Document of The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Report No. 17116-IND Public Disclosure Authorized
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
JABOTABEK URBANDEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Public Disclosure Authorized (Loan. 2932-IND)
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT Public Disclosure Authorized October 17, 1997
Transport Sector Unit Indonesia Country Management Unit
Public Disclosure Authorized East Asia and Pacific
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
Currency unit = Indonesian Rupiah (Rp.)
(January 1988) US$1.00 =Rp 1,650 Rp. I million = US$606
(March 1997) $US 1.00 = Rp 2252 Rp. I million = US$444
WEIGHTS AND MEASURES
Metric Units
FISCAL YEAR OF BORROWER
April 1 - March 31
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
BAPPEDA Regional Government Development Planning Board BAPPENAS National Development Planning Agency DGBM Directorate General Bina Marga (Highways), MPW DGCK Directorate General for Human Settlements (Cipta Karya) DKI-Jakarta Special Capital Region (Daerah Kusus Ibukota) of Jakarta ERR Economic Rate of Return FIRR Financial Internal Rate of Return GOI Government of Indonesia IDC Interest During Construction IUIDP Integrated Urban Infrastructure Development Program JABOTABEK Jakarta Metropolitan Region comprising the local government administrative areas of Jakarta, BOgor, TAngerang and BEKasi JUPCO Project Coordination Unit in DKI-Jakarta, BAPPEDA MHA Ministry of Home Affairs MPW Ministry of Public Works O&M Operations and Maintenance PBB Property tax (Pajak Bumi dan Bangunan) PJM Medium Term Expenditure Program RAP Resettlement Action Plan REPELITA Five-Year Development Plan SATLANTAS National Police TKPP Interagency Coordinating Team for Urban Development TNPR Transport Network Planning and Regulation Study
Vice President: Jean-Michel Severino Country Director: Dennis de Tray Sector Manager: Jeffrey S. Gutman Task Manager: Edward Dotson FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA JABOTABEK URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Ln. 2932-IND)
IMPLEMENTATIONCOMPLETION REPORT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE ------i
EVALUATION SUMMARY ------ii
PART I: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATIONASSESSMENT A. INTRODUCTION------__- __ 1 B. PROJECTOBJECTIVES ------1 C. ACHIEVEMENTOF PROJECTOBJECTIVES ------3 D. MAJOR FACTORSAFFECTING PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ------4 E. PROJECTSUSTAINABILITY ------5 F. BANK PERFORMANCE------5 G. BORROWERPERFORMANCE ------6 H. ASSESSMENTOF OUTCOME------7 I. FUTURE OPERATION------7 J. KEY LESSONSLEARNED ------8
PART II: STATISTICALTABLES TABLE 1: SUMMARYOF ASSESSMENTS------11 TABLE 2: RELATEDBANK LOANS/CREDITS------13 TABLE 3: PROJECTTMETABLE ------1 5 TABLE4: LOAN DISBURSEMENTS:CUMULATIVE ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL ------1 5 TABLE 5: KEY INDICATORSFOR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ------16 TABLE6: KEY INDICATORSFOR PROJECT OPERATION ------16 TABLE 7: STUDIES/TECHNICALASSISTANCE INCLUDED IN THE PROJECT------1 7 TABLE 8A: PROJECTCOSTS ------21 TABLE 8B: PROJECTFINANCING ------2 1 TABLE 9: ECONOMICCOSTS AND BENEFITS ------22 TABLE 10: STATUSOF COVENANTSIN LOAN AGREEMENT------23 TABLE 11: COMPLIANCEWITH OPERATIONAL MANUAL STATEMENTS ------24 TABLE 12: BANK RESOURCES: STAFFINPUTS ------24 TABLE 13: BANK RESOURCES: MISSIONS ------25
APPENDICES: A. EXPERIENCESWITH LAND ACQUISITIONAND RESETTLEMENT B. ICR MISSIONS' AIDES-MEMOIRE C. BORROWER'SCONTRIBUTION To THE ICR
Map IBRD 20491
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performnanceof their official duties. Its contents may not otherwisebe disclosed without World Bank authorization.
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REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA JABOTABEK URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Ln. 2932-IND)
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT
PREFACE
This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the JABOTABEK Urban Development Project in the Republic of Indonesia, for which Loan 2932-IND in the amount of US$150 million equivalent was approved on April 12, 1988 and made effective on September 26, 1988.
The Loan was closed on March 31, 1997 compared with the original closing date of March 31, 1995. The final disbursement took place on August 27, 1997, at which time a balance of US$ 1,316,048 was canceled.
The ICR was prepared by a team consisting of Mr. Edward Dotson, Senior Urban Transport Specialist and Task Manager, Transport Sector Unit, and Ms. JoAnne S. Nickerson, Senior Program Assistant, Urban Sector Unit, Mr. William Hardi, Transport Operations Officer, Resident Staff Indonesia, of the East Asia and Pacific Region. Ms. Concepci6n E. Del Castillo, Anthropologist, Human Resources Division, Asia Technical Department, was responsible for the review of experiences in land acquisition and resettlement. The Report was reviewed by Mr. Jeffrey Gutman, Manager, East Asia Transport Sector Unit. The Borrower provided comments that are included as Appendix C to the ICR.
Preparation of this ICR was begun during an Implementation Completion Mission in March 1997. It is based on material in the project file and interviews with GOI officials and Bank staff. Further discussions with the Borrower on the draft ICR were held during a follow up mission in July 1997. The Borrower contributed to preparation of the ICR by providing data, by commenting on the Bank's assessment and by providing its own evaluation of the project's execution.
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REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA JABOTABEK URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Ln. 2932-IND)
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT
EVALUATION SUMMARY
Introduction
Already in the late 1970s urban transport problems in Jakarta were becoming severe, and work on a Jakarta urban transportproject was begun. During 1986 the Governmentof Indonesia(GOI) introduced the concept of integrated urban infrastructure development programming (IUIDP) grouping together urban transport, water supply and sewerage, drainage and flood control and kampung improvement (KIP). The projectarea was then extendedto cover the whole metropolitanregion called JABOTABEK. Due to the size of JABOTABEK,it was not possibleto undertakeall IUIDP activitiesunder one project. Therefore, they were broken down into three projects with the first JABOTABEKUrban Development Project (JUDP 1) dealingwith urban transport.
Project Objectives and Description
Objectives. The institutionalobjectives of the Project were: (a) to support integrated infrastructure developmentplanning and programmingin JABOTABEKand urban transport programmingin DKI- Jakarta; (b) to increase DKI-Jakarta's technical capabilities in preparing and implementing road construction,and road rehabilitationand maintenanceprograms; (c) to improve traffic managementin JABOTABEK;(d) to improve the Borrower's policies, operations and regulations for public transport; and (e) to prepare for future integrated developmentprograms in the urban sector. Through physical improvementsthe project would (a) reduce traffic congestion in DKI-Jakarta;(b) improve pedestrian access and road safety; (c) introducepublic transportationpriority schemes; and (d) open up additional lands for urban developmentin environmentallysafe fringe areas.
Components. The projecthad three components: technicalassistance, training and physicalworks. The technicalassistance was for (a) project implementationsupport; (b) institutionaland policy development advisory services in integrated infrastructure planning and programming; municipal revenue improvement;urban transport planning and policy development (including bus and rail systems); air quality monitoring; road planning and traffic management; road maintenance and future project preparation. The trainingwas in traffic engineering. The physical works included: (a) constructionof 10 km of new primary arterial roads (b) new construction or major upgrading of about 66 km of secondaryarterial roads; (c) intersectionimprovements by constructionof four major flyovers;(d) about 35 km of developmentroads on the city's eastern and western fringesand the former KemayoranAirport site; (e) traffic managementand road safety measures;and (f) road rehabilitationand maintenance.
Covenants geared towardmeeting these objectives included(a) preparationand adoptionof an integrated five-year expenditure program; (b) a review of projected transport demands and identification of a transport corridor network together with policies and plans for an integrated transport system for JABOTABEK;(c) implementationof a Bus (PPD/DAMRI)Transport Action Plan; (d) preparationof a plan and implementationschedule for land acquisition and resettlement acceptable to the Bank; (e) implementationof a revenue improvementplan; (f) implementationof an action plan to increase tax (PBB) revenuesby at least 13% annually. Evaluation. The project objectiveswere clear, except for physical objective (d), which did not specify that "environmentallysafe fringe areas" meant areas on the east-west development axis. They were ambitiousat the time of projectappraisal. Experienceshows that the risks were correctlyidentified. The major risks not identifiedrelate to escalatingland prices, delays in land acquisitionand difficultieswith resettlement. The objectives and project components were sufficiently clear to permit detailed adjustmentsin project scope in responseto changes in the Borrower's circumstancesover the nine-year implementationperiod. The projectwas quite demandingfor the Borrower,and there was little scope for all its objectivesbeing accomplishedin a singleoperation.
Implementation Experience and Results
Achievement of Objectives. The SAR did not include quantifiablecriteria for judging the achievement of objectives, except in the urban transport, PPD and DAMRI Action Plans. This assessment is, therefore, based on a combination of the available measurable indicators and professionaljudgment. Overall, the project was satisfactoryin meeting its development objectives, with varying degrees of success among objectives. The lowest level of achievement was in relation to improvements in integrated programming,and in policies, operations and regulationsfor public transport. The physical improvementobjectives for public transportpriority and pedestrian access were also not fully realized. Local traffic congestionis still apparent,but traffic moves steadily if slowly,despite large increases in vehicle ownershipand travel demand. Trafficgrowth has simply outstrippedroad networkdevelopment.
Costs. Total project costs were estimatedRp. 369.5 billion (US$223.9million equivalent)with an IBRD loan of US$150 million. Actual project costs were Rp.552 billion (US$274.5 million equivalent) Financingarrangements changed little other than that the percentage of IBRD's contributionto the civil works category for primary arterial roads was reduced from 75% to 55% following project reformulation. DKI contribution increased dramatically due to increases in land costs. (See Part II, tables 8A and 8B.)
Schedule. The project was appraised in October 1987. Board approval came in April 1988, and the project became effective in late September1988. The project was reformulatedin November 1991 when infrastructurefor the former KemayoranAirport site was dropped. Two separateone year extensionsof the loan closing date were granted to allow time for maximum achievementof the projects' development objectives. The loan closed on March 31, 1997.
Main Factors Affecting Implementation of the Project. Factors outside of governmentcontrol were increasesin the cost of land which delayedimplementation, and public outcry over bus priority measures which effectively stopped their implementation. Of factors within government control, poor performancewith respect to resettlementhad the most adverse effect on project outcomes,and left many of those resettled worse off. Lack of commitmentto policy recommendationslimited the extent of the improvementin public transport operationsand traffic congestion. Delays in land acquisitionand utility relocation,reactive project coordinationrather than proactive project management,and variable transfer of knowledgefrom consultants(all factors under implementingagency control) also affected the project schedules.
Economic Analysis. For primary roads, the 10 year internal rate of return (IRR) estimated at appraisal was in the range 45% to 102%. The recalculatedIRR for the same sub-projectsis in the range 54% to 110%. iv
Performance of the Bank. The performance of the Bank was generally satisfactory, except for resettlement. It could have been better on procurement. The Bank should not have added the unappraisedcomponent related to the former KemayoranAirport site at negotiations. Bank resettlement procedures and policy requirementsin place at the time (OMS 2.33) were inadequatelyreflected in the project design. Resettlementspecialists were not included in the task team during preparationand the early years of implementation. Supervisionmissions did not conduct site visits specificallyto address resettlementissues until later in the project (1992-93)when people had been moved and constructionhad started. In the initial stages, the Borrower considered the Bank's procurement requirementstoo time consuming.
Performance of the Borrower. There has been a generallystrong sense of ownership of, and support for the project by all agencies. During the course of the project the Borrower (and the Bank) were able to adjust the project's scope in response to changing circumstancesbut within the developmentobjectives on two occasions: projectreformulation in November 1991, and the first Loan extension in March 1995. When constructionquality was cited as questionable,the Borrowertook steps to improve the quality of contractorsand of designand supervision.
Three aspects of Borrower performance require some discussion. These concern resettlement performance,policy recommendationsnot acted upon, and the role and responsibilitiesof JUPCO. The Borrower did not produce a resettlementplan acceptableto the Bank, even though the Loan Agreement required one. The Borrower focused on delays to project implementationcaused by delays in land acquisition,and not on the social and economic impacts on those involuntarilyresettled. The results of the project's TA were sound on the whole, but the Borrower's commitmentto implementingsome of the policy recommendationswaned. The role of JUPCO in the project was clearly misunderstood. The agency acted as littlemore than a point of contact between the Bank and the implementingagencies, and was reactive rather than proactivein coordinatingand monitoringproject activities.
Project outcome is rated as satisfactoryexcept for resettlementwhich is rated unsatisfactory.
Summaryof Findings,Future Operations,and Key LessonsLearned
Themost importantlessons of the project are the following.
ProjectManagement. The project office that is the prime point of contact with the Bank shouldbe designatedas a Project ManagementUnit (PMU) and given appropriateand clearly defined project managementrather than coordinationresponsibilities in the loan agreementand project implementation plan. However,meaningful project managementwill only happen if there is a mechanismfor senior officialsof executingagencies to meet, discuss and agree on changesto project components.
Training. Well defined and focused training programslinked to implementationof project components produce results.
Road Construction. Land acquisition/resettlementand relocation of utilities shouldbe completedbefore constructionstarts. In JABOTABEK,the cost of acquiringland is such that buildingnew roads may be less expensive (but potentially more socially disruptive) than widening existing ones. Interagency arrangementsfor utility relocationin Indonesiarequire strengthening.The Borrower indicatedthat Bank involvementfacilitated implementation of road constructionby allowingagencies multi-year budgets. v
Policy Implementation. To produce implementable and sustainable outcomes, institutional strengtheninghas to include the arrangementsfor (i) financing the program, (ii) adoption of plans and programs (to protect them from political and private sector development pressures), and (iii) an overarchingauthority with the technical, financial, and decision making ability to review and make decisionson proposalswhich are not in accordancewith the plans and programs.
Technical Assistance. For TA to produce good quality outputs that are likely to be implemented requires (i) consultants services to be the responsibilityof the end user of the outputs, (ii) for this end user to have the capacity to manage the consultant,and (iii) for actions to be taken to correct poor consultantperformance.
Resettlement. Lessons learnedfrom this projecthave already been incorporatedinto urban and transport projects appraised since late 1995, and included in loan agreements and project implementationplans. Since the implementationof this project, more rigorous Bank procedures for resettlement on road projects in Indonesia have been developed. They make satisfactory resettlement planning and performance on an individual road subproject a condition of disbursement. To support project implementation,TA is provided to strengthen the capacities of the agencies that are involved in resettlement. Other support is provided by Bank staff from the resident mission, as required. More detailed lessonsare provided in the main text and in the resettlementappendix.
Public Transport and Parking. Social dimensionsof implementingpublic transport and parking policy changes pose greater challengesthan the physical ones. For such policy changes to have any chance of being sustainablerequires governmentcommitment from the outset, and Bank support to Government duringthe difficulttimes
Future Operations. The roads built under the project are the responsibilityof the DirectorateGeneral of Highwaysand DKI. They will maintainthem as part of their normal activities. Traffic flows and speeds on the roads will be routinelymonitored by DLLAJ-DKI. Any operationaldifficulties would be brought to light by this monitoring, and remedial traffic management measures required to ensure the most efficient use of the roads can be designed in response.
Sustainability. The sustainabilityof the civil works and training components is deemed likely. The sustainabilityof the TA componentis likely except for the policy TA which is uncertain. Accordingly overall sustainability is likely. However, the sustainability of the project depends on continued improvementsin institutionalarrangements for the integration, updating and implementationof plans and programs, in the management and operation of the transport system, expansion of capacity (particularlyfor public transport integrated with urban development),and demand management. The recommendationsfrom TA studies undertakenduring the project provide a sound basis from which to develop firm proposals. 1
REPUBLICOF INDONESIA JABOTABEKURBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (Ln. 2932-IND)
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT
PART 1: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
1. Already in the late 1970s, urban transport problems in Jakarta were becoming severe, and work on a Jakarta urban transport project was begun. During 1986 the Government of Indonesia (GOI) introduced the concept of integrated urban infrastructure development programming (IUIDP) grouping together urban transport, water supply and sewerage, drainage and flood control and kampung improvement (KIP). The project area was then extended to cover the whole metropolitan region known as JABOTABEK. Due to the size of JABOTABEK, it was decided that it would not be possible to undertake activities in all the IUIDP areas under one project. Therefore, they were broken down into three projects. The first JABOTABEK Urban Development Project (JUDP 1) dealt with urban transport; the Second JUDP (Ln. 3219-IND) with water supply and sewerage, and the Third JUDP (Ln. 3246-IND) with KIP and drainage and flood control.
2. The life cycle of JUDP 1 from initial project brief to loan closing spanned 17 years. When project preparation commenced, there were very few high rise buildings in Jakarta, no urban toll roads, no grade-separated intersections for road or rail crossings, only a few isolated areas of severe traffic congestion, and extremely poor public transport services and pedestrian facilities. While the quality of public transport services and pedestrian facilities has improved little during the intervening period, the city and the greater metropolitan area have developed dramatically. The urban transport challenges have been impacted by the rapid pace of high-rise commercial development in the city center and extensive industrial and residential developments in the BOTABEK periphery, and by the associated growth in car and motorcycle traffic. The expanding toll road network has shaped the region's spatial development, and has also greatly influenced traffic patterns and flows within the city.
B. PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND DESCRIPTION
3. Objectives. The project's institutional objectives were: (a) to support integrated infrastructure development planning and programming in the JABOTABEK region and urban transport programming in DKI-Jakarta in particular; (b) to increase DKI's technical capabilities in preparing and implementing road construction, and road rehabilitation and maintenance programs; (c) to improve traffic management in the region; (d) to improve GOI's policies, operations and regulations for public transport; and (e) to prepare for future integrated development expenditures in the urban sector.
4. Through physical improvements the project would (a) reduce traffic congestion in DKI- Jakarta; (b) improve pedestrian access and road safety; (c) introduce public transportation 2 priority schemes; and (d) open up additional lands for urban development in environmentally safe fringe areas.
5. Components. The project had three components: technical assistance, training and physical works. Technical assistance (TA) was grouped together as follows
Project ImplementationSupport to assist with (i) projectmanagement; (ii) final engineeringdesign; and (iii) constructionsupervision; and Institutionaland Policy Developmentfor advisoryservices in (i) integratedinfrastructure planning and programming;(ii) municipalrevenue improvement;(iii) urban transportplanning and policy development,(iv) air qualitymonitoring; (v) road planning and traffic management;(vi) road maintenance;and (vii) future projectpreparation.
6. Training. In addition to on-the-job training by various advisors under technical assistance, formal training in traffic engineering was offered as follows:
Road Trafficand TransportTraining College (RYTC) to expand courses at this DGLT facilityat Bekasi; SATLANTAS to help establisha trainingprogram at the new traffic police trainingcollege at Serpong by trainingtrainers, developingcurricula and implementingnew courses; and TrafficEngineering Practice to extend the program initiatedunder the RegionalCities Urban TransportProject (Ln. 2817-IND).
7. Physical Works components, as originally conceived, included:
PrimaryArterial Roads for constructionof 10 km of new road links by DGH: SecondaryArterial Roads for new constructionor major upgradingof about 66 km of primaryand secondaryarterial roads; Major Intersectionsimprovements to four major intersectionsthrough constructionof flyovers; DevelopmentRoads (about 35 km) on the city's eastern and westernfringes and the former KemayoranAirport site; TrafficManagement to provide(i) comprehensiveimprovements to the main road networkwhich will involve less than full road reconstruction;(ii) bus priority measures; (iii) traffic signal equipment;(iv) intersectionimprovements; (v) pedestrianimprovements; (vi) signingand road marking by DKI-Jakarta;and RoadMaintenance for a four year program of routine and periodic maintenance,including institutionaldevelopment.
8. The project objectives were clear, except for physical objective (d), which did not specify that "environmentally safe fringe areas" meant areas on the east-west development axis. However, they were ambitious for a Borrower with the lack of experience, staff and management capacity in urban transport that was the case at the time of appraisal. Experience shows that the risks in achieving the objectives were correctly identified. The project scope was demanding for the Borrower and in reality there was little prospect of all the objectives being achieved in one operation. Although there were only three main components, their execution involved seven implementing agencies, four at national level and three within the local government of DKI- 3
Jakarta. Having the coordinating agency, the JABOTABEK Urban Projects Coordination Office (JUPCO), as a DKI level agency led to problems in dealing with the national level agencies. The major risks not identified were those of escalating land prices and delays in land acquisition which delayed implementation, and difficulties with resettlement. Opting to have JUDP 1 cover the JABOTABEK region rather than DKI Jakarta was technically the right decision but increased its complexity of the project. In practice, the BOTABEK area received little attention.
9. The objectives and project components were sufficiently clear to permit detailed adjustments to the scope of the project in response to changes in the Borrower's circumstances, during the project's nine-year implementation period. Such changes occurred on the occasions of the November 1991 reformulation and the first Loan extension in March 1995.
10. On the first occasion, civil works for the Kemayoran Airport development site component were replaced by increased technical assistance and training. For the loan extension, uncommitted funds were allocated to management and implementation of road maintenance, traffic management, air quality monitoring and emission inspection equipment, and the initial preparation of a possible future project. A further extension was granted to allow time for the project to achieve its development objectives to the maximum extent possible.
C. ACHIEVEMENT OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES
II. Quantifiable criteria for judging the achievement of objectives were not included in the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR), except in the urban transport, PPD and DAMRI action plans. Tlhisassessment is therefore based on a combination of measurable indicators (where available) and professional judgment. Overall, it is considered that the project has been satisfactory in meeting its development objectives, with some variation in degrees of success among objectives. The design of the project was generally appropriate for achieving the objectives. Training linked to the implementation of the project was successful and produced graduates who went on to management positions in technical units. Demand for places at the Road Traffic and Transport College now outstrips supply. More TA and training should perhaps have been included in the development of road maintenance management systems (this was added at the time of the first loan extension), and in multi year programming and budgeting.
12. The JUDP 1 main road construction and junction improvements provided much needed increases in road network capacity. Local traffic congestion is still apparent, but traffic moves steadily if slowly, despite large increases in vehicle ownership and travel demand. Without these investments, road congestion in many areas of the city would today be acute. With them, it is already bad in many corridors during peak periods, but the worsening congestion does not imply that the JUDP-I road and junction investments failed. Traffic growth has simply outstripped road network development. For primary roads, the 10-year internal rate of return (IRR) estimated at appraisal was in the range 45% to 102% The recalculated rate of return for the same sub-projects is in the range 54% to 110 %. For sub-projects added during the course of the Project the 10 year IRR's are in the range 40% to 94% for new roads and 43% to 99% for road rehabilitation and maintenance. 4
13. The lowest level of achievementhas been in relation to improvementsin the integrated programmingof transportinvestments, and in policies, operationsand regulationsfor public transport. Clarity with regardto projectbeneficiaries (in this case public transportusers) would have helped in focusingattention on the key steps to achievingimproved levels of service and operationalperformance. The physical improvementobjectives for public transportpriority and pedestrianaccess were also not fully realized.
14. The one unsatisfactoryresult concernsresettlement. This did not meet the Bank requirementthat no one would be adverselyaffected by the project. Furthermore,it has not been possible to determinewith any accuracythe numbers of people adverselyaffected and the extent to which they were affected.
D. MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
15. Factors not generally subject to government control. The main factors in this category were increases in the cost of the land, and the public reaction to bus priority measures. Land acquisition costs increased almost threefold from original estimates. Land price increases delayed implementation of new road construction, but did not force any road schemes in the project to be abandoned. Adversepublic reactionto bus priority measureseffectively stopped their implementation.The Borrowercommented that in the early years of the projectthe time taken by the Bank in reviewing procurement and generally responding to GOI correspondence, was a cause of delay.
16. Factors generally subject to government control. Poor handling of resettlement by GOI (and the Bank) was the main factor here. GOI's focus in resettlement was on property and not on the consequences of depriving people of land and assets, nor on the social and economic aspects of physical displacement. As a result, there were little attempt to ensure that those displaced were not worse off as a consequence of the project. Records of persons resettled were not routinely maintained. What evidence it has been possible to gather from tracer studies suggeststhat at least half the people displacedare likely worse off, but since they cannot be identified now, additional compensation cannot be offered.
17. There was limited discussion and a lack of commitment to the implementation of policy recommendations from studies funded by the project, especially in the case of the public bus company (PPD) and parking. This in turn limited the extent of improvement that could be achieved in public transport operations and reduction of traffic congestion. 5
Factors generally subject to implementing agency control
18. Implementation delays. A large amount of land acquisition was completed before the project started. However, where this was not the case, the time required to acquire land and the potential for delay was not taken into account in the scheduling of road works. This resulted in delays to complete major links and open them to traffic, as well as substitution of road schemes in the implementation program. Poor interagency coordination and insufficient anticipation of potential delays in the relocation of utilities also led to delays in the completion of road works.
19. Project coordination. JUDP 1 was the first GOI project where the idea of a single "window to the Bank" was tried, with the idea of making dealing with the Bank simpler for the various executing agencies. JUPCO was intended by the Bank to take an active role in project coordination and monitoring. However, JUPCO misunderstood its coordination role. It tended to be reactive rather than proactive in dealing with issues that arose during the life of the project. JUPCO's effectiveness was compromised by the fact that it was a DKI-Jakarta agency, and as such did not enjoy the same position of responsibility in the administrative structure as the central government agencies with which it was dealing.
E. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY
20. Sustainabilityof the projectoutcomes depends on continuedimprovements in the mechanismsfor delivery of integratedprograms, in the managementand operationof the transportsystem, expansion of capacity(particularly for public transport)integrated with urban development,and demandmanagement. The recommendationsfrom studiesfunded by the project,particularly the Jakarta Urban TransportShort TermImprovements (JUTSI) and Jakarta PrimaryRoad InfrastructureImprovement Project (JPRIIP),provide a soundbasis from which to developfirm proposals(see Table 7). The current size and structureof both the traffic managementunit (DLLAJ)of DKI-Jakartaand the Urban Directoratein DGLT provide the basis for furtherstrengthening and expansionwhich is needed to match the size of the task and to assure sustainabilityof project outcomes. The road agenciesin DKI and DGH are alreadyin a better positionto produce sustainableoutcomes, with some expansionof planning and programmingskills.
F. BANK PERFORMANCE
21. The Bank's performancewas generallysatisfactory, but the followingweaknesses should be noted.
KemayoranAirport Site. The funding of redevelopmentof this site was dropped soon after the projectbegan, after a review of the feasibilitystudy for redevelopment. With hindsight,the Bank should not have agreed,without a conventionalappraisal, to the GOI requestat negotiationsto add this component.
Resettlement. Bank resettlement procedures and policy requirements of the time (OMS 2.33, issued in February 1980) were inadequately reflected in the project design, although the Loan 6
Agreementrequired resettlement to be carried out in accordancewith a plan satisfactoryto the Bank. Resettlementspecialists were not includedin the task team during preparationand the early years of implementation.Supervision missions (1990-92)did not conductsite visits specificallyto addressresettlement issues until rather late in the project (1992-93),by which time few mitigationmeasures could be effective. Resettlementproblems were not reflected in reports to management. Even so, the Bank did not take action on the failure of the Borrowerto provide a resettlementplan. From 1993 to the end of the project, a concertedeffort was madeto locate and identify those most adverselyaffected and to design and implementa programto assist them, but with limited success. This program,known as the Land Acquisition,Compensation and ResettlementAction Program is ongoing.
Procurement. Bank procedureswere consideredtoo complexand time consumingby the Borrower. Delegationof responsibilityfor ICB procurementto RSI wouldhave expeditedthe approvalprocess, as well as raising the thresholdfor ICB to US$5 million or more. Disbursementschedules at the start of the project shouldhave been more realisticand taken accountof the time necessaryto completefinal engineeringdesigns and land acquisition.
G. BORROWERPERFORMANCE
22. There has generallybeen a strong senseof ownershipof, and supportfor the projectby all agencies.Flexibility was shownby the Borrower(and by the Bank) during the course of the project in adjustingthe project's scopein responseto changingcircumstances but within the developmentobjectives, on the occasionof Project reformulationin November 1991,and at the time of the first Loan extensionin March 1995. Constructionquality during the projectwas mixed as is recognizedby all parties. When this was raised as an issue,the Borrowertook steps to improvethe qualityof contractorsand of design and supervision.
23. Three aspectsof Borrowerperformance require some discussion. These concern resettlement,policy recommendationsnot acted upon, and the role and responsibilitiesof JUPCO. The Borrowerdid not produce a resettlementplan acceptableto the Bank, even though the Loan Agreementrequired one. The focus was on delays to projectimplementation caused by delays in land acquisition,and not on the consequencesof deprivingpeople of land and assets or the social and economicimpacts on those involuntarilyresettled. This approachreflected in part the Bank's initial supervisionconcerns with the propertyand expropriationaspects of land acquisition,to the disregardof the social dimension. Whenthe Bank did raise concernson the social and economicimpacts on those resettled,the Borrowerwas slow to respond.
24. The lack of progresson implementingcertain policies and programsis understandable. Institutionalarrangements within both DKI Jakarta and JABOTABEKprovide no mechanismfor the ratification,implementation, and updatingof transportpolicies and programsthat are integratedacross all the centraland local governmentagencies involved. While policy decisions on buses, parkingand transportnetwork planning should be within DKI's responsibilities,in practiceDKI's abilityto implementurban transportpolicy recommendationsappears limited when implementationalso requiresaction by central governmentagencies. The policy recommendationshad social and economicconsequences for bus drivers,bus passengersand 7 motorists, consequences that provoked opposition. Human resource factors in DGLT and DLLAJ-DKI during the project were not conducive to implementing the policy recommendations. (For example, there was no urban transport directorate in DGLT from 1991 to 1996). The human resource factors have now been largely overcome, and the current size and structure of both the Urban Directorate in DGLT and DLLAJ-DKI provide the basis for further strengthening and expansion which is needed to match the size of the task. But the other institutional shortcomings remain.
25. The concern with JUPCO stems from the definition of its role as a single window to the Bank with responsibilities to coordinate information from various project implementation units, (rather than to act as an overall project management unit), and its place in the implementation arrangements. JUPCO was correctly located in BAPPEDA-DKI, but in the organisation structure for project implementation, DKI Jakarta was shown as only one of five agencies reporting to the Interagency Coordinating Team for Urban Development (TKPP), the other four being from central government. As a result JUPCO tended to be reactive, particularly at the time of project reformulation and loan extension, rather than proactive in preparing the consolidated data required by the Bank. JUPCO deferred more substantive decision making on project management to TKPP, whose role and responsibilities were not discussed in the SAR.
H. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOME
26. Overall Assessment. Overall,it is consideredthat the project had some very positive results and achievedits main developmentobjectives. All the constructionworks carriedout under the projectare being heavily used and have high rates of return. The trainingcomponent was well defined and yieldedvery good results. The TA componenthad mixed results as acknowledgedby all. Institutional-buildingTA did a reasonablygood job of transferringof knowledge. PolicyTA was less successful.
27. The main shortcomingconcerns the poor resettlementperformance. The findingsof this review agreewith the unsatisfactoryoutcome of the project on resettlement(the projecthas been rated "3" in the Bank-widereview of resettlementsince 1994). This fundamentalissue has to be factoredinto the final rating of the project. It is consideredthat the unsatisfactory resettlementperformance be noted,but that overallthe Project be rated satisfactory.
I. FUTURE OPERATION
28. The roads built under the projectare the responsibilityof the DGH and DKI and will be maintainedby them as part of their normal activities. Maintenanceprogramming techniques developedunder the projectwill facilitatethese activities,and permit maintenancerequirements for these roadsto be monitored. Trafficflows and speedson the roads will be monitoredby DLLAJ- DKI as part of their normal activities. Any operationaldifficulties would be broughtto light by this monitoring,and remedialtraffic managementmeasures required to ensurethe most efficient use of the roads can be designedin response. 8
29. The Bank shouldcontinue to monitorthe progressmade on the implementationof the Land Acquisition,Compensation and ResettlementAction Program. This follow-upwill demonstratethe Bank's desire and dedicationto seeingthat its policieson involuntary resettlementare followed.
30. In terms of projectfollow-up, studies have been undertakenas part of the project which could form the basis for the preparationof a future JakartaUrban TransportProject.
J. KEY LESSONSLEARNED
31. The most importantlessons of the project are:
(a) ProjectManagement. The projectoffice that is the prime point of contactwith the Bank should be designatedas a Project ManagementUnit (PMU) and given appropriateand clearly definedmanagement rather than coordinationresponsibilities in the loan agreementand project implementationplan. One of the key lessons with regardto projectmanagement is that existingstructural units should be strengthenedto implementproject components effectivelyand requiredto coordinateamong themselves,with assistancefrom the PMU. The unit with the greatestinterest in the Project should be designatedthe PMU. Creating new functionalunits, such as JUPCO, is unlikely to be successful. However,meaningful coordinationand managementof projectswill only happen if there is a mechanismfor senior officialsof executingagencies to meet, discuss and agree on changesto project components. The PMU supportedby consultantscan provide support for such meetingsbut cannot take decisions. (b) Training. Well defined and focusedtraining programslinked to the implementationof projectcomponents produce results.
(c) Road Construction. The schedulingof land acquisition,resettlement and relocation of utilitiesshould be made explicitin projectschedules, the risks of delays assessedand built in to schedules,and activitiescompleted before constructionstarts. The cost of land acquisition in JABOTABEKis such that buildingnew roads may be less expensive(but potentiallymore sociallydisruptive) than wideningexisting roads. Interagencyarrangements for utility relocationin Indonesiarequire strengthening.The Borrowerindicated that Bank involvementfacilitated implementation of schemes,by raising their profile and permitting multi year constructionbudgets.
(d) PolicyImplementation. To produce implementableand sustainableoutcomes, support for integratedinfrastructure developing planning and programminghas to go beyond TA for studiesto developnetwork plans and programs,and to providetechnical training. The TA has to considerinstitutional and financialissues. The TA has also to include support for either developmentor strengtheningof institutionalarrangement for updating and implementationof plans and programs. Three critical areas for support in this context are the arrangementsfor (i) financingthe program, (ii) adoptionof plans and programs(to protect them from politicaland private sectordevelopment pressures), and (iii) an overarching 9
authority with the technical, financial, and decision making ability to review and make decisions on proposals which are not in accordance with the plans and programs.
In both DKI Jakarta and JABOTABEK, strengthening of existing arrangements for urban transport strategy formulation and implementation is necessary to provide a stronger framework for implementation of policy and investment decisions, and for the assessment of private sector investment proposals, particularly within DKI-Jakarta. In addition, further strengthening of existing agencies responsible for urban transport policy and planning (specifically BAPPEDA-DKI and DGLT) is necessary to ensure that recommendations of studies are implemented.
(e) TechnicalAssistance. For TA to produce good quality outputs that are likely to be implemented requires (i) consultants services to be the responsibility of the end user of the outputs, (ii) for this end user to have the capacity to manage the consultant, and (iii) for actions to be taken to correct poor consultant performance and outputs. The Bank has a responsibility ensure these requirements are met including through support to the agency managing the TA. It is the view of the Borrower that "in-house" TA to agencies committed to the TA provides greater transfer of knowledge than TA where consultant services are provided to produce a stand alone study.
(f) Public Transport and Parking
Improving Government's policies, operations and regulations for public transport requires more than TA supporting the design of these improvements. Where TA services concern policy issues, it is essential that there be ownership by and access to decision makers. Implementing changes in policies, regulations and policies is likely to produce strong negative reactions from sections of the traveling public and transport company staff, managers and owners. Social dimensions of implementing public transport and parking policy changes pose greater challenges than the physical ones. For such changes to have any chance of being sustainable requires government commitment and Bank support to Government during the difficult times. Similar lessons apply to policies, operations and regulations for parking.
(g) LandAcquisition and Resettlement.
There are three key lessons learned from this project.
(i) Land acquisition and resettlement have to be an integral part of project design, included in the loan agreement and taken into account in the scheduling of construction and disbursement, together with risk of delay or escalation in land prices. A resettlement specialist should be a core member of the task team. To ensure Bank requirements are met, continuous close monitoring of resettlement throughout the project is likely to be required, until satisfactorily completed. This is a labour intensive activity, for which adequate provision has to be made in supervision budgets. 10
(ii) To ensure that resettlement covenants in the loan agreement can be easily enforced, these covenants should require actions by a set date or make implementation of resettlement actions a condition of disbursement.
(iii) While the general principles of a government's policies on resettlement may be in accord with Bank policy on resettlement specific policy provisions may not be in accord. In addition, the detailed implementation arrangements may not meet Bank requirements, or give results acceptable to the Bank.
Since the implementation of this project, more rigorous Bank requirements and procedures for resettlement on road projects in Indonesia have been developed. These lessons have largely been incorporated into urban and transport projects appraised since late 1995, and included in loan agreements and project implementation plans. They make satisfactory resettlement planning and performance on an individual (road) subprojects a condition of disbursement. TA is provided to strengthen the capacities of the agencies that are involved in any land acquisition and resettlement. Other support is provided by staff from Environmental and Social Impact Unit of Resident Staff Indonesia, who also provide support to Task Teams for continuous monitoring.
The other key lesson is that a simple monitoring mechanism needs to be established to alert the Bank's regional management when resettlement provisions in loan agreements give the appearance of not being met. 11
PART II: STATISTICALTABLES
TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF ASSESSMENTS
A. Achievement of Objectives Substantial Partial Negligible Not applicable
Macro Policies El E El
Sector Policies a ] E
Financial Objectives X E l 5
Institutional Development 5 IX E E
Physical Objectives [I ] l
Poverty Reduction 5 a n
Gender Issues : EZ
Other Social Objectives [J E] [I] EJ
Environmental Objectives 5 5 x] El
Public Sector Management 5 5j 5
Private Sector Development 5 5 5 Ix
Other: Training [El El E
(Continued) B. Project Sustainability Likely Unlikely Uncertain (1) (v') ('/)
53 ~ E 5 12
Highly C. Bank Performance satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient (1') (/) (/) Identification IX]
PreparationAssistance E I E
Appraisal 13 a
Supervision El El
Highly D. Borrower Performance satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient (1) (/) (V) Preparation a Eo
Implementation l El
Covenant Compliance Ex El
Operation (if applicable) El IXI
Highly Highly E. Assessment of Outcome satisfactory Satisfactory Unsatisfactory unsatisfactory
El ~mxElEl 13
TABLE2: RELATEDBANK LoANs/CREDITs
--,.' i'',':"".":"''"''-'U...... ,,. .. ~~~~~~~~...... :. .. Ln. 2816-IND, To improveplanning, programming, and identificationof 1987 closedin Urban SectorProject investmentpriorities in Level II authorities;to ameliorate 1991 Level II capabilitiesto mobilizeresources and optimizethe use of funds;to upgradeurban services financing mechanisms; to enhancelocal government institutions and staff capabilities; and to strengthencoordination and consultationamong the variousagencies and levels of government. Ln. 2817-IND, To implementa high priority program of measuresaimed at 1987 closed on RegionalCities improvingtraffic and transportinfrastructure conditions in the October Urban Transport projectcities; to developcity professionaland technical 1, 1994 capabilitiesin planning,design, implementation and maintenanceof transportfacilities and services;to develop centralgovermment agency skills; and to establisha process of agencyinvestments in urbantransport infrastructure and services. Ln. 3219-IND, To developand implementa coordinatedprogram of physical 1990 ongoing Second investments,technical assistance and policiesfor urbanwater JABOTABEKUDP supply,wastewater disposal, drainage and water resource/quality management. Ln. 3246-IND, To introducea more effectiveand sustainableapproach to 1990 ongoing Third JABOTABEK providingbasic servicesthrough extensive community UDP participationand incorporationof social and economic developmentin low-incomeurban communities,to help alleviate poverty in metropolitan Jakarta. Ln. 3712-IND, To meetthe rapid growth in road traffic resultingfrom 1994 ongoing SecondHighway sustainedeconomic growth and to reduceroad transport SectorProject systemcosts. Also (a) to improvethe servicequality of the road network;(b) to develop effectiveapproaches for increasingroad networkcapacity; (c) to improvethe qualityof executionof road works; (d) to strengthenthe capabilityof DGH to formulatework programsand allocatefunds between activities;and (e) to improveroad sector policiesand strengthenthe capabilityof road sectoragencies to formulate and implement such policies. Ln. 3726-IND, To improveurban (a) servicelevels to the poor; (b) 1994 ongoing SurabayaUrban productivityand effectiveness;(c) environmentalquality. Development Project Ln. 3749-IND, (a) To improvethe provisionof urban infrastructureservices 1994 ongoing Semarang-Surakarta and the efficiencyof urban investments;(b) to promote UDP strongermore autonomousand financiallymore independent municipalgovernments; and (c) to contributetowards poverty alleviation,mainly through better accessto essentialservices and an improvedurban environment. 14
Ln. 4054-IND, (a) To reducetraffic bottlenecksin the N.JavaCorridor 1996 ongoing StrategicUrban (b) To address environmentaland socialissues associated with Roads Infrastructure increasedusage of nationalroads; (c) to assist GOI in Project decentralizingresponsibility for planning,design, construction, maintenance,management and regulationof urbantransport; (d) to strengthentechnical and institutionalcapabilities of urbanroad agencies;(e) to assist GOI in the formulation, articulation and implementation and urban transport policy. Ln. 4106-IND, To improvethe economicefficiency and servicequality of the 1997 not yet RailwayEfficiency railway subsector,and specifically(a) to reform the railway effective Project subsectorpolicy by restructuringthe railwaycorporation; (b) to rationalizerailway subsectorcapital investments;(c) to improverailway managementand operations;and (d) to increase the physical capacity. 15
TABLE 3: PROJECT TIMETABLE
.,....-...... *~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ . Step---i: cyc. Date Pamned A-t-. Date:---: First Project Brief (Jakarta Urban February15, 1980 TransportProject) February_____1980 SecondProject Brief January9, 1981 Third Project Brief September17, 1984 FourthProject Brief SeApril 8, 1985 Preparation(JUDP) AprlJune1987 Appraisal September1987 October 1987 Negotiations January 1988 February1-4, 1988 Board April 12, 1988 Signing April 20, 1988 Effectiveness April 1988 September26, 1988 MidtermReview None foreseen Reformulation- 11/91 Completion September30, 1994 March31, 1997 Closing March31, 1995 March31, 1997 Dates in this column are fromthe 1987 FEPS.
TABLE 4: LOAN DISBURSEMENTS:CUMULATIVE ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL
Appraisal 16.1 38.0 68.1 100.5 126.9 147.0 150.0 0 0 0 estimated 147_0 ______Actual 11.23 28.44 54.63 76.92 94.6 116.76 129.45 141.64 146.8 148.68 Actualas 70 75 80 76 74 79 86 % of estimate Date of Final Disbursement:August 27, 1997 16
TABLE5: KEY INDICATORSFOR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
...... 'g0-.'...... ''...... 'l.S...... Civil Works Primary ArterialRoads -New road construction 47.5 km. 49 km Secondary Arterials - New road construction 13.6kn. 13.3kan DKI Development Roads 35 km 23 km Major Intersection Improvements __X____ - Flyover/Underpass 4 6 Traffic Management _ - Area and Road CorridorImprovement 1 lkm 43 km - Bus Priority Measures 17 km. 17 km. - Traffic signalequipment (Intersections) 25 82 (plus 8 pedestrian) - Road Signs 3,929
Road Maintenance Primary Roads Rehabilitation/Betterment 17 km. PeriodicMaintenance 121km. Secondary Roads Betterment 13.7km. Rehabilitation 189.2km. Training -RTTC- Annualstudent throughput Increasefrom 40 to 100 Increasedfrom 40 to 80
DKI Revenue Improvement Minimum annual increase in real termsfrom 4/1/89to completion ofproject - Local tax revenues 6% 15.8% - PBB revenues 13% 25.6%
TABLE6: KEY INDICATORSFOR PROJECTOPERATION
Key indicators for project operation were not identified in the SAR, nor subsequently during implementation were any defined. For future projects of a similar nature, suitable indicators for the physical works components of road construction and traffic management (bus priority) would be "before and after" traffic speeds, accidentlevels and bus operatingspeeds. 17
TABLE7: STUDIES/TECHNICALASSISTANCE INCLUDED IN THE PROJECT
TRAINING Road Traffic & DGLT TA to expand the full-time course to 4 The objectives were successfully Transportation years; establish a short (3-month) course in achieved. Since RTTC was founded College traffic engineering, transport planning, and in the 1980's, four hundred and fifty (RUC) public transport regulation and planning; students graduated from the D-3 establish in-service training courses in diploma program, and 149 from the public transport operations and D4-Diploma program. This year management for bus company staff; (b) RTTC will double the student expand the campus to double the existing admission from 40 to 80 students. college throughput on the 3-year course; The number of applicants for places and (c) provide training equipment and has reached five thousand. facilities SATLANTAS Bina Marga TA to train about 40 existing College The training was very practical and trainers; (b) develop new curricula; (c) highly relevant. It is seen as a crucial implement new courses part in the development of police traffic control and enforcement capability in Jakarta and other major cities. The only downside is that the career path of some trainees has taken them away from road traffic matters. Public Works Bina Marga Training for senior, middle and junior The objective was achieved. Regional management as well as technicians from Training the local government offices. Courses will Center cover traffic and highway planning, road maintenance and use of computers, mainly focusing on technicians and junior management levels
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION DKI-Jakarta DKI To assist JUPCO in the areas of accounting Assistance to JUPCO was Project Bappeda and financial control, project planning, satisfactory; however the amount of Coordination administration and monitoring (including knowledge transfer is questionable. Advisors land acquisition and resettlement) Assistance in matters pertaining to land acquisition and resettlement was deficient. Road DKI- To improve road maintenance A Road Maintenance Management Maintenance Jakarta management, prepare a road maintenance System (RMMS) was developed and and rehabilitation program and to assist is in its final testing stage. When DPU in carrying out these works; to operational it will assist in the review policies, regulations and formulation of survey-based procedures for adopting privately funded maintenance programs that are more infrastructure rational and economic. Future budgeting will be based on this system. It is also compatible with the system developed for national and provincial roads as well as urban roads. 18
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT JABOTABEK DG To assistJABOTABEK regional Assignmentsuccessfully completed IUIDP BANGDA governmentsin the preparationof capital in 1989. Advisors expenditureprograms for RepelitaV and of individualannual expenditureprograms within the framework of IUIDP Transport DGLT To developan integratedurban transport An integratedtransport plan Network developmentplan and related action plans developedunder this TA formedthe Planning for eachtransport mode concerned;review basis for furtherplanning including Regulation existingand future demandbased on urban the ConsolidatedNetwork (adopted (TNPR) publictransport and devisenew route and on 2/93), a private sectorinitiative serviceplans and schedules for the Kota-BlockM metro line, TA for and preliminarydesign of Duri- Cakungline, but other private sector initiativesare being developed outsidethe plan. Somecross-linking of bus routes has been effected,and new operatorsintroduced, but recommendationsfor restructuring existingroutes are not completely implemented,nor has a monitoring unit been established. The fare structurehas not been changed,but efforts continue. Public DGLT To assist in the review of regulationof Jakarta's strategyplan supports,in Transport licensedservices and to determineactual theory,the use of publictransport. Regulation servicerequirements Howeverin reality, most infrastructuresupports the use of privatevehicles. (Since 1992,25 flyovershave been built, but not one is dedicatedto busways.) Bus lanes are providedbut other drivers ignore them, and there is little enforcement. One idea being entertainedis that of buildingelevated busways so that if the number of buses is increased,the capacityof the main roads is not diminished. ParkingPolicy DGLT/ Reviewstreet car parkingand prepare This TA was not successful. The DLLAJ proposalsto improvetraffic flows;review teamwas too task-orientedand revenuecollection and enforcement perhapstoo academic,resulting in proceduresand prepare proposalsto littletransfer of knowledge. The increasecity revenue from suchchanges study recommendationto establisha new sub-directorateof parking planningunder DLLAJ DKI has not implementedStudy recommendationson off-street chargeshas been adopted,but for on street chargesare still being discussedby the localcouncil. 19
Traffic DGLT To assist DLLAJwith furtherdevelopment All arterialroads were coveredby Management of its 5-yearprogram in traffic traffic managementstudies. In-house managementand bus priorities advisorsfor the Jakartaimmediate Action Program (JIAP)were useful for the transfer of knowledge,and staff capabilitieshave increased. JIAP local area traffic management schemesin particularwere very useful. DKI Revenue DIPENDA- (a) Prepareand assist in implementing 12/90. The study was completedin Improvement DKI directand PBB revenueimprovement July 1990. Recommendationswere and Financial action plans;(b) assist in preparing to be put into an action plan for Management REPELITAV IUIDPexpenditure program implementation.Consultancy for DKI Jakarta;(c) review DKI financial contractcame to an end and managementpolicies and arrangements DIPENDAdid not have specificstaff assignedto carry forwardthe work from where the consultantsstopped. National DGLT To assist and upgradethe capabilitiesof This study was not implemented. Public DGLT(LLAR) staff in the detailed The funds were reallocatedfor short Transport formulation,development and term urban transportplanning implementationof urbanpublic transport advisory services. policy PPD/DAMRI DGLT To supportthe managementteam of PPD Limited successhas been achieved Bus and DAMRIin implementingaction plans with PPD. The new method route Management to improvethe management,operation and was trialed but there were control and Operations provisionof publictransport bus systems problems due to weak supervisory Improvement in Jakartaand regionalcities and middle managementstaff. DAMRI is doingwell in all towns except one. DLLAJAir DGLT To improveair qualitymonitoring and Sometesting of all gasolinepowered Pollution analysisin DKI-Jakartaand help develop vehiclesis underway,with Monitoring nationalvehicle emissioncontrol strategy approximately30% passing and Equipment emissionstests. Testingof all vehiclesis scheduledto begin, in September1998 but enforcement methodsare not defined as yet. The quality of the testing needsto iimproveas non compliantvehicles can pass the test. The Presidentof Indonesiahas decreedthat the switch to unleaded fuel will take placein 1999. 20
FUTURE PROJECT PREPARATION Mass Transit DGBM/ To be determined from results of the The integrated transport plan from Feasibility DGLT TNPR study the TNPR study was developed into Study the Consolidated Network (adopted on 2/93). Further feasibility studies on the initial metro line from Kota to Blok M were undertaken as a private sector initiative. Medium/Large DGCK Continuation of project preparation Technical assistance was provided Cities initiated under the Urban IV project (Ln. for the preparation of the second 1972-IND) JUDP, Semarang-Surakarta UDP, Surabaya UDP and for advisory services of he DG of Water Resources Development, the Bina Program and DKI Jakarta. Kemayoran DGCK (a) To determine appropriate arrangements Taken out of program in 1991 Site and concepts for developing the former because GOI's development plan Development Kemayoran airport site; and (b) to prepare was deemed unacceptable. feasibility studies and bidding documents for the first phase of infrastructure development Jakarta Urban DGH for To develop policy framework and 5 year Acceptance of program by DKI, Transport DKI- investment program for the period 1997- DGLT and DGBM led to JUTSI Short Term Jakarta 2002 for secondary roads, traffic Program Development and JPRIIP. Improvements management and bus priority. (JUTSI) JUTSI DGLT for To develop specific policy guidance and Bina Marga, DGLT and DKI intend Programn DKI- implementation plans for investrnents in to combine results of the JUTSI and Development Jakarta the JUTSI Program JPRIIP studies into a single proposal for the development of the road and public transport network. Such proposal may then be submitted to BAPPENAS for inclusion in the "Blue Book" of projects under consideration or preparation for external finance. Jakarta DGBM To identify and prioritize primary road "Blue Book" proposal based on the Primary Road improvement projects to compliment results of the JPRIIP and JUTSI Improvement secondary road improvement program in studies to be discussed with GOI as Identification JUTSI. the basis for a possible Bank Project. Project (JPRIIP) 21
TABLE 8A: PROJECT COSTS
PrimaryArtenial roads 22.9 23.8 46.7 26.6 27.7 54.3 and intersections SecondaryArterials 43.2 48.8 92 43.9 49.5 93.4 Developmentroads & TrafficManagement Kemayoran Airport 4.2 4.5 8.7______Roadmaintenance 1.9 2.1 4 0 0 0 Equipment 1.1 5 6.1 1.3 5.7 7 ConsultingServices 7.4 13.1 20.5 11.6 20.6 32.2 Training 1.4 3.6 5.0 1.8 4.8 6.6 Unallocated 4.6 5.3 9.9 0 0 0 (Physical contingencies) Land 31 0 31 81* 81 Total Financing 117.7 106.2 223.9 166.2 108.3 274.5 Requirement
T Estimate:See AppendixA.
TABLE 8B: PROJECT FINANCING
. Loca: S =:lForpgu Toa...... Fo. To CentralGovernment 27.0 0.0 27.0 28.9 28.9 DKI-Jakarta 46.9 0.0 46.9 96.9 96.9 IBRD 43.8 106.2 150.0 40.4 108.3 148.7 TOTAL 117.7 106.2 223.9 166.2 108.3 274.5 TABLE 9 ECONOMIC COSTS and BENEFITS
IRR NPV Length Economic Traffic (pculh:one way) (10 year) (10 year) SAR Actual Cost(Rp. Million) Forecast Actual Forecast % Rp. Million Component (km) (km) SAR Actual 1995 1997 2000 BAR Actual BAR Actual
Road Construction OuterRing Road West 10.6 11.5 25,906 50,534 2170 2356-2364 3180 45 54 30,662 82,133 OuterRing Road South 10.0 11,6 22,109 37,286 1850-5760 1789-3865 2610-3650 102 73 68,623 127,327
Buncit-Lingker 6.6 4.2 4,934 7,358 2679-3676 2143-4911 3987-4979 33 75 5,002 15,138 Pinang-Pejompongan/a 5.9 7.1 20,765 22,008 2042-4040 3575-5568 2909-5275 79 65 29,598 78,450 Minggu-Depok 14.4 16.2 8,296 22,080 2700-3800 3499-3648 3000-3900 40 110 79,548 73,974
New Flyovers KebayoranLama 2,0 24,149 40 30,666 PutriHijau 4.0 16,498 59 21,774 AccessKebon Jeruk 3.7 4,249 94 12,131
Note:1. Economiccosts and benefitsat end -1985prices. 2. Trafficdata representativefor multiplesections with differingtraffic demands. 3. Pcu/h:passenger car units/hour. 4. TrafficForecasts are from the SAR. 23
TABLE10: STATUSOF COVENANTSIN LoAN AGREEMENT
i--:-' ...... ,...... ,-----...... -'-'-': ...... -...... tn I imt 4.01(a)-(c) I Complied 12/31of Haverecords and accountsaudited Of the 13 audit reports with after each year and furnish audit to the Bankno recorded,54% were late. Only delay later than 9 monthsafter the close one had a less than of the FY "unqualified" opinion. Schedule5 10 Complied 3/31/89 Prepareand adoptan integrated5- Inadequatetime was provided para I with year expenditureprogram, and for this task.
______subsequent annual programs Schedule5 9, 10 Complied 3/31/90 -Undertakea reviewof projected para 2 with transportdemands; to identify network,policies and plans. -Detailedaction plans for bus, rail 3/31/91 and other modesto be furnishedto the Bank Schedule5 10 Complied Implementa PPD/DAMRI Only limited implementationof para 3 with transportaction plan for the PPD plan. JABOTABEK region Schedule5 10 Complied 6/30/88 Borrowerto appoint:consultants para4 with 9/30/88 for: 1/31/89 (a) ProjectCoordination Office; (b) Transportnetwork planning; ______(c) Air quality monitoring Schedule5 10 Complied ProjectCoordination office to be para 5 with established under BAPPEDA DKI Schedule5 7, 10 Not All land acquisitionand Plan not preparedor agreed. para 6 Complied resettlementto be carriedout in with accordancewith a plan and implementationschedule satisfactory to the Bank Schedule5 2 Complied 3/31/89 DKI to prepare and implementa Actual Increasein real terms para 7 With revenueimprovement plan to 15.8%per year over the life of increaselocal tax revenuesby at the project least 6% per year in real terms Schedule5 2 Complied DKI-Jakartaand DGPajakto carry Actual Increasein real terms pam 8 With out jointly an actionplan to 25.6% per year over the life of increasePBB revenuesby at least the project 13% per year in real terms Schedule5 4,10 Complied DKI-JakartaDevelopment grants para 9 With and developmentbudget allocationsfor urban infrastructure are not to exceedFY88/89 levels in nominalterms Schedule5 10 Not Carry out and furnishto the Bank a The developmentplan for this para 10 complied pre-feasibilitystudy to developthe componentwas unacceptable. with formerKemayoran Airport site The componentwas dropped and the funds reallocated. Covenant Classes: 1. Accounts/Audit;2. Financialperformance/generate revenue from beneficiaries;3. Flow and utilizationof project funds 4 Counterpartfunding; 5 Managementaspects; 6 Environmentalcovenants; 7 Involuntaryresettlement; 8 Indigenouspeople 9 Monitoring,review and reporting;10 Implementation;11 Sectoralor cross-sectoralbudgetary or other resourceallocation 12 Sectoralor cross-sectorpolicy/regulatory/institutional action. 24
TABLE1 1: COMPLIANCEWITH OPERATIONAL MANUAL STATEMENTS
OMS 2.33 Social Issues Associated with Unsatisfactory Involuntary Resettlement in Bank-
______Financed Projects ______OD 4.30 Involuntary Resettlement Unsatisfactory from 1990-1992; Satisfactory remedial actions taken
______from 1993 to end of project. AppendixA on Experienceswith Land Acquisition and Resettlement provides rn-depth coverage on noncompliance withthese Statements.
...... I i8 TABLE1 12: ~ BANK...1~1 .I...... R{ESOURCES: ... STAFF INPUTS 5_ 9~ i ?t
...... --''-''... ''""'"-""''"''''...... '
ThroughAppraisal 58.7 145.6 Appraisalto Board =10.6 28.5 Supervision X 302.2 683.4 Completion 11.6 47.6 TOTAL 383.1 905.1
Staff Inputs in Supervision by FY*
Planned 0 0 18.6 | 42.0| 29.0| 23.0 1.0 26.0 1 16.8 | 12.4 168.8 L.Atual 9.8 |37.5 51.6 | 43.8 . 42.7 42.6 24.4 23.9| 10.9 15.0 302.2
*The SAR did not provide a supervision plan, nor is there any data on resources planned for lending operations or early supervision. The data shown on planned staff inputs is based on information from Forms 590. Actual inputs are from the Cost Accounting System. 25
TABLE 13: BANK RESOURCES: MISSIONS
St--g- - M.nth- No.. Dys Specialties Performance Types ofp bplem y--r pr sons ra.in.. .. .______: _ _- _ _ - - eld_ Is : DO Through appraisal
Preappraisal 06/87
Appraisal 10/87 4 18 0, TE, E, UT - Board to 6/88 2 TE, R,O - - Investigation of railway issues Effectiveness 8/88 1 None. Land acquisition reported ______progressing SPN 1: 5/89 2 3 Division Chief, - - TNPR and integrated Transport System limited E Improvement Study progressing out of phase SPN 2: full 6/89 3 UT, UT, E I 1 Review of compliance with covenants. Very tardy start-up of socio-economic impact study SPN 3: 7/90 4 4 UT, UT,FA Kemayoran airport site, Kebayoran Lama limited E/W Flyover problems SPN 4: full 10/90 5 14 FA, UT, E, 0, I 1 Land acquisition, relocation of utilities, PC lack of commitment to policy TA recommendations SPN 5: full 2/91 3 17 FA, E, 0 1 1 Land acquisition, procurement SPN 6: full 11/91 4 12 FA, E, 0, CE 1 2 Construction quality, land acquisition, relocation of utilities SPN 7: full 10/92 5 14 FA, UT, E, 0, 1 2 Land acquisition, relocation of utilities CE SPN 8: full 4/93 5 6 FA, E, 0, CE, 1 2 Land acquisition, relocation of utilities, SS construction quality, procurement SPN 9: full 5/94 5 10 FA, UT, 0, CE, 2 2 Land acquisition, relocation of utilities, SS construction quality, procurement SPN 10: full 11/94 3 21* UT, 0, CE S S SPN 11: full 3/95 2 4 UT, 0 S S Construction quality SPN 12: full 8/95 2 9* UT, 0 S S Tracer Study SPN 13: full 7/96 3 20* UT, 0, CE S S Construction quality SPN 14: full 10/96 3 15* UT, 0, SS S S ICR 1: 3/97 4 14* UT, SS, 0, PA S S Land acquisition/resettlement; Performance of policy TA; Loan funds uncommitted at closing ICR 2: 7/97 2 14* UT, O S S
Specialties: CE =Civil Engineer R = Railway Specialist E = Economist SS = Social Scientist FA = Financial Analyst TE = Traffic Engineer 0 = Operations Officer UT= Urban Transport Specialist PA = Program Assistant PC = Procurement Assistant
Note: * Days in field is total elapsed time between kick off and wrap up meetings.
APPENDIX A. LAND ACQUISITION AND RESETTLEMENT EXPERIENCES
A. INTRODUCTION
1. The physical infrastructurecomponents of JUDP, includingthe road construction,improvement, and expansion,required extensiveland acquisitionand causedwidespread involuntary displacement of populations. This appendix examinesthe experiencesand performanceof both the Bank and the GOI in this project and the resulting changes in policies,procedures and lessonslearned as a result of this project from its identificationthrough completion. This report is based on analysis of all the project's correspondenceand reports,supplemented by some interviewsand correspondencewith key actors in this project. The space limitationsof the appendixrestrict the presentationof much detail which is available with the ICR team. B. PROJECT SUMMARY
2. JUDP-I was prepared in the period of 1984-1987with a primaryfocus on urban transportand land development. This focus had the followingconsequences:
* Focus on the technical aspects of improvingurban transport neglectedthe examinationof the social costs, and the impact such a project would have on a denselypopulated urban area.
* No social scientist nor environmentalspecialists were representedin any of the project preparation missionsnor in the first four and a half years of projectimplementation (Sept. 1988to April 1993).
* It was well known that land acquisitionwould be required for the expansionof the urban transport network, but there was no social assessment of resettlement impacts or provisions for the rehabilitationof resettledpopulations in the preparatoryphase.
These consequencesin turn aggravatedthe problemsof an already complexproject leadingto delays in land acquisition,and unacceptableresettlement practices.
3. The Bank was remissnot to enforce its policiesor to insistthat agreementsand covenantsbe met. The Bank was also remiss in not understandingthe complexityof regulationson land acquisition, budgeting, and the process for regulatory reform at the DKI Provincial level. The project office for its part lacked the commitment and authority to comply with the arrangements reached during project negotiations, and GOI/DKI did not engage various parties at the community, regional, central, and cabinet levels that would have been necessary to comply with those agreements.
4. The outcome of the project was that between 50,000 and 81,000 persons were affected by JUDP, either through involuntary displacement or partial or total loss of housing and other assets. The true figures will never be ascertained because there was no baseline information compiled during preparation or early implementation. The total amount spent on land acquisition and/or compensation will also never be known because of the incomplete and inefficient record-keeping and the inconsistencies in these data.
5. The resettlement and land acquisition lessons of JUDP have been internalized to a large extent by the Bank and by the Borrower as reflected in current operations. JUDP was one of many projects in the late 1980's which showed the problems of non-compliance with Bank policy. Once the dimension of this project's resettlement impact began to be known, it resulted in more serious and efficient enforcement of the Bank's policy in Indonesia as well as to the establishment of more consistent monitoringmechanisms, and an attemptto achievea more sensitivetreatment of social issues in general. AppendixA: LandAcquisition and ResettlementExperiences Page 2
There is substantial room however, to improve the dialogue and performance of the GOI and its agencies in this respect. In the end, the overall project's impact and its performance assessment ought not to separate the negative performance of resettlement from other project components. By so doing there is a risk that one of the fundamental lessons of JUDP may be lost. This lesson: that the consideration of the social dimension cannot be disregarded in any instance, and is particularly sensitive in high density urban areas, is one of increasing relevance in East Asia projects. Unfortunately the lesson was borne by the thousands of displaced people.
6. The limitation of the INPRES 9/1973 and their implementation guidelines are seen as basic to the difficulties experienced, and the Presidential Decree (KEPRES) 55/1993 goes far to address them. In principle the KEPRES 55/1993 declares that the project affected people will receive compensation based on mutual agreement between the project affected people and the project officers, but most of the operational guidelines are biased to the formal bureaucracy. Additional guidelines need to be provided to ensure that all project affected people will not be worse-off after project implementation. Consultation and information dissemination need to be strengthened, and there should be internal and external control mechanisms to ensure that all activities comply with the guidelines. Assistance from Universities or independent organizations will be useful to help the community go through the difficult time of relocation.
C. JUDP: PREPARATION AND IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE
7. As previously stated, JUDP's preparation dates back to 1984, when it had an exclusively transport-oriented focus. At this time there was a Bank policy concerning involuntary displacement and land acquisition (OMS 2.33). This policy's successor, OD 4.30 effective June 1990, differed little from the earlier OMS. Both policies call for a number of actions to be undertaken at various phases of the project from identification through implementation. There were some significant gaps between the World Bank's policies and procedural requirements for land acquisition, and those GOI regulations and practices in effect at that time (i.e. before KEPRES 55/93 was issued) when the project was being prepared and negotiated. One of the significant gaps concerned the definition of squatters and occupants of land without clear title and their rights to compensation. When the project was being prepared and negotiated, these issues were not raised with the government.
8. By 1986 when GOI introduced the concept of integrated urban infrastructure development planning (IUIDP), BAPPENAS had already committed funds for land acquisition during the financial year 1986 for those parts of the project which had been taken through to the detailed engineering phase and planned to apply for retroactive financing. By September 1987 Final Executive Project Summary (FEPS) documentation indicates that there had already been substantial land acquisition undertaken by GOI and that a large number of the occupants of the land had been moved already.
9. Three documents from DKI obtained in the Legal Files show the list of compensation budgeted for only the first year's construction (Route B Section II), and a note stating that there was little detail to be obtained since there "was no engineering/topographical survey made". The estimate of 370 hectares is given in these documents as the total area of land to be acquired for the project as a whole. If these figures were not based on engineering or topographical surveys, it is clear that they were only estimates rather than realistic figures. It is important to note that the SAR subsequently gave the impression that all land acquisition for the project had been anticipated and planned for, which was not the case. The FEPS makes the point that the institutional capacity existed to undertake land acquisition for a project of this magnitude. However, the correspondence shows that there were serious reservations about the Appendix A: Land Acquisition and Resettlement Experiences Page 3
Indonesian's resettlement policies and practices as well as their institutional capacity within the Bank. It was agreed that the appraisal mission would review GOI's resettlement policy and approach, and "request GOI for a resettlement plan which was consistent with Bank guidelines, and an effective method for monitoring it. The plan and monitoring system would be a condition of loan negotiations."
10. Because the issues of resettlement and land acquisition were not dealt with until appraisal, there was no resettlement impact assessment nor an adequate study of the area and cost of land to be acquired. There was no baseline study, therefore the exact number of individuals and households which were resettled will never be known, nor do we have a record of how many people were affected and suffered partial or complete loss of homes or other assets. The figures given in the project files range from "several thousand" (EPS Meeting 9/21/87) to "1,000 households and 40-50,000 people" by the time the SAR was finalized (2/14/88). The inconsistency in the figures is addressed below because it is an intrinsic part of the problems JUDP-I encountered during implementation.
11. The appraisal mission's report does not clarify these issues. It verified that land had been cleared and people moved for the components to be constructed in the first year of implementation; estimated that the total number of people to be displaced would be 40-50,000, and acknowledged that there was " no plan for facilitating and minimizing the negative social and economic impacts of an urban land acquisition program of this magnitude..." It follows that: ".The Bank would wish to reach agreement with the Government at negotiations on an appropriate land acquisition and resettlement plan for the project." (Appraisal Mission Aide Memoire, October 16, 1987, page 13).
12. During Negotiations held in February 1-3, 1988, the Indonesian Delegation presented not a plan but a list of physical targets, including the land which had already been obtained for the initial physical works. The GOI's position was that there were already well established measures within the Indonesian laws to deal with land acquisition and compensation issues and therefore there was no need for a plan. The Bank's concerns however, resulted in an agreement on three basic points:
(1) That GOI would cause land acquisition and resettlement to be carried out in accordance with a "plan and implementation schedule satisfactory to the Bank'", but also that "every effort should be made to re-establish the standard of living ofpersons moved and households affected by land acquisition;
(2) That the project coordinating office would monitor these actions, and:
(3) That DKI would monitor the impact on the affected families and after the first year make recommendations for improvements in the procedures and implementation of resettlement (Minutes of Negotiations and SAR, p.42, para. 6.9).
13. The wording of the covenant is such that it left the Bank room to require a number of actions to ensure compliance with Bank policy as well as fair treatment of the people to be displaced or compensated, but there was lack of appropriate support for the implementation. Because land acquisition was such a key issue in the timely implementation of the physical works it was anticipated that land acquisition would take place one year in advance of construction needs. It was not understood how difficult it was to achieve under enforced procedures then current. The solutions proposed as remedial measures: to assist the displaced population to find PERUMNAS rental housing, join transmigration schemes, or return to their villages of origin were never taken seriously because they were so unrealistic.
Loan AgreementSchedule 5, paragraph6. Appendix A: Land Acquisition and Resettlement Experiences Page 4
14. The project's Coordination Office (JUPCO) was to be, according to the TOR of Feb. 16, 1988, responsible for monitoring the resettlement process and assessing it's impacts.2 While JUPCO was beginning to organize, in June of 1988 (before project effectiveness in September), the Bank conducted an evaluation of land acquisition and resettlement of four-Bank-financed projects, among which was JUDP3. The consultant's findings, even at this early stage (Pasar Pagi resettlement was under way and nearly successfully completed) confirmed that:
1. The rates of compensation were too low to enable people to buy equivalent land; 2. Resettlement as per Presidential Instruction 9/1973 was not taking place; 3. There was no transparency in the legal framework used to expropriate land, and; 4. There was no body established to hear legal complaints and to set compensation rates.
These findings were similar to previous findings on land acquisition. There was no suggestion that project personnel had broken any regulations on land acquisition, but rather that regulations themselves required review, if they were to comply with Bank guidelines.
15. The consultant recommended that:
I. The GOI and the Bank jointly review the issues of land acquisition and resettlement; 2. GOI should inform all sectors of the guidelines for land acquisition and resettlement; 3. GOI should provide for future projects complete plans specifying the legal framework, people's rights, and arbitration processes to be used in resettlement and land acquisition; 4. The RAPs should be more comprehensive, and include especially the poor and landless; 5. Monitoring agencies should be independent of the executing agencies; and 6. Participation of the affected people, rather than GOI appointees should be included in the process.
16. None of these measures were taken within the project. Instead, the record shows that in the period between September 1988 and April 1993 not only was there no effort by Bank Missions to protest or censure DKI for non-compliance with the agreements which had been reached at negotiations, but that there was constant contradiction in the statements of the supervision missions Back to Office reports and the Form 590s. While the reports cite land acquisition as a major problem causing delays in the physical works, all forms 590s state that land acquisition and resettlement are "in compliance". This suggests serious misreporting by the Bank Missions and lack of diligence on the part of Bank management since it is obvious that there was no compliance with a "plan and implementation schedule acceptable to the Bank"; no monitoring on the part of JUPCO, and; no study of the evicted families and suggested modifications to the resettlement process on the part of DKI. Instead there were documented excuses of
JUPCO will be responsible for the monitoring of the land acquisition and resettlement process and will be assisted by the consultants to carry out the monitoring and also an evaluation of the process in terms of the World Bank's Guidelines for Resettlement. The consultants should (a) familiarize themselves fully with the regulations procedures and processes concerned; and (b) select a suitable sample of families (with and without tenure) affected by the first year's land acquisition program and carry out a base line socio-economic survey of the families. The subsequent movements of the families concerned should be traced and a follow up survey should be carried out within 3-6 months of the initial displacement to determine their new socio-economic condition and prospects. Based on the surveys and the actual level of compensation paid or assistance in kind rendered by DKI Jakarta the economic impact of the resettlement program should be determined. Based on the evaluation results the consultants should prepare recommendations for improvement of the pertinent regulations and procedures before June 30, 1989 and assist in drafting the necessary amendments to the regulations and in their subsequent implementation...."
3 David Butcher, June 1988 Land Acquisition and Resettlement under Four World Bank Financed Projects. (Consultancy Report IENED/ASTEN [Industry and Energy Department, Energy Development Division] Asia Technical Environment Department]. Appendix A: Land Acquisition and Resettlement Experiences Page 5 budgets, time, lack of consultants, etc. which the Bank accepted. There was no attention given to resettlement, to the rehabilitation of the affected people, nor to improving the land acquisition and compensation procedures and measures. Within six months of effectiveness JUPCO decided to eliminate the table on land acquisition from its Quarterly Reports. Simultaneously, the numbers of households requiring compensation for land acquisition and the price of land were escalating in response to the explosive growth of Jakarta and to the realism of the land required for construction. The lack of transparency and apparent arbitrariness of the eviction processes resulted in antagonizing the majority of affected people and causing those who could afford to do so to contest the issues in court.
17. The Bank began to assess the resettlement experience in Bank-financed projects in 1992. As a result of this Bank-wide review or resettlement, JUDP was marked as one project with serious resettlement impacts, and where the Bank's policy had not been followed. Largely as a result of this new spotlight on resettlement, as well as because there was a newly formed Environmental and Social Development Unit in the Jakarta resident mission, there was --for the first time in 1993-- a resettlement expert included in the supervision mission for the project. In 1993 also, GOI altered its land acquisition regulations with a Presidential Decree, a higher status than the earlier INPRES of 1973 and largely along the lines of the Bank's guidelines. Once the resettlement issue was opened, the magnitude of the problem became evident and finally there were studies which tried to assess the impact of these experiences. By 1994 when some of these studies were conducted, however, it was hard to locate many of the thousands of households which had been relocated, and a tracer study was fairly ineffectual due to its scope and methodological shortcomings.4 There is enough qualitative information from some of the areas where people resettled to know that the social and psychological impacts of this project were particularly severe for the poorest segments of the urban population5. A Compensation and Rehabilitation Study using unallocated project funds began in 1996 to conduct a remedial program. Although the scale of this program is too small to make an effective impact on the affected population it is a way of showing GOI that the Bank has some degree of commitment to rehabilitation of resettled populations.
D. OUTCOME OF THE LAND ACQUISITION AND RESETTLEMENT EXPERIENCE
18. While the extent and impact of resettlement in terms of number of people and affected assets cannot be known in the absence of social and economic baseline information, the qualitative studies document extensively, if not statistically, the extent of human marginalization and impoverishment, psychological and social dislocation, and loss of assets and income eaming opportunities.
19. Compensation was tied to tenure status and documentation of rights to land, but lack of common understanding between the Bank and DKI over the issues of legal land tenure and settlements led to different perceptions about who was entitled to compensation. From the Bank's perspective, traditional titles such as adat milik titles, some of which dated from the Dutch period ( Verponding Eigendom
4 Secondara Data Analysis Land Acquisition Study in JUDP-I. GOI and Lembaga Demografi, Universitas Indonesia (Demographic Institute, Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia). Jakarta, 1995. This is part of a three volume study. The other two reports used and cited here are: Qualitative Analysis of Land Acquisition Study in JUDP-I, and Tracer Study of SocioEconomic Status of Post Resettled Evicted Families. Land Acquisition Studv i JUDP-I. Jellinek, Lea. "Involuntary Resettlement in Jakarta." Paper, January, 1995
------A Bottom Up View of Involuntary Resettlement and Impoverishment Risks in Jakarta. Paper, Dec. 1995. Appendix A: Land Acquisition and Resettlement Experiences Page 6
Letters), should have led to full and legal compensation for that large group of people.6 From DKI's perspective, these people (as well as those without occupancy titles and renters) were considered as illegal squatters on state-owned lands. They did not receive compensation, but in some cases they got a "transport allowance" to move out. The worst impacted segments of the population were the most marginal and impoverished households. The group which had hak adat milik/girik, that is to say, supported by receipts showing payment of property taxes received some compensation for land. The compensation rates established by law, however, were always below market price and too low to permit evictees to buy land plus construct new houses, therefore only those better-off households with savings could restore their standard of physical living.
20. Income levels fell as a result of two different processes. First, a large segment of the evictees had to move further out to the boundaries of the city. They were either forced to find new employment in the new areas or to spend extra time and money to commute to the old locations. Second --and more prevalent phenomenon-- the resettlement destroyed the income earning opportunities of many people who derived their livelihood from the informal sector. This happened largely because the social fabric upon which many of these businesses depended was destroyed in the resettlement process.
21. The social dislocation suffered by the most marginal and impoverished people has been documented in the JTUDPstudies. These also show significant human suffering as a result of losing the social and affective networks which are the basis of the urban kampung structure. By-products of this social dislocation included a higher incidence of disease because the relocation sites were often more crowded, have fewer services and less infrastructure. Malnutrition rose as a result of lowered incomes and social depression, as did mortality because the old people primarily, felt at a loss in new settings and could not "live" effectively.
22. Combining the available information from project reports and the Land Acquisition Study, it is estimated that the total number of affected persons may be as high as 81,508. The best estimate of the cost of land acquisition was Rp. 149 Billion. The land area best estimate is a minimum of 265 hectares reported in 1992. The originally budgeted amount for land acquisition was Rp. 51.6 Billion (US$31 million equivalent). Thus land acquisition costs increased almost threefold from the original estimates. The delays in land acquisition cost the project a minimum of 13 months' delay. The reasons for the delays were various, but primarily the fact that the legal procedures for land acquisition were cumbersome and slow. When this slow process was further encumbered by disputes over the price of land and compensations offered by DKI, plus court cases of people refusing to move or contesting the entire process, the DKI institutions responsible for the land acquisition were unable to respond in an effective and timely manner. The delays should have been anticipated and indicated as a project risk, in particular when 68% of the project's investment costs depended on the effective and timely land acquisition. The budgeting mechanisms and calendar for land acquisition of DKI also further encumbered this process because there were no funds available when the land for the following year's construction was to be acquired.
23. The Bank's performance was unsatisfactory and DKI's inability to perform under current regulation should have been addressed by various parties. None of the agreements reached on
6 Notably in this categorywere the Betawiswhose lands were inheritedfrom their ancestors. The lands had been granted to them by the Dutch. Conversionsof these letterswere mandatedby PublicLaw 5/1960. Few of thesepeople knew of the mandatoryconversions and even fewer realizedthat the conversiongranted them the title of renters,not ownerswhich they had always assumedthey were. Areas thus affectedincluded Kedoya, Kelapa Dua and Manggarai. AppendixA: Land Acquisitionand ResettlementExperiences Page 7 resettlement and land acquisition were ever enforced by the Bank, and DKI was incapable of changing the status quo. There is the appearance that until 1992-93 nobody cared about the social aspect of resettlement but only about the delays caused by the problems of land acquisition. The signal the Bank sent to DKI and GOI was that, regardless of policy, there was no serious concern about the welfare of the displaced populations
E. LESSONS LEARNEDFROM JUDP
24. JUDP was prepared and became effective at a time when the Bank's policy on involuntary resettlement was not being taken seriously. This environment changed dramatically as a result of the Bank-wide Resettlement Review in 1993 and changes in Indonesia's resettlement regulations also in 1993. JUDP's experiences have contributed not only to taking these policies seriously, but to require compliance in areas which are fundamental to a project's success.
(i) Legal Framework. A legal framework on land titling and tenancy, agreed between the Bank and the Borrower, and well understood by all parties to resettlement activities, has to be the starting point for the preparation and implementation of Resettlement Action Plans (RAP).
(ii) Design. Land acquisition and resettlement have to be an integral part of project design, including the accurate identification of the scope, magnitude, and mitigation measures required for resettlement, rehabilitation, and land acquisition; as well as an assessment of the institutional capacity and adequacy. of the legal framework to effectively undertake land acquisition and resettlement.
(iii) Resettlement and Land Acquisition Plan. Since JUDP, the policy has become mandatory and clearance of resettlement plans are required prior to negotiation. There are better mechanisms within the Bank, as well as a clearer understanding with the GOI about the requirements for resettlement. This continues to be a difficult subject, but there are clearer guidelines and procedures to prevent or mitigate the adverse impacts of resettlement. Dated legal covenants prevent the delays and fuzziness in carrying out required actions, as happened in JUDP 1.
(iv) Institutional Issues. Realism is required in the design of the institutions which will carry out resettlement as well as land acquisition. The policy provides not only for an examination of the legal framework but for the establishment of adequate institutions to implement the RAP, and the provision of assistance to the Borrower in those cases where it is needed to improve existing procedures and legislation.
(v) Monitoring. While external monitoring is essential to ensure that a RAP is followed and that there is transparency in the compensation and rehabilitation process, a good design will assist to ensure that the project itself has internal monitoring and feedback mechanisms to redress errors or adverse impacts.
APPENDIX B. ICR MISSIONS' AIDE MEMOIRE
JUDP 1 INDONESIA: JABOTABEK URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (IBRDLoan 2932-IND) ImplementationCompletion Mission March 11 to 21, 1997 Aide-Me moire
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 This aide-memoire summarizes the understandings and agreements reached between the Government of Indonesia and a World Bank implementation completion mission that visited Jakarta, Indonesia from March 11 to 21, 1997. The mission was led by Mr. Edward Dotson, Urban Transport Specialist, and comprised Mrs. JoAnne Nickerson, Program Assistant, Infrastructure Operations Division, Ms. Concepcion Del Castillo, Resettlement Specialist, Asia Technical Department, Human Resources Division, Mr. William Hardi, Transport Operations Officer, and Mr. Manzoor Rehman, Implementation Specialist, consultant. The mission wishes to express its sincere appreciation to the Government of Indonesia and the representatives of the various agencies involved in the project for their hospitality and constant availability over the course of the mission. The conclusions and recommendations contained in this aide-memoire are those of the mission and are subject to confirmation by World Bank management.
2. PROJECTBACKGROUND AND COMPOSITION
2.1 Preparation. During 1986 the Government of Indonesia (GOI) introduced the concept of integrated urban infrastructure development programming (IUIDP) grouping together urban transport, water supply and sewerage, drainage and flood control and kampung improvement (KIP). Due to Jakarta's large size, it was decided that it would not be possible to undertake activities in all the IUIDP areas under one project; therefore, they were broken down as follows. The first JABOTABEK Urban Development Project (JUDP 1, Ln. 2932-IND) dealt with urban transport, the Second JUDP (Ln. 3219- IND) with water supply and sewerage, and the Third JUDP (Ln. 3246-IND) with KIP and drainage and flood control.
2.2 Project Objectives. The project's institutional objectives are: (a) to support integrated infrastructure development planning and programming in the Jabotabek region and urban transport programming in DKI-Jakarta in particular; (b) to increase DKI's technical capabilities in preparing and implementing road construction, and road rehabilitation and maintenance programs; (c) to improve traffic management in the region; (d) to improve GOI's policies, operations and regulations for public transport; and (e) to prepare for future integrated development expenditures in the urban sector.
Through physical improvements the project would (a) reduce traffic congestion in DKI-Jakarta; (b) improve pedestrian access and road safety; (c) introduce public transportation priority schemes; and (d) open up additional lands for urban development in environmentally safe fringe areas. AppendixB: ImplementationCompletion Mission -Aide Memoire Page 2
2.3 Components. The project has three main components: technical assistance, training and physical works.
2.4 Technical assistance was grouped together as follows:
(a) Project Implementation Support to assist with (i) project management; (ii) final engineering design; and (iii) construction supervision; and
(b) Institutional and Policy Development for advisory services in (i) integrated infrastructure planning and programming; (ii) municipal revenue improvement; (iii) urban transport planning and policy development; (iv) air quality monitoring; (v) road planning and traffic management; (vi) road maintenance; and (vii) future project preparation.
2.5 Training. In addition to on-the-job training by various advisors under technical assistance, formal training in traffic engineering was offered as follows:
(a) Road Traffic and Transport Training College (RTTC) to expand courses at this DGLT facility at Bekasi;
(b) SATLANTAS to help establish a training program at the new traffic police training college at Serpong by training trainers, developing curricula and implementing new courses; and
(c) Traffic Engineering Practice to extend the program initiated under the Regional Cities Urban Transport Project (Ln. 2817-IND).
2.6 Physical Works components, as originally conceived, included:
(d) Primary Arterial Roads for construction of 10 km of new road links by DGH;
(e) Secondary Arterial Roads for new construction or major upgrading of about 66 km of primary and secondary arterial roads;
(f) Major Intersections improvements to four major intersections through construction of flyovers;
(g) Development Roads (about 3 5 km) on the city's eastern and western fringes and the former Kemayoran Airport site;
(h) Traffic Management to provide (i) comprehensive improvements to the main road network which will involve less than full road reconstruction; (ii) bus priority measures; (iii) traffic signal equipment; (iv) intersection improvements; (v) pedestrian improvements; (vi) signing and road marking by DKI-Jakarta; and
(i) Road Maintenance for a four year program of routine and periodic maintenance, including institutional development. Appendix B: Implementation Completion Mission - Aide Memoire Page 3
3. PROJECTSTATUS
3.1. The project's status,in terms of physicalprogress, consultant services, financial progress and Loan disbursementsat the end of the missionwas as follows.
PhysicalProgress
3.2 CivilWorks Part A (for DGH). All civilworks contracts including those foreseenunder the initial loan extensionaction plan have been completed. Contractsunder the secondloan extension action plan are scheduledfor completionon March31, 1997.
3.3 Civil WorksPart B (for DPU-DKI).The DPU-DKIcontract 'Manggarai Underpass Connection' (JUPCORef. 1.DR.14)was completedin September1996. Final handover was June 1997. The contractor for workson RoadImprovement in North Jakarta(JUPCO Ref. l .DM.11) underthe secondaction plan mobilizedon October1, 1996. The workswere completedon March6, 1997.
3.4 Equipment.The remainingtwo contractsfor vehicleemission inspection equipment (JUPCO Ref. l.DE.02)and air qualitymonitoring equipment(JUPCO Ref. 1.DE.03)were completedin August 1996.
Consultant Services
3.5 Three Technical Assistance (TA) contracts closed during the mission:
* DPU-DKI Road Maintenance Supervision (Ref l.DB.11) (as an addendum to the Senen Flyover Supervision Contract). This had been extended to cover supervision of the works in North Jakarta under the second loan extension action plan. The contract ended on March 15, 1997; - DGLT TA JUTSI Program Development (Ref l.LD.1-1). The mission attended a detailed presentation of the study results to DGLT and DKI by the JUTSI Team on March 11, 1997. The contract ended on March 31, 1997; and - DGBM (BINKOT) TA for Jakarta Primary Road Improvement Identification Program (JPRIIP) (Ref 1.BA. 06). The mission attended a detailed presentation of the study results to DGH and DKI by the JPRIIP Team on March 10, 1997. The contract ended on March 25, 1997.
3.6 Two TA contracts were ongoing up to the Loan closing date: * BAPPEDA DKI Land Acquisition, Compensation and Resettlement Action Program (Ref. LDB.22). The mission discussed the progress and future of this program with the University of Indonesia Lembaga Demografi Team. While this is a program with limited impact, it seeks to assist the traceable households displaced under JUDP- 1. The program is assisting them through income-generating and job creation activities, home improvements, and budget management training. The importance of this program lies not in its scale but in that it constitutes a significant milestone in cooperation between BAPPEDA and the University of Indonesia. It is intended to show the potential for remedial action for involuntarily displaced populations, and demonstrates the seriousness of the Bank in complying with its own policy on involuntary resettlement. * DPU-DKI TAfor Road Maintenance Management System (Ref l.DB.24). The mission had a brief discussion on the progress of the Stage II study with DPU-DKI and their consultants. AppendixB: ImplementationCompletion Mission - Aide Memoire Page 4
Financial Progress
3.7 About Rp. 374.57billion of projectcost has been committed(contracted) from the total estimated projectcost of Rp.378.58 billion. Finalproject costs and the final financingplan will be providedby JUPCOonce the four-monthgrace period for submittingwithdrawal applications is over on July 31, 1997
3.8 Loan Disbursements. At the start of the mission,and based on data to February28, 1997, loan disbursementswere US$143.75million (includingremaining initial deposit). Table I below shows the Loan allocationsby categoryover the courseof the project. Table 2 shows the status of disbursements by category as of end February.
Table 1: Disbursements (US$)
:00..- ...... :0-:S,''...... ,,,.. ..0- ...... t , ,. .{...... , .,.... 2
Civil works for 35,000,000 75 31,300,000 55 34,620,00 55 primary arterial roads O______Civil works for 69,000,000 75 69,000,000 75 70,010,00 75 secondaryroads 0 Civil works for 6,500,000 75 0 0 0 0 formerKemayoran Airport Site .______...... _...... Maintenance 4,000,000 100 4,000,000 100 0 100 (secondary roads) _ _ ...... ______O______...... _ Equipment 5,000,000 100of foreign; 5,000,000 100of 5,400,000 100 of foreign; 95 of loa foreign; 95 of local ...... (ex-factory); 95 of local (ex-factory);...... 65 of local (ex-factory); 65 of local expenditures 65 of local expendituresfor for otheritems expenditures. oth.eritems procured for other procuredlocally locally items procured ______~~~~locally______Consultants' services 20,500,000 100 29,400,000 100 33,360,00 100
Training 5,000,000 100 6,900,000 100 6,610,000 100
Unallocated 5,000,000 4,400,000 0 TOTAL 1150,000,00J150,000,00 150,000,0 AppendixB: ImplementationCompletion Mission - AideMemoire Page 5
Table 2: CategoryRecap as of end February1997 -'.'''- ">"'''''"'''"''''''"'""'.'.'"......
1) Civilworks for new primaryarterial roads 3,498,894.62 ...... 31,121,105.38
2) Civilworks for secondarterial roads ...... 1,927,518.73 68,082,481.27
3) Maintenance 0.00- --...... 00
4) Equipment 53,186.91 5,346,813.09
5) ConsultantServices 3,251,584.42 30,108,435.58
6) Training 558.61 6,609,441.39
SpecialAccount, Revolviiig Fund for all -2,483,508.93 2,483,508.93 categories
TOTALs 6,248,234.36 143,751,785.64
At present US$350,000 in consulting services remains uncommitted and is likely to be canceled.
4. IMPLEMENTATIONPERFORMANCE
A.^Views of the Borrower
4.1 Through interviews and meetings,the missionwas able to obtain the preliminary views of a wide range of government representatives, including from BAPPENAS, DGH, DGLT, DPU-DKI, DLLAJ- DKI, and BAPPEDA-DKI. In general all representatives of the Borrower were positive about the development outcomes of the project. They also saw the value of JUPCO as the "single window" to the Bank, and pointed out that JUPCO was the first use of such an approach in a Bank project. A few common themes emerged, including the slowness and complexity of Bank procedures, and difficulties with land acquisition (rather than resettlement).
DirectorateGeneral of Highways
4.2 PrimaryArterial Roads. DGH felt that the road sub components all had yielded high benefits. Concerns were expressed over the difficulties with land acquisition (carried out in accordance with GOI regulations, by DKI), and the resultant delays to the construction program. Delays in utility relocation due to difficulties with electricity and gas utilities were also cited as concerns.
4.3 SATLANTASTraining Program. This program was considered a success, the only downside being that the career path of some of the trained personnel had taken them out of direct involvement with road traffic matters. The program was extended through the Bank's Second Highway Sector AppendixB: ImplementationCompletion Mission - Aide Memoire Page 6
Loan(HSL2,Ln. 3712-IND),and DGH would like further Bank support, includingfor equipmentand for a test track.
4.4 RoadMaintenance Management. DGH had some reservationsabout the consultants recommendations on the organisational structure and functional relationships for maintenance of primary arterial roads, and are to supply details. The approachdeveloped under this TA is to be used as a pilot for other cities, pendingthe introductionof the full Urban Road ManagementSystem (URMS), being developedunder HSL2 and the StrategicUrban Roads InfrastructureProject (SURIP,Ln. 4054-IND).
4.5 JakartaPrimary RoadImprovement Identification Project (JPRIIP).This sub componentwas added at the time of the second loan extension to utilise some of the unallocated proceeds of the Loan. Afterreview and comment,DGH hopes to combinethe results of this studywith the results from the JUTSIProgram Extension to producea single consolidatedproposal for developmentof the road networkin Jakarta, ratified by the SteeringCommittees of both studies. The proposalwould then be submittedto BAPPENASfor inclusionin the "Blue Book". DPU-DKI
4.6 Secondary Arterial Roads and Development Roads. The outcome for city development has been positive, with some seven flyovers and 47 kms of road being constructed. Road construction had been speeded up and local traffic problems solved. Even so road space occupies only 5.7% of land area, compared with Tokyo at 14%. The list of schemes is different from the SAR, with changes being accommodated by reallocation of funds, for example for the Manggerai underpass. 4.7 Land acquisition costs, however, increased almost fivefold from an SAR estimate of Rp. 45.9 billion or approximately US$31 million to a final amount of Rp. 141 billion, compared to a civil works cost of Rp. 160 billion (excluding design and supervision). Based on this experience, DPU-DKI engineers consider it preferable to build new roads than to widen existing roads due to the higher cost of frontage property along existing roads. For any future Bank project, DPU-DKI would wish to acquire all land at the start of the project, and would try to arrange local financing to do this through Bank-DKI. 4.8 At the start of the project, there was a reluctance to submit procurement documents to the Bank for approval before they had been approved by GOI. As staff became more comfortable with Bank procedures, documents were submitted in parallel. Bank processing of procurement documents improved in the last three years of the project. Bank funded projects have added value for a project manager since they are accorded special treatment by other agencies in administration and in undertaking associated works. 4.9 Bank procedures were considered too complex and time consuming. Delegation of responsibility for ICB procurement to RSI would expedite the approval process, as well as raising the threshold for ICB to US$5 million or more. Disbursement schedules at the start of the project should be more realistic and take account of the time necessary to complete final engineering designs and land acquisition. 4.10 Secondary Road Maintenance This component was expanded during the course of the project at DKI request to provide for the development of a Road Management Maintenance System (RMMS). This is currently in the final testing stage and, when fully operational, will assist in the formulation of survey-based maintenance programs that are more rational and economic. Future budgeting will be based on this system. AppendixB: ImplementationCompletion Mission - Aide Memoire Page 7
DLLAJ-DKI
4.11 Traffic Management. All arterial roads have been covered by traffic management studies. In house advisors as provided for the Jakarta Immediate Action Program (JIAP) were more useful for the transfer of knowledge than consultant teams designing schemes in their own offices. JIAP local area traffic management schemes in particular were very useful. Many schemes have been implemented, and the capabilities of the staff increased. 4.12 Bus Priority. Bus lanes were introduced on a trial basis on a number of roads, which resulted in faster journey times for buses, but negative reactions from motorists and limited enforcement have prevented full implementation. Nevertheless, it is recognised that further priority measures are required, and that the next step should be the introduction of flyovers for buses and fully segregated busways as proposed in the JUTSI Program Development Study. 4.13 Traffic Signals. Despite procurement delays, the installation of traffic signals has accelerated the initial introduction of the Jakarta Area Traffic Control System (ATCS). 4.14 Improvements to Bus Services. The recommendations of the Transport Network Planning and Regulation studies (see para. 4.16) were generally accepted. Route network restructuring was resisted by owner drivers who feared that their income levels would be reduced, but is gradually being implemented. There has been cross linking on a number of routes. There are now more buses on the streets, and seven new private companies have entered the market, but it is recognised that little deregulation has occurred.
DGLT
4.15 Road Traffic and Transport Training College (RTTC). The objectives set out for consolidation and extension of the RTTC training program and facilities have been successfully achieved. The interest in the degree courses is such that in the last academic year there were over 1000 applicants for 40 places. RTTC now has the capacity to increase student intake to 60 and soon 80 persons. However realising this potential is constrained by current civil service rules on recruitment and placement of staff (which the mission was unable to pursue). RTTC intake is drawn from secondary school graduates by examination. Comments were made that some intake should also come from existing DLLAJ staff, as necessary with a lower but appropriate entry standard.
4.16 Transport Network Planning and Regulation (TNPR) Studies. The integrated transport plan developed in TNPR has formed the basis for subsequent planning and development work, including the Consolidated Network of February 1993, and the initiatives from the private sector for the Kota-Blok M metro line, and the Tangerrang - Bekasi line, as well as for the JUTSI and JPRIIP work financed later by the Loan.
4.17 As noted in the comments from DLLAJ-DKI, only limited success has been achieved in the implementation of proposals for bus network restructuring and deregulation. Cross-linking had been effective, but monitoring had not been, nor had the fare structure been changed, but efforts are continuing...
4.18 Parking Policy This TA did not function as well as had been hoped. Although the consultant team had worked in DLLAJ-DKI offices, it was felt that the team was too task orientated, and perhaps too academic, with the result that there was less transfer of knowledge than would have been expected. Data collection was continuing. DKI has made no change in the organisational arrangements for administration of parking or in parking charges, even though both recommendations were supported by the technical departments which participated in the TA. Appendix B: Implementation Completion Mission - Aide Memoire Page 8
4.19 PPD and DAMRIBus Managementand OperationsImprovement. Limited success has been achievedwith PPD. The new methodroute was trialed on route 55 and is now standardon all PATAS AC routes,but there are control problems(scheduling, financial and maintenance)due to weak supervisoryand middle managementstaff. In contrast,DAMRI in all cities is doing well except Medan. 4.20 Air PollutionMonitoring and Control Standardsare now betterthan before, with enforcement of vehicle emission standardsdue to start in September1998. DKI is conductingon-street inspection trials, which suggestthat only 30% of vehicleswill achievethe emission standard.
4.21 JUTSL Studyrecommendations are to be reviewedby the Steering Committeewith a view to preparinga consolidatedfive year programwith JPRIIPfor DGLT,DGH and DKI, a "Blue Book" entry, and implementinga pilot busway scheme.
B. Views of the Mission
4.22 The missionwas struckwith the sense of ownershipof, and supportfor the project by all agencies. Discussionswere frank and open, and the desire from technicalstaff to continuewith a similar project in the future was clear. Flexibilitywas shownduring the course of the project in adjustingthe project's scope in response to changingcircumstances but within the developmentobjectives, on the occasion of Project reformulationin November1991, and at the time of the first Loan extension in March 1995.
4.23 Constructionquality duringthe projectwas mixed as is recognisedby all parties, and steps have been taken to improvethe qualityof contractorsand of designand supervision. The limited inspectionof completedworks undertakenby the missionshowed no significantdeterioration in civil works sub- components. 4.24 Three issues remainof concernafter the mission: resettlementperformance, policy recommendationsnot acted upon, and the role and responsibilitiesof JUPCO. The missioncommenced a full review of Bank and Borrowerperformance on resettlement,including reviewing previous Bank reviewsand the current Action Program. This suggeststhat there was a conceptualgap in the Bank's thinking(and reflected in the Borrower's approach),that land acquisitioninvolved dimensionsof propertyand expropriationalone to the disregardof the social dimension. The focus was on land acquisitionand not on the consequencesof deprivingpeople of land and assets, nor the social and economicaspects of physical displacement.Resettlement specialists did not participatein supervision missionsduring the most criticalperiod involvingresettlement (1988-1993). The final results of this reviewwill be incorporatedin the ICR. 4.25 The lack of progresson implementingcertain policy recommendationsis understandable.There is no overarchinginstitution within Jabotabekwith responsibilityfor transportplanning. Whilepolicy decisionson buses and parkingand transport networkplanning should be within DKI's responsibilities, in practice DKI responsibilityfor implementationof urban transportpolicy recommendations appeared limitedwhen implementationalso requiredaction by centralgovernment agencies. The recommendationshad social and economicconsequences for bus drivers,bus passengersand motorists, consequencesthat will provokeopposition. Institutionalfactors in DGLT and DLLAJ-DKIduring the project were not conduciveto implementingthe policy recommendations.(For example,there was no urban transportdirectorate in DGLT from 1991to 1996). Thesehave now been largelyovercome, and the current size and structureof both the Urban Directoratein DGLT and DLLAJ-DKIprovide the basis for further strengtheningand expansionwhich is needed to matchthe size of the task. AppendixB: ImplementationCompletion Mission - AideMemoire Page 9
4.26 The concern with JUPCO stems from the definition of its role as a single window to the Bank with responsibilities to coordinate information from various project implementation units, (rather than to act as an overall project management unit), and its place in the implementation arrangements. JIUPCO was located in BAPPEDA-DKI (correctly in the view of the mission), but in the organisation structure for project implementation, DKI Jakarta was shown as only one of five agencies reporting to TKPP, the other four being from central government. As a result JUPCO has tended to be reactive, particularly at the time of project reformulation and Loan extension, rather than proactive in preparing the consolidated data required by the Bank. JUPCO deferred more substantive decision making on project management to TKPP, whose role and responsibilities were not discussed in the SAR.
4.27 These issues have been of concern to the Bank for some time, and none has been satisfactorily resolved within the life of the project, but the lessons learned can and are being incorporated into the design of new projects. Perhaps the one unresolved issue is the lack of an overarching institution within Jabotabek, with responsibility for transport planning and implementing urban transport policy recommendations across jurisdictions and agencies.
4.28 Apart from the issues noted above, greater human and financial resources should be put into traffic management. From the site visits undertaken, the mission considers that increased emphasis is now required on traffic management measures to make the most effective and efficient use of the past investment in roads and flyovers. These would include measures such as parking controls, and
* review (and if appropriate redesign) of junction layouts, including channelisation;
* more signal-controlled junctions with provision for right turns;
* removal of U-turns, (or signaled U-turns in conjunction with pedestrian crossings);
* more crossing facilities for pedestrians; and
* continuation of the program to provide pedestrian guard rails at heavily used bus stops.
5. PROJECTIMPACT
5.1 Overall, the project has been satisfactory in meeting the development objectives set at the time of appraisal in 1987, with some variation in degrees of success between objectives. Perhaps the lowest level of achievement has been in relation to improvements in policies, operations and regulations for public transport. The physical improvement objectives for public transport priority and pedestrian access were also not fully realised. Local traffic congestion is still apparent, but traffic moves steadily if slowly, even at peak periods, despite large increases in vehicle ownership and travel demand.
5.2 The scale and extent of resettlement is estimated at this time to have increased 450% from the estimates of the SAR. The number of people resettled, those suffering partial loss of assets, and the economic and social consequences of involuntary displacement are still being assessed and final conclusions will be incorporated into the ICR. To date, limited evidence suggests that up to 50% of the resettled population may be worse off than before the project; however, due to incomplete and inconsistent data prior to the project, the true extent of the resettlement impact may never be known. AppendixB: ImplementationCompletion Mission -Aide Memoire Page 10
6. OPERATIONALPLAN AND SUSTAINABILITY
6.1 Operationalplans for the differentcomponents of the project have been requestedfrom the executingagencies.
6.2 Sustainablityof the project outcomesdepends on continuedimprovements in the management and operationof the transport system,expansion of capacityparticularly for public transport integrated with urban development,and demand management.The recommendationsfrom JUTSIand JPRIIP provide a sound basis from whichto develop firm proposals. The current size and structureof both the Urban Directoratein DGLT and DLLAJ-DKIprovide the basis for further strengtheningand expansion which is needed to matchthe size of the task and to assure sustainabilityof project outcomes.
7. LESSONS LEARNED
7.1 The lessonslearned from the Borrower'sperspective are the following:
a) Land acquisition/resettlementshould be completedbefore constructionstarts. The cost of land acquisitionis such that buildingnew roads may be less expensivethan widening existingroads, b) Relocationof utilitiesshould be completedbefore constructionstarts, and interagency arrangementsfor their relocationrequire strengthening; c) Bank involvementfacilitated implementation of civil works;
d) Social dimensionsof implementingpublic transportand parking policy changespose greater challengesthan the physical ones; and
e) "In-house TA" provides greatertransfer of knowledge(DLLAJ experience with JIAP). 7.2 Lessonsconcerning land acquisitionand resettlementfrom the Bank's perspectiveinclude:
a) Land acquisitionand resettlementhave to be an integralpart of projectdesign and supported with specificlegal covenants. They require continuousmonitoring throughout the project, with resettlementspecialists participating in all missionsuntil satisfactorilycompleted;
b) A frameworkfor resettlementand a ResettlementAction Plan (RAP) must be formulatedand approvedby the Bank by the time of project appraisal. In compliancewith Bank policy it should includebaseline information and census of populationand affectedassets, criteria and mechanismsfor asset valuation,compensation, and arbitration,mitigation plans for the displacedpopulations, and a clear budget and timetable for implementationof the RAP. Constructioncan proceed only if land acquisitionand compensationhave been completed to the satisfactionof the Bank and in accordancewith the plan; c) Compensationand resettlementoptions for the displacedpopulations should be discussed with the Project AffectedPeople (PAP) and incorporatedinto the plan; d) The Bank shouldassist the Borrowerand specificagencies charged with land acquisitionand resettlementto preparethe necessaryplans and to implementthem. Institutionalcapacity building in this area is essentialto the success of future similarprojects. AppendixB: ImplementationCompletion Mission - Aide Memoire Page 11
7.3 Other lessons from the Bank's view are:
a) The project office that is the prime point of contact with the Bank should be designated as a Project Management Unit and given appropriate and clearly defined responsibilities in the implementation arrangements and the loan agreement;
b) Well defined and focused training programs produce results; and
c) Further strengthening of agencies responsible for urban transport policy and planning is necessary to ensure that recommendations of studies are implemented.
8. PREPARATION OF IMPLEMENTATIONCOMPLETION REPORT
8.1 During the previous mission in November 1996, the mission provided all executing agencies with a briefing on the requirements for preparation of the Borrower's contribution to the Implementation Completion Report (ICR).
8.2 On arrival, JUPCO provided the mission with a consolidated summary of the views of DGH, DGLT, DKI-Jakarta (DPU and DLLAJ) in Bahasa Indonesia. No comments had been provided by DIPENDA, DG BANGDA and DGHS. In addition, this summary lacked information on the IRR of the road sub-components and final financial data.
8.3 Schedule. The following schedule for the preparation of the ICR was agreed upon:
Steps Target Date
All outstanding information to Bank May 16, 1997
First Draft ICR for Bank internal review May 30, 1997
Draft of ICR to GOI for comment Early June, 1997
Bank mission to discuss Draft ICR June/July
Receive GOI comments and final contribution August 15, 1997
Final Bank approvals August 25, 1997
Distribution to Bank Board September 2, 1997 AppendixB: ImplementationCompletion Mission - Aide Memoire Page 12
8.4 OutstandingInformation. The missionnoted that the followinginformation is still outstanding and requestedthat it be providedby the date indicated.
Agen y ...... D..
DIPENDA,DGHS, Providecontribution to Borrower's Report to lUPCO April 15, 1997 DG BANGDA
JUPCO Englishversion of Draft Borrower's Reportto Bank April 25,1997
ALL Providethe Bank with an operationalplan for the future April 25,1997 AGENCIES/JUPCO operation of the project including responsible agencies, future maintenancework for construction,monitoring indicators,and budgetarysources
ALL AGENCIES Experiencewith Bank and GOI on procurementprocessing April 11,1997 times, brokendown by NCB, ICB, consultantservices
ALL AGENCIES Statementof current statusof each recommendationin final April 15,1997 reportsof TA studies.
DLLAJ-DKI& DPU- Provide locationsand costs of traffic managementworks April 11,1997 DKI
DPU-DKI& BINKOT Send map showing locationof major works carriedout under April 11, 1997 the project
BINKOT Send Bank a summaryexplaining how BRINKOT'sroad April 15,1997 maintenancestrategy ties in with DKI-DPU'smaintenance strategy
BINKOT Descriptionof how the road maintenancemanagement April 11, 1997 approachwill serve as a pilot for other cities(para 4.4)
BINKOT Carry out traffic surveysand journey times and calculate May 16, 1997 IRRs for their road works.1/
DPU-DKI Carry out traffic surveysand journey times and calculate May 16, 1997 IRRs for their road works.I/
1/ Meeting on April 30, 1997to discussthe preliminarytraffic survey data and IRR parametersbetween BINKOT,DPU-DKI, JUPCO and RSI.
JUDP-lUCR\AIDEMEMI.DOC\September 30, 1997 4:27 PM AppendixB: ImplementationCompletion Mission - AideMemoire Page13
JUDP 1 INDONESIA: JABOTABEK URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (IBRDLoan 2932-IND) FollowUp ImplementationCompletion Mission July 22 to August4, 1997 Aide Memoire August 5, 1997
3. This aide m6moire summarizes the understandings and agreements reached between the Government of Indonesia and a follow up World Bank implementation completion mission that visited Jakarta from July 22 to August 5, 1997. The mission comprised Mr. Edward Dotson, Senior Urban Transport Specialist and Mr. William Hardi, Transport Operations Officer, from RSI Jakarta. The mission wishes to express its thanks to the representatives of the various agencies involved in the project for their assistance during the course of the mission. The conclusions and recommendations contained in this aide-memoire are those of the mission and are subject to confirmation by World Bank management.
2. The objectives of the mission were to discuss and receive comments from GOI agencies on the draft Implementation Completion Report (ICR) previously circulated, and to assemble the remaining outstanding data required to complete the ICR. The mission received some comments. It was agreed that the last date for forwarding further comments would be the end of August. Action: GOI by August 31
3. The mission asked GOI to clarify whether the material previously forwarded to the Bank was to be included in the ICR as the GOI contribution, or whether an edited version of this material was to be prepared by GOI for this purpose. If a new document were to be prepared, it would need to be furnished to the Bank by the end of August.
Action : GOI by August 31
4. The four month period for payment of outstanding accounts ended on June 30. The MoF representatives asked the Bank to write with the amount of the to be canceled. The letter is also to cover any final changes in allocation of funds between loan categories. Action : Bank AppendixB: ImplementationCompletion Mission - Aide Memoire Page 14
5. It was agreed that the following information, required by the Bank to complete the ICR would be forwarded to RSI Jakarta by August 15.
Action GOI byAugust15
BINKOT, Plans for the future operationand maintenanceof the roads, DPU - DKI, traffic managementworks and equipmentfunded by the DLLAJ-DKI project includingmonitoring indicators, and sources and amountsof annual maintenancebudgets DGLT Current status of main recommnendationin final reports of TNPR, Public TransportRegulation, Parking and PPDBus
______Management and Operations studies. DLLAJ-DKI8c Showlocations of traffic managementworks on map of road DPU-DKI works completed BINKOT Road Maintenance (i) Explainhow BINKOT'sroad maintenancestrategy ties in with DKI-DPU'smaintenance strategy (ii) Descriptionof how the road maintenancemanagement
______approach will serve as a pilot for other cities BINKOT For each road link built under the project: DPU-DKI (i) "As Built" ConstructionCost (ii) Actual Land AcquisitionCost (iii) EstimatedAnnual average maintenance cost
(iv) Current 24 hour traffic flows based on peak and off peak classifiedcounts
______(v) Current peak and off peak journey times BINKOT Calculationof revised IRR for each BINKOTlink built under the project APPENDIX C: BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE OF THE PROJECT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
DGLT COMPONENT ...... 2
DGBM COMPONENT...... 7
DPU - DKI JAKARTA ...... 11
DLLAJ - DKI JAKARTA ...... 13
DIPENDA DKI COMPONENT ...... 15
DG BANGDA COMPONENT ...... 17
DGCK COMPONENT ...... 19
Although retyped, the materialin this appendix has otherwisebeen includedhere as received exceptfor minor editing to improvecomprehension, to ensure consistent formatting and to assist pagination. Appendix C: Borrower's Perspective of the Project Page 2
PROJECT EVALUATION REPORT DGLT COMPONENT
1. OBJECTIVESAND TARGETS
A. Objectives
1. Prepare development plan for an integrated urban public transport system which is required to meet the needs of urban public transport growth in Jabotabek areas, in line with spatial development policy and environmental capacity of Jabotabek region. The plan has to produce a consistent development framework in utilizing the human and financial resources.
2. Translate the integrated urban public transport development policy in Jabotabek areas, in order to provide service in meeting the demand, and its development to be carried out through an efficient investment of government fund and society/private resource to finance integrated infrastructure and means of transport development.
3. To produce tariff system which will assure and support the use of all transport means and infrastructure as effectively as possible, considering the interest and capability of the society.
4. Improve the capability of the urban public transport in a wider sense, in order to make a safe, secure, smooth, and efficient system, with affordable cost to the society.
B. Targei
Related to the above objectives, the targets need to be achieved were the following;
1. Development and improvement of human resources. 2. Traffic management and control 3. Improvement of public transport services/mass transport. 4. Others. AppendixC: Borrower'sPerspective of theProject Page3
2. RESULTACHIEVED
A. Developmentand Improvementof HumanResources
No. PackageProject Result 1. RTTC Trainingand 1. Improvementof the quantity and quality of teachingstaff for Fellowship DiplomaIII of the RTTC (Balai Diklat LLAJR, Pusdiklat PerhubunganDarat). 2. The executionof Diploma IV Land Transportationprogram in the Balai Diklat LLAJR Bekasi, which has graduated60 D IVstudents/year. 3. A number of short courses, such as two week course,two monthscourse and three months course have been undertaken. 4. The overseasmaster degree program in traffic engineeringand transportationhas provided fellowshipsto 10 students,and they all have graduated.
2. RTTC Campus Extensionand Constructionof RTTC Campus Extension (Balai Diklat LLAJR) has been done.
3. RTTC Equipment Provisionof supportingequipment for education in Balai Diklat has been done.
B. Traffic Management
No. PackageProject Result 1. TrafficManagement and 1. Action programfor bus priority and traffic managementfrom Parking Policy the 2nd year up to the 4th . ImplementationProject 2. Programfor traffic data collectionand monitoring. (TMPP) 3. Parkingpolicy (technical,financial and institutional). 4. Design and implementationprocedure of traffic management.
2. Jakarta Urban Transport 1. Technicalassistance to Pemda DKI Jakarta for the preparationof ShortTerm 5 year investmentprogram. Improvement(JUTSI) '2. Action programand evaluation frameworkto integrate long term and short term urban transport investmentup to the year 2002. 3. Carryout FS and /or FED for a number of selectedplans in order to be implementedin the one to three years ahead. 4. PrepareTOR and prepare and evaluateplans at the stage of FS and/or FED in order to be implementedbefore the year 2000.
3. Jakarta Urban Short 1. Guidelinesfor developingefficient and effectiveroad network. Term Improvement 2. Developmentof traffic management.. (JUTSI) Program 3. Developmentof subway. Development - Addendumof JUTSI. Appendix C: Borrower's Perspective of the Project Page 4
4. Jakarta Immediate 1. Short term program for the improvement of local public Action Program (JIAP). transport. 2. Technical assistance to Dinas LLAJ DKI Jakarta in traffic management and bus services. 3. Technical assistance to Dinas PU DKI Jakarta in temporary flyover utilization plan.
C 1. Improvement of Public Transport Services
No. Package Project Result 1. Perum PPD Bus 1. New Method Route System (RMB), with pilot project, route No. Management and 55 RMB and four other routes ( 1 route Patas AC, I route Patas, 2 Operation regular routes). Implementation Project 2. Improve the quality of services to support the RMB; * Plan and procedure for fleet maintenance and improvement. * Control procedure for scheduled operation. * Improvement of revenue collection. * Improvement of company's employee performance.
2. Perum DAMRI Bus * Planning of fleet operation service. Management and * Improvement of monitoring quality for scheduled operation. Operation * Technical assistance for improvement of revenue collection. Implementation Project * Improvement of employee performance. * Technical assistance for fleet maintenance improvement according to its life time.
3. Perum DAMRI Provision of special tools and general tools for 10 urban bus Equipment service areas of Perum DAMRI (Medan, Bandar Lampung, Bandung, Semarang, Solo, Surabaya, Ujung Pandang, Jakarta, Yogjakarta, Denpasar).
4 Bus Management and * Optimization of city bus route, fare system and collection method Operation for Damri Semarang and Surabaya. Implementation * Implementation of financial accounting system. * Implementation of scheduled city bus service system.
C2. Mass Public Transport
5. Transport Network * Jabotabek Mass Public Transport System Master Plan (MRT). Planning and Regulation * City bus route network, service system and monitoring. (TNPR) + TNPR * Feasibility of Manggarai Underpass. Addendum + Manggarai Fly over. AppendixC: Borrower'sPerspective of the Project Page5
6. Studyof Land and * Analysis concerningland developmentagainst the availabilityof PublicTransport public transport infrastructure. Developmentin * Formn of private sector participation in supporting the Jabotabek improvementof urban public transport in Jabotabek. * LRT technology
7. JabotabekUrban Mass * SAUMJ (Jakarta Urban Mass Rapid Transit System) which Transit Preparation represent a consolidation of the recommendationof TNPR and AdvisoryServices JMTSSstudies. * Steps in the preparation of the construction implementationof SAUMJ.
D. Others
No. Package Project Result i LLAJR Air Pollution * Macro and micro model on air pollution intensityin DKI Jakarta. Monitoringand Control * Air pollutionmonitoring location network. * Air pollutioncontrol and monitoringprocedure. * Technologicalaspect of free pollutionof the motor vehicles.
2. Equipmentfor LLAJR Procurementof air pollutionmonitoring and control equipmentto Air Pollution support monitoringactivities of the air pollutionin generalas well Monitoringand control as resulted from vehicle emission.
3. AFFECTINGFACTORS
One of the factors which affected the implementationof the projects was the limitedavailability of human resources in the related agencies, especially in providing time for the consultantto make routine consultationconcerning policy issues.
4. OPERATIONALPLAN AND SUSTAINABILITY
There are many study out comes or recommendations proposed by consultant which have been and will be followed up by implementing agencies, such as;
1) The increasing participation of private sector in providing city bus transportation service in region of Jabotabek.
2) The participation of private sector, domestic as well as international, in construction of SAUMJA Blok M - Kota.
3) The participation of private sector in the construction of triple deckers. AppendixC: Borrower'sPerspective of the Project Page 6
4) The implementationof variousforms of traffic managementscheme by Pemda; e.g: a. The considerationto be given to the implementationof parkingfare increase,as it was proposedby TMPP. b. Reductionof on street parkingto become off street parking. c. Applicationof traffic restraintin a number of main corridors. d. Applicationof special bus lane, which currently consideredto be extended to be a special bus way. e. Applicationof one way system.
5. BANK PERFORMANCE
In principle the performance of the Bank in assisting the preparation, implementation and supervisionof works are good, particularlythe supervisionmission who participate in evaluating the performanceof the works which have been submitted by consultants. However the process of providing NOL for either TOR, short list or bidding document sometimes requires a long time.
6. AGENCY PERFORMANCEEVALUATION
In general if project managementand control could be carried out according to expectation, almost all of the project packages could be done in time. Also there is no problem in the provision and withdrawal of funds for technical assistance from the World Bank. Some constraintsfaced are related to administrativeissues such as the process obtainingNOL, either it is from the governmentaspect or from Bank aspect, which sometimesare difficult to be obtained in short period. AppendixC: Borrower'sPerspective of the Project Page 7
PROJECT EVALUATION REPORT BINA MARGA COMPONENT
I. PROJECTLOCATION
1. Outer Ring Road West (BR 01, 02, 03, 04) 2. Outer Ring Road South (BR 05, 06, 07, 08, 09, 10, 24) 3. Warung Buncit (BR 11, 12) 4. Pondok Pinang - Pejompongan (BR 13, 14, 22) 5. Pasar Minggu - Depok (BR 17, 18, 19) 6. Kebayoran Lama Traffic Management and Fly over (BR 21, BT 01, 02) 7. Putri Hijau-Fly over (BR 23, 25) 8. Access Kebon Jeruk (BR 28)
ADDITIONAL PROJECT LOCATION (Generated from unallocated budget those were mainly for road betterment project and road maintenance project)
1. Pasar Minggu - Depok (BR 2) 2. Access Marunda (BR 30) 3. Yos Sudarso Sec B (BR 30) 4. DKI Border - Ciledug Sec B (BR 32) 5. Daan Mogot Sec B (BR 33) 6. Ciputat Raya (BR 34) 7. Perintis Kemerdekaan (BR 35) 8. Raya Bogor Sec B (BR 36) 9. Cilincing Raya (BR 37) 10. Martadinata Sec B (BR 38) 11. Maintenance Program The Location Map Attached.
II. OBJECTIVE
* To implement high priority program of physical work in the metropolitan city * To have a new accessibility in order to spread the volume of vehicles
HI. PROJECTRESULT
All the projects under the JUDP-I program have been completed and they are achieving success. The success was indicated by the increasing demand at all road links which have been constructed. Another indication is the generating development along the road links, including shops, offices, apartnents and condominiums. AppendixC: Borrower'sPerspective of the Project Page8
IV. AFFECTINGFACTORS
There were several factors affectingthe success of the projects:
1) The dominantfactor was land acquisition,it resulted in changes in the implementationof the project, especiallythe additionof the KebayoranLama Flyover. 2) Coordinationwith other relevant agencies in removing/relocatingpublic utilities (such as telephone pole, undergroundtelephone line, high voltage undergroundcable, water pipe line). Some utilities require a longertime.
V. FUTUREPROJECT OPERATION
In order to maximizethe future project benefits,a number of flyoversand underpasswill be constructed. Most of the intersections have already been studied and designed, and some of them have urgently required to be constructed.With fund providedby GOI, Pondok Cina Flyover in the south part of Pasar Minggu- Depok has been constructedin the fiscal year of 1992/1993and 1993/1994,together with some other flyoversoutside JUDP-I road links.
In fiscal year 1997/1998,government will start to constructTanjung Barat flyover which passing through Pasar Minggu- Depok rail way in the Outer Ring Road south link, and the funding will be provided by OECF.Other flyovers will be proposedto be constructed,either financedby GOI or by Loan.
All of the road links which have been constructedunder the JUDP-I programwill be maintainedwith the GOI fund by implementingthe maintenanceprogram. This program has been set up using the contract system.But under the new system, all maintenancewill apply the Direct Labor OrganizationSystem.
VI. PROCUREMENTPERFORMANCE
The followingsteps of procurementprocedure requires the No Objection Letter (NOL) from the World Bank, The steps are:
* Tender document * Contractorshort list * Draft contract * Contract
The currentprocurement procedure for the civil works some time took a longer time. However in the last three years, the process has been speededup. The procurementof civil works through SOE disbursement systemis relativelyfaster, because it does not requireNOL from the World Bank.
The procurementprocedure for the consultancyservice is not similar with the procurementfor the civil works. The procurement procedure for consultancy service is a standard procedure which requires internationalcompetitive bidding. The supervisionwork took a longer time than working with SOE method. It does mean that consultancysupervision service has always delay to mobilize its the personnel due to the procedure.
VII. BINAMARGA PERFORMANCE
The most important things to be considered in evaluation the Bina Marga performance is related to three factors i.e. Project Manager, contractor and consultant. AppendixC: Borrower'sPerspective of the Project Page 9
To improve the capabilityof Bina Marga's Project Manager and his technical staffs, Bina Marga has established trainingprogram through Diklat, i.e. Kursus Pejabat Inti Proyek (Project Core Management Course) two or three time a year.
To improve the capabilityof the contractor'ssuperintendent, within the last four years, Bina Marga has set up a program of screening& certificationof contractor'sProject Engineers.
This has been establishedtogether with Gapensi (Indonesiancontractor's Association). For the purpose of improvingthe capabilityof consultingengineers, within the last six years Bina Marga has established a program of screening and certification of consultant engineer. This program has been established together with Inkindo(Indonesian Consultant Association).
VIH. MAINTENANCEPROGRAM
A. The Result of TechnicalAssistance Comment to the result of technical assistance of the maintenanceprogram for the national road in Jakarta and the surroundingis reported in the attached table.
D. MaintenanceProgram Strategy Consideringthe managementsystem and its equipment preparation,the maintenanceprogram has been establishedand applied by Binkot with staging system. The current organizationconsist of one Project Manager and three sub Project Managers(completed with their staffs).
Until fiscal year of 1995/1996the maintenance program has been undertaken by applying contract system by sub Project Manager and coordinatedby Project Manager.In the fiscal year of 1996/1997it was slightly different. Besides a coordinator, the Project Managers team has the Direct Labor Organizationand several small equipmentto carry out maintenanceof supportingroad work such as side ditches, side walk, guard rail etc.
In the fiscal year of 1997/1998the function of Direct Labor Organization increased by carrying out patching hole in the sections outside the sections handled by sub Project Manager and also outside the sections handled by the bettermentprogram.
The Direct Labor Organizationwhich will carry out patchinghole will apply: a) the cold mix system b) the hot mix system,joining togetherwith DPU-DKIor ContractorsAsphalt Mixing Plant.
For the future maintenanceprogram, Binkot proposedto set up RoutineMaintenance Unit. Binkot is also still buildingthe computerizedprogram through Urban Road ManagementSystem (URMS).
The system was appliedin the NationalRoad of Jakarta and surroundas a pilot project and in the future also will be appliedin other metropolitancities and big Cities such as Medan,Bandung and Surabaya. Appendix C: Borrower's Perspectiveof the Project Page 16
IMPROVEMENTFOR ROAD MAINTENANCEAND REHABILITATION IN JAKARTA
AND SURROUNDING AREA -- --
I No. Suggestion/Recommendation by TA Consultant I No.| Implementation/Comment Establishment of Urban Road Maintenance ManagementGroup (URMMG) 1.1 The key Persons: 1.1 The key personsright now are: * Project Manager (Pimpro) * Project Manager (Pimpro)act also as DLO * MaintenanceSystem Engineer(MSE) * Technical Assistance * ContractEngineer (CE) * Head of Administration * Headof Direct Labor Organization(DLO) * Sub Project Managers(Pimbagpro) * HeadAdministration (A) * ThreeAssistants * Sub ProjectManagers 1.2 Establishmentof the DLO: 1.2 * A set of equipment for maintenance has already * Needto carry out emergencymaintenance been proposed * Need abase * Budget need + US Dollar 8,000,000.00/year, * Need equipment Available only + US Dollar 4,000,000.00/year * Need budgets 1.3 Establishmentof the DLO in Stages: 1.3 For the time being, maintenancework is still undertaken * To be undertaken by the Private Sector or by joint by the private sector agreement with DPU DKI _ 2. Procurementfor Road Inspections: 2. Has been done sub project manager. In the next fiscal * Routinelyinspected by three deputy project manager years of 1997/98 will be done by RBO-IX continuing with a data base system. 3. Establishmentof a Database 3. A road maintenance system,URMS still in development Urban Road ManagementSystem (URMS): process by BINKOT * Under completionthe developmentof URMS Jakarta road data base will be establishedby RBO-IX in * No comment by the consultant to understand the fiscal year 1997/98 capabilityof URMS 4. MaintenanceClassification 4. In the fiscal years of 96/97 only routine maintenance Type of Maintenance: has been done by DLO by ProjectManager. * RoutineMaintenance (by DLO) In the next fiscal years of 97/98 emergencyworks will * Recurrent Maintenance(by DLO or Contract) be done also by DLO * Period Maintenance(by Contract) * Emergency Work (by DLO) involves unplanned work 5. Bridge Maintenance: 5. Will be applied later on * Proposed Bridge Inventory and Inspection System by using maintenancemanual and procedures 6. System of Contract;Review and Procedures 6. The Contract has been standardized by Bina Marga Committee 7. EmergencyMaintenance: 7. The institutionalstrengthening is under process. * Need institutionalstrengthening Carrying our emergencymaintenance will be applied by * Carrying out emergency maintenance by DLO DLO system undertakenby the sector system 8. Training: S. The training will be applied by Bina Marga training * CommenceTraining center later on * Training for the maintenance system engineer undertakenoverseas AppendixC: Borrower'sPerspective of the Project Page 11
DINAS-PU DKI JAKARTA JUDP-I PROJECT EVALUATION
1. Project Objectives
a. Constructionof new roads, major intersectionby provision of grade separation in order to support the developmentof the eastern and westernregions. b. To support integrated infrastructuredevelopment planning and programmingin Jabotabek, particularlyDKI Jakarta Urban TransportProgramming. c. Improve the technical capability of DKI Jakarta in carrying out road construction and improvement,and the maintenanceprogram. d. ImproveJabotabek regions traffic management. e. Preparefuture integrateddevelopment program in urban sector. f. Improvegovernment policy on public transportoperation and regulation.
2. ProjectResul
2.1 Physicalworks Basicallythere are 5 types of physical results. i ) Constructionof new road, with total length of 34,203 meters 2) Road improvement/betterment,with total length of 13,700meters 3) Constructionof 12 Flyover/underpass,with total length of 2,880 meters 4) Road rehabilitation= 189,18 km. 5) Trafficmanagement.
The completionof the physicalworks, resulted an increaseof total length of roads of 12,7%.
2.2. Link SystemDevelopment Throughthe JUDP-I an integrated road networkhas been developed,under the name of links i.e. * East-westand North link i.e. Route D-Putri Hijau - Metro PondokIndah. * North South link, i.e. Penjernihan - Galunggung - Tambak. * North Southlink, i.e. Gunung Sahari - Otto IskandarDinata.
2.3. Benefits The constructionand improvementof those roads and major intersectionshave reduced traffic congestionin Jakarta. Thosehave been indicatedby the reductionof the VCR (VolumeCapacity Ratio) in the surroundingprojects.
Example:
Road VCR VCR WithoutProject With Project Cideng 1.41 0.66 Perwira 0.03 0.08 Diponegro 0.96 0.47 Imam Bonjol 1.44 0.66 AppendixC: Borrower'sPerspective ofthe Project Page12
2.4. RoadRehabilitation and Maintenance
Under the JUDP loan, a Road MaintenanceManagement system has been developed. The result produced; a. Road priority which need to be rehabilitated.Under a systematic survey to all road network in DKI Jakarta region, manual survey, roughness survey and falling weight deflectometer, it was agreed the roads need to be rehabilitated is about 250 kms (1997/1998). b. ImprovePersonnel Skills. Under JUDP-I Loan, various courses and training have been undertaken,such as operatinglaser profilometerinstrument, Falling deflectometer, Radar penetrometer and Geographic Information System (GIS) courses for operating package program of arc info. Those course are very useful for the continuationof the RMMSproject.
3. Benefitto the Society
Communityalong the project could do business,and the averagejourney time becameshorter.
4. AffectingFactors
Positive:community participation in providingland for the projects (to make the land compensationprocess easier)
Negative:natural disturbance, socio environmentaldisturbance.
5. A
Management: Project activitieswere undertakenbased on fund and time providedfor completingthe respectiveproject / sub projects.
Monitoring: Project monitoringhas been done along the progress of the projectand a certain steps have been undertakenin order to achievethe decided target.
Performanceof the project implementation
Contractors: The performanceis generallygood, but there are some contractorswhose performanceare less serious in carryingout the project.
Consultant: There is consultantwho does not mobilize personnelaccording to the expertise's needed, such that it does influencethe service of the consultant.
6. Bank Performance
The Performanceof the Bank in the process of preparation,implementation and supervisionis quite good, especiallyin providingsolution whenever there is problem in implementation. Appendix C: Borrower's Perspective of the Project Page 13
JUDP I - PROJECT EVALUATION FRAMEWORK DINAS LLAJ - DKI JAKARTA.
1. Scope of Project
JUDP- I Project under the responsibility of Dinas LLAJ DKI Jakarta covered: 1.1 FED Traffic Management (Consultancy) 1.2 Road Sign (Equipment) 1.3 Road Marking (Equipment) 1.4 Traffic Signals (Equipment)
2. Project Objective
2.1 Traffic Management Prepare bidding document and drawings for the work of road sign, road marking, traffic signal and pedestrian. 2.2 Road Sign Improve traffic safety and traffic flows 2.3 Road Marking Improve traffic safety and traffic flow 2.4 Traffic Signal Improve traffic safety and traffic flows at intersections.
3. Project Preparation
Procurement process of contractors/supplier for individual project were as follows:
3.1 FED Traffic management Local Competitive Bidding 3.2 Road Sign Local Competitive Bidding 3.3 Road Marking Local Competitive Bidding 3.4 Traffic Signals International Competitive Bidding
4. Project Implementation
4.1 FED Traffic Management * The work could be completed in time. * Provision and disbursement of fund for implementing the project amounted to Rp 739,838,825 (100%) 4.2 Road Sign * Duration 12/01/1993 to 15/06/1994. * The work could be completed in time * Provision of fund and its disbursement for the implementation of project were Rp 998,092,625 (100%). 4.3 Road Marking * Duration 26/05/1993 to 15/06/1994. -*The work could be completed in time Appendix C: Borrower's Perspective of the Project Page 14
* Provisionof fund and its disbursementthe implementationof projectwere Rp 3,232,676,950(100%). 4.4 Traffic Signal * Duration30/06/1993 to 31/03/1995. * The supplyof the equipmentrequired could be completedin time * Provisionof find and its disbursementfor the implementationof projectwere Rp 5,303,750,385 (100%).
5. Achievementof Targets
5.1 FED TrafficManagement The projectobjective and its targets required in the form of bidding documents and drawings for the work of road sign, road marking and traffic signal could be achieved. 5.2 Road Sign Project targets i.e. the installmentof 3,929 unit of road sign could be achieved. 5.3 RoadMarking Project target i.e. painting of road marking in the form of road lane 62,306 sq. m and Zebra Cross of 11,710sq. m could be achieved. 5.4 Traffic Signal Project target in the form of installmentof traffic signs could be achieved. * at intersection:82 locations * at pedestriancrossing: 8 locations
6. Conclusions
6.1 All of the traffic infrastructure(road sign, road marking and traffic signals) which have been installedto be maintainedproperly using routine budget of the governmentof DKI Jakarta, such that the functionof traffic infrastructurecould be maintained.
6.2 The traffic signals,previously to be installed in order to control isolatedjunctions. At present some of the traffic signals has been increased its capacity, to be interconnectedeach other in an Area Traffic Control System (ATCS). All of the traffic signals planned to be controlled in an ATCS.
7. Evaluationof Impact
7.1 PositiveImpact The JUDP-ITraffic Signal Project has positive impact to the developmentof ATCS, where the projecthas speed up the realizationof ATCS in Jakarta. The ATCS system to be able to optimizethe operationof traffic signal, so that it improvetraffic flows and it efficiency.
8. ExperienceLearned
Bidding procedure/biddingaward required quite long time, because besides having to follow the DKI Jakarta biddingprocedure, it also required the agreement(NOL) from the World Bank. It is proposed that only the bidding document should require NOL, while the bidding evaluation (coversbidding award) shouldnot require NOL from the World Bank. AppendixC: Borrower'sPerspective of the Project Page 15
DKI JAKARTAREVENUE IMPROVEMENT
I. The Objective:
The main objective of the technical assistance for the DKI Jakarta Revenue Improvement was to support the local Government of DKI Jakarta in order to:
a) Strengthen the accounting procedure and financial management b) design a Revenue Improvement action plan for local taxes/ retribution and the PBB property tax.
The long term objective of the study was to reduce the dependency of DKI Jakarta on Central Government grant in financing its local development. The consultant recommendations consisted of improvement of 5 key areas: accounting and financial management, tariff policy, participation of the private sector, strengthening of organization and implementation of information technology.
II. The Follow up of Recommendations.
1. Organization a. The improvement of the organization structure and procedure of the Dipenda DKI Jakarta was regulated in the Perda No, 9/1995. The Perda determined the provision of more authority to the Suku Dinas Pendapatan Daerah; rearranged the institutional aspect of Dipenda and the involvement of the lower level of government units in submitting the SPPT PBB to the society.
b. Intensifying the improvement of the quality of human resource through education and training and cooperation with private sector.
2. Improve tax tariff/local retribution a. Prepare NJOP (value of property tax object) of PBB property tax routinely b. Prepare tariff scale for motor vehicle routinely c. Improvement of tariff of exchange tax for motor vehicle from 5% to become 1% year. d. Delegation of authority from the Central government to DKI Jakarta in collecting PBB, and its relevant aspects.
3. Information technology Application of information technology step by step a. MIS, PBB Property tax. b. MIS Advertisement tax c. MIS Restaurant & Entertainment tax
4. Accounting and development management. Accounting and development management being developed and coordinated by Bureau of Finance of DKI Jakarta in cooperation with consultant.
5. Extension /Exploration Local Budget sources A number of Perda have been issued, among them: 1. Perda No 10/1996 concerning road light tax (non - PLN) 2. Preparation of Perda on motor vehicle fuels. 3. Perda No. 11/1996 local govermmentretribution in the field of development. Appendix C: Borrower's Perspective of the Project Page 16
6. Intensification a. Improvement of Perda Development Tax I through Perda No. 5/1996 (P.Pb I) b. Improvement of Perda No. 7/1996 concerning Entertainment Tax (P. Hiburan). c. Improvement of Perda on Foreigners Tax, through Perda No. 9/1996 (PBA). m RevenueImprovement Result
During the implementationperiod of JUDP-I for eight and half years, the local government revenue originatedfrom local tax/retributionand PBB propertytax has increasedfrom Rp. 334,6 billion in the budget year of 1980/1989to become Rp. 2006.6 billion in the budget year of the 1996/97; its indicated increased of 25,6% for year.
Compared to the estimated growth stated in the Loan Agreement, which requires the increase of local tax/retributionof minimumof 6% and revenue originatedfrom PBB propertytax of 13% real per years; the actual growth of local tax of 25,6% per year, were overcoming the estimated target in the Loan Agreement.
Data of the growth of local government revenue for the last five years from 1992/1993 to 1996/1997 indicated that Dipenda Revenue Improvement Action Plan insured the projected revenuesaverage growth of 25-30% per year for DKI Jakarta. AppendixC: Borrower'sPerspective of the Project Page 17
EVALUATIONREPORT IUIDP TechnicalAssistance In JabotabekRegion DIT. JEN BANGDACOMPONENT
1. The Objectiveof the Component
a. The objectiveof the Planning,programming and budgetingsystem study of the Dit. Jen. Bangdawere: l). Improvementof the urban managementin Jabotabekregion. 2). Develop and support the tasks and functionsof the BKSP as a body in co-ordinating developmentwithin the Jabotabekregion. 3). Assist and supportthe changing status of the administrativecity (KotaAdministration) into a mayoralty(Kotamadya). In 1997the Bekasi city is promotedto be mayoralty(Kotamadya). 4). To identifythe phasingof the long term planning in the managementof the Capital City of the Republicof Indonesia.
b. The activitiesand the resultsproduced were a conceptwhich was expectedto be implemented in the future i.e. The planning, programmingand budgetingsystem.
2. The Result Achieved
a. For the Regionalgovernment, the result of the project could indirectly improve the capability of the Regionalgovernment, especially the Jabotabekin preparing Urban DevelopmentProgram in JabotabekRegion.
b. In order to synchronisethe developmentplanning of Jabotabek region and to overcomethe weaknessof P5D mechanismwhich has to be adaptedto the need and current demand, Dit Gen Bangda has designed a concept of developmentplanning for the Metropolitan Region to be named MemorandumProgram PembangunanKoordinatif (MPPK) - CoordinativeDevelopment ProgramMemorandum.
This concept at the first phase to be tried out in Jabotabek Region in the Fiscal year of 1997/1998.For this purpose,before it is implemented,it was disseminatedas the following: * January 10, 1997at Bappeda DKI Jakarta * January20, 1997at Bappeda level 1, Jawa Barat * January31, 1997 at BKSP,Jabotabek
c. In order to develop organizational structure, particularly in Dit. Jen. Bangda, this technical assistance has urged the creation of a new sub Directorate, in the Directorate of Bina Kota, namelythe Sub Directorateof Bina KerjasamaPembangunan Antar Kota (Sub Dit. KSPAK)Sub Dit. Inter city DevelopmentCo-operation; under the followingJob description. * The Socio CulturalCooperation section with the main task: prepare regulation, guidance, technical guide for inter city cooperation, nationalas well as international. - EconomicCooperation section with the main task of preparing materials for regulation,guidance and technical guide of inter city cooperationat regional,national and internationallevel in the field of economic. * Monitoringsection with the main tasks to carry out monitoring,analysis and evaluation of the intercity development cooperation,domestic as well as international. AppendixC: Borrower'sPerspective of the Project Page 18
Beside, this sub Directoratehas succeededin preparing direction,guidance for the regions through seminars,domestic as well as internationalin order to improve intercitycooperation.
3. Affecting Factors
1) The central Governmentpolicy which did not allow the establishmentof a new working unit.
2) The relativelylow perceptionof the regional governmentemployees against the importantof developmentplanning coordinationby implementingMPPK concept.
4. Operational Plan and it's Continuation
The operationalplan of this project among others: I) MPPK conceptwill be implementedin the other metropolitanregions such as BandungRaya, GerbangKertasusila, others. 2) This MPPK conceptwill be disseminatedto the other provincesin Indonesia.
S. AgencyPerformance Evaluation
a. Dit Jen. Bangda is highly participative in supporting the consultant in order to promptly complete SP4 study.
b. In order to speed up and increasethe development of the Metropolitanregions, the provision of the Bank loan was consideredvery positive, and it is expectedthat the World Bank will be more concernedin increasingits assistanceto the developmentof Indonesia,especially in urban development. AppendixC: Borrower'sPerspective of the Project Page19
DIRECTORATEGENERAL CIPTA KARYA STUDYPAcKAGE-_JUDP-I (LoAN 2932-IND)
No. Package Project Result
1. Metro/Large Cities Study This activity has been applied to prepare Semarang- (Semarang-Surakarta Surakarta Urban Development Project (SSUDP)which Preparation-Stage1) consisted of clean water pump, urban road, drainage, housing and solid waste management, building administrationand technical assistanceprogram. 2. Metro/Largecities Study This activity has been applied to prepare Surabaya SurabayaPreparation-Stage Urban DevelopmentProject (SSUDP) which consisted 2) of clean water, urban road, drainage, housingand solid waste management,building arrangementand technical assistanceprogram.
3. IUDP Advisoryto DKI This activity has been applied to assist DKI Jakarta Jakarta governmentin carryingout JUDP-II and JUDP-III. 4. IUDP AdvisoryService to This activity has been applied to assist local Surabaya Government of Surabaya in carrying out Surabaya Urban Development(SUDP). 5. MunicipalityFinance This program has been applied to assist the Directorate Advisoryfor Dit Bina of Bina Programin preparingbudgeting for programand ProgramCipta Karya project in the Cipta Karya sector. 6. Project PreparationService This program has been applied to prepare the JUDP-II for JUDP-IIand JUDP-I1 and JUDP-III which was consisting of clean water, urban road, drainage, solid waste management and housingprogram. 7. JUDP-IIPAM Jaya System This activity has been applied to speed up FED of the ImprovementProject JUDP-II PAM Jaya and it has been financed by IBRD Loan 32219-IND.
8. JUDP-IIPAM Jaya Water This activity has been applied to assist the PAM Jaya ResourceAdvisory (SP-J) managementin carrying out JUDP-II PAM Jaya and it has been financedby IBRD Loan 3219-IND. 9. CentralManagement This activity has been applied to assist the PAM Jaya in AdvisoryTeam providingadvices to CMAT. 10. SurabayaUDP PPF and This activity has been directed to speed up the FED of Priority FED the SurabayaUDP and it has been financedby the IBRD Loan 3219-IND. Note:
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