Modernity/Coloniality in Legitimizing Agribusiness:
The Case of the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania
University of Amsterdam Graduate School of Social Sciences
Research Master in International Development Studies
A Master Thesis by Daniel Haudenschild [email protected] 11187905 Word count: 31410
December 7, 2018 © Daniel Haudenschild
Under the Supervision of Dr. Ir. Yves P.B. van Leynseele University of Amsterdam
Secondary Supervisor Second Reader Dr. Richard Mbunda Dr. Rosalba Icaza Garza University of Dar es Salaam ISS, Erasmus University Rotterdam
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Abstract
The new scramble for Africa’s farmland is exemplified by the launch of the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) in 2010. The experimental flagship project was put forward by an alliance between transnational agribusiness corporations, development organizations, and the government of Tanzania to radically transform the country’s agricultural sector through modernization and commercialization. The SAGCOT initiative aims to demonstrate the development potential of a large-scale Public-Private Partnership by implementing an inclusive green growth strategy to achieve inclusive and sustainable development. Recent studies of the first phase of SAGCOT have primarily focused on land- grabbing, as well as the impacts on smallholder farmers and the implementation of a green economy approach. However, less attention has been paid to the processes of legitimization ‘from above’ as the implementation of the corridor advances. In this thesis, I examine how hegemonic processes of legitimization are mediated and operate through a repertoire of discourses, strategies, and practices ‘from above.’ This case study is based on qualitative methods, including semi-structured interviews, participant observations, and document analysis over five months of fieldwork in corridor, especially in the Iringa Region as part of the Ihemi cluster. The findings of this study shows that the agricultural modernization discourse, the inclusive green growth strategy, and practices of inclusive participation are employed as a token commitment for inclusive and environmental sustainable development. These processes invisibilizes underlying inequalities, racialized hierarchies, and asymmetrical power relations between diverse stakeholders to legitimize the SAGCOT initiative. Linked to accommodating donors, agribusiness, and national interests, the practices of securing donor support, lobbying and influencing government policies, and securing political support unfold to contribute towards legitimizing the initiative ‘from above.’ Based on these findings, I argue that the SAGCOT initiative is legitimized through discourses, strategies, and practices that deepens coloniality and primitive accumulation in a extractivist corridor of power, control, and exploitation.
Keywords: Agribusiness; Processes of Legitimization; Modernity/Coloniality; SAGCOT; Tanzania
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Acknowledgments
I am grateful to a number of people, as this master thesis would not have been possible without their support and help. During the last two-years of this master, I encountered many ups and downs. Therefore, first and foremost, I offer my deepest gratitude to my parents Margreth and Pesche, my brothers Thomas and Thies, and my American parents Julie, Rich, and sister Renae for their enormous support, encouragements, and inspirations.
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Yves van Leynseele for his exceptional and excellent supervision. He has gone well beyond the role of a supervisor, and his guidance, encouragement, and critical feedback greatly contributed to my academic development. I enjoyed our meetings and critical discussions, while time and critical thinking is a scarcity in the context of the neoliberal Westernized university. I am thankful for Yves’ mentorship and friendship. I am deeply grateful to Dr. Richard Mbund who has been an outstanding and inspirational second supervisor at the University of Dar es Salaam. I am thankful for his advices, mentorship, and friendship, as well as his kindness for introducing me to his colleagues, friends, and family. I would like to express my appreciation to Dr. Rosalba Icaza for being the second reader of my thesis. Thank you, Rosalba!
I would like to express my gratitude to each and every person for take the time and energy to meet with me for a conversation over the SAGCOT initiative. Your commitment and willingness to meet for an interview made this piece of social research possible. In particular, I am thankful to all the Tanzanians who have welcomed me in their country. Also, Singo Leiyo, thank you for your excellent translation of a speech form Swahili to English for this thesis. My thanks go to my friend and comrade Sabatho Nyamsenda, the Jukwaa la Wajamaa Tanzania (Tanzania Socialist Forum), and the people who resist oppression through agribusiness. I am so grateful to Susan and her family for hosting me at their home in Dar es Salaam, and also introducing me to her family, friends, and neighbors. Thank you, Mr. English, for your friendship and amazing Swahili lessons!
In addition, I must particularly thank Dr. Kwame Nimako who first introduced me as an undergraduate student to critical decolonial scholarship, for his inspiration, and continuous v mentorship. I am also grateful for conversations over comments and inspiration form my friends Eoin Ó Cuinneagáin, Tam Nguyen, Katayoun Arian, Matías Pérez Ojeda del Arco, Michelle Ruiz Andrade, and Vuyolwethu Seti. I would like to extend my gratitude to Jill Tove Buseth, Dr. Alexander Dunlap, Mikael Bergius, and Dr. Judith Verweijen who have meaningfully commented in conversations over my research at the POLLEN18 Conference in Oslo and beyond. Thank you to all my friend back home and around the world, as well my classmates, everyone from the Decolonial Reading group in Amsterdam, the IDS Programme Committee, CDDE, and Amsterdam United. I am also thankful to the staff from the department of International Development Studies at UvA, in particular to Eva van der Sleen, Dr. Michaela Hordijk, and Dr. Denis Rodgers. I thank COSTECH for the research permit, and the financial support through the UvA fieldwork subsidy, supervision subsidy, and conference fund.
Finally, I am so very grateful to my partner Madlen for her patience, intellectual debates, support, and love. Her encouragement and perspectives provided me with strength during this master. Thank you for sharing this journey with me.
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Table of Content
Abstract ...... iii
Acknowledgments ...... iv
List of Figures and Tables ...... viii
List of Acronyms ...... ix
CHAPTER 1: Introduction ...... 1 Problem Statement ...... 3 Research Questions and Research Aim ...... 5 Thesis Outline ...... 7
CHAPTER 2: Theoretical Framework ...... 9 The Land Grabbing Debate and the Scramble for Africa’s Land...... 9 Inclusive Green Growth as Sustainable Agricultural Development ...... 12 Primitive Accumulation and Agrarian South ...... 14 Modernity/Coloniality ...... 16 Coloniality of Power...... 18 Coloniality of Knowledge ...... 21 Conceptual Scheme ...... 23
CHAPTER 3: Methodology ...... 25 Epistemological and Ontological Position ...... 25 Research Design ...... 27 Sampling ...... 28 Data Collection Methods...... 29 Semi-Structured Interviews...... 29 Participant Observation ...... 33 Document Analysis ...... 35 Data Analysis ...... 37 Positionality ...... 38
CHAPTER 4: A Brief History of Agricultural Developments in Tanzania ...... 40 Colonial Agriculture in Tanganyika ...... 40 Invasion and German Rule ...... 40 vii
British Rule ...... 42 From Uhuru to Ujamaa ...... 45 The Neoliberal Counter Revolution ...... 47 Towards a SAGCOT Corridor ...... 49
CHAPTER 5: Legitimizing Processes ‘From Above’ ...... 56 Agricultural Modernization and Land Grabbing in SAGCOT ...... 56 Legitimizing SAGCOT through Inclusive Green Growth ...... 61 Donor Support in SAGCOT ...... 65 Donor Funding for Agricultural Modernization...... 68 SAGCOT as an Extra Institutional Layer: Policy Lobbying ...... 71 The State in SAGCOT: Securing Political Support ...... 74 Conclusion ...... 78
CHAPTER 6: Legitimizing Control, Power, and Exploitation ...... 80 The Power of Participation and Inclusion in SAGCOT Stakeholder Meetings ...... 82 Smallholder Farmers and Participatory Control ...... 84 Training Schemes ...... 90 The SAGCOT Tomato Partnership ...... 93 An Unfolding Corridor ...... 97 Conclusion ...... 99
CHAPTER 7: Conclusion...... 101 Research Findings ...... 101 Theoretical Reflections...... 104 Concluding Remarks ...... 105
REFERENCES ...... 107
APPENDICES ...... 119 Appendix I – List of Interviews, Speeches, and Documents ...... 119 Appendix II – General Interview Guide...... 122 Appendix III – SAGCOT List of Partners ...... 123 Appendix IV – Member List of the Green Reference Group ...... 125
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List of Figures and Tables
Figures
Figure 1. Map of the SAGCOT Corridor ...... 3 Figure 2. Conceptual Scheme ...... 24 Figure 3. DFID Head Tanzania Beth Arthy and Minister of Agriculture Hon. Charles Tizeba .. 34 Figure 4. Mbarali Cluster Launch Event ...... 35 Figure 5. The Groundnut Scheme ...... 44 Figure 6. Map of the three proposed areas for the Tanganyika Groundnut Scheme ...... 44 Figure 7. Timeline of selected agricultural developments from 1880 to 1980 ...... 49 Figure 8. Timeline of selected agricultural developments from 1990 to present ...... 51 Figure 9. Clusters in the SAGCOT Corridor ...... 54 Figure 10. Selected SAGCOT investments by key Donors ...... 67 Figure 11. SAGCOT value chain development for clusters ...... 69 Figure 13. Minister of Agriculture, Hon. Charles Tizeba ...... 77 Figure 13. Map of the Ihemi Cluster ...... 82 Figure 15. Price of Tomatoes in Tanzania, 2016 ...... 96
Tables
Table 1. Summary of Interviews and Speeches ...... 31 Table 2. Selected Documents for Analysis ...... 36
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List of Acronyms
AGRA Alliance for Green Revolution in Africa ASDP Agricultural Sector Development Program CAADP Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme CEO Chief Executive Officer CSOs Civil Society Organizations CTF SAGCOT Catalytic Trust Fund DFID Department for International Development GRG Green Reference Group IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ICSID International Court for Settlement of Investment Disputes IMF International Monetary Fund NAFSN New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development NGOs Non-Governmental Organization PPPs Public-Private Partnerships SAGCOT Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania SAPs Structural Adjustment Programs SCL SAGCOT Center Ltd SIP SAGCOT Investment Project TANESCO Tanzania Electric Supply Company Limited TANU Tanganyika African National Union TAP Tanzanian Agricultural Partnership TIC Tanzanian Investment Center Tsh Tanzanian Shillings USAID United States Agency for International Development VAT Value Added Tax WEF World Economic Forum
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction
“This SAGCOT is for Muzungus only. It is not for us. These are just the agents from Muzungu. They need to promote the Muzungu to come back again to take our land. So, we have to watch with a second eye. What are they doing, these SAGCOT people?” – Smallholder Farmer1
“This [SAGCOT] is a kind of new way of colonization.” – Head of a Tanzanian Land Rights Organization2
Since the beginning of the twenty-first-century, the (re)emergence of “land grabbing” or large- scale farmland acquisitions/investments have constituted a central dynamic of the Eurocentric, modern/colonial, and capitalist/patriarchal world-system. The neoliberal crises of finance, food, energy, and ecology in 2007-2008 has turned farmland into an attractive investment opportunity for transnational agribusiness corporations to further capital accumulation (McMichael 2012). This has escalated into what Moyo et al. (2012) identifies as a “new scramble” for the control of Africa’s farmland and resources. The dimension of this control grab is unfolding at a scale unmatched since colonialism (White et al. 2012a, Hall, Scoones, et al. 2015). The scramble is led by a powerful alliance between transnational agribusiness, multilateral development organizations, and a number of African states. A key objective of investments into farmland is to rollout a new Green Revolution and radically transform agriculture. This is to turn farming into a business through modernization and commercialization. In the context of the drying up of development funds (Brooks 2016), with a shift towards Foreign Direct Investments for agriculture (FAO 2013, Kaarhus 2018) and a growing influence Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) (Birch and Siemiatycki 2016, Bayliss and Van Waeyenberge 2018), the concept of African Agricultural Growth Corridors has emerged as a visionary agribusiness project for modern agricultural development. African Agricultural Growth Corridors combine approaches of Public-Private Partnerships, value chain development, and private sector led-investments to
1 Interview 11, 08.12.2017 2 Interview 17, 20.12.2017 2 modernize and commercialize agriculture. This approach represents the latest imperialist attempt to bring modernity to African countries in the name of development.
The Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) has risen to become the most advanced flagship model to demonstrate the development potential of African Agricultural Growth Corridors.3 The $3.5 billion SAGCOT initiative was launched in 2010 at the World Economic Forum Africa Submit in Dar es Salaam. This Public-Private Partnerships rests on a powerful alliance between transnational agribusiness corporations, development organizations, and the government of Tanzania. The SAGCOT initiative’s central aim is to transform Tanzania’s agriculture sector though modernization and commercialization. To this end, the SAGCOT Blueprint is designed to catalyze “large volumes of responsible private investment, [while] the initiative aims to deliver rapid and sustainable agricultural growth, with major benefits for food security, poverty reduction and reduced vulnerability to climate change” (SAGCOT 2011, i). In other words, the initiative promises a seductive neoliberal triple-win scenario to achieve economic growth, climate change mitigation, and ensure food security and poverty reduction by mobilizing private sector investments. These trajectories are consolidated in the SAGCOT initiative’s inclusive green growth strategy, which promises to deliver sustainable and inclusive development. By 2030, SAGCOT envisions that it will convert 350,000 hectares of land into commercial framing, transform over 230,000 smallholders into commercial farmers, generate 420,000 new jobs, lift more than two million people out of poverty, and build infrastructure networks (roads, railways, ports, irrigation systems) (SAGCOT 2011, 7; SAGCOT 2018, 27). The agribusiness corridor covers about one third of the Tanzanian mainland (see Figure 1). The SAGCOT initiative links smallholders to medium and large-scale commercial farms through a value chain development approach, including contract farming and outgrower schemes.
3 In addition, the Beira Agricultural Growth Corridor in central Mozambique is a similar high-level initiative, but has recently faced major challenges in its implementation (see Kaarhus 2018). Several other African Agricultural Growth Corridors have been in the making (see Nogales 2014, Oxfam 2014, Byiers et al. 2016, Smalley 2017). 3
Figure 1. Map of the SAGCOT Corridor (Source: SAGCOT 2011, 2)
Problem Statement Since the launch of the SAGCOT initiative in 2010 and especially in the last few years, an emerging body of scholarship and NGO reports have scrutinized the large-scale agribusiness initiative. In particular, critical scholars have documented the involvement of SAGCOT affiliated agribusiness corporations in land grabbing that has resulted in dispossession and the destruction of livelihoods (ActionAid 2015a, Oakland Institute 2015, Ademba and Mpagaze 2016, Bergius et al. 2017, Bluwstein et al. 2018). Some scholars have also pointed out the gendered dimension of land grabbing and contested land ownership within the corridor (Sikira and Kashaigili 2016, Chung 2017). While land grabbing has been studied in relation to the SAGCOT initiative, contract farming and outgrower schemes have emerged as a dominant strategy to evade land conflicts in the corridor. These outgrower schemes can pose a market opportunity for smallholder farmers, but these smallholders also risk becoming marginalized by powerful agribusiness corporations partnering with SAGCOT (Oxfam 2014, Sulle et al. 2014, Sulle 2017). 4
Related studies demonstrate the impact on smallholders farmers in SAGCOT agribusiness investments compared to the benefits of independent smallholders’ food production. (Twomey et al. 2015, Schiavoni et al. 2018). This led some scholars to analyze the narratives of “opportunity” and “risk” revolving around the SAGCOT initiative, and cautioned against these polarized perceptions (West and Haug 2017). On the other hand, a study by Mbunda (2016) argues for the need for meaningful state supported peasants’ food production in Tanzania, and for the abandoning of agribusiness projects such as the likes of SAGCOT.
In addition, an emerging literature has emphasized environmental sustainability, as well as the role of the green economy in the SAGCOT initiative. In particular, Nijbroek and Andelman (2016) argue for improved criteria to determine sustainable agricultural intensification in the corridor. An NGO study titled “Encouraging Green Agricultural Development in the SAGCOT Region of Tanzania” advocates for sustainable agricultural development (SNAPP 2016). Similarly, another report assesses the potential of climate smart agriculture in the SAGCOT corridor (Mwongera et al. 2014). However, Buseth (2017) argues that the SAGCOT initiative has recently been going through a “greenwashing” process, in which the global green economy discourse has been appropriated to reshape the initiative. A study by Bergius et al. (2017) critically examines the implications of the green economy in SAGCOT through three Scandinavian agribusiness investments.
Based on the above reviewed literature concerning SAGCOT, I found that the overwhelming majority of research findings point towards a negative impact of the initiative on smallholder farmers and peasants. In fact, many studies conclude that SAGCOT is an extractivist corridor of land grabbing and exploitation. Despite the praise of some NGO reports on the initiative’s environmental sustainability, empirical evidence suggests it is a threat to ecosystems. Therefore, some studies call for the abandoning of SAGCOT, recommending a turn towards alternatives of food sovereignty and agroecology instead. The majority of the reviewed literature employs a political economy framework and focuses on a spectrum of (re)actions ‘from below’ in relation to the SAGCOT initiative. In contrast, only a few empirical studies, including Bergius et al. (2017), Buseth (2017), and West and Haug (2017) address aspects of the green economy discourse, governance, and political (re)actions ‘from above.’ However, these studies do not 5 cover the entire spectrum of political (re)actions ‘from above’ that legitimize SAGCOT. Therefore, studying political (re)actions ‘from above,’ including the legitimizing processes of discourses, strategies, and practices, as well as the formation of alliances between powerful private, public, and other actors can contribute towards a better understanding of SAGCOT. Especially the recent implementation of SAGCOT in the Iringa Region as part of the SAGCOT Ihemi cluster has raised new questions.4
Research Questions and Research Aim In this thesis, I aim to unpack the hegemonic processes of legitimization (discourses, practices, and strategies), as well as the alliances between actors in the SAGCOT initiative. Based on the literature and knowledge gaps reviewed and highlighted above, I have formulated the following research question:
How are processes of legitimation mediated in the SAGGOT initiative, and which hegemonic discourses, strategies, and practices are employed as processes of legitimization?
To help me answer the main research question, I have developed five sub-research questions:
1. What are the central underlying assumptions and development discourses that naturalize and legitimize the SAGCOT initiative?
National-Level 2. How are strategies and practices employed ‘from above’ to legitimize the SAGCOT initiative at the national-level?
4 The Ihemi cluster was the first out of six SAGCOT cluster to be officially launched in 2015. Today, the Ihemi cluster is the most advanced cluster, and compromises Iringa Region and Njombe Region in the heart of Tanzania’s Southern Highlands. The cluster is also of strategic importance because of existing infrastructure (roads, railway, electricity, and dams), large-scale commercial farms, and agribusiness companies. The Ihemi cluster serves as a vital link to other clusters. 6
3. How are SAGCOT actors negotiating between different interests to form alliances at the national-level?
Iringa part of the Ihemi Cluster 4. How are practices and strategies employed from above’ to legitimize the SAGCOT initiative in the Iringa part of the Ihemi cluster?
5. How are SAGCOT actors negotiating between different interests to form alliances in the Iringa part of the Ihemi cluster?
More concretely, I first examine the central underlying assumptions and development discourses that naturalize and legitimize the SAGCOT initiative. This analysis is guided by historicizing agricultural development in Tanzania from colonialism onwards. Second, I explore how national and local strategies and practices are employed ‘from above’ to legitimize SAGCOT. In particular, the emphasis is put on practices of influencing and lobbying invoked to secure political support, while also the strategies of inclusion and participation of stakeholders that are mobilized to manage dissent and engineer consent. These strategies and practices aim to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of stakeholders in order to naturalize control over land and labor in the corridor. Finally, I seek to unpack processes of negotiating different interests among actors in the SAGCOT initiative. These negotiations are entangled in a geography of foreign donor and national interests, as well as increasingly racialized relations between smallholder farmers and foreign agribusiness investors. The thesis pays specific attention to the implementation of practices and strategies in the Ihemi cluster. This study serves as an illustrative case for other SAGOCT clusters and similar agribusiness projects. I seek to address these knowledge gaps by studying political (re)actions ‘from above,’ as well as by drawing on perspectives from critical agrarian studies and the concept of modernity/coloniality. To help me answer the research questions formulated above, I employ three qualitative data collection methods: semi-structured- interviews, participant observations, and document analysis.
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Thesis Outline This thesis is organized into seven chapters. Chapter one introduces the topic of study, and presents a review of relevant literature to craft a problem statement. This is followed by formulating research questions and a research aim.
In chapter two, I present the theoretical framework of this study. I first provide an overview of the land grabbing debate from the critical agrarian studies perspective. I then turn towards the concept of primitive accumulation as formulated by scholars from the Agrarian South school. Second, I introduce the perspective of modernity/coloniality, and the concepts of coloniality of power and coloniality of knowledge. Third, I present a conceptual scheme as a guide for analysis.
In chapter three, I present a methodological framework and reflect on some challenges. I discuss my epistemological and ontological position, the research design, the qualitative data collection methods, and data interpretation and analysis. The chapter concludes with a reflection on my positionality.
In chapter four, I discuss a brief history of commercial agricultural development in Tanzania – from the colonial conquest to the present day. This is to situate the case study in a historical context, as well as to serve as a guide for analyzing historical (dis)continuities. I conclude by tracing the origins of the SAGCOT initiative.
In chapter five, I present the empirical findings to address sub-research questions one, two, and three. I first elaborate on the underlying assumptions and discourses that naturalize and legitimize the SGACOT initiative. Second, I discuss strategies, practices, and the negotiation of alliances at the national-level that legitimize the SGACOT initiative.
In chapter six, I turn towards the Iringa part of the Ihemi cluster to address sub-research questions four and five. I examine the strategies and practices of legitimizing the SAGCOT initiative at the local-level. For this, I focus on stakeholder meetings, educational training schemes, and the SAGCOT tomato partnership. 8
Finally, in chapter seven, I discuss and synthetize the research findings. I then situate the conclusions in the literature, and point towards future research possibilities.
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CHAPTER 2: Theoretical Framework
In this chapter, I introduce the broader debate on land grabbing in critical agrarian studies, and the modernity/coloniality perspective to form a coherent theoretical framework. For this, the chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part, I provide an overview of the land grabbing debate. Then I elaborate on the concept of the green economy and green growth as a strategy to legitimize land grabbing. This is followed by a discussion on primitive accumulation from the perspective of the Agrarian South school. In the second part, I first introduce the modernity/coloniality approach as the logic of colonialism that still operates today. I then discuss the concepts of the coloniality of power and coloniality of knowledge, and how they can shed new light on the broader dynamics of land grabbing. Finally, I present the conceptual scheme to illustrate the relationship between these concepts. The theoretical framework is motivated by the need to interrogate more carefully the current processes (discourses, strategies, and practices) of legitimizing agribusiness. This means that I do not focus on land grabbing as phenomena or on the material consequences, but rather on the broader legitimizing processes to control land, labor, and knowledge. I situate these processes as an entanglement in global coloniality by historicizing the modern/colonial world-system.
The Land Grabbing Debate and the Scramble for Africa’s Land In the wake of the currently evolving ‘global land rush,’ a body of literature has emerged to examine land grabbing. I draw on the definition of land grabbing as formulated by White et al. (2012b), as the “large-scale acquisition of land or land-related rights and resources by corporate (business, non-profit or public) entities” (610). This focuses on a specific kind of dynamics that are entangled in the dispossessions of natural resources, labor regimes, and capital accumulation.
In Africa, land grabbing has been a historical continuity. From the colonial expansion to developmentalist policies of independent states in the 1960s, to the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) of the 1980s, and to the more recent land grabs in the ear of the neoliberal crisis (Moyo et al. 2012, White et al. 2012b). The land grabbing phenomena is a historical continuity for the quest to control natural resources (Alden Wily 2012). According to Moyo (2011), colonialism in Africa signaled the first wave of land grabbing, which was primarily led 10 by the colonial state through land dispossession and displacement of the peasantry. Under the colonial regime, large scale-plantations and peasant economies were promoted as agricultural development to produce cheap agricultural raw material for export.5 The second wave of land grabbing in Africa occurred in the 1990s in relation to SAPs. This was characterized by a more “diffuse and low intensity” form of land grabbing, and compromised a mix of farming elites, middle and large sized farm lands, and some foreign farmers (Moyo 2011).
The current and third wave of land grabbing is marked by the neoliberal crisis of food, energy, finance, and ecology in 2007-2008. Borras et al. (2012) elaborate on the three central defining aspects of the current land grab: 1) a “control grab” of land and natural resources; 2) the scale of land and the scale of capital involved in land grabbing; 3) capital accumulation as the driving force of controlling the factors of production, including land and labor. Therefore, the neoliberal crisis has made investments in farmland an attractive target for a range of public and private actors. This includes actors from the US and Europe (North-South), as well as Brazil, China the Gulf states, and South Korea (South-South) (GRAIN 2009). This has evolved into a new scramble for the control of African farmland and resources (Moyo et al. 2012), at a scale unmatched since colonialism (Hall, Scoones, et al. 2015).
The current land dispossession follows a long-standing colonial logic that expresses itself in privatizing and formalizing property for the expansion of commercial agriculture and markets (Moyo 2011, 74). In the current global land rush, Africa is at the center. Some estimates by Oxfam put the share of global land deals since 2011 as high as 70 per-cent in Africa, which is 227 million hectares (Oxfam 2011). This is characterized by the establishment of large plantations and outgrower schemes (Moyo 2011). In a comprehensive report on land deals in the Global South by the World Bank, Deininger et al. (2011) it considers Africa as the last reserve of untapped and underdeveloped farmland with the potential for realizing enormous profits. This
5 Under colonialism in Africa, an agrarian economy developed that was based on a racial division of labor, and organized for plantation and peasant production. After World War I, an influx of white European settlers and investments increased the pressure on land in many African colonies (Alden Wily 2012). In some colonies, this contributed to the creation of white-settler colonies, and an expansion of white owned plantations. 11 narrative of unused and underdeveloped land underpins Africa’s land rush, on which I elaborate more in the second part of this chapter.
Land grabbing is a control grab of land and natural resources to accumulate capital on a world scale. The acquired land is used for a variety of purposes that ranges from agricultural production for food and fuel, extraction of natural resources, to nature conservation and eco-tourism, etc. Large-scale land deals can also combine some of these goals. This has resulted in an emerging body of literature on green grabbing – appropriation of land for environmental ends (see Fairhead et al. 2012) and blue grabbing – in the context of costal and marine conservation (see Benjaminsen and Bryceson 2012). Land, green, or blue grabbing is often associated with the countries in the Global South, but it is a global and dynamic phenomenon with range of diverse actors.
One among the most prominent countries in Africa for land deal by foreign investors is Tanzania (Sulle 2015). While Tanzania has a relatively robust land rights framework, cases of land grabbing have significantly increased. Locher and Sulle (2014) estimate that at the height of the land rush in 2012 foreign investors had conducted around one million hectares of new land deals (above 200 hectares) for agricultural production. Second, pressure on land also comes from national parks and conservation areas that cover 30% of national land and are benefiting conservation organizations and the tourism industry (Benjaminsen and Bryceson 2012). Third, mining in Tanzania has also experienced a boom since the 2000s, and attracted foreign investors (Bluwstein et al. 2018). In a way, investments in agriculture, mining, conservation, and tourism mutually reinforce each other to increase the pressure on land in Tanzania (Bluwstein et al. 2018). Despite many claims, farmland in Tanzania has become a scarcity (Bergius et al. 2017, Bluwstein et al. 2018). The pressure on land has resulted in the displacement of thousands of people and increasing conflicts among a variety of actors. This has reached a violent tipping point on 8 December 2000 in Kilosa where thirty-eight farmers were killed (Benjaminsen et al. 2009).
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Inclusive Green Growth as Sustainable Agricultural Development In the land grabbing debate, the role of the green economy has become a more recent focal point. In particular, the green economy gained prominence after the Rio+20 conference on Sustainable Development in 2012, which evolved into the Sustainable Development Goals. A central strategy that emerged out of the green economy approach is the green growth approach.6 At the Rio+20 conference, a range of multilateral development organizations identified various green growth strategies as their goal to achieve sustainable development (Scoones et al. 2015, Bergius et al. 2017, Buseth 2017, Cavanagh and Benjaminsen 2017). For example, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2012) and United Nations Environment Programme (2011) adopted green growth strategies. Similarly, the World Bank report by Deininger et al. (2012) on Inclusive Green Growth: The Pathway to Sustainable Development, put inclusive green growth at the core of its agenda. These institutions subsequently formed the ‘Green Growth Knowledge Platform’ to further support green growth (Scoones et al. 2015). The green growth strategy is employed as the cornerstone for more socially and environmentally responsible private sector investments.
The green growth strategy has also been employed for agricultural commercialization and modernization by implementing a range of market, technological, state-led, and citizen-led solutions. First, Scoones et al. (2015) argue that green market solutions are underpinned by the need to address market failures and externalities through green capitalists, payment for ecosystem services, and enforcement of property rights, which are perceived as concrete market incentives for responsible investments (16). This market-driven approach is perceived as one element to achieve inclusive green growth, and hence sustainable development. Second, the technology solutions addresses population growth and resource scarcity that can be fixed by an expert technology regime to deliver a ‘magic solution,’ such as genetically modified crops, climate smart agriculture, sustainable intensification, as well as the incorporation of bottom-up alternative technologies (Scoones et al. 2015, 16). These technology solutions are often
6 The definition of green growth is often vague (Buseth 2017). There have been multiple conceptualizations been put forward, including inclusive green growth, agricultural green growth, or inclusive agricultural green growth. They are similar, but each of them have some different emphasis. Therefore, in this thesis, I employ inclusive green growth to signal the green transformation. I also refer to inclusive green growth as a concrete expression the green economy approach. 13 characterized by top-down governance process. Third, state-led green solutions are marked by state backed policies, research funding, promotion of green jobs, and investments into green infrastructure to move towards a greener economy, as well as the engagement in international institutions concerning environmental issues (Scoones et al. 2015, 16). This tends to be associated with neo-Keynesian approaches. Fourth, citizen-led solutions are characterized by changes ‘from below,’ compromising a range of social movements, including green consumerism, climate justice, degrowth, self-sufficiency, and reclaiming indigenous ways of life (Scoones et al. 2015, 16). The citizen-led approaches can also be co-opted through inclusion and participation. These four approaches – or a combination of them – characterize inclusive green growth as “business-as unusual.”
However, green growth strategies requiring capital-intense technologies and market solutions are mainly deployed in the Global North, in contrast to environmental protection and the management of natural resources in the Global South (Scoones et al. 2015, Bergius et al. 2017, Buseth 2017). In Tanzania, this has resulted in the acquisition of farmland for sustainable and efficient commercial agriculture (genetically modified crops, climate smart agriculture, sustainable intensification), production of agro-fuels, and nature conservation schemes to achieve inclusive green growth. A concrete example that employs an inclusive green growth strategy is the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT 2013a, Bergius et al. 2017, Buseth 2017). In this way, the SAGCOT initiative draws on a range of these practices and strategies to champion a green transformation, which I elaborate more in chapter five.
The green growth strategy is also a powerful unfolding discourse and policy. One of the appealing aspects of green growth is pointed out by Buseth (2017):
“Since green growth is vague as a policy term, it can be incorporated into almost any policy or project, because actors themselves can define what ‘green’ means. Under this ‘green growth’ rhetoric, powerful actors have managed to establish schemes that have been framed as environmentally sustainable, but which in reality are often business-as- usual.” (48)
This denotes the power of the green growth discourse to maintain neoliberal policies, while addressing environmental sustainability. Hence, environmental issues are framed as attractive 14 neoliberal win-win solutions to further environmental sustainability and economic growth at the same time (Büscher et al. 2012). In other words, green growth attempts to illustrate the compatibility of capitalist growth and environmental sustainability. Furthermore, the concept of inclusive green growth as proposed by the World Bank (2012) and others aims for triple win-win solutions that supposedly yield benefits for economic growth, the environment, and reduce poverty. This approach is especially powerful, as it combines various objectives, actors, and interests to form a consensus in the belief of benefiting everyone. The activities to achieve triple win-win solutions follow a strategy to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of stakeholders (Brock and Dunlap 2018). In this way, the inclusive green growth strategy tends to obscure inequalities, hierarchies, and asymmetrical power relations between actors, as well as turning nature into a business opportunity.
Moreover, inclusive green growth offers the possibility of a new frontier of ‘greener’ accumulation disguised as ‘green modernization.’ According to Bergius et al. (2017), the “‘green modernization’ agenda seeks to ‘bring’ development, modernity and sustainability” (844). This adds the novelty of sustainability to the classical Eurocentric narrative of modernity and development. Before I elaborate further on these aspects, I discuss in the following section the concept of primitive accumulation. In the context of land and green grabbing, land for ‘green’ and ‘sustainable’ ends becomes a form of accumulation by dispossession (Benjaminsen and Bryceson 2012, Fairhead et al. 2012). This juncture of accumulation by dispossession and ‘green modernization’ exemplifies the paradox of ‘sustainable extractivism.’
Primitive Accumulation and Agrarian South The majority of literature on the land grabbing debate is conceptualized from the Global North (Middleton 2010, Mollett 2016). In order to theorize land grabbing, the school of Agrarian South offers a perspective that emphasizes the deep-connection between imperialism, primitive accumulation, and race. The school of Agrarian South aims to reconstruct the classical agrarian question beyond its Eurocentric and Northern formulations (Gill 2015). The theoretical foundations are rooted in political economy framework of world-system analysis and third world Marxism. In contrast to classical scholarship on the agrarian question, these critical scholars seriously engage with the agrarian question in relation to race, colonialism, and imperialism, 15 while locating the possibility of Europe’s capitalist development in the primitive accumulation within the periphery. This distinguishes the Agrarian South school.
A key argument of the Agrarian South school revolves around the centrality of primitive accumulation in land grabbing. Tanzanian scholar Shivji (2011) argues that today’s new phase of capital accumulation and land grabbing progresses on old forms of accumulation – that is primitive accumulation – rooted in the exploitative destruction of peoples and the pillaging of their land and natural resources. Hence, primitive accumulation is a violent process of accumulation by dispossession that separates laborers from the means of production (capital and land) to form a dispossessed class of people. Shivji (2011) further emphasizes: “[t]he trajectory of capitalist accumulation in the longue durée shows that primitive accumulation is not only a phase in, or original form of, accumulation, but rather lies at the very heart of the world system of capitalism” (4). In other words, primitive accumulation created the possibility for the rise of capitalist Europe in the long sixtieth century over 500 years ago.
From this perspective, the formation of capitalism is constitutive of imperialism (Amin 2003). Therefore, the periphery in the world-system has historically been the primary site of primitive accumulation thought imperialist exploitation of land and labor, as this contributes towards European capitalist growth (Rodney 1973, Amin 2003, Moyo et al. 2012). The kidnaping and then enslavement of African peoples for forced labor on the planation system in the Americas was a constitutive of land appropriation and alienation in the process of primitive accumulation. The extracted surplus from land and enslaved labor from the plantation system served as profit for re-investment in Europe’s capitalist rise. In addition, the periphery is the primary site of primitive accumulation due to an enduring and underpinning hierarchy of peoples – a racial division of labor (Moyo et al. 2012). This means that the relationship between the periphery and center was racialized. The asymmetric relationship between the center and periphery is an essential feature of the capitalist development in the five hundred-year history of the Eurocentric world-system (Amin 2003). Therefore, primitive accumulation remains a fundamental dimension of global capitalist accumulation on a world-scale.
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Today, a new and unique aspect of the current wave of land grabbing in the world-system is neoliberalism and the neoliberal crises. Moyo et al. (2012) point out these substantial differences as:
“new mode of highly financialized accumulation resulting from the spontaneous tendencies of monopoly capitalism; the entry of non-Western, semi-peripheral competitors in the race; and the existence of relatively autonomous capitalist states on the [African] continent, born of the anti-colonial struggles of the twentieth century.” (182)
Further, they argue that the “systemic determinants” of the new scramble are different, as a crisis of the current world order unfolds (Moyo et al. 2012). In other words, the current world-system is experiencing a re-ordering of the world order, in which the West attempts to hang on to its hegemonic positon. This is primarily due to the rise of the semi-peripheries, including Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, China, and South Africa (BRICS).
So far, I have discussed the land grabbing debate, critical approaches to the green economy, and the Agrarian South school’s conceptualization of primitive accumulation. However, the overwhelming majority of the land grabbing literature is inspired by a Marxist political economy approach or a Foucauldian inspired discourse analysis, while less attention is paid to power logics and race (Middleton 2010, Mollett 2016). Therefore, next I elaborate on the concept of coloniality, which entails an “epistemic turn” beyond the political economy vs. culture debate (Grosfoguel 2007).
Modernity/Coloniality In this second part of the theoretical chapter, I introduce the concept of coloniality, and I aim to link this to the land question.7 In particular, I discuss the concepts of coloniality power and
7 The modernity/coloniality approach compromises a pluriversality of perspectives, which emerged from the Global South from a subaltern perspective. However, coloniality is not to be confused with colonialism, and decoloniality is different form decolonization or anti-colonialism (for example, see Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015b). The modernity/coloniality approach is also different form post-colonial studies/approaches, which are primarily concerned with the cultural dimensions of the world system (Grosfoguel 2011). Finally, modernity/coloniality is not a (neo)Marxist approach, but it draws on Wallerstein’s world-system analysis, as well as the concept of underdevelopment and Nkrumah’s concept of neo-colonialism that in turn are inspired by Marxist approaches (Middleton 2010). In this way, the modernity/coloniality perspective shares a history with political ecology and critical agrarian studies 17 coloniality of knowledge. I subsequently link these concepts to the process of primitive accumulation as formulated by the Agrarian South school, as well as to critical perspectives on the green economy. This is to formulate a theoretical framework to guide my analysis.
There has been an emerging literature of case studies and theoretical interventions that link the concept of coloniality of power with the land question, for example, Middleton (2010) in the US, Groglopo (2012) in Uruguay, Gill (2015) in Ethiopia, Mollett (2016) in Honduras and Panama, Pérez Ojeda del Arco (2017) in Senegal, and Assis and Franco (2018) in Brazil. Coloniality offers an in-depth historical understanding of the colonial like relationship of today’s resource extractions (Escobar 2008, Middleton 2010). From this perspective, coloniality is a driving forces of the new scramble for Africa’s farmland and natural resources (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015a). In this light, I attempt to contribute to this emerging body of literature by understanding the SAGCOT initiative through coloniality that operates as a driving force to control land and labor in Southern Highlands of Tanzania. In this section, I discuss the concept of coloniality of power, from which I draw as a lens to analyze the colonial entanglement of the SAGCOT initiative in the subsequent empirical chapters.
From a decolonial perspective, global coloniality is an invisible power structure that lies at the center of the Eurocentric, modern/colonial, and capitalist/patriarchal world-system. A key notion is the concept of coloniality of power,8 which has been coined by Peruvian Sociologist Aníbal Quijano (2000, 2007) to describe colonial like power relations in the world-system. The concept has been further elaborated on by decolonial scholars Maria Lugones (2007), Walter D. Mignolo (2007, 2009, 2011), Arturo Escobar (2004, 2007, 2008), Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2014, 2015a, 2015b), and Catherine Walsh (2018), among others to describe modern forms of control, domination, and exploitation. A second concept is coloniality of knowledge, which describes the epistemological dimension of coloniality. Decolonial scholars, such as Enrique Dussel (2000, 2002), Ramón Grosfoguel (2007, 2011), and Boaventura De
approaches, but for the former race and for the latter class is the central organizing principle (Middleton 2010). 8 The early conceptualization of coloniality of power colonial matrix of power refers to the four dimensions of control of the economy, authority (government and politics), knowledge and subjectivity, and gender and sexuality (Quijano 2000). 18
Sousa Santos (2014), among others argue that Eurocentrism – the universalizing of local European historical experiences – operates as a hegemonic form of knowledge through epistemicides (ibid.).9 Therefore, they call for the need to provincialize Eurocentric forms of knowledge, and move towards epistemic justice and freedom. Third, the concept of coloniality of being has been developed by Nelson Maldonado-Torres (2007) to describe the ontological processes of dehumanization and inferiority. All three concepts together, coloniality of power, coloniality of knowledge, and coloniality of being reinforce each other to form global coloniality (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2014).
Global coloniality is as a hierarchical matrix of power between the Global North and Global South. Today, coloniality operates as the logic of colonialism. Maldonado-Torres (2007) defines it as such:
“[Coloniality] refers to long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define culture, labour, intersubjectivity relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations. Thus, coloniality survives colonialism.” (243)
This means that the elimination of the colonial administrations and decolonization through national liberation have not resulted in radical delinking from the modern colonial capitalist world-system, but rather have formed a continuous colonial entanglement. Therefore, decoloniality offers the possibility for decolonial futures. Decoloniality is a political and epistemological movement, as well as a way of thinking, knowing, and doing to advance a liberatory language from global coloniality (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015b).
Coloniality of Power Coloniality of power describes modern forms of control, domination, and exploitation in the colonial modern world-system to conceptualize racialized hierarchies, Eurocentrism, patriarchy and hetero-normativity, capitalist, and hegemonic asymmetrical power structures (Grosfoguel 2007). In the words of Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015b), “coloniality of power is a concept that
9 The term Eurocentrism was developed by Egyptian/French scholar Samir Amin (1988). Today, the rationality of modernity operates with a specific Western European and North American-centric rationality. 19 decolonial theorists use to analyze modern global cartography of power and how the modern world works” (490). The concepts of coloniality of power helps to investigate the mostly invisible modern/colonial power structures in the world-system. The modern colonial divide refers to those in power and benefiting from modernity, while the “wretched of the earth” become the victims of colonialism and imperialism (Fanon 1961 [2004]). The modern colonial divide classifies peoples as modern and developed, or as primitive and underdeveloped to create structures of superiority and inferiority, which is what Mignolo (2002) termed as the colonial difference. Therefore, coloniality of power constitutes a “darker side” of modernity to describes multiple hierarchies and power structure (Quijano 2000, Escobar 2004, Mignolo 2007, Ndlovu- Gatsheni 2015b). Modernity and coloniality are part of the same side of a coin – modernity/coloniality. This means there is “no modernity without coloniality” (Quijano 2000). Thus, there is “no development without coloniality.”
In addition, modernity/coloniality operates through narratives of ‘development.’ Since in Africa the colonial period began in the eighteenth century, Lushaba (2006) argues that Europe’s “colonialism in Africa was rationalised from the beginning as a ‘civilising’ mission, bringing development to a part of the world that had remained outside of history” (1). The concept and discourse of development gained currency after World War II (Hart 2001, Ziai 2016), and was backed by the rising influence of development economists. In fact, Escobar (1995) argues that development economics was the single most powerful influence in shaping the field of development. Among them was Walt Rostow (1960) who famously published, “The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto” that conceptualizes economic growth and accumulation as five linear stages. This stylized model for economic development was derived from the European historical experience, and to be universally applied to all countries. The liner progression of stages starts with the “traditional society” (stage one) engaged in subsistence agriculture to “high mass-consumption” (stage five) characterized by an industrial base and consumption.10 The upward progression of stages was achieved by accumulating surplus to be reinvested. In this model, the main role of agriculture is then to produce surplus. The surplus generating process in agriculture is accelerated by technological progress (mechanization, agro-
10 More specifically, the five stages include, Traditional Society, the Preconditions for Take-Off, the Take-Off, the Drive to Maturity, and the Age of High Mass-Consumption 20 chemicals, improved seeds, among others) that culminated in the Green Revolution. Therefore, the Green Revolution became the vehicle to modernize ‘traditional’ ways of farming (Eddens 2017, 4). In particular, Cotter (2003) and Cullather (2010) have demonstrated the entanglement of the Rockefeller Foundation, Ford Foundation, the US State Department, and other proponents of the Green Revolution in modernization theories to justify bringing development to the Global South and indigenous peoples (as cited in Eddens 2017). From this perspective, it was believed that economic development can only be achieved though progress in agricultural modernization. Hence, any development efforts should focus on agricultural development.
This model of development and modernization has been widely criticized from a range of scholars of dependency theory, world system analysis, post-colonial studies, and the decolonial project.11 In particular, the decolonial scholar Enrique Dussel (1993, 2000) describes this way of thinking as the developmentalist fallacy, which is underpinned by the long-standing civilizing mission and an unilinear modernization path. The developmentalist fallacy builds on the myth that the ‘modern’ is superior to the ‘traditional,’ and the need to bring development to peoples outside of modernity (ibid.). While the colonial difference remains, the discourse adapts to new conditions. Modernity is then expressed in development discourse on a global scale (Escobar 1995, 2007, Ziai 2016). In this way, the European historical experience becomes the blueprint for development. In order to achieve this, development operates through the rhetoric of ‘salvation,’ and is legitimized through the promise of progress and betterment in the future (Ziai 2016). From this perspective, development becomes a concept of control and a project of modernity. Therefore, development cannot be separated from modernity/coloniality.
Another key notion of the coloniality of power perspective is that race is an organizing principle of the modern/colonial world-system (Quijano 2000, 2007). Quijano (2007) elaborates on the specificity of race:
“[C]oloniality of power is based upon ‘racial’ social classification of the world population under Eurocentered world power. But coloniality of power is not exhausted in the problem of ‘racist’ social relations. It pervaded and modulated the basic instances of
11 Although, it should be noted that in Africa, Samir Amin (1988), Walter Rodney (1973), Kwame Nkrumah (1965), among others pointed out the economic dimension of coloniality as “dependency,” “underdevelopment,” and “neo-colonialism” respectively (as cited in Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015b). 21
the Eurocentered capitalist colonial/modern world power to become the cornerstone of this coloniality of power.” (171)
In other words, race as a social classification system is historically linked to coloniality of power. This has been the case since the rise of the colonial modern world-system over 500 years ago, which formed in the long sixteenth century. In particular, the conquest and colonization of the Americas became racially justified that resulted in enslavement of indigenous peoples, genocide, epistemicide, and ecocide. The long-durée between the sociohistorical production of race, and the control of labor led to the imposition of a “systemic racial division of labor” (Quijano 2000). The racial division of labor and specific Eurocentric rationality can be traced back to the origins of the current world-system (Quijano 2000). This kind of conceptualization of the world-system is not centered on a division of labor and the economy, but instead on race as an organizing principle. This is similar to the Agrarian South school, as they too conceptualize the world- system and primitive accumulation as racialized, and form a subaltern perspective of the underside of modernity.
Coloniality of Knowledge From the perspective of modernity/coloniality, hegemonic power structures and processes of primitive accumulation are interlinked with an epistemic and ontological dimension. This is conceptualized as the coloniality of knowledge, which refers to the politics of knowledge production and epistemological issues. The decolonial perspective offers not only an alternative vantage point in the debate on modernity, but is an “epistemic change of perspective” (Escobar 2007, 189). Therefore, decolonial scholars are also concerned with decolonizing knowledge. Smith (2008) reminds us that decolonizing knowledge is about decentering Eurocentric forms of knowledge, and not a total rejection of it. Before I elaborate more on this and my own epistemological position in chapter three, I first briefly turn towards the role of knowledge in conceptualizations of land and agricultural development.
Coloniality of knowledge plays a central role in the justification of land grabbing, and is reinforced by coloniality of power. Form the colonial period, land in Africa has been viewed by the colonizers as ‘terra nullius’ (nobody's land), which is rooted in a Eurocentric colonial epistemology of ‘virgin,’ ‘empty,’ and ‘underdeveloped’ land (Escobar 2008, Borras et al. 2011, 22
Moyo 2011, Gill 2015). This has been a long standing colonial imagination to justify land grabbing. The conceptualization of land as ‘terra nullius’ became operated through the racialization and dehumanization of indigenous peoples. In particular, the racialization and dehumanization created the possibilities of dispossession and displacement of peoples and the pillaging of their resources (Quijano 2000). Today, smallholder farmers and peasants are criminalized as ‘underproductive,’ ‘backward,’ and ‘inferior’ (Sulle and Nelson 2009, Gill 2015, Bergius et al. 2017). This follows the logic of racialization and dehumanization that means “the wretched of the earth” cannot own land or are not entitled to land. Hence, the land is ‘empty,’ and can be conquered.12 In this way, the racialization and inferiorization of indigenous peoples and their ways of life created the possibility for the colonial land grab in the first place (Waldmueller 2015).
The hegemonic processes of land grabbing and dispossession still operate today through the rhetoric of development and modernization, including the development and modernization of agriculture. I have demonstrated above the emergence of modernization theories in the 1960s regarding agricultural modernization. From the perspective of coloniality, the discourse of agricultural modernization is entangled in modernity/coloniality. In particular, the discourse of agricultural modernization is based on the superiority of technology-intensive agriculture and large-scale farms that are believed to be more productive and contribute to development compared to smallholder farmers or peasants (Bergius et al. 2017). This has also contributed towards the centrality of knowledge in legitimizing the technology intensive Green Revolution (Patel 2017, 3). The discourse of agricultural modernization and technology-centric development becomes hegemonic and an expression of the coloniality of knowledge. This discourse has also been institutionalized by multilateral development institutions. For example, the World Bank identified peasant food production as underproductive, unsustainable, and undesirable as it is believed to be the source of the food crisis (Mbunda 2016). The World Bank then turned towards the promotion of agricultural development and modernization through agribusiness companies. The World Bank becomes one of the central epistemic actors to promote agricultural modernization.
12 A similar process of racialization and dehumanization occurred in the conquest and colonization of the Americas that begun in 1942. 23
The World Bank has also participated in the shift towards sustainable and inclusive development that the SGDs singled. This is the most recent reconfiguration of the development discourse to alter to new conditions. In the Bank’s report by Deininger et al. (2011) on Rising Global Interest in Farmland: Can it yield sustainable and equitable benefits?, it aims to shift towards more socially and environmentally responsible forms of land based-acquisitions/investments (as cited in Gill 2016). For the World Bank, this means for example the mobilization of agribusiness investments for inclusive green growth. I have discussed above that the sustainable and inclusive development is expressed in inclusive green growth as a greener form of modernization.
However, the narrative of inclusive and sustainable development still follow the developmentalist fallacy and are intertwined with coloniality. Icaza and Vázquez (2017) argue that narratives of sustainable development, including the SDGs reduce the earth to resources which are to be extracted and exploited. This is similar to the concept of the inclusive green growth, as it is based on the SDGs. Second, Moyo (2011) cautions that the peasantry is also being increasingly exploited under outgrower schemes and contract farming that are promoted under inclusive development. Outgrower schemes and contract farming are especially being promoted by agribusiness in the name of inclusive agricultural development. While this arrangement allows the peasantry and smallholder farmers their formal ownership of land and does not result in direct land grabbing, they are subjugated to the control of agribusiness corporations. Third, the introduction of modern agricultural technology and practices has steadily separated people form nature and land (Bergius et al. 2017). Therefore, the agricultural modernization discourse impacts the livelihoods of smallholder farmers and peasants in many ways.
Conceptual Scheme In this process of formulating a theoretical framework, I have elaborated on the critical perspectives on inclusive green growth, primitive accumulation, coloniality of power, and coloniality of knowledge. This serves as a useful guide for my analysis of the complex SAGCOT initiative (see Figure 2). I situate these theoretical concepts in the modern colonial world-system to shed more light on dynamics of colonial (dis)continuities in relation to agricultural 24 modernization. As illustrated in Figure 2, the hegemonic and asymmetrical power structure expresses itself in the rhetoric of modernization, progress, and development, and subsequently in inclusive green growth to achieve inclusive and sustainable development. At the same time, coloniality of power, coloniality of knowledge, and primitive accumulation underpin the green agricultural modernization narrative. The inclusive green growth strategy for agricultural modernization is legitimized through processes (discourses, practices, and strategies). On the one hand, discourses operate in relation to environmental sustainability, smallholder farmers’ inclusivity, and economic growth. On the other hand, practices and strategies of governance are employed for the participation and inclusion of SAGCOT actors. The processes of legitimization I examine operate on the national level, as well as in the Iringa part of the Ihemi cluster.
SAGCOT in the Modern/Colonial Capitalist World-System
Inclusive and Sustainable Development Inclusive Green Growth Rhetoric of Modernization Processes of Legitimization Modernity Progress Development Discourses Practices
Appropriation and Inclusion and Institutionalization Participation Colonial Difference Reconfiguration Resistance
Practices of Control Agribusiness Government of Tanzania
Coloniality Domin ation of Power Exploitation Sothern Agricultural Growth Dispossession Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) SAGCOT Catalytic Trust Fund SAGCOT Center Ltd Primitive Coloniality Accumulation of Knowledge Development Organizations Framers Organizations
Figure 2. Conceptual Scheme
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CHAPTER 3: Methodology
In this chapter, I elaborate on the research methodology and reflect on some of the challenges of this thesis. First, I situate the thesis’ epistemological and ontological perspective. Second, I introduce the methodological approach of studying “political (re)action ‘from above”’ and its implications. In the third section, I present the sampling strategy. Fourth, I discuss the three different qualitative data collection methods employed in this study, including semi-structured interviews, participant observation, and document analysis. This is followed by an overview of my data analysis process. Finally, I reflect on the relationship between the researcher and the researched, as well as my positionality in relation to this study and beyond.
Epistemological and Ontological Position For me, a student in critical development studies at the University of Amsterdam, it is important to reflect on the aim of my research and its outcomes, as well as on my social location and epistemic. The latter is especially significant in the context of lacking epistemological reflections in the social sciences (Mbembe and Nuttall 2004, 349), and in particular in development studies (Escobar 1995, 221).13 According to Mbembe and Nuttall (2004), this lack of epistemological interrogation and often narrow focus on material realties in mainstream development studies contributes towards “the failure of contemporary scholarship to describe Africa’s complexity” (349). One effort to address this is what Grosfoguel (2007) calls “the epistemic decolonial turn.” I attempt to situate this thesis as part of the broader epistemic decolonial turn. This has been part of a long standing epistemological and political movement, as well as a way of practice to delink from colonial Eurocentric forms of knowledge. Rooted in the modernity/coloniality approach, Quijano (2000) argues that the 500-year old world-system operates with a Eurocentric mode of knowledge production that became universal and hegemonic. This means that the European historical experience was universalized as superior. The world-system also led to the creation of a global hierarchy where some peoples were perceived as superior and others as inferior
13 In the discipline of development studies, della Faille (2011) argues that discourse analysis remains marginal among mainstream development scholars. In contrast, Ziai (2016) argues that discourse analysis is a growing field within development studies due to the ‘postmodern turn’ in the social sciences. Hence, there seems to be an emergent emphasizes on epistemological inquiries in relation to the so-called development issues.
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(Grosfoguel 2007). This colonial difference defines white supremacist ideologies, such as ‘scientific’ social Darwinism.14 The colonial difference is also referred to as the racialized epistemic dimension of the modern/colonial world-system.
Today, the colonial difference persists, but it evolved into the difference between ‘developed’ and ‘developing.’ As a result, development becomes a concept of control that represents another system of classification of peoples. As Smith (2008) points out, the role of scientific research is an integral part of the colonial system, and it still shapes the relationships between the researcher and researched in anthropology, development studies, and other disciplines. In a way, I seek to situate this thesis as part of an ongoing dialogue to decenter Western modernity by drawing on theories from the Global South. Hence, epistemology informs the theory. Through the attempt of delinking from Eurocentric forms of knowledge, the main aim is to move towards pluriversality. For example, this is illustrated by what the Zapatistas are referring to as “a world where many worlds are possible.” This epistemic justice creates the possibility for a pluriversality of epistemologies and epistemic locations (Icaza and Vázquez 2013).
In addition, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the coloniality of being is the ontological dimension of coloniality. While race is an organizing principle of coloniality of power and knowledge, coloniality of being hierarchizes human beings based on a racial ontology (Grosfoguel 2011). This in turn informs coloniality of knowledge and power. Coloniality of being expresses itself for example in the racialized society/nature ontology, which emerged through the colonial encounter (Gill 2015). In this racialized ontology, essentialized views on nature and non-modern forms of life become inferior to the white supremacy and human-driven markets (Escobar 2008, 121). This racialized ontology is rooted in white colonial imaginations, which reduces nature and land to resources to be exploited. The epidemic and ontological dimensions are central to (de)coloniality.
14 In fact, colonialism was justified and legitimized in the ninetieth century by the ‘scientific’ views of social Darwinism, which is based on the concept of the ‘survival of the fittest’ (Smith 2008, 62). 27
Research Design Recent scholarship in critical agrarian studies has emphasized the need to look beyond ‘resistance’ in the land grabbing debate in order to study the entire spectrum of ‘political reactions “from below”’ (Li 2011, Borras and Franco 2013, Hall, Edelman, et al. 2015). While this is an important aspect, Geenen and Verweijen (2017) take a step further, and argue for the need to examine the understudied ‘political (re)actions “form above”’ in extractivist resource projects.15 In their paper, they follow corporate practices of “co-opting local elites and protestors, acquiescence in favoritism by local elites, fostering a climate of repression and a more rhetoric than real commitment to community participation” (Geenen and Verweijen 2017, 758). These practices are essentiality attempts to influence, manage, engineer, and control political (re)actions “from below” (Geenen and Verweijen 2017, 759). This broad repertoire of practices and strategies is not only employed by corporations, but also by governments, Public-Private Partnerships, and other private and public actors in extractivist projects. The asymmetrical spectrum of ‘political (re)actions “from above” and ‘political reactions “from below”’ also shape each other.
Nonetheless, the relative scarcity of scholarly analysis of political (re)actions “from above” has been a long-standing issue. In particular, Susan George (1986 [1976]) pointed out over forty years ago: “Study the rich and powerful, not the poor and powerless. Any good work done on peasants’ organizations, small farmer resistance to oppression or workers in agribusiness can invariably be used against them… Meanwhile, not nearly enough work is being done on those who hold the power and pull the strings. As their tactics become more subtle and their public pronouncements more guarded, the need for better spade-work becomes crucial.”
George underscores the centrality of studying the powerful agribusiness sector and how actors exercise power to oppresses and co-opt ‘political reactions “from below.”’ In this line of thought, an emerging body of literature is concerned with the multifaceted strategies to legitimize
15 Studying ‘political (re)actions “from above”’ is in some aspects similar to Laura Nader’s (1972) approach of ‘studying up.’ Nonetheless, a key difference is that the former focuses on practices and (re)actions, while the latter is more concerned with studying cultures of power and communities of experts. Furthermore, Mosse (2011) differentiates methodological and ethical issues between Nader’s (1972) ‘studying up’ and Shore and Wright (1997) approach of ‘following the policy.’ Therefore, there are a range of similar but different approaches of studying power or the powerful. 28 extractivist resource projects. In particular, attempts of ‘greening’ (Buseth 2017, Cavanagh and Benjaminsen 2017, Brock and Dunlap 2018) and introducing ‘participatory’ aspects (Kothari 2005, Dunlap 2017) have been examined by critical scholars.
Against this background, my research is inspired by George’s call to study the strategies of the powerful agribusiness, and I draw on the methodological approach of analyzing ‘political (re)actions “form above.” In particular, I examine how political (re)actions “from above” unfold in the SAGCOT initiative in order to legitimize the extractive agriculture corridor. For this, I follow some of the most prominent public and private actors in the initiative. Many of them are elite institutions, such as the World Bank, embassies, USAID, DFID, government agencies, transnational agribusiness corporations, among others. 16 This creates particular methodological challenges. I elaborate more on these challenges in section four of this chapter, in particular when discussing semi-structured interviews.
Sampling In this research, I employ a purposive sampling strategy. In contrast to quantitative approaches that often employ representative, random, and probability samples; qualitative research tends to emphasize on a smaller sample size to gain in-depth understanding (Bryman 2012, Lune and Berg 2017). One type of purposive sampling is theoretical sampling, which emphasizes the quality, positionality, and relevance of interviewed participants to a research project (Cook and Crang 2007, Bryman 2012). For this research that does not mean a representative sample of actors involved in the SAGCOT initiative, but a sample to emphasizes on who participated in an interview and what their perspectives are (Cook and Crang 2007). Therefore, I aimed to get a diverse sample that cuts across a spectrum of key actors in the SAGCOT initiative. This also addresses that information is spread asymmetrically among actors and presents insights form their various perspectives and positions.
As recommended by Lune and Berg (2017), I developed criteria of whom to approach for interviews. The SAGCOT partner list of 2016 served as an initial step to identify potential
16 I define elite institutions as the World Bank, WEF, and so on. At the same time, I am aware that the definition of elites and elite institution changes in different contexts. 29 interview participants.17 Then, I screened and evaluated actors in SAGCOT through website information, official documents, brochures, and casual conversations regarding their degree of involvement and relevance to my research. This led me to draft four broad categories for interview participants: a) agricultural private sector actors (transnational corporations and Tanzanian companies); b) public sector (government of Tanzanian, including different departments, ministries and regional governments); c) development organizations (donors, embassies and development originations); d) agricultural civil society organizations (CSO) and NGOs and farmer organizations (see Table 1 for interview participants). Through the process of theoretical sampling, I contacted potential participants via email, phone, or by visiting their offices to schedule an interview.
However, access to potential interview participants was difficult, as many of them hold an office in elite institutions and do not want to be studied (I elaborate more on this below). Therefore, I also relied on a snowball sampling strategy as a complement to theoretical sampling. Lee (1993) suggests snowball sampling is a particularly useful strategy for difficult-to-reach interview participants (as cited in Lune and Berg 2017, 39). In this way, I asked interview participants if they would recommend someone who is also involved in the SAGCOT initiative for a possible interview.
Data Collection Methods For the data collection of this study, I employ three different qualitative methods: semi- structured interviews, participant observation, and document analysis. These methods served to access and generate various data, which constitute a form of triangulation to strengthen the research findings (Bryman 2012, Lune and Berg 2017). Therefore, each method enabled me to pursue and explore a specific research interest of this study.
Semi-Structured Interviews As mentioned above, I employ semi-structured interviews as one of my primary method for data collection. In the most general sense, interviews are a form of conversation to gather information
17 Many of the listed partners are in fact not active in the SAGCOT Corridor or only signed a letter of intent for the partnership. 30 for the purpose of research (Yanow 2006, Lune and Berg 2017). These purposive conversations are a useful way for researchers to collect data. Especially, in-depth-interviews can be used to pursue specific questions and themes, which are more difficult to explore through participatory observations or documentary sources (Soss 2006, 141). In-depth interviews are also characterized as being interconnected with a set of research activities, for example, transcribing, coding, and memo writing etc. (Soss 2006, 136). In contrast to structured and unstructured interviews, semi-structured interviews offer a particularly flexible and focused approach in the pursuit of a detailed understating (Soss 2006, 142). For this study, I choose semi-structured interviews as a form of conversation to get an in-depth understating and to explore the roles and motives of key actors and elites in the SAGCOT initiative.
In preparation for the interviews, I first created a general sequential interview guide aligned with my research questions and theoretical concepts. As recommended by (Lune and Berg 2017, 72), I sequenced the interview guide by starting with an introductory part. This comprises of a brief introduction of my research, informed consent (confidentiality, anonymity, and agreement to recording), basic background questions, and some easily answerable questions to initiate an open dialogue.18 The main part of the interview was designed to gradually move into an in-depth understanding of sensitive issues with the opportunity to ask follow up questions. To close the interviews, I prepared more follow up questions and opened the space for comments and questions from the interviewed participants. Asking questions for elaboration and providing space for additional comments by the participants were some of the most essential aspects of many interviews. I also tailored the interview guide for each interviewed participant to account for their distinctive institutional position and expertise.
Over the five-month period I spent in Tanzania, I conducted 28 interviews and three follow-ups with key actors involved in the SAGCOT initiative (see Table 1). I conducted 17 interviews in Dar es Salaam, as the city is host to a large number of embassies, development organizations,
18 However, I was at times reluctant to record the interviews or not granted the permission to do so. Unlike recorded interviews, I felt that some participants felt more open and relaxed without being recorded. I had to navigate this challenge, as often times elites were reluctant to share information. I had to negotiate during the interviews, as it was sometimes difficult to move beyond the “official” story and gain actual in-depth insights. 31 agribusiness corporations, farmer’s organizations, and government entities involved in SAGCOT. In addition, I conducted a series of 11 interviews in Iringa Region, which is part of the Ihemi cluster and located in the Southern Highlands. I chose to conduct interviews in Iringa because of its prominence and relatively advanced implementation phase of the SAGCOT initiative. It was in Iringa where the first SAGCOT cluster was launched in 2015, and subsequently opened its second office. While studies concerned with the dynamics of the SAGCOT initiative have been conducted in various locations throughout the corridor, Iringa as part of the Ihemi cluster did not receive any coverage. Therefore, I identified Iringa as an important location to study the emerging dynamics of the SAGCOT initiative. For this, I conducted most interviews in the offices of the interview participants, as most of them preferred this arrangement. Other interviews were conducted at cafes or at the home of the participant. All interviews were conducted in English, and typically lasted one and a half hours.19
Table 1. Summary of Interviews and Speeches Organization Interviews Speeches Agribusiness Sector 12 0 Government of Tanzania 3 1 Development Organizations 8 1 Civil Society and Farmers Associations 5 3 Total 28* 5 * I conducted 3 follow up interviews, which totals to 31 conducted interviews.
However, interviewing elites comes with particular methodological challenges in comparison to interviewing non-elites. Gaining access to elites is difficult and establishing “rapport” and an open conversation is even harder (Nader 1972, 302, Laurila 1997, 407, Mikecz 2012, 482). While the high visibility of some elites made it relatively easy to get some background and contact information on the internet (see Laurila 1997, Mikecz 2012), getting in contact with them was of one of the most difficult obstacles I faced. This is due to the fact that elites do not want to
19 I acknowledge that the interview location is an important part of interviewing, and conducting it a person’s office reflects their power and bureaucratic position (Mikecz 2012, 483). Therefore, the interview location was a factor that influenced the interviewing process. 32 be studied (Nader 1972, 302). I had to carefully negotiate access and remain persistent with my request for an interview, which was time-consuming. The increasing politicization and polarization of the SAGCOT initiative posed a further challenge. It was particularly difficult to establish a “rapport” in terms of conversation, phone call, or email exchange. This is because elites are often guarded by a host of communication managers, security guards, and by the excuse of being “very busy” to keep outsiders at a distance.
In order to get a sense of the encountered barriers, I briefly elaborate on my experience with the issue of bureaucracy, security, and time. First, bureaucratic mechanisms are deployed as barriers to gain access to interviewing elites who hold an office. Many of my interview requests have been redirected to communications manager, websites, or published reports for information. For example, in an attempt to schedule an interview with an employee from the management team of the SAGCOT Center, I was redirected to the communication manager who promised to schedule an interview later. Despite being persistent with my interview request, the representative of the SAGCOT Center did not commit to an interview. Therefore, the SAGCOT Center was effectively unwilling to meet for an interview. On another occasion, a potential interview participants who holds a position at a transnational agribusiness corporation had to formally seek the approval of the board of directors, while others required me to sign a non-disclosure agreement. Second, I also experienced physical barriers to interview elites. For example, many office buildings were surrounded by a fence and gate that was guarded by security personnel. While at times I entered with ease, other times I encountered fortified buildings where my belongings were searched and had to show relevant paperwork in order to enter. A third barrier was time constraints and the excuse of being “very busy.” This was a recurrent theme that was deployed when planning and (re)scheduling interviews, as well as setting a strict time limit for an interview. When planning interviews, it was important to contact the participant well in advance through the right medium. For successfully scheduling an interview, I had to keep an extremely flexible schedule, as the elite dictated the time and location of the interview. In short, from the preparation to successfully conducing an interview, I relied on the willingness of the participants. This was a particularly challenging aspect for me, as I had to navigate and negotiate power relations.
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Participant Observation I draw on participant observation as an open method for data collection with the aim of exploring and gaining insights from ‘within.’ While some aspects of my research interest are impossible to obtain through participant observation (for example to pursue a specific question) (Soss 2006, 141), participant observation enables data collection on actions and settings (Lune and Berg 2017, 98). Participant observation is characterized as a flexible method because it does not follow a stepwise and rigid research protocol (Yanow 2006, 70). Therefore, it is considered in opposition to a “positivist” approach (Geertz 1973, Atkinson and Hammersley 1994). According to Yanow (2006), participant observation can entail “a repertoire of reading, conversational, and/or participatory “moves” – ways of framing a question, following a lead, responding to what has just been said, or joining a group engaged in an ongoing conversation” (71). For my research, I draw on some aspects of this broad repertoire to follow up on certain leads and gain valuable insights. On the spectrum of participant observation, I positioned myself as a observer as participant, which emphasizes observation.
One aspect of my participant observation involved casual conversations (informal interviews), which were essential on an exploratory level. For example, casual conversations helped me to follow up on a particular lead, identify participants for interviews, and gain a better contextual understating.20 As suggested by Yanow (2006, 71) above, I developed a repertoire of conversational topics relevant for my research, responses, and framing of questions. I experienced this as a process of negotiation, as often time, the vis-à-vis was someone involved in the SAGCOT (and agribusiness sector). In this context, I positioned myself as an ‘outsider,’ while attempting to gain information. In this role, I also dressed in a certain way, modified my behavior, and adjusted my language to fit in a particular (and often) elitist social group of the agribusiness sector and donors.
Second, I conducted observations during the high-level launch ceremony of Mbarali Cluster. I was invited to the event through a casual conversation and following-up with a lead. The high- level event was hosted by the SAGCOT Center to officially initiate the second cluster. The day-
20 The casual conversations were restricted to English speakers, as my Swahili language skills are very limited. 34 long ceremony was held at a luxury hotel, and attended by about 200 agriculture stakeholders (see Figure 3 and Figure 4). The participants ranged from smallholder farmers, CSOs, agribusinesses, donors, and district, regional, and national government officials. At this event, I collected data through conversations and observations, as well as recording speeches and collecting brochures. Particularly relevant was the speech made by Hon. Charles Tizeba, the Minister of Agriculture. I recorded the speech that was later on translated by Singo Leiyo from Swahili to English. My observations helped me gather rich and nuanced textual information. I systemically documented them in a notebook, as well as relevant aspects of casual conversations. I also wrote personal reflections and notes on a range of topics, especially on methodology, theory, and impressions of semi-structured interviews. This documentation was an important part to organize ideas, impressions, and reflections.
Figure 3. DFID Head Tanzania Beth Arthy and Minister of Agriculture Hon. Charles Tizeba (Source: The Guardian 2017)
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Figure 4. Mbarali Cluster Launch Event (Source: Author)
Document Analysis A third qualitative method I employ for data collection is a document analysis of the SAGCOT initiative. Document analysis is similar to participant observations, as the researcher does not know what the findings will be (Yanow 2006, 70). According to Bowen (2009, 32) document analysis draws on aspects of content analysis (organizing information relevant to the research question(s) into categories) and thematic analysis (identifying patterns and emerging themes). Therefore, my document analysis serves as a supplementary data collection method to gain further information and insights about the SAGCOT initiative and the roles of key actors. Document analysis is an important complementary method when access to interview participants and participant observations is difficult and limited, especially in the context of elite institutions that do not want to be studied (see Nader 1972). In particular, my document analysis contributes towards an initial investigation of strategies and mechanisms of planning and governance of the SAGCOT initiative. These insights helped me to develop interview questions and guided my 36 participant observations with certain leads. In this way, document analysis not only served as an exploratory method but also allowed me to gain in-depth understandings.
For the document analysis, I collected official documents, brochures, and leaflets which concern the SAGCOT initiative (see Table 2). I used these text-based sources to investigate strategies, plans, and the self-image of SAGCOT. As part of the investigation, I looked at the authors, original purpose, and target audience of the documents (Bowen 2009, 33). This helped me to contextualize and grasp relationships between the various actors in the SAGCOT initiative. Most of the official documents were publicly available on the internet in English. I collected brochures and leaflets during interviews and observations based on their relevance to my research interests. For the actual analysis of the documents, I used codes and analytical memos.
Table 2. Selected Documents for Analysis
Reference Title Retrieved (DFID 2012) Business Case and Intervention Summary: Southern 04.05.2018 Agricultural Growth Corridor in Tanzania (SAGCOT) (DFID 2017) Annual Review 2017 25.05.2018 (Norwegian Embassy Grant Letter to AGRA n/a 2015) (SAGCOT 2011) Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania: 24.07.2017 Investment Blueprint (SAGCOT 2012) The SAGCOT Greenprint: A Green Growth Investment 22.09.2017 Framework for the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT 2013a) A Framework for Agricultural Green Growth: 13.04.2018 Greenprint for SAGCOT (SAGCOT 2013c) Applying an Agriculture Green Growth Approach in the 13.04.2018 SAGCOT Clusters: Challenges and Opportunities in Kilombero, Ihemi and Mbarali (SAGCOT 2014) Memorandum of Understanding 21.10.2017 (SAGCOT 2016) Annual Report 2016 19.11.2017 (USAID 2017) Feed the Future Tanzania 22.05.2018 (World Bank 2016) SAGCOT Investment Project (SIP) 22.09.2017
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Data Analysis For the data analysis process of selected documents and transcribed semi-structured interviews, I used coding methods. First, I transcribed all recorded interviews and digitalized the notes of interviews that were not recorded. This process of turning oral communication in a text format is already a form of data analysis that is interconnected with various research activities like conducting interviews, analytic memo writing, and coding (Soss 2006, 136).21 During this process, I also wrote a comprehensive reflection report to explore potential findings. After transcribing, I coded the data (documents and interviews) in a way which helped me to organize, theme, and make sense of it. I used the computer software Atlas.ti version 8 for coding, organizing, and managing my data and codes. I employed a balance of inductive and deductive coding. Spencer (2011) asserts that inductive coding lets the data speak for itself and focuses on emergent themes, while deductive coding draws on theoretical and conceptual principles (as cited in Saldaña 2013, 54). In other words, I developed codes from the data, and other codes were inspired by the literature.
I conducted two cycles of coding. In the initial coding cycle, I used Descriptive Coding and Versus Coding. The aim of the former is to summarize in one or a few words a passage of an interview, which then helps to analyze and organize in basic topics (Saldaña 2013, 88). On the other hand, the aim of Versus Coding is to identify dichotomies, which I used to identify opposing and conflicting actors in the SAGCOT initiative (Saldaña 2013, 115). I also developed a new coding method to complement Versus Coding: ‘And Coding’ - aimed at indicating the collaboration between actors. These three coding methods helped me to examine power relationships within the SAGCOT initiative.
After the initial coding, I conducted a second cycle of coding by employing Pattern Coding to categorize, conceptualize, and theme the initial codes. This helped me to reorganize and reconfigure the basic codes, as well as narrow down the number of codes (Saldaña 2013, 221). In this process, I also shifted from descriptive to more analytical codes. As part of both coding
21 Transcribing the interviews enabled me to detect and address challenges in my interview approach. I was able to improve the wording and framing of some interview questions. I also learned how important it was to leave space for interview participants to think in silence. By noticing this, I became more comfortable during interviews and was able to pay attention to silences. 38 cycles, I systematically documented the coding process through analytic and reflective memos. For example, I reflected on the coding methods, overlapping codes, emerging networks, and selecting important quotes. The memos also led me to reflect on the very mechanic and rigid exercise of coding as a method. I also questioned the usefulness of dividing and isolating the data. Yanow and Schwartz-Shea (2006, 203–13) emphasize that data analysis in qualitative research is not restricted to coding but also focuses on analytical thinking. For me, it was important to combine coding with more open forms of analytical thinking. Therefore, I started emphasizing analytic and reflective memos about the data, while conducting the second coding cycle. This helped me to better analyze and explore processes and relationships in the data.
Positionality This research is inspired by a decolonial approach, and draws on decolonial ethics. Some critical features of decolonial ethics concern one’s positionality and the social location. In particular, throughout this research process, I have reflected, confronted, and problematized my privilege and position. I acknowledge that I write this thesis from the social location of a white heterosexual young man who is educated in the West, which has shaped the research process. In the process of formulating this research, I have carefully considered my position in relation to the research aim. In particular, my whiteness, gender, material inheritance of the colonial exploitation, and institutional affiliation puts me in problematic position of privilege in relation to conducting research in Tanzania. Therefore, throughout the process of this master thesis, I have attempted to confront and address this power relation through diverse reflections and practices. My first move was to decenter Eurocentrism by drawing from epistemological and theoretical perspectives from the Global South. I have discussed the epistemological aspect in the first section of this chapter, and I have elaborated on the theoretical dimension in chapter two.
The second move concerns my methodological choice of studying political reaction ‘from above,’ which I have discussed in this chapter. From my positionality, I feel that studying elitist development institutions and transnational agribusiness corporations – of whom many positions are held by whites from the West – could contribute towards valuable insights of their strategies. During the interview process in Tanzania, I have reflected on my white male positionality. I have encountered three distinctive types of responses and interpretations of my positionality. First, 39 many of the interviewed farm managers, development organizations, and embassy staff were white, and they often interpreted my whiteness and background as a common ground for understating. Due to this interpretation, I felt that this enabled me in some situations with access to particular information. Second, in one interview with a Tanzanian agribusiness actor, I was scrutinized due to my positionality as an outsider. The role of interviewer and interviewee was reversed, and I had to justify my research in Tanzania by answering a series of questions. Third, my whiteness, background, and position as an outsider was perceived in some cases as having the ability to influence the SAGCOT center. This underlined my positionality and privilege in the research process. These encounters shaped and influenced my research process.
My third move is to share my research findings beyond academic channels, and attempt to actively contribute towards transnational solidarity and justice. Linda Smith (2008) elaborates, “[t]wo important ways not always addressed by scientific research are to do with ‘reporting back’ to the people and ‘sharing knowledge.’ Both ways assume a principle of reciprocity and feedback” (15). For me, these are crucial aspects of ethical research. In this research, “reporting back” has featured only to a very limited extend due to the fact that the overwhelming majority of my interview participants are embedded in positions of power, including elite development organization and agribusiness corporations. Therefore, the reporting back aspect is different in this context. On the other hand, I am actively engaged in sharing my research findings. For example, I aim to publish a popular article of my research findings, which will be translated into Swahili. I also seek to synthetize my findings in post a blog entry. In addition, during my time in Tanzania and beyond, I was invited to various collaborations with critical Tanzanian scholars and activists. I seek to position my thesis as part of a political movement of scholars and activists from Tanzania and elsewhere who mobilize against land grabbing and exploitation by the SAGCOT corridor.
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CHAPTER 4: A Brief History of Agricultural Developments in Tanzania
In this chapter, I provide a brief historical overview of significant agricultural policies in Tanzania by discussing its main features and characteristics since the colonial conquest to the present. In the first section, I elaborate on the inherent violent and exploitative colonial agriculture of Tanganyika, which was followed by strategic colonial development policies. Second, I elaborate on Mwalimu Nyerere’s socialist agriculture development vision that shaped the two decades after independence. In the third section, I illustrate the trends in agricultural policies under the neoliberal counter revolution from 1980s to 1990s. Finally, I discuss the national and global policy context of the 2000s that converged in the SAGCOT initiative. This section also introduces some of the key features of the SAGCOT initiative. This historical intervention is inspired by my theoretical framework. I attempt to shed light on the continuities, discontinuities, and novel approaches in Tanzania’s agriculture development, as well as to highlight the interplay between local and global dynamics.
Colonial Agriculture in Tanganyika The Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 signaled the scramble for and partition of Africa by the European powers. The conference succeeded the transatlantic slave trade to justify colonialism and deepen global coloniality (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013d). German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck hosted the Berlin Conference and led the imperialist partition of Africa, while at the same time, he is known as unifier of Germany (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013c, 338). It was also the Germans who were the first European power to invaded what then was known as Tanganyika.
Invasion and German Rule The European conquest of Tanganyika was led Karl Peters who also co-founded the German East Africa Company.22 The colonizers envisioned for Tanganyika to become a significant source of primary resources, especially agricultural produce. The colonization was accompanied by famine and diseases that resulted in the disappearances of entire Kingdoms, such as the
22 Peters was a proponent of social Darwinism, which was employed to justify colonialism as noted above. 41
Karagwe and the Uzinza (Coulson 1982).23 The Germans introduced cash crops in the colony, and forced indigenous peoples to grow cotton for export.24 However, Zaramo planation workers in the south of Tanganyika refused the 35 cents for their first year’s work and rebelled (Iliffe 1972, 10). In July 1905, this erupted into the wide-spread Maji Maji Rebellion. This was one of most significant early anti-colonial movements on the African continent for independence (Coulson 1982, 31).25 The Maji Maji Rebellion targeted the German colonial state, missions, military garrisons, and trading centers. After some initial success of the anti-colonial movement, the German’s deployment of machine guns and scorched earth tactics resulted in defeat in 1907. The resulting death toll is estimated by Tanzanian historian Gwassa (2005) to be at 300,000 deaths due to the war and years of induced famine. Hence, the German invasion was accompanied by genocide and ecocide. As the Maji Maji Rebellion illustrates, commercial agriculture and violence go hand in hand in colonialism.
Under German rule, the colonial agriculture sector of Tanganyika was characterized by violence and a racial division of labor to produce export commodities. This type of colonial governance is described by Ugandan scholar Mahmood Mamdani (1996) as direct rule that included the “appropriation of land, the destruction of communal autonomy, and the defeat and dispersal of tribal populations for domination of indigenous peoples” (17).26 For the colonial state, racism was the ideology that reproduced coloniality (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013c, 341). Indigenous labor was organized for white settlers, plantation companies, as well as small-scale farmers (Coulson 1982, 36). The most prominent cultivated cash crops were cactus sisal, cotton, rubber, and coffee.27 Sisal was the most valuable export crop and produced on plantations. By 1910, fifty- four sisal plantations exported about 20,000 tones a year ((Hitchcock 1959, 5) as cited in
23 For example, rinderpest whipped out 90% of Tanganyika’s the cattle population in only five years. 24 As (2008, 6) points out the term ‘indigenous’ can problematic in many aspects as it collectivizes and reduces peoples and their experiences under imperialism, but at the same time, she explains that the term can point towards a way of including diverse peoples, languages, and experiences. I am drawing on the latter meaning of the term indigenous. 25 The Maji Maji Rebellion was predated by numerous similar anti-colonial movements. Among them, the Wahehe Rebellion of 1891–1898 that was led by the Wahehe peoples of present day Iringa Region in the Southern Highlands. 26 For the majority of the colonized or “subjects” this signified a system of “unmediated—centralized— despotism” (Mahmood 1996, 17). 27 Other significant export commodities were gold and diamonds.
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Coulson 1982, 37). In this way, monoculture was a colonial invention (Rodney 1973, 217). While the Europeans owned and managed the sisal plantations, black Africans worked as forced and low wage labor. Guyanese historian Walter Rodney (1973) asserts, “[g]ood examples of Africans literally being forced to grow cash crops by gun and whip were to be found in Tanganyika under German rule…” (146). This extractive and exploitative system of the colony was sustained by an infrastructure network. Railroads and feeder roads transported these various commodities from the interior to the coastal cities of Dar es Salaam, Bagamoyo, Mtwara, and Tanga. The plundered resources were then shipped to the metropoles of Europe for processing and manufacturing. The export commodities of the colony arrived in the European ports that half a century ago were notorious slave trading ports. In this way, Europeans did no longer exploit Africans by kidnapping and enslaving them for plantations in the Americas, but instead they exploited African labor and natural resources inside Africa (Rodney 1973, 144).
British Rule After World War I, the British took over as administrators of the territory of Tanganyika under a mandate of the League of Nations. While the flag of the colonizer changed, the colonial structure remained largely the same. Nonetheless, the British employed a new governance system of indirect rule that was to dominate a ‘free’ peasantry though ‘Customary Authority’ (Mahmood 1996, 17). An example of this was Tanganyika’s Native Authority Ordinances that granted chiefs limited customary law. This strategy was to divide and rule the indigenous peoples (Iliffe 1972, 12). In contrast to settler dominated agriculture of Kenya or smallholder based production of Uganda, Tanganyika’s agriculture was a mix between them (Saul 1973). From the mid 1930s to the mid 1950s, the British colonial administration believed that force was a necessity in order to change small-scale farmer’s agricultural techniques (Coulson 1982, 52). As noted above, the wages of African agricultural labor were very low, but the Great Depression of the 1930s resulted in an ever decreasing wages (Rodney 1973, 140, Coulson 1982, 48). This exemplifies the extent to which the colony was integrated in the world market.
A significant change in colonial agricultural policy occurred in the aftermath of World War II. Akyeampong (2018, 4) argues that the colonial state became a developmental state, which 43 promoted a revolution in agricultural practices.28 In Tanganyika this meant the development of a small number of large agricultural schemes (Coulson 1982, 52). Probably the most well-known scheme was the Tanganyika Groundnut Scheme that was put forward by the United Africa Comply in 1946 (Coulson 1982, 50, Rizzo 2006). The United Africa Comply was a British company and a subsidiary of the Anglo-Dutch conglomerate Unilever.29 The Groundnut Scheme proposal was to cultivate 3,210,000 acres with a planned annual output of 800,000 tons by using machinery (bulldozers for clearing trees and tractors for tilling) and fertilizer (see Figure 5 and Figure 6). The scheme was approved by a commission of representative from the public and private sector, including the British Colonial Office and the United Africa Company (Rizzo 2006, 208). Nevertheless, after five years and a £36 million investment, the Groundnut Scheme ended in a disaster. The reasons for the failure are plentiful, most notably among them are a lack of planning, technical assistance (Coulson 1982, 50–2), and shortage of labor (Rizzo 2006). According to Rizzo (2006, 210), the Groundnut Scheme was one of the “most famous disasters in colonial development history.” In fact, the Groundnut Scheme was to become the first among many failed commercial and large-scale agricultural development projects in the history of Tanzania. This illustrates that colonialism was attempted to be legitimized through development interventions (Ziai 2016). Many of these characteristics defining the Tanganyika Groundnut Scheme are today shared by the SAGCOT corridor. In particular, both are designed to as extractive territories, driven by the demand for export commodity crop from international markets, and mark status symbols of development and modernization.
28 A particular example of this broader shift in British colonial governance is the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1945 (Furnivall 1948, see Cooper 1998). This British policy was an attempt to invest large funds for development and welfare in their colonies in order to hold on to them. After all, anti- colonial movement gained strength, and the colonies were important sources of wealth. 29 Unilever operated offices in nearly all British colonies in Africa (Rodney 1973, 145), and produced about 75% of Western Europe margarine (Rizzo 2006, 207). Today, Unilever still operates offices and a large plantation of 3400 hectares in Tanzania. The country is the country’s largest tea producer. In addition, Unilever is also one of the key partners in the SAGCOT initiative. 44
Figure 5. The Groundnut Scheme (Source: Wood 1950)
Figure 6. Map of the three proposed areas for the Tanganyika Groundnut Scheme (Source: Rizzo 2006). 45
After the disaster of agricultural schemes, the British enforced one more agricultural policy in the 1950s before Tanganyika’s independence. The new policy aimed to concentrate resources on well-off farms who had the potential to increase their production by using modern inputs of machinery and fertilizer, as well as an increase in labor (Coulson 1982, 55). This was a further attempt to ‘modernize’ agricultural production, which was influenced by modernization theory. Peasants who refused to accept ‘modern methods’ were dismissed as unproductive, lazy, and ignorant (Kjekshus 1977, 271, Coulson 1982, 55). This was another way to criminalized and discriminate peasant’s subsistence agriculture and their way of live. Nearly a century after the Berlin Conference, the peoples and peasants of Tanganyika and elsewhere on the African continent endured famine, forced labor, violence, destruction, displacement, and other horrors of colonialism. However, the growing anti-colonial movements on the African continent achieved a first wave of national liberations. Rodney (1973) observes on this transition with respect to agriculture, “the vast majority of farmers went into colonialism with a hoe and came out with a hoe” (203).
From Uhuru to Ujamaa At Tanganyika’s independence in 1961, President Mwalimu (teacher) Julius Kambarage Nyerere and his government were faced with the challenge of nation building, while the country’s colonial economic structure was vertically integrated in the capitalist world economy. According to Coulson (1982), the British left behind an array of economic reports, of which the most significant and influential was the World Bank’s 1961 report on ‘The Economic Development of Tanganyika.’ The new government adopted the recommended agricultural policies for an ‘improvement approach’ followed by a ‘transformative approach.’30 While the former was characterized by agriculture extensions, modern inputs, and cooperatives for rich farms – similar to the 1950s policy, the later emphasized on machinery, irrigation, large capital expenditures – a total transformation towards a commercial agricultural system (Coulson 1982). At the same time, European companies, white settlers, as well as Asian businessmen still owned most of the large
30 Both, the ‘improvement approach’ and ‘transformative approach’ emerged out of the dogmatic modernization theory that conceptualizes economic development in a progression of stages. It put forward the ‘dual society’ thesis to distinguish between traditional and modern modes of production in a country. 46 export producing plantations and large farms (Shivji 1976, 36), while smallholder farmers producing for export still dominated the agricultural sector (Shivji 2008, 188). However, it soon became clear that the ‘improvement approach’ and ‘transformative approach’ were too costly and did not produce the substantial results.
A major turning point for agricultural policies was 1967 when president Nyerere and the Tanganyika African National Unity (TANU) passed the Arusha Declaration. This explicitly stated Tanzania’s commitment towards a socialist development path of Ujamaa or ‘familyhood.’ Ujamaa described the unique Tanzanian version of African socialism that was characterized by a focus on agriculture and self-reliance (Nyerere 1968).31 It can be described as search for an indigenous mode for economic development (Akyeampong 2018). Ujamaa was an attempt to transform the economy and society by nationalizing industries and agriculture. In particular, the TANUs second Five Year Plan put forward Siasa ni Kilimo (Politics is Agriculture) in 1972, which of was to transform agriculture via smallholder farmers. Mwalimu Nyerere (1973) emphasized the kind of development he envisioned:
“For the truth is that development means the development of peoples. Roads, buildings, are not development; they are only tools of development … Development brings freedom, provided it is development of peoples. But people cannot be developed; they can only develop themselves… Finally, if development is to increase people’s freedom, it must be development for the people.” (59–60)
This development vision led to the promotion of state owned agriculture and peasant food production for self-reliance.
On the one hand, nationalized state farming schemes produced crops and livestock with the aim of food security and eliminate foreign dependence, on the other hand, peasants were organized in Ujamaa villages to create a strong agrarian society (Mbunda 2016, 277). For the peasants, the Ujamaa villages offered a decentralized governance system to deliver services, including agricultural inputs and technical assistance. The villagization was achieved thought ‘Operation Vijiji,’ which forced about nine million peasants to relocate to Ujamaa villages (Akyeampong
31 Similar forms of African Socialism flourished in Kwame Nkrumah’s Ghana, Leopold Senghor’s Senegal, and Sekou Touré’s Guinea. 47
2018). According to Bernstein (1981) this villagization process was intended for the intensification of peasant production and expanded state control (48). In this way, large-scale state owned farms and small-scale peasant production were promoted at the same time. The vast majority of the state-owned farms were later privatized in the 1990s.
However, Tanzania’s socialism and self-reliance largely depended on Western donors and foreign direct investment who gained a growing influence. In fact, Tanzania was (and still is) among the top destinations for development aid in Africa. Especially agricultural develop received significant funds and technical assistance from donors (Shivji 1976, Bernstein 1981, Coulson 1982). Just to illustrate the sheer dimension of development aid in the 1970s, the government’s Five-Year Plan was up to 65% directly financed by donors (Bernstein 1981, 47). Among the largest lenders was the World Bank with a total of $692.7 million by 1978, of which $230.3 million (or 33%) was dedicated toward agricultural development (Coulson 1982, 304).32 The World Banks promoted particularly the intensification of monoculture for export (Shivji 2008). This was guided by the belief that large-scale and modern-technological intensive agriculture was superior to peasant and smallholder production. The World Bank policy signaled the abandoning of support for small-scale production, while Malimu Nyerere’s launched the agricultural policy of Kilimo cha Kufa na Kupona (‘Do or Die’ Agriculture) in 1983 as a final effort to support smallholders. Despite the efforts towards a socialist development under Umajaa, the agrarian economy was still centered around a colonial order to produce export commodities, and has not undergone any major structural changes (Shivji 1976, 2008, Bernstein 1981).
The Neoliberal Counter Revolution By the 1980s, Tanzania faced along many other African countries large amounts of debt, which put national self-determination at stake. The rise of Milton Friedman’s monetarist economics and the leadership of Margaret Thatcher in Britain and Ronald Reagan in the US signaled the neoliberal counter revolution that followed the mentality of “there is no alternative.” In
32 The World Bank lending programs relied on its International Development Association for a total of $374.7 million of which $318.0 million were channeled toward agriculture, while its International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) contributed a total of $193.3 million of which $37 million for agriculture (Coulson 1982, 304). In addition, USAID also heavy invested in agricultural development programs in Tanzania. 48 particular, the notorious World Bank report of 1981, Accelerated Development for Africa: An Agenda for Africa led to the devastating Structural Adjustment Programs (Shivji 2008, 184). In Tanzania, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) blamed Ujamaa for the economic crisis, and proposed stabilizing SAPs. The aim of these three-years SAPs reforms was to reduce the budget deficit and cut subsidies for agriculture (Mbunda 2016, 279). However, Mwalimu Nyerere was reluctant to accept the World Bank’s recommended SAPs and the conditions of the IMF, and eventually stepped down as president in 1985 (Mbunda 2016). In the meantime, the government of Tanzania and donors neglected the agricultural sector.
The ‘lost decade’ of SAPs was followed by neoliberal policies of the ‘Washington Consensus.’ Under the neoliberal counter revolution, marketization, privatization, and liberalization became the order of the day (Shivji 2008, 185). In Tanzania, the neoliberal policies were legitimized by the 1991 Zanzibar Resolution that completely dismantled the remains of the Arusha Declaration on Ujamaa and Self-reliance (Mbunda 2016). The majority of the state owned agricultural enterprises were privatized. According to a World Bank study, the agricultural subsidies reached $10 to 17 million in the 1980s, while they fell to zero by 1994 (as cited in Mbunda 2016). This new kind of agriculture was to commercialization and modernization smallholder farmers, and received support by the government’s Vision 2025. This national strategy was to lift Tanzania to a middle-income country by the year 2025. Vision 2025 described agriculture as “largely untransformed” and dependent on “backward technology” which is similar to the logics underpinning the SAGCOT initiative (Bergius 2014, 30). In a way, Vision 2025 signaled the government’s renewed commitment to agriculture, but it only remained on paper. Despite this, Vision 2025 was central to set the stage for neoliberal policies in the agricultural sector.
1
49
Decolonization
Great Depression Asia’s Green Revolution World War II World War I Debt Crisis Berlin Conference
Global 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 Colonial Tanganyika | United Republic of Tanzania Tanzania German Direct Rule British Indirect Rule SAPs Kilimo cha Kufa na Kupona Conquest & Resistance Promotion of Plantations & Peasants Siasa ni Kilimo
Arusha Declaration Forced Labor Maji Maji Rebellion Improvement & Transformation Independence Nucleus Farms
Agricultural Schemes
Ground Nut Scheme
Figure 7. Timeline of selected agricultural developments from 1880 to 1980
Towards a SAGCOT Corridor After decades of neglecting the agricultural sector, former president Jakaya Kikwete launched the Agricultural Sector Development Program (ASDP) in 2006 to mark the comeback of the state in agriculture (Mbunda 2016). ASDP was a seven-year blueprint for a green revolution in Tanzania. Some of the main features of ASDP included the mobilization of private sector investments for modernizing agriculture (SAGCOT 2011). The program aimed to achieve 5-6% agricultural growth per year (Hakiardhi 2011). This was financed through a basked fund, including the World Bank with $155 million among others (SAGCOT 2011
50 a, 25).33 The role of the state was primarily to support agricultural inputs, such as fertilizer (Bergius 2014).34 ASDP cemented the neoliberal agriculture approach of commercialization and modernization in Tanzania.
Despite these efforts, government of Tanzania recognized that additional efforts were needed to improve the agricultural sector (Mbunda 2016, 281). This resulted in 2009 in the launch of the Kilimo Kwanza initiative for mainland Tanzania and the Agricultural Transformation Initiative for Zanzibar. The Kilimo Kwanza initiative builds on the ASDP, as it too aimed to commercialize and modernize the agricultural sector through private sector investments (Sulle 2015). According to Mbunda (2016, 181–2), the ten pillars of Kilimo Kwanza are:
1. political will to transform agriculture through creating a national vision on Kilimo Kwanza 2. financing agriculture, 3. institutional reorganization and management of agriculture, 4. paradigm shift to strategic agricultural production, 5. availability of land for agriculture, 6. incentives to stimulate investments in agriculture, 7. industrialization for agricultural transformation, 8. science, technology and human resources to support agricultural transformation, 9. infrastructure development to support agricultural transformation and 10. mobilization of Tanzanians to support and participate in the implementation
In short, Kilimo Kwanza aimed to modernize small and large-scale agriculture through a Public Private Partnership approach, as well as value chain development, technology, and political reforms (SAGCOT 2011). A central aspect of this initiative was the mobilization of foreign direct investments for agribusiness developments. In fact, the launch of Kilimo Kwanza coincided with the onset of the current global land rush. Critics of Kilimo Kwanza pointed out a lack of participation, consultation, and the ambiguous role of small-scale producers, as the initiative has been set up by the Tanzania National Business Council (Hakiardhi 2011).35 Second,
33 Beside World Bank financing for ASDP, other donors contributed, involving the IFAD with $92 million, the AfDB with $56 million, JICA with $6.86 million, and Irish Aid with $5.75 million 34 At the same time, the Norwegian fertilizer giant Yara and the Tanzanian Agricultural Council launched in 2007 the Tanzanian Agricultural Partnership (TAP). The PPP also received support from the Norwegian Government and Prorustica, and can be viewed as a predecessor to the SAGCOT initiative (Buseth 2017). 35 In this context, small-scale producers mean mainly peasants and pastoralists. 51 the initiative has been criticized for a proposed amendment of Village Land Act No. 5 of 1999 that could result in wide-spread land grabbing (Hakiardhi 2011, Mbunda 2016, Bergius et al.1 2017). In this way, Kilimo Kwanza anchored the role of agribusiness in the development of Agricultural Polices from 1995-2018 Tanzania’s agricultural sector (SAGCOT 2011, 5).
AGRA Food, Finance, Energy, Ecology Crises
WEF’s New Vision for Agriculture
Rio + 20 CAADP Grow Africa NEPAD MDGs New Alliance (NAFSN) Rio Submit SDGs Global 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2018 Tanzania
Vision 2025 ASDP II ASDS Big Results Now ASDP TAP National Agricultural Policy SAGCOT CAADP
Kilimo Kwanza
Figure 8. Timeline of selected agricultural developments from 1990 to present
While several initiatives in Tanzania fortified a neoliberal agricultural development approach, multiple global initiative anchored it in international and Pan-African institutions. Therefore, the concept of African Agricultural Growth Corridors was first presented Norwegian fertilizer giant Yara at the United Nation’s General Assembly in 2008 (Paul and Steinbrecher 2013). This corridors concept is characterized by value chain development model, Public-Private Partnership, and foreign direct investment to unlock “Africa’s agriculture potential” (Kaarhus 2011, 2018, Paul and Steinbrecher 2013, Weng et al. 2013). The African Agricultural Growth Corridors concept was further developed at the 2009 submit of the World Economic Forum in Davos, 52
Switzerland through its initiative for New Vision for Agriculture.36 Subsequently, Tanzanian President Kikwete launched the SAGCOT initiative at the World Economic Forum Africa Submit in 2010 in Dar es Salaam. The SAGCOT initiative was to implement Kilimo Kwanza and mobilize global agribusiness. Only months after this, Tanzania also became a signatory of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP). CAADP is the agricultural program of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which is the African Union’s framework for socio-economic development.37 The CAADP aims to increase public investment for agriculture to ten percent of the national budget and to reach six percent of agricultural growth. This is to achieve economic growth, poverty reduction and food security, and is also aligned with the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) New Vision for Agriculture (Nogales 2014, 28). In other words, the SAGCOT initiative was not home grown, but rather emerged out of the WEF’s New Vision and backed by the G7.
Furthermore, these global initiatives and the launch of SAGCOT led to the Grow Africa Partnership to cement the neoliberal turn in agricultural development. The Grow Africa Partnership was founded in 2011 to mobilize ‘responsible’ private sector investment in agriculture. Former President Kikwete noted:
“The World Economic Forum’s partnership with Tanzania laid the groundwork for Grow Africa… Grow Africa’s founding partners – the AU, NEPAD and the Forum – have ensured that the effort is anchored in African institutions and supported by the global community.” (WEF 2016, 4)
The partnership is also partly funded by USAID, while Yara played a key role in the establishment of the partnership (Paul and Steinbrecher 2013). Grow Africa Partnership compromises 32 companies that are involved in the SAGCOT initiative. The Partnership is also linked to the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition (NAFSN). The New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition is the latest agriculture initiative for Africa to reducing poverty and
36 The New Vision aims to achieve food security, environmental sustainability, and economic growth, and includes the G7, the G20, and 11 countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America (Paul and Steinbrecher 2013). These objectives are in fact the corner stones of the African Agricultural Growth Corridors. 37 NEPAD is described by Nimako (2011) as an entanglement of African states in the European “neo- colonial trade web” (8).
53 achieve food security thought private sector investments. The New Alliance was launched at the G8 summit at Camp David in 2012. It is aligned with CAADP, and builds on Grow Africa and WEF’s New Vision approach (Nogales 2014, 28). Thus, SAGCOT is linked to all of these four initiatives. Among the New Alliance’s partners are the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) and the World Bank, which are some of the key players in SAGCOT.
As I have illustrated above, the SAGCOT initiative is interlocked with a set of national and international policies and initiatives that emphasizes on foreign direct investments for agricultural development. The SAGCOT initiative also builds on the notion of modernization and commercialization of agriculture. What is new to SAGCOT is the combination of an international Private-Public Partnership, value chain development, and corridor approaches. In particular, the SAGCOT corridor aims to mobilize global agribusiness to channels investment into a geographically confined space, which covers about one third of mainland Tanzania. Subsequently, the corridor is divided into six clusters that center on spaces for high agricultural potential (see Figure 9). According to the SAGCOT Blueprint (SAGCOT 2011), [c]luster development will be driven by the private sector based on the needs and opportunity of each area” (32). The cluster approach is intended to link agribusiness with smallholder farmers through outgrower schemes and contract farming. In this way, the SAGCOT initiative aims to develop large-scale farms and smallholder at the same time. The proponents of the initiative claim that this approach ultimate benefits smallholder farmers in the corridor.
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Figure 9. Clusters in the SAGCOT Corridor (Source: SAGCOT 2011, 32)
While SAGCOT also focuses beyond the clusters, each cluster is to specialize in a certain value chain. The Ihemi cluster was the first one to be launched in 2015, and compromises parts of Iringa Region and Njombe Region. The cluster is characterized by the development of five value chains that are coordinated by the SAGCOT Center in Iringa. Each of the five value chains in the Ihemi cluster is driven by an agribusiness company, including Darsh Industries for tomatoes, Mtanga Foods for potatoes, Silvelands for soya, ASAS Dairy for dairy, and Unilver for tea. Each of these agribusiness companies have been in existence prior the introduction of the Ihemi cluster in 2015, and hence lay the some of the foundation of agribusiness in the region. More recently, the Mbarali cluster has been launched in October 2017, which covers parts of Mbeya Region and Songwe Region. This second cluster is to emphasizes the rice value chain. Nonetheless, the launch of the four other clusters is still pending.
In this chapter, I have provided an overview of the historical development of commercial agriculture in Tanzania. The agricultural transformation went over time through a series of changes. First, I have demonstrated that since colonialism, Tanzania’s agriculture has been based 55 on a mix of large-scale plantation and peasant production. Both of these modes of production were dedicated to produce commodity crops for export. Second, the development projects of the 1940s, including the spectacular Tanganyika Groundnut Scheme were an attempt to modernize and commercialize the agricultural sector. The introduction of modern agricultural techniques (machinery and fertilizer) was driven by the demand of commodity crops from international markets. Third, the two decades after independence were characterized by Ujamaa. This involved the promotion of peasant production, and to a lesser extent state owned agricultural estates. However, I have discussed above that the Tanzanian agricultural sector remained organized around the colonial structure of producing commodity crops for export. Fourth, in the last decades of the twentieth century, SAPs and neoliberal policies signaled the rollback of state support and involvement in the agricultural sector. Finally, the ASDP, Kilimo Kwanza, and SAGCOT marked not only the comeback of the state in agriculture, but also a renewed commitment to agricultural modernization. In particular, the SAGCOT initiative targets smallholder farmer, medium and large scale farms, and the agribusiness companies to further the vision of modernization and commercialization. In this way, the narratives of agricultural modernization, commercialization, and development spans from the colonial period to the present, while the logic of producing commodity corps for export persists.
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CHAPTER 5: Legitimizing Processes ‘From Above’
In this chapter, I discuss some of the underlying assumptions and discourses, as well as the processes of legitimizing the SAGCOT initiative at the national-level. I aim to shed light on the relationships and alliances between powerful SAGCOT actors. This chapter addresses the sub- research questions one, two, and three. In the first section, I elaborate on the narratives of agricultural modernization and development of farmland as an underlying logic of the SAGCOT initiative. In relation to this, I examine the political reactions ‘from above’ on the issue of land grabbing in the corridors. Second, I discuss the state of institutionalization of the inclusive green growth discourse. In particular, I demonstrate the role of the Green Reference Group as a manifestation of the inclusive green growth strategy. In the third section, elaborate on the geography of interests of the donors funded finance mechanism of the SAGCOT initiative. Fourth, I examine the role of the SAGCOT Center and agribusiness companies of lobbing and influencing government policies. Finally, I elaborate on the role of the state in SAGCOT and process of securing political support. This is followed by some concluding remarks.
Agricultural Modernization and Land Grabbing in SAGCOT The SAGCOT initiative consists of a comprehensive Public-Private Partnership approach to commercialize and modernize agriculture in the corridor. By 2030, the initiative plans to convert 350,000 hectares of land into industrial framing use, transform over 10,000 smallholders into commercial farmers, generate 420,000 new jobs, lift out more than two million people out of poverty, and build a vast infrastructure network of roads, railways, ports, and irrigation (SAGCOT 2011, 7). As I have discussed in chapter four, this mega development project is aligned with a number of international initiatives to radically transform agriculture through a new Green Revolution. For Tanzania, the transformative potential and need for SAGCOT is highlighted by a DFID (2012) document:
“Given Tanzania’s socialist background and only recent policy turn to private-sector agriculture, the SAGCOT initiative presents the best opportunity to date for the public and private sectors to work together to achieve substantial impact in commercialising Tanzania’s agricultural sector and increase smallholder incomes. Given the very under- developed nature of Tanzania agriculture and the legacy of an agricultural economy run on collectivist and dirigiste principles, a number of pillars must be put in place for a significant portion of smallholder agriculture to commercialise and grow.” (n/a) 57
This illustrates the SAGCOT corridor as an important development opportunity to turn towards commercializing agriculture in Tanzania. The problematization of “underdevelopment” and the subsequent “need for development and modernization” is a common justification for the SAGCOT corridor.
In addition, DFID, the World Bank, other donor organizations become central epistemic actors in shaping and promoting narratives of agricultural modernization, as well as influencing specific policies for advancing development and modernity. Notions of “help,” “opportunity,” and “modern agriculture” for development were shared by multiple donors and agribusiness actors. In the words of a white SAGCOT agribusiness actor, “[t]hey [smallholder farmers] have to modernize the way of doing things. They have to take what is good form their traditional techniques and reject what is bad, and then move on.”38 In Tanzania, it is a common belief of smallholder farmers as being ‘backwards’ and ‘inferior’ (Sulle and Nelson 2009). This developmentalist narrative and paternalism is rooted in the developmentalist fallacy that characterizes modernity/coloniality. Therefore, SAGCOT can be situated as a project to bring modernity and development to Tanzania (Bergius et al. 2017). I further elaborate the modernization of smallholder farmers and the racialization between smallholder farmers and agribusiness corporations in chapter six.
The agricultural modernization narrative envisioned for the SAGCOT corridor expresses itself in the need to develop farmland through corporate agribusiness investments. The former Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete put it in the foreword of the SAGCOT Blueprint (SAGCOT 2011), “Tanzania has immense opportunities for agricultural development. There are 44 million hectares of arable land, only 24 percent of which is being utilised” (4). From this perspective, land is viewed as abundant, which needs to be developed for the use of modern agriculture. Similar views are shared by the TIC and other government institutions. This notion follows the long- standing Eurocentric imagination of “empty,” “virgin,” and “underdeveloped” land. The myth of abundant land in Tanzania has been debunked by a number of recent studies that have indicated a limited availability of farmland in the SAGCOT corridor for investors (Ademba and Mpagaze
38 Interview 6, 29.11.2017 58
2016, Bergius et al. 2017, Bluwstein et al. 2018).39 These findings are derived from national laws governing land in Tanzania, as they also apply for the SAGCOT corridor.
The miss-conceptualization of abundant land in the SAGCOT corridor has created some tension over farmland. The official position of the government is that there are “no land issues” in Tanzania.40 In contrast, the SAGCOT initiative acknowledges the issue of land grabbing in a number of documents. For example, the Greenprint (SAGCOT 2012) notes, “[the SAGCOT Investment] Guidelines also make clear that SAGCOT will not seek to compete with corrupt regimes that facilitate land grabs, in what may be described as Africa’s ‘race to the bottom’ for investor dollars” (49). This claim was also supported by key SAGCOT donors, as they cited the importance of social and environmental responsible investments in the initiative. In addition, a Vulnerable Groups Framework (2016) was established for the World Bank’s SAGCOT Investment Program. In this way, the self-image of SAGCOT accounts for land grabbing as a major issue for smallholder farmers, pastoralist, and other vulnerable groups, which distinguishes the initiative from many other large-scale land based projects.
However, in recent years, a number of studies and reports have identified key SAGCOT partners to be involved in land grabbing in the corridor. First, rice producer Kilombero Plantation Ltd (KPL) that is owned by UK-based Agrica has been documented to be involved in land grabbing (Oakland Institute 2015, Bergius et al. 2017). Second. Swedish-owned sugarcane plantation Bagamoyo EcoEnergy has acquired 20,000 hectares of land for industrial sugarcane production that was deemed to be unlawfully (ActionAid 2015a, Sulle 2015, Bergius et al. 2017, Chung 2017). Third, Singaporean agribusiness giant Olam-Aviv has acquired 5,000 acres of land in Lipokela village in the Ruvuma Region without the consent of villagers. (Ademba and Mpagaze 2016). In addition, a SAGCOT donor reported in an interview a dispute over the expansion of
39 Tanzania’s land governance system is an inheritance of the colonial state (Shivji 1998). Today, all land is public land, over which the president acts as trustee on behalf of the Tanzanian citizens. Land is governed by the Land Act No. 4 and the Village Land Act No. 5 of 1999, and organized into three categories: village land, reserve land, and general land. Village Land compromises about 70% of all land, and is governed by elected village councils. Reserve land is governed by a number of bodies, and is mostly used for conservation and tourism. General land covers urban areas and large land-based investments (in effect all non-village land and non-reserve land), and is governed by the Commissioner for Lands. 40 Interview 29, 22.01.2018; Interview 25, 15.01.2018 59
Anglo-Dutch owned Unilever tea planation (compromising an anchor farm and outgrowing scheme) in Mufindi, Iringa Region, as well as a conflict over water use and land access between Silverlands farms owned by UK-based SilverStreet Capital and villagers of Muwimbi in the Iringa Region.41 Both agribusiness companies are prominent actors in SAGCOT. An interview participant assessed the issue of land grabbing in the SAGCOT corridor as the following, “[t]hese Muzungus are taking our land. Who is making them to take our land? This SAGCOT!”42,43 This perception together with the above-mentioned case studies point towards the broader dynamics of land grabbing in the SAGCOT corridor, which operates through a racialized Global North-South axis. The above documented cases of land grabbing suggest a recent series of land grabbing by SAGCOT actors in the corridor, while at the same time, the SAGCOT initiative is moving further in its implementation.
A next major milestone in the implementation of the SAGOCT initiative concerns the World Bank’s SAGCOT Investment Program (SIP) thought its International Development Association. An initial dispute between the government of Tanzania and the World Bank over the latter’s safeguard policy on indigenous peoples resulted in years of delay of the funding.44 After four years of delay, the Bank’s $70 million SIP is to be implemented in 2018. However, serious concerns over the SIP has been raised by smallholder farmers, villagers, NGOs, and scholars in the wake of the increasing cases of land grabbing associated with SAGCOT.45 In responds, one of the World Bank’s senior staff addressed the issue of land grabbing in an interview:
“I mean it would be a mistake to trivialize the huge impact of land and land tenue issues in the SAGCOT growth corridor… I cannot speak too much about land issues in the context of the SAGCOT initiative, simply because the SAGCOT Investment Project is not going to entertain any investments that involve the reallocation or purchasing of
41 Interview 16, 20.12.2017 42 Interview 11, 08,12,2017 43 White foreigners are in Swahili popularly referred to as Muzungus. 44 After four years of stalemate, the Bank’s safeguard policy on indigenous peoples was waived in 2016, and replaced by the Vulnerable Groups Planning Framework. The government of Tanzania requested a waiver for the World Bank’s safeguard policy on indigenous peoples because the Tanzanian Constitution states that all citizens are equal, while no special treatment shall be made for any ethnic group. 45 A group of CSO, farmer associations, and NGOs complied a report in responds to the Greenprint, titled “Feedback and recommendations from Civil Society Organisations for the “Greenprint” strategy of the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania Initiative.” See www.tnrf.org/Greenprint.pdf
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land… We are only interested in investing in individual companies that are already based in the SAGCOT area that have titled deeds for the land that they are working on, and have had these title deeds for at least a minimum of two years. So, for us it is very clear cut issue.”46
The claim that the SIP will only work with existing investors who have titled land was supported by a government official associated with SAGCOT.47 The policy of exclusively partnering with established agribusiness corporations seems to signal a strategy shift to avoid the issue of land grabbing in the corridor. Another key official affiliated with SAGCOT assured me that projects of the SIP are guided by strict regulations in order to avoid the evictions of smallholder farmers, as they are the ultimate beneficiaries of the initiative.48
Avoiding land conflict is also in the interest of investors, as this poses a major investment risk. For example, in the case of Swedish-owned EcoEnergy in Bagamoyo, the subsidiary company went out of business after a Tanzanian court ordered to revoked its land title.49 In fact, a SAGCOT donor pointed out that land conflicts between investors and smallholder farmers is a major investment risk, and investors view the current situation as not a good time to investments due to concern over access to land.50 To address this investment risk, USAID, DFID, and the World Bank are working together on a pilot program for a low-cost land tenure registration program to promote land rights in the SAGCOT area.51 This pilot program could have a wide spread influence in the future to formalize land tenures in Tanzanian. The SAGCOT Center in collaboration with the International Union for Conservation of Nature’s “SUSTAIN Africa” initiative launched a Land Use Dialogues and The Forests Dialogues that are intended to address conflicts over land in the corridor. These community dialogues, together with the new policy strategy in the SIP, and a stronger emphasis on outgrower schemes by SAGCOT actors could
46 Interview 31, 24.01.2018 47 Interview 29, 22.01.2018 48 Interview 27, 18.01.2018 49 Currently, the court case is still ongoing because EcoEnergy filed a $500 million arbitration claim against the Government of Tanzania for contract determination with the International Court for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). In short, the ICSID serves as a court for investment settlement disputes between private investors and countries, in which the former can sue a country in the case of a breach of contract. The ICSID is also part of the World Bank Group. 50 Interview 16, 20.12.2017 51 Interview 16, 20.12.2017; Interview 31, 24.01.2018 61 reduce land conflicts in the corridor, while the same, the underlying extractivist and profit-driven assumption persists.
In this section, I briefly illustrated the unfolding narratives of agricultural modernization in SAGCOT, which are entangled with the land question. The self-image of SAGCOT as a “post land grabbing” project contributes towards its aim of inclusive and sustainable development. A further discussion on land issue is out of the scope of this thesis, as a range of scholars have extensively elaborated on this. Instead, I further examine narrative of agricultural development and modernization that underpin the SAGCOT initiative. For this, I turn in the next section to analyze inclusive green growth, which is a discourse and strategy to legitimize the SAGCOT initiative.
Legitimizing SAGCOT through Inclusive Green Growth The inclusive green growth strategy serves as a central component of the SAGCOT initiative to ensure inclusion and benefits for smallholder farmers, attract responsible agribusiness investments, and achieve environmental sustainability. However, Buseth (2017) demonstrates that SAGCOT was not initially conceptualized as an inclusive green growth project, but the initiative went rather through a greening or greenwashing process to adapt to new global policy discourse on the green economy. In addition, Bergius et al. (2017) illustrate based on three Scandinavian investments in the SAGCOT corridor that a triple win approach is employed to justify the ‘green modernization’ agenda. Building on these studies, I examine the inclusive green growth strategy as a process to legitimize the SAGCOT initiative. I first elaborate on the appropriation of the inclusive green growth strategy by SAGCOT actors in the Ihemi Cluster. Subsequently, I turn towards the SAGCOT Green Reference Group (GRG) as a concrete practice of legitimizing the SAGCOT initiative through the inclusive green growth strategy.
The SAGCOT Greenprint (SAGCOT 2012) aims “to sustainably intensify agriculture for smallholder and commercial agriculture alike, while simultaneously conserving the natural resource base that supports agriculture and reducing pressure on forests, water resources, and biodiversity” (ii). This is presented as a triple-win scenario, in which the beneficiaries are smallholder farmers, agribusiness investors, and the environment. The focus on inclusion and 62 environmental sustainability distinguishes the SAGCOT initiative form many other large-scale agricultural development projects that are informed by a Green Revolution approach (SAGCOT 2012). The inclusive green growth strategy is consolidated in a number of SAGCOT documents and institutions. For example, the SAGCOT Greenprint documents serves as guiding framework (SAGCOT 2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c), while the newly created SAGCOT Green Reference Group acts as advisory body to the SAGCOT Center and the SAGCOT Catalytic Trust Fund (CTF). Proponents of the initiative champion the inclusive green growth strategy as a unique and innovative approach of socially and environmentally responsible investments to modernize and commercialize agriculture in Tanzania. Through prompting responsible investments, the inclusive green growth strategy is also put forward as a way to avoid land conflicts. The inclusive green growth strategy in SAGCOT is a powerful and novel strategy that distinguishes the project from past agricultural development approaches.
Nonetheless, multiple SAGCOT actors perceived the inclusive green growth strategy not as a defining feature of the initiative. In particular, several conversations with donors revealed a lack of implementing the strategy. One key SAGCOT donor assessed:
“[D]uring my time here, the whole focus of all the funders has been on making SAGCOT operational as an organization. So, that perspective that you mentioned [of green growth] has not really been prioritized a lot… Environmental issues and green growth has not been in focus basically.”52
Another donor supports this by pointing out that the SLC struggles regarding environmental responsibility because they can only recommend environmental responsible investments but cannot require inventors to be responsible.53 This points towards more of a rhetoric of inclusive green growth than a firm commitment (also see Buseth 2017). Furthermore, some SAGCOT agribusiness actors in the Iringa part of the Ihemi cluster seemed to be only limited informed about the inclusive green growth strategy. A farm manager of a long standing and prominent SAGCOT partner explained, “I did not realize that they [SAGCOT] were actually promoting
52 Interview 26, 16.01.2018 53 Interview 16, 20.12.2017 63 green growth.”54 This was supported by an interview participant form an agribusiness company who works directly with smallholder farmers.55
The perceived lack of awareness among some SAGCOT actors regarding inclusive green growth was supported by other interview participants in regard to limited environmental sustainability. In the words of a commercial farm manager:
“When we came here, we did not really think about the environment aspects besides an Environmental Integrated Assessment… We have an environmental policy [now], but this came after we invested… Environmental aspects are becoming more of a focus, but there is a lot of talk and not much action.”56
Similarly, an employee from a transnational agribusiness corporation who has over time been closely involved with SAGCOT believes that the initiative is not able to actually implement practices of environmental sustainability on the ground.57 This supports the perceived weak institutionalization of the inclusive green growth strategy among multiple actors in SAGCOT.
The Green Reference Group (GRG) is an important institutionalization of the inclusive green growth strategy that advises on social and environmental issues.58 The objective of the GRG is to “provide the SAGCOT Centre and its partners with guidance, advice and recommendations on environmental and social issues in the SAGCOT region.”59 The GRG was recently initiated by NGOs and CSOs to serve as a non-binding advisory body to the SAGCOT Center and Catalytic Trust Fund. 60 The advisory body is organized into three sub-groups: the Environmental Feeder Group, Social Feeder Group, and Business Feeder Group with members from civil society organizations (CSOs), non-governmental organizations, farmer associations, as well as government and agribusiness representatives (see Appendix IV for a list of GRG members). These feeder groups channel information “from the ground” to the GRG, which subsequently
54 Interview 20, 09.01.2018 55 Interview 22, 10.01.2018 56 Interview 6, 29.11.2017 57 Interview 18, 08.01.2018 58 An Ihemi Green Reference Group (IGRG) has also been formed recently to better address specific local issues in the Ihemi Cluster. 59 http://sagcot.co.tz/index.php/green-reference/ 60 Interview 12, 15.12.2017 64 advises the SAGCOT Center and CTF on social and environmental aspects. In fact, multiple interview participants pointed to the GRG as a cornerstone of social and environmental responsibility in the SAGCOT initiative, which functions as an inclusive platform for marginalized and oppressed groups.61 In the GRG, CSOs and farmer associations participate directly in SAGCOT. The GRG is a manifestation of the inclusive and environmental aspect of the inclusive green growth strategy.
However, the precise role and advisory capacity of the GRG in SAGCOT is unclear. Multiple respondents felt that the role of the GRG is unclear, and its non-binding advisory role to the SCL limits and marginalizes the involvement particularly of CSOs and farmer associations.62 A respondent form an NGO who is a participant in the GRG explained, “if your role is just to advise, your advice will be taken on board or not been taken on board. And then you have no power.”63 From this perspective, the mere advisory role is a sense of powerlessness. In this instance, the act of inclusion and participation could to disempowering rather than empower marginalized groups. This process is referred to by Kothari (2001) as “participatory control,” which encourages the inclusion and participation to legitimize a process that reproduces particular inequalities and hierarchies. The country director of a donor organization assessed that SAGCOT depends on the participation of smallholder farmers because if they would withdraw from the initiative, the agribusiness corporations would be forced to reconsider their responsible investments.64 This further highlights the importance of smallholder farmers and CSOs participation in SAGOCT to legitimize the initiative. To express dissatisfaction for the SAGCOT approach, the head of a Tanzanian CSO decided against the participation of its organization in the GRG. He put it, the GRG is only a “rubber stamp decision making body.”65 In the current arrangement, the role of GRG is reduced to monitoring and addition, but without powers for clear intervention. More importantly, the GRG influences SAGCOT only within certain institutional boundaries. The GRG seems to functions as a legitimizing practice to include CSOs,
61 Interview 16, 20.12.2017; Interview 29, 22.01.2018 62 Interview 17, 20.12.2017; Interview 26, 16.01.2018; Interview 30, 22.01.2018 63 Interview 30, 22.01.2018 64 Interview 2, 08.11.2017 65 Interview 18, 20.12.2017 65
NGOs, and farmer associations without their meaningful participation or decision-making power in SAGCOT.
In addition, the commitment of SAGCOT to the inclusive green growth strategy is further undermined by its ambiguous definition. A respondent from a Tanzanian branch of an international NGO who is a member of the Green Reference Group expressed concerns about different interpretations of the meaning of inclusive green growth, which depend on an actor’s position and perspective.66 For example, a number of interview participants had different interpretations of the environmental sustainability component of the inclusive green growth strategy. Some respondents viewed various environmental conservation and protection schemes as key,67 while others perceive management of natural resources as a critical component.68 This supports Buseth’s (2017) claim of lacking a clear definition of green growth, which enables powerful SAGCOT actors to define themselves what it means. The ambiguous meaning of inclusive green growth in SAGCOT can be employed and appropriated by powerful actors to suite their interests. The inclusive green growth strategy in SAGCOT is portrayed as the cornerstones of social and responsible agribusiness investments, but the implementation and institutionalization of this strategy is unclear, vague, and ambiguous.
Donor Support in SAGCOT The modernization discourse and the inclusive green growth strategy illustrates a shared effort by SAGCOT donors, while a geography of interests among donors is being negotiated. The SAGCOT initiative is backed by a range of multilateral and predominately Western donors, which are engaged in many ways. For example, the SAGCOT Center receives funding from the World Bank, DFID, USAID, the Royal Norwegian Embassy, and more recently AGRA and The Netherlands’ Embassy.69 On the other hand, the SAGCOT Catalytic Trust Fund is mainly
66 Interview 30, 22.01.2018 67 Interview 1, 31.10.2017; Interview 7, 05.12.2017; Interview 8, 06.12.2017; Interview 9, 07.12.2017; Interview 12, 15.12.2017; Interview 24, 15.01.2018 68 Interview 6, 29.11.2017; Interview 9, 07.12.2017; Interview 12, 15.12.2017 69 In 2016, the SLC had an operating budget of about $5 million, and was funded to 46% by USAID, 33% by DFID, 15% by AGRA, and 6% by the Norwegian Embassy. The European Delegation to Tanzania and UNDP and were only involved in the early stages of the setting up the Center (DFID Annual Review 2017). 66 financed though the World Bank’s $70 million SIP. While SAGCOT is an agricultural initiative, three interviewed key donors reported to be involved in SAGCOT not as an agricultural development project, but rather as a private sector development program.70 This contributes towards the SAGCOT initiative as begin a corporate led and profit driven mega project. In fact, one of the donors pointed out, “from the beginning, it [SAGCOT] was surrounded by big companies… but without all these huge corporations SAGCOT is nothing.”71 This includes transnational agribusiness companies, such as Yara, Monsanto, Syngenta, Olam, and Unilever (also see chapter four).
Many donors are involved in the SAGCOT initiative through their own agricultural development programs (see Figure 10). For example, USAID channels $41 million yearly through its Feed the Future Tanzania program to SAGCOT activities, as well as its Mboga na Matunda (USAID 2017). DFID backs SAGCOT through a $60 million program, while future commitments are pending. The Norwegian Embassy is involved in SAGCOT mostly through pooling funds in AGRA and the African Development Bank because they have limited control of SAGCOT funds.72 The multi-donor involvement is perceived by a senior official as a challenge because each donor works within a particular set of regulations and interests.73 The different financial commitments to SAGCOT also enables some donor to steer the initiative in certain directions. The head of a donor organization put it, “[i]t is all the Americans who are in control [of SAGCOT]. Because they are the biggest donor.”74 The US is the largest donor in SAGCOT through the involvement of the World Bank and USAID, which provides them with particular influence.
70 Interview 13, 15.12.2017; Interview 16, 20.12.2017; Interview 26, 16.01.2018 71 Interview 2, 08.11.2017 72 Interview 2, 08.11.2017 73 Interview 27, 18.01.2018 74 Interview 2, 08.11.2017 67
Project/Institution Program Overview Funds SAGCOT Investment The SIP is a non-concessionaire loan to fund the The SIP is a $70 million Project (SIP) SAGCOT Catalytic Trust Fund (CTF). Up to $60 loan five-year project. World Bank million is channeled to the CTF to be used for The funds are delayed, agribusiness loans. The SIP is designed to reach and will be released in 100,000 smallholders farmers. 2018.
Feed the Future - The largest program of Feed the Future Tanzania Feed the Future Mboga na Matunda is Mboga na Matunda (vegetables and fruits), Tanzania yearly budget USAID which addresses the horticulture sector in is $52 million, while $41 SAGCOT and Zanzibar. The program is to million (80%) is for the benefit 450,000 people, and is carried out by the SAGCOT. Mboga na development corporation Fintrac between 2017- Matunda is backed by 2021. $25 million.
SAGCOT Programme DFID’s SAGCOT Programme is to reach The total 5-year program DFID 230,000 smallholders farmers between 2013 to between 2013 to 2018 is 2018. A share of 45% of the funds are for “road $60 million, while future transport” and 40% for “agricultural commitments are development.” The program is carried out by pending. European Commission, Gatsby Africa, Gatsby
Charitable Foundation UK, SCL, TechnoServe,
and WFT Africa.
Inclusive Green Growth The grant by the Norwegian Embassy is to fund The Norwegian of the Smallholder AGRA’s IGGSAS initiative over one-year Embassy finances the Agriculture (IGGSAS) (2017). This is part of a five-year program to initial grant of $1.2 to Norwegian Embassy via “increase agricultural market driven productivity AGRA, as part of a five- AGRA among small holders using climate smart year program. agriculture technology.” The program is a partnership between AGRA, SAGCOT, and YARA.
Figure 10. Selected SAGCOT investments by key Donors
One aspect of the donor-leverage concerns the influence on government policies that favor the expansions of agribusiness. For example, the TIC as a government agency receives support for capacity building thought the World Bank’s SIP. In particular, the TIC employs a consultant for “growth potential in agriculture” and a communication specialist “to build success stories of the SAGCOT initiative” form the Bank.75 The TIC has also aligned its investment safeguards
75 Interview 29, 22.01.2018 68 policies on inclusivity and environmental sustainability to World Bank standards.76 This exemplifies some of the policy influence of the World Bank in the Tanzanian government agency. At the same time, donors also support their own transnational agribusiness companies that are involved in SAGCOT as input-suppliers, invertors, insurers, farm managers, and contractors. Two senior staff members from donor organizations explained to be actively influencing the Tanzanian government on agricultural policies in order to support the market expansion of their national agribusiness companies.77 In this way, donors play a key role in the geography of interests within SAGCOT and the government of Tanzania. From a historical perspective of coloniality, these efforts indicate the establish of control over policies for advancing extraction of resources and exploitation of labor in the SAGCOT corridor by transnational agribusiness corporations. Before I further elaborate on the policy lobbying and securing political support in the next sections, I turn towards a World Bank investment project.
Donor Funding for Agricultural Modernization The World Bank’s SAGCOT Investment Project (SIP) is a significant donor project, which integrates the inclusive green growth strategy through the Catalytic Trust Fund (CTF). The main role of the CTF is to channel finance for assisting agribusiness investments in the corridor. In contrast to the limited influence on responsible investments by the SCL, multiple interview participants pointed out that the CTF plays a key role for ensuring inclusive and sustainable investments through financial incentives.78 The funding for the CTF comes from the World Bank’s 70 million SIP, which is a concessionary loan (in theory, without strings attached). In particular, the CTF channels these funds into “early wins” investment opportunities as identified in the SAGCOT Blueprint (2011, 9). The CTF offers a $45 million grant-matching program79 and a $20 million joint social venture capital program for large-scale commercial farms and agro-processors partnering with SAGCOT.80 The former seeks to strengthen the linkages between agribusiness and smallholder farmers, while the latter aims to kick-start and scale-up
76 Interview 29, 22.01.2018 77 Interview 13, 15.12.2017; Interview 26, 16.01.2018 78 Interview 16, 20.12.2017; Interview 27, 18.01.2018 79 In order to be considered for the CTF grant matching program, investments need to be a minimum of $250,000. The payout of a grant ranges between $250,000 to $1,000,000, and matches dollar-by-dollar the investor’s initial investment. 80 Interview 27, 18.01.2018; Interview 31, 24.01.2018 69 growth of commercial agribusiness. The linkages between smallholder farmers and agribusiness corporations are promoted through contract farming, outgrower schemes, educational training schemes, among others (see Figure 11).
Figure 11. SAGCOT value chain development for clusters (Source: SAGCOT 2011, 8)
The dispute over the safeguard policy on indigenous peoples between the World Bank and the government of Tanzania has delayed the funding for SIP. In the meantime, the government of Tanzania has injected funds for the CTF to run a two-year grant-matching pilot program. In particular, the grant-matching program aims to financially support investments in capital or operational expenditures that reduces the cost of doing business for producers. The program is also guided by the inclusive green growth strategy, which requires an agribusiness company to demonstrate the inclusion and benefits for smallholder farmers, while employing environmental sustainable practices.81 For example, an agro-processor receives a grant from the CTF to buy agricultural inputs form a so-called service provider. The inputs are then delivered to smallholder
81 Interview 27, 18.01.2018; Interview 31, 24.01.2018 70 farmers that in turn are able to increase the quality and quantity of their agricultural output. The stallholders then sell their produce to the agro-processor, which closes the circular relationship. Multiple interview participants claim that this approach directly benefits smallholder farmers because they have a guaranteed market, receive improved agricultural inputs, and are included into the commercial agricultural value chains.82 This mode of financing is different from traditional bank loans that often target individual smallholder farmers. Proponents of SAGCOT see the relationship among actors in these financial schemes as a key mechanism for the inclusion of smallholder farmers, and to develop an inclusive value chain.
However, the CTF mainly benefits the service providers of agricultural inputs, as well as agro- processors and large-scale commercial. An official associated with SAGOCT explained that through the grant-matching program, “the real consumer of our money is the service provider… The [smallholder] farmer doesn’t need money, he needs a service on his farm to produce. That is the main concept.”83 This perception draws not only on a limited understanding of inclusiveness, but also assumes to know what smallholder farmers need. Inclusions of smallholder farmers is then reduced to including them into the commercial value chain. The effects of the CTF financial scheme is best explained in the words of an agro-processor, “[t]he SAGCOT CTF only benefits smallholder farmers indirectly because SAGCOT is helping the industries. If they help industries directly, then they are helping farmers.”84 This suggest that the CTF financial scheme operates with as a market push fore. The financial assistance acts as push a push factor to subsidize agribusiness companies in SAGCOT, which benefits stallholder farmers only marginally. In other words, the CTF funding model follows a tickle-down modernization logic that incentivizes the growth of capital intensive agribusiness corporation. Smallholder farmers become depended on the growth of these agribusiness corporations.
While the smallholder farmers are being included in the commercial value chain, the CTF financial schemes only indirectly benefits smallholder farmers. This is despite the fact that SAGCOT upholds smallholder farmers as the ultimate beneficiaries form the initiative. The
82 Interview 27, 18.01.2018; Interview 31, 24.01.2018 83 Interview 27, 18.01.2018 84 Interview 22, 10.01.2018 71 smallholder farmers are being included in the value chain through outgrower schemes, but they do not have ownership or significant decision-making power in this arrangement (ActionAid 2015b, Sulle 2017). A representative form a Farmer’s Association puts it:
“[T]he catalytic fund is not functioning to us Smallholder farmers. It is just for the big farmers and processors. So, the one who has got already [the money], so just you give them another kick. And the one who is down - you don't. That is not fair.”85
Similarly, an employee form a transnational agribusiness company explained, “[t]he SAGCOT catalytic fund is going to these people [and companies] who are very strong… but this empowers the empowered.”86 Both interview participants referred to powerful agribusiness corporations in Iringa Region, comprising ASAS, Darsh, Silverlands, and Unilever. In this way, the CTF grant-matching fund not only finically subsidizes agribusiness corporations, but the funds are also managed and administered by agribusiness for smallholder farmers. This subjects smallholder farmers to agribusiness corporations, which is legitimized through practices of inclusive green growth. I further elaborate on asymmetrical power relations between agribusiness and smallholder farmers in the instance of the SAGCOT tomato value chain in chapter six.
SAGCOT as an Extra Institutional Layer: Policy Lobbying The SAGCOT Center is the key link between agribusiness corporations and the government of Tanzania. An objective of the SCL is policy advocacy and lobbying for agribusiness investments. The Public-Private Partnership aspect of SAGCOT connects the SCL with government ministries, government agencies, state-owned enterprises, and local governments. This serves as an opportunity for SAGCOT affiliated agribusiness investors to influence government policies. Some of the most far reaching policy changes as a result of direct lobbying efforts by the SCL compromises flexible regulation on seed registration, elimination of Value Added Tax (VAT) on poultry feed, the exemption of export permits on horticulture products, an overall tax reduction on stable food and cash crops, among others (see SAGCOT 2018). The SCL has been described by Tanzanian and international agribusiness investors as a key institution and great help to overcome any constraints and barriers to investment related issue
85 Interview 21, 10.01.2018 86 Interview 9, 07.12.2017 72 with the government of Tanzania.87 In the words of an employee from an Iringa-based agribusiness company partnering with SAGCOT:
“If you become a partner of SAGCOT you will get some benefits, like if you have a conflict with the government, or like that, they can do linkages… [in the beginning, we] had no electricity in the factory. So, we talk to the SAGCOT people. They put some pressure up, and then we got electricity”88
This not only demonstrates the role of the SLC as a broker between private and public actors, but also illustrates its influence on the state-owned Tanzania Electric Supply Company Limited (TANESCO).89 This was supported by another interview participant, who perceived the SCL as a “middleman” to solve any problems with government.90 In this way, multiple agribusiness actors view the SCL as an opportunity to accelerate agribusiness investments.
Moreover, the influence of the SCL reaches to the highest government circles, which symbolizes the national significance of the mega project. To exemplify this, a key official affiliated with SAGCOT pointed out:
“For example, we had a project to bring in cows form outside the country through ASAS and Njombe Milk factory. But then we realized that it is a night mirror because you will need like three years of approval to bring in these cows. But through this [SAGCOT] project, we are able to bring the minster in a room, commerce secretary the in a room, and say that is a very good project where is the problem? The government people come and talking, ASAS and the private sectors talking. So, we were in a single room, and the prime minster solved the problem. And then, he orders some of the changes into the policy if needed. So, our project is very very influential in that sense.”91
The SCLs power to mobilize top-level government actors, and subsequently changing a particular policy is significant. Another area where the SLC successfully lobbied government policy is in regard to market access and tax issues.92 These examples reveal the extent of the SCL’s influence on government entities. In short, the SCL provides investors with an
87 Interview 6, 29.11.2017; Interview 18, 08.01.2018; Interview 22, 10.01.2018; Interview 27, 18.01.2018 88 Interview 22, 10.01.2018 89 TANESCO is among many SAGCOT actors a member of the National Investment Council. This is a government entity, which deals with investment issues of major significance. 90 Interview 18, 08.01.2018 91 Interview 27, 18.01.2018 92 Interview 23, 11.01.2018 73 opportunity for fast-track access to government entities, which is a component of the negotiating alliances among SAGCOT actors.
Despite the lobbying efforts by the SCL, the more powerful SAGCOT actors often take matters in their own hands. A commercial farm manager and SAGCOT partner explained in regard to the elimination on VAT on poultry feed:
“One of the big issues [for us] was VAT on poultry feed. We have done a lot of lobbying together with the Poultry Association. But then SAGCOT took the glory for it. This is ok for us because we got what we wanted. But there was not any occasion where SAGCOT came with us to the ministry.”93
In a similar case, the exemption of export permits on horticulture goods is claimed to be achieved through a combined effort of USAID and Tanzanian Horticulture Association (TAHA) and not by the SCL.94 While the SCL accomplish numerous policy changes, at the same time, SAGCOT actors themselves are involved in directly lobbying the government. These lobbying efforts resulted in successful policy changes, and are subsequently showcased by the SCL as achievements and successes.
However, since the election of President John Magafuli in 2015, there have been a series of policy reform that are perceived from the agribusiness sector as negative. One of the most prominent and recent changes has been the introduction of a bulk procurement system for fertilizer. This system intends to encourage competition among fertilizer producers and sets a price celling for fertilizer in order to reduce the fertilizer price for smallholder farmers across the country. Estimates suggest that Norwegian-based Yara controls up to 40% of the fertilizer market share in Tanzania (Benson et al. 2012), and therefore, the new policy change would be in opposition to the SAGCOT affiliated agribusiness corporation’s interests. In particular, Yara and the Norwegian Embassy perceived this policy change as a bad for the agricultural development.95 When asked about the collaboration between Yara and the Norwegian Embassy on this matter, an employee form the latter responded, “[we are] supporting Yara with information and also
93 Interview 6, 29.11.2017 94 Interview 16, 20.12.2017; Interview 25, 15.01.2018 95 Interview 7, 05.12.2017; Interview 26, 16.01.2018 74 trying to raise the issue [of the new bulk procurement system] with the authorities. So, we try to influence the situation as best as we can.”96 This further illustrates the involvement of donors in influencing government policies. Despite the lobbying efforts, in this case there were no subsequent changes in the government policy. While not all lobbying efforts are successful, it exemplifies the powerful and influential role of donors in the central government.
The State in SAGCOT: Securing Political Support The fourth phase government of President Jakaya Kikwete (2005-2015) launched Kilimo Kwanza and the subsequent SAGCOT initiative, which signaled a comeback of the state in the Tanzanian agricultural sector (Mbunda 2016). I have situated this in a historical context in chapter four, while in this section I discuss the relationship between the state and SAGCOT. For the establishment of the agribusiness corridor, the support of the public sector is central, especally for a conducive investment environment (SAGCOT 2011). In an effort to strengthen the SAGCOT initiative and Public-Private Partnership approaches, President Kikwete launched the multi-sector (including agriculture) Big Results Now initiative in 2013. 97 In addition, the current government of President John Pompe Magufuli presented in 2018 the most recent agricultural policy called ASDP II. This has been heavily influenced by the SAGCOT agribusiness approach, and the World Bank is with $280 million the largest donor. These policies position the SAGCOT initiative as part of an architecture of national policies and programs to commercialize and modernize the agricultural sector through the agribusiness corporations and Public-Private Partnerships. At the same time, I have discussed how these initiatives are intertwined with a global policy agenda compromising CAADP, NAFSN, New Vision for Agriculture, Grow Africa Partnership (see chapter four). Despite the alignment of Tanzania’s national strategies with a global policy agendas, multiple interview participants from key donor organizations attribute the so-called “success” of SAGCOT to a great extent to the continues
96 Interview 26, 16.01.2018 97 The Big Results Now initiative was launched by President Kikwete in 2013 to accelerate the Tanzanian Development Vision 2025, and to become a middle-income country by 2025. The initiative employs a multi-sector approach to address energy, water, transport, agriculture, education, and natural resource. Big Results Now is modeled after the Malaysian Big Fast Results development initiative. 75 political support of the government.98 In this section, I elaborate on the negotiating process of alliance and securing political support of the state for legitimizing the SAGCOT initiative.
The SAGCOT initiative as a large-scale agricultural development project, Public-Private Partnership, and a show case of African Agricultural Corridors relies on the political support of the Tanzanian government. To emphasize the role of the government in the initiative, an official associated with SAGCOT explained that it is a government owned project.99 Similar, the country director of a donor organization pointed out, “the government is SAGCOT, and SAGCOT is the government.”100 To underline this link, the long-standing CEO of the SCL, Geoffrey Kirenga was in fact the former director of the Crop Development Division at the Tanzania Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives. The entanglement between SAGCOT and the government blurs the lines between the public and private sector. This can be an opportunity for investors, which I have discussed in the section above. However, the close relationship can also be a potential risk. One donor commented on these risks:
“When you are building a kind of model like SAGCOT, you are taking a big risk because one or two cases of corruption or political manipulation can destroy everything. Because you are putting all the eggs in one basket.”101
For example, a political shift in government priorities could jeopardize the initiative and related agribusiness investments.
One such political shift occurred with the election of President Magufuli on November 5, 2015. President Magufuli was elected on a platform of a populist nationalist narrative of self-reliance and a vision of industrialization. Since taking office, President Magufuli has unsettled the neoliberal political and economic establishment though some major policy reforms. For example, President Magufuli implemented free education, canceled a free trade agreement with the European Union, and charged the British based mining company Acacia with a multi-billion dollars fine for tax fraud. Similarly, the implementation of the bulk procurement system for
98 Interview 2, 08.11.2017; Interview 26, 16.01.2018; Interview 29, 22.01.2018; Interview 16, 20.12.2017 99 Interview 23, 18.01.2018 100 Interview 2, 08.11.2017 101 Interview 2, 08.11.2017 76 fertilizer that I described in the section above represents one of these policy reforms. In this sense, President Magufuli followed up to his reputation as “the bulldozer.” This unfolds in the wake of a new wave of rural authoritarian populism across the world (see Scoones et al. 2018). The new course of the Magufuli government to curb some neoliberal policies and prioritization of industrialization has unsettled multiple SAGCOT stakeholder, in particular donors and transnational agribusiness corporations.102 In the words of a SAGCOT donor, “I am not sure how much political support there is for the SAGCOT Center at the moment.”103 Similarly, the 2017 DFID Annual Review of SAGCOT assesses this new political environment as the following:
“A lesson to be learnt is that a weak enabling environment, including a move towards increased state control of industry, continues to compromise progress towards the SAGCOT vision of commercial agriculture.” (DFID 2017, 1)
The annual report also increased the SAGCOT initiative’s risk rating from “Medium” to “Major.” The newly embarked reform course of the Magufuli government has left many SAGCOT donors and agribusiness stakeholders in a sense of uncertainty about agribusiness development.
Nonetheless, more recently, the central government has restated its rather vague commitments to the SAGCOT initiative at the launch ceremony of the Mbarali Cluster in Mbeya. The Minister of Agriculture, Hon. Charles Tizeba addressed agricultural stockholders:
“[SAGCOT] started during the fourth phase government and this [new] government decided to continue with it as it is, and improve it. As it is in a sense that all important issues that had been agreed with – that is the content of the program, will remain the same. But its implementation should cope with the policy and will of the government in power. There are things that we have learnt since the program started, there are things that we have been learning and the lessons we get direct us on where we should go.”104
In other words, the government seems to support the commercialization of agriculture, but re- aligns SAGCOT to the new policy priority of industrialization.105 One of the modification that
102 Interview 6, 29.11.2017; Interview 7, 05.12.2017; Interview 13, 15.12.2017; Interview 16, 20.12.2017; Interview 20, 09.01.2018; Interview 26, 16.01.2018; Interview 31, 24.01.2018 103 Interview 26, 16.01.2018 104 Speech 1, 27.10.2017 by Charles John Tizeba, Minister of Agriculture 105 The political support of SAGCOT is also exercised through frequent positive newspaper coverage that depict the benefits and success stories of SAGCOT initiative. 77 the Minister of Agriculture raised during his speech was a nationwide expansion of SAGCOT.106 This has been met with opposition from donors, as they explained that the whole purpose of the SAGCOT initiative is to channel investments into a geographically confined corridor.107 To my understanding, the proposed expansion of the SAGCOT corridor is also politically motivated because areas outside of the corridor do not benefit from the mega project.
Figure 12. Minister of Agriculture, Hon. Charles Tizeba (Source: SAGCOT 2017)
For now, it seems to be too early to draw any further conclusions regarding the role of the Magafuli government in SAGCOT. Nonetheless, Nyamsenda (forthcoming) argues that after two years since President Magafuli’s election, the central government apparatus remains on a neoliberal course, while only the executive branch is characterized by increasing challenges the neoliberal establishment. In this new environment, a SAGCOT donor explained that the SCL is attempting to re-align the initiate with President Magafuli’s vision of industrialization though promoting agro-processing factories in the corridor.108 This exemplifies the potential flexibility
106 Speech 1, 27.10.2017 by Charles John Tizeba, Minister of Agriculture 107 Interview 2, 08.11.2017; Interview 31, 24.01.2018 108 Interview 26, 16.01.2018 78 of the SAGCOT initiative to adapt to new policy discourse. Buseth (2017) demonstrated how the SAGCOT initiative in the past has appropriated the inclusive green growth strategy to adapt to new global policy discourse on the green economy. This points towards the flexibility of the SAGCOT initiative in contrast to past static Green Revolution approaches. The government’s new policy discourse of industrialization in relation to the SAGCOT initiative could benefit from a further investigation.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have discussed how processes (discourses, strategies, and practices) ‘form above’ legitimize the SAGCOT initiative. First, I have argued that the agricultural modernization discourse legitimizes the SAGCOT initiative through the promise of modernization and development. The imagination of ‘empty’ land in SAGCOT is an expression of this discourse, which follows a long-standing colonial and racialized epistemology to justify land grabbing by transnational agribusiness corporations. The process of primitive accumulation is then legitimized through the agricultural modernization discourse. In particular, the inclusive green growth strategy is the most recent configuration to achieve ‘development.’ The inclusive green growth strategy puts forward a triple-win scenario to ensure economic growth, while achieving food security, and reducing poverty, and mitigating climate change. This seductive triple-win scenario is based on the neoliberal beliefs of inclusion and participation for creating consensus, while asymmetrical power relations are being invisibilized. The inclusion and participation of farmer associations, CSOs, and NGOs in the Green Reference Group contributes towards the social legitimization of the SAGCOT initiative. The relative powerless role of the Green Reference Group, as well as the ambiguous definition and lack of implementing the inclusive green growth strategy suggest it to be more of a rhetoric rather than meaningful commitment towards inclusive and sustainable development.
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Second, I have unpacked the alliances between donors, the SAGCOT Center, and the state through examining their roles and involvements in the SAGCOT initiative. In particular, Western donors are key actors in funding the SAGCOT institutions and initiative. While Donors’ interests are underpinned by a geography of national interests to further their national agribusiness corporations, the donors also function as important actors to facilitate and support agribusiness investments. The majority of donors are not involved in SAGCOT as an agricultural development project but as a private sector development project. This points towards the corporate and profit-driven agenda that underpins donors’ involvement in SAGCOT. The World Bank’s SIP exemplifies the support for corporate agribusiness, which follows a modernization logic.
Third, I have elaborated on the role of the SCL as an extra institutional layer between the state and agribusiness corporations to fast-track investments. In particular, the SCL employs practices of lobbing to influence and change government policies to further the SAGCOT vision of agribusiness development. This benefits agribusiness corporations in the SAGCOT corridor, and further enables them to control the value chain. The election of President Magufuli has created uncertainty about the political support for the SAGCOT initiative, while foreign agribusiness investors and donors perceive the new reformist course as risks to agribusiness. Renewed efforts to securing political supports for SAGCOT proved to be fruitful to some extent. The backing of the government of the SAGCOT corridor is a key factor for the political legitimization of the initiative. The donor support and political support for SAGCOT reinforces each other, while the inclusion and participation of farmer associations, CSOs, and NGOs contribute towards the social legitimization of the SAGCOT initiative. This process of legitimization at the national- level illustrate a repertoire of political (re)action ‘from above.’
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CHAPTER 6: Legitimizing Control, Power, and Exploitation
In this chapter, I examine neoliberal practices and strategies legitimizing the SAGCOT initiative in the Iringa part of the Ihemi cluster, as well as the partnerships and collaborations between SAGCOT actors. I identified various practices and strategies as political reactions ‘from above’ to engineer consensus and manage dissent that signal a control grab of the value chains in SAGCOT. The importance of social and economic inclusion in extractive development projects is illustrated by former World Bank consultant Gavin Hilson, who advises multiple strategies to create harmony and mitigate resistance:
“‘implementation of re-skilling programs;’ the ‘establishment of small and medium sized enterprises;’‘Educational and Training Facilities;’ and ‘infrastructure projects such as road and rail development, hospital and school construction, and housing development.’” ((Hilson and Murck 2000, 230) as cited in Brock and Dunlap 2018, 38)
In the context of the SAGCOT initiative, this translates into creating outgrower schemes, implementing educational trainings, building roads and collection centers, promising jobs and market opportunities, and involving smallholders in SAGCOT stakeholder meeting. These political reactions ‘from above’ are to winning the hearts and minds of smallholder farmers, as well as securing political and private sector support for legitimizing the SAGCOT initiative. In first section of this chapter, I discuss process of (adverse) inclusion, participation, and processes of negotiation among SAGCOT actors in stakeholder meetings, which are underpinned by asymmetrical power relations. Second, I elaborate on the role of educational training schemes as a way to link smallholder with agribusiness, and to introduce modern agricultural practices. In the third section, I analyze the dynamics of the SAGCOT tomato partnership between smallholder farmers and agro-processor Darsh. I this chapter, I examine the repertoire of these legitimizing processes in the Iringa part of the Ihemi cluster.
The Ihemi cluster was the first SAGCOT cluster to be launched in 2015, and covers Iringa Region and Njombe Region. The cluster in the heart of Tanzania’s southern highlands, has been promoted because of “[t]he abundant resources, established infrastructure, and high agriculture and forestry potential put this Cluster in a position to attract partners that are looking for quick wins.” (SAGCOT 2013c, 11). The Ihemi cluster is characterized by the development of five 81 value chains, compromising tomato, potato, tea, soy, and dairy.109 The development of the value chains is coordinated by the SCL branch office in Iringa, while each value chain is driven by an agribusiness corporation. Figure 13 shows the location of these lead agribusiness corporations in the Iringa region, including Darsh Industries Ltd for tomato, Mtanga Foods Ltd for potato, Unilever for tea, Silverlands Tanzania Ltd for soya, and ASAS Dairies Ltd for dairy. Other prominent SAGCOT actors in Iringa Region are transnational agro-input suppliers, including Monsanto’s subsidiary Siminis for seeds, agro-chemical supplier Syngenta, and Norwegian based fertilizer giant Yara. As mentioned in chapter three, I choose the Iringa part of the Ihemi cluster as a site for study, due to the relative advanced implementation of the SAGCOT initiative in the area.
109 In total, SAGCOT has identified 13 value chains in the Ihemi cluster development framework, but only five of them have been strategically prioritized. 82
Figure 13. Map of the Ihemi Cluster (Source: SAGCOT 2011, some map labels modified by author)
In the Iringa Region, SAGCOT has turned towards partnering with existing agribusiness companies that are located along the corridor. A government official explained that the majority of the agribusiness actors partnering with SAGCOT have been in Iringa Region for at least five to ten years prior the initiative.110 For example, Unilever as the driver of the SAGCOT tea value chain has been operating in Iringa Region for multiple decades. Mtanga Foods as a key player in the potato value chain, and ASAS as a major actor in the dairy value chain have been established for almost two decades. Silverlands in the soya value chains have and Darsh Industries in the tomato value chains have been in Iringa since the launch SAGCOT, while both reported that SAGCOT did not influence their initial investment decision. Both companies only became SAGCOT partners after they setup their operations. In fact, an interview participation from the agribusiness industry explained that Unilever, ASAS, Silverlands, Mtanga, Dash are all here because of their own efforts.111 This is exemplified in the words of a manager from an agro- processors, “[w]e put the factory by ourselves. But after that, when they [SCL] know that the factory is there, they came to us and introduce themselves.”112 This shows that all of the SAGCOT lead agribusiness companies in the Iringa Region have been established independently from the initiative.
The Power of Participation and Inclusion in SAGCOT Stakeholder Meetings A central characteristic of the SAGCOT development model in the Ihemi cluster is the inclusion and participation of smallholder farmers and agribusiness in value chain stakeholder meetings. The frequent stakeholder meetings are organized by the SCL in Iringa, which offers a platform for the inclusion and participation for a range of public and private actors. In these meetings, the SCL functions as a broker between smallholder farmers, agribusiness companies, and governments authorities. The role of the broker is to address various issues and managing of dissent between SAGCOT actors. The stockholder meetings aims to create a consensus for an
110 Interview 29, 22.01.2018 111 Interview 6, 29.11.2017 112 Interview 22, 10.01.2018 83 inclusive and environmentally sustainable implementation of the SAGCOT initiative. In particular, the inclusion and participation of smallholder farmers, agribusiness corporations, and government authorities function as a critical method for the legitimacy of SAGCOT. However, the act of inclusion and participation of actors in SAGCOT stakeholder meetings is intertwined with power and control. According to Kothari (2005), “[t]he very act of inclusion, of being drawn in as a participant, can perform the exercise of power and control over an individual” (441). Therefore, stakeholder meetings are not only characterized by the asymmetrical power relation between actors, but the power to control also operates in the act of inclusion and participation itself. The inclusion of agribusiness companies, smallholder farmers, and government actors becomes a practice to legitimize SAGCOT in the Ihemi cluster.
In addition, the involvement of agribusiness actors in SAGCOT stakeholder meetings exemplifies their endorsement and support for the initiative, which further contributes towards the legitimization of SAGCOT. The participation of agribusiness companies at meetings is for them an investment of resources and time for anticipated future returns. For example, some of agribusiness actors in Iringa perceive SAGCOT stakeholder meetings as an opportunity to network with other agribusiness companies, as well as addressing issues with government authorities.113 In chapter five, I have discussed the relationship between agribusiness companies, government, and the SCL at the national level. Nonetheless, in Iringa, some of the lead agribusiness corporations in SAGCOT question the benefits of participating in stakeholder meetings. A commercial farm manager in the cluster described their relationship with the SLC as good, although:
“There were also [stakeholder] meetings here in Iringa, but very few private investors attend these SAGCOT meetings because investors think that SAGCOT is pretty useless. It is too much blah blah talking, and no action. But it would also not be possible for me to attend all the SAGCOT meetings because they are so long and many.”114
The perception of too many lengthy stakeholder meetings, and as being ‘too much talk and no action’ was supported by two other agribusiness actors based in Iringa.115 This suggest that some
113 Interview 7, 05.12.2017; Interview 22, 10.01.2018; Interview 23, 11.01.2018 114 Interview 6, 29.11.2017 115 Interview 22, 10.01.2018 84 agribusiness actors perceive the duration and frequency of stakeholder meetings, as well as the limited effectiveness of stakeholder meetings as a drawback of the partnership SAGCOT.
Despite the SAGCOT initiative being an agribusiness initiative, the alliance between agribusiness actors and the SCL should not be taken for granted. The Private-Public Partnership covers a geography of interests, as I have discussed in chapter five. From the perception of a commercial farm manager, “SAGCOT was very cooperative, but obviously, they are more on the sides of farmers than on commerce… In the future, we do not plan any more projects with SAGCOT. It is not worth it.”116 This view supports the perceived limited capabilities of SAGCOT to benefit agribusiness corporations. These views of large-scale commercial farmers suggest that the mobilization and alliance of agribusiness for the SAGCOT initiative might not be as wide spread as the public image implies.
Smallholder Farmers and Participatory Control Furthermore, the participation of smallholder farmers in SAGCOT stakeholder meetings functions as an attempt to include them in the initiative. Maintaining some sort of participation and inclusion of smallholder farmers in SAGCOT is imperative for the initiative’s social legitimization. An example of this is the Green Reference Group, which I discussed in chapter five. Nonetheless, some actors who attended stakeholder meeting felt that the representation of smallholder farmers is minimal or almost not existing.117 Despite their underrepresentation, a smallholder farmers explained that he is able to voice his opinion in the meetings, but there are no solutions to problems faced by smallholders.118 In the words of an agribusiness actor:
“[I]f you bring farmers to the meetings, they only speak of one thing: price, price, price - every meeting. But it is a question which has had no answer for a long time. No one is talking - has given them the answer of the price.”119
This was supported by another agribusiness actor who felt that the stakeholder meetings have failed to solve the price issue between smallholder farmers and SAGCOT affiliated agro-
116 Interview 20, 09.01.2018 117 Interview 18.08.01.2018; Interview 21, 10.01.2018; Interview 24, 15.01.2018 118 Interview 21, 10.01.2018 119 Interview 18, 08.01.2018 85 processors.120 This illustrates that the price issue has been a long-standing unresolved concern for smallholder at SAGCOT stakeholder meetings, which is also supported by some agribusiness actors.
The price issue is especially prominent in the case of tomatoes and milk, which involves SAGCOT affiliated agro-processors Darsh Industries and ASAS Dairies respectively. A regional government official pointed out that the agro-processors ASAS and Darsh discriminate smallholder farmers by paying them a low price for milk and tomatoes.121 I elaborate further on some dynamics of the SAGCOT tomato and dairy value chains in the third section of this chapter, while the stalemate on the price negotiations exemplifies the underlying asymmetrical power relation between smallholders and agribusiness in SAGCOT stakeholder meetings. Only a few smallholder framers are included in value chain stakeholder meetings, but they are able to participate and voice their opinion. Despite their presence, participation, and persistence, smallholders have been powerless over the past years to negotiating with agribusiness on a fair price on agricultural produce. In other words, the mere presence of smallholder farmers in SAGCOT stakeholder meetings without a meaningful ability to negotiate is an adverse form of inclusion, while their presence legitimizes SAGCOT. This is a similar process that is unfolding in the Green Reference Group.
Profile: ASAS Dairies Ltd ASAS is the SAGCOT lead company in the dairy value chain in Iringa. The company operates a milk possessing plant of 50,000 liters per shift and a dairy farm estate of about 1000 hectares. Some of their products include fresh milk, yoghurt, cheese, and butter. The milk is sourced to 94% from smallholder farmers. ASAS is linked to over 1400 smallholders via contract farming agreements and provides extension services. The company also imported high performance cow breeds from Europe. ASAS participated in the CTF grant matching pilot program to further import high preforming cow breeds. However, due to a limited supply of fresh milk form smallholder farmers, the processing capacity is reduced to 23% or 11,500 liters. ASAS Dairies is part of the ASAS Group founded in 1978 that in turn originated out of the A.S. ABRI Transporters of 1936. Today, the ASAS Group also conducts business in cargo transportation, petro-fuels, and real-estate.
120 Interview 22, 10.01.2018 121 Interview 10, 08.12.2017 86
The inability of stakeholder meetings to resolve one of the most pressing issue for smallholder farmers negatively impacts their livelihoods, while agro-processors benefit from low prices due to the stalemate. The SCL as a broker has been unable to resolve the conflict, despite the claims of SAGCOT ultimately benefit smallholders. A smallholder farmer referring to the price conflict with Darsh Industries put it:
“And people still suffer because the same issues are raised again and again, which is not good. So that is the main setback for SAGCOT. We always don't come up with concrete resolutions. And say if next meeting they don't come with a resolution, then what are we going to do? There is nothing that binds one partner. That if we don't make with this resolution then we're going maybe to remove him from the partnership. No, it is always silent, silent, silent. That is the main setback for the SAGCOT…. SAGCOT doesn't have the teeth to bite.”122
This evidence suggests that the SCL as the host of stakeholder meetings has not actively intervened in the price issue. The silence of the SCL in this matter has resulted in the support of powerful agro-processors. Therefore, the stalemate in the price negotiation has benefited agro- processors. The price issue between smallholder farmers and agribusiness corporations is not unique to the SAGCOT corridor, but the above discussion suggests that the SCL reinforces asymmetrical power relations in price negotiations. The SCL as a broker seems not to follow up on the concerns of smallholders, which leaves the latter in a powerless situation. This suggests that the SAGCOT stakeholder meetings rather contribute towards the disempowerment of smallholder farmers, as they have become included in a process that reinforces inequalities and the status quo of agribusiness. Kothari (2001) describes this process as “inclusionary control,” in which the powerless have been included to legitimize a process that reproduces inequalities and hierarchies.
Another power hierarchy underpinning the SAGCOT stakeholder meetings in Iringa concerns racialization, especially between white agribusiness actors and black smallholder farmers. An interview participant observed during stakeholder meetings, “[b]ecause when we sit in the meetings, you can see the difference there. These are the whites who produce more, and there are the blacks who produce less.”123 He further elaborated:
122 Interview 21, 10.01.2018 123 Interview 11, 08.12.2017 87
“Because SAGCOT - they just have one direction that will promote the growth of industry, [and] will promote the growth of farmers. But which farmers? For example, you see, the Silverlands is a white farmer, the Mtanga is a white farmer. So, the producer of all the crops in the high-yield are the white ones…What is the meaning of this SAGCOT? If this comes here to promote the white people to come and take our land, or is that to promote us, we black in order to feed these industries. Because we don’t see the industry which is run, even by a partnership between white and black. Or between - they say a PPP - the Private Public Partnership. No, it is run by individuals, and those individuals are white… This SAGCOT is for Muzungus only. It is not for us. These are just the agents from Muzungu. They need to promote the Muzungu to come back again to take our land. So, we have to watch with a second eye. What are they doing, these SAGCOT people?”124
From the perspective of this smallholder, SAGCOT promotes white commercial farmers to acquire farmland instead of supporting black smallholder farmers. This reveals the often- invisible racialization of SAGCOT actors and the racialized division of labor in the corridor. The interview participant also pointed out that ASAS Dairies is owned by a Tanzanian-Arab and Darsh Industries by a Tanzanian-Indian.125 The racialization of SAGCOT actors in the Iringa part of the Ihemi cluster is also supported by my observations. As discussed in chapter four, the Tanzanian agriculture sector is still organized around a colonial and extractive structure to produce commodity corps for export. The SAGCOT vision of modernizing agriculture in the corridor is intertwined in this historical process, and operates with a historically produced racialized division of labor in the corridor. The SAGCOT vision runs not only the risk to become a corridor of power (Bergius et al. 2017), but also to reinforce a racialized division of labor. In the SAGCOT model, the majority of black smallholder farmers are only involved through outgrowers schemes or contract farming in which they are subjected to often white-operated and owned agribusiness corporations. This racialized division of agrarian labor operates similar to Tanzania’s colonial past, or to the present cases of South Africa, Zimbabwe, among others.
124 Interview 11, 08.12.2017 125 Interview 11, 08.12.2017 88
Profile: Mtanga Foods Ltd Mtanga is a lead company in the SAGCOT potato value chain, and produces certified seed potatoes. The agribusiness company also grow maize, soya and barley, as well as livestock keeping and operating a slaughterhouse. Mtanga operates three farms of which each covers about 1300 hectares. For one of their farms, Mtanga acquired disputed land from Sun Biofuels, which is a failed large-scale biofuel plantation and land grab. Mtanga’s farm estates have existed in various forms since 2002, but the company was founded in 2012 though the creation of shareholders. The agribusiness company is registered as a Tanzanian company, but many shareholders and farm managers are white. Today, Mtanga employs about 200 farm workers, but does not run any outgrower schemes or contract farming. Mtanga was also one of the four agribusiness companies that participated in the CTF pilot grant matching program. The CTF grant was primarily used to educate smallholder farmers in workshops on the benefits of buying seed potatoes.
Profile: Silverlands Tanzania Ltd Silverlands Tanzania is a lead partner in the SAGCOT soya value chain. The crop division includes three farms totaling about 3000 hectares, of which 2300 hectares are to be irrigated. In particular, the Selous Farm is located next to Muwimbi Village in Iringa Region, while the others are situated in Makete and Ndolela. Silverlands also grows seed maize, seed beans, potatoes, avocados, barley, and livestock, and conducts some contract farming with smallholder soya bean farmers. In addition, the transnational agribusiness corporation operates the Makota Farm to produce poultry feed and breed day-old chicks, which is located next to Ihemi Village in Iringa Region. In recent years, the Makota Farm and Selous Farm received over $50 million investment for the expansion of the poultry operations and crop irrigation systems. Silverlands’ Selous Farm has been in conflict over water use and land access with villagers of Muwimbi. The majority of the farmland has been acquired form a previous agribusiness estate. Silverlands Tanzania was established in 2013, while many farm managers are foreign and white. Silverlands Tanzania is part of London-based SilverStreet Capital, a private equity investor with offices and farming operations in Namibia, South Africa, and Zambia.
The lack of meaningful involvement smallholder farmers in SAGCOT goes beyond their participation in stakeholder meeting and contract farming because many smallholders are not aware of the initiative. In the words of an Iringa based agribusiness actor, “[i]f you ask farmers about SAGCOT, they don’t know SAGCOT.”126 This was supported by another agribusiness SAGCOT actor who put it, “they don't know what SAGCOT is… farmers cannot even pronounce SAGCOT. If they cannot pronounce, they don't know what is SAGCOT.”127 The lack
126 Interview 22, 10.01.2018 127 Interview 9, 07.12.2017 89 of knowledge among smallholder farmers of the SAGCOT further alienates smallholder from the initiative. Despite the inclusive green growth strategy, multiple interview participants criticized the SAGCOT initiative as a top-down project, as well as its inability to reach smallholder farmers (see Bergius et al. 2017, Buseth 2017).128 Because of this, an interview participant assessed that unless SAGCOT restructures from being owned by investors to being owned by ‘the people’ – the initiative will not be impactful.129 A step towards this direction was suggested by a local government official to include the popular farmer cooperatives into SAGCOT, which could strengthen the voices and positions of smallholders.130 A recent shift in SAGCOT also signals a focus towards smallholder farmers, but this is limited to often exploitative contract farming and outgrower schemes (see Twomey et al. 2015, Schiavoni et al. 2018). For example, the Anglo-Dutch conglomerate Unilever plans to expand its tea plantation in the Ihemi cluster plans via outgrowers. Similarly, ASAS and Darsh in Iringa rely to a great extent on contract farming, while other SAGCOT agribusiness corporations, including KPL and Olam also depend on outgrowers schemes.
Profile: Unilever Unilever is the lead company in SAGCOTs tea value chain. The transnational corporation operates tea plantations, three processing factories, and an outgrowers scheme in Mufindi, Iringa Region. The Mufindi tea estate cover about 3400 hectares of plantation and about the same area for forest conservation. The corporation employs in high season up to 6000 farm workers, while in low season 3500-4000. The leaf processing plants in Mufindi produce 10,000 tones of tea per year. Unilever sources about 12-14% of green leafs from its 1276 smallholders though an outgrowrs scheme. The company also provides extension services and operates a farmers’ field school. The tea is certified by the Rainforest Alliance and the Dutch Sustainable Trade Initiative. Unilever signed a memorandum of understating with SAGCOT and the government of Tanzania to expand its tea plantation by outgrows. However, this evolved in a dispute over Unilever’s expansion plans with surrounding villages. The Mufindi tea planation was established in the 1940s as the Tanganyika Tea Company, which subsequently became Brooke Bond in the 1970s, and was acquired by Unilever in 1984. Unilever is an Anglo-Dutch owned consumer product conglomerate, and some of the farm management is white.
128 Interview 2, 08.11.2017; Interview 9, 07.12.2017; 17, 20.12.2017; Interview 30, 22.01.2018 129 Interview 18, 08.01.2018 130 Interview 10, 08.12.2017 90
Training Schemes One way to link smallholder farmers with agribusiness in the SAGCOT corridor occurs through educational training schemes, including farmer field schools, training centers, demonstration plots, and agricultural extension services. These training schemes follow so-called “Good Agricultural Practices,” and are employed by a number of Tanzanian and transnational agribusiness companies affiliated with SAGCOT. The one to two weeks training schemes aim to introduce smallholders to see “Farming as a Business,” and to a variety of modern agricultural techniques. The topics in these trainings ranges from pest-control and soil-management to environmental sustainability and women’s empowerment. All leading agribusiness SAGCOT actor in the Iringa reported to employ trainings schemes, including large-scale commercial farms (Silverlands, Unilever, and Mtanga), agro-input suppliers (Siminis, Syngenta, and, Yara), and agro-processors (ASAS and Darsh). In most instances, the training schemes existed prior to SAGCOT, but it is upheld in the initiative as a crucial component to modernize and commercialize smallholders. Proponents of SAGCOT present this link as another key element in the initiative’s commitment to the inclusion of smallholders and environmental sustainable that forms the inclusive green growth strategy.
Agribusiness companies employ the training schemes to modernize smallholder farmers, as they perceive the farming techniques by smallholders as inferior, ‘traditional,’ and ‘backward.’ I have discussed the notion of superiority and inferiority in relation to land in chapter five, while training schemes are directly targeting smallholder farmers. An agribusiness actor puts it, the “[c]hallenges are the educational level and the attitude of smallholder farmers.”131 Multiple agribusiness actors partnering with SAGCOT in Iringa supported this perspective.132 This problematizes smallholder farmers as being in the need of assistance and help for development. An agribusiness actor explained in regard to smallholder farmers, “[b]asically, we are trying to change their mentality.”133 As the SAGCOT Blueprint (2011) would have it, this means to turn smallholder farmers into commercial farmers through modern agricultural practice. In other words, smallholders are framed as being in need of modernity, progress, and development for
131 Interview 23, 11.01.2018 132 Interview 7, 05.12.2017; Interview 19, 09.01.2018; Interview 20, 09.01.2018 133 Interview 22, 10.01.2018 91 salvation from ‘underdevelopment.’ The training schemes are then concrete ways to deliver modernity to smallholder farmers. A white commercial farm manager described to have mixed feeling about this aspect of the SAGCOT initiative: “It is challenging because these people have been farmers for generations and we just come in from the outside… My hesitation is from: ‘how do you teach people who have been farming all their lives – with all of their ancestral knowledge as well – that their way is not right when it could be better or enhanced?’”134
This suggest that SAGCOT agribusiness actors perceive a universal superiority of modern forms of agriculture and traditional ones as inferior.
An example of an agribusiness educational training schemes are demonstration plots or demo- plots to show the effectiveness of modern agro-inputs to smallholders. These demo-plots are typically operated by a selected smallholder farmer who is supervised by an agribusiness actor. The smallholder cultivating the demo-plots is often a community leader and relatively well-off farmer. This is to further a trusting relationship between agribusiness actors and smallholders. An agro-input supplier noted on the role of demo-plots, “the idea is to have demo-plots in the villages, so we can demonstrate the performance of our products. You know, for these farmers, seeing is believing. These farmers have to see the quality of our products.”135 In some cases, the government also delivers extension services to the demo-plots that forms a public-private collaboration.136 An alliance of agribusiness companies has also undertaken a joint demonstration plot program in the Ihemi cluster, in which each agro-input component was supplied by a different actor: Monsanto’s subsidiary Siminis for seeds, Yara for fertilizer, and Syngenta for pesticides.137 Another agro-input supplier explained the importance of demo-plots for commercial agribusiness corporations:
“[O]ur vision is to increase our market share. That is why we are taking part in training farmers and doing demonstrations. All of them are aimed to create demand to the farmers, so that we can increase our market share.”138
134 Interview 20, 09.01.2018 135 Interview 9, 07.12.2017 136 Interview 7, 05.12.2017; Interview 8, 06.12.2017 137 Interview 9, 07.12.2017 138 Interview 7, 05.12.2017 92
The role of demo-plots for market expansion was supported by another input-supplier.139 The modern agricultural inputs used in demo-plots are often unaffordable to smallholder farmers due to the high cost of these technologies.
In addition, the training schemes and extension services are administrated and conducted by agribusiness corporations themselves. In fact, the SAGCOT model encourages this through the CTF grant matching program, which only allows agribusiness corporations to apply for funding. As mentioned in chapter five, the CTF grant matching program disburses funds to agribusiness corporations that in turn cerate inclusive linkages, such as educational training schemes for smallholder farmers. This means that agribusiness actors become the owners of training schemes, while smallholders are reduced to recipients. This entangles agribusiness corporations with smallholder farmers in a dual position of a business relationship and an educational training mentor role, which forms a trusteeship relationship with smallholders (see Li 2007, Leynseele 2018). On the one hand, agribusiness actors engage with smallholders by supplying agro-inputs or buying their produce, while on the other, they design the training schemes for smallholders. As many agribusiness corporations partnering with SAGCOT are white agribusiness actors – the trustee relationship also becomes racialized. The double role of mentor and business partner played by agribusiness companies enables them with significant power over smallholder farmers. A representative from a NGO conducting trainings in the SAGCOT corridor with smallholders downplayed the issue of power:
“So, when people talk about power relations shapes - and I've heard that in development circles for so long - the issue is not about power relations. The issue is about whether we think the organization itself is inherent concerned for inclusivity. How well do they use this inclusive approach part of their DNA?”140
In this way, the asymmetrical power relations between agribusiness and smallholders are invisibilized through employing the language of inclusive development. This move to invisibilize inequalities and asymmetrical power relations by inclusivity is wide spread among SAGCOT actors, and in fact a key characteristic of the inclusive green growth strategy in the initiative.
139 Interview 9, 07.12.2017 140 Interview 12, 15.12.2017 93
The SAGCOT Tomato Partnership The tomato value chain in the Ihemi cluster is one of five value chains that are being developed by SAGCOT in the cluster. The tomato value chain development is praised by the proponents of SAGCOT as a success story, but a critical analysis of the relationship between agribusiness corporations and smallholder farmers in the value chain suggest a different picture. The Iringa Region as part of the Ihemi cluster is Tanzania’s main tomato growing region. It is estimated that the Iringa Region supplies about 70% of the country’s tomatoes, of which are 60% consumed by the urban market of Dar es Salaam (URT 2012). Tomatoes are primarily grown by smallholder farmers as a cash crop. This involves about 60,000 smallholders in the region, who own an average plot of 0.26 hectares (0.64 acres) and rely on rain fed irrigation (URT 2012). The tomato harvest seasons is determines by rainfall, and creates the phenomenon of bulk harvests.141 During the peak harvest months of July, August, and September the market is oversupplied with tomatoes that results in a steep drop in the market price.142 According to Mwagike and Mdoe (2015), about 60% of smallholder farmers in Iringa Region sell their tomatoes to brokers due to market access barriers, which results in significant financial losses for smallholders. A lack of market access for smallholder framers has also been identified by SAGCOT (SAGCOT 2011, 2015). Multiple interview participants pointed out that in these market condition, smallholder farmers who cultivate tomatoes make only marginal profits and at times incur losses.143 The expanding agricultural economy of Iringa Region has recently attracted major agribusiness investments.
141 In the tomato market, the lack of any price controls and limited post-harvest management results in a temporary oversupply of the crop, which is followed by a sharp drop of the market price. This culminates in the phenomenon of bulk harvests. The oversupply of tomatoes occurs because farmers rely on rain fed irrigation that creates a high quantity in a short time span. During the rest of the year, tomatoes can only be grown by employing addition irrigation methods because of the lack of rain. In off-tomato season, most of the tomatoes supply comes from farmers operating greenhouses in Iringa Region or from other regions in the country. 142 The tomato harvest season for smallholder farmers who rely on rain fed irrigation in Iringa Region takes place between April and September. Farmers with capital to operate greenhouses and drip-irrigation can harvest tomatoes throughout the year. 143 Interview 10, 08.12.2017; Interview 18, 08,01.2018; Interview 21, 10.01.2018 94
In 2015, SAGCOT partner Darsh Industries Ltd inaugurated a new $6.7 million tomato processing plant in Iringa, which promised a new market opportunity for smallholder farmers.144 Through the investment of Tanzanian-based Darsh Industries and the launch of the Ihemi cluster, the strategic SAGCOT Tomato Value Chain Partnership was formed to increase smallholder productivity and profitability (SAGCOT 2015). Darsh is the lead agribusiness actor in the SAGCOT tomato value chain.145 The tomato processing plant was established to eliminate imports of tomato paste from China, and has a capacity of 200 metric tons per day. The locally sourced tomatoes for paste is then further processed at the company’s Arusha plant into tomato sauce, chili sauce, ketchup, and others products under the brand Redgold. The new agro- processing plant in Iringa not only employs up to 150 people, but has also created a significant market for smallholder farmers. Today, the agro-processor sources tomatoes directly from 3400 smallholder farmers in Iringa, and has built eight collection centers to reduce post-harvest loss for smallholders.146 According to a SAGCOT document, the “[c]ollection centres are an important element of the partnership, helping to increase smallholder famers’ bargaining power, as they are no longer obliged to accept low prices offered by middlemen” (SAGCOT 2015, 1). This direct link between smallholder farms and agribusiness is at the center of the SAGCOT model, and understood as the “inclusion” of smallholders into the commercial value chain. The head of DFID Tanzania, Beth Arthy put it at the launch ceremony of Mabrali cluster in 2017, “I am seeing for example a flourishing tomato processing plant that is providing a market for smallholder farmers where in the past, a lot of their crops has been going to waste.”147 The proponents of the SAGCOT model present the tomato value chain partnership as a key success story of the initiative.
144 Darsh Industries’ new agro-processing plant was also established by a grant of over $200,000 from the Agriculture Fast Track Fund, which is part of the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition (NAFSN). 145 The SAGCOT tomato partnership includes a total of 14 public and private actors, including agribusiness corporations Darsh Industries, Yara, Syngenta, Balton, Kisolanza; government entities compromise Regional Administrative Secretary of Iringa and Njombe regions, local government authorities in Iringa Region and Njombe Region; farmer associations and NGOs are TAHA, WWF, BRITEN, INCOMET, MUVI, PAWAGA Farmers Association (SAGCOT 2015). 146 Interview 22, 10.01.2018 147 Speech 2, 27.10.2017 by Beth Arthy head of DFID Tanzania 95
However, empirical evidence suggests a different picture, which depicts an exploitative relationship between agro-processor Darsh Industries and smallholder farmers that is facilitated by the SAGCOT center. As mentioned above, during stakeholder meetings, a reoccurring issue is the conflict over the price of tomato between Darsh and smallholder farmers. The latter accuse Darsh of buying tomatoes at an extremely low price that is well below the market price. Darsh justifies the low price in turn to guarantee a market for smallholders. On the other hand, a regional government official pointed out that the agro-processor Darsh discriminates smallholder through this low-price strategy.148 This was supported by a representative from farmer’s association and an employee from transnational agribusiness company whom both are affiliated with SAGCOT.149 As illustrated in the first section of this chapter, the SAGCOT center in Iringa has been so far unable to mediate the conflict between smallholder farmers and agribusiness regarding the issue of the tomato price at stakeholder meetings. Despite the collection centers and the cutting out the broker or “middleman,” smallholder farmers are subjected to low prices by Darsh.
This qualitative evidence is also supported by quantitative data. According to two respondents, Darsh buys tomatoes for only 5000 Tsh per Tenga, which is a very low price.150 This translates to about $0.07 (158 Tsh) per kilogram tomatoes.151 In Figure 14, I plotted the price at which Darsh Industries buys tomatoes (red) alongside the price (blue) and average price (orange) for tomatoes in Tanzania for 2016. The graph indicates the fluctuating tomato price due the rain-fed inflicted bulk harvest. This occurs during peak harvest month in July, August, and September. In 2016, the tomato price collapsed by nearly 34,000 Tsh - from a maximum of almost 52,000 Tsh per Tenga in May to a minimum of almost 18,000 Tsh per Tenga in September. The graph also illustrates the price of 5000 Tsh per Tenga offered by Darsh, which is about 10,000 Tsh below the market price. According to an interview respondent, “if you sell 5000 [Tsh] per Tenga, it just covers your production costs. But you don't get a profit. That means you have worked for the
148 Interview 10, 08.12.2017 149 Interview 9, 07.12.2018; Interview 11, 08.12.2017 150 Interview 11, 08.12.2017; Interview 18, 08.01.2018 151 I employ the exchange rate of one US Dollar to 2282 Tanzanian Shillings (Tsh), which is based on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange as of June 1, 2018. 96 industry.”152 Smallholder farmers who sell their produce to Darsh receive a very low price that is often only sufficient to cover their production costs. In other words, the agro-processor Darsh takes advantage of the oversupply of tomatoes in the market, and buys tomatoes from smallholders at a dumping price. This case indicates that simply cutting out of the broker or “middlemen” by linking smallholder farmers directly to agribusiness corporations does not necessarily result in a ‘win-win’ situation as the SAGCOT proponents would have it.
Price (Tsh) per Tenga (40kg) tomatoes in Tanzania 2016
Price Darsh Industries
Figure 14. Price of Tomatoes in Tanzania, 2016 (Source: TAHA 2016, graph modified by author)
Furthermore, Darsh Industries limits the operation of its tomato processing plant to the peak tomato harvest season when prices are low. According to an interview participant, the processing plant only operates three or a maximum of four month a year due to a limited supply of tomatoes during the rest of the year.153 In the words of a regional government official:
“They [Darsh Industries] waits with processing for the tomato season when the price of tomato is low. The processing factory is closed when there is no tomato season. Farmers are starving.”154
152 Interview 21, 10.01.2018 153 Interview 22, 10.01.2018 154 Interview 10, 08.12.2017 97
The claim that the processing plant only operates when tomato prices are low was supported by two other actors affiliated with SAGCOT tomatoes partnership.155 I have indicated Darsh’s limited period of processing in Figure 14. Darsh only operates the tomato processing plant during peak harvest season, and claims that they are not receiving the proper quality and quantity through the rest of the year. This means that the factory is closed for at least eight month of the year, in which the supposedly 150 new jobs at the factory are idle. In this way, smallholder farmers are being exploited and factory workers face insecure working conditions, while the SAGCOT partner Darsh runs economic losses due to the closure of its processing plant.
In addition, the agro-processor Darsh and a smallholder farmer’s association signed a contract to secure a steady supply of tomatoes during peak harvest season. The triparty contract between Darsh Industries, the Association of Iringa Tomato and Vegetable Growers, and the Tanzanian Agriculture Development Bank was designed to link smallholders to the agro-processor. This required smallholder to deliver at least 100 metric tons of tomatoes per day for three month. The guaranteed market for smallholder in turn enabled smallholders to access bank loans. However, an interview participant pointed out:
“[W]e have not received a single tomato form this association. Because that time, the [market] price was a little bit higher. So, most farmers in this association were selling tomatoes to the fresh market.”156
This illustrates the deep mistrust between smallholders and agribusiness in SAGCOT. The contract breach by smallholder farmers is not surprising, as in the past, the SAGCOT stakeholder meeting proved not to be fruitful for any price negotiations for smallholders.
An Unfolding Corridor A similar process is unfolding in the dairy value chain in the Ihemi cluster, which has been praised as another SAGCOT success story. Iringa-based dairy processor ASAS is one of the central actors in this value chain, and was part of the CTFs pilot grant matching program. The agro-processer employs a contract farming scheme reaching over 1400 smallholders who supply
155 Interview 9, 07.12.2018; Interview 11, 08.12.2017 156 Interview 22, 10.01.2018 98
94% of the processing plant’s milk. To demonstrate the success of this partnership, one of these smallholder dairy farmers was selected to hold a short speech at the Mbarali cluster launch. The smallholder addressed the audience with the following:
“Thanks to the SAGCOT project, because it has really enabled me to reach where I am. It has helped me to go from traditional agriculture to go to modern agriculture… I am keeping cows, but I am sure with the market because I work with ASAS… But we thank God because at least for one liter we get that piece [of 600 Tsh].”157
The speech by the smallholder farmer about how SAGCOT and ASAS improved his livelihood was greeted by applause. The smallholder pointed out the guaranteed market for milk, while on the other, he noted the subsequently low price for milk paid by ASAS. The market access is a tradeoff for a significant lower in price, as ASAS sells the processed milk for 2,000 Tsh per liter in supermarkets. This process is similar to the discussed tomato value chain.
In addition, the relationship between ASAS and smallholder farmers is underpinned by an asymmetrical power in relation for negotiating a fair price for milk. A regional government official noted:
“[T]he low price of milk doesn’t discourage dairy farmers. The dairy farmers don’t have the power to process the milk themselves. The dairy farmers cannot negotiate because there is no alternative. ASAS is a monopoly in the market.”158
He further added that agro-processor ASAS Dairies and Darsh Industries are suppressing smallholder farmers by the low-price strategy.159 The dominant market position by ASAS provides the processor with a powerful bargaining position in price negotiations. Smallholder farmers are linked to agribusiness through inclusive value chain development, while smallholders are rather subjected to agribusiness. The agro-processor ASAS also struggles with the supply of milk from stallholders, and had to reduce its operation to only 23%. This suggests a similar dynamic to be unfolding as in the SAGCOT tomatoes partnership, in which a SAGCOT affiliated agribusiness companies attempts to control the value chain to monopolize the benefits.
157 Speech 3, 27.10.2017 by smallholder farmer from Iringa Region 158 Interview 10, 08.12.2017 159 Interview 10, 08.12.2017 99
Furthermore, during my research in the Iringa part of the Ihemi cluster, I perceived the relationship between SAGCOT affiliated agribusiness corporations and neighboring communities as conflicting and exploitative. In one instance, when I returned from an interview with a transnational agribusiness corporation in Iringa Region, a few temporary day-laborers employed by the company outside the gate asked me for money. They illustrated their precarious and exploitative employment situation with the agribusiness corporation. Second, a resident next to the Unilever tea planation in Mufindi mentioned that he rather drives the community transport service than work as a plantation laborer for 150,000 Tsh per month. This translates into a poverty wage of about $2.20 dollars a day, which the agribusiness conglomerate Unilever pays for its tea plantation laborers. The low wage and precarious working condition of agriculture labors employed by SAGCOT affiliated agribusiness companies was supported by the findings of two studies (see Twomey et al. 2015, Schiavoni et al. 2018). Third, when I visited a commercial large-scale farm in Iringa Region, it was secured by a barbed wire fences and security guards. I learned that the agribusiness company had been in a confit with neighboring residences over land access.
Conclusion In this chapter, I have examined SAGCOT stakeholder meetings, educational training schemes, and tomato partnership in which practices and strategies unfold to legitimize the SAGCOT initiative in the Iringa part of the Ihemi cluster. These processes of legitimization are also entangled in different interests and power dynamics. I have argued that multiple asymmetrical power relations underpin the relationship between agribusiness corporations, smallholder farmers, and other SAGCOT actors by examining the dynamics of stakeholder meetings, educational training schemes, and the tomato value chain. In the first section, I have identified the act of inclusion and participation in SAGCOT stakeholder meetings as a practice of power to control. The involvement of agribusiness actors and smallholder farmers in stakeholder meetings serves also as a practice to legitimize the SAGCOT initiative. The asymmetrical power relations between agribusiness actors and smallholder farmers are sustained by the SCL, as I have exemplified in the process of price negotiations. One of these power relations concerns the often- invisible racialization of SAGCOT actors. In a way, the SAGCOT stakeholder meetings operates 100 as a political reaction ‘from above’ to create consensus and manage dissent. The establishment of control over value chain development operates from coloniality of power.
In the second section, I have argued that the educational training schemes employed by agribusiness corporations are concrete measures in the attempt to modernize and commercialize smallholder farmers. The role of the educational training schemes is twofold. On the one hand, agribusiness corporations introduce smallholder farmers to use modern and capital-intensive technological agro-inputs. On the other hand, training schemes are a way for agribusiness corporations to expand their market share. This creates a dual position for agribusiness corporations, while the role of knowledge production and capital accumulation are closely related in advancing the new Green Revolution. This operates in the axis of coloniality of knowledge and primitive accumulation, and is reinforced by coloniality of power. Therefore, the training schemes bring modernity to smallholder farmers, which is rationalized on a developmentalist basis of superior and inferior of knowledge. That is coloniality of knowledge.
In the third section, I have critically examined the so-called success story of the SAGCOT tomato partnership, which highlights an exploitative relation between smallholder farmers and agro-processor Darsh. I have identified three major factors for this exploitation. First, the phenomenon of bulk harvest and the local market conditions favor Dash Industries to set a dumping price for tomatoes. Second, the stalemate of price negotiation in SAGCOT stakeholder meeting hosted by the SCL reinforces the low price for tomatoes, while the livelihoods of smallholders are being negatively impacted. Third, the limited operation of the tomato processing plant creates work insecurity for factory and an unstable market opportunity for smallholders. This situation can be hardly called a success story - not for smallholder farmers or factory worker, nor for the agro-processor. A similar process of exploitation is unfolding in the SAGCOT dairy value chain. The SAGCOT tomato and dairy partnership represent forms of primitive accumulation in the corridor. The dynamics in SAGCOT stakeholder meetings, educational training schemes, and tomato partnership can be illustrative of the evolving dynamics in the SAGCOT corridor, which legitimize agricultural modernization.
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CHAPTER 7: Conclusion
“Imperialism is a system of exploitation that occurs not only in the brutal form of those who come with guns to conquer territory. Imperialism often occurs in more subtle forms, a loan, food aid, blackmail. We are fighting this system that allows a handful of men on Earth to rule all of humanity.” ― Thomas Sankara
In this final chapter, I offer a conclusion to this thesis. First, I elaborate on the overall research finding. Second, I engage in a theoretical reflection. This is followed by some concluding remarks.
Research Findings In this thesis, I have examined the legitimizing processes in the SAGCOT initiative through insights into political (re)actions ‘from above.’ This study has contributed towards an understanding of discourses, strategies, and practices that legitimize the SAGCOT initiative by drawing on concepts of coloniality of power, coloniality of knowledge, and primitive accumulation. The theoretical and methodological approach in this study situates it in an emerging body of literature of decolonial perspectives on the land question and the broader dynamics of land grabbing. This case study is illustrative of the unfolding dynamics in the extractivist SAGCOT corridor in Tanzanian, and pays particular attention to the unfolding dynamics in the Iringa Region as part of the Ihemi cluster.
The SAGCOT initiative has been put forward by a powerful alliance between agribusiness corporations, development organizations, and the government of Tanzania as a flagship model to demonstrate the development potential of African Agricultural Growth Corridors. I argue that the SAGCOT initiative is the latest attempt to transform the agriculture sector in Tanzania through commercialization and modernization, while being entangled in colonial like relations. Starting from the German invasion to the British-led Tanganyika Groundnut scheme in the 1940s, the neoliberal counter revolution though the SAPs and the ‘Washington Consensus,’ and to the more recent comeback of the state through ADSP and Kilimo Kwanza in the 2000s have all attempted to commercialize agriculture in Tanzania. In this series of agricultural development projects, the SAGCOT initiative is embedded in a global neoliberal governance regime through NEPAD’s CAADP, the G7’s New Alliance, and others that institutionalize asymmetric relations. What is 102 new to SAGCOT initiative is the inclusive green growth strategy and the Private-Public Partnership to mobilize social and environmental responsible agribusiness investments to achieve inclusive and sustainable development. The institutionalization of the inclusive green growth strategy has been proposed as an inclusive value chain development to link smallholder farmers to agribusiness corporations. To achieve this, a number of practices have been put in place that range from the establishment of the Green Reference Group, financial assistance for social and environmental responsible investments through the CTF, inclusion of smallholder farmers at SAGCOT stakeholder meetings, educational training schemes by agribusiness corporations for smallholder farmers. In this Public-Private Partnership arrangement, the SAGCOT Center functions as a broker between actors, while a key element concerns securing donor support and political support to rollout the large-scale agribusiness initiative.
In this study, I have examined how hegemonic processes of legitimization are mediated and operate in the SAGCOT initiative. I argue that the SAGCOT initiative is being legitimized through discourses, strategies, and practices that reinforce coloniality and primitive accumulation. In particular, the agricultural modernization discourse contributes towards the naturalization and legitimization of the SAGCOT initiative. The discourse is rooted in a Eurocentric and racialized epistemology of empty land and inferiority of smallholder farmers, which justifies the need to bring development and modernity. The epistemological and the sociohistorical context created the possibility for the agricultural modernization discourse. The discourse constructs agricultural modernization and development as the salvation from underdevelopment, which legitimizes the SAGCOT corridor. This follows the development fallacy of a unilinear modernization path based on the European historical experience (see Dussel 1993, 2000), and denotes the colonial difference between developed and underdeveloped (see Mignolo 2007). While the underlying architecture remains, the agricultural modernization discourse is reconfigured to alter to new conditions.
One of these discursive reconfiguration is the green economy, and the subsequent inclusive green growth strategy employed in the SAGCOT initiative. I argue the inclusive green growth strategy employed in the SAGCOT initiative represents only a token commitment to social inclusion and environmental sustainability. The inclusive green growth strategy puts forward a seductive triple- 103 win scenario for economic growth, while promising food security, reducing poverty, and mitigating climate change. This follows the neoliberal believe that economic growth and environmental sustainability can be compatible. However, the inclusive green growth strategy’s ambiguous definition, lack of implementation, and the non-binding advisory role of Green Reference Group exemplify the rhetorical commitment towards environmental suitability. This contributes towards the legitimization of the SAGCOT initiative.
Furthermore, I argue that the negotiation between powerful SAGCOT actors with different interests illustrates some of the risks of a Public-Private Partnership, while a repertoire of political (re)actions ‘from above’ is employed to legitimize the SAGCOT initiative. First, the donors’ support for SAGCOT is entangled with national interests, as Western donors often facilitate investments of their own national agribusiness corporations by influencing government policies and regulations. Second, the SAGCOT Center serves an extra institutional layer for lobbying and influencing government policies that favors agribusiness corporations. Third, securing political support for the SAGCOT initiative is a crucial element for its further implementation. Together, donor support, lobbying, and securing political support are practices ‘from above’ to the legitimization of the SAGCOT initiative. The top-down arrangement is legitimized through practices by foreign donors, transnational agribusiness corporations, and the SAGCOT Center that follows the logic of coloniality of power, which is an attempt to control government policies and politics for expanding agribusiness development in Tanzania. As a result, the SAGCOT corridor becomes a corridor of control for powerful agribusiness corporations.
Furthermore, I argue that multiple practices and strategies legitimize the SAGCOT initiative through a token commitment to inclusion and participation. The Green Reference Group, SAGCOT stakeholder meetings, educational training schemes, and SAGCOT tomato partnership exemplify practices of participatory control that includes smallholder farmers, farmer associations, CSOs, and NGOs in a participatory process to sustains asymmetrical power relations, inequalities, and racialized hierarchies. First, these practices of inclusion legitimize the SAGCOT initiative through managing dissent and engineer consent by involving a range of stakeholders. This contributes towards establishing a corridor of control, as a form of coloniality 104 of power. Second, the practices of participatory control sustain exploitation of smallholder farmers, agrarian labor, and land grabbing in the SAGCOT corridor, which furthers primitive accumulation. Third, the educational training schemes are informed by the agricultural modernization discourse to bring modernity to smallholder farmers. Therefore, the educational training schemes operate with the logic of coloniality of knowledge. Fourth, the SAGCOT stockholder meetings and educational training schemes are underpinned by inequalities and racialization between smallholder farmers and agribusiness corporations that illustrates a racialized division of labor in the corridor. Finally, I argue that coloniality of power, coloniality of knowledge, and primitive accumulation reinforce each other in the SAGCOT initiative. This does not only contribute toward capital accumulation on a world scale, but also signals a deepening of coloniality.
Theoretical Reflections In the second chapter of this thesis, I have developed a theoretical framework to guide my analysis, in which the land grabbing debate served as a point of departure. First, I have discussed critical approaches to the green economy in relation to land. Second, I have elaborated on the process of primitive accumulation as conceptualized by scholars from the Agrarian South school. Third, I have discussed the notion of modernity/coloniality, including the concepts of coloniality of power and coloniality of knowledge. For me, integrating these perspectives into a coherent theoretical framework serve to examine the diverse processes of legitimization in the SAGCOT initiative. This helped me analyze how hegemonic power structures operate on various axis and reinforce each other.
However, the formulation of a theoretical framework was not a linear process for me, instead, I modified and reworked multiple aspects of the theoretical framework during the research process. In particular, during data analysis, a more complex picture emerged, which also let me to adjust the research questions accordingly. For example, a historical and epistemological inquiry became central for analyzing the embedded agricultural modernization discourse as an expression of modernity. Mudimbe (1988) elaborates on these relationships, “[w]hat the notion of conditions of possibility indicates is that discourses have not only sociohistorical origins but also epistemological contexts. It is the latter which make them possible and which can also 105 account for them in an essential way” (9). This illustrates the interconnection between the sociohistorical and the epistemological context, as well as the role of discourse. Therefore, I have elaborated on the sociohistorical context in chapter four and on the epistemological dimension in chapter three. The relation between these elements helped me to narrow down the specific processes of legalization to discourses, strategies, and practices that are employed in the SAGCOT initiative.
In addition, the notion of modernity/coloniality served as a basis for analyzing modernity’s Eurocentrism in relation to the current development regime that is expressed in the SAGCOT initiative. The concepts of coloniality of power and coloniality of knowledge were useful to examine colonial continuities, discontinuities, and novel emerging dynamic. This was also guided by the brief historical overview of agricultural development in Tanzania, which I have discussed in chapter four. The development of a theoretical framework that is based on the concepts of coloniality of power, coloniality of knowledge, primitive accumulation has contributed towards an understanding of the SAGCOT initiative as being entanglement with asymmetrical power relations, racialized hierarchies, inequalities. This theoretical framework helped guide the study’s analysis of legitimizing discourses, strategies, and practices that are intertwined with these multiple hierarchies and power structures. By drawing on this theoretical framework for the case study, I seek to contribute towards an emerging decolonial body of literature concerned with the land question and the broader dynamics of land grabbing. Other hierarchies or power structures that could be explored in the context of the SAGCOT initiative revolves around the coloniality of gender (see Lugones 2007) and coloniality of nature (see Escobar 2008).
Concluding Remarks Finally, the SAGCOT initiative demonstrates an attempt to establish a corridor of control, power, and exploitation by inducing a range of inclusive and sustainable discourses, strategies, practices. Despite the SAGCOT model as being presented as a flexible, inclusive, and environmentally sustainable initiative, it follows a similar logic of past Green Revolution projects that relies on market-driven and technocratic solutions to commercialize and modernize agriculture and smallholder farmers. The SAGCOT initiative and the concept of African Agricultural Growth 106
Corridor might illustrate a renewed effort to bring back large-scale agricultural development project though the Public-Private Partnership approach. The promotion of the SAGCOT corridor as a green and inclusive agricultural development project disguise its entanglement in industrial and technology-intensive agriculture, dependency on fossil fuel, and corporate driven character. In this context, the SAGCOT corridor symbolizes a show case project beyond Tanzania, as an increasing number of replicating corridors are in the making.
In this thesis, I have examined the processes of legitimization in the SAGCOT initiative, which has raised a number of new questions. This is inspired by reflections and experiences during my research process. First, future studies could address the increasing racialization between smallholder farmers and agribusiness corporations. In particular, studying the racialized trustee relationship could contribute towards a better understating of the racialized division of labor in the corridor. Second, the role of racialized knowledge and nature in the SAGCOT corridor could be further scrutinized, especially in relation to climate smart agriculture, sustainable intensification, and agricultural practices. Third, future studies could address the dynamics of emerging clusters in the SACOT corridor, and particular large-scale agribusiness investments. This could contribute towards a better understating of the scope and dimension of the emerging SACOT corridor. I identified these as possibilities for future studies to scrutinize the SAGCOT corridor in relation to control, power, and exploitation.
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APPENDICES
Appendix I – List of Interviews, Speeches, and Documents
Summary of Interviews and Speeches Organization Interviews Speeches Agribusiness Companies 12 0 Development Organizations 8 1 Government of Tanzania 3 1 Civil Society and Farmers Association 5 3 Total 28* 5 * I conducted 3 follow up interviews, which totals to 31 conducted interviews.
List of Interview and Speeches Number Date Method Details 1 27.10.2017 Speech Hon. Charles Tizeba, Minister of Agriculture 2 27.10.2017 Speech Beth Arthy, Head of DFID Tanzania 3 27.10.2017 Speech Smallholder Farmer from Iringa Region 4 27.10.2017 Speech Smallholder Farmer from Njombe Region 5 25.11.2017 Speech Smallholder Farmer from Morogoro Region 1 31.10.2017 Interview 2 08.11.2017 Interview 3 15.11.2017 Interview 4 20.11.2017 Interview 5 28.11.2017 Interview 6 29.11.2017 Interview 7 05.12.2017 Interview 8 06.12.2017 Interview 120
9 07.12.2017 Interview 10 08.12.2017 Interview 11 08.12.2017 Interview
12 15.12.2017 Interview
13 15.12.2017 Interview 14 18.12.2017 Interview 15 19.12.2017 Interview 16 20.12.2017 Interview 17 20.12.2017 Interview 18 08.01.2018 Interview (Follow up) 19 09.01.2018 Interview 20 09.01.2018 Interview 21 10.01.2018 Interview (Follow up) 22 10.01.2018 Interview 23 11.01.2018 Interview 24 15.01.2018 Interview 25 15.01.2018 Interview 26 16.01.2018 Interview 27 18.01.2018 Interview 28 19.01.2018 Interview (Follow up) 29 22.01.2018 Interview 30 22.01.2018 Interview 31 24.01.2018 Interview In order to ensure anonymity for interview participants, I do not provide any additional interview details.
List of Documents
Reference Title Retrieved (DFID 2012) Business Case and Intervention Summary: Southern 04.05.2018 Agricultural Growth Corridor in Tanzania (SAGCOT) (DFID 2017) Annual Review 2017 25.05.2018 (Norwegian Grant Letter to AGRA n/a Embassy 2015) 121
(SAGCOT 2011) Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania: 24.07.2017 Investment Blueprint
(SAGCOT 2012) The SAGCOT Greenprint: A Green Growth 22.09.2017 Investment Framework for the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT 2013a) A Framework for Agricultural Green Growth: 13.04.2018 Greenprint for SAGCOT (SAGCOT 2013c) Applying an Agriculture Green Growth Approach in 13.04.2018 the SAGCOT Clusters: Challenges and Opportunities in Kilombero, Ihemi and Mbarali (SAGCOT 2014) Memorandum of Understanding 21.10.2017 (SAGCOT 2016) Annual Report 2016 19.11.2017 (USAID 2017) Feed the Future Tanzania 22.05.2018 (World Bank 2016) SAGCOT Investment Project (SIP) 22.09.2017
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Appendix II – General Interview Guide
Note: During the research process, this general interview guide was adjusted and updated to account for the positions of interview participants.
Background questions and involvement in SAGCOT: 1. When did your organization become a SAGCOT partner? 2. Can you tell me more about how your organization got involved in SAGCOT? 3. What are your objectives and goals within the SAGCOT framework? 4. In your opinion, how do these goals tie to your organization’s visions? 5. Can you tell me what makes SAGCOT stand out from other development projects?
Shaping partnerships in a PPP: 6. Can you tell me about your focus area or projects in the SAGCOT region? 7. Who are your main partners for development projects? 8. Can you tell me more about your coordination with other SAGCOT partners? 9. Do you experience any challenges while working in a Private-Public Partnership in the framework of SAGCOT? If so, what are they?
Agricultural development: 10. Can you tell me more about the role of the private sector in the modernization of agriculture in Tanzania? 11. How do you assess the investment environment in Tanzania? What do you perceive as some of the challenges?
Private Sector: 12. How do you feel about predictability of government policy towards the private sector investments? 13. How do you assess the investment environment in Tanzania? What do you perceive as some of the challenges?
Public Sector: 14. How do you see the role of the public sector in agricultural development in Tanzania? 15. In your opinion, what role play international institutions to make SAGCOT possible? 16. Can you tell me more about the ideas and approaches that guides the SAGCOT framework? 17. Do you feel that the SAGCOT partnership is influencing national agriculture policy? If so, in what ways?
Closing: 18. What are your goals and vision for the SAGCOT initiative? 19. What do you perceive as the future challenges for SAGCOT? 20. Thank you for your time and insights. Would you like to add something or do have any questions? 123
Appendix III – SAGCOT List of Partners
The data for this list of SAGCOT partners was retrieved on November 7, 2017 from the document titled SAGCOT List of Partners.160
Private Sector Companies ▪ Agriculture and Climate Risk Enterprise ▪ Mtanga Foods Ltd ▪ Africa Fertilizer and Agribusiness ▪ Mtenda Kyela Rice Supply Co Ltd Partnership ▪ African Potato Initiative ▪ Muvek Development Solutions Ltd ▪ Akiba Commercial Bank PLC ▪ National Microfinance Bank Plc ▪ ASAS Dairies Ltd ▪ Njombe Milk Factory Company Ltd ▪ Bagamoyo EcoEnergy Tanzania Ltd ▪ Nuziveedu Seeds Ltd ▪ Bagamoyo Fruits Company Ltd ▪ Olam International Ltd ▪ Balton Tanzania Ltd ▪ Opportunity International ▪ Bayer Crop Science AG ▪ Outassurance Broker Ltd ▪ Beula Seed Co and Consultant Ltd ▪ Palladium Group ▪ Building Rural Income through Enterprise ▪ Pannar Seed Ltd ▪ Buyuni REDD Farms Ltd ▪ Pee Pee Tanzania Ltd ▪ Clinton Development Initiative ▪ Private Agricultural Sector Support ▪ CRDB Bank Plc ▪ Power Flour Ltd ▪ Darsh Industries Ltd ▪ Profate Investments Ltd ▪ Dead Sea Works ▪ Pyrethrum Company of Tanzania Ltd ▪ Diageo ▪ Raphael Group Ltd ▪ DOB Equity ▪ SABMiller/Tanzania Breweries Ltd ▪ EA Fruits Farm and Company ▪ SeedCo Tanzania Ltd ▪ Empien Farms Ltd ▪ Shambani Graduates Enterprises Ltd ▪ Faida Market Link ▪ Silverstreet Capital LLP ▪ Farm Inputs Promotions Africa Ltd ▪ Sirius Minerals Plc ▪ Geoman Cane Estate Ltd ▪ Smart Finance Ltd ▪ Green Valley Agro Ltd ▪ Spintelligent ▪ Homeveg Tanzania Ltd ▪ Sunflower Development Company Ltd ▪ Jain Irrigation Systems Ltd ▪ Sumitomo Chemical East Africa Ltd ▪ Jack Allan Services Ltd ▪ Syngenta International AG ▪ Kilombero Plantations Ltd ▪ TANSEED International Ltd ▪ Litenga Holding Ltd ▪ Tanzanice Agrofoods Ltd ▪ Live Support Systems Ltd ▪ Tomoni Farms Ltd ▪ McLaughlin Gormley King Company ▪ Unilever Plc ▪ Minjingu Mines and Fertiliser Ltd ▪ UPL Advanta Ltd ▪ Monsanto ▪ Vehicle and Equipment Leasing Ltd ▪ MORAGG Co Ltd ▪ Yara International ASA
160 http://sagcot.co.tz/index.php/mdocuments-library/ 124
Apex and Farmer Organizations ▪ Agricultural Council of Tanzania ▪ Tanzania Horticultural Association ▪ Confederation of Tanzania Industries ▪ Tanzania Sugarcane Growers Association ▪ Rice Council of Tanzania ▪ Tanzania Private Sector Foundation ▪ Tanzania Agricultural Society Southern ▪ Tanzania Seed Trade Association Highlands Zone ▪ Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture
Development Partners, Foundations, Research Organizations and CSOs ▪ African Wildlife Foundation ▪ Norges Vel, Tanzania ▪ Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa ▪ Royal Norwegian Embassy ▪ Best Dialogue ▪ SNV Netherlands Development Organization ▪ Department for International Development ▪ IDH Sustainable Trade Initiative ▪ Embassy of the Kingdom of Netherlands ▪ Tanzania Agricultural Partnership ▪ Farm Africa ▪ Tanzania Coffee Research Institute ▪ Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition ▪ Tea Research Institute of Tanzania ▪ Heifer International ▪ The Nature Conservancy ▪ International Centre for Tropical Agriculture ▪ The Wood Foundation Africa ▪ International Fund for Agricultural ▪ United Nations Development Programme Development ▪ International Institute for Tropical ▪ United States Agency for International Agriculture Development ▪ International Union for Conservation of ▪ United Nations World Food Programme Nature ▪ International Livestock Research Institute ▪ Vital Signs ▪ International Rice Research Institute ▪ Wildlife Conservation Society ▪ Kilimo Trust ▪ World Bank ▪ Land O’ Lakes International Development
Government of Tanzania ▪ The Government of the United Republic of ▪ Agricultural Markets Development Trust Tanzania ▫ President’s Office ▪ Financial Sector Deepening Trust ▫ Prime Minister’s Office ▪ Rufiji Basin Development Authority ▫ Vice President’s Office ▪ Tanzania Development Bank ▫ President’s Office - RALG ▪ TIB Development Bank ▫ Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and ▪ Tanzania Investment Centre Fisheries ▪ Agricultural Seed Agency
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Appendix IV – Member List of the Green Reference Group
The data and categorization for the member list of the SAGCOT Green Reference Group was retrieved on March 27, 2018 from the SAGCOT website.161
Members of the Green Reference Group Stakeholder Category Member Institution Deputy Permanent Secretary of Co-chair government Vice President’s Office the Vice President’s Office Co-chair private sector Agribusiness (large or medium) Kilombero Plantation Ltd CEO Agribusiness (small green Private Sector (agribusiness) CEO Roundtable growth champion) Non-Agribusiness company, Private Sector (non- selected from membership JAIN Irrigation agribusiness) amongst CEO Roundtable and/or TPSF membership Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Work Ministry of Water Permanent Secretary of Ministry Ministry of Natural of Natural Resources Resources and Tourism Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Energy and Government – Minerals and Energy Minerals Ministries/Agencies Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries Livestock and Fisheries Rufiji Basin Development Director General RUBADA Authority (RUBADA) Research Institution Regional Director Africa, CIAT CIAT
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Lead of the Development United Nations DPG-E Secretariat Partner Environmental Group Environment Program DPG-E Secretariat Finish Embassy - Tanzanian CEO of a Non-State World Wildlife Fund Actor on Environmental Tanzanian CEO of a Non- State None State Actor Actor on Vulnerable Groups i.e. CARE International Gender Tanzanian CEO of a Non-State MVIWATA Actor on Land Financial Organizations CRDB Bank Ltd Financial Institutions Private Agriculture Sector Financial Organizations Support Senior representative of a Global institution World Economic Forum leading global institution Environmental/Social Vital Signs Technical Support organizations The Nature Conservancy Agricultural Council of Technical Support Social Tanzania Environmental & Social officer Secretariat SAGCOT Centre Ltd of the SAGCOT Centre Ltd