- desirable according to whom or what? This issue is cess in past operations and to predict success in at the heart of EU military conflict management, future operations a sound understanding of what yet it is hardly ever discussed. On the contrary, constitutes such a success is required. The purpose definitions of success, which are often implicit of this article is to encourage rigour concerning rather than explicit, vary considerably. The notion the notion of success in CSDP missions and oper- of success itself has not been subject to much

1 This list includes neither the Union’s civilian missions nor its maritime or military support, training and assistance operations, which serve different purposes than military conflict management.

181 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

consideration. This article suggests that existing success criteria are decided upon by the EU alone. knowledge from the study of international peace- On the one hand, it is important not to automati- keeping, conflict management, military interven- cally equate self-defined interest with self-interest, tion and foreign policy may be helpful in this but on the other, it is important to recognise that regard,2 as the problem of which perspective to internal success criteria reflect self-selected goals. adopt when defining success is not confined to the This notion of success, as defined by the intervener evaluation of EU military conflict management. itself, can be referred to as internal success. Accord- For example, Pushkina and Baldwin have high- ing to this definition, whether an operation is a suc- lighted ongoing disputes concerning whether to cess is ultimately assessed according to whether it evaluate success from the perspective of the pol- has reached its stated objectives. This logic suggests icy actor, the target or according to theoretically that the EU should be judged on its own merits defined standards in international peacekeeping alone and that whether a CSDP military conflict or foreign policy analysis, respectively.3 management operation is a success depends simply on whether it fulfils its mandate. Internal success is an important part of an Internal success overall success. However, as a stand-alone definition internal success is problematic for three key In practice, a narrow definition of success reasons. Firstly, it suggests that an operation is reflecting the interests and intentions of the pol- successful when its outcome is compatible with icy actor – in our case the EU – is often applied. the intentions and interests of the intervener, In the military, operational success is understood disregarding the fact that these do not necessar- as mandate fulfilment.4 This perspective is shared ily reflect the needs of the target or indeed the across the board when evaluating military opera- overall purpose of this kind of operation. Sec- tions and has to some extent been adopted by the ondly, assessing the operation solely according to EU, which evaluates success in these operations whether it has met its stated objectives is risky, according to its own aims and objectives. In effect, as this logic suggests that success can be ensured EU representatives can claim that all the operations by a vague mandate aiming to achieve very lit- to date have been successful – even if they leave no tle. On its own, this definition of success would more than a mere pinprick in the conflict coun- mean that an EU military conflict management try. 5 Although a mandate may include considera- operation could be declared successful, even if tions on behalf of the target, this understanding of the conflict situation it left behind was less secure success is internally defined, in the sense that the than when the operation was launched, as long as

2 See for example Diehl, Paul F. & Druckman, Daniel (2010). Evaluating peace operations. London: Lynne Rienner; Freed- man, Lawrence (2006). Interventionist strategies and the changing use of force, In: Croker, Chester, A., Osler Hampson, Fen & Aall, Pamela, eds. Turbulent peace: The challenges of managing international conflict.Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, pp. 309-321; Haas, Richard, N. (2006). Using force: Lessons and choices In: Croker, Ches- ter, A., Osler Hampson, Fen & Aall, Pamela, eds. Turbulent peace: The challenges of managing international conflict. Wash- ington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, pp. 295-307; Howard, Lise Morje (2008). UN peacekeeping in civil wars. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Ramsbotham, Oliver, Woodhouse, Tom and Miall, Hugh (2011). Contem- porary conflict resolution. Cambridge: Polity; Ross, Mark Howard and Rothman, Jay (1999). Theory and practice in ethnic conflict management: Theorising success and failure. Basingstoke: Palgrave; Seybolt, Taylor B. (2008). Humanitarian military intervention: The conditions for success and failure. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 3 Baldwin, David A. (2000). Success and failure in foreign policy, Annual Review of Political Science, 3, pp. 167-182; Pushkina, Darya (2006). A recipe for success? Ingredients of a successful peacekeeping mission. International Peacekeeping, 13(2). pp. 133-149. 4 Diehl, Paul F. (1994). International peacekeeping. London: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp.33-61. 5 Solana, Javier (2009). Ten years of European Security and Defence Policy. ESDP newsletter. 9. pp. 8-11; Syren, Haakon (2009). ESDP 2009 – The military dimension. Interparliamentary conference on ESDP. Stockholm, 9th of November.

182 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

the operation fulfilled its specific mandate, how- External success ever narrow that may have been. Although this is common practice, it is not an appropriate way to Although internal success is an important part evaluate success. To illustrate why, it is useful to of a broader definition of success, an internal suc- draw a comparison to medical practice: would it cess does not necessarily constitute an overall suc- be proper to declare an operation a success, even cess. In fact, this article rejects an actor-specific if, after the operation, the patient was still dying? definition of success based exclusively on the The absence of outright failure does not necessar- internal goals and intentions of the EU. ily equal success. Finally, the internal definition of The alternative to assessing an intervener on its success does not sufficiently evaluate the means by own merits (internal criteria) is typically to define which the intervener attempts to reach its goals. It success according to a set of theoretical principles simply suggests that an operation is a success if its reflecting the perceived interests of the target and/ implementation went according to plan, without or the purpose of conflict management (external evaluating the plan itself. Returning to the medi- criteria). With regard to military conflict manage- cal analogy, one could then declare an operation ment, the interests of the target are usually associ- a success, if a toe stops hurting, even if this was ated with sustainable peace, justice and reduction achieved by amputating the whole leg. It is impor- of human suffering.7 tant to recall that a fundamental premise of the This suggests that success should be defined legitimate use of force, according to the Just War according to standards independent of the inter- doctrine, is that one must: vening actor. It is disputed, however, what such external criteria should be. To give but a few exam- “Consider most carefully and honestly whether the ples of external success criteria presented in peace- good we can reasonably expect to achieve is large keeping scholarship, Stedman and Downs have enough – and probable enough – to outweigh the argued that a successful operation must end vio- inescapable harm in loss of lives, damage and lence and leave behind a self-sustaining ceasefire. disruption (…) It cannot be right for a leader, Diehl has suggested that success is when an armed responsible for the good of all the people, to under- conflict is limited and an operation facilitates con- take – or prolong armed conflict, with all the loss flict resolution.8 Howard has evaluated the legacy of life or other harm that entails, if there is no of operations after their departure, incorporating reasonable likelihood that this would achieve a maximalist standards of institution-building and better outcome for the people than would result positive peace, although not going so far as to say from rejecting or ending combat and simply doing that all missions that do not result in just societies whatever is possible by other means.”6 with stable economies are failures.9 These quite different examples of external criteria underline This principle must be reflected in the under- the continued difficulty of defining success in standing of success in EU military conflict man- military conflict management. agement operations, which should include success criteria concerning appropriate implementation as well as goal attainment.

6 Guthrie, Charles & Quinlan, Michael, 2007. Just war: The just war tradition: Ethics in modern warfare. London: Bloomsbury, pp.20-21 and p.31. 7 Druckman, Daniel et al (1997). Evaluating peacekeeping missions. Mershon International Studies Review, 31(1), pp. 151-165. 8 Diehl, Paul F. (1994). International peacekeeping. London: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 33-61. 9 Howard, Lise Morje (2008). UN peacekeeping in civil wars. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 7.

183 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

OVERALL SUCCESS

Internal success External success for in conflict intervening actor management

Internal Internal External External goal attainment appropriateness goal attainment appropriateness

Mandate Timely, efficient No continuation, Discrimination and objectives and cost-effective diffusion, escala- proportionality in implementation tion or intensifi- application of force achieved cation of violence Graphic: Peen Rodt/Scala Graphic: Peen Evaluation framework for military conflict management operations: dimensions, criteria and indicators of ‘success’

Evaluating success

The conceptual problem of defining success One should expect an EU military conflict causes further problems in the evaluation of suc- management operation to have a positive impact cess. Depending on which definition one applies, on the management of a conflict. However, one the level of success varies significantly. Where the should not expect EU soldiers to resolve the internal definition arguably asks too little for an underlying root causes of that conflict. This is operation to succeed, the external perspective normatively unfair, analytically unsound and often evaluates success according to an ideal state practically unproductive. The definition of suc- of peace, practically impossible for soldiers to cess must reflect the purpose of military conflict achieve. Both definitions reflect misconceptions management; namely, to militarily manage the about the purpose of military conflict manage- violent aspect of a conflict. Conflict management ment operations. This causes observers to allocate must not be confused with conflict resolution. the forces too much or too little credit – credit- The resolution of a conflict is dependent on the ing or blaming the intervener for developments in actions of domestic, regional and international which it is neither the only nor, often, the decisive actors engaged in the conflict and its resolution, actor. The internal success criteria often set the bar not simply the presence of an EU force.10 This too low, whereas many external criteria for suc- article, therefore, also rejects definitions of success cess make it all but impossible for an operation soley based on extensive external criteria. Neither to succeed. This problem is mirrored in the EU internal nor external success alone constitutes scholarship. overall success in EU military conflict manage-

10 Johansen, Robert, C. (1994). UN peacekeeping: How should we measure success? Mershon International Stud- ies Review, 38(2), pp. 307-310.

184 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

ment operations. The understanding of success which incorporates internal and external goal must incorporate both internal and external per- attainment as well as the appropriate implemen- spectives on success so as to reflect the interests of tation thereof. This is particularly important if the intervener (the EU), the target (the conflict) one seeks to compare the success of several oper- and the purpose of this type of operation (conflict ations or to draw lessons from completed opera- management). tions to future operations and to the practice of military conflict management more generally. Failure to address these issues appropriately may Conclusion lead to analytical misunderstanding, misguided policy prescription and, in the worst case, to less Violent conflict and military conflict man- than successful operations. The EU has an inter- agement are both complex phenomena. Success est in succeeding in these operations, but it is in military conflict management operations is important to recall that failure in military con- a complex issue to define, let alone to evaluate, flict management has serious implications for explain and predict. Because of that complexity, the soldiers who implement the operations and this article proposes that the notion of success in for those who live and all too often die in the military conflict management operations must conflicts they seek to manage. This is why sys- be based on a theoretically grounded under- tematic scrutiny of success in EU military con- standing of success and a sound analytical frame- flict management operations is important – not work for its evaluation (illustrated in Figure 1), only in theory, but in practice. Photo: European Union European Photo: Systematic scrutiny of success in EU military conflict management operations is important – not only in theory, but in practice (in the picture: Medal parade for EUFOR RCA)

185 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

2.4.2. Benchmarking and impact assessment for civilian CSDP missions

by Birgit Loeser

Benchmarking was formally introduced into The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability civilian CSDP mission planning and conduct (CPCC) accordingly undertook extensive research in 2011. However, its main elements were not and in-depth analysis of existing approaches to new; in fact, since the very first mission in 2003, the topic, studying other EU, international and all mission concepts of operations (CONOPS) research best practice. Benchmarking for the pur- defined concrete objectives and mission tasks; poses of civilian CSDP was eventually described as they also contained definitions of ‘end states’ and ‘criteria for success’ based on analysis of risks and „a methodology designed to contribute to measur- opportunities for mission accomplishment; and ing progress and outcome by comparing a situa- missions were asked to report regularly and com- tion (an initial baseline) against its evolution at prehensively on mission progress. given points in time using pre-defined indicators. However, prompted inter alia by the financial The information obtained from this process is then crisis, and in the light of a number of civilian SSR- fed back into the mission chain of command, related missions being prolonged time and again, facilitating tactical, operational and strategic pol- notably in the Democratic Republic of Congo, icy adjustments as required” 1. Member States requested that the approach to benchmarking and delivery/impact be tightened More specifically, the benchmarking methodol- up. ogy agreed in 2011 provides the following: In this context, the basic consideration was As benchmarking serves as a tool for measuring that one of the key objectives of civilian CSDP change, the starting point is a conflict and situa- missions is to facilitate the changes or processes tion analysis and assessment of needs that leads to necessary to foster stability in crisis situations. the definition of a ‘baseline’. This work is normally With this goal in mind, a monitoring and report- done at the stage of Crisis Management Concept ing mechanism designed to provide objective and (CMC) drafting, later refined and detailed during timely feedback on progress made was considered operational planning with input from the ground. essential, among other things to help verify the Whilst the CMC sets out the aims and political- impact of missions on the ground. strategic objectives of the envisaged CSDP mission It has to be kept in mind that civilian CSDP mis- as well as its basic parameters, the further opera- sions are but one of the instruments at the disposal tional planning translates these into mission ‘tasks’ of the EU in conflict prevention or post-conflict and ‘benchmarks’. The concept of operations thus scenarios, where the EU is not the only actor. In identifies lines of operations suited to achieving general, they are conceived and designed to oper- those aims and objectives. Political intent becomes ate in a short- to medium-term perspective, focus- direction and guidance. ‘Decisive points’ and ing on specific aspects of the situation and meant ‘desired outcomes’ are defined in this process. to help in advancing towards a political end-state The subsequently developed OPLAN further which the EU is pursuing in the longer term. elaborates the operational details necessary for

1 Cf. Guidelines on the Implementation of Benchmarking in Civilian CSDP Missions, 17110/01, PSC noted in 2011.

186 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

the implementation of the chosen lines of operation. It defines specific mission tasks and related benchmarks, including their respective baselines, objectively verifiable indicators (OVIs) and means of verification (MVs). On this basis, the missions are to programme and record in an internal document – the Mis- sion Implementation Plan (MIP) – the activities undertaken within each of the assigned tasks. These mission activities are expected to produce specific effects (outcome) leading to the expected task output. Whilst monthly mission reports provide factual information on mission activities and mission EUPM BiH Photo: progress, six-monthly mission reports contain EUPM Bosnia and Herzegovina was reviewed as a case more in-depth analysis of mission achievements study during the development of the impact assessment methodology in comparison to the original baseline. When this concept was introduced in late 2011, existing missions had to adapt to it – not drasti- 2012 by the renowned New York based Cen- cally, as the methodology built on what existed tre for International Cooperation on a possible already, but still, terminology changed and the sys- methodology for civilian CSDP mission impact tematic approach and necessary consistency had to assessment. The main constraint identified by the be organised. New missions that were established research team was that of the security classifica- thereafter had a more natural approach to this, as tion of CSDP planning documents, which makes they benefited not least from dedicated CPCC-led an impact assessment by external actors impos- induction prior to deployment. sible. Still, a method was identified that would A major lesson since 2011, however, is the obser- allow CPCC-led assessment teams to reach the vation that the proper handling of benchmarking necessary level of objectivity, notably by associat- does require a specific skill set. It includes knowl- ing (security-cleared) external participants, from edge of project-based work and also experience in e.g. the EEAS or Commission services or Member change management. This has led the CPCC to States, and by introducing a standardised tem- reflect such notions in relevant job descriptions, plate for proceeding with such reviews. during recruitment as well as in the standardised This methodology is still being considered and mission structure. Training modules too are now will soon be presented to Member States, which receiving a greater emphasis from the CPCC on remain keen to be sure about a mission impact. such required planning skill and project manage- This is for double accountancy purposes – that ment techniques where possible. of the already mentioned concern over value for Now, whilst all of the above has greatly money, but also that of political credibility and improved the mission management, focus and the comparative advantages of civilian CSDP as reporting on mission progress, mission evaluation one tool in foreign and security policy. The EU and impact assessment, into which benchmarking aspiration is to be a global player active in the naturally feeds, is a distinct function that remains field of peace and security, with real potential for to be further defined. contributing to sustainable change. Being able to For these purposes, the Swedish Ministry of attribute success to its own activities makes these Foreign Affairs financed a study undertaken in efforts more visible and ultimately more credible.

187 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

2.4.3. Lessons learnt and best practices

by Giovanni Cremonini

What is a ‘lesson learnt’? This is worth explain- lessons systems, formal or informal, to take into ing as there are different understandings of the account what works and what does not work term. In normal speech, a ‘lesson learnt’ is often and to improve their performance. What can- used as a synonym for ‘experience’ and does not not be solved at the level of a mission or opera- necessarily imply that any action has been taken tion should be reported to HQ as part of regular as a consequence. In daily life, one can note some- reporting. Good feedback on lessons from the thing as a ‘lesson learnt’ and that can be the end field is extremely valuable. of the story. Each of the three CSDP structures at EU HQ Lessons specialists, particularly in the military (CMPD, CPCC and EUMS) now has its own domain, are more precise. They define a ‘lesson’ as internal lessons system for recording, analysing any occurrence or finding that has an impact on and implementing lessons. CMPD collects les- operational output, which requires further devel- sons from political-strategic planning of CSDP opment or monitoring. After proper analysis and missions and operations and from the related validation, a simple ‘lesson observed’ becomes a strategic reviews. CPCC collects lessons from ‘lesson identified’. At this point remedial action operational planning, conduct and support of should be taken, which may, for example, con- civilian CSDP missions. EUMS collects lessons sist of modifying concepts, planning documents, from advance planning and support to military training documents, guidelines or standard oper- HQ and from reports from missions and opera- ating procedures in order to reflect the lesson. tions. As far as possible, lessons are also collected After remedial action has been taken, a lesson through visits by officials from Brussels HQ to identified becomes a ‘lesson learnt’. Therefore, a CSDP missions and operations and through ‘lesson learnt’ is a lesson that has been not only interviews with mission and operation staff and observed and identified but also acted on. other stakeholders. ‘Best practice’ is a successful practice that Certain lessons identified by CMPD, CPCC or should be replicated. It can be classified as a posi- EUMS cannot be implemented by any of those tive lesson, and in this context replication takes structures on their own. Since 2013, these lessons the place of remedial action. are discussed in a two-level CSDP Lessons Man- Learning lessons is essential for organisational agement Group/Lessons Working Group, which improvement in any environment. This also includes not only CMPD, CPCC and EUMS applies to the planning and conduct of CSDP but also all other CSDP stakeholders: INTCEN, missions and operations, and considerable efforts Security Policy and Conflict Prevention, MD have been made to improve the CSDP lessons sys- CR&OC, CivCom, EUMC and PMG chairs, tem over the last few years. An exhaustive report relevant geographic and thematic departments, as on CSDP lessons from security sector reform was well as the Commission’s DG DEVCO, ECHO issued in 2012 and the CSDP lessons system in and FPI. An effective lessons system needs the Brussels was overhauled in 2013. Missions and involvement of the highest level of management, operations should, of course, also have their own and the CSDP Lessons Management Group

188 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

is composed by the heads of these bodies and sons system itself.1 They were accompanied by chaired by a member of the Corporate Board of nineteen specific recommendations for remedial the EEAS. The CSDP Lessons Working Group action or replication of good practice. The PSC has the same composition at expert level and is endorsed these key lessons and recommendations chaired by an official appointed by the Chair of in line with the advice from the relevant Council the Lessons Management Group. It discusses working groups. in detail the lessons raised by its members and The CSDP Lessons Working Group monitors attempts to produce a shared analysis and joint the implementation of the key lessons and recom- recommendations. mendations. In 2014, it found that good progress Every year, the CSDP Lessons Management had been made in all five areas identified in the Group identifies up to five broad, overarching 2013 Report, although further work was needed, issues or key lessons and submits them to the Polit- particularly on certain aspects of the comprehen- ical and Security Committee (PSC) for endorse- sive approach and on pre-deployment training. ment in an Annual CSDP Lessons Report. This The lessons work will continue this year and in report also includes the input from EU Delega- the years ahead, which should help, in practice, tions in countries where missions and operations constantly to improve the functioning of the are deployed. The key lessons of the 2013 Report CSDP. Of course lessons are only useful if they concerned the implementation of the compre- are duly recorded, carefully analysed and actually hensive approach, pre-deployment training, local implemented, which requires the commitment ownership, preparatory measures and the les- and active involvement of all concerned.

Lesson observed 1 • Action: proper analysis and validation

Lesson identified • Action: remedial action such as modifying concepts or standard 2 operating procedures

Lesson learnt 3 • Lesson implemented

1 A summary of the Annual 2013 CSDP Lessons Report is available at http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/documents/annual_2013_csdp_lessons_report_en.pdf

189 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

2.4.4. The conceptual background for EU crisis management

by Morten Knudsen

Concepts are an important tool in EU crisis ment and EUMS involvement in civil-military management.1 Military and civilian concepts set concept development at EU level. The biannual out fundamental principles for crisis management programme comprises over 30 concepts, both missions and operations. Ideally, concepts estab- updates of already existing concepts and the devel- lish basic parameters and definitions and ensure a opment of new ones. In addition to operational common understanding with a view to the plan- requirements, the work is driven by the Capability ning and execution of missions and operations, Development Plan (CDP) and the work of Euro- both in the civilian and military fields. They also pean Defence Agency, EU presidencies and Mem- contribute to standardisation where required and ber States’ initiatives, the work of the Headline applicable. When 28 Member States and the dif- Goal Task Force as well as analysis of lessons from ferent EU institutions work together, many fun- operations, missions and exercises, both civil and damental issues need to be clearly defined. Precise military, and input from international organisa- definitions of operational standards, policing, rule tions. of law, force generation, planning procedures, etc. play an essential role in making CSDP missions and operations as efficient as possible. Civilian concepts Concepts are important for internal reasons, i.e. ensuring that all EU actors have a joint under- The Crisis Management and Planning Direc- standing of the issues involved. They are also useful torate (CMPD) is responsible for keeping the for training purposes and for third States partici- overview of CSDP and CSDP-related concepts Concepts and guidelines ensure a common understand- pating in CSDP operations and missions as well and conceptual documents, and for developing ing for the planning and execution of CSDP missions, e.g. the Operational Guidelines for Monitoring Mentoring and as for international organisations with which the concepts. The Civilian Planning and Conduct Advising. EU cooperates, in particular the United Nations. Capability (CPCC) is active in producing guidelines on various aspects of civilian crisis management. The CMPD has concentrated on develop- Military concepts ing broad overarching concepts, establishing the foundation for some of the tasks set out by the Military concepts are developed by the EUMS European Council in Feira in 2000 such as polic- (the Concepts & Capability Directorate). The ing and the rule of law. CMPD has also put con- EUMS follows biannual work plans set out in siderable emphasis on the link between internal the EU Military Concept Development Imple- and external security, an important item for EU mentation Programme (CDIP). The CDIP is crisis management. Recently, CMPD addressed revised annually and provides a projection for the the issue of border management in CSDP mis- next two years of EU military concept develop- sions at the conceptual level with a view to ensur-

1 For the purpose of the article, ‘concepts’ refer both to concepts as such and to guidelines, handbooks and other guidance notes that aim to facilitate the planning and conduct of missions and operations.

190 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

September. Member States also agreed on Opera- tional Guidelines for Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising (MMA) in civilian CSDP missions, an issue that is increasingly important in many of the ongoing missions. Both in the military and civilian fields, reflections on how to ensure rapid deployment continued in line with the conclusions of the European Council of December 2013. Some of the issues addressed involved civ/ mil cooperation. The EU concept for Logistic Support for EU-led Military Operations and Mis- sions may eventually facilitate closer cooperation with EU-led civilian missions as it attempts to address the different options for the execution of logistics functions. The Health and Medical Con- cept for EU-led Crisis Management Missions and Operations, also adopted in 2014, was drafted on the basis of cooperation between the military and the civilian structures. It aims to provide concise and consistent guidance for the optimal provision of medical support for both civilian missions and military operations. Good concepts and guidance notes make it easier for newcomers to understand how things work. Colleagues who are involved in crisis management issues, but not on a full-time basis (geo- Photo: EUPOL RDC Photo: graphical or thematic desks in the EEAS, Mem- Concepts and guidelines ensure a common understand- ber States’ diplomats outside the EU structures, ing for the planning and execution of CSDP missions, e.g. Delegations, Commission services, etc.), often the Operational Guidelines for Monitoring Mentoring and need to familiarise themselves rapidly with issues Advising. related to crisis management. In such cases, a clear ing that border issues are addressed efficiently in conceptual foundation can contribute to facilitat- future missions. The CPCC complements this ing the understanding of the issues at stake. Con- works by developing operational guidelines, for cepts, handbooks and guidance notes should thus example the guidelines on mission organisation, continue to play an important role. In a multilat- the benchmarking guidelines, the Use of Force eral environment, the need for clear guidance and guidelines and the guidelines on Mentoring, doctrine is even more important than at national Monitoring and Advising. level – when 28 Member States work together, As regards conceptual developments in 2014, there are many things that cannot be taken for there were 33 military concept development pro- granted. As recalled above, many third States take jects ongoing and twelve concepts were success- part in our missions and operations, and we coop- fully completed. In the civilian field, the CPCC erate closely with international organisations. So finalised Guidelines for the preparation of civil- what we want to do, and how we do it, has to be ian CSDP mission-specific rules for the use of spelled out clearly. That is, ultimately, the role of force, which were agreed by Member States on 18 concepts and guidance documents.

191 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

2.5. Challenges 2.5.1. Cyber security and defence by Wolfgang Röhrig

The Cyber Threat Landscape and its Impact on CSDP

The threat landscape covers everything from internet vandalism to physical and criminal damage. The theft of intellectual property and economic or state-sponsored espionage lies some- where in-between. The recent attack by the group Introduction called ‘CyberCaliphat’ on the US Central Com- mand indicates that terrorist groups have started For a long time, crises affecting national secu- to discover the opportunities of using cyber space rity or citizens´ well-being have had in common not only for propaganda and recruitment but also that both their roots and impacts were exclusively as attack vector. Also, the capacity to destroy or linked to the physical domains of land, air, sea or damage physical property represents a strategic space. Over the last two decades a new domain shift. Malware targeting industrial control systems The success of conventional military operations in the other domains is enabled by, and dependent on, has evolved – ‘Cyber Space’, which may still rely (e.g. STUXNET), constitutes one example of this the assured availability of, and access to, cyberspace on and consist of physical assets (server, router, new type of threat. We can anticipate the devel- etc.), but which, more importantly, contains a opment of more dangerous tools and, eventually, new virtual dimension. The online world has per- their use. The European Network and Informa- vaded society as a whole; the increasing number tion Security Agency, ENISA publishes an annual of online services and connectivity (e.g. Internet report on the development of the threat landscape of Things) has enabled tremendous economic, reflecting recent technology trends. The picture social and political developments to take place. ENISA paints with their last reports is quite However, this strength is now also becoming a alarming. Targeted attacks through Advanced weakness. Information and communication tech- Persistent Threat (APT) malware will become the nologies are a critical enabler for our economic most difficult threats to counter. growth and our societies now rely on the inter- The cyber threats are: net in many different ways and on many different • Versatile, permanently changing its shape and levels. Cyber security incidents, either intentional hiding its origin and motivation; or accidental, are increasing at an alarming rate • Worldwide, ignoring physical boundaries – the and are impacting in many areas; they could also territorial ones but also those of specially pro- disrupt essential services such as water, healthcare, tected areas (e.g. critical infrastructures, mili- electricity or mobile services. tary installations and networks);

192 2 CSDP Missions and Operations Photo: Austrian Armed Forces Austrian Photo:

The success of conventional military operations in the other domains is enabled by, and dependent on, the assured availability of, and access to, cyberspace

• Ubiquitous, anybody can buy anonymously al- were affected by a – technically quite simple – most everything – attack kits or services at the Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack. online black market; The tools for such attacks are nowadays avail- • Extremely rapid, the reaction time counts in able in any basic hacker kit. That the military seconds. and a society can be paralysed through cyber attacks was demonstrated during the Georgia conflict one year later in 2008. However, what has this virtual world and its 2. Crises or disasters in the physical domains (e.g. threats got to do with CSDP crisis management? power outages) can regionally affect the availability of cyber space. The regional or even 1. Crisis can be initiated or exacerbated through widespread unavailability of cyber space can cyber space. The three-week-long cyber-attack cause tremendous negative economic and soci- campaign on Estonia in 2007 almost turned etal effects which might exacerbate a crisis or a into a national crisis, as governmental and vital disaster. For example, one aspect addressed by services for the functioning of Estonian society Finland in its cyber security strategy is the psy-

193 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

chological resilience of its citizens in the face of • Consider cyber threats as intentional or ac- a major cyber crisis. cidental from the beginning of planning, 3. Vital and critical crisis management assets can throughout the mission and until the end of be affected through cyber attacks. Today ef- redeployment of all personnel and assets; fective crisis management relies on modern • Consider the effects of activities or disasters in information and communication systems or the physical domains on cyber space in crisis services, and equipment with many embedded management; technology and processors, which often use cy- • Establish a dynamic risk management approach ber space. in order to improve the resilience of vital and In the military cyber space is nowadays widely critical systems and to minimise their vulner- recognized as the 5th operational domain besides ability to attacks. land, sea, air and space. The success of conventional military operations in the other domains Since the EU published its “Cyber Security is enabled by, and dependent on, the assured Strategy – An open, Safe and Secure Cyber- availability of, and access to, cyber space. Simi- space” on 7 February 2013 the Strategy has lar enabling conditions and dependencies can taken, like other national cyber security strate- be assumed for civilian CSDP missions. The EU gies, a comprehensive approach. It addresses, rightly prides itself on its ability to deploy civil- within the remit of EU’s responsibilities, the civil ian and military responses to global crises. All the aspects of cyber security as well as Cyber Defence same, it is important that the EU adopts a com- for CSDP. In December 2013 at the EU Coun- mon civilian and military approach to self-protec- cil on defence matters, the EU heads of state tion in cyber space. Own vulnerabilities are cen- and government recognised cyber defence as a tral in the context of the cyber domain. Hostile priority for capability development. An action actors may exploit these at critical times or during plan for CSDP was agreed with the EU Cyber decisive phases of an operation or mission. Thus, Defence Policy Framework in November 2014 the threat landscape must be seen in the context and plenty of work is in progress for its imple- of the following crisis management implications: mentation with the aim of making missions and • Crisis management activities in the physical do- operations more cyber resilient. mains rely on guaranteed access to cyber space; • Crisis management is increasingly dependent on civil (critical) infrastructures – both home Practical Tips base and in the deployment area; • As crisis management becomes increasingly As a new domain, there is still little under- interconnected, using internet technologies, standing of the cyber planning techniques nec- internet vulnerabilities get closer to deployed essary to adequately consider cyber space dur- personnel and their assets. ing planning for crisis management operations and missions and their execution. However, it is The impact of cyber attacks can range from sim- essential that civil and military senior decision- ple inconvenience, reputational damage, loss/ makers and their support staffs, including spe- compromise of information, right up to physical cialised staff like Legal Advisers or Political Advis- damage and/or loss of life. ers, fully understand the environment in which In consequence, today’s crisis management, be it they will operate; that includes the cyber domain in a civil mission or on military operations, has to: and the understanding of the dependency of • Establish and maintain Cyber Situational activities in the traditional domains of land, air, Awareness; sea and space on the cyber space domain. With

194 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

respect to Cyber Situational Awareness, the main focus is to establish and maintain a comprehensive understanding of how actors make use of the cyber domain to pursue their interests in the conflict. A wide range of actors (from ‘hacktiv- ists’ to criminals and terrorists right up to state actors) can be relevant and actors may pursue their interests in a myriad of different ways. The cyber domain provides favourable opportunities for covert activity. In the current epoch, state actors are engaged in asymmetric conflict with various actors including non-state actors. Thus, it cannot be rule out that trends we see in the physical world, like hybrid warfare, spill over into cyber space as this domain provides a perfect platform for far-reaching impacts from a distance, even from outside of the deployment area, and, compared to a physical presence in a region, the risk is lower as the possibilities for deception are legion. Consequently, identifying both covert and overt actors operating in or through the cyber domain is a precondition for obtaining sufficient cyber situational awareness. Cyber activities of different actors at the different stages of a conflict can serve the following purposes: • Intelligence gathering to enhance own situational awareness; Poster of the “CE2014”, the EU cyber-crisis • Sabotage to take systems or assets out of opera- cooperation pan-European exercise tion; • Fundraising through cyber criminality; • Positioning in adversary networks from which • How can strategic cyber threats and cyber fac- they can conduct actions later in the course of tors affect the operation or mission; conflict, and finally; • Which options help to reduce undesirable con- • Subversion and influence activities. sequences of cyber activities; • What is the applicable legal framework (e.g. When planning and executing a crisis manage- Law of armed conflict, international humani- ment operation or dealing with mission-relevant tarian law) and which authorisation (e.g. Rules questions with respect to the cyber domain, of Engagement) and escalation processes have aspects which should be considered are: to be in place; • How do regional actors and global actors with • How do cyber factors affect own courses of ac- interests in the deployment region make use of tion; the cyber domain, what are their offensive cy- • When and where are cyber assets critical for ber capabilities, and what are their motivations success, what are their vulnerabilities and how and thresholds for employing offensive cyber can the risk that these vulnerabilities will be ex- capabilities; ploited be mitigated;

195 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

Networkand Information Lawenforcement Defence security • Commission/ENISA • CERT-EU • EC3/Europol • EEAS EU •Network of • CEPOL • European Defence competent authorities • Eurojust Agency • EP3R

ademia

Industr

Ac •National CERTs • National Cybercrime • National defence NATIONAL •NIS competent Units and security authorities authorities Source: http://eeas.europa.eu/policies/eu-cyber-security/cybsec_comm_en.pdf Source: To address cybersecurity in a comprehensive fashion, activities should span across three key pillars – Network and Information Security (NIS), law enforcement and defence – which also operate within different legal frameworks

• Which cyber defence considerations should be Military Operations” was agreed in December de-conflicted and coordinated with other con- 2012 and is the EU’s military guideline for opera- siderations; tional commanders to create and maintain cyber • Which cyber security/defence activities should situational awareness. The Concept outlines the be synchronised with activities in other do- need to adopt a risk-based threat assessment meth- mains; odology and to create coordinating structures to • Who are the relevant internal and external ensure that national cyber defence capabilities work partners that can give support in the case of coherently to protect the Force. An update of the large-scale incidents (e.g. CERT-EU, national concept is scheduled for 2015. Member States aug- CERTs, contracted service provider); mented the concept in March 2013 with the ‘EU • Who should have the authority to release cyber Cyber Defence Capability Requirements State- defence/security related information to exter- ment’. Through the participation of the EU in the nal partners; US-led Multinational Capability Development • What are the best mechanisms for optimal Campaign since late 2014 additional supporting cyber information-sharing with external part- documents for cyber defence planning for CSDP ners; have become available, with a handbook and guide- • How should own cyber defence be organised lines for integrating cyber into operational planning (structure, manning, processes, disposition, and a guide and specifications for the analysis of the equipment)? cyber domain. These documents can be obtained During the execution phase of the operation or either through the EUMS or through the EDA. mission Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) For civilian missions, pilot projects have been for Cyber incident response, business continuity launched in order to increase cyber security and disaster recovery should be established and capabilities and as a basis for further implemen- frequently exercised and tested. tation and instructions across all civilian CSDP In terms of practical support to military opera- missions. The above documents can serve as ini- tions, over the last year an initial set of operational tial guidelines for civilian missions until specific concepts and references has been developed. The guidance covering both missions and operations “EU Concept for Cyber Defence for EU-led is developed.

196 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

The Human Factor Conclusions

The public perception is often that cyber pro- As in the other domains, the success of cyber tection primarily is a technological rather than a security/defence in CSDP operations and mis- human issue. Nowadays, all personnel at all levels sions will depend on a balanced combination of require an increasingly sophisticated understand- competent personnel, connected through well- ing of cyber space and how to operate effectively developed processes and procedures, and apply- in cyber space. Competencies and skills have to ing state-of-the-art technology. However, human be developed and maintained. Cyber Security/ beings are, and will continue to be, our most Defence is not limited to Cyber Security/Defence precious cyber security/defence asset. For the specialists. ICT users, today that is almost eve- time being, humans are the first (users) and the rybody, have a role to play in Cyber Security/ last (cyber security/defence specialists) lines of Defence. They must have up-to-date knowledge defence. The competence and expertise of all per- and awareness of the threat environment and how sonnel is a fundamental requirement for success- to react in the event of incidents. This awareness ful cyber security/defence in CSDP operations should be frequently updated and tested as appro- and missions. priate. Decision-makers must understand the cyber options and the impact of cyber operations when making decisions. Cyber modules in general courses and specific cyber security courses are in the inventory of the ESDC and more specific cyber security/defence courses are under development and will be available soon to increase the competencies and skills of the different stakeholder groups. Cyber awareness seminars for staff and deployed personnel have been developed, notably by the EDA, and may be applied for if required. The EDA has also developed a framework of necessary competencies and skills for the different stakeholder groups with respect to cyber defence. Besides the value of the framework for the development of new course curricula, it can serve to augment different job descriptions as necessary with required cyber security/defence competencies.

197 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS Source: https://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/risk-management/evolving-threat-environment/enisa-thematic-landscapes/threat-landscape-of-the-internet-infrastructure/iitl Source:

198 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

Campaign/ Year of Attack Malware Target Objective Description Discovery Vector Name The Cyber Caliphate, a hacker group claiming Propaganda Cyber association with terrorist group ISIS seized control 2015 USCentCom and reputati- Defacement Caliphate of the @CENTCOM Twitter and YouTube accounts onal loss representing U.S. central military command. Energy and Energetic Bear Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) manufactu- Spear campaign appears to be a long-term operation Energetic ring sector, phishing and which has targeted companies in several coun- Bear/ 2014 unknown research Watering tries. DragonFly organisations, Hole attacks 20 000 victim IP addresses. Gathers information public sector about connected industrial control systems. This significant vulnerability was undetected for Day 1 exploit some time. The buggy code is at least 19 years Any Internet Unicorn Bug 2014 Multiple using drive- old and has been remotely exploitable for the past Explorer user by attacks 18 years. The problem has been present since the original release code of Windows 95. Surgical strikes against targeted guests at luxury hotels in Asia and the US infecting victims via Top managers Compromised spear phishing attacks: e.g. the victim got a pop- Dark 2014 and senior Espionage Wifi infra- up alerting him to a new Adobe software update; Hotel officials structure when he clicked to accept the download, he got a malicious executable instead. It is assumed that attackers were active for at least 7 years. Local Area Middle East A virus used to attack computer systems that run Flame 2012 Espionage Network or countries on Microsoft Windows as their operating system. USB stick Organisations An ongoing series of cyber attacks that started worldwide incl. in mid-2006. The operation was derived from the the Internati- common security industry acronym for Remote onal Olympic Operation Access Tool (RAT) and was behind the cyber attack 2011 Committee, the Espionage Shady Rat on the 2008 Summer Olympics. United Nations, industry and defence con- tractors The Stuxnet worm destroyed 1 000 nuclear centri- Destruction fuges at Natanz and is assumed to have set back Nuclear facility of uranium Stuxnet 2010 USB stick the country’s atomic programme by at least two in Natanz, Iran enrichment years. It spread beyond the plant and infected over centrifuges 60 000 computers around the world. Prior to the bombing of the Syrian nuclear installations at Kibar, it is assumed that Israel had penet- rated the Syrian military’s computer network, that Disabling of they could monitor Syrian activities and – more Operation Syrian air de- 2007 Syrian air unknown importantly – that they were able to direct their Orchard fence surveillance own data streams into the Syrian air-defence network, introducing a false image of a radar screen, misleading Syrian radar operators and thereby effectively turning off Syria’s air defence. A German college student unleashed a virus that Disabling of had resounding effects all around the world. The Netsky and computers E-mail and estimated damage was assumed at USD 500 Sasser 2004 Multiple through vulnerable million. However, experts believed that it could computer buffer over- network port have been more as it disabled the Delta Air Lines worm flow computer system and resulted in the cancellation of several transatlantic flights. Considered to be one of the biggest cyber attacks Several com- in history, it not only compromised military intel- puter networks ligence and classified data, but also paved the Titan Rain 2004 including Espionage way for other hackers and espionage entities to NASA, Lock- infiltrate these systems as it left backdoors in the heed Martin infected machines. Examples of recent and/or ground-breaking cyber attacks/campaigns (as of March 2015)

199 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

2.5.2. Private Military and Security Companies in CSDP Missions

by Anne-Marie Buzatu

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, the use of Pri- ards for clients such as the EU to observe when vate Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) contracting services with PMSCs which help to to support military and security missions has ensure respect for human rights and humanitar- been on the rise.1 In line with this trend, the EU ian law. is increasingly utilising PMSCs in its crisis management operations, including CSDP missions. While these private actors can help to support Overview of standards for and supplement security, they can also pose sig- clients contracting with PMSC nificant challenges. In particular, these challenges include the lack of clear international standards When contracting with PMSCs, clients wield for the provision of private security services as significant power in determining how services will well as inadequate or ineffective oversight mech- be carried out. These include putting in place pro- anisms. As recognised by the European Court of cedures and criteria for the selection and contract- Justice, the EU has legal obligations to ensure ing of PMSCs, defining and limiting the kinds of respect for human rights and humanitarian law services that they will provide, setting out require- within these operations, which may extend to ments for the manner in which services must be services provided by PMSCs. Fortunately, there carried out, monitoring compliance and support- now exists a set of international norms and standing accountability.

Definition of PMSCs

The Montreux Document on the use of Private Military and Security Companies defines PMSCs as “private business entities that provide military and/or security services, irrespective of how they describe themselves. Military and security services include, in particular, armed2 guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings and other places; maintenance and operation of weapons systems; prisoner detention; and advice to or training of local forces and security personnel.”

1 Hans Born, Marina Caparini, and Eden Cole, “Regulating Private Security Companies in Europe: Status and Prospects”, (2007), DCAF Policy Paper 20, 1. Also see Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, (Cornell University Press, 2003). 9-11. 2 The International Code of Conduct (ICoC) for Private Security Service Providers recognises that private security services may also be provided by unarmed personnel.

200 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

Procedures for the selection of and • Training of personnel contracting with PMSCs PMSCs should provide initial and ongoing training to their personnel in relevant national When choosing PMSCs to provide commercial law and local culture and customs, interna- security services, it is important to bear in mind tional human rights and humanitarian law, in- that not all PMSCs are alike. Some have incorpo- cluding on the appropriate use of force, as well rated systems and policies into their operations that as training on any weapons they carry in the substantially lower the risk that they will negatively course of performing security services. impact human rights and humanitarian law, while • Management of weapons others have not. As the implementation of these PMCSs’ policies for managing weapons should systems and policies can often be costly, leading to include procedures for secure storage, records an increase in the cost of their security services, it is documenting to whom and when weapons are important that clients do not use lowest price as the issued, identification and accounting of all am- only criterion for the selection of PMSCs. munition, and procedures for proper disposal. Before entering into a contract with a PMSC, • Incident reporting clients should conduct a background check on the PMSCs should require reports for all incidents company for the purpose of obtaining the follow- where their personnel were involved in the ing information: use / discharge of a weapon, any escalation of • The principal services that the PMSC has pro- force, injury to persons, criminal acts, damage vided in the past, including any they have sub- to property, or traffic accidents. contracted out; • Grievance mechanisms • References from other clients for whom the PMSCs should have established grievance pro- PMSC has provided services which are similar cedures for personnel and third parties to report to the ones the client would like to acquire; allegations of improper and/or illegal conduct. • The PMSC’s ownership structure, relationships Such procedures should be accessible, fair and with subcontractors, subsidiaries and partner- should offer effective remedies to those injured. ships.3 • Subcontractors PMSCs should demonstrate that any subcon- Other important factors to consider when tractors they use to perform services meet the selecting a PMSC are the systems and policies same requirements as the contracted PMSC. employed by the company to lower the risk of Clients may consider requiring in the contract human rights and humanitarian law violations. that PMSCs obtain their approval before any These include: subcontractors are used. • Selection and vetting of personnel PMSCs should have established policies and procedures to determine the suitability of per- Assessing risks and determining sonnel to perform private security services, in- services cluding by conducting checks that they have not been convicted of crimes, been dishonour- An important way to lower the risk of viola- ably discharged from police or military servic- tions by PMSC is by limiting the services they es, or have had their employment terminated are contracted to carry out. Using PMSCs to by another company for violations of human support operations in the context of armed con- rights or humanitarian law; flicts raises a number particular considerations.

3 This is taken from the Montreux Document, Good Practices for Contracting States, 17.

201 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

As a point of first order, PMSCs should not be • National private security regulation, including contracted to carry out activities that internatio any legal requirements and/or shortcomings in nal law explicitly assigns to state agents, such as national frameworks; acting as the officer responsible for prisoner of • Where considering using armed private secu- war or internment camps.4 Furthermore, clients rity, assessing the risks against needs/benefits of should consider whether a particular activity carrying arms; could involve the direct participation of PMSCs • Particular groups or populations which may be in hostilities. For example, by providing secu- at a heightened risk of negative human rights rity services for legitimate military targets, such impacts. as military convoys or weapons depots, PMSCs are considered to be directly participating in The information gained from risk and impact hostilities. assessments will offer guidance on how PMSCs As such, they lose their civilian protection, should be used, helping to inform context-rel- becoming legitimate military targets them- evant prevention and mitigation strategies that selves. address identified risks. The results from such In all situations, clients should carry out risk assessments can offer insights on how best to and impact assessments of security arrangements integrate PMSCs in missions, for example by to identify both risks to the operation and to the identifying activities that are better handled by PMSC and its personnel, as well as the potential PMSCs versus those that are not, or by provid- adverse human rights impacts arising out of the ing information on whether using local PMSCs activities. When conducting a risk and impact will find greater or less acceptance within the assessment, clients should include the following community as opposed to international PMSCs. elements: Such findings will help to provide guidance on • The operating environment and risks, particu- the kind of PMSC that is more appropriate to larly when operating in areas of weakened gov- use, set the purpose and objectives of the activi- ernance; ties to be contracted, and should provide the • How PMSCs – both local and international – basis for the terms of reference for the services are viewed by the local population and by pub- provided by PMSCs. lic authorities;

Rules for the Use of Force by PMSCs

There is an emerging international consensus5 that the resort to the use of force by PMSCs should be very limited, restricting it to use in self-defence or defence of others – a right to the use of force that all civilian persons have. This reaffirms the civilian nature of PM- SCs, underlining that they do not have any additional privileges or rights to use coercive force than do other civilians. Furthermore, it reinforces clear differences between PMSCs and state police and military forces, who as state agents typically are authorised to use a greater spectrum of force in order to protect public safety, including powers of arrest, search and seizure.

4 Please see the Montreux Document, p. 11. 5 See ICoC, para 30-32, ANSI PSC.1, and the commonly accepted standards for the use of force in self-defence under criminal law.

202 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

Monitoring compliance and ensuring Additional Guidance for accountability Contracting with PMSCs

When contracting with PMSCs, clients should There are a number of international instru- include mechanisms within the contract to moni- ments, both conventional as well as ‘soft law’, tor compliance and to ensure accountability. that can offer guidance to those contracting with These can include requiring that the PMSC per- PMSCs: form their services in compliance with specific • The European Convention on Human Rights instruments of international law, establishing • The International Code of Conduct for Private regular meetings with the PMSC to discuss the Security Service Providers manner in which it is complying with the terms of • The Geneva Convention of 1948 and its Ad- the contract, and/or using external actors to carry ditional Protocols out monitoring. • The Montreux Document on the use of PM- Monitoring can be carried out by the security SCs division of the CSDP mission, or by an independ- • UN Guidelines on the Use of Armed Security ent third party, such as the International Code of Services from Private Security Companies Conduct Association (see below). In conducting • The UN Guiding Principles on Business and monitoring, performance indicators can be used Human Rights to ensure that conduct is tied to specific outcomes • The American National Standards Institute such as financial rewards or penalties, or even ter- PSC.1 Standard mination of the contract. Disciplinary measures should be sufficient as to provide real deterrence, and should also provide effective remedies to those who were injured. Examples of performance indicators to ensure compliance include: PMSC record of attendance, number of incident reports, complaints (internal, client and third party) alleg- ing violations of international human rights/ humanitarian law, national law, or other terms of the contract. Furthermore, procedures should be developed for reporting abuses and violations to local authorities where appropriate.

Membership of the International Code of Conduct Association (ICoCA)

Private security service providers who are members in good standing of the ICoCA must demonstrate that they meet international standards for company systems and policies as laid down in the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, including selection and vetting of personnel and subcontractors, training in international human rights and humanitarian law, management of weapons, incident reporting and providing effective remedies for those who are damaged or injured by their services. The ICoCA also conducts ongoing monitoring of members, including in the field, and supervises how member companies handle grievances.

203 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

Private Military and Security Companies in CSDP missions

Security and protection for civilian CSDP missions primarily rely on the host nation, unless an executive mandate is at stake. In the event of high risk and specific security requirements, the mission may be authorised to use seconded or contracted armed personnel, including a contract with a Private Secu- rity Company. Nonetheless, assuming that a contributing state is willing to provide the required assets, the mission may also have a seconded armed security contingent incorporated into its structure. Another option would be the development of synergies between civilian and military CSDP engagements, if and when operating in the same theatre. For example, in case of colloca- tion in the same compound and without prejudice to the operational autonomy necessary to implement their mandates, operational and financial benefits could be achieved through a cost/benefit analysis of how to better address the respective civilian/ military security and protection requirements. Finally, special arrangements might be established, as appropriate, with other organisations e.g. UN, NATO, AU, etc. Luigi Bruno

204 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

2.5.3. Local ownership and cooperation with civil society

by Maria Fihl Photo. EUAM Ukraine EUAM Photo. Ensuring local ownership is a key factor of success when supporting Security Sector Reform. The Head of the EU Advisory Mission in Ukraine with the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and the Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration on administrative, social and economic reforms

One of the largest challenges for international sions and operations’ mandates are often based efforts in the field of crisis management and on partnerships and ownership (think of train- conflict prevention, and for civilian CSDP mising missions, capacity-building), and linked to a sions, is to ensure that mandates and operations culture of change (e.g. the increasing introduc- are found which link into the work of the host tion of security and justice sector reform into government the mission is assisting. The involve- civilian and military CSDP mandates), it is of ment and support of civil society with respect key importance for the mission on the ground to what the mission is trying to achieve is an to build and foster its cooperation with both the equally important challenge. authorities it works with, and the civil society at Guidelines and best practices have been devel- large. oped on a regular basis on engagement with civil When reforms are at stake, the art of achiev- society in theatres of operations, notably in rela- ing local ownership is not to draft on behalf of tion to the EU Framework and Action Plan on the mission interlocutors, but to be willing to Human Rights and Democracy. As CSDP mis- spend the necessary time to have a clear under-

205 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

A positive example of this is the Kosovan Comprehensive Settlement Proposal (CSP), which laid out the above-mentioned ingredients for a future Kosovan state. The drafting of the CSP took place over a three-year period with multi stakeholder involvement including the government, opposition, civil society, international community and minorities. Once the actual implementation took place, there was overall support for legislative change and not least implementation roadmaps of all kinds, from the law on police to the establish-

Photo: EEAS/EUFOR RCA EEAS/EUFOR Photo: ment of municipalities, because the principle of Commander of the Spanish Special Forces engages with common local ownership for the changes had local leaders of 3rd district been applied. Local buy-in is key to such major, extensive developments. Every intervention is different and every situation requires a tailor-made solution. It is important to understand both the history of a place and the entire political and legal framework, so that all contexts and structures are clear to the ones providing support. Members of the mission need to spend time with the interlocutors and form an understanding of their everyday lives, otherwise they will not be able to become close to the people they are working with. An important part of local ownership rests in supporting accountability mechanisms and the

Photo: EUFOR Tchad-RCA EUFOR Photo: preparation of public discourse for the aspects EUFOR Tchad-RCA. Discussing EUFOR’s role with the local of reform which a mission is advising on. Civil population, December 2008 society is one strong component of this. Civil society can range from very competent democ- standing of what is needed. This can include for ratisation NGOs to human rights-based NGOs, instance structural changes to representation often linked up to strong international and in agencies/ministries/courts and similar and subject-specific organisations such as Freedom ownership across institutions, how institutions House, Transparency International, Human should cooperate and how subordination should Rights Watch, Amnesty International, etc. In function, etc. addition to this category it is vital to involve Only when this is formulated and jointly the different unions and entrepreneur socie- understood by the local government, the local ties, those who organise the professional groups, opposition and not least the wider civil society, to understand their insights, and not least to is it possible to start efforts to implement the get their buy-in for the reform process, where different aspects of the reforms. changes will not be easy to accept for all.

206 2 CSDP Missions and Operations Photo: EUPOL Afghanistan Photo: Development course for policewomen at the Police Staff College in Kabul, September 2014. The training was delivered under Afghan ownership as part of EUPOL’s transition process

It is important to keep oversight civil society Work with civil society is also part of a long- actors, who follow and measure progress in pub- term strategy for the mission and not least for lic campaigns, on board, and to ensure that they the authorities the mission is working with. It measure the progress of the work to be under- provides excellent training, in particular for the taken, in this sense creating a public barometer youth who participate, in how to formulate gov- for what the government achieves on the basis of ernmental policies and the limitations and obli- the mission’s advice. gations of the government involved. This creates Such measures allow the population to follow a more informed public, who may be critical progress. A strategy like this gives the govern- towards the government’s policies and actions, ment and its relevant agencies time to imple- but will importantly have a strong sense of local ment what needs to be implemented, while pro- ownership. gress is communicated to the public and it is Local and international NGOs and civil soci- clear to the wider world what will be required ety organisations also efficiently contribute to and what the final end goal will be. early warning and prevention, and can feed into Another advantage of civil society and in par- the mission’s situational awareness and even its ticular think tanks is that as they integrate aca- operational activities. Liaison with civil society demic research, they are good at inspiring, and at organisations often helps the mission main- creating town hall meetings, where visions can be stream human rights and gender in its activities, shared in public, and later met with the bureau- and flag up sensitive areas. These organisations cratic and not least financial obligations which it can also contribute to the assessment of a mis- will be just as necessary to accommodate. sion’s activities and mandate implementation.

207 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

2.5.4. Public health engagement in CSDP operations and missions – enhancing personnel sustainability

by Bastian Bail and Evert-Jan Slootman

Introduction

Historically, in almost all conflicts involving military personnel, only 20 % of all hospital admissions have been from combat injuries. The other 80 % have been from disease and non-battle injuries (DNBIs). These figures do not include vast numbers of soldiers with decreased combat The EU supports the International Community by coordinating the EU Ebola Virus Disease response effectiveness due to illnesses not requiring hospital (in the picture: High-level international conference on Ebola: from emergency to recovery, Brussels, 3 March 2015) admission. Most DNBIs can be prevented by public health measures. These measures are simple, common- sense actions which anyone can perform and with which every leader must be familiar in order to contribute to the sustainability of EU personnel in operations and missions. Commanders are responsible for all aspects of health and sanitation. Only they can make command decisions taking into account the nature of the mission, medical threats and the health condition of deployed personnel. training for deployment and aims to furnish The Comprehensive Health and Medical Commanders and Heads of Mission, as well as Concept for EU-led Crisis Management Mis- their medical advisers, with concise and consist- sions and Operations deals with all medical and ent guidance for the optimal provision of medi- health issues in CSDP operations and missions. cal support. The concept sets out medical support principles Besides this concept, health and medical support for the guidance of Commanders/Heads of Mis- planning must always consider the whole spectrum sion and their staff. It provides functional direc- of mission environments with all possible health tion in order to optimise health and healthcare risks. It must also include detailed measures for the support on EU-led crisis management missions prevention of physical or mental illness and injury and operations, to guarantee mission staff best- of deployed mission personnel or military forces practice medical treatment in compliance with as a key factor of personnel sustainability. These common EU standards. This EU concept acts measures are not limited to the period of deploy- as a guide for operational plans, directives and ment but must include preparatory measures

208 2 CSDP Missions and Operations Photo: European External Action Service Action External European Photo:

The EU supports the International Community by coordinating the EU Ebola Virus Disease response (in the picture: High-level international conference on Ebola: from emergency to recovery, Brussels, 3 March 2015) before deployment (e.g. fitness screening, vaccina- disease, promote health and prolong life among tion, malaria prophylaxis) and follow-up measures the population as a whole. Its activities aim to pro- after deployment (e.g. psychological support), both vide conditions in which people can be healthy, within national responsibility. and focus on entire populations, not on individ- Medical plans have to be tailored to the mission ual patients or diseases. Thus, public health is con- requirements and need to be based on a specific, cerned with the whole system and not only the detailed health risk assessment to ensure the safety eradication of a particular disease. The three main and availability of all deployed personnel, in com- public health functions are to: bination with health promotion measures. • assess and monitor the health of communities and populations at risk, identifying health problems and priorities; What is public health? • formulate public policies designed to solve identified local and national health problems The World Health Organisation (WHO) and priorities; defines health as “a state of complete physical, men- • ensure that all populations have access to appro- tal and social well-being and not merely the absence priate and cost-effective care, including health of disease or infirmity”. It is not an absolute con- promotion and disease prevention services. cept and it should be noted that there is a con- This highlights that public health practice also tinuum of health status, between well-being and involves engagement within areas outside health- ill-health. The WHO concept first articulated in care in order to improve the health of the popu- 1948 must, in a military context, be broadened to lation. In the military, public health refers to all embrace fitness in addition to well-being. organised measures to prevent disease, promote WHO defines public health as all organised health, and contribute to the sustainability of the measures (whether public or private) to prevent military force.

209 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

Public health today miology, which can be defined as the study of patterns and determinants of health-related states or Public health is about populations as opposed events in defined populations, and the application to individual patients, and takes a long-term of this study to the control of health problems. view of events beyond a consultation, clinical The collection and analysis of health data from intervention or finished consultant episode. It EU operations and missions is pivotal. It affects considers a number of directly and indirectly policy decisions and evidence-based practice by related subjects, in particular health economics, identifying risk factors for disease and targets for statistics, health psychology, health sociology, preventive healthcare. health education and promotion and management theory. The gathering and management of health and social information is crucial. It is a Public health in CSDP operations rigorous, science-based and evidence-based dis- and missions cipline which assesses health needs before going on to assess the effectiveness of health outcomes The Health and Medical Concept establishes through evaluation. Protection from both com- the basis and the framework for effective planning municable disease and environmental hazards and implementation of combined and joint multi- remains a cornerstone of public health. For national health and medical support which reflects example, research has shown that the simple act the pre-defined medical standards within the EU. of hand washing with soap can prevent many Specific health and medical support principles contagious diseases. In other cases, treating a and guidelines are the basis for the planning and disease or controlling a pathogen can be vital execution of health and medical care during any to preventing its spread to others, for example kind of civilian or military mission or operation. during an outbreak of infectious disease, or con- They draw on the medical ethics code of medical tamination of food or water supplies. personnel, the rules of conduct that express the The core skill and tool of public health is epide- humanitarian conscience of the Member States, and the comprehensive and demanding definition of health by the WHO and the Geneva Conven- tions. These basic principles and guidelines should Going upstream: Imagine you are standing beside always govern the implementation of health and a river and see someone drowning as he floats by. medical care in EU-led missions. One of the basic You jump in and pull him ashore. A moment later, principles listed in the Health and Medical Con- another person floats past you, going downstream, cept is ‘Preservation of Health and Prevention of and then another and another. Soon you are so ex- Disease’. hausted, you know you won‘t be able to save even one more victim. So you decide to travel upstream to see what the problem is. You find that people Force Health Protection are falling into the river because they are stepping through a hole in a bridge. Once this is fixed, peo- Force Health Protection (FHP) is the conser- ple stop falling into the water. When it comes to vation of the working or fighting potential of a health, prevention means going upstream and fix- force so that it remains healthy, mission/combat ing a problem at the source. capable and available to the Head of Mission or Commander. Force Health Protection focuses on Source: Conrad and Kern, 2nd edition, 1986, defining and implementing mitigating measures The Sociology of Health and Illness: Critical Perspectives to counter the debilitating effect of lifestyles, envi-

210 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

ronmental and occupational health risks, indus- Health risk assessment trial hazards, diseases and selected special weapon systems, and includes preventive measures for per- The primary task in preventing diseases and sonnel, systems, and operational forces of the mis- injuries within deployed forces is that of conduct- sion. Such measures will include recommenda- ing a detailed health risk assessment before the tions on immunisation against biological threats, deployment phase. By ‘going upstream’, a Head as well as hygiene measures to reduce the risk of of Mission or Mission Commander and the medi- e.g. gastro-intestinal disease. FHP staff should cal planner can exclude or at least minimise health also assess the threats of physical injury, and the risks for their staff. effectiveness of measures to reduce associated risk. Besides the operational intelligence inputs FHP is the responsibility of the Commander regarding force, capabilities and intent of a pos- and the task of FHP staff is to provide timely and sible enemy, the basis for all medical risk assess- accurate information in order to advise Command- ments is access to comprehensive, rapidly availa- ers and staff on the management of these risks. ble, accurate and up-to-date medical intelligence, Public health is concerned with the whole sys- providing detailed information on e.g.: tem and not only the eradication of a particular • geographic factors such as climate, topography, disease. Public health/FHP specialists are always flora and fauna, which may each have specific looking for new and better ways to prevent disease effects on health; and injury and enhance sustainability of the force. • epidemiological data on endemic diseases, their types and prevalence; the current prophylactic measures, resistant strains, treatment, etc.; Planning public health in CSDP • outbreaks of diseases; operations and missions • hygiene and sanitation; • special environmental and industrial health The gathering and management of health and hazards (EIHH) such as radiation hazards, tox- social information is vital. The availability of med- ic industrial hazards (Toxic Industrial Chemi- ical intelligence from the initial planning stage, cals (TIC)), pollution, etc.; throughout the operation and during and after • the acquisition, threatened use and/or actual redeployment is an essential requirement of medi- use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), cal support. It serves several essential purposes at defined as chemical, biological, nuclear or ra- the strategic and operational levels of planning diological (CBNR) materials, by national or by Heads of Mission and Commanders and is other actors (e.g. terrorists); important for the medical planning, preventive • medical resources and infrastructure available medicine and operational staff. It provides the in the theatre of operation (e.g. availability and basis for action throughout the range of medical possible use of host nation support, IOs and operations. The intelligence required for medical NGOs). planning and operations must be comprehensive, Preventive medicine has a major part to play in rapidly available, accurate and up to date. Medi- any fact-finding mission/information-gathering cal staff are responsible for developing medical mission and must be adequately represented in intelligence requirements in order to enable staff the Force Headquarters or Mission Headquarters. to efficiently request, acquire and disseminate the All this information should be gathered from finished intelligence products needed. Therefore, various sources. In addition to data from open the gathering of medical information is a com- sources such as the World Health Organisa- mon and continuous task for all medical person- tion (WHO), the EU and the European Centre nel in missions and operations. for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC),

211 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS Photo: Evert-Jan Slootman Photo: On 8 August 2014, the WHO declared the Ebola virus disease epidemic to be a public health emergency of international concern

Member States support the Head of Mission/ assessments must be conducted, as changing con- Force Commander with any medical intelligence ditions may endanger deployed personnel’s health requested, in accordance with their capabilities. and sustainability, and measures that have already Assessing the public health burden of death, been implemented can still be optimised. It is vital diseases, injuries, syndromes or consequences of to address these issues as early as possible. exposure to environmental or occupational risk factors is a vital mission task. The circumstances in which these occur, and their effect on opera- Public health emergency tional capabilities, must then be identified, as challenges well as any preventive or counter-measures that could be applied. Failure to detect public health Public health emergencies can arise and progress incidents or outbreaks, natural or otherwise, may rapidly, leading to widespread health, social, and jeopardise the health of EU personnel, EU capaci- economic consequences. Commanders and Heads ties and missions. of Mission must be prepared to make timely deci- Health risk assessment is a very complex task, sions to protect lives, property, and infrastructure. given that data from a local population or health They should expect a level of uncertainty during system must be transferred to the conditions of the decision-making process, especially during European deployed personnel in an uncommon early stages of a public health emergency. Current environment under the special conditions of an operations and crises show that Commanders/ operation/mission. The optimisation of this pro- Heads of Mission and health professionals have a cess is an ongoing evidence-based task, with the symbiotic relationship during a disease outbreak. aim of guaranteeing enhanced sustainability and Both play an important role by informing public health of our personnel. Even when operations perceptions and policy makers in their decision- and missions are ongoing, regular health risk making process.

212 2 CSDP Missions and Operations Photo: Evert-Jan Slootman Photo: Ebola survivor wall

Three functions have to be performed during and continuous health risk assessment took place, health crises: disseminating accurate informa- with interaction between the Commander and tion to mission personnel, medical professionals the medical adviser. Considering a possible spread and policy makers; acting as the go-between for of EVD to Mali led to the early development of mission staff, decision makers and health and an infectious disease outbreak management plan science experts; monitoring the performance of and subsequently to the revision and adjustment the public health response. A Commander’s goal of the CONOPS for EUTM Mali. is to inform his personnel responsibly in order The Mission Commander’s intent was to pro- to achieve the public health goals of prevention tect the health and security of all mission staff by through raising threat-awareness while mini- keeping them regularly informed about EVD and mising panic. The struggle to strike a balance taking a series of protective actions and measures between commanding the unit and protecting to minimise its impact. He therefore took meas- the dignity of patients while also conveying the ures to prepare, train, reinforce and stockpile severity of an epidemic is harder in the era of the means and resources requested to fight the disease 24/7 news cycle. wherever it threatened the mission. One of the keys to success was the coordination with Malian national authorities and other international part- Ebola virus disease ners such as the International Committee of the Red Cross to establish an early warning system On 23 March 2014, the WHO published for- for EVD outbreaks and developments, in order mal notification of an outbreak of Ebola virus dis- to implement flexible and comprehensive reactive ease (EVD) in Guinea on its website. On 8 August, measures in time. WHO declared the epidemic to be a “public health The CONOPS outlined the tasks and responsi- emergency of international concern”. A thorough bilities of EUTM Mali personnel in terms of reduc-

213 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

ing the risk of, or containing, an outbreak of EVD. Deployment health surveillance is a fundamen- The plan included public health aspects (preven- tal component within the overall concept of Force tative measures to reduce exposure to EVD) and Health Protection and is essential for obtaining briefings to all EUTM Mali personnel. These pre- a clear picture of personnel health status and the ventive measures comprised precautions, informa- efficacy of measures taken. Medical data collection tion distribution, restrictions on freedom of move- and analysis from ongoing CSDP operations and ment, training, stockpiling, temperature controls, missions is pivotal and done by Member States isolation of staff in special facilities, repatriation, via an informal agreement with the Deployment specialists in enhanced readiness, stopping mission- Health Surveillance Capability, a branch of the related tasks, setting the criteria for case definitions, NATO Centre of Excellence for Military Medi- acquisition of medical assets including manpower cine. and supplies, eligibility for treatment, medical waste management, sustainability issues and protection equipment for healthcare workers. Importance for the Commander/ EUTM MALI was prepared and ready to Head of Mission counter this severe threat even before the first case appeared in Mali. This shows the importance of an Failing in Force Health Protection measures immediate and coordinated preventive approach based on a thorough health risk assessment is to threats like this, based on a functioning infor- not an option. Commanders should encourage mation and coordination system to counter the all officers to pay close attention to this vital and spread of a disease. Regarding the Ebola virus mission-critical health aspect in all CSDP opera- disease, it is clear how infectious diseases can tions and missions. affect the operability of a whole mission and why Heads of Mission and Commanders have a continuous medical and health surveillance is an responsibility to consider all threats and counter- absolute necessity. measures in order to fulfil the mission’s objectives Without implemented actions the crisis might without jeopardising the sustainability, health and have had a major impact. A non-military threat well-being of personnel. might have led to severe consequences, ranging from minor restrictions to mission objectives to the withdrawal of the mission. Summary

The provision of public health resources in Quality assurance EU CSDP missions should be based on health status, health risk assessment and preventabil- Prevention or preventive measures are not static ity. Providing immunisations, battling disease and cannot be standardised. Quality management outbreaks, improving hygiene and knowledge of (plan – do – check – act) and lessons identified/les- health measures, and improving the health status sons learned are essential. Force Health Protection of deployed personnel by preventing non-com- includes all actions, before, during and after an municable disease are therefore key tasks. Public operation or mission, to plan and implement pre- health or Force Health Protection measures are ventive measures (on behalf of the Commander), essential and even if their impact is not easy to assess their effectiveness and make adjustments, measure, a focus on public health will contribute for better performance and under changing con- to the sustainability of EU personnel in opera- ditions. tions and missions.

214 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

2.5.5. Counter-terrorism

by Sofie Rafrafi Photo: EEAS/EULEX Kosovo Photo: EULEX Special Police Department exercises counter-terrorism measures

Terrorism is one of the main threats the EU While the EU has become an area of increasing is facing today. The phenomenon has become openness, it is facing the emergence of new terror- increasingly diverse and geographically diffuse. ist groups, new modi operandi (e.g. foreign fight- When analysing terrorist attacks over the last ers) and the proximity of their attacks. Upholding ten years such as the Madrid bombings, the democratic values, maintaining public confidence very recent shootings in Brussels, Paris (Char- in the Union and the citizens’ perception of their lie Hebdo) and Copenhagen, together with own security will greatly depend on the capacity the devastating regional impact of the attacks of its policy-makers to taking strategic action and from Boko Haram in the Sahel and from ISIL decisions that will guarantee security and stability (Da’esh) in Syria and Iraq, it is fair to say that in Europe. The success of these actions depend on the main terrorist threat today is transnational the capacity to follow up on and to adapt existing and cross-border terrorism. The latter has strategies, to enhance cooperation between EU become a growing concern for the EU, its citi- institutions, its agencies, financial instruments zens and their policy-makers as it poses a threat and EU Member States, to deepen partnerships to the EU’s internal and external security, to the with third countries and to stabilise key frag- fundamental rights and freedom of its citizens, ile regional partners in order to address the root to economic prosperity and to the democratic causes of this threat encompassing both an inter- values of its societies. nal and external security dimension.

215 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

What kind of strategies? portionate response to the transnational threat of terrorism. It lays the foundation for the common Following 9/11, the EU, after having rec- understanding that additional efforts are required at ognised that it equally is subject to the threat national, European and international level to reduce of international terrorism as described in the terrorist threats and the EU’s vulnerability. The encompassing European Security Strategy in strategy sets out objectives “to prevent new recruits to 2003, committed itself to counter-terrorism terrorism; better protect potential targets, pursue and (CT) in order to provide for the security of its investigate members of existing networks and improve citizens and to pursue its interests within and our capability to respond to and manage consequences outside its borders. Accordingly, it produced a of terrorist attacks”3. It builds its strategy around binding framework of strategies, action plans, the following pillars: prevent, protect, pursue and programmes and Council Decisions. This strate- respond. The fifth pillar is concerned with ‘interna- gic framework supports the development of the tional cooperation’ which provides the framework EU’s concrete CT policy and actions to be taken for the regional strategies that have progressively internally and externally. Within this frame- been developed (see below). The EU CT strategy work, the EU puts special emphasis on a crimi- addresses both internal and external dimensions of nal justice approach to CT while protecting and terrorism, promotes key areas of joint cooperation promoting human rights. and stresses the increasing necessity to coordinate The EU CT strategic framework adopts both efforts with a wide array of partners. defensive and pro-active measures. On the one This comprehensive and broader EU CT hand, defensive countermeasures aim at protect- strategy has been complemented and reinforced ing potential targets by trying to make attacks by additional strategies, some directly integrated more costly for terrorists and/or by reducing as part of the four pillars. To name a few: the their likelihood of success. Pro-active measures, ‘The European Union Strategy for Combat- on the other hand, often mean taking the offen- ing Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terror- sive. Here, governments can directly confront a ism and its action plan’4 published in Novem- terrorist group or its supporters and take meas- ber 2005 aimed at providing a comprehensive ures such as destroying the terrorists’ resources EU response by defining guidelines on how to and equipment, eliminating their safe havens, reduce the threat by disrupting existing terrorists curbing or freezing their financial assets and even networks and preventing new recruits from join- targeting their members.1 ing terrorist groups (Prevent). The revised strat- For the EU, besides the 2003 EU Security Strat- egy on ‘Terrorist Financing’, endorsed by the egy and its implementation report, one of the most Council in July 20085, highlights the fact that important documents that serves as framework for the fight against terrorist financing is a key area its CT policy is the ‘EU Counter Terrorism Strat- of CT and proposes a series of measures in this egy of 2005 and revised action plan’2. This strat- regard (Pursue). The ‘Internal Security Strategy egy incorporates both defensive and pro-active for the EU: Towards a European Security model’ measures. It constitutes a comprehensive and pro- published in March 20106 emphasises the fact

1 Todd Sandler (2015), Terrorism and counterterrorism: an overview, Oxford Economic Papers, p. 1-20. 2 The European Union Counter Terrorism Strategy, 14469/4/05 REV 4, 30 November 2005. 3 Ibid. 4 The European Union Strategy for Combatting Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, 14781/1/05 REV1, 24 November 2005. 5 Revised Strategy on Terrorist Financing, 11778/1/08 REV 1, 24/25 July 2008. 6 Draft Internal Security Strategy for the European Union: “Towards a European Security Model”, 7120/10, 8 March 2010.

216 2 CSDP Missions and Operations Photo: Austrian Armed Forces Austrian Photo: “All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.” (Art. 43 (1) TEU) that a ‘zero risk’ environment does not exist. Yet Why an external dimension of it is possible to minimise the risk and to create a security? safer environment by addressing a series of common threats that pose a challenge to the internal The external dimension of security is inherently security of the EU. linked to the internal dimension of security. To The implementation of these strategies and address them separately will not provide lasting action plans is documented in reports that results. assess concrete (joint) cooperation activities and The CT actions taken at international level achieved results. The recent reports of July and are twofold. First, they are aimed at tackling the November 2014 on the ‘Implementation of the root causes of terrorism in those regions that are EU CT Strategy’ and the ‘Implementation of the subject to underdevelopment, structural poverty, Revised Strategy on Terrorist Financing’ both food insecurity, state fragility, flows of refugees show considerable progress. and displaced persons, human trafficking or drugs The strategic framework lays down its activities and arms trafficking. These phenomena can cause in the field of Justice and Home Affairs (internal) instability within states which provides opportu- and in the CFSP (external). It stresses the impor- nities for terrorist groups to flourish and to fur- tance of coordination between the EU and the ther recruit and radicalise foreign fighters, for Member States and the need to exploit all exist- example. Second, these CT actions are aimed at ing tools at national, EU and international level. protecting EU’s interests which are geopolitical, It further stresses the need to mainstream CT in strategic and economic in nature, such as securing the EU’s foreign and security policy by strength- sources of energy, establishing economic partner- ening cooperation with international partners as ships and expanding trade with various partners. the internal and external dimensions of security The EU also committed itself to promoting the are intimately related. universally recognised values and human rights

217 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

regional strategies also incorporate the ‘devel- In spring 2015 the Commission will pre- opment and security nexus’, for example: ‘the sent the European Agenda on Security Sahel development and security strategy’, ‘the for the period 2015-2020, which will de- EU regional strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as fine the strategic priorities to address the the Da’esh threat’, ‘the Comprehensive Security threats to internal security of the EU for Strategy for the Horn of Africa’, the EU Paki- the next five years. The European Agen- stan CT security strategy7. CSDP missions can da on Security will be a priority for the be deployed to help implement the EU’s regional Commission, and counter-terrorism will strategies, as for example is the case for EUCAP be an important part of it. Sahel Niger and Mali. They are aimed at supporting capacity building for the security forces in the fight against terrorism and organised crime, that are at the heart of its foreign policy. Terrorist enhancing regional coordination of international groups will often jeopardise those interests. actors, intelligence sharing and integrated bor- To ensure the complementarity of all these der management, with a security sector reform international actions it is important to have an dimension in the case of EUCAP Sahel Mali. overall view of the EU’s existing tools and to The Commission is responsible, in a joint facilitate their coordination. This role is assumed effort with the EEAS facilitated by the High by the Counter-Terrorist Coordinator, Gilles de Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Kerchove. He monitors the implementation of Policy who is also Vice-President of the Com- the comprehensive EU CT strategy, coordinates mission, for identifying the appropriate finan- complementarity in the use of all existing EU cial instruments that will be used to facilitate instruments between the Member States, the the implementation of those strategies. These Commission and the European External Action tools are aimed at peacebuilding, crisis manage- Service and promotes international cooperation ment, socio-economic development and con- by mainstreaming CT aspects in external policy flict prevention in which more and more CT is dialogues. being mainstreamed. One of these instruments is the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace; cooperation and development efforts also What concrete actions? broadly rely on the European Development Fund and the European Neighbourhood Instrument. How does the EU manage to organise and The Commission will also finance EU capacity- formulate its international action? The EEAS is building measures and assistance programmes amongst others responsible for drafting regional that support CT efforts in third countries and security strategies which also constitute the coordination with key partners. framework for CSDP missions and operations. The EU (CTC and EEAS) further supports These strategies find their “raison d’être” in the international cooperation and policy dialogues fifth pillar of the EU CT strategy (international with third countries aimed at increasing joint cooperation) and have been developed gradually. efforts and cooperation or strengthening new They address those fragile regions of interest for partnerships in the area of CT such as with the the EU and Member States. Since fragile states US, Turkey, Russia, Canada, Pakistan, Saudi and regions raise a multitude of issues, the EU Arabia, North African Countries, Egypt, Middle

7 EU Counter-Terrorism/Security Strategy on Pakistan, 11045/1/12 REV 1, 21 August 2012.

218 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

Eastern countries and Australia. Dialogue is also borders. The phenomenon of foreign fighters has increased with the United Arab Emirates, AU, become an increasing concern to which the EU UN or relevant regional coordination structures needs to adapt itself as well as its strategic frame- such as the G5 Sahel. The EU supports the UN work. It will have to continue complementing its Global CT strategy, the implementation of a actions in the area of justice and home affairs and series of related UNSCR, the latest of which are accompany them with an increased commitment 2170 and 2178, and is an active participant of in the countries of the Middle East, the Sahel, the Global CT Forum. the Gulf and North Africa. The EU and Mem- ber States will have to put additional emphasis on the fight against ISIL and Boko Haram while What are the next steps? making greater efforts to prevent radicalisation, recruitment, and the equipping and financing of Since these threats are cross-border, they must terrorism. However, these efforts against terror- be countered at both national and international ism will be efficient only if underlying causes are level. Following the events of early 2015, the addressed through a more comprehensive EU EU reaffirmed its CT commitments through approach to security and CT. the Council conclusions of 9 February 2015 that also informed the Foreign Affairs Council Decision of 12 February 2015. Terrorist groups are changing their modus operandi while their attacks take place closer to or inside the EU’s

The phenomenon “terrorism” in the EU treaties

Terrorism can be found within the CSDP task catalogue of Art. 43 (1) TEU, implicitly in the mutual assistance clause of Art. 42 (7) TEU and explicitly in the solidarity clause of Art. 222 TFEU. Taking these rules all together, the European Union will face the phenomenon “terrorism” within and outside the EU, preventively or in the form of consequence management. There are no clear indications whether one rule will be preferred in practice. One could argue that the CSDP task catalogue and the mutual assistance clause are designed for the fight against terrorism outside the territory of the EU, whereas the solidarity clause will be the rule for the EU territory itself. The fight against terrorism in the sense of preventive engagement remains an open question. By including the task “fight against terrorism” in all relevant paragraphs of the Treaty which will influence capability development in the EU, the Union made a clear and promising statement that it will be ready and prepared to face the challenge and protect its citizens worldwide against any kind of terrorist threat.

Jochen Rehrl

219 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

2.5.6. Climate security1

by Marcus Houben

Climate action is a key priority for the EU. To and fish stocks, increased flooding and prolonged respond to the challenges and investment needs droughts are already happening in many parts of related to climate change, the EU has agreed that the world. Climate change will alter rainfall pat- at least 20 % of its budget for 2014-2020 – as terns and further reduce available freshwater by as much as €180 billion − should be spent on cli- much as 20 to 30 % in certain regions. A drop in mate-related action. To achieve this increase, miti- agricultural productivity will lead to, or worsen, gation and adaptation actions will be integrated food insecurity in the least developed countries into all major EU spending programmes, in par- and bring about an unsustainable increase in food ticular cohesion policy, regional development, prices across the board. energy, transport, research and innovation and the Water shortage in particular has the potential Common Agricultural Policy. to cause civil unrest and lead to significant eco- However, climate action has not been main- nomic losses, even in robust economies. The con- streamed into the Common Security and sequences will be even more intense in areas under Defence Policy. The purpose of this contribution strong demographic pressure. is to reflect on this issue by asking three ques- The overall effect is that climate change will fuel tions: existing conflicts over depleting resources, espe- 1. What climate change challenges do we face? cially where access to those resources is politicised. 2. Is climate change a security issue? 3. Should and can CSDP operations and missions Economic damage and risk to coastal cities and contribute to EU climate action? critical infrastructure. Coastal zones are the home of about one fifth of the world’s population, a number set to rise in the years ahead. Mega-cit- What climate change challenges ies, with their supporting infrastructure, such as do we face? port facilities and oil refineries, are often located by the sea or in river deltas. Sea-level rise and the Climate change manifests itself in many ways, increase in the frequency and intensity of natural from extreme weather to rising sea levels, rising disasters pose a serious threat to these regions and temperature, changes in storms and hurricanes, their economic prospects. melting ice and ocean acidification to name a The east coasts of China and India as well few. If we think about climate change in terms of as the Caribbean region and Central America its security implications, the following scenarios would be particularly affected. An increase in come to mind. disasters and humanitarian crises would put immense pressure on the resources of donor Conflicts over resources.Reduction of arable land, countries, including capacities for emergency widespread shortage of water, diminishing food relief operations.

1 This contribution draws heavily on the paper from the High Representative and the European Commission to the Euro- pean Council on ‘Climate change and international security’ (S113/08), dated 14 March 2008.

220 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

Loss of territory and border disputes. Receding Europe, with factors of production and distribu- coastlines and submergence of large areas could tion concentrated along vulnerable coastlines. result in loss of territory, including entire countries such as small island states. More disputes Tension over energy supply. One of the most sig- over land and maritime borders and other territo- nificant potential conflicts over resources is likely rial rights are likely. to arise from intensified competition over access There might be a need to revisit existing rules to, and control over, energy resources. Because of international law, particularly the Law of the many of the world’s hydrocarbon reserves are Sea, as regards the resolution of territorial and in regions vulnerable to the impacts of climate border disputes. A further dimension of competi- change and because many oil and gas producing tion for energy resources lies in potential conflict states already face significant socio-economic and over resources in polar regions which will become demographic challenges, instability is likely to exploitable as a consequence of global warming. increase. Desertification could trigger a vicious circle of This has the potential to feed back into greater degradation, migration and conflicts over terri- energy insecurity and greater competition for tory and borders that threatens the political sta- resources. bility of countries and regions. As previously inaccessible regions open up due to the effects of climate change, the scramble for Environmentally induced migration. Droughts resources will intensify. Energy corridors, particu- in southern Africa are contributing to poor har- larly the Black Sea region, are also of increasing vests, leading to food insecurity in several areas with strategic interest, as they are critical to the energy millions of people expected to face food shortages. security of the EU. Migration in this region, but also migration from other regions through northern Africa to reach Pressure on international governance. Cli- Europe (transit migration) is likely to intensify. mate change will fuel the politics of resentment In Africa, and elsewhere, climate change is between those most responsible for it and those expected to have a negative effect on health, in most affected by it. particular due to the spread of vector-borne dis- The impacts of climate mitigation policies (or eases, further aggravating tensions. policy failures) will thus drive political tension nationally and internationally. Situations of fragility and radicalisation. Sea- The potential rift not only divides North and level rise may threaten the habitat of millions of South; there will also be a South-South dimen- people as 40 % of Asia’s population (almost 2 bil- sion, particularly as the Chinese and Indian share lion) lives within 60 km of the coastline. Water of global emissions rises. The already burdened stress and loss of agricultural productivity will international security architecture will be put make it difficult for Asia to feed its growing popu- under increasing pressure. lation, which will additionally be exposed to an increase in infectious diseases. Changes in the monsoon rains and a decrease in Is climate change a security issue? melt water from the Himalayas will affect more than 1 billion people. Conflicts over remaining resources Taking international reference documents as a and unmanaged migration will lead to instability in point of departure2, we can observe that experts a region that is an important economic partner for agree that climate change and the consequences

2 Among others: the 2014 National Climate Assessment, U.S. Global Change Research Program, Washington,

221 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS Photo: Austrian Armed Forces/SOF AUCON TCD AUCON Armed Forces/SOF Austrian Photo:

Climate change manifests itself in many ways, from extreme wheather …

of climate change can and indeed do have security From the Nobel Committee, Oslo (12 Octo- implications. ber 2007): “By awarding the Nobel Peace Prize for 2007 From the US National Security Strategy (2010): to the IPCC and Al Gore, the Norwegian Nobel “The danger from climate change is real, urgent, Committee is seeking to contribute to (…) pro- and severe. (…) we must focus American engage- cesses and decisions (…) necessary to protect the ment on (…) forging cooperative solutions to the world’s future climate, and thereby to reduce threat of climate change” (p. 3); the threat to the security of mankind.” “Climate change and pandemic disease threaten the security of regions and the health and safety Underlying these lines of convergent thinking is of the American people” (p. 8). the notion that climate change is a threat multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions From the Communication on Climate Action by and instability. It is stressed that the risks related the European Commission (2013): to climate change are not just of a humanitarian “… the extra demands placed on health services nature; they also include political and security risks and basic infrastructure by climate change and that directly affect national or strategic interests. increasing political and security tensions over lim- Moreover, it is clear that many issues related to the ited natural resources such as water.” impact of climate change on international security

http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report, retrieved 4 February 2015; 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap, Depart- ment of Defense, http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/download/CCARprint.pdf, retrieved 4 February 2015. Climate action. Build- ing a world we like, with a climate we like, European Union, 2014, http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/climate-action-pbNA0 614034/?CatalogCategoryID=sciep2OwkgkAAAE.xjhtLxJz, retrieved 4 February 2015.

222 2 CSDP Missions and Operations Photo: Austrian Armed Forces/Heimo Grasser Armed Forces/Heimo Austrian Photo: … to rising sea levels, rising temperature, changes in storms and hurricanes

are interlinked, requiring comprehensive policy seeks to live by and promote. In other words the responses. The impact of climate change is thus EU, as a community of values, wishes to contrib- considered to be multidimensional and a cause for ute to a world in which respect for human rights concern across sectors, including security. Climate is a cornerstone of society. We can view climate change threatens to overburden states and regions change and climate action along similar lines. Cli- which are already fragile and conflict prone. Protec- mate change shapes the world in which we live. tion of the environment and management of the Climate action is needed if we are to manage and impacts of climate change are strategic (maritime) adapt to climate change, mitigate its consequences security interests. The conclusion is thus clear: cli- and strengthen our resilience. Human rights and mate change is a security issue. climate change have this ‘systemic’ quality in common, guiding and aligning our actions as we seek to build a world in which we want to live. The Should and can CSDP operations case can thus be made that climate action should and missions contribute to the also be mainstreamed into CSDP. Firstly because EU climate action? we want to be consistent, and secondly because of its systemic importance: we want to use all of To answer the normative question (‘should’) we our policies, strategies and instruments to sustain, can attempt to draw a parallel with human rights preserve and improve our world. and gender. Both human rights and gender have To answer the practical question (‘can’), let us been mainstreamed into all EU policies includ- turn to what is already happening in the field. ing CSDP (each CSDP mission has an appointed CSDP missions often take place in countries human rights officer). This is considered necessary that are affected by the negative consequences as respect for human rights is a core value the EU of climate change (e.g. Mali, Niger, Somalia).

223 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS Photo: EEAS/EUNAVFOR SOMALIA EEAS/EUNAVFOR Photo:

Operation Atalanta (EUNAVFOR SOMALIA) was set up to protect the shipments of food aid from the World Food Programme against piracy

Operation Atalanta, for example, was set up as a • the analysis of how mitigation and adaption humanitarian mission to protect the shipments of measures can have an impact on the overall se- food aid from the World Food Programme for the curity situation in the partner/target country; population in drought-stricken Somalia. CSDP • the appointment of an Environmental Of- missions are conducted to mitigate or address a ficer in each CSDP mission and operation to crisis that is the direct result of, or has been exac- strengthen expertise in this area; erbated by, climate change. Consider the capac- • strengthening of the link between capacity ity building mission in Mali, for example. What building and local resilience. would mainstreaming climate action into CSDP In conclusion, the EU is in a unique position to mean in practical terms? How would this be trans- respond to the impacts of climate change on inter- lated into practice? Consider the following pos- national security, given its leading role in develop- sible practical consequences: ment and global climate policy and the wide array • the assessment of ‘environmental issues’ as a of tools and instruments at its disposal. theme to be addressed in all Crisis Manage- Moreover, the security aspects of climate change ment Concepts and Strategic Reviews of CSDP play to Europe’s strengths, with its comprehensive missions and operations; approach to conflict prevention, crisis manage- • an examination of the security implications of ment and post-conflict reconstruction, and as climate change in dialogues with partner/tar- a key proponent of effective multilateralism. It get countries, including through the sharing of would thus be only logical for climate action to be analyses; mainstreamed into CSDP.

224 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

2.5.7. Maritime security

by Marcus Houben and Fredrik Lindblom

The missions and operations conducted under types of marine life, are crucial for maintaining the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy the earth’s biodiversity and are home to numerous (CSDP) have been established to address a great unique and diverse marine ecosystems. The global variety of crises and conflicts around the world. maritime domain is not only used to feed man- Amongst other things, they aim to address sys- kind and construct ports and offshore installa- temic instability and insecurity (Central Afri- tions for oil and gas exploration, but also for play, can Republic), strengthen border management relaxation and tourism. There are as many differ- (EUBAM Libya) and the rule of law (EULEX ent users as there are different stakeholders. An Kosovo), and fight piracy (EUNAVFOR Ata increasing number of people live or want to live lanta). The purpose of this contribution is to offer in cities, and the majority of these large conurba- a brief reflection on the topic of maritime security tions are located at or near the coast. We call the and consider seas and oceans (‘the global mari- seas and oceans the ‘global maritime commons’: time domain’) as an arena for CSDP missions and they belong to us all. Think of the global maritime operations. The contribution is divided into two domain as a series of crossroads: money, power, parts: the first part sets out why maritime security influence, people, information, all converge in the matters and why it is likely that crises will mani- coastal zones of the global maritime domain. Seas fest themselves in the maritime domain, while the and oceans have become key arenas where multi- second part looks at maritime security from an ple global interests come together. Now consider operational and mission-oriented perspective. The territorial disputes as a consequence of competing contribution concludes with a number of observa- maritime claims, the illegal extension of Exclusive tions. Economic Zones, illegal fishing, irregular migration, trafficking, piracy and maritime terrorism. Combine that with the consequences of climate Why maritime security matters change (extreme weather, ‘climate refugees’) and the realisation that climate change acts as a threat The global maritime domain is not only of vital multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, ten- importance to the EU and European citizens, it sions and instability. The point is that maritime is of vital importance to all of mankind. ‘Planet risks and threats are multidimensional in nature. Ocean’ is an enormous ecosystem that sustains life The only way to stand a chance of dealing with on earth. Seas and oceans are used as a medium these types of risks and threats is through a cross- to facilitate commerce and international trade, sectoral approach and effective maritime multilat- are the breeding grounds for fish stocks and all eralism: cooperating with international partners.

225 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

Why is the global maritime It should not be wildly off the mark to assume domain an important arena? that some of the most complex, multifaceted problems and crises the world will witness in the 21st An important lesson learned from EUNAV- century will manifest themselves in the global mar- FOR Atalanta was how the strategic relevance of itime domain. As these crises require a cross-secto- the Gulf of Aden has evolved over the past few ral (comprehensive) approach integrating different years. Its location as a node in the global net- policy instruments into a single strategic framework of maritime trade routes remains of prime work, and require us – more than ever before – to importance, but the simultaneous presence of work with international partners (public and pri- three naval operations together with independ- vate), it is clear that CSDP missions and operations ent deployers made the Gulf of Aden an arena for are crucial instruments, not only to allow the EU international cooperation. All big players – the access to this particular domain, but to connect and United States, India, China, Japan, Korea, Rus- work together with international partners. sia, the EU, NATO, the UK, France, Spain, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium – were represented. Furthermore, as successful cooperation Some operational aspects at sea often has a positive spin-off in other policy areas, being present in the Gulf of Aden alongside Over the course of recent years, maritime these other nations and having the opportunity security has become an important element of to cooperate became a strategic interest. EUNAV- several of the EU’s CSDP missions. The most FOR Atalanta thus became a ticket for the EU to well known is probably EUNAVFOR Atalanta, enter the arena for international cooperation. a military mission launched in December 2008 A second consideration is that, although mari- with an executive mandate to fight piracy at sea. time security themes have an almost universal rel- Since then, what was once a severe threat to all EUNAVFOR Atalanta: Monitoring a commercial vessel under military escort (Off the Somali Coast, 2013) evance (e.g. freedom of navigation, sea control), seafarers in the region has become much less so. the regional context and particular characteristics In 2011, 176 ships were attacked off the coast determine to a large extent what maritime secu- of Somalia, but during 2014 only two attacks rity really means for a given region. In Africa for were reported. Though a military mission like example, maritime security can by and large be EUNAVFOR may prove instrumental in main- framed as a development and governance issue; taining security by deterring pirates, it is for civil- piracy and armed robbery at sea can be dealt with ian missions such as EUCAP Nestor to try and by addressing governance and development issues ensure that threats to security are prevented from ashore. Irregular migrants – although not a mari- arising in the first place. It is through capacity time security issue – use the maritime domain building that we can address the root causes of as a key vector to try to reach Europe. Maritime any threat to security – in the case of the Western security in a Latin American context is strongly Indian Ocean, the threat arising from piracy. influenced by organised crime (narco-trafficking) In order to help Somalia fight piracy, the EU and increasingly by concern for the protection launched the civilian mission EUCAP Nestor in of offshore oil and gas exploration installations. 2012, working on capacity building in the region. Maritime security in the South-East Asian context In Somalia itself, the goal is to support the coun- is, on the other hand, closely linked to sovereignty try in finding a long-term solution to the piracy issues such as competing territorial claims, the ter- problem. In the East African states of Djibouti ritorial integrity of the state and freedom of navi- and Tanzania, as well as in the island state of Sey- gation, and as a consequence is predominantly chelles, the mission aims to help these countries framed as a defence and military security issue. increase and improve their own ability to fight

226 2 CSDP Missions and Operations Photo: EU NAVFOR Atalanta/EU Navy Force Media and Public Information Office Media and Public Information Force Navy Atalanta/EU EU NAVFOR Photo:

EUNAVFOR Atalanta: Monitoring a commercial vessel under military escort (Off the Somali Coast, 2013)

piracy. EUCAP Nestor works on the entire chain EUBAM1, which was launched in 2013. Given of justice. Legal experts give support in review- Libya’s location bordering the Mediterranean, ing and drafting legislation so that authorities the country’s borders must be controlled at sea as involved in fighting piracy receive proper legal well as on land. Therefore, the mission in Libya powers. Maritime experts advise the authorities includes expertise on sea border management, in charge of maritime security issues on how to with advice and training in fields such as mari- improve their operational capacity. For their part, time port security, safety at sea, search and rescue, law enforcement experts train maritime police or etc. These different civilian tasks are often referred coast guard officers on how to carry out effective to as coast guard functional activities. Although maritime surveillance. All activities are conducted there is no internationally agreed definition of on the basis of international law and European these activities, the definition used most often is standards, and as proposals for the counterparts to the one proposed by the European Coast Guard use as a standard in their self-sustainable develop- Functions Forum, according to which coast guard ment of maritime security. There are also CSDP functions include: missions whose mandate covers the maritime • maritime safety, including vessel traffic man- domain in parallel with other areas. One example agement; would be the border assistance mission in Libya, • maritime, ship and port security;

1 At the time of writing, EUBAM Libya is relocated outside Libya due to the political and security situation in the country.

227 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS Photo: EUCAP Nestor/Marek Gajdos EUCAP Nestor/Marek Photo: EUCAP Nestor aims at enhancing the maritime capacities of five countries in the Horn of Africa and western Indian Ocean, through mentoring, training and advising. Its activities also support regional coordination, Djibouti 2015

• maritime customs activities; ficking, for instance, or violation of environmen- • the prevention and suppression of trafficking tal regulations – usually the result of a govern- and smuggling and connected maritime law ance deficit. enforcement; However, the sea adds a new dimension. • maritime border control; Maintaining security at sea does not mean sim- • maritime monitoring and surveillance; ply putting a customs officer on a boat to combat • maritime environmental protection and response; smuggling. • maritime search and rescue; Rather, crimes occurring at sea require a • ship casualty and maritime assistance service; maritime law enforcement mandate and exper- • maritime accident and disaster response; tise. Any EU CSDP mission in a country with a • fisheries inspection and control and coastline will have to take the aspect of maritime • activities related to the above coast guard func- governance and security into consideration. tions. The experience of European experts in the field so far is that the EU has a growing understanding and awareness of the operational aspects of mari- A new dimension for CSDP time security and maritime law enforcement. By encompassing the maritime dimension, Though piracy may be the first issue that CSDP missions today are a specific EU contri- comes to mind when discussing maritime secu- bution to maritime capacity building, fighting rity, security at sea may be compromised by the maritime crimes and maintaining law and order same issues as occur on land: smuggling and traf- at sea.

228 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

2.5.8. Hybrid warfare

by Gabor Iklódy

During the course of the past year, Europe’s subversive tactics. The latter can include vari- security environment has changed dramatically, ous forms of sabotage, disrupting communica- with two key developments dominating secu- tions and energy supplies, working through and rity agendas. To the East, Russia’s aggression in empowering proxy insurgent groups. All this Ukraine challenges the core principles of inter- is done with the objective of achieving political national law. Russia’s conduct of massive and influence, even dominance over the country, as well-coordinated hybrid warfare targets first and part of an overall strategy. foremost Ukraine’s integrity. It also seeks to cre- A critically important aspect of hybrid warfare ate uncertainty in the minds of the international is to generate confusion, doubt and ambiguity community as responses are considered. To the both in the affected population under attack and South, the advances of ISIL, a barbaric and well- in the broader international community about resourced terrorist group, threatens to turn an what is actually going on and who may stand entire region into a zone of failed states and ter- behind the attack. Such ambiguity can paralyse ror. ISIL’s expansion and aggressive ideology have the ability of an opponent to react effectively and driven thousands of young Europeans away from mobilise defences and also divide the interna- traditional European values towards jihad, and tional community, limiting the speed and scope these same young people have joined the terrorist of its response to the aggression. group as ‘foreign fighters’. Another fundamental characteristic of hybrid warfare is that hybrid techniques seek to find and exploit the target country’s most important vul- What is hybrid warfare/ nerabilities. The majority of these vulnerabilities tactics?1 are areas that could be addressed by means of EU action, both within and beyond CSDP. Hybrid warfare can be defined as the com- Hybrid tactics are in fact not new, they are bined, centrally designed and controlled use of as old as war itself. What makes the example various covert and overt military and non-military seen in Ukraine disturbing is the extremely well- means and tactics, ranging from conventional coordinated and highly effective deployment of forces, through economic pressure to intelligence. a large variety of hybrid instruments and tech- Disinformation campaigns or control of the nar- niques. This poses complex challenges to Euro- rative are an important part of hybrid tactics. pean countries and their organisations, like the The attacker seeks to undermine and destabilise EU and NATO. its opponent through applying both coercive and

1 The recently published EUISS paper (Alert 4/2015) on hybrid warfare provides useful additional analysis.

229 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

Resisting hybrid attack

Responding to and countering hybrid threats rule of law, corruption or the funding of political remains first and foremost a national responsibil- parties. ity. However, the EU could play a role in sharing In response to a wide-scale information war- information, coordinating responses and helping fare, which through denying or distorting facts to contribute to building resilience. As part of that manipulates large parts of the affected popula- effort, enhanced coordination and cooperation tions, effective strategic communications need with NATO are required. to be developed drawing on expertise and Building resilience to deal with hybrid threats instruments available in Member States, the requires Member States to recognise and share EU and the affected partner countries. Swift their own perceived internal vulnerabilities so that decision-making at high political levels will common steps can be taken to reduce the number be critical for the success of efforts to prevent of possible attack options. Building resilience in and defend against hybrid threats. Given the critical areas of vulnerability would seem to be the character of hybrid threats, such decisions may best way of preventing hybrid attacks from suc- need to be based on assumptions, predictions ceeding. and trust. With regard to external EU partners, the EU, Hybrid threats also require a fundamentally drawing on its wide array of instruments and different mind-set, where traditional separation expertise, can also play a central role in supporting lines between internal and external, defence and partner countries, including in areas such as cyber homeland security, civil and military, and in some security, border management, the energy sector, cases public and private, may no longer be sus- or by reducing vulnerabilities associated with the tainable. Graphic: Jochen Rehrl Elements of hybrid warfare

230 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

2.5.9 Sustainability: a key factor in ensuring successful results, lasting changes and CSDP credibility

by Sofie Rafrafi

Context egy. After the closing of a mission one might ask: “what changes did the mission really generate and Since the Common Security and Defence how solid are they?”. Policy (CSDP) was established, the EU has To the public eye and for the international launched over 30 civilian missions and military community, tangible and lasting results have operations in several regions of the world. The increasingly become the benchmark for measur- mandates of civilian CSDP missions mostly ing the EU’s success and mission impact. This suc- address capacity building of security and rule cess factor is absolutely necessary if the EU wants of law actors as well as support to Security Sec- to maintain public support and its international tor Reform (SSR), both through Monitoring, credibility as a global actor in civilian crisis man- Mentoring and Advising (MMA) and training. agement. They aim at reforming or reinforcing structures of the host country in order to make them more effective and operational in delivering results in The Concept of Sustainability1 a given area. EUCAP Sahel Niger, for instance, aims at increasing the capacity of the Nigerian Sustainability literally is the capacity to main- security and defence forces in the fight against tain some entity, outcome or process over time. terrorism and organised crime. The term ‘sustainable development’ achieved In order to be successful, however, a mission international public prominence through the needs to generate a positive and lasting – ‘sustain- 1987 report of the World Commission on able’ – change in the modus operandi and capaci- Environment and Development entitled ‘Our ties of the existing structures and actors of the Common Future,’ often called the Brundtland host country. Report2. Since then, the concept has shifted, The notion of ‘sustainability’ is not unfamil- even though for many agencies and organi- iar to the EU as nearly all mission mandates and sations it has remained essentially a working planning documents, the Concept of Operation definition. The term sustainability has become (CONOPS) and Operation Plan (OPLAN), refer popular as an expression of what public policies to it. Sustainable results are even often described ought to achieve in the domains they are applied as a ‘sine qua non’ for the successful implementa- to (economic, cultural, social, energy, political, tion of a mission’s mandate and aim to provide a religious etc.). It has generated over time a series solid basis to ensure their transition and exit strat- of models, each with specific theories aiming at

1 Our aim is not to produce an in-depth analysis of the concept, to analyse the various sustainability models or to couple one or several models with the EU CSDP. 2 Tom Kuhlman and John Farrington (2010), What is Sustainability?, Sustainability, 2, pp. 3436-3448.

231 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

achieving endurable results that are pursued or the ‘exit’ or ‘transition strategy’: sustainability is sought to make up for something that is lacking, set as a pre-condition for the CSDP mission to deficient or insufficient in terms of quantity or exit theatre and transition to other instruments in quality. or local authorities. Yet no specific guidelines are Sustainability has also become measurable. provided on how to achieve sustainable results. Over the years, a variety of instruments have been EUCAP Sahel Niger has therefore developed its developed in order to assess the progress and the own sustainability strategy and action plan, focus- viability of these results on a quantitative or quali- ing on training6. tative basis3. The metrics used for the measure- The EUCAP Sahel Niger sustainability strategy ment of sustainability are evolving: they include, first of all entailed the creation of a series of opera- amongst other things, benchmarks, standards tional tools and a legislative framework taking and indicators but also assessment, appraisal and into account the element of local ownership (from other reporting systems4. the mission, to the NSDF, back to the mission) in order to achieve the following: 1) the capacity to transfer knowledge and methodologies from the The case study of EUCAP Sahel mission to the NSDF, 2) the capacity to autono- Niger mously reproduce from within the NSDF and 3) the capacity to evaluate and recreate, both by the EUCAP Sahel Niger, launched in July 2012 mission and the NSDF. and part of the European Security and Develop- The action plan envisaged the following element Strategy for the Sahel, is a capacity-build- ments/steps: ing mission. The mission aims at reinforcing the • the creation of standardised EUCAP training Nigerien Security and Defence Forces (NSDF) in documents, templates and modules, all con- the fight against terrorism and organised crime. tained each time in a thematic ‘training kit’ (1); Its activities consist of training, strategic advice • the creation of thematic ‘appropriation com- and projects (linked to the ‘train and equip’ con- mittees’. This tool was used to ensure the grad- cept). The mission structure is also the first to ual transfer of technical knowledge and skills have a proper ‘sustainability policies unit’ in the (training kit) to be officially recognised in the operations department. It shows that the Civilian NSDF training programmes (1); Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), the • the creation of a ‘drafting committee’ to draft Brussels-based operations headquarters for civilian a consensus-based decree for a “harmonised CSDP missions and its operational planners are trainers’ statute” that offers legal support in rec- well aware of the importance of and the need for ognising the appointed Nigerien trainers and sustainable results. They consistently implement their role in ensuring quality transfer of knowl- the benchmarking methodology agreed in 20115. edge (1); Accordingly, the EUCAP Sahel Niger OPLAN • conducting integrated quantitative trainings makes a direct link between the need for success- and qualitative trainings through the ‘training- ful sustainable results and the implementation of of-trainers’ (2);

3 Ehrlich, P.R. & Holden, J.P. (1974). “Human Population and the global environment”, in American Scientist, 62(3): 282–292. 4 Bell, Simon and Morse, Stephen (2008), Sustainability Indicators. Measuring the Immeasurable?, Second ed. London: Earthscan. 5 Cf. Guidelines on the Implementation of Benchmarking in Civilian CSDP Missions, 17110/01, PSC noted in 2011. 6 The main trainings provided in the mission concern forensics, intelligence, border management, intervention techniques, human resources, logistics and civilian crisis management.

232 2 CSDP Missions and Operations

Photo: EUCAP Sahel Niger

In Niger, the integrated training courses in pedagogical techniques for trainers of the four security forces (national guard, police, gendarmerie, and Nigerien armed forces) aimed at enhancing sustainability in schools and training centres (Ecole Nationale de Police, Niamey, June 2013)

• the mentoring and monitoring of the trainers ologies and techniques, which in turn increased afterwards while re-delivering the modules (2); their interoperability and efficiency on the ground • the creation of evaluation indicators and tools by enabling them to work together. to establish ‘hot’ (directly) and ‘cold’ (six months after) outcome assessments of the generated change in behaviour and attitudes. The Challenges and suggestions assessment is made both by the trainee and the hierarchical superiors (3). There are several challenges ahead when it The mission strategy mainstreamed local owner- comes to advancing sustainability across CSDP ship at all levels of hierarchy by integrating secu- missions. The first concerns the development of rity forces personnel from the lowest to the high- standardised sustainability guidelines. They could est management level in the development and offer operational tools that the mission would implementation process. This is also a key element take into account to achieve sustainable results of success. when planning its activities. A pilot phase (six months) and a pilot pro- Second, since each host country environment is ject in the field of forensics, first-level training different, each mission will need to operationalise was conducted during which the action plan was the guidelines according to local realities. A mis- implemented. The result in the field of forensics sion could for example develop its own sustain- is that the NSDF are now capable of autonomous ability strategy and action plan. Missions have to training and can increase their capabilities in that consider not only historical, political, economic area (level I). Moreover, they all integrated and or cultural specificities, but also challenges related officially recognised the use of the same method- to a culture of change, change management, local

233 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

Sixth, in this vein, the ‘comprehensive approach’ efforts must be further pursued as CSDP missions/operations alone cannot deliver on sustainability. Quite the opposite: recent lessons have clearly confirmed that CSDP is but only one tool out of a series normally active in any given theatre. Ideally, all these activities are linked and coordinated so as to allow for the necessary mutual support, reinforcement and sustainability. The EU internally can achieve this if each of the EU actors, in the field and at HQ level, engage in Photo: EUCAP Sahel Niger the ‘comprehensive approach’. Beyond training and advice, ensuring sustainability is a key Finally, the current work of CPCC on an Impact factor of success for CSDP missions (in the picture: EUCAP Assessment methodology that builds on the 2011 Sahel Niger: certification ceremony at the “Ecole de Police”) benchmarking methodology will help to evaluate the success of all the above in the future. ‘Lessons absorption capacity and local buy-in. Once again, learning’ is crucial in order to evolve and to gener- local ownership is key. ate constant improvement in the planning of mis- Third, in the field of capacity building, mission sions, and can feed into these processes. Sharing structures are to reflect the need for mainstream- best practices and feedback on experiences among ing and implementing sustainability. The latter is a mission staff on the issue of sustainability, through transversal element that needs to be implemented seminars and debriefings organised at CPCC/head- both from within the mission to guide its activi- quarters level, could further stimulate the discus- ties and from the mission to the host countries’ sion and inclusion of sustainability in mandate actors in creating the capacity to transfer and the implementation and assessment. capacity to autonomously reproduce, create and maintain. Fourth, a mission’s sustainability strategy and Conclusions its implementation always need to be closely interlinked with other mission activities such as In the years to come, the EU will not only planning and evaluation. From the outset, stra- be praised for its capacity to project missions tegic as well as operational planning need to take outside its borders and create policy frameworks sustainability into account. Evaluation activities and strategies in which they operate. It will also should also analyse sustainability. increasingly be held accountable, by its citizens Fifth, the training and induction of both mis- and the international community, for its abil- sion staff and EEAS planners need to encompass ity to generate or contribute to real and lasting a stronger awareness of the need for sustainability. changes to a country or region. Sustainability is This includes the need to systematically main- one of the key factors in ensuring this success, yet stream sustainability into planning documents. its implementation has been entrusted mainly For EU mission staff and trainers, this means to mission staff – to understand the concept, being aware of the greater, sustainability-oriented analyse it and mainstream it into the missions’ framework into which their work will fit. Such activities. The EU has already acknowledged the training could be delivered by the ESDC, the importance of this aspect, and a series of con- national EU Member States training institutes crete and pragmatic suggestions have been made and the missions’ induction training. to help it move forward.

234 3 Capabilities

235 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

3.1. Capability Development 3.1.1. Military capability development

by Paul van der Heijden

EU military missions and operations should The European Security Strategy be planned and executed as part of a comprehensive approach to conflicts and crises. In order to To answer the key question ‘what do we need, be able to conduct the full spectrum of missions militarily speaking?’, we have to go back to the and operations envisaged in the Treaty on Euro- basis of the Common Foreign and Security Policy pean Union (TEU), a diversity of capabilities is (CFSP). One of the major documents laying the required. Therefore, military capability develop- ground in this regard is the European Security ment has always been one of the areas of focus Strategy (ESS), which was adopted by the Euro- of the Common Security and Defence Policy pean Council in 2003. Entitled ‘A secure Europe (CSDP). Within the EU Military Staff, the Force in a better world’, the strategy identified several Capability Branch of the Concepts & Capability interlinked threats and challenges, calling for the Directorate is contributing to the capability devel- development of multidimensional and multilat- opment process (see fig. below). eral responses, as well as for the development of

HR/VP EU Cell at CEUMC SHAPE

DIRECTOR GENERAL EUMS EU Liaison CEUMCWG UN NY

LEGAL DEPUTY ADVISOR DIRECTOR GENERAL ACOS ACOS NPLT EXTERNAL SYNCHRONISATION RELATIONS

COMMUNICATIONS CONCEPTS & INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES LOGISTICS &INFORMATION SYSTEMS

Military Intelligence Logistics CISPolicy& Concepts Assessment& Policy Policy Requirements Planning

CrisisResponse Information Force Intelligence &Current Resource Technology& Capability Support Operations Support Security

Exercises, OPSCENTRE Administration Training & Intelligence &WatchKeeping &Support Analysis Production

The European Union Military Staff, March 2015

236 3 Capabilities

HLG 2010: EU Level of Ambition

60 000 troops within 60 days for a major operation or planning and conducting simultaneously a series of operations and missions of varying scope • two major stabilisation and reconstruction operations supported by up to 10 000 troops for at last two years • two rapid response operations of limited duration using inter alia EU battlegroups • an emergency operation for the evacuation of European nationals (in less than ten days) • a maritime or air interdiction operation • a civ-mil humanitarian assistance operation lasting up to 90 days • around a dozen CSDP civilian missions of varying formats together with a major mission (up to 3 000 experts) lasting for several years.

Headline Goal 2010

capabilities to enable the EU to act. The strategy Europe and for a period of at least one year. Sev- was re-affirmed in the report on its implementa- eral lesser ambitions were also defined (see fig. tion in 2008 and some threats were added – such above). as cyber attacks and maritime piracy. EU Member In answering the question ‘what capacities States all agreed that the EU should play a more do we need to fulfil this Level of Ambition?’, it is active role in the field of international security, important to understand the types of situations drawing on civilian and military capacities. in which European troops on CSDP missions and operations could be deployed. For this purpose five ‘illustrative scenarios’ were defined (see Fig. Headline Goal & Level of next page), in combination with different Stra- Ambition tegic Planning Assumptions (SPA) – including reaction time, distance from Europe, the need for Since the inception of CSDP, the scope of the rotations, the hypothesis according to which sev- role that the EU wanted to play under this policy eral operations are ongoing at the same time. This has framed its capability requirements. Drawing led to an extensive list of military requirements on the definition of the Petersberg tasks (ini- in terms of equipment and personnel. This ‘what tially defined in 1992 for the Western European do we need?’ was formalised in 2005, in what is Union), EU Member States established a capacity termed the Requirement Catalogue (RC05). objective, the Headline Goal. The first ‘Headline Goal 2003’ was defined in 1999 at the European Council of Helsinki – the ‘Level of Ambition’ decided upon has not changed since then. The biggest ambition is to be able to deploy a maximum of 60 000 troops within 60 days. This must be possible at thousands of kilometres away from

237 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

Military Illustrative Scenarios Stabilisation, Evacuation Assistance to Separation of Conflict Reconstruction and Operation in a Humanitarian Parties by Force Prevention Military Advice to non-permissive Operations (SOPF) (CP) 3rd Countries (SR) environment (EO) (HA) • Tasks of combat • Peacekeeping • Preventive • Non-combatant • Prevent forces in crisis • Election Engagement Evacuation Atrocities management monitoring • Preventive Operation • Consequence • Peacemaking • Institution Deployment Management • Secure Lines Building • Joint Disarma- of Communi- • Security Sector ment Operations cations Reform • Embargo • Support Operations rd 3 Countries in • Counter Fight against Proliferation Terrorism

Illustrative Scenarios

Three Catalogues

With a view to capacity development, Mem- in the Progress Catalogue (PC), which was lastly ber States were asked what they could potentially updated in 2014 (PC-14) and agreed upon by the make available for the Requirement Catalogue. EUMC. Their contributions are voluntary and non-binding and cannot be used for Force Generation processes. These voluntary contributions (the answer The European Defence Agency to the ‘What-do-we-have question’) are laid down in the Force Catalogue (FC). The FC is regularly The European Defence Agency (EDA) plays updated; the latest update at the time of writ- a crucial role in the whole process of Capability ing was agreed upon by the EU Military Com- Development. The result of the Headline Goal mittee (EUMC) in 2014 (FC14). The EUMC is process (the prioritised capability shortfalls) is the supported in this respect by the EUMC Work- EUMC’s input to EDA’s Capability Development ing Group/Headline Goal Task Force (HTF), in Plan (CDP). This CDP has four Strands. The which all Member States have their subject-matter EUMC input is called Strand A. The other inputs experts represented. are: Strand B, which covers future requirements, Unfortunately, there are still differences in the long term (e.g. Air-to-Air Refuelling; between the requirement catalogue, the RC05, Cyber Defence; Government SatCom; Remotely- and the Force Catalogue, the FC14 (i.e. differ- Piloted Aircraft Systems); Strand C, which covers ences between the ‘what we need’ and ‘what we the Defence Plans of individual Member States have’; let’s then call this question: ‘what are we still (here the Member States can see what others have lacking?’). These capabilities, which are not poten- in their Plans, which could create opportunities tially made available to achieve the total require- for pooling and sharing of – future – capabilities); ments as defined in the EU Level of Ambition, and Strand D, which deals with lessons identified are called ‘shortfalls’. All shortfalls are mentioned during missions and operations (see Fig. p. 239).

238 3 Capabilities

Capability Development

ESS

Level of Ambition (LoA) HLG • 5 Illustrative Scenarios (SOPF, SR, CP, EO, HA) • 60 000/60 days/Sustain one year

What we need? Requirements Requirements Catalogue 2005 (RC05)

MS What we have? Force Catalogue 2014 (FC14) Contributions

Capability Progress Catalogue 2014 (PC14) What we don’t have? • Capability Shortfalls Shortfalls • Level of Ambition

Capability Development

Capability Development Plan

Headline Goal 2010 Future Trends Process Planning

a Shorter Longer B D Term Term C Reality MS Defence Plans & Lessons Identified Equipment Programmes

Capability Development Plan

The whole process of capability development duplication of effort, the EU capability develop- is intense and complicated, but the CDP is very ment planning timelines are aligned with those usable for all stakeholders. In order to simplify of NATO as much as possible. Using the same the process, NATO and the EU agreed to use language and timelines symbolises the close the same information-gathering tool and the cooperation in this realm. same Capability Codes and Statements (CCS). The EUMC decided in January 2015 to In addition, the EU Member States who are launch an EU Military Capability Questionnaire also NATO members do not have to fill in long (EUMCQ-15). questionnaires twice. Finally, in order to prevent

239 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS ESA Schiebel, Florian Hirzinger, Eurofighter, Photos: The European Council 2013 endorsed four major capability programmes: • Air-to-Air Refuelling, with the objective of establishing a multinational fleet from 2019; • Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, with the objective of laying the foundations for a European solution in the 2020-2025 timeframe; • Cyber Defence, with a focus on technology, training and protection of EU assets; • Governmental Satellite Communication, with the objective of preparing the next generation in the 2025 timeframe.

Capacity Development: a continued process

The European Security Strategy was formulated in 2003 and re-affirmed in 2008. Since then sig- Military capability development nificant changes have affected national defence budgets as well as the international security land- In December 2013, the European Coun- scape. Technical developments are accelerating (e.g. cil identified a number of priority actions cyber-warfare and nano-technology) and regional built around three axes: conflicts are getting worse and closer to European • increasing the effectiveness, visibility borders (e.g. Crimea, eastern Ukraine, develop- and impact of CSDP; ments in the Middle East, North Africa, growing • enhancing the development of capa- threat of terrorism, hybrid warfare). In 2015 work bilities and started on a review of the European Security Strat- • strengthening Europe‘s defence in- egy, with a view to the European Council of June dustry. 2015 on security and defence. The new European Security Strategy may entail a revised Level of Ambition. The Capability Devel- opment mechanism may need some adjustments to realign with political requirements.

240 3 Capabilities

3.1.2. Civilian capability development

by Nina Antolovic Tovornik

The nature and form of international crises and ground level training, to providing strategic advice conflicts have drastically changed over the last to ministers of the interior and justice or mentor- decade. Finding the right mix of tools to manage ing police or judiciary bodies. them is far from being an easy task. CSDP is just The EU has established itself as a global actor one facet of the EU’s external action. However, it and security provider. In early 2015, it deployed is an essential one and its use is constantly on the around 1500 international experts1 on three con- rise. tinents for the purpose of civilian CSDP missions. At the time of writing, 11 out of 16 ongo- Recent events in the EU’s southern and eastern ing CSDP missions are civilian. The last two to neighbourhoods and developments in Africa and be launched were EUAM Ukraine and EUCAP the Middle East are forceful reminders that we Sahel Mali, established after deliberations at the will continue to need sufficient civilian capabili- European Council (EC) in December 2013. It ties to address crisis management challenges. By was the first time in many years that the heads civilian capabilities we mean the right number of of state and government sat down to discuss the staff with the right skill-set, but also the adequate CSDP. Therefore, the event was seen as an oppor- policies, procedures and equipment at hand to tunity for the EU to move forward with a joint do the job. And these procedures take time to vision of the capabilities that Europe needs, and develop. to lay the framework for a more efficient CSDP. The experts in civilian CSDP missions are sec- However, some disappointment was expressed at onded internationally and hired internationally the imbalance between the civilian and military and locally. Secondment by a Member State is still parts of the EC Conclusions. the main applicable employment regime. This The original idea behind CSDP missions means that the EU relies on voluntary contribu- was crisis management, mostly understood as a tions from Member States – usually for periods ‘quick-fix’ intervention focused on priority areas of one year at a time. There is no one-stop shop agreed at the Feira European Council in 2000. As to get the right civilian expertise. Police officers, crises proliferate and get increasingly complex, so judges, prosecutors and other civilian experts in does the need to quickly adapt and be flexible in Member States have to be encouraged to apply, providing response. Nowadays, our CSDP mis- trained, released from their everyday work and sions are not discrete actions but are well embed- replaced during their time of absence, as well as ded in overall EU strategies towards a particular adequately integrated back into the system upon region or country, and cover activities from basic, return from a mission. Therefore, the prime

1 The overall figure decreased due to the downsizing of the largest mission, in Kosovo. In 2014, the closure of EUPOL RDC and the suspension of the EUBAM Libya also impacted the total approved number of staff required.

241 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

responsibility for capability development for civil- the time was based on scenario-based planning ian CSDP missions lies with the Member States. and was detached from the operational reality of It requires a cross-government approach. Further- civilian CSDP missions. This also led to the cri- more, Member States have each established differ- sis management structures we have today, where ent national structures, strategies, policies or other civilian capability development is not under one arrangements on how to train, recruit and deploy unique authority. The same goes for the mission and pay civilian experts. Civilian CSDP capabil- planning process, which is divided between the ity planning is multifaceted with many national Crisis Management and Planning Directorate stakeholders, different layers of decision-making (CMPD) and the Civilian Planning and Conduct and budget lines. Capability (CPCC). The fact that international contracted staff in The CHGs have certainly achieved encourag- civilian CSDP missions are on the rise and already ing results but also touched the limits of scenario- make up almost one third of the total number based capability planning. In the post-Lisbon of international staff in civilian CSDP missions set-up and in order to provide further political should also not be neglected. impetus, in December 2011 the Council called Despite the progress made, generating civilian for a multi-annual work programme for civilian capabilities – for EU rapid deployment in par- capability development. To steer the work, this ticular – remains a challenge, especially due to led to the adoption, in July 2012, of a Civilian shortages of well trained personnel in specialised Capability Development Plan and the key action- profiles. lines for 2012 and 2013, in an additional docu- In terms of its evolution, Civilian Capability ment. Development2 followed the example of the mili- The Civilian Capability Development Plan sets tary, where there is a long history and tradition of out four interlinked drivers that in the civilian capability development and a well-structured sys- realm replicate the four strands of the EU’s Capa- tem. It started with the Feira European Council bility Development Plan (CDP) managed by the in June 2000, which decided to develop the civil- European Defence Agency (EDA). ian aspects of crisis management in four priority Among the key action-lines were the establish- areas: police, rule of law, civil administration and ment of a list of generic civilian CSDP tasks and civil protection. The EU ambition to play a role the finalisation of the Goalkeeper project. in global security was spelt out in the European The aim of the list of generic civilian CSDP Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003. This allowed tasks is to present the collation of the opera- the EU to pursue, under the European Security tional objectives that can reasonably be expected and Defence Policy (ESDP), the development of to occur in CSDP civilian crisis management, crisis management capabilities needed to face the expressed in a generic non mission-specific way. challenges and key threats for the EU. It led to It should contribute to the building of a com- the endorsement by the EC of the two Civilian mon understanding of the generic civilian CSDP Headline Goals (CHGs), namely CHG 2008 and tasks and provide a coherent vision of the extent CHG 2010. While the former focused strongly on to which the EU is able to address these tasks as personnel, the latter also recognised other impor- well as the relative weight of shortfalls identified. tant factors of capability development such as It will also facilitate work on civilian-military synergies, lessons learnt, concepts, security, equip- synergies. ment and the CSDP-FSJ (Freedom, Security and The Goalkeeper software environment is a cru- Justice) nexus. Civilian capability development at cial mainstay of EU initiatives to facilitate civil-

2 Developing civilian capabilities for CSDP would be a more suitable term.

242 3 Capabilities

ian deployment. It is a web-based information to rapid deployment and ways to make procedures hub that serves Member States, Brussels HQ and more flexible. Times have changed. Nowadays, CSDP civilian missions by supporting training, working groups such as the Committee for Civil- recruitment, and the development of national ian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) rosters, capability development and institutional and the Political and Military Group (PMG) memory. In the area of civilian capabilities for are discussing ways to make more savings in the CSDP, Goalkeeper bridges the operational and CSDP budget without too much of an impact on strategic levels as initially planned during the operational delivery. work on the 2010 CHG. It is expected that it will These are just a few examples of different work be finalised and become operational in 2015. strands with concrete deliverables and impact on The logistic needs of new civilian CSDP mis- civilian capabilities. One should not neglect the sions, in particular during start-up, were better work on partnerships, training, lessons learnt met after the establishment of the permanent and transition strategies, as well as issues beyond CSDP Warehouse, which became operational in CMPD’s remit such as the revision of the Crisis June 2013. The Warehouse has the capacity to Management Procedures (CMP). The main dif- store strategic equipment primarily for the effec- ference remaining between civilian and military tive rapid deployment of 200 personnel in the area capability planning even today is that the for- of operations of a newly-launched mission, within mer remains fragmented while the latter is better 30 days of the approval of the Crisis Management structured. In the absence of a coherent strategy, Concept. It was used to provide equipment to civilian capability development may seem less EUBAM Libya, established in 2013. There is a viable. plan to revise the Warehouse framework, which For a successful, efficient and sustainable civil- should be synchronised or streamlined with the ian CSDP, it is essential to step up the work at the ongoing work on establishing a Shared Service Member State and EU levels on mechanisms and Centre to centralise mission support structures. procedures to recruit and train civilian personnel, In recent times, money issues have also become as well as to provide the adequate supporting tools an important planning factor. Finances before in order to obtain a better impact by EU CSDP were not a major consideration but mostly linked missions on the ground.

243 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

3.2. Rapid Reaction/Response 3.2.1. Military Rapid Response

by Jerónimo Domínguez Barbero and Tomas Abrahamsson

When time for action is considered, politically, The complexity of contemporary crisis situa- as pressing, we refer to such urgency as demanding tions indicates that the EU needs to have capabili- ‘Rapid Response’. A response is measured in time ties across all military dimensions in order to be from the moment that the EU considers action as able to act/react in a flexible manner that can be appropriate up to the moment that Forces arrive adapted to the uniqueness of each situation and to and are able to operate in the area of operations. the tasks that need to be undertaken. Hence, the At the 1999 Helsinki European Council, Rapid EU Battlegroups (EU BG) Concept (2006), the Response (RR) was identified as an important EU Maritime Rapid Response Concept (2007) aspect of EU crisis management. As a result, the and the EU Air Rapid Response Concept (2007) Helsinki Headline Goal 2003 assigned to Member were conceived, developed and agreed in that States the objective of being able to make rapid order by Member States. response elements available and deployable at very In December 2013, the European Council1 high levels of readiness. Subsequently the first EU emphasised the need to further improve the EU Military Rapid Response Concept (MRRC) was Rapid Response (RR) capability, inter alia by agreed in early 2003. increasing the operational usability and deploy- The operational birth of the EU military ability of the EU Battlegroups. In this regard, the response is more often associated with the Mili- revision of the EU Military Rapid Response Con- tary Operation in the Democratic Republic of cept was completed and finalised on 17 Decem- Congo (DRC), code-named Artemis, which was ber 20142: it now also includes the subordinated launched on 12 June 2013 (seven days after the Land (new), Maritime and Air Rapid Response Council adoption of the Joint Action). It success- concepts. fully demonstrated the EU’s ability to operate with a rather small force at a distance of more than 6 000 km from Brussels. Accordingly, Operation Rapid Response Pillars Artemis became a reference point and model for the development of a Battlegroup-sized Rapid To achieve an overall Rapid Response, both the Response capability. Rapid operational assess- political reaction and the military response need ment, Member States’ political support, decision to be fast and effective. However, the first step to making, planning, force generation, together with unlocking this capability must be the EU Member Member States’ force contributions and deploy- States’ political will to use it. In other words consen- ment, were identified as critical criteria for success sus amongst Member States must be inseparably in future operations. linked to the responsibility to properly resource

1 European Council 19/20 December 2013 – Conclusions (EUCO 217/13, 20 December 2013). 2 EU Military Rapid Response Concept (17036/1/14 REV 1, 8 January 2015).

244 3 Capabilities Photo: Austrian Armed Forces/Horst Gorup Armed Forces/Horst Austrian Photo:

Military Rapid Response is the acceleration of the overall military approach which encompasses all interrelated measures and actions in order to enable a decisive military response to a crisis within 30 days

a response during the informal force sensing, by may be appropriate and invites the EEAS to de- those same authorities, to match the degree of velop a Crisis Management Concept (CMC). urgency agreed by Member States. The subsequent key decisions are the follow- In addition to the aforementioned unavoidable ing: approval of the CMC by the Council, the requirement for Member States’ political will, the Council Decision establishing the mission/ development of the overall approach is based on operation and the Council Decision to launch three pillars, which must in all cases be fulfilled in the operation/mission. order to enable a swift and decisive EU military • Secondly, there is a need to finalise all phases response: of crisis response planning in a very short • Firstly, there is a need for an extremely com- period of time. The new Crisis Management pressed decision-making process in response Procedures established a special procedure, to a developing crisis. This process follows the called the Fast Track process, in order to accel- crisis management procedures3. This decision erate this process. Concurrent planning activ- process is initiated when the PSC analyses the ity, the early appointment of the Operation/ situation and considers whether CSDP action Mission Commander and Force Commander,

3 Suggestions for crisis management procedures for CSDP crisis management operations (7660/2/13 REV 2, 18 June 2013, public).

245 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

OVERALL EU RESPONSE

Decision to EU Action Mission/ launch the appropriate Operation established operation

STANDARD RESPONSE

PFCA MSO CONOPS

PSC or Crisis Council CMC IMD OPLAN situation tasking to develop a CMC

Urgent Response Fast Track process

PSCDECISION PSCDECISION

RAPID RESPONSE

Shortcuts after formal Rapid Response decisions Standard Response process is depicted with blue arrows Rapid Response process is depicted with red arrows

and the early designation of Operation/Mis- This early identification should trigger the sion Headquarters (OHQ/MHQ) and Force related rapid response initiation procedures to Headquarters (FHQ) are of utmost impor- activate and prepare the forces involved and to tance. better enable their further reaction. • And thirdly and finally, there is a need to de- In accordance with the crisis management ploy forces and capabilities already held at procedures, the rapid response label is formally a very high state of readiness by Member decided by either: States. These rapid elements are made available • a PSC decision to directly develop a CMC, ex- by Member States and generated through the cluding the Political Framework for Crisis Ap- agreed set of rapid response mechanisms. proach (PFCA). This option is called Option for Urgent Response; or • a PSC decision to utilise the fast-track process EU Rapid Response label and for the operation/mission planning. This pro- shortcuts cess avoids developing the Military Strategic Options (MSO) and the Concept of Opera The timeline requirements established for the tions (CONOPS). In addition, the draft military rapid response forces and capabilities Operation Plan (OPLAN) should be drawn after the Council Decision to launch the Opera- up in parallel with the preparation of the tion are extremely demanding. Therefore, in order draft CMC and draft Initiating Military Di- to facilitate their compliance, it is imperative to rective (IMD). All of this is undertaken with identify as soon as possible the point at which a view to shortening the operation planning the EU labels a CSDP mission or operation rapid time. response.

246 3 Capabilities

Political reaction time Military response time

Decision Detection EU Action CMC Forces start to launch the of the appropriate approved implementing Crisis operation mission in JOA

Generic Military Planning 25 DAYS Rapid Response (time not defined) D + 25 D–?

Express Response Planning (Primarily for EU BG) in 5 days 10 DAYS D + 10

Time not fixed 0 D–5 D + 5 D + 10 D–? D Day D + 25

Military Rapid Response Timeline6

Use of EU Rapid Response egy, the Report on its implementation five years later, the Council conclusions of December The Treaty on European Union (TEU) pro- 2013, and the Recommendations on EU Bat- vides the framework for the deployment of mili- tlegroups5 provide further indications regarding tary assets on missions outside the Union (peace- the significance and possible recourse to military keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening rapid reaction. Taking into account that Rapid international security). This framework follows Response is decided by a PSC decision, it is in the principles of the United Nations Charter. In the latter’s remit to decide the scenario in which addition, drawing on the previously agreed Peters- the military forces and capabilities will develop berg tasks4, the Treaty of Lisbon provides for the the standard generic military tasks in a rapid following possible tasks: joint disarmament oper- response format. ations; humanitarian and rescue tasks; military advice and assistance tasks; conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks; tasks of combat forces Military Rapid Response Time in crisis management, including peace-making and requirements and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, includ- While the Political Reaction Time is the period ing by supporting third countries in combating between a crisis being identified and the point at terrorism in their territories. which the Council takes the decision to launch an Key EU documents have further elaborated operation, the Military Response Time is meas- on or described other possible scenarios, threats ured from the point at which the Council takes or challenges. The 2003 European Security Strat- the decision to launch the operation to the point

4 The Petersberg tasks were first agreed upon at the June 1992 Western European Union (WEU) Council of Ministers near Bonn, Germany. Article II.4 of the subsequent ministerial declaration outlined the following three purposes for which military units could be deployed: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peace-keeping tasks; and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making. 5 PMG recommendations on EU Battle Groups (17150/11, 17 November 2011, non-public). 6 Based on the EU Military Rapid Response Concept.

247 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

EU BG Land RR FLEXIBILITY Roster Y Database

USABILIT

EUEU LandLand RRRR BattlegroupBattlegroup CapabilitiesCapabilities (if(if required)required)

MODULARITY

MarMar RRRR AirAir RRRR CapabilitiesCapabilities CapabilitiesCapabilities

Maritime RR Air RR Database Database

Modular approach scheme

at which forces start implementing their mission Rapid Response Force in the Joint Operation Area. Generation Mechanisms Military Rapid Response is the acceleration of the overall military approach which encompasses Conceptually, Member States are to offer, on all interrelated measures and actions in order a voluntary basis, such Military Rapid Response to enable a decisive military response to a crisis forces and capabilities by means of a pre-agreed ros- within 30 days. ter (as in the case of the EU Battlegroups), as well as Two main military response times have been the Land, Maritime and Air Rapid Response Data- established (see graphic on p. 247): bases of capabilities, along with the related Rapid 1. the generic Military Rapid Response, whereby Response Force Generation Conference. implementation of the mission starts 25 days For operations and missions using forces and after the EU decision to launch the operation; capabilities which are not pre-agreed or commit- 2. the Express Response Time, whereby imple- ted, it remains a national decision to determine the mentation of the mission starts 10 days after forces, and their state of readiness, to be offered to the EU decision to launch the operation (pri- the EU for the Military Rapid Response in Force marily for EU Battlegroups). Generation conferences especially dedicated to a In addition, on 23 May 2005 at the General Af- specific operation/mission. Finally, under some fairs External Relations Council, Member Sta- circumstances, alternate Rapid Response recourse tes also agreed a challenging planning timeline mechanisms could be employed, namely the EU requirement prior to the Council Decision to Framework Nation concept and/or Article 44 of launch an operation. It was determined that the the Treaty on the European Union could be used. planning timeline should be completed within At the end of the day, the availability of forces five days of the Crisis Management Concept offered by Member States, at the correct state of being approved, particularly for operations in- readiness, will dictate whether a Military Rapid volving Battlegroups. Response is possible.

248 3 Capabilities

Modular Approach In summary, this revision inter alia identified the decisions that initiate a Rapid Response, estab- As directed by the December 2013 European lished the procedures to be followed and meas- Council, the Military Rapid Response concept ures to be taken in order to facilitate the timely includes a package of measures in order to ensure commitment and generation of Rapid Response consistency, interconnection, compatibility, forces. It also aligned timelines and developed the interoperability, complementarity and standardi- modular approach with a view to enabling flex- sation across the full spectrum of the EU Mili- ibility and complementarity between the different tary Rapid Response concept suite. The newly Rapid Response tools. adopted approach aims at developing a modular There is no doubt that all of this increases both approach in order to make the rapid response the operational usability and deployability of the tools more adaptable to the entire range of pos- EU Battlegroups, and strengthens the complete sible crises. suite of Rapid Response instruments as called for In most cases the Military Rapid Response may by the European Council in 2013. have to be tailored to the required task. The EU However, such agreed enhancements will be of has taken measures to streamline the process of use only if, from the outset, Member States’ polit- Force Generation, through the Rapid Response ical will to respond “rapidly” is supported by their mechanisms (EU BG Roster and Rapid Response appropriate and timely contributions to carry out databases) and has introduced the modular the related mission or operation. approach. The development of the modular approach enhances both the EU BG’s usability and the flexibility of the Rapid Response, without reducing the level of ambition. This approach uses modules which are most likely to be capability- based (see graphic on p. 249). They may or may not have utility on their own, but are to be used as building blocks for a force designed to tackle all the assigned tasks when responding to a particular crisis. Member States may commit such modules specifying their durations and readiness levels (preferably matching them to the ones of the EU BGs).

Conclusion

The revised Military Rapid Response Con- cept, as agreed by the EU Military Committee on 17 December 2014, refined the entire Rapid

Response suite and represents a significant step Union Council of the European Photo: forward and improvement in the overall EU mili- The EU Battlegroup concept is based on the ex- tary rapid response capability. periences and best practices of EUFOR ARTEMIS in 2003

249 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

3.2.2. Civilian Rapid Reaction/Response

by Birgit Loeser

When, back in 1999, the European Secu- regarding rapidity in deployment, including the rity and Defence Policy (ESDP) was introduced following: as part of the European Union’s Common For- • guidelines for rapid deployment of Integrated eign and Security Policy (CFSP), the idea was to Police Units (IPUs) and other police elements obtain ‘crisis management’ capabilities – a notion in the initial stage of an EU-led substitution clearly indicating rapid response in a post-conflict mission and interoperability of IPUs and Police scenario. Headquarters The first Civilian Headline Goal was set in 2000 • guidelines for rapid deployment of police ele- at the meeting of the European Council in Santa ments in an EU-led substitution mission Maria da Feira, Portugal. It identified ‘policing’, • a concept for rapid deployment of police ele- the ‘rule of law’, ‘civil administration’ and ‘civil ments in an EU-led substitution mission protection’ as four priority areas for the EU in this • guidelines on standard IPU/FPU structures context. In the area of policing, the 2000 Feira • the Crisis Response Team concept, a pool of Council set concrete targets whereby EU Mem- pre-selected experts. ber States would collectively provide up to 5 000 However, already the very first mission, EUPM police officers for crisis management operations, Bosnia and Herzegovina, launched in January with 1 000 officers on high readiness (able to be 2003, was not so much a mission in ‘crisis ma- deployed within 30 days). In the area of justice/ nagement’, but a longer-term capacity-building rule of law, the 2001 Gothenburg Council sub- mission with tasks including the following: EUMM Georgia was deployed in a record time following the war between Georgia and the Russian Federation, sequently set the following goal: by 2003, the EU • support to the police reform process; in order to monitor the EU-brokered Six-Point Agreement: patrolling activities started two weeks after the Council Decision launching the Mission was to be able to (i) have 200 judges and prosecu- • assistance in the fight against organised crime; tors prepared for crisis management operations • removal of non-compliant BiH police officers. in the field of rule of law who could be deployed Also the second mission, EUPOL Kinshasa, and within 30 days, (ii) establish a pool of experts in its successor, EUPOL RD Congo, was aimed at the area of civilian administration (including gen- training the Congolese police and later to contri- eral administrative, social and infrastructure func- bute to wider police reforms. EUPOL COPPS, tions), and (iii) provide civil protection teams of launched in 2005 in support of Palestinian police up to 2 000 people, all deployable at very short development, had a similar function. notice. These teams included two to three assess- These three early missions are examples of mis- ment/coordination teams consisting of 10 experts sions launched with a longer-term perspective who could be dispatched within three to seven of capacity building. As a matter of fact, EUPM hours. At the 2004 Civilian Capabilities Commit- Bosnia and Herzegovina lasted six years, the Con- ment Conference in Brussels, these targets were golese civilian CSDP mission engagement lasted declared to have been met (and indeed exceeded). seven years overall and the Palestine mission has In parallel to these efforts, the responsible Police so far gone on for eight years. Unit within the Council Secretariat developed a Having said that, three other civilian CSDP number of concepts underpinning the ambitions missions were set up within a very short reaction

250 3 Capabilities Photo: EUMM Georgia Photo:

EUMM Georgia was deployed in a record time following the war between Georgia and the Russian Federation, in order to monitor the EU-brokered Six-Point Agreement: patrolling activities started two weeks after the Council Decision launching the Mission

time, actually within just 6 to 8 weeks, as fol- Each of these missions saw the deployment of lows: mission personnel in record time, within a few • AMM Aceh in 2005 to support the post-tsuna- weeks only from the agreement that ‘action was mi demobilisation of Aceh rebels; appropriate’ and each with a full set of the neces- • EUBAM Rafah in 2005 to provide a third-par- sary legal and planning documents in place. ty presence at the Rafah Crossing Point, to help What made them so fast? build relevant Palestinian capacity and to help There are a number of factors contributing to build up confidence between the Government this: of Israel and the Palestinian Authority; • First of all, each of these missions saw rather • EUMM Georgia in 2008 to provide civilian innovative solutions to problems, in part even monitoring of parties’ actions, including full slightly bending the rules: for Georgia, ‘pre- compliance with the six-point Agreement with paratory measures’ (a financial instrument for a view to contributing to stabilisation, normali- the start-up of civilian CSDP missions) were sation and confidence building. used for the first time, allowing the mission

251 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

quicker access to funds for procurement, sala- budget for the preparatory phase of a mission, ries, rent, cars, etc. EUBAM Rafah, by con- before it is actually set up legally and financially trast, still had to obtain unprecedented ‘vol- by a Council Decision; untary contributions’ from Member States 3. the revision of the applicable procurement rules to fill the mission budget quickly and un-bu- that, for now, remain the same as those appli- reaucratically. The EU Military Staff assisted cable for development projects, which have no in the setting up of EUMM Georgia with time constraints; what is called the ‘Rapid Staging and Onward 4. the establishment of a warehouse near Berlin Movement’ capability (RSOM), which was es- that stores such assets, readily available for any sential to get the promised 200 monitors on initial deployments and mission start-up; time to their respective field offices. 5. the revision of the 2003 crisis management proce- • Secondly, all three missions were monitoring mis- dures in 2013 that allow for an earlier appoint- sions that do not necessarily require, at least ment and thus also deployment of the Head initially, high-profile experts. A monitor who of Mission and his/her Core team as well as understands his role and who can write reports early access to the mission budget which, again, is all that is needed, at least for a start. By con- mainly facilitates early procurement; trast, longer-term capacity-building missions 6. in December 2013 EU Heads of State and Gov- performing mentoring and advisory tasks do ernment for the first time in five years dedicat- require a certain degree of seniority and pro- ed the European Council Summit to CSDP. In fessionalism, a good sense of conflict awareness the run-up to this event, there were a number and, often, even diplomatic skills. Such experts of Member States’ non-papers and proposals can only be found through proper recruitment on how to enhance the effectiveness of CSDP, processes that take up to four months. including in the field of civilian capabilities and • Thirdly, each of these missions met with une- rapid response. The European Council ended qualled, massive and unanimous political will by up inviting the Commission, the High Rep- EU Member States. Lessons clearly show that, if resentative and Member States “to ensure that this is in place, then rules can be adapted and the procedures and rules for civilian missions en- means are available, almost in abundance. able the Union to be more flexible and speed up It is worth noting that the latest civilian CSDP the deployment of EU civilian missions”. A ‘road missions all focus on longer-term capacity-buil- map’ was agreed as a follow-up to this, which ding and reform support tasks, yet Member States addressed related financial, logistical, decision- often wish to see them set up rapidly, not least making, planning and other aspects. for visibility and credibility reasons. This was for The latest civilian CSDP missions planned and example the case when planning for the EUCAP set up in 2015 (EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUAM Sahel Niger mission, but also EUBAM Libya and, Ukraine) were able to benefit from the above- most recently, EUAM Ukraine. mentioned steps and the momentum created by Over the past few years, therefore, major show- the December 2013 Council and saw some real stoppers in rapid deployment have been addressed, improvements in the speed in which missions can inter alia through the following: be set up. Yet there is room for improvement and, 1. the conclusion of ‘framework contracts’ that hence, the following avenues are being pursued to speed up considerably the procurement of further reduce the timelines: critical enabling material such as soft-skin and • TheEuropean Gendarmerie Force (EGF) has the armoured vehicles, IT and security equipment capacity to deploy speedily and, for example, and similar services; mount an interim mission Headquarters and 2. the establishment of ‘preparatory measures’, a show a visible presence on the ground. Whilst

252 3 Capabilities Photo: EUBAM Rafah Photo: Following the conclusion of the Agreement on Movement and Access, EUBAM Rafah was deployed rapidly to provide a third party presence at the Rafah Crossing Point. On stand-by since 2007, the mission continues to support the Palestinian Authority in building up their border management capacity with a view to their return to Gaza border crossing

the EGF is not a European Union body, it has To sum up, the EU has proven that it does offered its services to the EU in the framework have a real capability for rapid response, but there of CSDP, and this is now being considered. are also limitations, the main one relating to the • Whilst the procurement rules have been adapted selection of the right number and quality of mis- over time and made more flexible, what would sion personnel, which is critical for longer-term really help is if the Financial Regulations could capacity-building missions that operate in a crisis be changed in a similar way as was done for environment. These mission personnel need not ECHO, the EU humanitarian aid and civil least to have sound experience in change manage- protection department. ment, which makes them scarce and not easy to • A feasibility study for a ‘Shared Service Centre’ was release from their present jobs. concluded in 2014 which is now being discussed “Where there’s a will, there’s a way” – this old with Member States. The basic idea consists in saying also remains true. Unanimous and strong centralising certain mission support functions for political will can “move mountains”. The main civilian CSDP missions in Brussels, which should conclusion is that Member States have to set their considerably facilitate efficiency and standardisa- level of ambition and preparedness. They are the tion, and ultimately also the speed in delivering ones to dictate the rhythm and speed of decisions essential services to these missions. taken in Brussels.

253 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

3.3. Building Human Resources via Training

3.3.1. The European Security and Defence College

by Jochen Rehrl

More than 80 national training providers support the activities of the European Security and Defence College (in the picture: a family photo of the Executive Academic Board)

Greek presidency introduced what it called ‘Com- mon training’ as one of the presidency priorities. The task of common training involved developing a European security culture by providing knowl- edgeable personnel both in the EU Member States and within the EU institutions.

ESDC = 28 EU Member States

The EU Member States are the political mas- ters of the college. They convene in a steering committee, which is chaired by a representative of the High Representative and which gives political guidance and strategic direction on issues relating to the academic training programme. 2005 saw the establishment of a new institution The programme encompasses all the training which would soon become the number one train- activities offered in the course of the academic ing provider in the field of Common Security and year, which runs from September to July. A small Defence Policy. That institution was the European but efficient international secretariat located in Security and Defence College, also known by the Brussels facilitates the conduct of training activi- abbreviation ESDC. ties and the organisation of meetings in various formats.

ESDC = facilitator of a European Security Culture ESDC = 80 training providers

Before the foundation of the ESDC, there was The ESDC was created as a network college no single entity in the EU devoted to European and therefore relies on certified national training training and the development of a common Euro- institutes, which provide training on a ‘costs lie pean security culture. It was only in 2002 that the where they fall’ basis.

254 3 Capabilities Photo: Jochen Rehrl Photo:

More than 80 national training providers support the activities of the European Security and Defence College (in the picture: a family photo of the Executive Academic Board)

In general, the courses can be attended cost- ESDC = 40 different training free, insofar as the ESDC does not charge tuition courses fees. The sending authority covers participants’ Over the years, the ESDC has developed around travel and accommodation costs. 40 different training activities, most of them with The college is currently composed of around 80 a regional or horizontal focus. Two of the more national training institutes with various areas of general courses are on the Common Foreign and expertise and backgrounds. Security Policy itself, at newcomer level in the case Network members range from national defence of the CSDP Orientation Course and at strate- academies to peace universities, from police col- gic leadership level in the case of the CSPD High leges to diplomatic training institutes. Level Course. The other courses/seminars/confer- Some of the college’s activities are hosted by ences focus on horizontal (e.g. peacebuilding) and ministries or permanent representations, others regional (e.g. Western Balkans) issues. Specific by EU institutions or other EU entities including training programmes for partners (e.g. Eastern the European External Action Service. Partners) complement the academic programme of the college.

ESDC = embedded in the EEAS ESDC = support to EU missions The structure of the college is as unique as its and operations setting within the EU structures. The ESDC is embedded in the crisis manage- The latest discussions on CSDP in various ment structures of the European External Action Council bodies (inter alia CIVCOM) has put pre- Service. deployment training, in-mission-training and pre- It is therefore not a CSDP agency, unlike the paratory training on the ESDC agenda. More and European Defence Agency or the Institute for more CSDP missions and operations involve a role Security Studies in Paris. for the college in providing training for staff. The It has limited legal capacity and is able to pro- first such training course was an eLearning course vide first-hand training to meet real-time train- for newcomers in EUNAVFOR Somalia and more ing needs and requirements. recent courses have included an in-mission-training course on Security Sector Reform.

255 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

reprint with amendments ESDC = three handbooks and Second Edition ed. (rev.) ed. nd

several other publications 2

Since 2010, the ESDC has published three

handbooks on the Common Security and HANDBOOK ON CSDP Defence Policy. A total of about 15 000 copies of these publications have been distributed to date, primarily to facilitate the college’s various training activities. The handbooks were as follows: Jochen Rehrl, Hans-Bernhard Weisserth (eds): Weisserth Hans-Bernhard Rehrl, Jochen 1. Handbook on CSDP: This handbook, pub- HANDBOOK lished in 2010, was the first in the series of CSDP related handbooks. It gives an overview CSDP

THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY of procedures, structures and policies. The OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ISBN: 987-3-902275-34-9 third edition of the handbook was published vailable under: http://goo.gl/T3i LN p vailable

in 2015. A 2. Handbook for Decision Makers: The second handbook was developed for decision makers. It provides comments and analysis on current CFSP/CSDP issues such as sanctions, cyber security and non-proliferation. The first edition was published in 2014.

3. Handbook on CSDP Missions and Opera- H andbook F o R d ECISI on M ak ERS tions: This latest handbook was published in 2015 and focuses on operational aspects of the (ed.): Rehrl Jochen Common Security and Defence Policy. Handbook

FoR The three handbooks were published by the dECISIon MakERS

Austrian Ministry of Defence and Sports. Other the CommoN SeCurIty aNd defeNCe PolICy of the euroPeaN uNIoN publications, including an electronicISBN: 987-3-902275-35-6newsletter,

were issued in the margins of the military Eras- under: http://goo.gl/J CG 3W N vailable A mus programme, either by the Polish and Cypri- ot presidencies or by the ESDC itself. The handbooks and other publications have contributed greatly to both expertise development and brand visibility.

ESDC = recognised high quality training

As a network college, the ESDC has a presence in Brussels and across all 28 EU Member States. Besides the classical national training institutes, ministries and national permanent representations also provide training at EU level. vailable under: http://eeas.europa.eu/esdc vailable A

256 3 Capabilities

In order to guarantee a minimum level of quality, all training delivered under the aegis of the ESDC must follow a standardised curriculum, which is developed by the host country or institute and agreed by all Member States. These curricula are revised annually by the relevant bodies of the European External Action Ser- vice and by the national institutes and other external experts active in the field, amongst others.

ESDC = young officers exchange scheme

Since 2008, the college has been actively involved in and leading the young officers exchange scheme. The main goal of this initiative, which is modelled on its civilian counterpart ERASMUS, is to instil European officers with a common security culture and therefore render the armed forces 100 % interoperable. Within the ESDC framework, military, navy and air academies across the Member States work towards the achievement of this ambitious politi- College Security and Defence European Photo: cal goal. The ESDC is embedded in the EEAS structures and supported by the hierarchy (in the picture: former HR/VP Catherine Ashton) ESDC = using synergies for mutual benefit support to ESDC activities for the Eastern Partner- ship countries. Other Commission directorates also Other initiatives aim at identifying and using provide support to meet specific training needs. synergies between various actors in the field of They include DG HOME (counter-terrorism), CFSP and CSDP to support the regional priori- DG MOVE (maritime security) and DG DEVCO ties of the EU Member States and the European (fragility, security, development). External Action Service. Building on these efforts, strong ties have been established between the ESDC and the newly cre- ESDC = number one CFSP/CSDP ated Directorate General for Neighbourhood Pol- training provider icy and Enlargement negotiations (DG NEAR). TAIEX, a European Commission Technical The college has several advantages over other Assistance and Information Exchange instrument training providers: managed by DG NEAR, finances ESDC training 1. The ESDC is embedded in the EU structures, activities directed at the implementation and facili- hence able to quickly identify new training tation of accession efforts. The Eastern Partnership needs and include them in its programming cy- platform, also within DG NEAR, provides similar cle and curricula.

257 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS Photo: Ukrainian National Defence University Ukrainian National Defence Photo:

With regional training programmes, the ESDC supports the Eastern Partnership initiatives and the Western Balkans (in the picture: a training event in Kiev, October 2014)

2. The ESDC provides first-class training, thanks groups are balanced. This approach allows for to its network structure, its broad variety of lec- exchanges of views on CFSP and CSDP from a turers including practitioners, academics and variety of vantage points. officials, its use of participants with a wealth 5. The ESDC supports the regional policies of the of expertise and professional experience as re- EU by providing tailor-made training for part- source persons, its eLearning Management tool ners such as the Asia Regional Forum and the and its standardised, annually updated curricu- Arab League. la. 6. The ESDC evaluates all training events and in- 3. The ESDC awards its students a certificate, cludes its findings in the annual revision pro- which is signed by the High Representative cess. This ensures that shortfalls can be limited, of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security good practices can be shared and a high quality Policy and legally recognised by all EU Member of training can be guaranteed for future train- States and EU institutions. ing activities. 4. The ESDC follows an inclusive approach, inviting civilian, police, military and diplomatic staff to its courses, and ensuring that training

258 3 Capabilities

How to register for an ESDC event

The main ESDC target group is made up of officials from EU Member States and EU institutions/agencies, including CSDP missions and operations. For registration, the ESDC uses a secure electronic registration system called ENLIST. Each relevant entity nominates a responsible person, who registers and ranks participants from his or her institution. You will find a complete list of ENLIST nominators on the ESDC website (http://eeas.europa.eu/esdc). The ESDC Secretariat performs the role of ENLIST nominator for candidates from third countries and organisations. For some courses such as the Senior Mission Leader Course or the Advanced Political Advisor Course, the training host may prefer to use a more personalised registration system. In these cases, candidates are requested to fill in an application form. Based on the data provided, the training host, together with the ESDC Secretariat, performs a selection process to identify the most suitable participants. Some training courses, include those on classified information require that participants have personal security clearance (PSC).

ESDC = 8 000 alumni Where to find out about courses and seminars: In 2015, the ESDC can look back on a 10 year success story. More than 8 000 students have been ESDC courses are advertised trained in more than 350 training sessions, seminars and conferences. a. on the ESDC website All EU Member States, institutions and agen- (http://eeas.europa.eu/esdc), cies have sent staff to ESDC events. ESDC train- b. via the Schoolmaster system and ing is also recognised as an important part of pre- c. on the EEAS training intranet site deployment and in-mission training. Thanks to its (EEASzone). success, the ESDC is well known by EU partners within and beyond Europe. All EU Member States, institutions and Within its current mandate, which is framed agencies, including CSDP missions and by the 2013 Council Decision, and with the operations are invited to every training unanimous support of all the actors involved, the event through their nominated points of ESDC is well equipped to provide high-quality contact. training to tackle the challenges of tomorrow’s Where third States or organisations are missions and operations. invited, course details are sent via their The ESDC facilitated the development of a missions, Delegations or other offices in European Security Culture over the past 10 years Brussels. and will build on its efforts in the future.

259 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

3.3.2. Training for the CSDP missions

by Petteri Taitto

Personnel deployed to crisis areas need to be Training path equipped with the necessary skills and knowledge to perform successfully from the start of their tour Training for the CSDP missions can be proof duty in the respective CSDP mission or opera- vided in various phases, settings and frameworks. tion. Every mission member should understand There is no comprehensive training system, but the comprehensive crisis management and func- the training activities can be classified as basic, tioning principles of the Common Security and advanced, pre-deployment and in-mission train- Defence Policy. They also need to know the roles ing. of different actors in theatre, to possess the neces- The basic training provides participants with sary communication and negotiation skills, and the basic knowledge and skills required on an to understand the importance of human rights. international crisis management mission, indepen- Lastly, they need the basic skills to tackle safety dently from the specific function they will perform and security risks in the mission area and comply as experts in their own fields. Such training pri- fully with the EU Code of Conduct. marily helps participants to acquire the skills and Training can be seen as bridging the gap knowledge they will need on the missions, and thus between required and existing competencies. enhance possibilities for successful recruitment. Most of the competencies can be secured through Advanced training enables civilian experts in a efficient recruitment focusing on relevant educa- particular field to understand how their expertise tion and work experience. However, working in a will need to be adapted for use in crisis areas, and multicultural mission environment requires spe- what special considerations may apply to their cific skills and knowledge that can be obtained particular area of work. These training courses only through relevant training. So training is an can be seen as complementary to the basic train- essential pre-requisite for anyone being deployed ing or function-specific preparation provided to to crisis management missions. the selected experts at the time of deployment.

phases for training and recruitment Preparedness/Training Recruitment Mission specific Mission/Operation Phase Phase Training Phase Phase

Deployment Redeployment

Civilian Call for Selection Induction Training Missions Contribution Process Advanced/Generic Predeployment In-Mission Training Training Training

Military Force Force Force Rotation Phases Operations Sensing Generation/ Integration Manning Training (FIT)

Specific Training for pre-identified staff e.g. • CSDP FoundationTraining • EU Operational Planning Course Graphic: Rehrl/scala

260 3 Capabilities

Advanced training may also take the form of com- PDT Modules plementary training for mission personnel delivered during the tour of duty in the mission area. Generic Mission mandate The ESDC provides, for instance, ‘Senior Mission Leader’, ‘Legal Advisor’, ‘Political Adviser’, ‘Press Mission specific eHEST, HEAT and Public Information’ and ‘Gender Adviser’ courses. Security CSDP, International actors, Nominated/selected personnel receive pre- CoC, MMA, Projects, deployment training just before the mission Reporting, planning, deployment. It aims to harmonise the manage- Cultural awareness, etc. ment culture of CSDP missions and ensure that Available methods: the persons concerned receive the knowledge and • Residental courses skills they will need to be fully operational from Graphic: ESDC/scala • IDL the beginning of their tour of duty. This training also prepares the future mission members to Pre-deployment training consists of generic and mission- specific modules and, often, also a security module make the most of the field induction training, in order to adapt to the new working environment as quickly as possible. A number of surveys1 and seminars include Induction training is given in the mission (area) valuable information on what is needed in terms immediately after deployment and is complemen- of the content and delivery of pre-deployment tary to the pre-deployment training. This form of training activities. However, the content and training aims to further familiarise the person with requirements of pre-deployment training have the administrative procedures for joining the mis- been defined rather loosely in the existing docu- sion, as well as the security and communication ments.2 aspects applicable to all mission members. Based on ‘lessons identified’ and training docu- Some EU Member States have organised ments providing guidance on pre-deployment debriefings, and Lessons Learned events are also training, pre-deployment training should aim to organised, aimed at improving the quality of the train personnel so that at the end of their training seconding authority’s training provision. the participants will: • understand the EU’s CSDP and how a specific mission is connected to it; Pre-deployment training • be familiar with structures and roles of the EU’s civilian crisis management system; From a legal point of view, and in more gen- • understand the overall mandate of the speci eral terms, pre-deployment training is part of the fic civilian crisis management mission and its employer’s duty of care towards its employees. management; Hence, seconding authorities and CSDP missions • understand the links between the mission and (for contracted personnel) are responsible for pre- relevant departments in Brussels-based institu- paring their personnel to difficult working conditions; tions so that they are aware of their rights, duties • know about the mandates and activities of oth- and responsibilities. er actors on the ground and how they interlink,

1 i.e. Civilian crisis management pre-deployment training report on survey results and elements for the way ahead (2011/ 673853). 2 i.e. Future training needs for personnel in civilian crisis management operations (16849/06), Generic Standards of behaviour (8373/32005), Enhancing civilian crisis management training (15567/2/09).

261 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

especially in the context of the EU’s compre- lar, between the Member States. The first step in hensive approach to crisis management; such coordination is to standardise the curricula. • be familiar with the local culture; Pre-deployment and induction training courses • be able to identify the security risks in the mis- are complementary, so the curricula should be sion area. developed through close cooperation between the providers and the recipients. Security training requirements, such as eHEST Member States should seek ways to combine for all missions and Hostile Environment Aware- resources in order to be more efficient. This has ness Training (HEAT) for the high-risk missions, not been successful over the last 10 years owing would ideally be a precursor to attending the pre- to the lack of coordination. It has been suggested deployment training. that pre-deployment training can be arranged in the Member States, whereby certain training institutions would specialise in preparation for certain Pooling and sharing requires missions. This solution requires complex logistical coordination arrangements at the time of deployment. Asking all 14 missions to apply the same quality stand- According to the Lessons Learned report 2013, ards at the same time in a range of different loca- a common foundation of pre-deployment train- tions will be challenging. ing for all CSDP mission staff can greatly enhance The ESDC is the only training actor solely mission effectiveness and coherence. The impor- devoted to CSDP training and one of its tasks tance of proper pre-deployment training was men- is to support the management of training in the tioned as one of the five most important findings. field of conflict prevention and civilian crisis man- CIVCOM stressed in its conclusions that training agement. Some progress has been achieved, when in the field of CSDP is principally a Member State ESDC, with its network institutions, has devel- competence, and agreed that a common founda- oped a standardised curriculum for ‘Preparatory tion for both seconded national staff and interna- training for CSDP Missions’, which is certified tional contracted staff is an important objective. 3 by all EU Member States. This training addresses Already in 2011 it was identified that a large both generic and mission-specific training needs. number of mission personnel do not receive pre- In the future, the main challenge will not, deployment training.4 Primary responsibility for however, be the content, but rather the process the training of seconded staff lies with Member whereby preparatory training is included as part States, whilst the CSDP mission is responsible of the ‘in-processing’ of CSDP missions. Deploy- for the training of contracted personnel. Many ment from home to the pre-deployment train- of the Member States have found it difficult to ing and from the training to the mission area is arrange preparatory training for small numbers at the most cost-efficient way to include training in the time of deployment. For years, Member States the in-processing. So in future pre-deployment have been encouraged to cooperate in pre-deploy- training should, where possible, be arranged on ment training courses5, but little real progress has a monthly basis at a place that is easily reached been made. by both instructors and participants, preferably in Further coordination and pro-active planning Brussels though also where the institutes involved is needed among all stakeholders and, in particu- in the network are located.

3 Annual 2013 CSDP Lessons Report 00407/14. 4 2011 Comprehensive Annual Report on CSDP and CSDP-related training 17438/11. 5 Enhancing civilian crisis management training 15567/2/09.

262 Conclusions 4 and Way ahead

263 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

4.1. EU-UN cooperation in regional conflict management: beyond the horizon

by Michel Liégeois

In order to look beyond the horizon and try to in 2000, have been key stakeholders in the ‘New figure out how the EU’s Common Security and Horizon’ dynamic and take a substantive part in Defence Policy (CSDP) could develop over the the annual debate in the C-34, the special com- next decade, let us posit the following: mittee on peacekeeping operations. Without With time passing after European troop with- denying the importance of this wide range of drawal from Afghanistan, the EU’s Common support and involvement, the unspoken reality Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) will face a behind these statements is that, since the second growing risk of inconsistency if it goes on claiming half of the nineties, the EU’s Member States have a commitment to effective multilateralism while largely deserted UN peacekeeping operations, in excluding the possibility of deploying CSDP capa- which they used to be very active. For almost 20 bilities under UN command. years now, UN peacekeeping activity has been Since the early stages of the CSDP, the official staffed mainly by developing countries. The UN discourse about the use of military capabilities Secretary-General has regularly expressed con- in support of the EU’s foreign policy has largely cern about such an obvious imbalance at a time emphasised multilateral peace operations as a of overstretched UN peacekeeping. At the same major area of activity. It began in the early nineties time, with the same regularity, the EU has praised with the Petersberg missions and continued there- itself as a major supporter of international peace after, with the 2003 Security Strategy stating that and security, both through financial support for “[t]he EU should support the United Nations as UN operations and through the conducting of it responds to threats to international peace and EU operations mandated by the UN Security security”. Council. Five years later, in the first report on the implementation of the strategy, the Council confirmed that Enhancing European support “[t]he UN stands at the apex of the international through the CSDP system” and states further: “Everything the EU has done in the field of security has been linked to Let us look at the practical arrangements and UN objectives. (…) We support all sixteen current available options for the EU to provide military UN peacekeeping operations”. support to UN peacekeeping. In New York, the EU’s Member States tend to The first option is participation by some EU express similar views on the evolution of UN Member States in a UN operation. As already peacekeeping; they welcomed the Brahimi report mentioned, many European countries took a large

264 4 Conclusions and Way ahead

part of the burden of UN peacekeeping at its post- cold-war peak. This fairy tale came to a dramatic end with the fatal trilogy: Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda, where European Blue Helmets experienced casualties and intense frustration due to the poor match between the mandates and the situations on the ground. From then till now, as far as Europeans are concerned, the UN is no longer the preferred framework for military operations abroad, to say the least. The first significant move away from this reluctance came in 2006 with the reinforcement of the UN Interim Force in Leba- non (UNIFIL). Responding to the call of the UN Secretary-General, a group of EU Member States decided to provide the core of the new UNIFIL. But they did so by imposing their own specific conditions on the UN Department of Peacekeep- ing Operations (DPKO). Their participation was Photo: European Union/Kena Betancur subject to unusual arrangements regarding heavy European Union Foreign Policy Chief Federica Mogherini weaponry, rules of engagement, staffing of the with United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon at UN headquarters, New York, 9 March 2015 operational headquarters in Naqura and the creation of a Military Strategic Cell within DPKO in New York. Model consists in deploying EU militaries along- An evolution of that first option could be the side UN troops in order to provide them with creation of a clearing-house system within CSDP robust capabilities on the ground. EUFOR DRC structures, enabling DPKO to deal with a single in Kinshasa during the 2006 election process is an point of contact – at EU level – for the purpose example of that model. In December 2008, the of UN peacekeeping force generation. The added UN Secretary General officially requested another value of such a system must however be demon- EU standby operation in support of the MONUC strated. From the DPKO point of view, adding a in Eastern Congo. For lack of willingness on the layer of bureaucracy between their office and the part of EU Member States, that request was not Member States is regarded with scepticism. fulfilled. The second option is to conduct EU operations The third option consists in providing Euro- in support of the UN. This means the EU deploy- pean military assets to UN operations under ing military assets under its own command and DPKO control. That is ‘blue-hatting’ CSDP control system to perform a UN Security Coun- capabilities. This third option can also unfold in cil mandate. As envisaged by the Joint Statement different ways. The first one is envisaged in the on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management above-mentioned Joint Statement. It takes the of June 2007, it can apply two models of opera- form of a modular participation of European tions. The Bridging Model consists in using the assets in UN-led operations. One can think about rapid deployment capacity of the EU to stabilise high-tech, specialised or heavy military assets that the situation on the ground and enable the rather are usually lacking when the core manning of the slow UN force-generation system to provide the UN operations is provided by developing coun- UN troops thereafter. Artemis and EUFOR Chad tries. EU Member States could then, in the frame- were implementations of that model. The Standby work of the CSDP, usefully provide pooled airlift

265 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

capabilities, aerial intelligence, Special Forces or Let us look further in the details of the strategic helicopter units. concept of a joint operation. A more ambitious way to implement this An EU-UN joint operation would be a UN- third option would be for the EU to provide the mandated operation in which the EU is the main core component of a UN mission. This is quite troop and civilian personnel provider. It would be unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future, given characterised by the following principles: the restrictions and requirements related to partic- • the operation is given international legitimacy ipating in military missions abroad in the major- through a UN Security Council (UNSC) reso- ity of EU Member States. lution; Should this option be considered, it would • the mandate of the operation is jointly designed most likely draw on the provisions used when by the UNSC and EU Council [the mandate is negotiating the participation of several EU Mem- actually negotiated during a joint UN-EU Con- ber States to the reinforced UNIFIL in 2006. ference and then submitted to the UNSC by the UN Secretary General]; • the strategic control of the operation is jointly A joint EU-UN operation exercised by the UN and the EU; • an efficient double reporting line (to the EU- There is one final possibility that has never identified operation headquartersand to been seriously considered to date, unless theo- DPKO) is ensured by a strong Joint Strategic retically: a joint EU-UN operation. The main Coordination Mechanism (JSCM) [JSCM will added value of that model is that it preserves the be mainly staffed with European civilian and integrity of the EU’s strategic line of command military officers]; and control. • both civilian and military top management of Yet this could be a way to escape from the polit- the joint operation will be jointly appointed ical restrictions that prevent both the majority of by the UNSG and EU Member States in the Member States and, as a consequence, the EU as Council or the Political and Security Commit- such from taking part in UN peacekeeping opera- tee [Considering that the EU will be the main tions. The conduct of a peace operation by the troop contributor, the Joint Special Representative UN jointly with a regional organisation is not a (JSR), the Force Commander (FC) and the Police novelty. The United Nations-African Union Mis- Commissioner should be of EU origin]; sion in Darfur (UNAMID), despite its errone- • advanced military planning will be supported ous nickname ‘Hybrid’, is indeed a joint UN-AU by an EU force HQ; operation. • operational efficiency will be guaranteed by a One might argue that UNAMID cannot be single chain of command going top-down from seen as a prototype of successful operation. Oth- the UNSG through the Under Secretary-Gen- ers will add that few among the UNAMID stake- eral for Peacekeeping Operation [traditionally holders express great satisfaction with the UNA- European] to JSR [EU] and FC [EU]; MID Hybrid arrangements. What is suggested • the force HQ will be organised and staffed in here is that the difficulties experienced in imple- accordance with EU standards; it will be com- menting UNAMID’s ‘hybridity’ resulted from the plemented by additional personnel from other major imbalance of capabilities between the UN troop-contributing countries; and the AU. This UN-AU asymmetry is obvious • the overall management of the operation (in- in terms of experience, budget, human resources, cluding outfits, flags and markings) will be management, etc. Such an imbalance would not based on United Nations standards, principles exist in an EU-UN joint operation. and established practices;

266 4 Conclusions and Way ahead

• the costs of an EU-UN joint operation will fall Revisiting cooperation under the UN assessed-contributions system [see the UNAMID precedent]; • overheads will fall under the EU ‘costs lie where Such a CSDP involvement in UN peacekeep- they fall’ system. ing activities will also open up ways to bring new For such an option to be considered, it is neces- ideas into the ongoing debate on the evolution sary to demonstrate its added value compared of peace operations. For example, a conceptual to other existing options. The added value for breakthrough remains to be made in terms of a the UN would consist in the availability of new regional approach to peacekeeping. capabilities, enhancing both geographical diver- In areas like the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes sity and operational performance; access to rap- region and the Sahara-Sahel, the UN regional idly deployable forces without using the ‘Bridging approach remains far too rhetorical and lacks Model’ and thus avoiding the sometimes prob- application on the ground. When conflicts are lematic handover procedures; enhanced stand- regional, armed groups routinely conduct cross- ardisation and interoperability of the European border operations and States are unable to exer- contingents under the CSDP umbrella. cise proper control over thousands of kilometres From the point of view of the EU and its Mem- of remote borders, peace operations can no longer ber States, the added value is also worth consider- be defined with the same State-centric paradigm ing: that has been applied hitherto. • mutual support and collective management of This regional logic is to a certain extent encom- security issues on the ground; passed in the practice of the CSDP, and this takes • gain in common operational experience; the case for the EU’s comprehensive approach one • testing in real operational contexts of new step further. The EU added value could here also CSDP assets; take the form of expertise, support and training, • possibility of deploying European troops made e.g. in border management, in UN headquarters available through a CSDP procedure under as well as within UN peace operations. It could the UN flag in places where the EU flag would also consist in bold contributions to the ongoing have been less welcome; conceptual debate on the future of UN peace- • enhanced consistency of the EU discourse on keeping, advocating in favour of regional man- effective multilateralism; dates and cross-border deployments when the • strengthening of the position of EU (perma- situation requires it. nent and non-permanent) members of the Nonetheless, the political weight and the credi UNSC; bility of such a statement depend heavily upon • CSDP weighted leverage on CFSP in the area a future renewed EU commitment in UN peace of deployment. activities. It goes without saying that such an option would not be suited for all situations. It is very likely that if it ever sees the light it will be for a very limited number of occurrences. Yet, recent accounts of peace operations show more ad hoc designed concepts of operations rather than the application of unchangeable doctrines. It is therefore especially important to diversify the options available to Member States within the CSDP for cooperating with the UN.

267 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

4.2. Emerging security challenges

by Gustav Lindstrom

Introduction

The Common Security and Defence Policy Framework for Crisis Approach serves to encour- (CSDP) has come a long way since its operation- age a more coherent use of different instruments. alisation in 2003. Three developments stand out. Taken together, these developments under- First, CSDP missions have taken on a broader pro- score CSDP’s evolutionary capability to max- file. After an initial focus on police and peace-keep- imise added value. As a policy tool, CSDP also ing operations, missions and operations now tend needs to adapt to changes in the environment, to include rule of law, monitoring, security sector including possible emerging security challenges. reform (SSR), and capacity-building dimensions. The following section highlights emerging chal- Additional elements, such as gender mainstream- lenges that may have implications for CSDP in ing, human rights, and a comprehensive approach the future. are routinely integrated into mission profiles. Second, numerous mechanisms and bodies have developed to bolster CSDP’s effective- Emerging Security Challenges: A ness. Examples include the creation of a Civilian possible role for CSDP? Planning and Conduct Capability to facilitate command and control for civilian operations The future of CSDP is likely to include new and the setting up of a Crisis Management types of missions and operations. A starting point and Planning Directorate to enhance civilian- to gauge which missions and operations might military planning. Several initiatives have like- be most likely in the future is to analyse changes wise been unveiled to facilitate the execution in the security environment over the past dec- of CSDP missions and operations. The Athena ade. The table (see p. 269) provides an overview mechanism, created in early 2004, finances the of some these changes since the adoption of the common costs of military CSDP operations. European Security Strategy in 2003. As shown in In early 2007, an EU Watch-keeping Capabil- the table, it provides an overview of EU-external ity was formed within the EU Military Staff to developments, such as the rise of a more assertive streamline information exchanges and to moni- Russia, and intra-EU developments that likewise tor CSDP missions. Combined, these and other may include a security dimension – e.g. a growth initiatives contribute to a more active CSDP. in radicalisation across several EU Member Third, policy-makers have developed concepts States. and procedures to facilitate CSDP planning pro- A couple of conclusions can be drawn from a cesses. The EEAS has revised the CSDP crisis cursory overview of these security changes. First, management procedures to make faster responses the EU is facing a host of new challenges that possible when needed. The use of a Political originate from within or outside the EU. Second,

268 4 Conclusions and Way ahead

EU-external developments Intra-EU developments

• The rise of a more assertive/confident • An extended financial crisis since 2008 Russia aiming to uphold its interests in the and its associated implications for re- European neighbourhood sources available to address domestic/ • ‘Arab Spring’ and its aftershocks in the international challenges; continued high Middle East/North Africa region, several unemployment in many parts of Europe – with implications for the EU (e.g. illegal especially among youth migration) • A growth in radicalisation across several • Rise of ‘hybrid’ conflicts that require novel EU Member States, raising the prospect of thinking/policies; recent examples include more complex social threats and challen- conflict/war in Syria, Ukraine, and Gaza/ ges – including home-grown terrorism Israel; also includes new forms of transna- • Gradual implementation and extension of tional terrorism such as ISIL/ISIS the Schengen area; while offering many • The return of geopolitics, ranging from advantages, it also raises prospects of territorial disputes in the South China Sea higher volumes of transnational organised (Senkaku/Diaoyu) to increased interest in crime (including trafficking) the high north • Continued growth in European tourism • The gradual securitisation of several issu- abroad – raising prospects of EU citizens es of concern, including climate, health (as facing threats and disasters abroad seen during the recent Ebola outbreak), • Growing reliance on information and water, cyberspace, and strategic minerals communications technologies for daily • The continued rise of the ‘East’ in com- business; in addition, greater interlinkage parison to the ‘West’ – particularly visible across critical infrastructures and services in Asia/China; effects can be perceived resulting in greater vulnerability and possi- across economic, demographic, and gover- ble cascading effects across sectors nance sectors • Continued demographic trends of concern, • Enhanced ‘interaction effects’ across for- including ageing of European society com- merly distant arenas – e.g. climate change bined with low birth rates across several and resource-based conflict, global war- EU Member States ming and spread of disease to new areas (including EU Member State territory)

Table 1: Examples of contextual security changes post 2003 ESS (in no particular order)

a number of these potential security challenges • Addressing a possible rise in illegal immigra- do not have implications for CSDP. For example, tion to the EU in the aftermath of the Arab certain demographic trends – such as a rapidly Spring and current hybrid conflicts in parts of ageing European society – cannot be ameliorated the Middle East. through CSDP. Third, some of these security • The possibility of significant health security challenges will require a multi-pronged approach, challenges in the EU’s neighbourhood – a case which could theoretically benefit from a CSDP in point being the outbreak of Ebola in several contribution. At least four areas stand out in par- West African countries. The response from the ticular: United States, which included military person-

269 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

How might CSDP provide added value?

As noted earlier, addressing relevant challenges in Table 1 may not require CSDP assets. Indeed, several of these issues – such as a hypothetical evacuation of EU citizens stranded abroad – are likely to be handled at national level by the countries affected. A similar argument could be made for addressing illegal immigration, where the brunt of the challenge is likely to be borne by the recipient countries. Nevertheless, there may be situations in which a more collective response, which could include CSDP assets, could come into play. For example, under the auspices of a CSDP mission, specific competences such as monitoring, provision of medical equipment, evacuation services, etc., may prove more cost-effective and useful deployed under a CSDP umbrella rather than under individual national umbrellas. Specialised civilian expertise, such as a Cri- sis Response Team, may also be easier to deploy

Photo: Austrian Armed Forces Austrian Photo: as part of an EU ‘recovery’ mission rather than There are several factors and trends that suggest that CSDP as separate national efforts. Further synergies might become more relevant for EU homeland security may be envisaged with, for instance, the Emer- gency Response Coordination Centre, operating within the European Commission’s Humanitar- nel, exemplifies how health issues may become ian Aid and Civil Protection Department. ‘securitised’. Concerning homeland security, which could • Radicalisation of groups of individuals across gain greater relevance should illegal immigration several EU Member States. Exacerbating this and radicalisation challenges arise, the role for concern is the possibility that a small subset of CSDP is more difficult to anticipate. Providing these individuals travel to conflict zones, where homeland security involves a number of stakehold- they gain fighting experience which could then ers at all levels of government, ranging from local be leveraged within the EU at a later stage. authorities to national ministries. At national level, • Continued growth in European tourism abroad. consequence management may involve the minis- According to Eurostat, residents from the EU-28 tries of defence, foreign affairs, public safety, energy, (aged 15 and above), made 1.1 billion tourist trips interior, etc. The complexity of homeland security in 2013. Of this figure, 25 % went to interna- makes it difficult to envision how CSDP resources tional destinations – many outside the EU. While might fit into the puzzle. Moreover, homeland growth in travel abroad is a positive trend, it could security is associated with domestic/internal secu- have security implications should a substantial rity as opposed to external security. Thus, under number of EU citizens be caught in a natural or CSDP’s current remit – which focuses on external man-made disaster in distant locations. security – there is apparently no role for CSDP.

270 4 Conclusions and Way ahead

Nevertheless, there are several factors and trends that suggest that CSDP might become relevant for EU homeland security. To begin with, there is widespread recognition that the boundary between internal and external security is fuzzy in a globalised world. To adequately respond to threats that span the external/internal divide – such as trafficking in arms, drugs, humans, etc. – it is reasonable to consider whether CSDP resources can add value on a case-by-case basis rather than to automatically discard their possible contribution. A trend to observe is the tools used by EU Member States to address illegal immigration – beyond CSDP capacity-building efforts and long term EU policies which contribute addressing root causes of this phenomenon. At Jochen Rehrl Photo: the operational level, the EU has relied on a Specific competences such as monitoring, provision of patchwork of national contributions to provide medical equipment, evacuation services etc. may prove more cost-effective and useful deployed under a CSDP ships and other assets to curb illegal immigra- umbrella rather than under individual national umbrellas tion routes – many of which originate in West- (in the picture the flags of the participating countries in ern Africa. With the support of FRONTEX, MILEX 09 in FHQ Naples) the EU’s border security agency, interception operations have been mounted to stem the flow of illegal migrants. As a community agency, Another category of CSDP-related contributions FRONTEX is not part of the CSDP toolbox. might involve the use of maritime and air assets However, FRONTEX cooperates with agencies for monitoring and surveillance purposes. at the service of CSDP such as the EU Satel- lite Centre (EUSC). Among other activities, the EUSC has monitored illegal migration routes Conclusion and provided imagery with corresponding analysis covering areas of concern. Developments within the EU, coupled with Another trend to follow is policy-makers’ efforts changes in the international security landscape, to fight terrorism and provide internal security. suggest potential growth in demand for CSDP Considerable political capital was spent on fram- missions and operations. And while CSDP may ing a Solidarity Clause. Although the Solidarity only play a partial role in addressing such emerg- Clause has not been activated to date, it offers a ing security challenges (contingent on sufficient viable option in the event of a large-scale terrorist political will), the complexity of these issues will attack. Under such circumstances, CSDP assets, require careful analysis of how the EU should pri- whether civilian or military, could come into play. oritise where limited CSDP assets should or could A plausible example of such assistance is in the be employed. area of consequence management. Presently, there is an EU database listing military assets and capabilities that could be requested by an individual EU Member State in the aftermath of a large-scale event, including the case of disaster response.

271 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

4.3. The EU’s unique strength in preventing conflicts and managing crises by Gabor Iklódy

The world does not stand still; the past year Develop shared analysis – we has brought about new, dramatic changes in must understand the problem Europe’s security environment. To the East, Rus- sia’s aggression in Ukraine and continuing efforts Shared analysis should set out what we under- to intimidate the neighbourhood; to the South, stand about the causes of a conflict or crisis, the the advances of a barbaric terrorist group, ISIL, main people and groups involved, the dynam- which represent a genuine threat to international ics of the situation and potential risks. It should law and to European ideals. Failing States and the identify EU interests and our potential role in spread of violence across borders are features of contributing to peace and stability. We can a deteriorating security landscape. Whether right achieve this by strengthening early, proactive on Europe’s borders or further away, they chal- and regular information-sharing and coordina- lenge our security and undermine our interests. tion amongst all EU actors in the field and in Strategic external changes must be matched by Brussels (especially Delegations, CSDP mis- strategic internal changes: the EU needs to adapt sions, EU Special Representatives and Member and evolve both structurally and on policy. There States). Crises do evolve and therefore from time has been much talk, and more non-papers, on the to time we may have to review and refresh our comprehensive approach, a key concept giving the earlier analysis. To that end, a continuous, open EU unique strength in preventing conflicts and dialogue between CSDP missions/operations managing crises. The concept is no doubt compel- and the Brussels-based crisis management struc- ling but its true potential is yet to be unleashed. tures is required. Below are a few thoughts on how this can be In addition we must seek to develop and imple- translated into effect, building on the key areas for ment a common conflict/crisis analysis meth- improvement as highlighted in the EEAS/Com- odology involving all relevant EU actors and mission Joint Communication. CSDP, which is institutions, taking into account perspectives on part of the EU’s extensive toolbox, does have an development, humanitarian, political and security important supporting role to play in furthering from both the field and HQ. our broad state-building objectives.

272 4 Conclusions and Way ahead

Focus on prevention Develop a common strategic vision Whenever possible we must seek to prevent conflict before a crisis emerges or violence erupts. Building on shared analysis of a conflict or cri- We all know that preventing conflict saves lives sis, the EU should work across institutions and and reduces suffering, avoids the destruction of with strategic partners to develop a single, com- homes, businesses, infrastructure and the econ- mon strategic vision. This will set the overall omy, and makes it easier to resolve underlying direction for all EU support. tensions and disputes. It also helps protect EU The EU’s strategic vision for a country or a interests and prevent adverse consequences for region can be set out in an overarching EU strat- EU security and prosperity. egy document, such as the Horn of Africa Stra- We are establishing new EU early-warning tegic Framework and the Sahel Strategy. Today, systems, and modifying existing ones, to identify there is a growing need to develop comprehen- emerging conflict and crisis risks and determine sive, regional strategies that can be implemented joined-up mitigating actions. This may require through country-specific action plans. The region changes in Brussels, but again, input from col- affected and/or threatened by ISIL is a case in leagues in the field regarding the ‘ground truth’ point – in particular if we want to assess how the will be crucial. EU could help to contain the threat and strengthen This is likely to be augmented by strategic the resilience of the societies concerned. In crisis foresight, a new tool under development by the mode we are increasingly seeing the use of the CMPD. It is well established that moving from Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA) assessment to action in the crisis cycle is problem- as a key instrument to allow informed and coher- atic for anything other than reactive crisis manent decision-making. agement. When we consider conflict prevention measures, we have yet to act proactively by providing CSDP activity, even though Member States Mobilise the different strengths increasingly ask us to do so. We have a gap in the and capacities of the EU crisis cycle that we must fill in order to deliver conflict prevention contributions by CSDP mis- An effective response should draw on the dif- sions. To that end we need to look ahead and plan ferent strengths, capacities, competencies and ahead, implementing the CMPD’s mandate on relationships of EU institutions and Member advance planning. Strategic foresight, if incorpo- States, in support of our common vision and rated into long-term planning processes, can have objectives. The ‘train and equip’ concept, which a significant impact on policy-making and deci- is widely seen as one of the most important deliv- sion-making. Horizon-scanning, looking beyond erables of the June European Council on defence, the current challenges and preparing scenario- addresses precisely this issue as it aims to imple- based possible futures, and thereby improving our ment the comprehensive concept. It is intended understanding and preparation, should, I believe, to fill an identified gap by building partner coun- be an indispensable role of the EEAS. Strategic tries’ capacities also in the security and defence foresight will ensure that policy options, coupled sector, which is to be regarded as part of the EU’s with proper assessment of risks, resources and broad state-building efforts. CSDP is but one of support needs, are presented to senior manage- the instruments in the EU’s extensive toolbox ment in sufficient time, with sufficient coordina- and, despite occasional political temptations, it tion, and with sufficient analytical rigour to allow should not always be regarded as the instrument early decision-making. of first choice.

273 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

CSDP missions/operations rely heavily on Link internal and external Member States, and the alignment of potentially action disparate Member State activity with a common EU strategy in-country may be problematic. EU internal actions can have external effects on However, the comprehensive approach is not for conflict and crisis situations. Equally, these situa- the EU institutions alone – the role of the Mem- tions, and our responses to them, can impact on ber States has to be harnessed, or at the very least internal EU matters. For example, EU maritime understood, if we are to make this work. transport policy has a direct impact on Somalia Whilst the importance of partners’ capacity- and the Horn of Africa; in other situations the building will likely grow in importance in terms same may apply to fisheries or energy policy. Like- of both preventing and managing crises in the wise, the emergence of organised crime, terrorism, civilian and military fields alike, Member States’ or mass migration associated with violent conflict expectations vis-à-vis the EU playing a bolder role can have a direct impact on individual Member in protecting them from growing ‘hybrid threats’ States. are becoming more pronounced too. In a number The tragedy of ‘Charlie Hebdo’ and the grow- of areas the EU can serve as a platform to boost ing problem of ‘foreign fighters’ again remind us Member States’ and partners’ national efforts to that keeping ‘internal’ and ‘external’ apart is no counter such threats, build resilience against them longer sustainable. We need to remove the thick and thus reduce critical vulnerabilities. Clearly, walls that have traditionally separated the various CSDP can contribute. aspects of security: internal and external, defence and justice and home affairs, civil and military, and – in areas like cyber security – public and pri- Commit to the long term vate. This also requires a fundamental change in our Addressing the underlying causes of conflict mindset with regard to our missions and opera- and building peaceful, resilient societies requires tions. And, flowing from this, we need to mod- long-term engagement in peace-building and ernise our understanding of the capabilities we state-building. The objective of sustainable peace need. must be at the core of the EU’s response from the outset. CSDP is not in itself a development tool that seeks generational change. CSDP can play a Make better use of EU very important practical and political role, but a Delegations CSDP mission/operation is not designed for the long term. The EU Delegation, supported by an EU Spe- The results of short to medium-term CSDP cial Representative (EUSR) where appointed, is engagement need to endure beyond that lifespan, the focal point of the EU presence and should and we should constantly assess how we can tran- play a central role in delivering and coordinat- sition away from CSDP. ing action. Their role is pivotal in implementing How do we want to leave, with what legacy, and the comprehensive approach. Their reinforce- how do we achieve that? The strategic review pro- ment, where necessary, with proper security and cess will be instrumental in working out options defence expertise is vital. During the development and presenting them to the EEAS hierarchy and of detailed CSDP planning, the Delegation’s rela- to Member States, and your involvement in this tionship with the crisis management structures will be important. will be important.

274 4 Conclusions and Way ahead Graphic: European Parliamentary Research Service ParliamentaryGraphic: European Research The tragedy of “Charlie Hebdo” and the growing problem of “foreign fighters” again remind us that keeping “internal” and “external” security apart is no longer sustainable

Once launched, a CSDP mission/operation unmeasurable. But we will ask them to assess, must maintain and foster close links with the rel- propose modifications, seek greater synergies with evant EUSR and EU Delegation. This will not other instruments, and adapt. This is the best way, impact on the chain of command, but it should I believe, to ensure that they contribute directly to impact on the ability to deliver enduring effect. In the desired end-state. particular, options for transition may be fostered and enhanced by routine discussion with the EU Delegation.

Conclusion

So, what is new? The desire to align multiple lines of activity into a single coherent strategy is very much new. This will result in complex issues being tackled with a range of policy options, and complexity will impact on CSDP missions/ operations. The certainties of military or civilian security planning may become less fixed, but conversely this may also allow adaptive and more clearly focussed CSDP activity. We will not ask our missions and operations to do everything, with mandates that are simply unachievable or

275 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

4.4. The challenges OF CSDP Command and Control

by Wolfgang Wosolsobe

Introduction

The Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and Commander and will report to the PSC at regular the European Security Strategy (ESS) contain intervals. The EU Military Staff (EUMS), being the range of tasks for potential CSDP operations part of the EEAS, provides assistance in its sup- and missions. The successful accomplishment of porting role to the EUMC/CEUMC. At the mili- these tasks, further developed in five illustrative tary level, the C2 arrangements for any operation scenarios1, requires an appropriate Command are laid down on a case-by-case basis. In principle, and Control (C2) Structure. As the EU does not the EU military chain of command encompasses have a standing military C2 structure, tailored C2 three levels: Military Strategic (with the activa- arrangements are needed in order to ensure the tion of an Operational Headquarters – OHQ), successful planning and conduct of EU opera- Operational (with the activation of a Force Head- tions and missions. However, given the continu- quarters – FHQ), and Tactical. In some cases ous development of EU military involvement, in (usually for non-executive missions), the Council particular through non-executive missions2, the might appoint an EU Mission Commander who current arrangements may need to be revisited to performs the duties of both the Operation Com- ensure they continue to meet the requirements. mander and the Force Commander.

Concept and Principles Command options

A tailored command structure Due to the fact that it does not have a standing command structure, the EU establishes the chain The political control and strategic direction of of command for EU-led military operations and any EU military operation or mission is exercised missions on a case-by-case basis. This is achieved by the Political and Security Committee (PSC), by: under the responsibility of the Council and of the • selection and activation of HQs listed in the High Representative / Vice-President. The Chair- Force Catalogue3; man of the Military Committee (CEUMC) will • the activation of the EU Operations Centre act as a primary point of contact with the EU (EU OPSCEN);

1 Assistance to Humanitarian Operations, Separation of Parties by Force, Stabilisation, Reconstruction and Military Advice to third countries, Conflict Prevention and Evacuation Operations. 2 A non-executive mission supports the host nation in an advisory and / or training role. A contrario, an executive operation is mandated to conduct actions in place of the host nation. 3 France, Germany, Greece, Italy and the United Kingdom have listed an OHQ in the Force Catalogue. France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom have listed an FHQ in the Force Catalogue.

276 4 Conclusions and Way ahead

OpCdr Military Strategic level (OHQ) MCdr (MHQ) FCdr Operational level (FHQ)

CC Land CC Air CC Mar Other CCs Mil Tactical level elements Forces Forces Forces Forces Graphic: Wosolsobe/scala In principle, the EU military chain of command encompasses three levels: military strategic, operational and tactical.

• having recourse to NATO common assets and Other MS) ‘augmentees’. Augmentation by other capabilities and utilising SHAPE as an OHQ EU MS is achieved using a list of pre-identified under the Berlin+ arrangements. personnel (Primary Augmentee Database), and/ • using other ad hoc national/multinational or through a dedicated Manning Conference. OHQs or MHQs tailored to the mission. This system is intended to allow the designated To this end, and regardless of the chosen com- EU OHQ to achieve initial operational capacity mand option, HQs have to be activated, rein- (IOC) within 5 days. forced by staff coming from different EU Member States (MS), and fully integrated in a command structure consisting of a mixture of permanent Concept versus reality elements from the relevant HQ and augmentees. Development of non-executive missions Augmentation process Recent developments have witnessed the Based on advance planning and in discussion deployment of non-executive missions rather than with other potential EU HQs and EU bodies, a the more traditional executive military opera- Member State indicates its willingness to provide tions. The command arrangements of these non- an EU OHQ or an EU FHQ for a possible EU- executive missions have involved the merging of led military operation. The final agreement on the military strategic and the operational levels of the chain of command is formalised by a Coun- command into a single Mission Command. The cil Decision. The designated Parent HQ provides merging of these levels of Command requires the the Key Nucleus Staff of the EU OHQ which Mission Commander to divide his time and staff is reinforced by the activation of both national resources between the operational level command (from the Parent Nation) and multinational (from on his/her mission and the essential strategic level

277 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

Political Strategic Level Chairman EU Military Committee (principal point of contact for Op Cdr)

COUNCIL/PSC EU Military Staff

Military Strategic Level

EU OHQ at SHAPE Designated EU OHQ EU OPSCEN Mission HQ Berlin+ with Autonomous Autonomous Autonomous recourse to (EUBG size) (non-executive NATO assets Mission) and capabilities Graphic: Scala Military command and control options

requirement to interact personally with Brussels- level) is a critical event in the planning timeline. based stakeholders. As a consequence, the Mission However, the format in which this handover takes Commander has limited capacity either to spend place still needs to be more clearly defined. time in Brussels, interacting with other Brussels- As previously mentioned, the activation of an based stakeholders (and thereby jeopardising EU HQ requires, among other things, the acti- the prospect of achieving a truly comprehensive vation of pre-identified augmentees from MS approach), or to spend sufficient time in the mis- to plan and conduct military operations4. How- sion area to maintain the desired level of interac- ever, the commitments of MS in the Primary tion with local actors or to optimise his/her ability Augmentee Database (the list of pre-identified to command the mission. In this respect, the need augmentees) are in no way binding. As a result, to support the Mission Commander in areas like there is always a doubt as to whether MS will Force Generation or Financing has been identi- honour their Primary Augmentee database com- fied as requiring further examination. mitments. In the event of an MS failing to meet its commitments, there may be a requirement to conduct a bespoke manning conference or the Challenges presented by the non- Parent Nation may have to fill the gaps. Further- permanent nature of EU HQs more, the Augmentee database (national and Pri- mary Augmentee) historically tends not to fully The designation of an EU HQ to plan and address the manning requirements of an OHQ, conduct an operation takes place relatively late with approximately 20 % of the posts remaining in the planning process. The handover of plan- unfilled. If it is deemed necessary to address this ning responsibility between the EEAS/EUMS shortfall, a bespoke manning conference might (planning at political strategic level) and a newly also be required. activated OHQ (planning at military strategic In order for an EU HQ to be immediately

4 The manning of a Mission Headquarters (non-executive missions) is addressed by means of dedicated manning conference(s).

278 4 Conclusions and Way ahead

effective on activation, the personnel manning Further improving the knowledge of EU it must be appropriately trained. Several courses HQs and harmonising their work are organised and proposed to Member States, and specific requirements are defined in the job Work is ongoing in the HQ Community to descriptions of each post (e.g. knowledge of Oper- further develop an all-encompassing planning ational Planning). However, as the proof of the tool, covering all phases of planning across both pudding is in the eating, it is only when an HQ the political strategic and military strategic levels, is activated that its effectiveness can be measured. including detailed reflection on the critical hand- The EU has developed a lessons process and EU over of planning responsibility. Work has also HQs gather on a regular basis as an HQ Commu- started on further harmonising processes between nity to harmonise work practices and to exchange and within HQs. Finally, EU HQs will be briefed views on issues of common concern. Nevertheless, on work ongoing in Brussels which could lead to the establishment and maintenance of a corporate the activation of an EU HQ. memory remains a significant challenge, especially in the case of a non-executive mission which cannot rely on a permanent key nucleus staff to Conclusions maintain its corporate memory. Even with an efficient lessons learned process, the risk of repeat- The appetite for the use of military CSDP ing the same mistakes cannot therefore be totally instruments has not diminished in recent years; excluded. on the contrary, several new operations and missions have been launched. For military operations, the C2 challenges posed by the non-permanent Possible way ahead nature of EU HQs have been addressed in a manner that is militarily adequate. However, for non- Better support for Mission Commanders executive EU military missions, the challenges to effective and efficient Command and Control As previously stated, the commanders of non- posed by current C2 arrangements are still a cause executive missions are stretched between their for some concern. The upcoming EEAS review roles as strategic and operational commanders. could, and possibly should, be taken as an oppor- Several possible ways of addressing this issue tunity to address this issue. might be explored, such as: • Strengthening the role of the EU Military Staff (EUMS) or establishing a coordination mechanism in Brussels; • Using already activated OHQs to support new non-executive missions; • Appointing one single Commander, based in Brussels, for all non-executive missions. Of course, any proposal for changes in CSDP structure must be carefully assessed and discussed in order to gain support of all stakeholders, especially the Member States. The upcoming EEAS review might be an opportunity to address this issue.

279 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

4.5. Mission Delivery

by Kenneth Deane

A number of factors have influenced the issue of comprehensiveness and cohesiveness. Yet the of mission delivery in recent years: Lisbon Treaty opened new opportunities in this First of all, and as outlined in the chapter on regard that both the European Commission and civilian CSDP missions, these missions have con- the EEAS are actively pursuing. siderably expanded in terms of mandate and geo- The EEAS for instance now takes part in the graphic scope, in line with the evolving require- multi-annual financial planning of Commission ments of the EU’s foreign policy and changing external relations funds, and Commission services international realities. From the original police in turn are actively contributing to CSDP mission/ missions in the Balkans, they have evolved into operation planning. In the field, this is matched more encompassing rule of law and security sector by regular contacts, information exchange and reform missions – see by way of example EUCAP close coordination. Tangible results of this can be Sahel Niger and Mali, EUCAP Nestor, EUPOL observed in many theatres already – see the many COPPS, EUAM Ukraine etc. positive examples in other chapters of this Hand- Their main added value compared to other book of such concerted action ensuring a better EU instruments still stems from their recourse to outcome. officials in active service from across all 28 Mem- Linked to this is the discussion on ‘sustainabil- ber States, be they police officers, judges, border ity’, which is covered in detail in another chapter guards, customs officers or other law enforcement of this handbook. We came to realise that, what- officials, as well as the tight political control and ever we do with whatever tool, it will not necessar- strategic direction the Brussels-based decision ily lead us anywhere in terms of effect, unless we making structures are exercising in terms of the ensure the necessary sustainability of our efforts. chain of command (see earlier chapter on this CSDP and other instruments are too costly and topic). These two distinct features make CSDP the stakes are too high in terms of regional sta- missions and operations a rather powerful tool bility and security to fail to make sure that our that is much sought after, complementary to investments last. This requires foremost, as indi- other EU tools. cated by others, a detailed analysis of needs, risks This leads to the second main factor: the and opportunities. The support activities, in our increasing awareness that all these tools are best case CSDP, then have to be calibrated on that applied if coordinated such that potential syner- basis. gies and mutual support can be generated. This But it does not stop there: those responsible debate is not new; in fact, the 2003 crisis man- for the different instruments have to continue agement procedures already addressed the issue to coordinate amongst themselves the details of

280 4 Conclusions and Way ahead

their respective activities, and working arrange- bilities to pursue and fulfil its mandate. This is a ments must be identified and agreed where pro- very critical step in Member States’ recognition of jects are linked. Most civilian CSDP missions, the link between mission capability and delivery for instance, have a ‘project cell’ capability that that was previously not as prominent. allows missions to provide very limited amounts As Civilian Operations Commander, I take due of equipment to the host countries if and when note and account of all these strands and evolv- this directly pertains to the mission mandate and ing thinking. They lead me now to concentrate on when considered conditional to effective mandate two main issues as my own contribution to future delivery. But as these cells are very limited, pro- effective mission delivery: jects run by other instruments or bilateral actors The first main effort relates to more effective could and should usefully complement these. planning, conduct and support of these missions. We have seen in the other Handbook contribu- In essence, the 28 EU Member States give mis- tions that such an approach is particularly relevant sions a budget and personnel with which to deliver for missions in transition, when exiting a country. on a set of agreed objectives and tasks. On this This is an area where some lessons are still being basis, Member States, host nations and partners learned and conceptual work is being pursued. rightly expect timely and sustainable effect on the The last main factor directly pertaining to mis- ground. My role, together with the missions, and sion delivery is the wish by Member States to supported by the CPCC, is to make this happen. see ‘value for money’ in times of shrinking pub- With, as we have seen, public funding shrink- lic funding and increasing pressure on external ing over the last few years whilst the number of and internal security. This has led those working crises worldwide has increased, we have to achieve within the CSDP structures in Brussels to revisit that aim with fewer resources. This, plus a number our processes and decision-making procedures, of lessons learned from past experiences, has led examining the way we set up our missions and us to introduce over time a number of measures how we plan, support and conduct them. that tighten for example the mission internal set As a result of this, the revised crisis manage- up – see our guidelines on a standardised mission ment procedures lead us – we believe – to more organisation that include also specific guidance on lean and efficient missions that are better planned, management principles.1 as the Head of Mission and Core team are on the In view of the ‘comprehensive approach’ and ground when the CPCC develops the operational search for synergies, we will more pro-actively planning documents, CONOPS and OPLAN, engage with other EU actors and international but also, critically, the mission budget. This allows partners to seek synergies. We continue to rein- inter alia the Core team to sit down with the local force our coordination efforts so that we are authorities and other actors concerned to work certain that our actions do not duplicate what towards more detailed, results-based planning is already done by other donors, but rather add that also ensures the necessary management of value and support national priorities and plans. expectations and early identification of synergies. In some cases, our initiatives are becoming a plat- The introduction of the notion of ‘Initial form for other donors to invest in the security Operational Capability’ (IOC) in civilian CSDP of our neighbours. The importance of partners missions is a noteworthy new element in this advocating the same reform agendas and pooling regard: in fact, in accordance with the new crisis efforts to achieve sustainable change cannot be management procedures, a mission will only be understated. ‘launched’ once it has reached the necessary capa- We are also tightening up the force generation

1 ‘Guidelines to design civilian CSDP mission-specific organisational structures’ (11833/12 of 26 June 2012).

281 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

and selection procedures so as to help Member and help us, the services, to evaluate mission States better plan and prepare for their second- impact and effect. As said, we will be measured ment of mission staff. The visiting experts con- by delivery and so we ought to know, in the first cept2 has already helped reach out to specialised place, our own perspective on this. staff who are increasingly needed in our ever The second major focus of my work will be more complex missions. linked to the security of mission personnel, who We will invest more in training with a view operate increasingly in non-benign environ- to increasing the number and quality of mission ments. Despite our already comparatively tight staff, who are particularly scarce in the field of security provisions, we sadly saw, most recently, civilian CSDP, as explained in the previous chap- casualties among our personnel serving in Kos- ters. ovo, Afghanistan and Djibouti. Operational planning and mission set-up, too, I have since reinforced the security expertise have been considerably improved, not only by within the CPCC and am reconsidering our cur- the aforementioned revised crisis management rent security arrangements and protocols. CSDP, procedures, but also through the introduction of by the nature of its purpose, operates in crisis the benchmarking methodology that is addressed areas. Not deploying at all is not an option. But in an earlier chapter of this handbook, and also we can, and have to, do everything in our power revised reporting procedures that the CPCC has to ensure that we operate as safely as possible, even issued in 2012. if the environment is not safe. This is another, in Logistical and financing/procurementthe true sense, vital element of mission effect and arrangements are constantly being reviewed and delivery. gradually rendered more suited to our needs. The This work requires not only continued pro- warehouse has proved to be a step in the right cedural and material resources, but also politi- direction. A Shared Service Centre is being con- cal support and effective situational awareness. ceived and financial provisions made more flex- Working on this is a top priority at present. ible. Twelve years of Civilian CSDP in opera- Furthermore, I am working on a system of tion has seen many successes with real changes internal support review that will allow me to brought on the ground, but these years have also check at regular intervals whether a mission is taught us what does not work. fit for purpose. Such reviews will look at the The present Handbook puts together the operational, support and management functions whole cycle of policy, concepts, training, imple- within a mission which will allow me and the mentation, and lesson-learning. It clearly illus- CPCC to address any shortfalls identified, as trates that we will only succeed if we adapt to required. ever new challenges. My task is to be ready to Finally, the CPCC is currently finalising the deliver in whatever circumstances, and I am con- impact assessment methodology that seeks to fident that we, together, as the European Union, complement the benchmarking methodology will achieve this.

2 ‘Guidelines on the use of Visiting Experts in the context of civilian CSDP Missions’ (8551/12 of 4 April 2012).

282 ANNEXES

283 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

AUTHORS (in alphabetic order)

Lt. Col. Tomas Abrahamsson has worked at degree in politics and international relations from the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) as Stockholm University, and has published research an action officer with responsibility for EU bat- on mediation and peacebuilding, peacebuilding in tlegroups since 2011. He started his military post-modern conflicts, regional security dynam- training in the Norrbotten Subarctic Infantry ics, and the conflict management challenges fac- Regiment (19th) in Boden. He received his coming subregional organisations. mission in 1985, after studies at the Military Academy in Umeå and Boden. He graduated Martin Albani is a crisis response planner and from the War Academy, Infantry Combat School, project manager at the European Commission’s in 1990. He graduated from Senior Staff Col- Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI.2). lege in 2005. In addition, Lt. Col. Abrahamsson He previously served as head of office for a foreign underwent international EOD officer training in policy spokesperson at the European Parliament. 1999. Lt. Col. Abrahamsson has his background Other postings include the Russia unit of the in the Subarctic Infantry but in 1990 he trans- Commission’s Directorate-General for External ferred from the Army to the Air Force, where Affairs (RELEX), the German Institute for Inter- he became ground defence officer. His career national and Security Affairs (SWP), the German has included several appointments within the Federal Parliament and the German Permanent Subarctic Infantry Brigade, from platoon leader Representation to the United Nations in New to company commander, and he has held simi- York. He has studied international relations at lar appointments in the Air Force. After his unit Freie Universität Berlin, Sciences Po Paris and the career he served as officer in command of cur- London School of Economics (M.Sc.). rent operations at Swedish International Com- mand (Swedint) and as director of training at the Nina Antolovic Tovornik works as a capability Swedish EOD and Demining Centre (Swedec). development planner at the Crisis Management Between 2007 and 2011 he was director of the and Planning Directorate (CMPD) of the Euro- Combined Joint Operations Centre (CJOC) for pean External Action Service. She graduated in Nordic Battlegroup 08 (stationed in the UK) and politics and international relations in 2003 from Nordic Battlegroup 11. the University of Ljubljana. She joined the police service in the same year, where she worked in Eldridge Adolfo is a conflict and mediation Interpol Section until she was posted for four adviser at the European External Action Service. years as a delegate of the EU Committee for Civil- Before joining the European Union, he was a con- ian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) to flict researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute in the Permanent Representation of Slovenia to the Uppsala, Sweden, and worked as a conflict adviser EU. She joined CMPD in September 2013. at the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL). With the UN, Lt. Col. Bastian Bail has worked for the Ger- he worked on mediation and peacebuilding in man Ministry of Defence. Currently, he is sec- several countries in Africa, as well as in Colombia, onded to the European External Action Service/ Georgia, Myanmar and Libya. He holds a master’s European Union Military Staff in Brussels. His

284 ANNEXES

previous posts included planner for missions and Luigi Bruno, Brigadier of Carabinieri (reserve), training and development at the headquarters of is a planner at the European External Action Ser- the German Joint Medical Services. He has been vice /Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability deployed to missions in Kosovo, Afghanistan and (CPCC). His professional expertise combines Mali. He holds a number of doctor’s degrees and 15 years of law enforcement at managerial level medical specialisations. His publications focus on with 15 years of international crisis management, medical and military-medical issues. having served with the UN, NATO and the EU. He holds three bachelor’s degrees: in politics, Dr Christian Behrmann is attorney-at-law and internal and external security, and international policy officer in the Managing Directorate for and diplomatic studies. He has drafted a num- Global and Multilateral Issues of the European ber of major doctrinal documents adopted by the External Action Service. Before joining the dip- Council in the field of civilian common security lomatic service, Dr Behrmann practised law pri- and defence policy (CSDP). vately, at the EU institutions and at the United Nations. He holds a Ph.D. in public interna- Dr Anne-Marie Buzatu is Deputy Head of the tional law and lectures at the University of Leu- Operations IV Division (Public-Private Partner- ven. ships) at the Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). Before coming to Prof. Sven Biscop is director of the Europe in the DCAF, Ms. Buzatu practiced human rights law World Programme at the Egmont – Royal Insti- and worked with human rights and humanitar- tute for International Relations in Brussels and ian organisations on rule of law and human rights teaches at Ghent University and at the College of issues. A member of the Texas Bar, she began Europe in Bruges. He is a member of the Execu- her career working in private international com- tive Academic Board of the European Security mercial law. She holds a Bachelors of Arts from and Defence College (ESDC). the University of Texas in Austin, a Juris Doctor in international law from a joint program with Helena Bogusławska is deputy head of division Tulane University and Paris II Panthéon-Assass, in charge of relations with partner countries on and an LLM in international humanitarian and the common security and defence policy (CSDP) human rights law from the Académie de droit in the Crisis Management and Planning Directo- humanitaire et droits humains in Geneva, Swit- rate (CMPD) of the European External Action zerland. Service. She previously worked as an action officer in the Planning and Policy Unit of the European Andrew Byrne is currently Head of the Political Defence Agency (2005-2007) and as first secretary Affairs, Press and Information Section at the EU and defence adviser to the Political and Security Delegation in Norway. He worked in the Conflict Committee (PSC) Ambassador at the Polish Per- Prevention, Peace-building and Mediation Instru- manent Representation to the EU (2003-2005). ments Division of the European External Action Before moving to Brussels she worked as a Polish Service. In previous posts, he was the Deputy Per- civil servant at the Ministry of Defence for seven manent Representative to the UN at the European years. From 2000 to 2003 she headed a Euro- Commission’s Delegation to the International pean Security and Defence Policy Unit within the Organisations in Vienna, and Deputy Permanent Defence Policy Department. She graduated from Representative at the European Commission’s Del- Warsaw University’s Institute for Applied Linguis- egation to the UN Organisations in Rome. Prior to tics. She speaks Polish, English, French, German those postings, Mr Byrne worked on transatlantic and Russian. relations (in particular, agricultural trade aspects) at

285 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

the European Commission’s Directorate-General From June 2007 to November 2008, Mr Deane for External Relations (RELEX). performed the roles of Deputy and Acting Head of Mission in the European Union Police Reform Giovanni Cremonini is in charge of lessons learnt Programme in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghani- at the Crisis Management and Planning Directo- stan), before becoming Head of Operations in rate (CMPD) of the European External Action the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability Service and chairs the CSDP Lessons Working (CPCC) Directorate of the European External Group. A permanent EU official, in the course Action Service. Mr Deane further performed of his career he has been posted to the EU Del- the role of Acting Chief of Staff/Deputy Civilian egations in Russia and in China and has helped Operations Commander between May 2010 and coordinate the European neighbourhood policy. September 2011. In 2004, Mr Deane undertook He completed his military service in Italy’s Alpini a six-month secondment with the UK’s Foreign mountain troops. He holds degrees in Greek and and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in Basra, Latin Classics from Milan Catholic University, in Southern Iraq, where he was a senior police international relations from the London School adviser to the British Consulate General and of Economics and in public sector management mentor to the province’s Iraqi Chief of Police. In from Brussels’ Solvay Business School. early 2005 he again assisted the FCO in developing anti-terrorist and public order policing in Cdr. Vincenzo De Benedictis is an Italian navy Macedonia. From June 2006 to June 2007 he officer who has worked in the Concept and was chief police adviser to the British Ambassa- Capability Directorate of the EU Military Staff dor in Kabul, which included a six-month spell (EUMS) since August 2012. His areas of work in Helmand Province and working alongside include China and South-East Asia, maritime the Commanding General, Combined Security security, human rights, gender, women, peace and Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) security, and mass atrocity prevention. He drafted in assisting US policy development in respect of the EUMS concept on the protection of civilians Afghan national police reform. He joined the in EU-led military operations. His previous expe- Royal Ulster Constabulary in October 1980 and riences include: (a) command of two Italian mili- served in a variety of operational, training and tary ships, (b) work at NATO (Supreme Allied staffing roles from Constable to Assistant Chief Command Transformation – Norfolk, VA, USA) Constable rank. Mr Deane holds an honours in the field of education and training, where he degree in public policy and management from directed the production of joint functional area the University of Ulster and a post graduate cer- training guides and (c) team leader, for five years, tificate in education from Canterbury Christ of the national contributions to both the NATO Church University, Kent. Defence Planning Process (NDPP) and the EU Capability Development Process (CDP), at the Kinga Devenyi holds a permanent position as a Italian Defence General Staff in Rome. training officer at the Crisis Management Centre (CMC) in Finland, a governmental institution Kenneth Deane was appointed EU Civilian and a centre of expertise in civilian crisis manage- Operations Commander and Director of the ment. Currently she is seconded to the EU Inte- EU Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability grated Border Management Assistance Mission in (CPCC) in June 2013. Previous to his current Libya (EUBAM Libya) and is stationed at its head- position he was appointed Head of Mission of quarters in Brussels. Previously she has worked at the Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Finland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Minis- Support (EUPOL COPPS) on 1 July 2012. try of the Interior, as well as the EU Monitoring

286 ANNEXES

Mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia). She holds Simon Duke D.Phil. is a professor at the Euro- a master’s degree in international relations and a pean Institute of Public Administration, a senior bachelor’s degree in business studies. research fellow at Maastricht University, adjunct Maj. Vicente Díaz de Villegas works as the fellow at the Federal Executive Institute (Virginia) information operations subject matter expert in and co-editor of the Journal of European Integration. the Current Operations/Crisis Response Plan- He has written extensively on EU external actions ning Branch of the EU Military Staff (EUMS). and security issues. He is also actively involved in He graduated from the general staff course at the designing and providing training programmes for Spanish Armed Forces Centre for Superior Stud- the European External Action Service. ies (CESEDEN) and his previous appointment was in the Spanish Armed Forces Joint Opera- Maria Fihl works at the European External Action tional Command (MOPS). He has an operational Service, in the Civilian Planning and Conduct background with deployments in the Multina- Capability (Conduct of Operations Division), tional Stabilisation Force (SFOR), twice in Kos- where she has been working on the daily conduct ovo peacekeeping force (KFOR), in the former of European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia during Opera- Bosnia and Herzegovina, the European Union tion Amber Fox, in Iraq during operation Iraqi Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM Geor- Freedom and in Lebanon for UNIFIL. gia), and lately the European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform in Lt. Col. Jerónimo Domínguez Barbero is cur- Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine), since 2011. Previ- rently serving as a seconded national expert to ously she worked for 11 years in the Balkans, with the European External Action Service in Brus- assignments such as donor in post-conflict areas, sels, where he is employed as an action officer in working with the UN, the International Civilian the EUMS Concepts Branch with responsibil- Office contributing to establishing the independ- ity for EU military rapid response. He has been ence of Kosovo, the EU Special Representative, dealing with CSDP concepts since 2012. He as well as founding a school – the International commenced his military career in 1988. Com- Learning Group – in Kosovo. missioned as an air force officer (fighter pilot), he has served as fighter instructor (23rd Wing, Dr Florika Fink-Hooijer has spent most of her Talavera AB 1990-1993), fighter pilot (151 Sqn, career at the European Commission working on Zaragoza AB 1993-2000), staff officer (Span- external policy matters, and in particular on cri- ish Air Combat Command 2001-2002, 2003- sis management and conflict prevention. She is 2004), Tactical Leadership Programme (TLP) currently the Director for Strategy, Policy and instructor (Florennes AB 2001-2003), squadron International Cooperation at the Directorate commander (122 Sqn, Torrejón AB 2004-2008) General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protec- and group commander (23rd Wing, Talavera AB tion. Previously she was head of the private office 2009-2012). He attended the ESDP Foundation of Commissioner Kristalina Georgieva, who was Training in Potsdam (2007). He also attended the responsible for humanitarian aid, international Collège Interarmées de la Défense (CID) in Paris cooperation and crisis response. At the Com- (2008-2009) where he was certified as a manage- mission, Dr Fink-Hooijer set up the managerial ment, command and strategy defence expert, and and financial structures for the common foreign followed the Mediterranean Sea and Middle East and security policy and crisis management and studies. He contributed to the Spanish Air force has been directly involved in initiating numerous Catedra Kindelán seminar (2010) for the develop- EU police, rule of law and protection missions ment of air concepts and doctrine in operations. in third countries. Her professional experience

287 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

includes the design and management of various headquarters in Brussels. He has served at the EU conflict-prevention schemes such as instruments Delegation to the United Nations in New York to counter the financing of terrorism, as well as and in Israel. He previously worked at the Euro- the EU’s sanctions management in general. She pean Commission’s Directorate General for Exter- has also negotiated for the EU in the Kimberley nal Relations, where he was in charge of election Process Certification Scheme to curb the trade observation. Before joining the EU, Mr Giaufret in blood diamonds and has been responsible for worked at the OSCE Office for Democratic Insti- EU relations with Japan, Korea, Australia and tutions and Human Rights. Mr Giaufret has a New Zealand. At the Secretariat-General of the PhD in the history of international relations from Commission, she has gained in-depth experience the University of Florence and a master’s in Euro- in external policy coordination, having advised pean affairs from the College of Europe in Bruges. Commissioners Monika Wulf-Mathies and Frits Bolkestein as a member of their private offices on Galia Glume works in the EU’s Civilian Planning EU external policies at large as well as justice and and Conduct Capability (CPCC) in Brussels, as home affairs/internal market matters. Dr Fink- a reporting officer for the EU Monitoring Mis- Hooijer is German. She is a lawyer by training sion in Georgia (EUMM Georgia). Previously she having specialised in intellectual property rights was seconded by Belgium to EUMM Georgia. and public international law/foreign policy affairs. Between 2004 and 2011 she worked as an assistant and researcher in the field of international Mercedes García Pérez is the Head of the Opera- relations at the Université Catholique de Louvain tions Division of the Civilian Planning and Con- (UCL). She is an expert member of the Réseau de duct Capability (CPCC), the body of the Euro- Recherche sur les Opérations de Paix (University pean External Action Service in charge of the of Montreal) and associate researcher at the Cen- planning and conduct of civilian CSDP operations tre d’étude des crises et des conflits internationaux under the responsibility of the Civilian Operations (CECRI-UCL). She holds a master’s degree in Commander. Prior to occupying her current posi- international relations (UCL) and a BA in applied tion, she was the Head of the Europe Section of communication and journalism (IHECS). the CPCC, and worked as a member of the planning and methodology section of the CPCC. Ms Eva Gross Ph.D. works as a senior analyst at the García has been an EU official since 2003, and EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) where has also worked on development and West Africa she covers CSDP, the Western Balkans, India and issues. A lawyer by training, from 1998 to 2002 AfPak. Prior to joining the EUISS Ms Gross was a she worked as a practising attorney in EU law in fellow at the Stiftung Neue Verantwortung in Ber- Brussels. Until 2011, Ms García was a Member of lin, where she worked on a project on Germany in the Academic Council of the Institut Supérieur de Europe; and senior research fellow at the Institute Management Public et Politique. She holds a mas- for European Studies (IES) at the Free University ter’s degree in European studies from the College of Brussels. of Europe in Bruges and university degrees in law and in Spanish language and literature. Canan Gündüz is a mediation adviser at the European External Action Service. Before joining Emanuele Giaufret is currently the Head of the EU, she helped set up the European Forum Division for Democracy and Electoral Observa- for International Mediation and Dialogue in tion at the European External Action Service. He 2011, where she acted as CEO, partner and board previously worked on North Africa and the Mid- member. She is a qualified mediator, and brings dle East at the European External Action Service a background of institutional advisory work to

288 ANNEXES

private- and public-sector clients on policies and ments abroad also included working in Vienna at operations in conflict-affected countries, as well as the Hungarian CSCE/OSCE Mission following peacebuilding work in South and South-East Asia. the fall of the Berlin Wall. He was part of the team Over the last four years, she has worked on several that negotiated and implemented the CFE treaty. EU mediation support assignments, including in Afghanistan, Yemen, Nigeria, Egypt, Kyrgyzstan, Joëlle Jenny is Director for Security Policy and and Georgia. Ms Gündüz holds a BA in modern Conflict Prevention at the European External European studies from University College Lon- Action Service. Prior to joining the European don, a master of science degree in development External Action Service she worked successively studies from the London School of Economics, as a Swiss and a British diplomat, covering inter- and an MA in mediation from the European Uni- national security issues, non-proliferation/arms versity Viadrina. She has published extensively on control, and conflict prevention and peace build- peacebuilding, conflict analysis and mediation. ing, including at the UN. She has worked extensively in Iraq, Yemen and the Palestinian Terri- Marcus Houben D.Phil. works for the European tories, and held postings in New York, Angola, External Action Service as head of the support Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Rwanda team for the EU 2014 Chairmanship of the Con- and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedo- tact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. nia. She holds a master’s degree in international Mr Houben combines strong academic credentials security from the Fletcher School of Law and with operational experience as a military officer. Diplomacy in Boston, USA. Previous assignments include the strategic planning for the regional maritime capacity-building Dr Arnold Kammel is Director of the Austrian mission EUCAP Nestor. Institute for European and Security Policy (AIES). He studied law, European studies and politics in Gabor Iklódy took up his duties as director of Graz, Vienna and Alcalá de Henares (Madrid). the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate His research and publications focus on European (CMPD) of the European External Action Service foreign, security and defence policy from a legal in June 2014. Until September 2013, Mr Iklódy and political point of view. had served as NATO Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges. He joined Radek Khol currently works in the Democracy the NATO International Staff after 27 years of and Election Observation Division of the Euro- national public service. Before taking up his post pean External Action Service. He worked at the at NATO, he worked as political director and Institute of International Relations, Prague, from state secretary in charge of multilateral and secu- 1996 until 2006 (including as head of its Centre rity issues in the Hungarian Foreign Ministry and for Security Analysis from 2001). Since 2006 he helped prepare his country for its first EU presi- has worked in the crisis management structures dency in the first half of 2011. Prior to that, Mr of the EU institutions, most recently in the Cri- Iklódy served two four-year terms in Scandinavia sis Management and Planning Directorate of the as Ambassador, first in Norway (1999-2003) and European External Action Service. He graduated later in Sweden (2005-2009). In Budapest, he was from Department of War Studies at King’s Col- Director General for European Political Coopera- lege London and from Department of Interna- tion when Hungary joined the European Union tional Relations, Charles University Prague. He in 2004 and headed the Foreign Ministry’s NATO widely published on CSDP, EU civilian crisis and WEU Department when Hungary prepared management, NATO enlargement, security poli- for and joined the NATO in 1999. His assign- cies, civil-military relations and missile defence.

289 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

Morten Knudsen is a senior policy officer at the Prof. Michel Liégeois teaches international rela- European External Action Service. Since 2013 tions, geopolitics and security studies at the Cath- he has worked in the Crisis Management and olic University of Louvain (UCL, Belgium). He is Planning Directorate (CMPD), in the division also head of the European branch of the research for concepts, lessons learned and capacity devel- network on peace operations (ROP). His research opment. Previously he worked for the European and publishing activities focus on peace opera- External Action Service’s Multilateral Division, tions and the use of force, the regional dimension and before that for the General Secretariat of the of peacekeeping as well as UN security council Council of the European Union. Before joining issues. the European Union in 1997, he was a teacher of politics and French language and literature. Fredrik Lindblom is a seconded national mari- He has written articles on EU-UN cooperation, time expert at the European External Action international humanitarian law and the European Service/CPCC. He previously served as country security strategy. team leader for EUCAP Nestor (a civilian CSDP mission with a focus on maritime security capac- Dr Sari Kouvo is a policy officer focusing on ity building in the Horn of Africa) in the Sey- human rights and gender at the Partnership chelles and as liaison officer for the same mission Division of the Crisis Management and Plan- in Tanzania. His position in Sweden is Chief of ning Directorate (CMPD) of the European Staff for the Swedish Coast Guard Air Surveil- External Action Service in Brussels. Prior to lance Division and he was formerly the Head joining CMPD, Ms Kouvo served as co-director of Surveillance and Control at the Headquar- for the Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN), a ters of the Swedish Coast Guard. Other earlier field-based policy research organisation focusing postings has been as site commander and project on politics and security in Afghanistan and its manager for Sweden’s contribution to EUNAV- region. Sari has also worked in several interna- FOR’s operation ATALANTA and responsibility tional human rights organisations and taught for Sweden’s contribution to different missions human rights related subjects at universities in within FRONTEX. Mr Lindblom has university Belgium, Sweden and the UK. She holds an degrees in seamanship and maritime security, associate professorship and a doctoral degree in senior maritime engineering and civilian basic international law from Gothenburg University law. He has also has a degree as a law enforce- and has published extensively on gender, human ment officer within the coast guard and police rights and Afghanistan. structures in Sweden.

Jozef Kozlowski Ph.D. currently works for the Dr Gustav Lindstrom is the Head of the Emerg- Polish Ministry of National Defence in War- ing Security Challenges Programme at the Geneva saw. From 2011 until 2014 he was seconded to Centre for Security Policy (GCSP). Previously, he the European External Action Service/European headed the GCSP’s Euro-Atlantic Security Pro- Union Military Staff in Brussels. He holds an gramme and was the Director of the European M.Sc. degree in electronics from the Military Training Course. Dr Lindstrom received his doc- Technical University in Warsaw and a Ph.D. torate in Policy Analysis from the RAND Gradu- in social sciences from the Warsaw’s National ate School and an MA in international policy Defence University. His publications focus on studies from Stanford University. Prior to his time issues of management in the information envi- at the GCSP, Dr Lindstrom served as a senior ronment of national and international security/ research fellow at the EU Institute for Security defence structures. Studies (EUISS). His areas of interest and exper-

290 ANNEXES

tise include the European common security and Michal Narojek worked for the Polish Minis- defence policy (CSDP), emerging security chal- try of the Interior. He was seconded to Poland’s lenges, non-proliferation and disarmament, and Permanent Representation to the EU where he cyber security. served as Justice and Home Affairs Counsellor. He also served as a national seconded expert in Snowy Lintern has over 25 years professional the General Secretariat of the Council of the experience in military operations and crisis man- EU dealing with judicial cooperation in crimi- agement, including service in Iraq and Afghani- nal matters. In 2010 he joined Europol. He is stan, warship command, and six years at the politi- responsible for the Agency’s external relations, cal strategic level in the EU. Currently he works including cooperation with the European Exter- for the European External Action Service/Crisis nal Action Service. He holds master’s degrees in Management and Planning Directorate in Brus- law and international relations. He is an alum- sels. He has developed and written extensively nus of the George C. Marshall European Centre on transition strategies in an EU/CSDP context, for Security Studies and of the European Secu- ensuring policy development is coherent with the rity and Defence College. aspirations of other EU Institutions and Member States. He holds two master’s degrees in widely dif- José-Miguel Palacios (ES) has been head of the fering fields: international relations (King’s College Analysis Division at the EU Intelligence Analysis London) and applied oceanography (University of Centre (EU INTCEN) of the European External Plymouth). Action Service in Brussels since September 2011. He joined the EU Situation Centre (renamed Birgit Loeser has been an EU official since 2001. EU INTCEN in 2012), which was part of the She is currently Deputy Head of Division/Head General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, as of the Planning and Methodology Section within an analyst in 2006. He previously worked for the the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability Spanish government from 1986 in several ana- (CPCC) of the European External Action Service, lytical roles. Mr Palacios holds a Ph.D. in poli- in charge of leading all planning efforts for civilian tics and is the author of ‘Transición democrática CSDP missions. Before this, she was the CPCC’s postcomunista: democratización y estatalidad en acting Head of Operations Unit and Head of the la Unión Soviética y en Yugoslavia’ (Post-Com- Africa Section. Before the setting-up of the CPCC, munist democratic transition: democratisation she was a member of the Police Unit of the former and statehood in the Soviet Union and in Yugo- DGE9/EU Council Secretariat. She also worked in slavia) (2003). He is fluent in English, French, DGE8 on military ESDP operations. From 2005 Russian and Serbian (Croatian, Bosnian). to 2006 she was seconded to the UK Ministry of Defence where she worked on UK policy and Annemarie Peen Rodt Ph.D. is Associate Pro- defence relations with Sub-Saharan Africa. Before fessor in Global Studies at Roskilde University becoming an EU official, Ms Loeser worked for in Denmark. Her research appraises the role of five years in the Political Affairs Division of the regional actors like the European Union in con- Western European Union (WEU). Ms Loeser flict prevention, management and resolution, holds a master’s degree in politics from both the currently focusing in particular on the protec- Freie Universität Berlin and the Institut d’Etudes tion of civilians, the responsibility to protect, Politiques de Paris. and the prevention of mass atrocities. Her recent monograph, ‘The European Union and Military Conflict Management: Defining, Evaluating and Achieving Success’, published by Routledge in

291 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

2014, proposes measures for benchmarking and previous posts included press officer in Iraq and impact assessment with regard to CSDP missions the Balkans. Previously he was Chief of the Air and operations. Staff at UNIFIL mission in Lebanon and chief of the press office of EUFOR Althea. He is also Col. Michael Pesendorfer is the Austrian a journalist. Defence Attaché to Bosnia and Herzegovina and a career officer. After graduation from the The- Dr Jochen Rehrl formerly worked for the Aus- resan Military Academy in Wiener Neustadt he trian Ministry of Defence and Sports. Currently, served as a platoon leader, company commander he is seconded to the European External Action and chief of staff in an elite mountain battalion of Service/European Security and Defence College the Austrian Armed Forces. After he finished his in Brussels. His previous posts include political law studies at Salzburg University he joined the adviser both in Vienna and Brussels. He holds Army Higher Administrative and Legal Service. three master’s degrees – in economics, interna- He served in the European Union Military Staff tional relations and journalism – from the Uni- in Brussels, in EU civil missions and in several EU versities of Salzburg and Vienna and from the and NATO military operations as legal adviser as Diplomatic Academy in Vienna. His publications well as political adviser to the commander. focus on foreign and security policy from a legal and political point of view. Sofie Rafrafi works as an independent senior consultant in sustainable capacity building activities Victor Reuter is spokesperson of the Head of Mis- in the broad area of civilian crisis management. sion in EUAM Ukraine. Previously, he worked in Previously, from 2013-2014 she was seconded various media related positions both in missions by Belgium for two years to the EUCAP Sahel and capitals. He was ‘directeur d’antenne’ of RTL Niger mission, as the head of the Sustainability Tele Lëtzebuerg, director of ELDORADIO and Policies Unit of the Operations Department. journalist for the Belgian Press Agency BELGA Between 2005 and 2012 she worked for the and RTL radio. He studied journalism and com- Egmont Institute, spending five of those years as a munication. senior training programme manager. She has been the President of the Belgian Euro-Atlantic Youth Wolfgang Röhrig is the Programme Manager association. She won the prize of the Minister of Cyber Defence of the European Defence Agency Foreign Affairs with her thesis and holds a master’s (EDA). After completing the University of the degree from the VUB in International Relations. Federal Armed Forces in Hamburg as MBA he served in several officer positions in the German Giovanni Ramunno is a colonel in the Italian Navy and Joint Services. Since the mid 1990’s Army Aviation where he worked as a helicopter he was specialised in communications and infor- pilot and a press officer. Currently, he is sec- mation systems. In March 2012 he joined the onded to the European Union Military Com- EDA and became programme manager for cyber mittee in Brussels as a military assistant to the defence on the beginning of 2014. Inter alia he is Chairman for Public Information/Relations. responsible for the identification of cyber defence Giovanni has gained a broad operational experi- capability gaps and the development and imple- ence as a military officer in more than ten years mentation of solutions. spent abroad working for the EU, NATO, the OSCE and the UN. In 1998 he was accredited Lt. Col. Jean-Philippe Scherer is Branch Chief in to the Italian Embassy in Belgrade and started the European Union Operations Centre. He is an the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission. His active officer in the French Air Force. As a fighter

292 ANNEXES

pilot, he was engaged in major operations in the and fight against corruption. Raluca Stefanuc Middle East, Africa and Central Europe. He has holds an LL M in European law from King’s Col- been a flight commander, an evaluator at NATO, lege London. experimental test pilot for Rafale and chief of air sensors operations. A War College graduate, he Petteri Taitto is training manager at the ESDC holds a Master of Business Administration (HEC with the responsibility to lead CSDP mission and Paris) and an engineering degree in Aeronautics operation support and cooperation with other and Space Systems (IS AE-SUPAER O). civilian training stakeholders. He has previously worked as project leader and head of training at Lt. Col. Evert-Jan Slootman MD Dr M.Sc. the Crisis Management Centre Finland, princi- works for the Netherlands Ministry of Defence. pal instructor at the Emergency Services College Currently, he is seconded, as a medical expert, and teacher at the National Defence College. He to the European External Action Service/Euro- is EU Civil Protection coordination expert and a pean Union Military Staff in Brussels. His pre- member of EU Civilian Response Team (CRT). vious posts included Medical Coordination and He holds a Master of Education and a General Plans Officer and Medical Operations Officer at Staff Officer degree. NATO – SHAPE, Belgium. He holds a master’s degree in community medicine and epidemiol- Col. Paul van der Heijden is currently the Chief ogy. His publications focus on applied research on of the Force Capability Branch of the EU Mili- preventive measures for deployed military person- tary Staff (EUMS). He is a colonel of the Royal nel. Netherlands Air Force and has served in several national and international positions, most Kees Smit Sibinga has been on a secondment recently in the Netherlands Air Force HQ as Act- as senior policy officer to the Security Policy and ing Chief of Cabinet and as Head of Management Sanctions Division of the European External Development. He was also military assistant to Action Service since 2011. He previously worked the NATO Secretary General and NATO’s Mili- in various positions at the Dutch Foreign Min- tary Liaison Officer to the United Nations in New istry and Embassies abroad, including as deputy York. Amongst other assignments he was Com- Head of Mission. Mr Smit Sibinga holds a degree mander of the Netherlands Air Force Training and in modern history and international law from Lei- Military Leadership Squadron and he served as a den University, the Netherlands. UN military observer.

Raluca Stefanuc works as anti-corruption pol- Victoria Walker is the deputy head of DCAF’s icy desk at the European Commission’s Support International Security Sector Advisory Team Group for Ukraine. Previously, she was the coor- (ISSAT), where she has worked extensively on dinator of anti-corruption policies within Direc- security and justice development in Sub-Saharan torate-General Home Affairs of the European Africa, the Balkans, Latin America and the Carib- Commission between December 2010 and March bean, and South East Asia. Her previous EU expe- 2014. Prior to this, Raluca Stefanuc had worked rience includes the EU planning team for EULEX for two years in the EU Delegation in Skopje, Kosovo, the Aceh Monitoring Mission, and the covering the fields of fight against corruption and EU Monitoring Mission in Albania. She also held organised crime. Before taking up the assignment a commission in the British Army. Victoria holds in the EU Delegation in Skopje, she had worked master’s degrees in Development Management for five years in the Romanian Ministry of Justice, and Social Sciences. dealing with issues related to judiciary reforms

293 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

Dr Richard Winkelhofer is a rule of law adviser Lt. Gen. Wolfgang Wosolsobe started his mili- in the Civilian Planning Conduct Capability tary career in 1974. After several assignments as (CPCC) within the European External Action an infantry officer he attended the General Staff Service. He holds a master’s degree in Business Officers Course of the Austrian Armed Forces Administration and a Doctorate degree in Law. (1982-1985) followed by a post as defence plan- He has been working in the Austrian judiciary ner. He completed his education at France’s ‘École from 1995, starting full-time practice as a judge in Supérieure de Guerre Interarmées’ and the ‘Cours 2000. From 2008 to 2010 he served for the Rule Supérieur Interarmées’. In 1991, he joined the of Law mission EULEX Kosovo, as the President Austrian Diplomatic Mission in Geneva as a mili- of the Special Chamber of the Supreme Court of tary adviser on disarmament. His international Kosovo on Kosovo Trust Agency Related Matters. career continued with his assignment as Defence Prior to joining the European External Action Attaché to France from 1992 to 1997. After a Service in 2014, he was then Head of the Justice command period he went on to deal with military Department in the Permanent Representation of policy, which led him to the post of Defence Pol- Austria to the EU. icy Director in 2006. From there, he joined Brus- sels as Austrian Military Representative in 2007. In 2012, he was elected to the post of Director General of the EU Military Staff (EUMS) as of 28 May 2013.

294 ANNEXES

List of abbreviations

A C ACO Allied Command Operations C2 Command and Control ACT Allied Command Transformation C34 Special Committee on Peace- ADL Advanced Distance Learning keeping Operations AFD French Development Agency CA Comprehensive approach AFISMA African-led International Support CAR Central African Republic Mission in Mali CARICOM Caribbean Community AFRICOM United States Africa Command CB Confidence-Building AIES Austria Institute for European and CBCR Country-by-country reporting Security Policy CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological AMA Agreement on Movement and and Nuclear Access CCS Capability Codes and Statements AMANI- CTC Counter-Terrorism Coordinator Africa EU training and exercise pro- (EU) gramme supporting the African CDIP Concept Development Implemen- Union’s capacity to manage and tation Programme deploy the African Standby Forces CDP Capability Development Plan AMIS African Union Mission in Sudan CEPOL European Police College AMISOM African Mission in Somalia CERT Computer Emergency Response AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission Team APIC Agreement on Privileges and CEUMC Chairman of the Military Committee Immunities of the International CfC Call for Contribution Criminal Court CFSP Common Foreign and Security APSA African Peace and Security Policy Architecture CIMIC Civil-Military Co-operation APT Advanced Persistent Threat CIVCAS Civilian Casualties ARF Regional Forum of the Associa- CIVCOM Committee for Civilian Aspects of tion of Southeast Asian Nations Crisis Management ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian CivOpsCdr Civilian Operations Commander Nations CLS Combat Life Support ASPR Austria Study Centre for Peace CMC Crisis Management Concept and Conflict Resolution CMO Crisis Management Operation AU African Union CMP Crisis Management Procedures CMPD Crisis Management and Planning Directorate B CNO Computer Network Operations BG Battle Group CP Conflict Prevention BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina CoC Code of Conduct BP Barcelona Process CoE Council of Europe CoE Centre of Excellence Col Colonel COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa CONOPS Concept of Operations

295 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

COREPER Committee of Permanent E Representatives EaP Eastern Partnership COSI Standing Committee on Internal EAT Election Assessment Team Security EBRD European Bank for Reconstruc- CPCC Civilian Planning and Conduct tion and Development Capability EC European Commission CPO Close Protection Officer ECDC European Centre for Disease Pre- CRIA Crisis Response Information vention and Control Activities ECHO European Commission’s Depart- CROC Crisis Response and Operational ment for Humanitarian Aid and Coordination Civil Protection CRT Crisis Response Team ECOFIN Economic and Financial Affairs CSP Comprehensive Settlement Council Proposal ECOWAS Economic Community of West CSDP Common Security and Defence African States Policy EDA European Defence Agency CSO Civilian Strategic Options EDC European Defence Community CT Counter-Terrorism EDF European Development Fund EEA European Economic Area EEAS European External Action Service D EEC European Economic Community DAC Development Assistance Commit- EEM Election Expert Mission tee of the OCDE EGF European Gendarmerie Force DAESH al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi Iraq wa al- EHEST Online Hostile Environment Secu- Sham (Islamic State in Iraq and rity Training the Levant) EIDHR European Instrument for Democ- DCI Development Co-operation racy and Human Rights Instrument EIHM Environmental and industrial DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation health hazards and Reintegration ELARG Directorate-General for Enlarge- DDoS Distributed Denial-of-Service ment (former) DepK Department K Security Pol- ENISA European Network and Informa- icy and Conflict Prevention tion Security Agency DEVCO Directorate-General for Develop- ENP European Neighbourhood Policy ment and Cooperation (European ENPI European Neighbourhood and Commission) Partnership Instruments DFID UK Department for International EP European Parliament Development ENTRi Europe’s New Training Initiative DG HOME Directorate-General for Migra- for civilian crisis management tion and Home Affairs (European ENISA European Union Agency for Net- Commission) work and Information Security DG MOVE Directorate-General for Mobil- EO Evacuation Operation ity and Transport (European EOM Election Observation Mission Commission) EPC European Police College DG NEAR Directorate-General for Neighbour- ERMES European Resources for Media- hood and Enlargement Negotia- tion Support tions (European Commission) ESDC European Security and Defence DIO Defence Intelligence Organisation College DNBI Disease and Non-Battle Injuries ESDP European Security and Defence DRC Democratic Republic of Congo Policy Dr iur Doctor of Law ESG Executive Secretary-General DSG Deputy Secretary General ESS European Security Strategy

296 ANNEXES

EU European Union EU SSR EU mission in support of Secu- EUAM EU Advisory Mission rity Sector Reform (e.g. in EUAVSEC European Union Aviation Security Guinea-Bissau) Mission EUSEC European Union Security Sector EUBAM European Union Border Assis- Reform Mission tance Mission EUSR European Union Special EU BG EU Battlegroup Representative EUCAP European Union Capacity-building EUTM European Union Training Mission Mission EVD Ebola Virus Disease EUCOM United States European EW Electronic Warfare Command EWS Early Warning System (for EUDEL EU Delegation conflicts) EUFOR European Union Forces (military) EU INTCEN EU Intelligence Analysis Centre EU ISS European Union Institute for F Security Studies FAC Foreign Affairs Council EUJUST European Union mission in sup- FAO Food and Agriculture Organisa- port of the justice sector tion (United Nations) EULEX European Union Rule of Law FATF Financial Action Task Force Mission FC Force Catalogue EUMAM EU Military Advisory Committee FC Force Commander EUMC European Union Military FHP Force Health Protection Committee FHQ Force Headquarters EUMCQ EU military capability FIBUA Fighting in Built-Up Areas questionnaire FPI Service for Foreign Policy Instru- EUMM European Union Monitoring ments (European Commission) Mission FPA Framework Participation EUMS European Union Military Staff Agreement EU MS European Union Member State Frontex European Agency for the Manage- EUMS INT EU Military Staff Intelligence ment of Operational Cooperation Directorate at the External Borders of the EUNAVFOR European Union Naval Force Member States of the European EU OPCEN European Union Operation Centre Union for the Horn of Africa FSJ Freedom, Security and Justice EU OPSCEN European Union Operation Centre FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of within the European Union Mili- Macedonia tary Staff (EUMS) EUPAT EU police advisory team EUPM European Union Police Mission G EUPST European Union’s Police Services GAM Free Aceh Movement Training Programme GDACS Global Disaster Alert and Coordi- EUPOL European Union Police Mission nation System EUR Euro GDP Gross Domestic Product EUROJUST European Union’s Judicial GRECO Group of States against Corrup- Cooperation tion (Council of Europe) EUROPOL European Union’s law enforce- GSC General Secretariat of the ment agency Council ERCC European Response Coordination GTIA Groupement Tactique Interarmes Centre (Combined Arms Tactical Group) EU SITCEN EU Situation Centre (now EU INTCEN) EUSC EU Satellite Centre (now Satcen)

297 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

H INTERPOL International Police Organisation HA Humanitarian assistance IO International Organisation HEAT Hostile Environment Awareness IOC Initial Operational Capacity Training IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Cli- HEST Hostile Environment Security mate Change Training IPU Integrated Police Unit HLC High Level Course IRB Interim Response Programme HLG Headline Goal ISA Intelligence Support Architecture HN Host Nation ISB Intelligence Steering Board HoA Horn of Africa ISIL Islamic State in Iraq and the HoD Head of Delegation Levant HoM Head of Mission IST Information Strategy Team HQ Headquarters IT Information Technology HR High Representative of the Union IWG Intelligence Working Group for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy HRVP High Representative of the Union J for Foreign Affairs and Security JAES Joint Africa-EU Strategy Policy and Vice-President of the JHA Justice and Home Affairs Commission JOA Joint Operation Area HR Human Resources JRC Joint Research Centre HR Human Rights JSCM Joint Strategic Coordination HTF Headline Goal Task Force Mechanism JSR Joint Special Representative JSSR Justice & Security Sector Reform I IACA International Anti-Corruption Academy K IBM Integrated Border Management KLE Key Leader Engagement ICC International Criminal Court ICoC International Code of Conduct ICoCA International Code of Conduct L Association (for private security LAS League of the Arab States service providers) LOAC Law of Armed Conflict ICRC International Committee of the LRRD Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Red Cross Development IcSP Instrument Contributing to Stabil- LSTO Locally-recruited Short Term ity and Peace Observer ICT Information and Communications LtCol Lieutenant Colonel Technology LtGen Lieutenant General IDL Internet-based Distance Learning IDP Internally Displaced Person IED Improvised Explosive Device M IfS Instrument for Stability Mag. iur. Master of Law IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on MD Managing Directorate Development MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation IHL International Humanitarian Law MEP Member of the European IMD Initiating Military Directive Parliament InfoOps Information Operations MHQ Mission Headquarters INFORM Index for Risk Management MIEDA Mine and IED awareness (European Commission)

298 ANNEXES

Mil PI/PR Military Public Information/Public ODIHR Office for Democratic Institutions Relations and Human Rights MINUSMA United Nations Multidimensional OHQ Operation(s) Headquarters Integrated Stabilisation Mission OLAF European Anti-fraud Office in Mali OpCdr Operation Commander MIP Mission Implementation Plan OPLAN Operation Plan MISCA/ OPSEC Operations Security AFISM-CAR African-led International Support OSCE Organisation for Security and Co- Mission in the Central African operation in Europe Republic OVI Objectively Verifiable Indicator MMA Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising MNE Multinational Experiment P MoDS Ministry of Defence and Sports PA Public Affairs (Republic of Austria) PbP Peace-building Partnership MoI Ministry of the Interior PC Progress Catalogue MoU Memorandum of Understanding PD Public Diplomacy MPA Military Public Affairs PFCA Political Framework for Crisis MPE Myanmar Police Force Approach MRRC Military Rapid Response Concept PIR Prioritised Intelligence MS Member State(s) Requirements MSO Military Strategic Options PPIO Press and Public Information MST Mediation Support Team Officer MSU Mission Support Unit PMG Politico-Military Group MTIC Missing Trader Intra-Community PMSC Private Military and Security Fraud Companies MV Means of Verification POC Protection of Civilians PSC Political and Security Committee PsyOps Psychological Operations N NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NCO Non-Commissioned Officer R NDPP NATO Defence Planning Process RC Requirement Catalogue NEAR Directorate-General for Neigh- RELEX Working Party of Foreign Rela- bourhood Policy and Enlargement tions Counsellors Negotiation RoE Rules of Engagement NGO Non-Governmental Organisation RoL Rule of Law NSC Nuclear Safety Cooperation RTD Research and technological development RR Rapid Response O RSOM Rapid Staging and Onward OAS Organisation of American States Movement OC Orientation Course RUoF Rules for the Use of Force OCG Organised Crime Groups OCHA Office for the Coordination of S Humanitarian Affairs SADC Southern African Development OECD Organisation for Economic Co- Community operation and Development SAR Search and Rescue ODA Official Development Assistance SASE Safe and Secure Environment (OECD) Satcen EU Satellite Centre

299 HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

SDPU Strategy, Development and Plan- U ning Unit UAE United Arab Emirates SEA Single European Act UfM Union for the Mediterranean SFOR Stabilisation Force UK United Kingdom SGBV Sexual and Gender-Based UN United Nations Violence UNAMID United Nations-African Union Mis- SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied sion in Darfur Powers Europe UNCAC UN Convention against SIAC Single Intelligence Analysis Corruption Capacity UNDP United Nations Development SIENA Secure Information Exchange Programme Network Application UNDPKO United Nations Department of SOFA Status of Forces Agreement Peacekeeping Operations SOMA Status of Mission Agreement UN-Habitat United Nations Human Settle- SOP Standard Operating Procedures ments Programme SOF Special Operations Forces UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund SOPF Separation of Parties by Force UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in SOR Statement of Requirements Lebanon SOCTA Serious and Organised Crime UNIOGBIS United Nations Integrated Peace- Threat Assessment (EU) Building Office in Guinea-Bissau SR Stabilisation and Reconstruction UNISDR United Nations Office for Disaster SR Special Representative Risk Reduction SSR Security Sector Reform UNO United Nations Organisation STRATCOM Strategic Communication UNSC United Nations Security Council STRATCOM Strategic Command UNSCR United Nations Security Council Stuxnet computer worm (found in 2010) Resolution UNSG United Nations Secretary-General UoF Use of Force T US(A) United States (of America) TAIEX Technical Assistance and Infor- USJFCOM United States Joint Forces mation Exchange Command TCN Troop Contributing Nation TE-SAT Terrorism Situation and Trend V Report VP Vice President of the European TEU Treaty on European Union Commission TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union TFG Transitional Federal Government W (Somalia) WIO Western Indian Ocean THB Trafficking in Human Beings WKC Watch-Keeping Capability THW German Federal Agency for Tech- WEU Western European Union nical Relief WFP World Food Programme TIC Toxic Industrial Chemicals WHO World Health Organisation TNI Indonesian National Armed WMD Weapon(s) of Mass Destruction Forces ToA Transfer of Authority TRM Transitional results matrices

300

HANDBOOKAND OPERATIONS ON MISSIONS

Jochen Rehrl, Galia Glume (eds): Rehrl, Jochen HANDBOOK

MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

ISBN: 978-3-902275-42-4