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Mali 2020 OSAC Crime & Safety Report

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Mali 2020 OSAC Crime & Safety Report Mali 2020 OSAC Crime & Safety Report This is an annual report produced in conjunction with the Regional Security Office at the U.S. Embassy in Bamako, Mali. OSAC encourages travelers to use this report to gain baseline knowledge of security conditions in Mali. For more in-depth information, review OSAC’s country-specific page for original OSAC reporting, consular messages, and contact information, some of which may be available only to private- sector representatives with an OSAC password. Travel Advisory The current U.S. Department of State Travel Advisory at the date of this report’s publication assesses Mali at Level 4, indicating travelers should not travel to Mali due to crime, terrorism, and kidnapping. Review OSAC’s report, Understanding the Consular Travel Advisory System. Overall Crime and Safety Situation Extremists and criminal groups operating in northern Mali continue to act as spoilers to the peace process and threaten those seeking to return government authority or deliver humanitarian services. While terrorist attacks in the north of Mali remain at previous levels, those in the center increased significantly in 2018 - 2019, especially in the Mopti and northern Segou regions. A significant driver of insecurity in the center is the increased inter-ethnic conflict that resulted in what Human Rights Watch reported were more than 1,000 civilian deaths in the Mopti region in 2019. The 2017 merger of four terrorist groups to form Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM, the “Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims”) and the recent emergence of ISIS-GS (ISIS in the Greater Sahel) were also underlying factors in the increase in violence. Terrorists in Mali seek to target foreigners in addition to their continued efforts to undermine the national reconciliation process. The government of Mali extended the national State of Emergency through October 31, 2020, giving security forces broader power to limit protests, detain individuals, and search people and property. Thousands of military and civilian personnel working at the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA), the European Union Training Mission to Mali (EUTM), The EU Capacity Building Mission in Mali (EUCAP) and the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance Program (ATA) are making concerted efforts toward security sector reform with assistance from the international community. Mali continued to rely heavily on MINUSMA and French forces to help marginally stabilize and secure the northern and central regions. The French military’s Operation Barkhane, an integrated counterterrorism mission for the Sahel region, continued efforts to degrade terrorist elements operating in Mali. MINUSMA maintained its presence in northern Mali in 2019 while taking on a greater role in protecting civilians in that region. MINUSMA also continued to work with the Government of Mali and armed groups signatory to the Algiers Peace Accord to facilitate redeployment of government administrators and security forces to northern Mali. The countries of Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Chad, and Burkina Faso created the G5 Sahel Joint Force in 2017 to combat terrorism in the Mali/Niger/Burkina Faso tri-border region. The G5 Sahel Joint Force headquarters relocated to Bamako following the 2018 attack of its headquarters in Sevare. It has since begun operations to clear out terrorists in the ungoverned regions in the Sahel, and is conducting operations in the Mopti region in an attempt to stabilize the center of the country. Much work remains for the Malian security services to be capable of controlling extremist and criminal organizations inside the country. Large swaths of northern Mali remain largely cut off from effective state control, as do portions of Mopti region. While impossible to prevent active shooter attacks, a tactic employed in previous attacks, Malian security services need better training to aid their response to such attacks. Some government and financial services returned to the northern regions of Timbuktu and Gao; however, school closures due to threats in the central region remain a persistent problem. Mali’s long-standing problems of unemployment, food insecurity, and long-term economic underdevelopment persist. Mali is far from being able to combat the economic drivers that lead individuals to banditry, still the largest disruptive force against private organizations operating in the north. Avoid the northern parts of the country due to terrorist and criminal activities, the threat of kidnapping, and ongoing military operations. Northern Mali remains desolate, difficult to patrol, and continues to provide sanctuary for extremist groups. Crime Threats The U.S. Department of State has assessed Bamako as being a CRITICAL-threat location for crime directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests. Although most crimes in Bamako are of a nonviolent and opportunistic nature, criminals can be violent and are often armed. Most reported incidents targeted unaccompanied individuals in the early morning or late night hours. Home invasions, armed robberies, and carjacking are among the most common violent crimes reported. Bandits routinely set up roadblocks on major routes outside of Bamako to stop vehicles to steal belongings; a number of motorists have died in such robberies. There are periodic reports of nighttime robberies of commercial establishments (e.g. restaurants, convenience stores, small businesses) in Bamako; these tend to spike before major holidays. Residential break-ins are less common; however, maintain proper locks and solid doors and consider employing residential guards 24 hours per day. Like in many capital cities, marketplaces and popular public areas in downtown Bamako are gathering places for criminals and prostitutes. Visitors should be vigilant and exercise caution in these areas at night. Review OSAC’s reports, Hotels: The Inns and Outs and Considerations for Hotel Security. Crime continues to increase outside of Bamako, affecting a large number of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). In late 2019, many NGOs had to suspend operations in parts of central Mali because of increased crime. Thieves and carjackers routinely target NGOs in the center and the north. Terrorist actors used a stolen NGO vehicle as a vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in the attack on the UN camp in Timbuktu in 2018. Criminals have beaten and tied up NGO workers during vehicle thefts, as well as kidnapping them for ransom. Terrorists and bandits routinely warn NGOs not to work in certain villages and steal supplies donated to the local population. Visitors to Bamako should practice the same personal security precautions they would in any large city. Visitors should be vigilant and maintain awareness at all times in crowded areas such as markets. Be aware of anyone who jostles you, even if it appears innocent. This is often a ploy used by pickpockets, including children, to distract you. Do not carry, let alone display, large sums of money. Do not carry anything in your wallet that you cannot replace easily. Theft of unattended items is common. Review OSAC’s reports, All That You Should Leave Behind. Avoid wandering around in remote areas of the city alone, particularly at night. Travel in groups and stay in illuminated areas as much as possible. Avoid travel at night on foot since the roads are often poorly illuminated, increasing the chance of being struck by a vehicle or motorbike. Thefts from hotel rooms may occur. Visitors should not leave anything of value in their room and ensure their hotel room doors stay locked while sleeping in the room. Given a history of terrorist attacks against soft targets like hotels in Mali, consider carrying your own doorstop to secure your hotel room while sleeping. Cybersecurity Issues Review OSAC’s reports, Cybersecurity Basics, Best Practices for Maximizing Security on Public Wi-Fi, Traveling with Mobile Devices: Trends & Best Practices, and Satellite Phones: Critical or Contraband? Transportation-Safety Situation Road Safety and Road Conditions Driving is a major safety concern. Enforcement of existing traffic laws is practically non-existent. Low-level police corruption remains endemic; drivers can expect police to request cash bribes on site. Automobiles share the road with mopeds, motorcycles, bicycles, donkey carts, and pedestrians, many of whom do not look before they venture into the street. Many drivers lack rudimentary driving skills, and many vehicles, including public transportation vans and taxis, lack poor maintenance, are overloaded, and break down frequently. Drive defensively and expect the unexpected from drivers. Driving at night in Bamako can be hazardous, as many vehicles lack headlights and roads are poorly illuminated. Mali continues to improve paved roads leading from Bamako to most major cities in the south; however, this has resulted in many accidents due to speeding. The rainy season (June-September) can make many of the roads outside the capital impassable. Deep sand and ditches are common on the major routes. Consider using four-wheel drive vehicles with spare tires and emergency equipment and/or roadside assistance kits. Travel overland in convoys and with long-range communications capability. Cellular phone coverage is limited in many areas; use satellite phones if practicable. Limit overland travel to daylight hours to avoid the risk of banditry, typically occurring at night, and of poorly illuminated roadways. Traffic police are routinely slow to respond to accidents, and drivers often resolve the accident by mutually agreeing on a sum of money to cover damages in order to settle the accident without the assistance of the police. Local motorists expect those involved in an accident resulting in injury to pay for the immediate medical treatment of the injured regardless of who was at fault. Crowds commonly gather at the scene of an accident/altercation. Crowds have become involved in the situation in support of either party and have the potential to threaten the safety of the parties. Vigilante street justice is common. Most accidents occur between cars and motorcycles, often resulting in injury of the motorcyclist.
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