◀ Yat-sen Comprehensive index starts in volume 5, page 2667.

Sunzi Sūnzǐ ​孙 子 Said to have flourished early fourth century bce Military strategist

Sunzi, a military strategist said to have flour- Stratagems along similar lines were recommended in a ished during China’s chaotic Warring States number of widely distributed treatises during these war- period, is known for a work attributed to him ring centuries that led to China’s consolidation under the usually translated as . During a Qin. The military thinking of these strategists paralleled time when 600,000 men could participate in a the newly emerging ideas about governance developed by single battle, strategy became paramount for thinkers commonly known in the West as Legalists ( fajia a state’s survival; Sunzi reserved his highest 法家), led by Fei Zi. The Legalists advocated strong praise for a ­strategist-​­general who could win central control as the surest way to enhance the power of a war without ever fighting a battle. Centuries the state. The Qin state, which was the successor state in later Mao Zedong would use his advice in his the Zhou homeland around what is now known as Xi’an, campaigns against the Nationalists. had been led by Legalist ministers for many years. It suc- ceeded in dominating all its neighbors, though this first empire disintegrated after only a few years with the death of Qin Shihuang. The Legalist philosophy of authoritar- unzi 孫子 was the most famous and successful ian control as a means of prosperity and social stability, of many Chinese strategists. In ­self-​­defense ev- however, far outlasted the Qin, and has had a persistent ery one of the seven Warring States of his time influence throughout Chinese history. (he was said to have flourished in the early fourth cen- Before the , warfare in China tury bce) identified someone to prepare strategies and was conducted largely in an aristocratic mode that em- ­counter-​­strategies. Little is known of his life, despite the phasized individual feats of valor. The armies typical of historian ’s (c. ­145–​87 bce) having identified the Spring and Autumn period (770–​476 bce) were led him as a strategist serving the state of Wu. What is certain by aristocrats driving chariots. The largest armies of the is that the thinking assembled under his name reflects the sixth century bce assembled 50,000 men. Two centu- cumulative wisdom of the Warring States period in Chi- ries later the Warring States could muster up to 600,000 nese history (475–221​ bce), which came to an end with the men in a single battle. Under these pressures, honor was unification of China under the ­short-​­lived Qin dynasty no longer relevant as a motivation for soldiers. Instead (221–​206 bce). This period saw incessant warfare among they were to be strictly obedient within a ­top-​­down com- the seven states which were gradually swallowed up by mand structure. The orders were given by the king’s most the state of Qin until in 221 bce it succeeded in unify- trusted servants, the ­strategist-​­generals. ing all of China under the first emperor, Qin Shihuang. Sunzi seems to have been the earliest or at least the

2136

© 2009 by Berkshire Publishing Group LLC S Sunzi n Sūnzǐ n 孙子 2137

most famous of the ­strategist-generals,​­ outlining the mod- els to be applied afresh to each particular situation. The text attributed to Sunzi, usually translated as The Art of Sample ­Warring-​ War (or Warfare), seems to have been widely available, ­States Stratagem read by ­would-​­be strategists and ministers throughout China. In it the strategist recommends avoiding direct The strategist Sunzi (also known as ­Sun-Tzu)​­ recom- confrontations with an enemy. In fact, he reserves his mended using spies and false informers (or indeed highest praise for a ­strategist-​­general who can win a war any means necessary) to win a war, rather than brute without ever fighting a battle. The best means for doing force. His strategems can be understood best by com- so depend on outsmarting the enemy, but that in turn re- bining remarks from chapters 6 and 7 of The Art of quires intimate knowledge of how the enemy has situated War: his assets. Sunzi recommends the liberal use of spies, false informers, simulated retreats, or indeed any technique Standing your ground, awaiting those that is likely to yield his side the upper hand. far away, awaiting the weary in comfort, awaiting the hungry with full stomachs, is mastering strength. The Ambush at and: Maling, 342 b c e Those who are first on the battlefield and await [their] opponents are at ease; those Twelve years after the state of was saved through who are last on the battlefield and head the of , the state of Wei in turn attacked the Han into battle get worn out. Therefore good state. The Han ruler called on the state of for help. Tian warriors cause others to come to them, and Ji and (the chief general and the chief strategist, do not go to others! respectively), commanding the Qi army, immediately led Source: Sunzi. (1993). Sun-­ ​­Tzu: The art of warfare, trans. it in an attack against the Wei capital. As soon as Pang R. Ames. New York: Ballantine. Juan, commander of the Wei troops, heard about this, he pulled his army back out of Han territory. Strategist Sun Bin (believed to be a direct descendent of Sunzi) knew of General ’s arrogance and his low opinion of of Sun Bin, who had previously had his kneecaps cut off the Qi troops. Faced with an advancing Wei army, Sun on Pang Juan’s orders after having been framed by the Bin began an apparent retreat. On the first day, his troops general as a traitor. left behind traces of 100,000 campfires; on the second day 50,000, and on the third day only 30,000. Pang Juan, eager for victory, concluded that the Qi army had been seriously Medieval Applications weakened by mass desertions. So he left the bulk of his infantry behind and set out in pursuit with some lightly Centuries later the Chinese were still fascinated by wily equipped troops. strategists, as attested by the fourteenth century classic He covered two days’ worth of ground in a single day’s fiction calledThe Romance of the Three Kingdoms( 三国演 march. Sun Bin had calculated that Pang Juan would 义 sanguo yanyi). This work, written by Luo Guanzhong, reach Maling at dusk. is one of the four ­all-​­time classics of Chinese fiction. It Sun Bin set an ambush there and waited. As planned, was set during the turmoil of the third century ce associ- the Wei troops arrived exhausted from their forced march, ated with the fall of the (206 bce­ –​220 ce) and Sun Bin’s army demolished them. General Pang Juan and weaves together the schemes and wars of an entire committed suicide on the battlefield, much to the delight century into an orderly whole, analyzing the strategies

© 2009 by Berkshire Publishing Group LLC 2138 Berkshire Encyclopedia of China 宝 库 山 中 华 全 书 used in great detail. The hero, Zhuge Liang, whose tomb Mao, who had studied the Chinese classics as part is still preserved in Chengdu, is widely honored because of his schooling, has clearly learned from Sunzi, at one his strategies outwitted those of all his adversaries. point even echoing Sunzi’s idea of an army awaiting the exhausted enemy at its ease. In condensed form, Mao formulated the essence of Modern Application the strategy in a ­sixteen-​­character poetic formula for of The Art of War guerrilla warfare, which translates as: When the enemy comes, we go. Sunzi’s approach to warfare has applications reaching When the enemy rests, we disrupt. into the modern era. In his essay “Strategic Problems of When the enemy is exhausted, we fight. the Revolutionary War in China,” dated December 1936, When the enemy goes, we give chase. Communist Party leader Mao Zedong (1893–1976)​ wrote, in reference to his fight against the Nationalists under As this passage indicates, the military tactics of Mao, Generalissimo Chiang ­Kai-​­shek (1887–​1975): fighting against the Nationalists, owed a substantial debt to the Chinese tradition of strategical thinking. If an attacking opponent is superior to our army in numbers and firepower, we can alter the balance of John G. BLAIR and Jerusha McCORMACK power only when the enemy has penetrated deep into the interior of our base territory and there has drained the cup of bitterness to the lees, so that Further reading “the fat grow lean and the lean exhaust themselves Lewis, M. E. (1990). Sanctioned violence in early China. to death.”...​ At​ that point the enemy army, though Albany: State University of New York Press. still strong, has been substantially weakened; its Luo Guanzhong. (1959). Romance of the three kingdoms. soldiers are tired out and demoralized, and many Rutland, VT: C. E. Tuttle Co. of the enemy’s weaknesses are revealed. The Red Mao Zedong. (1954). Strategic problems of China’s revolu- tionary war. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. Army is still weak, but it has been preserving its Sonshi: Online resource for ’s Art of War: Origi- strength, storing its energies, and awaiting the ex- nal approach to conflict and competition. (2009). Re- hausted enemy at its ease. At this point it is pos- trieved March 5, 2009, from http:­ //www.sonshi.com/ sible, as a rule, to strike a certain balance in the index.html strength of the two sides or to transform the en- Sunzi. (1993). Sun-­ ​­Tzu: The art of warfare, trans. R. Ames. emy’s absolute superiority into a merely relative New York: Ballantine. ­superiority—​­sometimes it is even possible for us von Senger, H. (1991). The book of stratagems, trans. M. B. to gain the upper hand. Gubitz. New York: Viking.

Super Girl ▶

© 2009 by Berkshire Publishing Group LLC