Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security
2009 Edition omm - 02 04.2010
DGA C Direction Générale de l’Armement White left page intentionally strategic plan for research & technology in defence and security (PS R&T) 2009 edition
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 1 1 Preface
Blandine Vinson Rouchon - Director of the Research and Technology in Defence and Security Division (DGA/DS/SRTS) Vrignaud DGAcom -F.
Recent events are a reminder of how much the world as we know it has changed and continues to change ever more rapidly. A year ago, the White Paper on Defence and National Security outlined our new priorities. The Strategic Plan for Research & Technology outlines the way forward and the investments needed for our defence system and future procurement programmes. In order to meet future defence and national security challenges, we collectively (i.e. all stakeholders) must be in a position to make the most of technological breakthroughs, whether we initiated them or not. I therefore hope this Strategic Plan will stimulate substantial interest from our current and future partners leading to an increase in cooperation allowing us to achieve the initiatives highlighted in this plan. It is intended that this document will serve as a clear open reference for men and women in the Ministry of Defence, be they offi cers, engineers or researchers in their dealings with those who help us on a daily basis to prepare future systems for our Forces. Special attention has been given to the type of contracts which are best suited to deliver fast joint work. I also believe that this plan provides our current R&T partners, whether in industry, academia or other organisations, with a clear understanding of what they have been sharing with DGA for a number of years. This English version will promote the DGA R&T vision which will facilitate exchanges with our partners abroad. As we are particularly keen to share the majority of our R&T projects in Europe and with our partners, we have made a special effort to identify priority areas suitable for cooperation. As a matter of fact, the question now is not “Can I fi nd a way to cooperate?” but rather “Is there anything that stand in the way of cooperation?” The Strategic Pan describes the implications for R&T following the publication of the 2009 “30-Year Plan” (Plan prospectif à 30 ans, or “PP30”). The 30-Year Plan prepares and recommends the choices to be made to procure and maintain operational capabilities for our forces now and in the future. With that in mind, we have undertaken an exhaustive yet synthetic appraisal of all technical areas related to defence and security. Priorities were identifi ed and are listed according to technical domains to ensure successful implementation by DGA Technical Team Leaders. The Strategic Plan also complements the document entitled “Basic Research Policy” (POS) which serves as a reference for DGA and focuses on low TRL(1) technologies from basic research to initial lab tests. As this is a live document, we encourage you to add to it by sending us your views and observations, preferably via our DGA web site ixarm.com, and by completing the attached questionnaire. I now invite you to read on and familiarise yourselves with this Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in Defence and Security.
(1) Technology Readiness Level
2 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 Table of contents
1 Foreword 1.1. introduction 5 1.2. functions OF R&T IN DEFENCE AND SECURITY 6 1.3. scopE & INTERFACE OF THE PS R&T WITH OTHER STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES 7
2 Issues7 at strake indefence R&T 2.1. issuES CONCERNING THE WHITE PAPER AND THE LPM (MILITARY PLANNING LAW) 11 2.2. capaBILITY ISSUES 11 2.3. sECURITY 14 2.4. prEPARATION FOR AND ADAPTATION TO REGULATORY CHANGES 14 2.5. rEDUCTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 15 2.6. ECONOMIC ISSUES 17 2.7. spacE 18 2.8. EVOLUTION OF CIVILIAN TECHNOLOGIES 19 2.9. tECHNOLOGIES OF SOVEREIGNTY (TSV) 20 2.10. r&T COOPERATION 20 2.11. industrial STAKES 21
3 PS R&T implementation strategy 3.1. intERNAL ORGANISATION 25 3.2. iMPROVEMENT OF R&T SPIN-OFF 27 3.3. rELATIONS BETWEEN DGA AND OTHER R&T INVESTORS 30 3.4. rELATIONS WITH R&T PROVIDERS 32 3.5. funding 37
4 Technological analysis 4.1. gENERAL ASPECTS 39 4.2. systEMS OF SYSTEMS 40 4.3. architECTURE AND TECHNIQUES FOR AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS 44 4.4. architECTURE AND TECHNIQUES FOR NAVAL SYSTEMS 53 4.5. architECTURE AND TECHNIQUES FOR LAND SYSTEMS 59 4.6. architECTURE AND TECHNIQUES FOR C3I SYSTEMS 65 4.7. MISSILES, WEAPONS AND NUCLEAR DEFENCE TECHNIQUES 76 4.8. sENSORS, GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION (CGN) 84 4.9. tELECOMMUNICATIONS 95 4.10. inforMATION SYSTEM SECURITY 99 4.11. huMAN SCIENCES AND PROTECTION 101 4.12. MATERIALS AND COMPONENTS 106 4.13. tESTING METHODS 112 5 Appendices APPENDIX I: TRL SCALE (TECHNOLOGY READINESS LEVEL) 115 APPENDIX II: GLOBAL PROJECTS 119 APPENDIX III: TECHNOLOGICAL BASIS 121 APPENDIX IV: TECHNICAL AERAS AND ITS R&T ACTIVITIES 122 APPENDIX V: GLOSSARY 124 APPENDIX VI: DIFFERENT DGA LOCATIONS 132
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 3 4 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 1 1 Foreword
1.1. INTRODUCTION Foreword Evolution of global requirements Our experience of recent military operations abroad, against a security context characterised by the struggle against a number of disparate organisations, has highlighted a number of new requirements, sometimes long term and often urgent. Societal changes in recent years have accelerated the development of the regulatory corpus (health and safety, safety at work and in using hardware, eco-design, case law, the precautionary principle, etc.) applicable to defence systems and their use. The challenge for DGA is to target its R&T efforts appropriately in order that its future systems meet the needs of this new context as fully as possible. The White Paper on Defence and National Security constitutes the new reference document for our medium and long term needs, the operational capacities we need to obtain and also the degree of sovereignty and autonomy we need to preserve and the international partnerships we need to develop for the planning, execution and implementation of each programme. Apart from areas falling under pure national sovereignty, a very large degree of European and NATO cooperation and sharing of the most costly know-how is necessary in order to reach our goals within the budget available. European cooperation must become the normal operating mode for defence and security research, which must only be abandoned in the case of a real, long-term incompatibility of interests. Targeted cooperations outside Europe can also provide interesting opportunities. Finally, an optimal use of civilian research is required. Consultation of civilian bodies and their awareness of defence and security needs must be deeply reinforced. These various elements require a rational, flexible and opportunist approach to defence research. It is through dialogue with the best research and development departments that technological breakthroughs will be made and their emergence may be encouraged by new funding at the expense, if necessary, of technologies at the end of their maturity cycle.
The Strategic Plan for Research and Technology In this context of new requirements and sometimes of a possible contradiction between short- term and long-term interests, research priorities need to be define, to combine and rationalise the efforts of many more participants, but whose budgets are structurally decreasing. This Strategic Plan aims to present the results of this analysis in an educational format. It describes in detail the mechanism linking defence research to available technology, knowledge of the state-of-the-art abroad and in the civilian sector, and also to the capability and programmatic issues for Defence and National Security. It is a public document, providing DGA’s partners with an overview of the issues in this domain.
The document The Strategic Plan for Research and Technology constitutes a global framework for DGA’s actions in anticipating and mastering the evolution of the technologies required for future defence and security systems. Based on the operational needs and key priorities described in the PP30, the aim of this document is to place the available R&T studies within an overall framework (future operational needs/technology priorities/partnerships) in order to respond to operational requirements foreseeable by 2012-2025. It complements the POS, which describes the basic research to promote in order to produce the
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 5 technologies which our future defence systems will require. It sets forth the areas where work is needed in order to meet the challenges facing us in the next few years but the effective funding of these studies will be reviewed in accordance with the resources available at the time. It implicitly includes all research priorities that DGA intends to finance, including those outside the “strictly defence” domain on which future systems may depend. It is presented according to areas of application, corresponding to DGA’s weapon systems’ “architectural areas” and “joint technology and components areas”, and could provide a useful reference tool for annual technical policy discussions between defence and security industries and DGA technology areas leaders. It will also structure dialogue with our international partners, encouraging the mutual understanding of our goals and actions, and will provide a key tool for building efficient cooperation.
1.2. FUNCTIONS OF R&T IN DEFENCE AND SECURITY The main functions of R&T in defence and security, its beneficiaries and uses are presented below. The different issues associated with its various functions will be set forth in details in Chapter 2:
Functions Beneficiaries
Possess the scientific and technical skills in • The Defence Ministry and its key staff, who validates order to advise decision makers. the major policy areas for preparing the future (LPM); • Military staffs, directorates and departments of the Ministry in charge of preparing the future.
Meet medium and long-term capability • The military staff who evaluates the possibilities of requirements (PP30) with new technical their integration into equipment; solutions in order to achieve autonomy and • DGA, which integrates the results in the preparation supremacy of our means of action (on our own of armament operations and the enhancement of or in coalition) while minimising costs and time. coherency between military systems.
Master defence system technologies • The defence industry of the target DTIB(2), which corresponding to the technical solutions uses the skills acquired or maintained to produce the envisaged with the good degree of autonomy, required equipment; both at the national and European level. • DGA, which draws up the technical specifications for future weapon systems while taking into account regulatory and environmental considerations.
Contribute to the construction of a European • Military staff, DGA and the defence industry of the Defence by federating efforts around DTIB, to evaluate whether a specified performance the launching of ambitious technological level is achievable in operational conditions of use; demonstrators. • The defence industry, to motivate and federate teams around major large-scale projects; • European states, to focus and develop cooperation on major projects; • DGA and the defence industry of the DTIB, to reduce the risks, costs and delivery times of future armament programs
Build a competitive defence and security • DGA, which identifies the products, industries and industry by: technologies to be used for armament operations; • Communication of the sector based • The defence industry and laboratories, which carry (product), industrial and technological out research work; priorities of each DGA technical expertise • The SMEs and research laboratories concerned, which division; will be able to maintain or develop their skills • Support of the technological research effort; • Support of innovation by SMEs and research laboratories. (2) DTIB: Defence Technological and Industrial Base
6 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 1.3. SCOPE & INTERFACE OF THE PS R&T WITH OTHER STRATEGIES AND 1 PRIORITIES 1.3.1. scopE of thE ps r&t Defence R&T is part of the global process of preparation of the future. It covers a large range of activities. Apart from supporting the preparatory phases of armament programs, it also includes many applications resulting from the life cycle of programs, such as qualifi cation of equipment, improvement of operational maintenance, dismantling, and reduction of renewal costs and
maintenance of the skills of the industrial and state-operated teams. Foreword The purpose of this document is to present R&T priorities according to technical division, with time to application ranging from 2 to 15 years, as well as the key potential areas for coherency within the ministry regarding Research and Technology and ways of achieving them. R&T covers: - Research and technology responding to identifi ed operational needs - Demonstrators in characterised environments. The PS R&T covers all defence and security technological needs regardless of the various forms of fi nancing the associated work. We can therefore fi nd, for example: - Contracted “research studies” including exploratory research and innovations (unsolicited proposals) - Subsidies to and contracts with public agencies(3) and Engineering Colleges under the supervision of the Ministry of Defence. Civilian funding will be considered for some of the priorities mentioned, in particular for security R&T for the technologies concerned (i.e. Biometry).
1.3.2. intErfacing BEtWEEn thE ps r&t and othEr docuMEnts and prioritiEs The PS R&T corresponds to the priorities set forth in the White Paper on Defence and National Security and draws from preparatory work undertaken for the Military Planning Law. It also provides the Ministry’s r&t programming process with the major trends in R&T. This programming process takes place once a year and consists of two complementary approaches for the use of R&T study resources:
30 years: A long-terme vision (PP30) • Scientific policy • R&T strategy 12 years: (2 LPMs) Priority • Industrial strategy Review of needs: October • Cooperation strategy Choice of objectives: March • Technical expertise 3 to 5 years: Plan of engagement R&T study frame of work corresponding to objectives: March Planning: June
1 year: Execution Plan
(3) ONERA, ISL, CNES, CEA
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 7 - The capability approach, based on equipment plans, which determines the demonstrations, the risk reduction operations and the technological developments to be carried out before launching the programs, - The technological approach, which identifies promising technological work to be supported, without any precise timeline The PS R&T sets forth the Defence R&T priorities contained in the Thirty-Year Plan (PP30). The PP30 is written by military staffers and DGA engineers and aims to constitute a long-term forward- planning document, setting goals up to 30 years in advance in terms of defence and security needs. The Basic Research Policy (POS) is the DGA reference document in terms of scientific priorities (available at http://www.ixarm.com/Politique-et-Objectifs). The POS is a document similar to the PS R&T, but focused on technology with very low TRLs, from the basic research to its first experiments performed in laboratories. Along with the PP30 and the POS, the PS R&T presents the key areas of coherence in terms of R&T.n
8 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 1 Foreword
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 9 10 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 2 Issues at stake in defence R&T
2.1. issuEs concErning thE WhitE papEr and thE lpM (Military planning laW) 2 The White Paper on Defence and Security set forth a new defence and security policy for the years to come. The resulting military strategy is based on three key principles: − Nuclear deterrence; − Autonomous situation awareness; − The decision to retain full military power. The operational goals set for the Armed Forces correspond to fi ve strategic functions (knowledge
and awareness, prevention, deterrence, protection and intervention) and their associated means Issues at stake in defence R&T of implementation. The White Paper also defi nes the main technological and industrial priorities resulting from the strategic goals for National Security to 2025. It details a few domains where expertise could, or should, be acquired and developed through European cooperation. Alongside the long-term stakes exposed hereafter, overseas interventions have provided feedback on experience and short-term technological solutions. Those various inputs enable the identifi cation of general characteristics that proper planning and execution of defence and security research must possess: • Enable sustained effort on sovereign technologies with long term objectives and slow maturation, • Allow major changes in priorities such as those suggested in the White Paper, while controlling their pace and consequences, • For shorter-term applications, provide enough fl exibility and reactivity in order to maintain operational control in overseas theatres facing an ever-moving and ever- evolving threat. The confrontation between these various issues and the technological state of the art within the defence and civilian sector, in France, in Europe and worldwide, enables the defi nition of a research policy as well as long term and short term planning of the corresponding actions.
2.2. CAPABILITY ISSUES The aim of defence R&T is to satisfy the capability requirements identifi ed within the armed forces.
These requirements have been segmented C.Fiard - Dicod within defence into fi ve main so-called systems of force described in detail in this chapter. White paper
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 11 ● “deterrence” system This system requires from R&T in defence and security the possibility to master the technological capabilities rendering it possible to design and execute, with full national autonomy, the essential elements of all the weapon systems necessary to exert a credible deterrence on a potential attacker in order to: - Ensure the technical credibility of weapons, their carriers and strategic transmissions: reliability of complex systems often integrating non dual-use technologies and making it possible to maintain the upper hand; resistance of weapon propellants and explosives to various categories of attack; nuclear safety of weapons and nuclear steam supply systems, up to and including their dismantling phase; stealth technology; effi ciency, reliability and safety of weapons through simulation, without nuclear testing; - Implement nuclear forces: reliable and safe transmission of orders and information to nuclear weapons carriers for the command and control of nuclear operations; sustainable invulnerability of ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) with regard to the current and future threats, minimum dependency on external means, improvement of certain ballistic missile performances; range, precision, penetration and stealth for the airborne component; capability to identify the attacker.
● “command and information superiority” system The objective is to acquire or improve a broad set of features and capabilities: - command and control: information sharing, improvement of operations tempo, real-time mission reconfi guration , optimisation of the human factor in the Command and Control chain (C2); use of aerospace vectors and weapon systems optimisation offered in the operational command
general architecture ; transparency of the combined DGA Flight Testing battle-space and capacities of autonomous analysis of the environment for the situation awareness; UAV SIDM (EADS) - communicate: global network offering the forces a groupware and the inter-agency and international interoperability necessary for network operations; processing and operating capability compatible with foreseeable increases in volume of data and accessible information; - supervise, acquire, recognise, inform: availability of long mission radar sensors to be integrated onto Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for surveillance, accelerated information up-dating, multi- sensor capability, use of Earth observation from space, use of electromagnetic signal intelligence at all levels in the command chain, all weather national and/or European air/ground surveillance capability, disposal of a global and reactive airspace surveillance network, space surveillance (detection, recognition and identifi cation of objects in space).
● “projection - Mobility - support” system Defence strongly relies on technology from the civilian transport sector, but requires security and defence R&T to master technological capabilities for specifi c military needs and adapt civilian equipment and concepts for military use, in order: - to project forces: architecture of innovative air and naval platforms to project forces, in-fl ight refuelling systems; - to ensure mobility: architecture of innovative land, air and sea platforms in order to provide in-theatre mobility, complementary to projection, self–protection DR systems for such platforms against proliferating threats; Demonstrator Catamaran (CNIM)
12 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 - to maintain and restore on-the-ground support to operations: improvement of logistics and of equipment availability, reduction of ownership costs, improvement of soldiers’ living conditions, energy sources at a controlled cost and reduction of fuel consumption and optimisation of transport fl ows for a global improvement of the service from beginning to end.
● “Engagement and combat” system The aim of R&T is to prepare the evolution of the forces’ equipment so that they dispose of the best possible systems for asymmetric confl ict, while maintaining the capacity to design equipment required to face the most serious threats. Adaptation to asymmetric confl icts requires: 2 - Precision of armaments (ammunition and missiles) and control of their effects; - Observation and identifi cation capabilities; - Protection of platforms and soldiers against threats which are no longer frontal but from all sides. The low density of forces in such confl icts needs long range, precise and fast support. Apart from work Issues at stake in defence R&T to control the effects of the weapons, the role of technology in the observation/decision/action loop is essential to maintain freedom of action. Improved collaborative action on land, in the air and at sea is the key to superiority in both asymmetrical and symmetrical confl icts. Longer-term actions are necessary to prepare the systems of 2030. Robotics, artifi cial intelligence, will make it possible to design systems with enough autonomy to avoid unnecessary exposure of soldiers Vrignaud DGAcom - F. to danger. Deep area interventions will use cruise Caesar (NEXTER) missiles, combat drones and stealth planes.
● “protection and safeguard” system This system is particularly well adapted to the exploitation of dualities between civilian and military projects and corresponds to the defence/security synergy recommended in the White Paper. The main capabilities put forward are as follows: - protect approaches and national territory by means of fi ve military capabilities: air defence (ground to air, air to air, air policing) surveillance and intervention at sea based on sensor networks and means of action (patrol boats, surveillance planes, etc.), control of space in order to ensure continuity of services based at fi rst on radar surveillance, advanced alert with detection and identifi cation of missile fi rings, anti ballistic missile defence with their interception in a given zone; - Ensure protection of armed forces and sites: protection of sites and physical networks, protection of operations on the ground, protection in coastal waters; as well as capacity to limit or prevent the acquisition of intelligence by the enemy; - Ensure protection of personnel: health support for personnel in operations, improved rehabilitation of wounded personnel, protection against the CBRN threat, capability to establish evidence of attack and identifi cation of the attacker in order to engage criminal proceedings (charges, inquiries, etc); - Ensure security of the civil environment: participation in the inter-ministry crisis and major event management, participation in population security, search and rescue, assistance
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 13 2.3. SECURITY The strategic plan of the Ministry of Defence as regards security R&T is to have civilian ministries benefi t from its know-how and skills, to use as effi ciently as possible the R&T carried out by civilians and to actively participate in work aimed at ensuring the coherence of R&T in defence and security, from an inter-ministry point of view aimed at providing optimal protection of our interests and of the population through defence and national security policy.
Synergies exist to meet the needs of DR the armed forces and security forces, successfully using many important Medical evacuation dual technologies in several fi elds: intelligence, sensors, surveillance, UAV, reduced lethality weapons, etc. 15% of defence R&T, nearly €100M, directly concerns security, making the Ministry of Defence the largest investor in security technologies. Thus, civilian ministries (Interior, Transport, etc.) are involved in the studies on dual- use topics and they also benefi t from defence R&T. Defence also seeks to ensure coherence between its research and that fi nanced by the civilian sector. The European Union, the National Research Agency (Agence Nationale pour la Recherche, or ANR) and the single inter-ministry fund (Fond Unique Interministériel, or FUI) for competitive clusters fi nance research projects on dual topics (maritime surveillance, software radio, simulation, etc.), fi elds in which DGA also invests. Inter-ministry cooperation on the technology needs for defence and security makes it possible to orient security R&T towards technological themes of common interest. DGA provides its expertise and knowledge of R&T management and prioritisation. Under the coordination of the National Defence Secretariat (Secrétariat Général de la Défense Nationale, or SGDN), DGA chairs the national thematic group which brings together the public and private R&T communities, maintains the list of national R&T priorities and the security R&T program database. DGA participates to the ANR program “concepts, systems and tools for global security”, launched in 2006 and takes an active part in its executive board (composed of members of the Ministries of Defence, Research and Interior At the inter-ministry and European level, this board is in charge of chairing and managing the security part (European Security Research Programme – ESRP) of the European R&T Programme (7th Framework Programme) and represents France on the ESRP programme committee. This strategy exists within a national and international context undergoing signifi cant changes, with an increasing emphasis on the use of technology to address new security issues (terrorism, organised crime, pandemics, etc.) and on synergies between defence and security. The use of civilian R&T enables early detection of technological advances while ensuring a permanent knowledge of the industry structures and key skills availability.
2.4. PREPARATION FOR AND ADAPTATION TO REGULATORY CHANGES Defence and security R&T provides the technological knowledge and needs necessary, in the best possible economic conditions, to ensure the observance of existing regulations, adapt to regulatory change and to control the establishment of new regulations. For example, in the area of arms control, the adhesion by France on 11 April 2001 to the fi rst additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions requires its observance of Article 36 thereof, which commands that the State systematically determines the compliance of weapons or methods of warfare it plans to design or acquire with the relevant rules according to the law of armed confl ict. In other words, each State must assess the lawful nature of any new weapon, means or method of warfare that it decides to study, develop, and acquire or adopt.
14 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 Some new weapons require regulations to be modifi ed. For example, the development of drones requires the regulatory adaptation and/or new regulations for their integration into airspace shared with civil aviation. For other topics (frequency management, technical authority, reliability of equipment, lifespan of systems, costs of maintaining in operational condition), standardisation is an indispensable tool. Having the security of the civilian world as its ultimate objective, and being mindful of the effi ciency of its equipment under any circumstances, defence has an active role in the regulatory and normative environment, in particular in the following fi elds: - Maintain State skills necessary for future programmes, - Secure sources of technology, - Reduce national dependency on foreign technologies, 2 - Eco-design, - Deconstruction, - Capacity to exert technical authority, - Legal protection of the State and its agents.
2.5. REDUCTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT Issues at stake in defence R&T Society expects eco-responsible behaviour from the military forces even during confl ict. There are many areas of application: waste sorting, in metropolitan area military sites as well as during home or overseas operations, energy management, hazardous substance management, noise pollution management around airbases and recycling of equipment are examples of topics which defence has been taking into consideration for several years. This is illustrated, for example, by the joint directive on environmental protection in operations(4) and the manual on the law of armed confl icts(5), referring to several texts and international law agreements concerning environmental protection. compliance with legislative and regulatory provisions The “applicable regulatory corpus” is a notion which varies both in time and in space. Regulations evolve and equipment, in the vast majority of cases, is mobile. While European and national regulations are generally respected, local regulations must not be neglected, which may limit the mobility and operation of equipment and compromise the export of defence equipment. technological and industrial impact of these regulations Even if some regulations include exemption clauses for defence and security activities, they nevertheless strongly infl uence the domain. Defence is increasingly less certain to benefi t from exemptions in its favour, as all these regulations will have an increasingly signifi cant
(4) Directive interarmées sur la protection de l’environnement en opération PIA 05- 302 N°514/DEF/EMA/EMP.5/NP as of 17 May 2004. (5) Manuel de droit des confl its armés, DAJ, 22 October 2004, available on the Internet http://www.defense.gouv.fr/defense/ DGA/Comm enjeux_defense/defense_et_droit/droit_ des_confl its_armes/manuel_de_droit_des_ confl its_armes No exception for defence electronics
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 15 impact on the market and thus on technologies available in the long term. The market is generally driven by civilian demand, and a “standardisation of the least polluting technologies” is taking place making certain components whose only user remains defence obsolescent or over-priced. The directive known as “RoHS(6)” is a revealing example: it severely regulates the use of certain hazardous substances, including lead, in electrical and electronic equipment. Defence equipment is excluded from the scope of this regulation. However, in practice, defence electronics is not significant enough on the electronics component market to preserve such components for its own specific needs. Similarly, the new European regulation on the registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of chemical products will entail the disappearance from the market of some substances critical for defence equipment.
Precautionary principle The prevention and precautionary principles are written in the French Constitution since 2005. Applying them requires the actors concerned to establish concrete provisions in order to prevent risk (known risk in the case of the prevention principle, suspected risk in case of the precautionary principle). The provisions must be adapted to the risks, use the best technologies available and take into account proportionality imperatives. The case of nanotechnology is interesting. In a 2006 report, the prevention committee of French Ministry of Ecology and Sustainable Development advocated to balance public research funding on nanotechnology between the evaluation of their risk on tho one hand and their development on the other hand. Public incentives for research and investment in this domain must systematically include safety and traceability provisions. In general, the identification of health and environmental risk is becoming a necessity for research and equipment programmes, in order to manage risk and be able to prove its proper management.
A pragmatic and progressive process The procedure lies on a combination of two criteria, giving priority, on the one hand, to advances easy to carry out providing immediate progress, and, on the other hand, actions that might be more difficult but are motivated by more important risks. Corresponding action must be determined in general according to two approaches: - Curative: manage the heritage of the past (dismantling, maintenance in operational condition of the existing systems, palliative solutions, etc.), - Preventive: be able to develop future operational capabilities in satisfying conditions (substitution of disappearing technologies, command tools including better control of effects, development of sustainable and appropriate dismantling procedures, etc.).
Corresponding industrial and technological efforts Future research programmes and demonstrators will include the following key priorities: - Limit energy consumption and harness alternative sources of energy: • consumption reduction of existing platforms; • research and validation of alternative sources of energy for defence applications; • increased use of simulation. - Develop less polluting technologies and processes • research alternatives to critical substances used by defence and on the verge of disappearing from the market (impact of REACH regulations);
(6) Restriction of hazardous substances – Directive 2002/95 – January 2003 by European Union, came into force as of 1 July 2006
16 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 • processes for cleaning up polluted soil and for dismantling defence equipments in a more environmentally friendly manner; • Waste disposal during operations. - Reduce noise pollution: • Apart from the physical and chemical risks, limitation of noise pollution must be taken into account by research projects for local inhabitants, those operating the equipment and even for animals (impact of active sonar on sea mammals). 2 - Acquire and integrate environmental footprint assessment tools: • In an operational context
• In a systems engineering context Vrignaud DGAcom -F. for the preparation and design of armament programmes. DGA Missiles Testing / Isle du Levant: environmental protection Issues at stake in defence R&T European coordination These recommendations may be reinforced by coordinated action with our European partners. The European Defence Agency might be the appropriate framework to ensure this coordination; in particular in the following areas: - Monitoring of norms and regulations and active participation in their evolution; - Joint technology research efforts; - Harmonisation of procurement policies in terms of sustainable development requirements.
2.6. ECONOMIC ISSUES 2.6.1. rEduction of oWnErship costs Two major causes of economic and budgetary constraints that defence must face are: - The raising costs to maintain some increasingly complex armaments in operational condition, - The work needed to dismantle equipment at the end of its life cycle that new concerns regarding sustainable development tend to develop. The rather recent concept of the sustainability of a system integrates its fi nancial cost throughout its entire life cycle: it involves making sure that beyond its development, acquisition and commissioning, the forces will have enough fi nancial resources to implement it, maintain it, modernise itand fi nally dismantle it. The French equivalent of the cost concepts found in partner countries(7) is the concept of “overall ownership cost” (coût global de possession - CGP), i.e. the calculation of costs over the whole lifespan of the system, or the cost of the life cycle. The overall cost is now a decisive criterion in the decision to launch a program. It has consequently become a major performance aspect of a system and is paid full attention, in particular in terms of technological studies chosen according to their capacity to decrease the CGP of existing or future systems. Cost reduction issues enter constantly into the preparation of programmes. They appear in all areas of defence. R&T will enable, for example, to reduce the costs of air surveillance missions through the use of UAVs, to increase the time between programmed maintenance periods of naval vessels,
(7) Life Cycle Cost (LCC), Whole Life Cost (WLC), Cost of Ownership (COO), Total Ownership Cost (TOC)
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 17 in particular submarines, to reduce the size of crews, or, through systems architectures, to allow the easy replacement of obsolete components or equipment. The associated trade-off studies make it possible to present decisive arguments during the selection of R&T projects.
2.6.2. curtailing EnErgy consuMption Apart from the operational advantage it presents (autonomy, discretion, reduction of logistics in particular), mastering the energy consumed by weapon systems is a strategic issue. Energy consumption by the Ministry of Defence was reduced by 30% between 1995 and 2005. This consumption is 80% dependent on fossil fuels and in particular on oil. In addition, the volatility of the cost of oil and the prospect of exhausted energy reserves in the long term have an obvious impact on the DGAcom -F. Vrignaud Vrignaud DGAcom -F. contribution of energy to the budget of the Ministry of Defence. Moreover, France has Photovoltaic energy laid down an ambitious policy for sustainable development, requiring even more control over energy consumption by weapon systems. One should also adapt to other European and international legislative and normative changes in the fi eld of energy and ensure that equipments operate with the fuel available in operation. For the majority of platforms, the fundamental long-term purpose is to reduce dependency by using other energy sources to replace conventional fuel. The use of synthetic fuels is under consideration, according to their availability in the civilian sector and/or possible NATO type standardisations. The evolution of other forms of energy (thermoelectric, fuel cells, high-effi ciency solar, hydrogen, etc.) is also being carefully observed. They may be considered for targeted operational applications (generators, soldiers, UAVs, etc.).
2.7. SPACE In this fi eld, synergies between defence and civilian research are fundamental and the National Space Centre (Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales, or CNES) is the key institution. Conducted in close cooperation with CNES, space related defence R&T aims to satisfy users’ needs by: • Reinforcing the robustness, precision and autonomy of satellite positioning and synchronisation information, with the support of the governmental department of the European program Galileo; • Developing dual and cooperative aspects of the expansion of future network systems via satellite to a global network (communication and shared services) in order to offer the military a groupware as well as the necessary inter-ministry and international interoperability;
• Extending the use of Earth imaging EADS-Astrium from space and signal intelligence at all command chain levels. Galileo system
18 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 Lastly, space defence R&T aims to develop specific technologies necessary for new defence applications and to validate them with space demonstrators. The R&T activity aims to respond to spatial defence autonomy issues within a European framework. DGA make sure that competencies are preserved and combine its efforts with those of the CNES in shared military & civilian fields.
2.8. EVOLUTION OF CIVILIAN TECHNOLOGIES In the civilian sector, companies must optimise, now more than ever, their products permanently, first in order to face increasing competition, for example in terms of ownership costs, safety, energy consumption and operational performances, and second to very actively seek technological breakthroughs which will give them a durable competitive advantage. For some of them, the strong growth of the worldwide market for consumer goods offers sufficient prospects of profits to devote huge resources to the research and development of new products. This is the case in 2 aeronautics and land transport, where the key industries are all global players; or in manufacturing sectors with large-scale production like electronic components, materials and IT. This competition is extended to the level of States and even of continents. Thus, States organise the public funding of civilian research so that their corporations can extract the best competitive advantages within their various markets. Civilian research funding thus plays an increasingly important role in the evolution of technological capabilities of industries. For example, as regards sustainable development, one of the priorities of the European Commission, EU programmes are
setting the pace for the technological progress of European industries. This is also the case for dual- Issues at stake in defence R&T use technologies for more electrical aircraft, the use of more energy efficient and less polluting fuel or technologies used for modular aircrafts. The defence research in this Strategic Plan is a research: - funded by the State, as opposed to private sector investment in research motivated by commercial perspectives based on innovative products, - oriented according to precise and quantified technological objectives, and even by a specific need identified for an operational system, as opposed to civilian public research oriented according to research field and giving priority to the proliferation of ideas for a broad spectrum of applications Defence research is thus different from civilian research. Defence may however benefit from civilian scientific and technological advances for its own purposes. It must do so for the simple reason that, as they are easily accessible, they may be used at any time by another State or hostile organisation, and thus induce a technological gap and a strategic handicap. Dual research makes it possible to exploit synergies at the border between the two fields. Coordination actions between civilian and defence organisations are covered in Chapter 3. The area covered by civilian technologies is in a state of constant change, tending to increase considerably. Defence research must evolve coherently in order to remain complementary, and technological objectives must be adjusted even if capability objectives remain unchanged. Thus, the cost reduction associated with the progress of civilian technologies have led to an increased use of civilian technologies in defence systems, mainly electronics and software-related at the beginning. Duality now increasingly concerns the design and the components of the systems, their architectures and validation. This introduces an increasing overlap of civilian technologies with the technological capabilities of defence, thus raising the question of the control of the architectures and of in service support (ISS) during the lifespan of systems, as civilian and military systems have different life cycles. Indeed, civilian technologies develop and succeed one another at increasingly rapid pace, significantly faster than the life cycle of defence systems, at the same time inducing new needs in the Military. For example, dual-use information technology should ideally be able to be rolled- out in the Military simultaneously with its mass diffusion in civil society, in order to benefit from a mature, robust and maintained technology. Moreover, in some sectors (electronic components, materials) and for some needs, defence becomes a marginal customer in term of series. There is a risk that certain technological fields on
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 19 which defence is dependent for its equipment in use may become extinct. To correct this situation, defence must know how to anticipate and manage stocks, or improve modularity thus enabling the replacement of equipment at reduced costs. This has resulted in a growing interest in research themes such as behaviour with ageing, or the architecture of open systems and their qualification. In order to better exploit the results of civilian research, defence research therefore tends: - to accelerate the transition between the various phases of technological maturation: exploratory research, technological development, demonstration, - to master open architectures authorising technological insertions during the development phase, partial upgrading during the life cycle of the systems, as well as incremental developments.
2.9. TECHNOLOGIES OF SOVEREIGNTY (TSV) To satisfy the strategic capacities of defence and security defined by the White Paper, some technologies fulfilling crucial functions are rare, difficult to acquire or implement. In order to guarantee the national autonomy of the systems concerned, access to these technologies, called technologies of sovereignty (TSV) must be rendered secure, notably by means of R&T action. This implies: - either their control by French industry; - or guaranteed access to industrial capabilities present on national territory; - or access guaranteed by intergovernmental agreements when they are not available on national territory. The most obvious technologies of sovereignty are linked to issues such as deterrence (design of strategic missiles). In other cases, they are tied to strong economic issues: aircrafts, launchers, satellites, nuclear energy, high power lasers, simulators, navigation, etc. Other less obvious TSVs may be used at various subcontracting levels without a sufficient approval process in place concerning their control by the customer or at a higher level of industrial integration. However, they must be identified, anticipated and supported in coordination with the scientific and industrial environment in order to direct investment and thus to maintain and develop state-owned and industrial skills in these fields. In the long term, projects for intergovernmental component licenses or the setting up of a European free trade area are among the possible solutions with regard to the least sensitive equipment. The security of TSVs cannot be addressed only at a national level. It is approached, with all necessary precaution, with our allies having similar concerns.
2.10. R&T COOPERATION With a few exceptions(8), international R&T cooperation is seen as essential and will grow over the coming years as long as it is in the technical, industrial and financial interest of all parties. Co- operation should lead to: • enlarging the scope of R&T work by sharing resources and competences. Co-operation is the only way Europe can build a credible defence at an affordable price. France is very keen to promote more exchanges. • reducing cost and risk and joining R&T effort to meet future requirements at a faster pace. • building European DTIB ahead of programmes and progressively contribute to its rationalisation. • preparing groundwork for future procurement programmes. In an ideal world, R&T cooperation should begin with a common strategy and could lead to mutual technology dependency with a view to the best possible DTIB. Although France wishes to maintain sovereignty on subjects such as deterrence, sensitive work on certain threats, crypto and intelligence, it strongly favours bilateral cooperation or multilateral
(8) See § 2.9 “Technologies of Sovereignty”
20 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 European cooperation within the European Defence Agency (EDA). For it is within Europe that, most acutely, solving DTIB problems, meeting common requirements and agreeing on true strategies to share competences is most relevant. In 2008, France spent 835 million Euros on R&T (not including nuclear and dual research) of which 150 million (18%) was spent on collaboration. France is thus the first contributor to R&T cooperation in Europe, equal to United Kingdom. Should France wish to increase that percentage and achieve a figure in excess of 200 million Euros, we need to: - undertake cooperation in the most appropriate frameworks while avoiding dispersal, - identify the best tools for cooperation and, - prioritise promising collaborative actions and consider early withdrawal from those appearing to have little chance of success. 2
2.11. INDUSTRIAL STAKES A large industrial sector in France The defence industry is an industry of high technological value, with expertise essential in order to satisfy military needs and to guarantee, even in the long term, the supply of our forces with equipment, their freedom of action and the possibility to export.
France has a large, successful defence industry, the second largest in Europe after the United Issues at stake in defence R&T Kingdom. French defence industry skills are well positioned in Europe, and, for some of them, in the world: they form a complete spectrum, covering all sectors. France has an important group of industrial clusters of excellence that gives it unquestionable leadership in some domains (electronics, space and missiles, among other things), positions of excellence at the best technological level for aeronautics and naval systems, and good expertise in the land sector. Today, research and development represents 10 to 20% of the revenues of the ten largest defence groups in France, which employ some 20,000 persons in their research centres. Research favours technological innovation and constitutes a driving force in many major technologies, with some civilian applications.
Essential industrial skills to maintain and develop The armament industry is the key to defence; it is essential to maintain and develop a DTIB with a proper level of autonomy on a European or national scale, while seeking a competitive edge. The DTIB relies on various industrial expertises, some of which are strategic with regard of the wished level of autonomy. Some of this expertise is fundamental and concerns R&D capacities (research, studies, design, engineering), but also some manufacturing know-how (industrialisation, processes, etc.) and is associated to State-owned expertise and capacity, especially in terms of defence evaluation and testing. Mastery of industrial expertise relies on the implementation of a policy to maintain and develop this expertise in order to satisfy the needs of the armed forces in the long term and to ensure the best economic efficiency of investment and reduce the burden on the nation. One of the challenges is to perpetuate expertise in order to provide, maintain and upgrade the equipment in service. For sectors currently under development, the challenge is to acquire and develop the expertise that will enable us to answer future needs.
National public procurement At the national level, the White Paper on Defence and National Security has reasserted the need for an industrial policy and set forth the technological and industrial priorities resulting from the strategic goals for national security to 2025. The chosen capacities as well as the renewal cycles of key equipment resulting from the White Paper have been transposed in the Military Planning Law (Loi de Programmation Militaire, or LPM) validated by the Parliament, and have a structuring impact on the DTIB, depending on the sector and whether concerning production or R&D.
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 21 During production phases, implying low levels of work for research centres, the sustainability of high technology industries implies the mobilisation of a core of expertise, comprising engineers and researchers, towards technology goals aimed at preparing the next generation of weapon systems: the load of the industrial engineering departments, which conditions the maintenance of their technological expertise, is carried out through a substantial amount of “research studies” funding and an adapted organisation of future programmes, firstly in the key sectors set forth in the White Paper (deterrence – nuclear submarines, space, complex missiles), and secondly in the strategic combat aircraft sector (platforms, electronic warfare, propulsion).
Europe: a reference framework The current level of European budgets and the increasing cost of weapon systems mean that no single nation in Europe, including France, has alone the size and thus the capacity to bear the cost of a defence industry able to answer all its needs. In the specific case of sectors falling strictly under national sovereignty, for which France wants to retain national autonomous capacity, and with the exception of equipments with no particular strategic value in terms of supply (shared equipment that can be supplied by many providers) procurement can be carried out on the world market. In all other cases, the mutualisation of procurement by European nations is an interesting perspective enabling control of industrial expertise. This implies the acceptance of mutual dependencies between European partners, which in turn implies reciprocity and balance.
Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) Industrial expertise is present at all levels, from large industrial groups among world leaders to many SMEs. Around an estimated 4,000 SMEs take a share in the defence effort, some of them owning crucial and even strategic expertise. Generally speaking, SMEs are reactive and competitive, and also, thanks to their capacity for innovation, indispensable for maintaining and developing the technological excellence of weapon systems. SMEs’ expertise has to be fully exploited for in “research studies” as well as in the armament programmes. n
22 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 2 Issues at stake in defence R&T
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 23 24 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 PS R&T implementation 3 strategy
3.1. INTERNAL ORGANISATION 3.1.1. procEss The organisation of defence to control its R&T refl ects the specifi c nature of the latter, both dedicated to reaching the highest possible levels for precise applications in the medium and long term (up to several decades) and to best exploit the results of civilian research. Its goals are: • to ensure concentration of R&T efforts on the most strategic issues; • to facilitate the work of key players in the process by providing them visibility adapted to their level of command; 3 • to reduce the gap between the R&T scope statement and its realisation; • to take into account the scientifi c, technological and industrial environments. The link between the capability requirement and the innovative technologies needed (with a view to their inclusion into future armament programmes) is established according to two approaches: • global projects: global projects (Appendix 2) bring together in an ordered and coherent way the capability requirements and work needed in order to meet them, prepare future armament programmes and improve the associated operational capabilities. They are described in the PP30 and are documented in a scope statement and roadmaps. They are under the shared responsibility of the capability managers, within DGA, and the joint chiefs of staff (EMA). Implementation R&T PS strategy Corresponding tasks are quantifi ed by explicit goals.
High-level Roadmap (RM) Why: Platforms Platforms, equipment and their milestones and equipment interested by Links product
Why stages/objectives RM constraints
RM programmes Objectives What: Technologies “Products” to realise in response to “why”:
DTIB, cooperation What Links RM primary action How: actions/products Technological breakthroughs: required action How
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 25 • technological Basis: (Appendix 3) organised by the technical expertise areas, this is comprised of the low readiness level technological breakthrough concept studies adapted to longer term operational needs, generic technological developments (e.g. modelling tools), multiple operational application technologies (e.g. electronic components present in many weapon systems or subsystems, for which European autonomy desired); DGA heads of technical areas are in charge.
High-level Roadmap (RM) Why: Platforms PlatePlatforms, equipment and their milestones and equipment interested by Links development Why stages/equipments RM stages of development, What: DTIB, cooperation Products” to realise in response to “why”:
What feasibility stages in development
Links actions/stages of development RM action How : Technological breakthroughs: required action How
With this double approach (unifying projects and technological basis) “R&T studies” are planned according to a long medium and short-term process described in Appendix 3: • priorities according to a 10-15 year time frame; • research planning on a moving 3-5 year time frame; • annual scheduling of action. Execution of this planning is done by DGA management units. a strong set of priorities, defi ned according to technological goals defi ned in terms of content, deadlines and costs, organised according to stakes, was issued in early 2009 for the next twelve years or so. It will be updated every 3 years or in order to remain consistent with revisions of the Military Planning Law (LPM). All R&T goals and actions are planned via road maps linking R&T action to the capability goals. This project management process has been implemented progressively since the end of 2008. Information management tools help updating, consistency management and capitalisation of all synthesis data.
3.1.2. instruMEnts The instruments used to allocate R&T budgets among the various providers depend on the status of the latter and on the type and fi nality of the service provided. research programmes (programmes d’études amont, or pEa(9)) are applied research and technology acquisition activities on well-defi ned themes. Their goals are to explore the military potential of new technologies and to place the defence industry in a position to be able to integrate them into defence equipments. They are implemented by public procurement or international cooperation (see §4 for the technological priorities of each division). They account for more than 90% of the funding of contracted research. Exploratory research and innovation allows innovative companies (in particular SMEs), academic laboratories and public organisations to have an easier access to defence research funding through
(9) 750 PEAs are managed in the 2008-2010 programme
26 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 unsolicited proposals via a single DGA portal, with specifi c eligibility criteria and contracting procedures (see §3.4.4). sME support for dual innovation (Régime d’Appui aux PME pour l’Innovation Duale - RAPID) supports industrial research or experimental development projects with strong technological potential, having military applications but also potential for the civilian market. dga/osEo innoVation partnerships and participation on the management boards of competitive clusters enable the support of dual application innovation. The partnerships provide funding of up to 50% of the cost of the proposed programmes, reimbursable if the commercial applications identifi ed are successful. partnerships and coordination with civil research organisations, like the National Research Agency (Agence Nationale pour la Recherche, or ANR), the National Centre for Scientifi c Research (Centre National pour la Recherche Scientifi que, or CNRS), universities, for scientifi c innovation and fundamental research, especially through the funding of doctoral theses. grants to public research organisations (onEra, isl, cnEs, cEa) as well as to Engineering colleges under dga supervision, allowing them to execute internal research programmes with the support of the Ministry of Defence.
3.2. IMPROVEMENT OF R&T SPIN-OFF 3.2.1. Balancing of r&t WorK DGA has systematised the use of the technology readiness levels (TRL - see Appendix I): PEA are described with their TRL from beginning to end. Basic R&T (TRL 1 to 3) explores the fi eld of the emerging technology with potential applications for 3 defence. It constitutes a breeding-ground for technology, of which the most promising will later be subjected to deeper research, and possibly later still to demonstrators. Technological studies (TRL 4 and 5) aim to reduce the technological risk. They enable to transition from a laboratory concept to a model capable of evolving in an environment representative of its future usage. Demonstrators (TRL 6 and 7) make it possible to validate a set of technologies in an environment representative of the operational environment. They unify teams around ambitious projects or cooperation, which prepare them to meet the technical challenges of future programmes and to validate State-governed and industrial organisations. PS R&T Implementation Implementation R&T PS strategy The relevant spread of the funding between these three types of activities makes it possible to advance the targeted technologies in the short and medium term to an acceptable readiness level for the programmes, without neglecting emerging technologies indispensable to long term progress.
TRL 9 Actual system “proven” on successful operational mission _ _ TRL 8 Actual system completed and “qualied” through test and demonstration _ _ TRL 7 System prototype demonstrated in an operational environment _ _ TRL 6 System/subsystem model or prototype demonstrated/validated in a relevant environment _ _ TRL 5 Component and/or breadboard verication in a relevant environment _ _ TRL 4 Component and/or breadboard test in a laboratory environment _ _ TRL 3 Analytical or experimental critical function and/or characteristic proof-of-concept _ _ TRL 2 Technology concept and/or application formulated
Technology Readiness Level (TRL) Scale Readiness Level Technology _ _ TRL 1 Basic principles observed or reported
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 27 Hence, DGA aims to allocate: Demonstrators realised or scheduled in - 15% of the budget to basic R&T (TRL 2, 3), cooperation for the 2009–2012 period: - 50% to technological research (TRL 4, 5), - Generic system of networking and information - 35% to technology demonstrators (TRL 6, 7). management; - Software radio; 3.2.2. Demonstrators Policy - Airborne ground surveillance radar; Like a prototype, a technology demonstrator - Airborne multichannel active modules radar; combines a set of new technologies, often - Electromagnetic multifunction integrated system; developed separately, to execute the key - Cruise missile, post-BDI (Battle Damage functions of a future product. It makes it Information); possible to define and verify the accessible performance in an operational environment, - Hyper-speed hyper-ramjet; and to manage the associated technological - Land System transformation (Bulle Opérationnelle and industrial risk. Aéroterrestre, or BOA); Also, demonstrators offer an excellent - Land combat missile; framework for structuring cooperation. - Metric precision ammunition; Much more than the simple mutualisation of research effort, these large-scale projects, - Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle; like a demonstrator can create conditions - All-weather and re-enforced operational favourable to the realisation of complete capability helicopter; cooperative programmes, by validating the - Close-range minesweeping system; share of work, industrial alliances as well as - Airborne optronics for fire control system; the extension of common standards. - Global chemical, biological, radiological, and The UCAV European nuclear (CBRN) defence system. demonstrator nEUROn: A structuring project for the European defence industry
Within the next twenty years, the European combat aircraft industry will face two great challenges: - Development of strategic technologies that the United States already have – or will have – and that will never be transferred to Europe; - Maintenance of its clusters of excellence and the workload of its research centres. The European industry has developed many technological niches, and a lack of workload might make this expertise disappear. The best way to face these challenges would be to launch a new combat aircraft programme, based on European-only development. Unfortunately, the replacement schedule for the current generation of European combat aircraft clearly shows that this opportunity will not come about before around 2030. Given this situation, French Government has taken the initiative to launch an unmanned combat aircraft technology demonstrator, project developed in European cooperation.. Via the nEUROn demonstrator, the aim of the French initiative is to give European research centres a project enabling them to develop and maintain their strategic expertise over the coming years. This project will go further than the theoretical studies conducted so far within the European Union; up to the manufacture and in-flight trials of a demonstrator. The French initiative is also an opportunity to launch an innovative process for the management and organisation of a European cooperative programme. In order to be efficient, the programme is managed by a single body, DGA, and a unique executing unit, Dassault Aviation, general contractor of the nEUROn programme. Apart from France, the Italian, Swedish, Spanish, Greek and Swiss governments, as well as their respective industries:
Alenia, SAAB, EADS, Hellenic Aerospace Industry (HAI) Dassault Aviation and RUAG, constitute, around the nEUROn programme, a successful model of European cooperation. UAV nEURon
28 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 3.2.3. Fast integration of technology In order to extract the best from the most recent technological advances and encourage their insertion into future systems, the Ministry of defence favours modular and open architectures. This approach, introduced occasionally or in some sectors (avionics, naval combat systems, modular drone systems) until 2003, has been re-enforced and used in a multi-disciplinary manner with the creation of the “system of systems” technical expertise area. The French MoD battlelab (LTO, Laboratoire Technico-opérationnel) is a powerful tool to study and validate operational concepts and new technologies. In particular, it makes it possible to place operational users in realistic future conditions of use.
Involvement of clients through the LTO As a DGA-EMA national entity, managed by the CATOD (Centre d’Analyse Technico-Opérationnelle de la Défense, or CATOD), in Arcueil, the Ministry of Defence’s battlelab (LTO) is a structure that instrumentalises the definition and evaluation of capability issues in a collegial manner, involving DGA as well asthe armed forces and industry. Thus, the LTO provides a set of methods, services and tools enabling shared and interdisciplinary discussion on doctrines, concepts, architectures or organisations, and offers the opportunity to carry out experiments virtually (through simulation) or in the field (with hybrid devices mixing simulations, prototypes and real equipment). It can also carry out inter-connection and interoperability of several systems and participants, from State, industry or even allied countries or organisations (NATO, etc.). It also 3 enables, through the use of concept imaging and modelling tools, to have a multi-cultural team share a common interpretation of the concepts and scenarios used. The LTO has been operational since the end of 2006 and has demonstrated its added value in terms of creativity and collaborative work with clients (forces) and industrial
prime contractors. It has also been DR PS R&T Implementation Implementation R&T PS strategy used for global security issues, passing outside of the strict defence LTO Exercice framework.
Special forces equipments The role of the special operations is to offer the authorities non- conventional options for riposte. In terms of equipment, Special Operations Command (Commandement des Opérations Spéciales, or COS) looks for equipments in limited quantity and with reduced lifespan but offering breakthrough capabilities. Their needs are defined between COS and DGA in the framework of a DGA-COS mixed creativity group. The PEA objective is to develop and produce demonstrators that will be used by the special forces in order to evaluate their operational potential. They are selected using a scope statement and will allow to: - increase the special forces operational capability - enable the advanced use of technical solutions which may later be of interest for the conventional forces - test innovative procurement procedures.
This research programme is a perfect example of a short loop between DR operational requirements, technical solutions and operational application. VAB with electromagnetic jammer
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 29 3.3. RELATIONS BETWEEN DGA AND OTHER R&T INVESTORS Security Defence R&T contributes significantly to 3.3.1. Cooperation with the global security objective, encouraging civilian research collaboration with civilian research organisms Collaboration and the search for synergies and civil authorities on protecting against between defence and the institutional research the biological and chemical threat, as well as community must be developed, encouraged and medical support. reinforced in order to: The policy of the Ministry of Defence aims to: • Use the results of this civilian research, • Urge laboratories and motivate the best notably by participating in their funding researchers in the French science and • Encourage coordination between technology community to work on topics of different funding organisms (e.g. EDA and interest for defence; the European Commission) • Increase the efficiency of the shared financial The search for synergies is the search for resources and thus contribute to a more the best use of State’s resources in order for efficient public research system; defence to guide and take advantage of civilian “security” research programmes for • Spread the knowledge of defence needs defence purposes, both at the national (ANR outside the ministry and share the defence programmes) and international (European goals with the civilian community; Security Research Programme - ESRP) levels. For example, in the information processing • Integrate defence into national and European domain, the Ministry of Defence has long civilian research networks by stimulating new involved the civilian ministries in the R&T research tracks with innovative laboratories programms to develop technological building and SMEs, by supporting competitive cluster blocks for the automatic processing of the projects of interest to defence. spoken word. The launch in early 2008 of a permanent group will reinforce defence- The following must be developed in order to security synergies in the long term. Defence stimulate these synergies: also associates organisms concerned by • Direct contact and discussion with the bodies open information. It invests in video image intelligent processing for video, non- in charge of research policy: civilian ministries cooperative biometry linked to work carried (Research, Interior, Industry, Transport, etc.), out by the National Police. agencies (ANR, OSEO, etc.), and the strategic directorates of large research organisms (CNRS, CNES, etc.) • Participation in the ANR, European Commission and competitive cluster project management boards • Exploitation of the dual research programme (191) of the Budget Law (Loi Organique relative aux Lois de Finance, or LOLF) • Implementation of joint Research and Development projects with civilian research.
Defence has also taken a strong position in favour of the development of competitive clusters mobilising collaboration from universities and research institutions, industry (large companies and SMEs), institutional territorial actors, around high visibility shared national and international R&D projects. Aware of the technical and economic issues at stake for the clusters, the Ministry of Defence decided, as early as 2005, to provide financial support. This process makes it possible to involve SMEs as well as large groups in research designed to promote technological innovation for dual applications with an important leverage effect. This cooperation between DGA and the civilian research community and industry, particularly SMEs, can exist at the strategic level as well as on specific projects, shaped by agreements, partnerships and also contracts.
30 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 3.3.2. Development of international cooperation 3.3.2.1. Selected and better targeted forums Bilateral cooperation has already proved very efficient. France intends to develop bilateral cooperation with those countries in Europe that dedicate significant parts of their activities to defence and share common goals in terms of DTIB and capability vision. As far as other countries are concerned, European and non-European, France intends to engage into “a la carte” cooperation, depending on specific interest and opportunities following a less structured path and concentrating on very specific competences. France enjoys a special relationship with the five other European countries(10), with the largest R&T budgets. France sees the European Defence Agency (EDA) as the preferred forum for multilateral cooperation. The four departments of the Agency provide a coherent structure to prepare for the future. The new organisation of the R&T department echoes the French approach. The European R&T strategy which was approved of by Ministers in November 2008 sets the scene for R&T cooperation. Technological priorities are now in place and will provide the background for common R&T projects. In essence, NATO provides the appropriate forum to discuss interoperability issues and standards. NATO Research & Technology Organisation (RTO) does not do R&T but offers the opportunity to share experience in a large number of areas. France intends to carefully select its participation to some of the many working groups even though, in terms of technology watch, it would be in its interest to be more involved.
3.3.2.2. New tools So far R&T cooperation meant: 3 • Information exchange sometimes leading to an exchange of results of R&T national studies and in turn to cooperation for the next phase. • Coordinated work with each party placing a separate contract for part of the work and sharing results. • Collaborative programme contracts placed with consortia made of industries belonging to the participating nations (a variation consists in placing the contract with a prime contractor supported by sub-contractors with the approval of the participating Nations). The above methods are perfectly adequate. However, they are not ideal in terms of DTIB since each
country chooses their contractors locally. It makes sense to resort to a wider competition in order Implementation R&T PS strategy to select the best technological solutions. In the recent past, in agreement with its partners, France began to encourage the development of new concepts to allow a certain level of competition. They are: • Innovation Technology Partnerships (ITP) to structure certain parts of the DTIB. A prime contractor, in partnership with Governments, co-ordinates R&T work in a number of technical areas open to competition. The ITP is open to academia and research laboratories as well as SMEs. The concept is already in use in two collaborative programmes: one bilateral (UK and France) project on missiles and one on multifunction compact radars (France, Sweden and UK) within EDA. France is determined to promote the concept using lessons learnt from the first two projects. • Joint Investment Programmes (JIP) in EDA which select a number of common technological objectives with a view to find the best possible solutions by issuing a call for proposals to a large audience. A group of experts chosen among participating Nations then assesses the offers on the basis of criteria agreed in advance and later submits its selection to a Steering Committee. Two programmes are now in the making. - The “Force Protection” programme with 20 countries, including France, Germany and Poland which contribute 60% of the overall project. - The “ICET” (Innovative Concept and Emerging Technologies) programme with 11 countries promoting R&T research. France, Germany and Spain contribute 2/3 of the overall programme. (10) The United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 31 France intends to use lessons learnt from the above JIPs to develop the concept based on a competition of ideas.
3.3.2.3. IPR (intellectual property rights) better suited to R&T cooperation As mentioned in the above paragraph, R&T collaborative projects have been designed with a view to preserve a balance between the contributions of each participant. This was done by resorting to the traditional IPR concept. While promoting state-of-the art technological innovation, France is aware that, in the absence of a secure system ensuring the protection of innovation, the best players will discouraged. The risk is less with low TRL since time is needed to go from concept to technology. With medium TRL, the risk is high since there is no stopping those involved in the development of technologies (and not necessarily as originators) from passing them on to integrators. France is therefore determined to be part of any forum, particularly within EDA, addressing the issue.
3.3.2.4. Which R&T cooperation? For the moment, cooperation is limited to “basic research” and “applied research”, simple and involving relatively small amounts of money. The new mechanisms, as mentioned above, should allow making better use of their R&T potential. With the exception of nEUROn, cooperations on demonstrators are still few and far between, even though demonstrators would help serve European DTIB and represent significant investments. France is determined to promote an ambitious approach of demonstrators. A recent list of European technological priorities showed that several of our European partners were clearly interested in developing collaboration on architectures, with a special interest for air and land.
3.4. RELATIONS WITH R&T PROVIDERS 3.4.1. Research Organisations 3.4.1.1. Public establishments under the authority (or co-authority) of Ministry of Defence These organisations contribute, at various TRL: - To the acquisition of defence technological capability; - To DGA‘s technical expertise capability, in their domains of excellence, and in coordination with the Technical Directorate; - In maintaining expertise. They also facilitate the relationship between defence and civilian R&T organisations, facilitating the monitoring of scientific progress and the exploitation of dual work. For this, they receive subsidies (for their research activities) and contractual funding (for their application activities and transfers to industry). French Ministry of Defence has authority over three organisations, Institut Saint-Louis (ISL) (shared with Germany), ONERA and CNES (shared with the Research Ministry) in order to: • Improve the general framework of their activities and act in order to have the necessary evolution take place in each of them, while respecting the spirit of a subsidy; • Provide an interface with the DGA directions in charge of the prioritisation of their technical activities; • Follow the performance of the pluriannual contracts with the Government and the overall financial balance of the establishments, and notably, oversee the contractual activity (finality of funding, control of research and application activities). Although DGA has no formal authority over CEA, it participates in the same manner in orienting CEA’s activities with defence subsidies.
32 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 institut de saint louis (isl) ISL is an important actor in defence research, and contributes to the development of the technology capacities of the industry, French and German in particular. It carries out work in fi ve areas, oriented by the CCRE(11): laser-material interaction, perforation and armours, protection and environment of the combatant, projectiles acceleration, and projectiles command. ISL is notably known for its expertise in internal ballistic, explosions, electric acceleration of projectiles, aero-acoustics, metrology, and laser sources.
In the framework of the modernisation process in ISL recent years, the ISL has several major objectives, notably: PEGASUS: electric rail gun - Open up its activity: by developing dual activities, notably linked to security; through the development of contractual activity, notably through European projects (7th Framework Program, European Security Research Programme, or ESRP); through the reinforcement of partnerships with other research establishments and industry; - “Europeanise”: by contributing fi rstly to the constitution of a network of European defence research institutes, then to the creation, through EDA, of a European research centre for defence and security. 3 onEra The assessment of the fi rst pluriannual 2004-2008 “objectives and means contract” (Contrat d’Objectifs et de Moyens, COM) confi rmed ONERA’s role in the aeronautics and space domain; it contributes to excellence in this fi eld. This contract emphasised in particular ONERA’s strengths: scientifi c excellence, openness to the outside world, importance of innovation and detection of technological Implementation R&T PS strategy breakthroughs. Its capacity to conduct pluridisciplinary research, control the systems, provide expertise for the needs of the Ministry of Defence and its European ambitions, especially in cooperation with its German counterpart, DLR, are strong assets for ONERA. The Onera development of its expertise activities for DGA is an important result of the COM. Elsa The key priorities of ONERA for 2009-2014 - the new Military Planning Law period - to be included in the next COM currently being fi nalised, are the following: - ONERA contributes to defence research as a national technical referrer, a breeder of technologies and concepts, and in providing specifi c support to DGA project management, in the following technical domains: Airborne Systems Architecture, Command-Control-Communication-Intelligence Systems Architecture, Sensors-Guidance-Navigation, Missiles, Arms and Nuclear Security, Materials and Components, Systems of Systems; - ONERA maintains a prospective dialogue with the Forces Systems Architects; - ONERA contributes to the Defence Industrial and Technological Base (DITB), with specifi c effort in terms of SMEs. The 2009-2014 COM sets forth these priorities in detail.
(11) CCRE: Conseil Consultatif des Recherches et Etudes
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 33 national centre for space research (Centre national d’études spatiales, or cnEs) Via the defence team at CNES (DGA-EMA-CNES members), designed to detect and promote defence and security dual activities of, DGA is involved in guiding CNES activity toward the preparation of future observation, intelligence and telecommunication systems, and general R&T in defence and security. This action has triggered DGA-CNES cooperation on several projects, partly fi nanced by the subsidy attributed under the dual research programme, notably: ELISA (Electromagnetic Intelligence demonstrator), Pleiades (optical observation), Altika (altimetric oceanography), Athena-Fidus (high bandwidth telecommunications), MUSIS CSO (post- Helios preparatory actions), CERES (Electromagnetic Intelligence programme, in a preliminary research EADS Astrium phase). Helios Defence also encourages joint projects between CNES and ONERA. This approach has materialised since 2004 with several partnership agreements in the domain of space orbital systems, launchers, and exploration robotics.
Commissariat à l’énergie atomique, or cEa Through its fundamental research, the CEA has built up a scientifi c potential of great value. For the future, in the domain of deterrence, the goal is to lead and adapt the research activity of CEA to its indispensable global reduction in a context of restricted budgets. The challenge will be to maintain this potential for nuclear safety and propulsion, and to maintain the scientifi c credibility of CEA/DAM (Military Applications Directorate) in the absence of nuclear experimentation thanks to simulation. In the framework of a CEA-DGA partnership agreement, discussions are under way in order to coordinate some complementary defence research CEA action to be carried out by departments within CEA and DGA. Megajoule Laser
3.4.1.2. Enginnering colleges under the dga authority In a context of the internationalisation of academia and of increased competitiveness, the Engineering colleges under the authority of the Ministry of Defence (Ecole polytechnique, Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Techniques Avancées - ENSTA, Institut Supérieur de l’Aéronautique et de l’Espace - ISAE and Ecole Nationale Supérieure d’Ingénieurs des Etudes et Techniques d’Armement - ENSIETA) have invested in several areas of change regarding teaching and research which they have taken to care to coordinate with the cycle of change that recently took place in France in the fi eld of higher education: the Licence Master Doctorat!(12) reform, the creation of research and higher education clusters, and the creation of advanced research thematic networks, etc. Among the main development priorities that have been chosen, are, in particular; international openness, a coherent set of Masters courses of interest for defence (e.g. an Ecole Polytechnique Master in Systems of Systems Engineering) and increased internal sources of revenues (research contracts, chairs, etc.) DGA also uses the scientifi c and technical expertise of these establishments to carry out defence- oriented research and provide expertise to the R&T work of the research programmes (PEAs). (12) Levels of diplom
34 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 3.4.1.3. Other research organisations Relations with other research organisations, other than the direct contacts and joint participation in scientific networks, essentially consist in the funding of research work, with exploratory research and innovation contracts (REI) and the funding of researchers (doctors, post-doctors, researchers, confirmed researchers). This mode of interaction enables the promotion of defence needs within the national academic community and maintenance within DGA of a scientific monitoring capacity by closely following advanced scientific research work
3.4.2. Acquisition Policy The Ministry of Defence’s acquisition policy is based on the principle of competitive autonomy enabling to seek the best economic efficiency for purchases while preserving an autonomous supply. The goal of R&T acquisition is to enable the application of this principle for future programmes. This principle leads to different responses (sovereignty, cooperation, recourse to the global marketplace) depending on the end use of the equipments concerned. Examples of acquisition policies: - Sovereignty: nuclear submarines, strategic missiles, electronic warfare, navigation - Cooperation: A400M, Tigre, NH90, nEUROn, UAV - World Market: wheeled vehicles, air observation planes, catapult for aircraft carrier This R&T acquisition policy (notably the scope of competitive purchasing) is set forth each year for each technical division with regard to the operational, technological, industrial, financial and international considerations. These recommendations, concerning top level contracting, are grouped into around sixty products segments with technological and industrial coherency. They 3 determine the scope of the competition purchasing and cooperation.
R&T procurement The principle of competitive autonomy applies to European cooperation R&T programmes. In order to obtain the best economic conditions, but also to stimulate innovation and improve output, procurement must be made with recourse to the widest possible competition. It must be carried out within a geographical scope adapted to the desired degree of autonomy. For cooperative research and technology programmes, the scope of competition is the area formed by the countries participating to their funding. Implementation R&T PS strategy
Procurement Plans At the second industrial contracting level, the Ministry of Defence favours the use of procurement plans. These aim to give DGA visibility and transparency over the competitive acquisitions by the prime contractor and favour competition-stimulated innovation.
Purchasing procedures adapted to exploratory research and innovation Defence develops direct contracts with scientific actors, SMEs and industry, for exploratory research and innovation. Special procedures (REI and RAPID) make it possible to establish contracts quickly for non-solicited proposals. . 3.4.3. Actions for SMEs Defence action for SMEs consists firstly in maintaining a constant watch in order to identify and know those SMEs with strategic interest for the needs of defence. The Ministry of Defence implements different intervention tools in their favour. In the domain of R&T, it is more specifically for upstream research, the REI (Exploratory Research and Innovation) projects and joint funding with OSEO-ANVAR. SMEs’ access to defence research must be encouraged by accessible, relevant and clear information offering SMEs a greater capacity to anticipate and direct their work. Greater value must be given to
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 35 SMEs, freeing their growth potential, by, for example, improving their administrative relations with DGA. Different DGA-SME Action Plan initiatives must facilitate SMEs’ access to public procurement by providing them with the resources, not only financial but also human, necessary for their development and facilitate innovative technology transfer towards industry. In this framework, the creation of a dedicated bureau within DGA’a SME Bureau, makes it possible to implement SME support measures. One of the goals of this bureau is to propagate within the Ministry of Defence better knowledge of the expertise and innovations of SMEs and to have a better knowledge of market opportunities. SMEs thereby benefit from advice on the tools implemented by defence and on the rules (contracting, exports, REI contracts, RAPID, etc.). SMEs have a dedicated area on the DGA portal http://www.ixarm.com. The Ministry of Defence wishes to offer SMEs increased visibility of its R&T priorities and of the resulting opportunities for upstream research contracts. For this purpose, defence organises every year the “R&T workshops day” for technology SMEs and thematic forums. Direct access by SMEs to public contracting is encouraged by the renewal and optimisation of purchasing procedures, by the adaptation of the DGA organisation and by an improved link between exploratory research, upstream research, development and production. The Ministry of Defence has set up a purchasing team dedicated and adapted to small contracts, making it possible to shorten contracting delays and adapt procedures to the SMEs. This reorganisation is accompanied by the adoption of new contractual clauses aimed at limiting the financial risk of companies for high technology contracts. The Ministry for the Economy, Industry and Employment and the Ministry of Defence announced on 11 May 2009 the launch of RAPID, a mechanism supporting strategic innovation projects of SMEs. The SME support regime for Dual Innovation, or RAPID (Régime d’Appui aux PME pour l’Innovation Duale) will support high technological potential industrial research or experimental development projects with military applications but also civilian market spinout. Any independent SME with fewer than 250 employees, either alone or in a consortium with a company or research organisation, may offer an unsolicited proposal, in order to benefit from a “RAPID” subsidy. The mechanism is set up in order to be extremely reactive and to be able to finance selected projects within a four-month delay between submission of the dossier and the start of work. RAPID is implemented by the Directorate General for Competitiveness, Industry and Services (Direction Générale de la Compétitivité, de l’Industrie et des Services, or DGCIS) and DGA, which will jointly assess the proposed projects and thereby reinforce their strategic action in favour of developing these companies.
3.4.4. Promote Innovation Innovation is an essential component in preparation for the future. In both its mission to equip the armed forces and that of preparation for the future, the Ministry of Defence places innovation at the heart of its role as public contractor, responsible for the availability of technologies. For this purpose, it aims to facilitate the emergence of innovative ideas that may lead to new concepts and performance or cost improvements sought by users. DGA has created at the end of 2004 the mechanism called “REI” - Recherche Exploratoire et Innovation – whose goal is to manage the projects proposed without request by research laboratories and innovating small and medium-sized enterprises, alone or in partnership.
More information is available on the DGA website “ixarm.com”. The link to “REI news” describes themes that are of particular scientific interest for defence. In addition, the Mission for Scientific Innovation and Research has been animating since 2004 and in cooperation with the Council of French Defence Industries (Conseil des Industries de Défense, or CIDEF) and the French Aeronautical and Space Industries Group (Groupement des Industries Françaises Aéronautiques et Spatiales, or GIFAS) a working group whose goals are:
36 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 - identify the limits of present technological families; Eligibility criteria for REIs - monitor emerging technologies; Beneficiaries of this - analyse breakthrough potentials and procedure must be: their consequences for equipment - either public research performance, costs and concepts of use; laboratories, - define technological roadmaps and - or innovative SMEs, identify accessible or specific industrial - or private research laboratories, associated organisations concerned. with a SME or a public laboratory, The group has established a list of forty - or a group of laboratories and SMEs. technologies considered to have potential The REI projects must enable the exploiration of for breakthrough. The presence within this new scientific approaches of interest for defence. group of the main companies forming our Innovative SMEs may act in partnership with defence industrial and technological base, academic or industrial research laboratories. makes it possible to share the strategic The maximum funding by DGA is €300k (incl. visions underlying R&T projects to be VAT) for periods up to 36 months. In case of launched, and also to have better visibility a particularly ambitious project with several with regard to the feasibility of integrating partners, including at least one SME, this can be technological advances into future supplemented with an option carrying maximum € equipments. The group procedure must funding by DGA (base + option) of 500k (incl. make it possible to favour technological VAT). The selection committee is free to accept innovation and anticipate its integration or reject the proposed option. into future systems. 3 3.5. FUNDING Defence R&T depends on the defence section of the Budget Law, and more precisely on programme 144 “Environment and Prospective for Defence Policy”. Its budgets are thus included in the scope of the Military Planning Law. Defence R&T has represented an annual budget of around 800 million Euros in the Budget Law in recent years. The Economic Recovery Plan (Plan de Relance de l’Economie) has pushed this budget up to around 930 million Euros in the 2009 Budget Law.
So-called dual R&T, with military as well as civilian end uses, is the topic of programme 191 “Dual Implementation R&T PS strategy Research”, that contributes to the Interministry Mission for Research and High Education (MIRES) and that includes State funding to the two operators of this programme during this period, CNES and CEA. Its annual budget has been about 200 million Euros over recent years. n
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 37 38 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 4 Technological analysis
4.1. GENERAL ASPECTS 4.1.1. Key technologies The Ministry of Defence develops its strategy and its activity focusing on key technologies necessary to prepare, use and evolve our weapon systems with the appropriate level of autonomy. Research studies are always connected either to a capability requirement, or to new promising technologies (see Chapter 3). They are always led by actors belonging to a technical division and a DGA business activity (see Appendix IV(12)). It belongs to a family of technologies identified in the PS R&T and qualified by a Technology Readiness Level (see Appendix I). The key technology approach of the PS R&T makes it possible to attribute to a single identified project manager the definition of national competences desired, the organisation of discussions with foreign partners or civilians, the launch and follow-up of actions in cooperation, and knowledge management and training.
4.1.2. Tables of technologies The tables presented below specify “required national capabilities”: - Fields to be controlled at the national level (specifications and integrating industry on national homeland), - Nature of the activity: techno-operational expertise of the government and industry, purchaser’s skills (smart customer(14)), - Certain data influencing upstream R&T (critical performance, environmental conditions, safety, vulnerability, conditions of integration, through life support, etc.) and some information on crossover with civilian research. Informations on “cooperation” indicate: 4 - Technical areas for which cooperation is sought, - Forums under consideration, mentioning certain partner countries. The missing mention of countries in the text and the table referring thereto means that every option is examined on an individual case basis, - Nature of cooperation activities: demonstration, benchmarking, preparation of design capability, preparation of a capability for reactive adaptation, - Methods of organisation considered: distribution of technological sets of themes among partners Technological analysis under joint access terms; sharing of results; production of equipment or demonstrators by sharing tasks or under the supervision of a sole contracting authority and prime contractor; preparation of a joint programme or of an evolution; other constraints.
(13) Appendix IV presents the technical divisions of the DGA as well as the business activities and their contribution to R&T. (14) Acknowledgement of the industrial technical bid, its technical level, its accessibility; ability to propose and evaluate acquisition strategy allowing to give rise to industrial organisation, technical solutions optimising the response to the need; ability to propose R&T strategies to develop technologies and to give rise to technical and industrial fields, if necessary
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 39 4.1.3. Eco-dEsign Sustainable development requirements described in § 2.4, 2.5 and 2.8 bring the expression of key priorities in terms of energy consumption and environmental impact reduction from the design stage and all through the life-cycle of defence and security systems. Apart from the unifying project “master energy dependency” which objective is to manage all R&T activities related to weapon systems in the domain of energy, these priorities are described in the technological analysis of the different divisions, in the paragraphs below. The 5 following areas refl ect transversal concerns shared by all analyses presented in this chapter: - Research for less polluting technologies or procedures; - Substitution of the most impactful or suspect substances (precautionary principle); - Control of noise pollutions; - Systematic integration of environmental aspects in project management; - Systematic use of simulation for design, validation and training.
4.2. SYSTEMS OF SYSTEMS A system of systems (SoS) is a set of inter-connected autonomous systems, coordinated in order to satisfy a military capability and/or to realise a number of predetermined effects that none of the participating systems could achieve alone (emerging capability linked to the system of systems). The SoS area covers activities linked to: - Analysis and defi nition of the architecture of systems of systems, with tasking between the participating systems and control of the interfaces, - Rationalisation and urbanisation of the SoS (including the Information Systems), - Design of methods and engineering and simulation tools necessary for the preparation, design, acquisition, evolution and restoration, with controlled costs and risks, of systems and “systems of systems”.
SCCOA System of systems DR
40 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 The challenge concerns the capacity to control complexity and risks, design defence systems with lower costs and shorter delivery times, increase their reliability, ensure interoperability of systems at the various levels required by joint and multinational operations, and manage interfaces with civilian devices. The Ministry of Defence, and more particularly DGA, is interested in maintaining a high level of skills for the various technical areas directly tied to the concept of system of systems and listed below.
4.2.1. rEpository, corE systEM nEtWorK and architEcturE fraMEWorKs The approach for core system network chosen by DGA leads to mutualisation and rationalisation of the elements used in C3I systems, with a goal of modularity. This modularity aims to reduce dependency between components and limit the impact of local evolutions and thereby the risks of related programmes. This approach contains a general framework of technical architecture, a reference frame of standards (such as for example the “NATO C3 technical architecture”), a list of hardware and software products and a reference frame of data architecture to guarantee control of interoperability. The general architecture frameworks defi nes, for the Ministry of Defence, a standardised manner to control architecture while taking as a starting point the enterprise architecture approach of the civilian sector. They provide a means to model, represent, understand, analyse, share and specify the capacities, systems, systems of systems and operational processes. Those models may be very complex and they are therefore represented from various viewpoints, each with a specifi c purpose (“operational”, “techniques”, “services”, etc.). The architecture frameworks carry a standard set of views. They are commonly used in the governance of information systems. In recent years, DGA has been using the “proprietary” architecture framework: AGATE(15) for the Command and Control Information Systems (CIS) programmes. Taking into account the ongoing convergence of the main frameworks of architecture adapted to defence and in order to facilitate exchanges with the industry and allied forces, DGA has decided to adopt the NATO Architectural Framework (NAF). Design evolutions are still necessary in order to meet the needs of the Systems of Systems.
4.2.2. dEcision-MaKing procEssEs One of the key interests in the increasing digitalisation of the battle-space and the networking of actors is to benefi t from a largely facilitated access to information and thus improve the preparation of decisions and the coordination of actions. The engagement of our forces must be accompanied and prepared with operational planning and decision making support tools. Progress is necessary in corresponding technologies such as: - Distributed man-machines interfaces, similar to those used for virtual enterprises and information 4 systems of corporations (beside this, not specifi cally for SoS, technologies allowing a rapid reconfi guration of Man Machine Interfaces – widgets... - deserve special attention because they allow to solve ergonomics problems that can stir up rejection by fi nal users.) - Multi agent systems with application to cooperative engagement, robotics and mobile networks. Other fi elds of research, related to functional chains, are of special interest to DGA: - Heterogeneous data fusion (including symbolic data) from multiple distributed sources Technological Technological analysis - Supervision and automatic reconfi guration of complex systems and systems of systems (auto- regulated computing, autonomic computing, etc.) - Improvement of the robustness of the functional chains against breakdowns and attacks (jamming, intrusion, computer attacks)
DR (15) AGATE: Atelier de Gestion des Architectures Techniques
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 41 R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Fusion at plot level for multi- platforms/multi-sensors (Radar, Networked function panoramic watch, IR, ESM) Operational Heterogeneous data fusion situation awareness (including human information) for land contact combat Networked Command/Decision aids European cooperation National expertise function Command Networked functions Optimisation under Engagement and constraint in real-time collective use of the weapons Fault-tolerance (failure detection), robust architectures (SOA, GRID) Self-configuring Networked function (degraded mode) European cooperation National expertise Survivability of SoS Resistance to external attack (collaborative protection, threat detection and alert diffusion, counter-measure coordination) Cognitive aspects in Cognitive aspects in European cooperation National expertise Systems of Systems systems of systems
4.2.3. Network architectures In the field of the Network Architectures, DGA will build its knowledge on important activity existing in the civilian world. DGA considers as necessary to use civilian technologies such as: - IPv6 protocol; - Service Oriented Architectures (SOA). DGA is particularly interested in the evaluation of operational and economic contribution of Services Oriented Architectures in defence systems; - Real-time distributed Middleware.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Frameworks Development for SoS architecture: generic architectures (SOA) and applied architectures SoS architecture (patterns: Ballistic Missile Defence, National expertise Land networked capabilities)
Interoperability within SoS: Standards European cooperation and NATO European control for the definition Battle lab Tools and methods for battle labs of the methods National control for the application
In the long term, multi level security solutions, with the management of users’ rights, will be available and standardised for the needs of corporations. The security aspects are also very impacted at the tactical level by the dynamic nature of the network (compatibility with IPSEC, VPN with dynamic ad hoc networks, architecture Red/Black, “by-pass” for QoS, etc.).
42 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 4.2.4. Methods and tools for systems engineering In order to unify as much as possible the set of common tools, DGA wishes to develop a continuous dialogue with industry and corporations in this field through the various usual forums for discussions (AFIS, Industrial associations, etc.) and competitive clusters, and also promotes cooperation with other interested countries.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Systems of systems engineering (Agile software development, representation of architecture, European control testability of the systems of for the definition systems and assistance to the Methods and tools for European of methods systems engineering definition of tests, tools for rough cooperation estimates of the cost of SoS) National control Validation and qualification methods for the application of SoS architectures (metrics, processes, integration labs)
4.2.5. Engineering and reliability of embedded systems The studies carried out in this field relate to the optimisation of embedded systems and to the tools and methodologies to manage obsolescence and reliability (formal methods).
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Formal methods Analysis and validation of the reliability of life-critical systems adapted to new distributed European control Engineering and information processing architectures for the definition European reliability of of methods cooperation embedded systems Embedded systems engineering (software/hardware National control independence, segmentation for the application of applications for IVVQ(16)) Open architecture
4.2.6. Infrastructures, tools, technologies and standards for simulation 4 The topics of interest for defence are in particular: - Infrastructures for simulation, to build, on a national or cooperative basis, federations of simulations, simulators and real systems, for experimentation with operators in representative situations, within the framework of LTO(17); - Methods and standards: development and application of a methodological and technological common reference framework of Verification Validation Accreditation (VVA), HLA certification,
specification of environmental data exchange formats between simulations (SEDRIS); Technological analysis - Generic models: the constitution of model libraries (generic, coherent with present needs, evolutionary, perennial and validated) is necessary for simulation used for the analysis and design of complex systems. Multi level studies (aggregation/disaggregation) of the modelling of human behaviour for the automation of simulations, and of the impact on the command chain of new forms of combat are essential to reach a high level of skill in this field; - Simulation environments allowing fast and simple composition of the above-mentioned models, notably in the framework of techno-operational analyses.
(16) IVVQ: Integration, Verification, Validation, Qualification. (17) LTO: Laboratoire Technico-Opérationnel
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 43 R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Interoperability between simulations (standards, HLA certification, SEDRIS) and between simulations and Command & Control Information Systems (CBML) Architectures of simulation, structures of federations (LAN, WAN)
Validation, verification and accreditation of simulations (IVVQ) Infrastructure, Security of distributed simulation tools, technologies systems (Protection of classified European National control and standards simulations into federations) cooperation, NATO for the application for simulation Techniques and environments for modelling, Domain Specific Language (DSL)
Internet technologies (Web- based Services, cartography, etc.) for defence infrastructures and simulation tools Technologies developed for multi player computer games applied to defence simulation tools
4.3. ARCHITECTURE AND TECHNIQUES FOR AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS The technical “Architecture and techniques for Aeronautical Systems” area covers technical activities necessary for the preparation, public contracting and role of technical authority regarding systems based on manned fixed-wing or rotary-wing air platforms including unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAV) and also systems able to land men and equipment from the air (parachutes, airdrop, etc.) The role of technical authority includes in particular expertise activities for the navigability of aircrafts including UAV systems. The major technological priorities are:
System design R&T programs must address the primary concern which is to ensure in-service support and to enable current platforms to evolve. The analysis of equipment plans shows that little new equipment will enter into service before 2020, and even by 2040. Even before the preparatory phase of clarifying operational needs prior to the launch of a new programme, it is necessary to prepare industrial capabilities, in order to offer competitive technologies. However, the main primary contractors of aeronautical systems are all dual, which ensures the renewal of most necessary skills. The sustainment of skills is a major issue for the area, and relates also to aircraft in service, the evolution of which, including management of obsolescence, requires certain specific military skills, in particular for the carriage and integration of new armaments and combat systems. It is necessary for DGA to preserve control of the tools enabling in-service support of existing and future platforms (structural modelling, aging platforms, processing of in-service events), and the validation of new technological solutions, enabling it to answer in a reactive and effective way to requests for evolution resulting from operational needs. With regard to European cooperation, DGA wishes to support the European Defence Agency in launching actions to promote new technologies adapted to the needs of military aircrafts. Other cooperation, for example bilateral, is however also possible, in the interests of efficiency. For demonstrators of integration, the organisation of multilateral cooperation will have to be implemented, with the need for identifying a single industrial prime contractor able to guarantee the maintenance of integration skills and ensure overall consistency.
44 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Preliminary design tools Share of the design for combat aircrafts Concurrent numerical design Integration of combat Multidisciplinary design National control for methods aircraft platform the global design Acceleration of design loops Exchanges of results in the preparation Concurrent engineering of a demonstrator overall concept of platforms without equipments The control of basic technologies, which is constantly evolving (aerodynamics, structures, low observable (LO) technologies), and of their association and implementation, is necessary for the future in-service support of the aircraft (processing of in-service events), and will be essential for the design of new platforms. In these fi elds, certain technological breakthroughs will remain possible and have to be evaluated. The evaluation of these aeronautical technologies must be able to be based on the upstream scientifi c skills existing in research laboratories, like ONERA, which will remain a key partner for industrial teams for the modelling of complex physical phenomena, or for the adoption of innovative technologies. ONERA also has an important role providing Onera scientifi c and technical expertise for the benefi t of DGA. EPISTLE
R&T areas Key technologies Coopération National capabilities
New piloting forms and laws
Aerodynamics and Flow control, new control surfaces Benchmarking National control for fl ight control of adapted to LO platforms of tools the aerodynamic and structural 4 combat aircrafts Exchange of results Carriage and internal environment of Aeroelasticity and weapon carriage Wind tunnel testing combat aircrafts carriage/weapons for numerical including LO integration Flutter prediction tools validations concepts.
Interaction with fl ight control
Design and justifi cation Technological Technological analysis Prevision of dynamic effects
Structures of new platforms (LO) National control Benchmarking to allow the Methods for of tools evolution of the design/structural Structural vulnerability aircraft in service Vulnerability qualifi cation/repair (qualifi cation of Control of ageing aircraft Repair technologies storage integration) (diagnostics and methods of repair) and reparability
Control of the environment (corrosion), eco-design
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 45 R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Tools, modelling methods, tests
Reduction of Reduction of the detectability EM Electromagnetic and IR of existing platforms) Benchmarking of tools (EM) and Infrared National expertise Reduction of detectability of Sharing of results (IR) signatures of air intakes and afterbodies (demonstrator) combat aircrafts Methods and means for in-service support Tools, modelling methods, tests National control Electromagnetic Behaviour under strain Methods and tests of models and vulnerability (lightning, strong fields) Standards test methods Electromagnetic and radioelectric compatibility
Unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAV) Even if their entry into service is not foreseeable before at least 2020, the concept of the UCAV is the object of multiple demonstration programmes, both in the USA and Europe. France has involved itself with several other European countries in the definition and realisation of the nEUROn demonstrator, which was centred on the design of a Low Observability platform able to release an armament from an internal weapon storage. The observability goals are very ambitious and much higher than those for manned combat aircrafts. The work has already highlighted a few technical areas of difficulty that imply that the initial performance objectives will not be met during the demonstration. It is thus necessary to maintain the research and demonstration efforts on the Low Observability UCAV platform in order to be able to continue to follow the roadmap towards an eventual programme. UCAV engines will probably derive from existing civilian or military engines, while taking into account the flight envelope and performances considered. It will be advisable however to examine the specific constraints induced by the integration into the platform and in-service use: UCAV storage, “intermittent” use being able to comprise very intensive phases of use (for ex: flight in Operation).
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Benchmarking National control Architectures of Definition of a Concept studies into UCAVs, etc Official means UCAV systems future aeronautical of simulation combat system
Simulation of use Intelligent Specifications of customer (access UCAV engines Determination of UCAV specificities propulsion function to technologies) Operational feedback Through life support Intelligent Low Observability Concept studies Concept studies and demonstration customer (access of the Platform Demonstrator to technologies)
In-flight refuelling Taking into account the operational issues of projection and hovering, in-flight refuelling is impossible to avoid, whether in terms of inhabited platforms or, in the future, UCAVs. For UCAVs, it will be necessary to be able to attain full automation of the process. As of now, its application to combat aircrafts represents an important issue in terms of reducing the risks of accident and incidents, in a context where the tiredness of the crews plays a major role.
46 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Open to cooperation Improvement of in-fl ight refuelling (interoperability) Intelligent In-fl ight refuelling customer (access Concept studies Automation of in-fl ight refuelling to technologies) Demonstrator combat aircraft engines The duality with civilian applications of methods and industrial resources is particularly marked for engines. This reality must make it possible to increase the profi tability of technical and human investments, and spread out the industrial workload in a sector where the development of new engines with purely military applications has become the exception to the rule, due to the size and nature of the defence market. DGA is not considering the national development of a new combat aircraft engine, except in order to adapt the M88 engine of the Rafale in order to improve availability and reduce the costs of through life support. This fi eld will remain very dependant on new materials, but should also benefi t from progress to be achieved in in-service support and engine fl ight control. As regards basic technologies (multi- physical modelling, high temperature materials, etc), the Ministry of Defence will rely on the progress made on civilian engines except for certain needs attached to military applications like low pressure compressors, afterbodies, engine control laws, architecture and integration. DGA supports research into the applications of ceramic matrix composites, which are of particular interest in improving the lifespan of several high temperature components in the engine). Engines represent up to 40% of the overall cost of the through life support of a combat aircraft, and it is therefore fundamental to seek and validate technological improvements enabling to reduce the overall costs of ownership including ISS, production and fuel costs. The objectives are: - to supply engines in conformity with the specifi cations, at the lowest cost and as soon as possible, - to ensure follow-up of the airworthiness of the aircraft, while identifying during the instruction of in-service events appropriate solutions for users in terms of availability and cost, - to ensure the reliability, maintainability, and lifespan of the different engine components, and fi nally in-service availability. Engine control architecture and equipments should evolve gradually towards all-electrical systems and more distributed and optimised architectures. Future engines could be “more intelligent”, auto-adapting to the cycle of the engine, the missions, the engine status and environmental conditions. Engines may have self-diagnosis and even fault detection and forecasting capacities. 4 These improvements will have to take environment protection objectives into account (reduction of noise pollution mainly through engine usage procedures, and emissions reduction) as well as the need to optimise the platform survivability aspects and the employment in context of inter- allied operations. Defence will be interested in American projects for substitution fuels, while monitoring similar European Union actions for civilian applications. Technological analysis As regards European cooperation, we should seek to exchange information and carry out joint research, which could be developed on the basis of future shared programmes (TP400 for example). Defence would also like to develop work on innovative topics such as the specifi c issues involved in UCAVs Vrignaud DGAcom -F. engines. Engine M88-2 on Navy Rafale
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 47 R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
More economic use (operational National control Turbine blades analysis, through to ensure the in- life support) service support of Technologies: existing platforms Engines: reduction and to control of the cost of exchange of High temperature materials and results & possibly costs of ownership ownership, thermal barrier technologies (priority on M88) improvement of distributed access availability, reduction to the technologies of consumption Missile turbo-engines Specifications National control National control Cooperation for a to ensure in- High pressure core technologies future platform service support of existing platforms
National control Engines better Intelligent engines (cycle to enable the adaptable to management) Open evolution of employment Health control of the engine existing engines
Generalisation of the use of electrical equipment European More electric aircraft Intelligent customer More electric engines architecture cooperation (functions integration)
Ceramic materials National control of Benchmarking the effects on the of technological Design tools, evaluation of new general design of Tools and advanced solutions technologies and engine architectures a combat aircraft technologies Cooperation in the Intelligent context of a new Environmentally friendly engines customer (access platform design (noise, fuel alternatives) to technologies)
Aeronautical platform equipments The introduction of new technologies driven by the concept of more electrical aircraft will be realised primarily through research carried out in the civilian sector. Action by the Ministry of Defence will consist mainly in technological monitoring, with occasional R&T support in cases presenting technical specificities different from the civilian and linked to military environment and use. In addition, in this equipment field, where industrial parties remain multiple, the priority issue is the safety of flights, which depends on in-service support and a control of supply, which requires an industry with sufficient stability to limit the risk of faults in in-service aircrafts, as well as in programmes currently under industrialisation or production.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
More electric platforms architecture (Energy management, functions integration, more National control electric components) architecture, More electric aircraft Concept studies Integration of electrical performances generation into the engine and integration Start up on accumulator or alternator
48 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Hybrid air conditioning National control of the architecture, Air conditioning Demonstrator performances Integrated power module (IPM) and integration
Intelligent Environmentally-friendly Concept studies Fire protection customer (access extinguishing systems Demonstrator to technologies)
Modular avionics The gap between the low rate of fleet renewal and the fast progress of avionics technologies is increasing, pushed by the extending duality of certain hardware and software components with the non aeronautical civilian world. As a result there is the need to implement on military aeronautical platforms avionics architecture solutions which will be able to adapt in the future to the evolutions of technologies and systems, as well as to the environment and concepts of use. In this field, DGA also seeks to make the best use of advances in civilian research, which will need to be adapted to military uses. The man-system interface including crew aspects will have to be tackled. Since the end of 2006, a decree concerning the navigability of military aircrafts requires their certification. New design methods have to be implemented in order to suppress early risksof incoherency and errors, as well as to be able to justify compliance of the hardware and software with the safety requirements. In addition, the creation of a generic tool for the design, development and demonstration of a shared physical and functional system architecture is under consideration for future air combat platforms, whether or not unmanned. In supporting the implementation of open modular avionics principles, it will facilitate, beyond the design and development of new platforms, management of hardware and software obsolescence at a controlled cost, as well as the evolutions of needs and concepts of use. This demonstration is to be built with European cooperation and aims to establish a common methodology, accessible to all industrial and official teams concerned, and independent of the final platform of integration. The research under consideration should also make it possible to approach differently and in a more effective way the mid-life restoration of existing combat aircrafts.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Definition of principles National control and standards of principles and standards 4 Convergent Design methods integrating cost engineering Management aspects and demonstration Open and shared (definition of an capability of modular avionics implementation, cooperation Functional and logical analysis evaluation) State control Logical architecture mock-up Standards of costs State customer Architecture demonstration expertise Technological Technological analysis
Combat systems For the vulnerability assessment of combat aircrafts and their combat systems, the development of global analyse simulations is necessary. The increasingly elaborated and technically representative means of simulation must be able to be implemented both at the initiative of industrial teams and in government facilities, with networking solutions when needed. The importance of fast and accurate air-to-ground strike capability has been confirmed in all recent conflicts. Operational analysis and the evolution of the programme in progress are fundamental in this sense. The associated operational needs require the evolution of the technologies linked
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 49 to this capability, in order, for example, to transmit coordinates in real time, identify a target with ground assistance and return fi re. The development of technologies making it possible to achieve accurate all weather air- to-ground fi re control systems is essential to enable strike effectiveness and minimise the risk of collateral damage or fratricide effects. In the medium term, the purpose is to address movable and even mobile targets. It is necessary:
• to take into account the evolution DGAcom - O. Guerr of sensor and effector technologies and that of transmission systems, IR decoys and to evaluate performances under conditions representative of operational use; • to launch the integration demonstrations necessary to evaluate the prospects of application in an operational context, including the possible impact on concepts of use. The use of shared electromagnetic and optical antennas appears likely to greatly improve the performance of communication, detection, fi re control systems and recognition on future combat platforms, on the condition that they are able to carry out their integration without degrading aerodynamic performance or that of low observability. Self-protection is an essential contributor to the reduction of vulnerability of aircrafts which should be developed in coordination with the evolution of threats and the networking of platforms. The functions of detection and threat jamming enter into a global strategy for managing the vulnerability of aircrafts, tied to LO technology aspects.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Research into National control aeronautical Global survivability Exchange of results systems State means of architectures simulation Cooperation between aircrafts: - Transmission and management Evaluation of of tactical data technologies - Cooperation between sensors Defi nition of Weapon systems architecture new sensors (cooperation between functions, sensors within a platform and MMI)
High fl ow data transmissions European cooperation National control (taking into account Weapon system possible cooperation aeronautics Benchmarking, cooperation on sensors and Air-to-ground fi re-control systems according to the armaments) sensors used Integration and Air-to-air fi re-control systems evaluation of Meteor Integrated architectures European cooperation technologies
Self-protection: architecture, Decoys sensors, decoys
50 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Antennas and apertures architecture on aircraft (design, Technological Shared and integration, demonstration) solutions low observable National control antennas Radar, ESM and CNI antennas(18) Integration on a future aircraft Optical apertures
helicopters The priority in the helicopters fi eld is to ensure in-service support and the evolution of the various rotary wing platforms for national needs, which implies effort targeted on the most recent programmes: the Tiger, the Cougar, and the NH90. Eurocopter is the airframe prime contractor (along with Agusta Westland for the NH90). European cooperation would seem to be the proper framework for the design of future rotary wing platforms. Vrignaud DGAcom -F.
DGA takes advantage of the design skills Helicopter Tigre (EUROCOPTER) of helicopters platforms used for civilian applications. The cooperation established between ONERA and the DLR should make it possible to evolve basic technologies, one important topic being low observable propulsion integration with regard to survivability needs in operational contexts. As regards turbine engines, it will be important at some point to be able to develop more powerful versions of the current engines (Tiger and NH90), Eurocopter - Deulin but priority will be given to introducing evolutions and know-how enabling signifi cant gains in ownership costs and Helicopter NH90 (EUROCOPTER) 4 operational availability. Beyond the basic platforms, systems and survivability in operation aspects will require a sustained effort in the decades to come, in particular with regard to the adaptation of capacities and use to coalition operations. DGA is very open to cooperation on the development of all weather military use capacities, and on Weapon systems’ capacities of evolution and adaptation, and is thus ready to involve in close cooperation on these two subjects.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities Technological analysis
Monitoring (electro-optical National control of: sensors and radar) architecture, Concept studies performance of the Weapon systems Tactical data links and cooperation integration of tactical with other aircrafts and UAVs Technology blocks data transmissions, mission information Target designation and management fi re control system
(18) Communication - navigation - identifi cation
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 51 R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Sensors (mutual All weather sensors and navigation access) National control over Data processing (fusion) Global performances architecture and data related to the and collision avoidance All-weather Conduct of flight safety, performance helicopters Help in landing in precision of demonstration or navigation, and links Low altitude tactical flight heavy helicopter with Weapon systems (including Crew vision and MMI (workload) architecture)
The technological priorities of specific interest to Defence include: - Improvement of the protection and survivability of the helicopters, at the level of the crew or the systems (in a passive way by the use of new materials or new architectures, and in an active way, thanks to the evolution of sensors and effectors); - Development of fly-by-wire flight control applications, in terms of evolved piloting laws,in particular for all-weather flights close to obstacles; - Insertion in the digital battlefield, which requires increased capacities of coordination of actions and data transmission and processing; - Applications linked to advanced sensors, with the appearance of new technologies (optronic, electromagnetic, acoustic), precise navigation associated with the digitalisation of ground data, development of the capability for fusion between this data, and, in the longer-term, cooperation between sensors, on the same platform and in multi-platforms. Lastly, to profit fully from new technologies from the civilian world, which will make possible a better control of some obsolescence risks, it will be necessary to ensure there will be no dependence creation at the level of the hardware and software components used.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Knowledge and Protection of the crew fine modelling Databases of tests of the threats Survivability Behaviour in crash landing Exchange and tuning Official global of simulation analyse simulations Global survivability integrating Official modelling activation of the Weapon systems of vulnerability (detection - protection - action) Modelling of IR, EM and Tests databases Low observability acoustics signature National control of the helicopters Exchange and tuning Low observable propulsion of simulation integration
Referencing of threats European cooperation: Self protection of exchanges of results, Global analyse simulation National control the helicopters new concepts of Studies of self-protection self-protection architecture and integration
Transport and specialised aircraft Beyond the A400M, in the long run, the prospects as regards future air transport being able to interest defence will depend on the evolution of the civilian market for airliners, which should profit from important technological advances, in particular as regards environmental impact and fuel consumption reduction. Military needs may, however, require special adaptation of
52 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 these platforms (loading, carriage, dropping techniques) and systems (interoperability, network communication, self-protection, navigation/guidance systems). In the very long term, military applications of more innovative solutions could be considered (tilt-rotor, VSTOL techno for example), in response to signifi cant needs, and after the maturation of these technologies.
Prospects as regards specialised aircrafts EADS/Airbus (intelligence and reconnaissance), beyond the exploitation of advances in platforms not A400 M dedicated to this, will depend in part on the development of specialised UAVs and satellite means, and also on the operational needs, sensors and systems concerned. landing systems (sMt) Within the logistical chain, the costs of transboarding, in terms of delays and personnel, are a permanent concern for the forces. New reconditioning means for air pallets must be perfected in order to interface with the upstream chain (mostly civilian) and the downstream chain (military). At the end of the chain, theatres of engagement such as Afghanistan have proven the need to be able to supply advance units by air in a DR context of air superiority and poor ground security (ambushes, IED). This requires a sharp Airdrop from C160 TRANSALL improvement in the precision of all-weather airdrops.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Monitoring (foreign systems) National control High altitude airdrops Soft wing control (sails) Concept studies of landing systems autonomous systems Technology blockss architecture and Trajectory management and control performances systems for precision landing 4 4.4. ARCHITECTURE AND TECHNIQUES FOR NAVAL SYSTEMS This area is structured around activities: naval platforms (NP) and naval combat systems (SNA), carrying out work applicable throughout the life of the ships, from design to dismantling phase. NP covers general contracting activities and work on the architecture of ships and submarines, activities relating to navigation safety systems, life on board as well as the implementation of weapon systems on the ships and submarines and integration of nuclear steam supply systems and nuclear weapons. SNA covers all activities relating to control of the combat capacity of naval platforms, whether airborne, on the water or underwater, both in terms of global performance Technological analysis and control, and the functional integration of the following components: - “Combat Management Systems” and their operational use; - Underwater Warfare, including Mine Warfare; - Communications and Tactical/Navigation data-links; - Situation Awareness; - Implementation of surface-to-air, sea-to-sea and ground fi re support weapons; - Planes, helicopters or Unmanned Vehicles (UVs).
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 53 With the recent launch of many large programmes to renew the fleet, now in production phase, thus soliciting less engineering and innovation capacities, the R&D effort is devoted to sustaining a qualification level sufficient to maintain the DITB in the domain surface ship and submarines design, in order to ensure the superiority of the underwater, surface and air forces, in coastal zones, and the implementation of the naval component of deterrence. In this last field, it must prepare the future oceanic component of deterrence. It allows the maturation of breakthroughs, including multi-platform engagement capability and underwater combat systems. The aims of naval R&T are as follows: - overall cost reduction of operational capabilities (in-service support and crew reduction); - control of environmental impact and ships’ safety; - surface warfare with synergies within the naval force (multi-platform situation awareness and engagement capability); - submarine warfare and emerging concept of underwater cooperative engagement; - future mine warfare, with stealth threat and diversification of modes of action on surface or submarines vehicules - preparation of future oceanic deterrence..
4.4.1. Naval combat systems A first area of effort is to streamline and ensure scalability of naval combat systems. Architectures must be able to integrate short life-cycle equipments throughout the life of the system. Evolution is linked either to new missions, threats, performance, or interoperability reasons such as, for example, the use of new high rate telecommunication equipment, operational data-processing computer systems (naval Intranet) or systems-of-systems standards. Future naval combat management systems will have to be designed from a core software base shared by a group of ships, with interfaces with the various traditional subsystems (air warfare, underwater warfare, land warfare, command and information system) and with new additional functions (multi-platform engagement capacities), without having to modify this core. Since June 2007, in order to reduce the number of in-service naval combat systems, the Ministry of Defence has prepared a strategic plan for naval combat management systems, which makes it possible to plan evolutions by developing synergies between systems for the main two categories of platforms: ships and submarines. In the future DGA will continue to engage its public and its industrial partners (national and international) on the methods of implementing this information system strategic plan. At the stage of physical and functional integration, more compact and powerful aerial architectures are required in terms of electromagnetic compatibility and signature reduction..
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Integrated, modular and evolutionary combat management systems Integration of tactical data link into combat systems Safety Combat management IInteroperability Architecture of systems securityt Exercises naval combat National control Integration of sensors and NATO, EDA, Maritime systems armaments (general contracting Theatre Missile tools, “illustrateurs de besoins Defence (MTMD) d’exploitation opérationnelle” (IBEO), reference and integration platforms, interactive visualisation of needs, specifications, standards, naval Battle Lab) Electromagnetic compatibility
54 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 4.4.2. on water warfare These systems include combat against aircraft, missiles, ships and land, ballistic missile defence and protection of platforms against asymmetrical and terrorist threats. Multi-platform integration, by supporting the sharing of rough information, the development of common situation awareness within the naval force and the automated optimisation of the use of sensors and weapons are priorities for the improvement of combat superiority. For combat against aircraft, performance is required in terms of early detection, robustness against manoeuvring targets, detection in a complex or disturbed environment, identification of non co-operative targets and capacities to intercept missiles whatever manoeuvre they make. For combat against ships, precision of target designation and the capability to target over the horizon are top priorities. In the future UAVs should have a major impact on the overall performance of detection and in controlling the operations. UAVs must be studied according to their intrinsic capacities (VTOL(19), autonomy, payload) and associated integration constraints (time to operate, platform movements and sea state).
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilitiess
Implementation and integration of UAVs into the combat Combat Systems management system Equipment Non-cooperative targets Interoperability above the surface Exercises National capability On water warfare Allied interoperable force functions Simulations for classified tactical data (ISS(20)) Optimisation of multi MTMD platform concepts of use Research on Implementation of new means international and weapons (ergonomics, crew standards reduction, systems security)
4.4.3. Underwater warfare Underwater detection is essential to ensure the invulnerability of the deterrence force, protection of the aircraft carrier battle group in open seas and superiority in coastal areas. In this field, priorities are: • sustain a high level of performance in detection to ensure the tactical advantage of ships (widening bandwith of sonars, transients); • signal processing (reduction of false alarm rates, backing sonars evolutions, influence of environment and oceanography); • synergies between underwater detection applications and other applications (detection 4 equipment, data processing); • inter platform cooperation: air (maritime patrol planes), surface and underwater, by developing multi-statism; • dedicated sensors and their integration (antennas, light towed sonars) and integration to the new carriers (underwater robotics). Beyond detection, it is also fundamental to be protected against underwater threats (mines, Technological Technological analysis submarines, scuba divers, and unmanned vehicules) by regrouping the different detection, prevention, neutralisation and threat processing surveillance. The priorities are: • torpedoes: physical integration, on-board processing with capacities against targets with sophisticated countermeasures in coastal areas, autonomous decision-making, concepts of use; • protection against torpedoes (detection, jamming, deception, destruction); • preparation of future mine-hunting systems. Work or evaluation concerns the following technologies: multi-platform architectures, use of unmanned platforms, tactical underwater
(19) VTOL: Vertical Take Off and Landing (20) ISS: Information Systems Security
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 55 communications, fast embedded microcomputers, lasers (blue-green) for detection, high frequencies sonars for identifi cation and recognition, sensor data fusion, on-board integration and implementation, joint operations, supply chain management and storage (joint equipments, transport, in service support), on-board intelligence chain; • design and demonstration of Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs) for mine detection and neutralisation. Research on innovative solutions in artifi cial intelligence DCNs and mission programming algorithms. Barracuda submarine The design of the mine-hunters systems (Systèmes de lutte anti-mines futurs, or SLAMF) will differ from the dedicated tools currently in service (tripartite class mine-hunters) by simultaneously working upon various platforms. Evaluation of these systems and preliminary works mean considerable challenges in terms of operational issues and ownership costs.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Antennas, Integration of antennas Development of an interception demonstrator Development of a transient wave sonar demonstrator No global cooperation Acquisition and signal processing: considered National control Sonars self noise, false alarms, variable environment, acoustic impact of the environment, transient and biological, hard underwater environments (fl uctuating, reverberation, coastal areas Impact of sonars on marine-life Open Imagery sonars Intelligent purchaser Division of European General architecture and design European cooperation expertise Physical integration and system Torpedoes Firing control system No cooperation National control Use close to the coast and considered in shallow waters New concepts of use
Tactical systems European or Mine hunting Underwater robotics international Intelligent purchaser Video technologies cooperation Underwater countermeasures: alarm systems, anti-torpedo countermeasures European cooperation Underwater warfare UUVs Underwater warfare Concept of use of air-dropped National control underwater sensors Analysis and evaluation of the threat No cooperation considered Underwater jammers
56 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 4.4.4. dEsign of naVal platforMs Existing or future naval platforms must be persistently maintained at the best possible operational level throughout their life cycle, whatever evolution occurs in terms of missions, threats and/or regulations. It is thus necessary to maintain architecture skills in order to be able to answer any questions regarding the integration of new armaments, active or passive sensors or dedicated platforms (Unmanned Surface Vehicle - USV, UUV, UAV) and to evaluate security levels and how they affect life on board. Whenever possible, civilian state of the art technology is used and skills must be focused on specifi c military aspects: survivability (damages prevention, sea risk, combat damages) and ammunition safety . The evolutionary nature of the conditions of service favours use of the Battle Lab in order to be able to test quickly and thoroughly the consequences Vrignaud DGAcom -F. of any material or organisational evolution Interoperability trials of BPC Tonnerre such as crew reduction. Evaluation of survivability will be built upon the control of integration developed within the industrial teams and based on their capacities for simulations and tests (shocks, blows, fi re, etc.). Consequences of crew reduction must be studied in terms of ship’s management and weapon systems’ management, design and evaluation of man-machine interfaces, organisations of tasks and maintenance and socialisation of crews. This also implies consideration of crew time on station as well as the ship’s use (navigation, combat, etc). Guaranteeing the safety of submarines (underwater safety and nuclear steam supply systems integration) requires uninterrupted effort regarding submarine architecture, manufacturing processes, design and construction of the hulls and specifi cation and validation of the choices of materials. To guarantee the invulnerability of the deterrence force, acoustic and non-acoustic stealth skill must be maintained at the highest level, which requires uninterrupted efforts in the processing of vibrations, active control, engines and rejections in their scientifi c, technological and industrial aspects. Life in a confi ned environment requires effort to control the composition of this atmosphere and to determine acceptable rates of pollutants for humans, means for measurement these levels and regeneration processes. 4
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilitiess
Evaluation and simulation of the concepts Architectural impact assessment of the integration of new systems or components (constraints linked
National control Technological analysis General architecture Results of simulation to propulsion and the safety of of architecture of naval platforms the ammunition on board) Concept studies trades-offs Optimisation of naval architecture Safe-keeping of digital technical information throughout the life cycle of the system Dimensioning and Capacity to specify Cooperation General design of construction of hull Access to technologies preparing a naval platforms Ship superstructures programme National control Resistant hull of submarines of safety
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 57 R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
External structures (ballasts, bow and stern frames, tower); internal structures (bridge, compartment, supporting structures, cradles, etc) of submarines Physical integration of weapon systems Use of simulations: virtual prototyping, operational use cases, IBEO; virtual ship with men in the loop Physical integration of UAVs, USVs and UUVs, along with their systems of implementation Capability to specify Integration of ammunition Cooperation Access to technologies (concepts of deconfi nement preparing a General design of and storage, regulation) programme National control naval platforms Safety studies (fi re, of safety pyrotechnical, safety) Fire modelling, Man Machine Interface (MMI) Manoeuvrability and speed of submarines, exit of weapons Constraints (compartments, insulation, energy, cooling, monitoring) Crew reduction Environmental protection: waste management, use of pollution- free materials and paints, monitoring of rejections Control of confi ned Comparison of tools National control atmosphere in submarines and methods Acoustic low observable (LO) technologies: propellers, hydrojets, accessories, noise of the hulls Survivability of Comparison of tools National control naval platforms LO EM and IR technologies and methods above water Combat damage
The control of energy production, its transformation, delivery to users and its storage will take into account the general trend toward an increased use of electricity providing increased fl exibility, increased availability, a reduction in ownership costs and reduced gas emissions. In addition, the wiring of military ships will have to be also evaluated according to its
survival capability and its capability DGA Naval Systems to easily integrate future large energy incentive systems. Ibeo: virtual ship with men in the loop
58 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 Of proven interest for large ships, the concept of an all electric ship still needs to progress in term of compactness of the delivery systems and propulsion. More electric technologies must also be evaluated for applications such as small ships, submarines, USVs and for some platform systems like aircraft catapults. For ships, the use of fuel cells would make it possible to reduce gas emissions in ports and to supply energy for emergency (replacement of the small power thermal generators). The combination of fuel cells and gas turbines makes it possible to consider improved yields for the primary energy generators. More prospective technologies such as, for example, the application of magnetohydrodynamics, supra-conductivity and thermo-electricity also merit evaluation.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilitiess
More electric ship: Generation, delivery Conversion, storage of electricity Propulsion and energy In the context of Intelligent purchaser management, Propulsion of submarines: the preparation or improvement National control for Air processing - Fuel, other anaerobic of a program nuclear propulsion nonnuclear systems - Regeneration of the atmosphere in submarines
4.5. ARCHITECTURE AND TECHNIQUES FOR LAND SYSTEMS The “Architecture and techniques for Land Systems” division (AST) covers activities necessary to attain technical general contracting capability for land systems, vehicles and equipments, along with their in-service support. Land armaments encompasses: fighting vehicles, special vehicles, general purpose vehicles and equipments, soldier systems and autonomous systems. The mastery of the architecture of the land systems relies on the mastery of exchanges with other systems, requiring: - high level standards ensuring coherency between elementary systems, use of systems engineering; - constraints and methods of secure information systems architecture, constraints and methods of architecture for human factors and protective Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear,(CBRN) systems; - interface standards with other systems: aeronautical, naval, and C3I systems; - missiles and artillery; - other products and technologies to be integrated (Battlefield Management Systems, small UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles), telecommunications systems, monitoring equipment, positioning, 4 etc.). As an integration domain, AST mainly aims at opportunely exploiting R&T developed elsewhere by/for other divisions. In addition to its own research AST benefits from research carried out in the Missiles, Arms and Nuclear Defence Techniques area (Missiles, Armes et techniques Nucléaires de défense, or MAN, including Metric Precision Munitions, Laser Guided Rockets, etc.), the SoS area (BOA, PHOENIX II, etc.) and transversal areas (Sensors, Guiding and Navigation for the optronics of future vehicles, or Component Materials, for the protection of soldiers, for example). Technological Technological analysis The following needs have been identified, with high expectations from new technologies: - All-weather vision for the soldier, either mounted or dismounted, (including indirect and panoramic vision for armoured vehicles) and autonomous systems; - Reversible means of controlling a crowd or threatening individual - Means of neutralisation with limited collateral effects - Sniper detection systems; - Mobility assistance for the dismounted soldier (for example: exoskeleton and/or sherpa robot); - Weight reduction of ballistic protection and other equipment carried by the soldier;
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 59 - Innovative technologies for vehicle mobility (hybrid, drive-by-wires); - Autonomous decision-making for robots, either mobile or fi xed (including sensor networks), with short-term focus on their capability to conduct simple missions, in a reliable and robust way with regard to the environment; - Modular, standardised and more effi cient vetronics with better power management, integrating automated functionalities (Detection, Recognition and Identifi cation - DRI, target tracking, aids to mobility, etc.) and elaborated Man Machine Interfaces (speech recognition, multimodal interfaces, Augmented Reality, Head-up display); - Construction of tactical information networks which are fl exible, intuitive, reconfi gurable and above all robust, including in harsh environments (urban areas, etc.); - Decision making support tools and effi cient real time tactical situation assessment; Sagem - Protection of the soldier in aggressive conditions (climatic, CBRN) and physiological support; FELIN equipment with MINIROC robot - Adaptation of training techniques and tools (virtual reality, hybrid simulation integrated into combat equipment, networked training, etc.). In this context, nanotechnologies as well as biotechnologies appear to be vectors of technological breakthrough whose potentialities need to be further investigated (explosive detection, “smart dust”, etc.).
4.5.1. land systEMs, tEchnology “usErs” For land systems, the main challenge will remain access to multiple candidate technologies and their quick exploitation within acceptable costs in terms of adaptation, integration and maintenance so that they remain compatible with exploitation in land systems. One challenge is to reduce the cost and time to “militarise”, which is today the main obstacle to the operational diffusion of technological innovation. This is the case for innovative products (robotics) and also for more classical equipment either under development or requiring reactive adaptation. With respect to land applications, technologies can be categorised into three categories: - dual-use technologies, which may mature within civilian market, which should in the future become a reference and for which active observation for potential defence applications is suffi cient; - specifi c military technologies, which should be reduced to the sword/armour problem (weapons, ammunition and protection against their effects); - a number of under-employed innovations from the civilian sector for which the challenge remains their identifi cation, preliminary assessment then, once accepted, their fast maturation, adaptation to the operational environment, and resolution of the diffi culties of integration to the weapons in service.
4.5.2. VEhiclE-systEM intEgration Given the new operational needs, future vehicles will integrate more electric systems (observation, protection, communications, etc.). There is a concern with providing enough energy to these platforms. Weight, volume and cost constraints have resulted in a focus on vetronics and the integration of functions and equipment. This fi eld is open to cooperation notably taking advantage of modular architectures and the mutualisation of equipments.
60 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Reactive capacity Architecture (final integration of all Experience sharing, to integrate functions with respect to the trade- open to cooperation “French Eyes off Mobility/Survivability/Firepower) Only” equipment Integration capability in SoS. Capability to operate in networks Cooperation Adaptation to to ensure an the needs and interoperability Battlefield Management organisation of System (embedded C3I) the Military European Vehicle-System cooperation Integration for modular architectures National design Vetronics (including protocols) capability and mutualised equipments (at least MMI) National capability Organisation and crew workload of controlled Share experience - simulation Safety of operation, maintenance, etc.: open to cooperation National design Simulation of operating processes, capability Monitoring systems for vehicles
4.5.3. Vehicle Firing Function In this domain, the issue is to find a good balance between survivability and platform mobility requirements and the desired fire-power. France promotes in particular the Case Telescoped Ammunition (CTA) system, a weapon system based on the concept of telescoped ammunition, of which the main advantages are better reliability and space saving in the turret.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Armaments and ammunition integration (guns and missiles) Cooperation with Intelligent Turrets (weapon assembly, the UK on 40 CTA purchaser Vehicle Firing pointing, optronics) Function Observation, detection, 4 identification, target acquisition Open Design capability Co-operative engagement capability, non-line-of-sight fire
4.5.4. Vehicle Mobility Over and above increased mobility performance, the aim is to find technologies enabling the
reduction of the total cost of ownership of the system as well as a reduced footprint in overseas Technological analysis contingency operations.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Energy production and management Intelligent “Exotic” fuels and their impact purchaser on EURO norms engines Vehicle Mobility Open Tires, suspension, steering and driveline Design capability Hybrid transmission
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 61 4.5.5. VEhiclE protEction The survivability of armoured vehicles and their crews is directly linked to the global architecture of the system (principle of “layers” for survivability). Even if the fi nal resulting architecture is mostly “French Eyes Only” (vulnerability of our systems), the constituent technologies are open to cooperation.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Passive protection Passive protection against mines and IEDs(21) Vehicle vulnerability reduction (backfi re, blast and shocks) Capacity of reactive Vehicle Protection Open adaptation for Active protection by masking and French equipments deception Active protection by interception before impact Control of signatures
4.5.6. land roBotics Robotics is one of the main vectors of innovation, especially with the development of cognitive functionalities in response to operational needs. The use of robotics in land operations should improve (all the more so as the level of autonomy is high): - the protection of soldiers by replacing them in dangerous situations; - the productivity and consequently the availability of soldiers, by carrying out
repetitive tasks in the place of soldiers, Vrignaud DGAcom -F. - fl exibility of use. Autonomous decision-making ranks among MINIROC (ECA) the primary technologies to develop, in order to reduce the burden on transmission resources and operator workload for monitoring autonomous systems. Focus should be given to navigation and perception for navigation. Further work will no doubt include: “tactical” autonomy, cooperation with heterogeneous entities, etc. Robotic applications already under study include: - semi-autonomous robots designed for mine-sweeping and countermining operations as well as the detection and neutralisation of Improved Explosive Devices (IEDs). - networks of unattended sensors, laid down or scattered on the ground (they could be used for the protection of sites (see R&T priority) by ensuring peripheral surveillance, or for remote action, by monitoring adverse activities in zones unoccupied by friendly forces, in addition to other means such as land robots, satellites and UAVs);
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Innovating locomotion, and associated command and control Robotics Energy management Open Intelligent purchaser Effi cient means of communication in urban areas
(21) IED: Improvised Explosive Devices
62 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
European Semi-autonomous navigation cooperation (EDA project) Autonomous “Tactical” Sharing of Decision-making information possible European cooperation for Robotics Global Control Architecture Design capacity interoperability and standardisation Man/robot interaction Multi-robot cooperation Possible European and cooperation with cooperation heterogeneous entities
4.5.7. soldiEr - systEM intEgration The digitization of the battlefi eld falls within the scope of future soldier programmes. The purpose of digitization is to transform one to one communication into a capability to communicate with all players on the ground at the same time all together. However, the tactical use of future land combat systems architectures, necessary to control this level of complexity, will not be possible unless production, storage and delivery of electrical energy technologies keep pace with the increasing needs. The multiplication of electrical devices on the soldier’s clothing as well as on individual protection equipment (see corresponding R&T priority) is also challenging as for weight and volume. Civilian technological developments are of interest to the DGA and must be supported to meet the specifi c military needs. As such, DGA notably participates in security R&T, in order to orient and sometimes monitor this R&T for a better correspondence between the technologies (for example, in geolocalisation) and covers the needs of the armed forces, as well as those of DR the security forces (police, constabulary, customs) and fi refi ghters. FELIN 4
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Mobility (light materials, miniaturisation, optimised integration of equipments, etc) Observation/Vision (fusion of sensors (II-IR(22)), networking of the equipment) Technological analysis C4I (networking for knowledge, Soldier - System tactical situation assessment, European cooperation Design capacity integration 3D localisation in urban areas) Future infantry armament Coordinated management of fi res Support (biomedical sensors, energy autonomy, reduced support system)
(22) II: Image Intensifi er (Intensifi cateur de Lumière), IR: Infra-Red
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 63 4.5.8. protEction of soldiErs, sitEs, routEs and conVoys Protection during overseas contingency operations is a fi eld in which important technological advances regularly occurs Passive protection remains a priority, but is increasingly associated with active protection, which must enable a quick detection of danger. In terms of cooperation, the “Force protection” programme, launched in 2006, is the fi rst joint R&T programme of the DGA / ETAS European Defence Agency. Force protection in urban environments corresponds to a major BUFFALO need of the armed forces. In all theatres of operations, our soldiers, as well as the rolled-out infrastructures and command and communication systems, are exposed to multiple threats (suicide attacks, improvised explosive devices, CBRN risks, snipers, etc.). In parallel, with regards to the fi ght against terrorism, this military fi eld possesses technological synergies with the security fi eld. Defence technologies are often used in the security domain. Conversely, the DGA is interested in civilian technologies used for explosive detection.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Passive protection (new Off-the-shelf Soldier protection materials, signature reduction) Open procurement Detection of snipers Intelligent purchaser EDA Cooperation Site protection Networks of sensors, etc Design capability (Force Protection) Self protection: architecture, Counter RAM(23) sensors, effectors, Open Design capability chain of lethality Mines and explosives detection Itineraries and Detection of any change, convoys protection suspect objects, etc. Open Design capability (Countermining, war against IEDs) Sensors fusion for detection Explosive Ordnance Disposal
4.5.9. diVErsification of MEans of action The question here is to explore new weapons for soldiers and vehicles, in response to precise objectives such as the control of lethality.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Graded responses, from lethal to reversible effects Selective means to stop/impede Diversifi cation of /counter adverse mobility Open Intelligent purchaser weapons for soldiers Multiple-effect weapons and vehicles Weapons with reduced lethality Capability to lead Reactive adaptation Without special operations capability
(23) War against indirect fi re (rockets, artillery shells and mortars)
64 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 4.6. ARCHITECTURE AND TECHNIQUES FOR C3I SYSTEMS C3I Systems (Command, Communication, Control and Intelligence) enable the acquisition, processing and use of the required information by the forces. The White Paper attributes an important role to C3R Systems by prioritising capabilities in areas such as knowledge and anticipation, network warfare and interoperability, both combined and civilian-military, as well as in the fi eld of geophysical information. These C3I systems can be divided into three domains, with a high level of technical interrelation: - “Space, Observation, Intelligence and UAV Systems” (Espace Observation Renseignement et systèmes de Drones, or EORD), the principal mission of which is intelligence, including airborne and non-airborne theatre surveillance systems, - “Command & Control Information Systems” (Systemes d’Information Operationnels or SIO), the main purpose of which is to provide information support, enabling strategic command planning, and decision-making both operational and tactical as well as logistical, if necessary within a coalition, - “Geophysical Environment” (Environnement géophysique, or EN), which covers all information required to properly describe the geographical and physical endo-atmospheric environment (land, air and sea), as well as human geography, be it to provide environmental data as such or to assess its impact on defence systems.
4.6.1. spacE, oBsErVation, inforMation and uaV systEMs Surveillance, Target Acquisition, Reconnaissance and Intelligence systems (Surveillance, Acquisition de cibles, Reconnaissance et Renseignement, or SA2R are involved at every level of the command chain (tactical, operational and strategic), justifying the use of a variety of means. This fi eld is therefore essential to political decision-making and to the operations preparation, control and assessment. Cooperation is possible, but only according to methods guaranteeing national
access to information and assessment autonomy. EADS/Astrium A large variety of sensor systems exists due to the diversity of the means devoted to intelligence: satellites, CSO planes and helicopters and their pods (Reco NG, Clio, etc.), UAVs, land vehicles, ships, other ground means of zone control (network of unattended sensors, autonomous robots) and human intelligence. Intelligence systems of have developed with the assistance of increasingly powerful sensors. A 4 comprehensive approach is needed. This is provided by the concept of “intelligence chain” covering both intelligence and the surveillance chain (transferring information from the sensor to processing and exploitation sites). Skills in information chain architecture are essential in order to optimise the resulting information and its access time, support the development of sensors adapted to each carrier and develop the adaptability of the information chain to the theatre. That means taking into account the equipment available for the various types of engagement and phases of engagement as well as improving the interconnection capacities of the information chains, both in the context of a national operation or in cooperation. Technological analysis DGA’s activity on SA2R systems and on their architecture consists in: - defi ning continuous, coherent and effective information chains; - contributing to integrate the intelligence systems into the information chains: • by determining the sensors and processing characteristics which are key to the intelligence performance ; • by defi ning the adequate requirements to ensure that the integration of the intelligence system into the intelligence chain will meet overall coherency needs (interconnection of the intelligence tools with the processing and multi-sensors exploitation tools, data format and exchanges standardisation, etc.);
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 65 - ensuring the consistency of the production of systems dedicated to intelligence; - providing space systems dedicated to intelligence and warning; - providing UAV systems; - providing the ground systems of sensor monitoring, transmission and exploitation of intelligence.
4.6.1.1. space and satellite systems By providing a permanent capability to see, listen, communicate, locate and synchronise, on a worldwide scale, satellites have acquired an important role in the control of information in situation assessment, preparation and action phases. They contribute to save means by enabling a better concentration of resources for maximum military effi ciency. Satellite systems improvement research concerns two main goals: the precision of information obtained and the delay of information delivery. Except payload, space system improvements require DR control of integration with board/ground trade- SAR image offs and adaptation of concepts and techniques developed for civilian applications. DGA and CNES regularly coordinate their action within the CNES-DGA framework agreement as regards space research which deals with dual-use space technologies (mainly the platform and propulsion). Hence DGA’s activity mainly concerns R&T relating to the global architecture, the ground segment and the payload. DGA has carried out various military satellite programmes, including HELIOS, for space observation, which has contributed to reinforcing its national industrial skill in the fi eld of satellites. DGA pursues this by supporting new capabilities demonstrators in the fi eld of intelligence. The guarantee of autonomous access to information justifi es the current existence of a national industrial basis in the fi eld of intelligence and observation satellites. In the mid-term, France will favour: - setting up solutions consisting in sharing capabilities at a European level, following the examples of HELIOS 2/SAR LUPE and HELIOS 2/COSMO-SkyMed agreements (exchange between optical and Synthetic Aperture Radar images); - developing cooperation within the programmes. DGA cooperates with its German, Belgian, Spanish, Greek and Italian counterparts on the space based imaging system MUSIS, intended to ensure the continuation of service of the HELIOS 2, SAR-Lupe (Germany), COSMO-SkyMed (Italy) and PLEIADES (under French leadership) systems.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
General architecture Control of the Actuators and sensors European cooperation architecture of Observation and on the preparation satellite systems Intelligence Satellites Satellite systems (constellation, cluster) of new programmes (space defence coordination) Integration of payloads Procurement/ Structure and technologies of Acquire Space SAR(24) detection exchanges of space space SAR remote detection contracting skills SAR/optical capability (24) SAR: Synthetic Aperture Radar
66 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Space optics, Access to the National control Zone monitoring components Acquire contracting skills Optronic detection: - fast detectors Access to the European components - MTI radar detection components production capacity - multispectral, hyperspectral, Methods National expertise - optical interferometry for performances Observation and space and processing optronics detection Transmission and ground processing: - fast digital link - large capacity memory Intelligent purchaser - compression, European cooperation information security National control of information security - high data rate transmission (including laser, relay) - production of images (fast calculators, archiving)
4.6.1.2. uaVs and mini-uaV systems In addition to observation satellites, UAVs provide permanent zone capability to the global information system. Connected to the theatre telecommunications networks , they have the capability to transmit to the forces in real-time the information acquired . Their missions require a number of sensors and navigation systems, for which the technologies are available but the integrability at various levels of complexity still remains to be shown. More particularly dedicated to intelligence at strategic and operational levels, enduring Thomas Lockhart UAVs offer an essential information capability 4 within a limited zone with the required UAV‘s landing on a ship permanence. The European context is suitable for the construction of an industrial capability in this fi eld. The Advanced-UAV (medium altitude, long endurance) is being developed in cooperation with Germany and Spain. Beyond taking part in controlling the architecture of this system of UAV, dga puts special emphasis on the systems, mainly on the defi nition optimisation and the specifi cations homogeneity. Vertical Take-Off and Landing (VTOL) UAVs respond to the need to collect tactical information for land or naval forces and provide a solution minimising the logistical footprint in the case of ground Technological analysis use and , subject to the development and validation of technological solutions for deck landing, the integration constraints on a ship in the case of a naval application. Insertion of UAVs in the general air traffi c is a priority both for civilian and military applications. This subject, of increasing interest in Europe, must progress at technological and standardisation levels (USAR codes adopted by NATO for the fl ight of UAVs in controlled airspace). DGA supports the launching of the MIDCAS operation, which will allow to unify European “sense and avoid” efforts, an essential issue with regard to the circulation of UAVs in uncontrolled airspace. DGA takes part in a European debate on critical standards as regards the safety of UAVs. It supports a suffi ciently open regulation to make it possible to develop competitive products.
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 67 R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
SAR remote detection on UAVs: Integration of active antennas, Control architecture European SAR Detection on UAV SAR technologies (very high- of the sensors cooperation (EDA) resolution, low frequency, etc.) and processing Compression Access to decisions Design and integration system: and expertise on Enduring UAVs, architecture, Theatre UAV, mini UAVs, micro UAVs National control of Information Security European cooperation UAV systems Rotary wings and new concepts (EDA, NATO) Intelligent purchaser Hovering/fast advance Light and/or compact energy sourcess Control of integration Energy autonomous concepts Micropropulsion Sensors for UAVs and Intelligent purchaser microdrones Control architecture Autopilot, automatic Landing European cooperation of onboard systems (EDA, NATO) and naval platforme Control of architecture Data link & National controls (Information security)
UAV systems Perception of the environment Open Control of architecture Behavioural autonomy Expertise on European cooperation architecture Insertion in air traffic (EDA, NATO, Sense and avoid R&D Framework Control of onboard Programme - RDFP) and ground station integration To define following Airworthiness certification European certification European debate
4.6.1.3. Sensor orientation The use and benefit of intelligence sensors is no longer limited to the unit of implementation or these to which the sensor is organically attached; it is increasingly multilevel (tactical, operational and strategic). At the same time, multi-sensor systems, like UAVs, are developing and implementing several sensors at the same time during a mission, either for different needs or for the same need for information. These evolutions result in a significant increase in the complexity of the sensors orientation function, which must seek to provide the best response to the need within the means available. Tools must be developed to help the operators. This theme affects the forces organisation and must take interoperability into account. In cooperation with NATO, DGA undertakes a multi-annual study on the management and orientation of sensors (Optical, IR EM, on UAV or deposited vehicles) in a theatre of operations.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
NATO and EDA National Expertise Planning, optimisation, cooperation: adaptation of Orientation of sensors standardisation, the standards/ Decision-making support exercises methods, etc..
68 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 4.6.1.4. images exploitation (optical, ir and sar) The mass of data collected by means of military intelligence is increasing signifi cantly. It is crucial to set tools to assist in the processing of this data, in order to be able, with unchanged manpower, to quickly identify relevant information in the mass of information collected, and to correlate various data in order to extract richer, higher level information. The issue of heterogeneous data fusion must also take into account accurate geo-referenced information in relation to time. DGA keeps its efforts in the fi eld of information fusion as it strongly conditions the MAJIIC project: sensors fusion intelligence chain architecture by impacting the intelligence production processes, the chain organisation as well as the way performances are allocated.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Optimisation of fi ltering National control Institutional of raw data and Exploitation of civilian research Special fi ltering of interpretation SAR images European EDA Geolocalisation of images (recording cooperation Interferometry parameters) Coordination of multi- resolution images Institutional National control Exploitation of civilian research Multispectral processing of optoelectronic optical images European EDA systems Automatic classifi cation cooperation Recognition and identifi cation Fusion at the pixel level Methods, principles: 4 National Expertise Institutional civilian adaptation Data fusion Fusion at the primitive level research European of standards/ cooperation Fusion at the decision- methods, etc. making level (EDA NATO)
4.6.1.5. intelligence chains
Intelligence chains are essential in order to coordinate resources. Their design relies on innovative Technological analysis tools such as the French MoD battle lab (LTO, see §3.2.3), or via NATO cooperation.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
COP Management support National control of Intelligence chains MMI NATO intelligence chain General architecture architecture LTO
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 69 4.6.1.6. Goniometry, Elint, Comint At the strategic and tactical level, the function of electromagnetic intelligence (Elint) is fundamental for situation assessment at the highest levels of command or for managing information at the battlefield level. At the strategic level, Elint is a fundamental source of information. The integration of the exploitation of data in C4I systems is an essential need for command purposes.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Localisation and Tracking Goniometry/ Control of of transmitters Possible localisation architecture Geolocalisation of transmitters Super High Frequencies (SHF) and Frequency-Hopping Interception of Spread Spectrum (FHSS) Low TRL studies Control of communications (NATO) architecture Equalisation-synchronisation (HVUHF)
4.6.1.7. Voice recognition, translation These techniques, linked to Comint, are essential to the rapid exploitation of the information collected. DGA is deeply involved in civilian research networks and cooperates with OSEO Innovation. It supports the study and development of the Quaero software product, providing expertise dedicated to the evaluation of technologies for the automated processing of speech and images. Experience shows that these subjects greatly benefit from the diversity of methods and experiments in European countries and can provide significant contribution to improving interoperability.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Identification State control of Voice recognition, Automatic transcription Tools and corpus: EDA implementation (key- translation or NATO cooperation Automatic translation words and topics) Translation of oral speech
4.6.1.8. Data mining The Internet is a great multilingual database. Data and information retrieval for the purpose of military intelligence requires the definition of a specific ontology. The adaptation of civilian search engines is the most promising method.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Official control of Data mining Civilian institutional Data mining implementation (key research Unstructured data words and topics)
4.6.2. GEOPHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT Accompanying the massive move toward digitised data use in weapon systems, environmental data are becoming essential in operations preparation and control, systems navigation functions and targeting. The data need is two-fold: information system and operation of the weapon system. The operational context has a strong impact on environmental information needs, which requires the development of a progressive approach for: - Collecting data by means of off-the-shelf products, systematic acquisitions or even “reactive” programme of work meeting operational deadlines, which play a fundamental role in the organisation of defence; - Data exploitation means (access services, etc.).
70 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 It is necessary to synchronise and control the consistency between the evolution of needs for user systems and the evolution of capacities to acquire supply and delivery of information (standardised services and products). The control of the geometrical quality of images, which requires adapted expertise
regarding the sources, comes under SHOM sovereignty insofar as it conditions the positioning capabilities of mobile defence Rapid Environment Assessment forces. DGA is interested in all techniques and activities linked to knowledge of the geographical and physical endo-atmospheric environment (ground, sea and air), as well as human geography. They are necessary for the specifi cation and development of systems and equipment aimed at acquiring knowledge of this environment, representing it, and enabling its exploitation, in order to optimise the operational effi ciency of in-service arms and command systems or the design of future systems. The three areas of principal interest, geographical information, military oceanography and atmospheric physics, are requiring the following techniques and activities: • Techniques for the in-situ or remote-sensing acquisition of environmental data, studies and specifi c developments of sensors, methods of interpretation and qualifi cation of thedata collected; • Modelling and characterisation of the various media from the point of view of their infl uence on the design and operational use of systems, in particular the infl uence of the environment on propagation and radiation conditions; • Production and qualifi cation process for geographical, oceanographic or weather information, including: techniques of informations geo-referencing or imagery whatever its fi nality (information, targeting, geography), methods for environmental information fusion from various origins and techniques to access to this information (infrastructure of geospatial services); • Specifi c methods for the representation, transformation and fusion of environmental information by allowing adequate exploitation in the user’s systems. The characterisation of the needs of systems remains the responsibility of the designers of these systems; • Management and exploitation techniques for environment information, in particular those using geo-referenced databases; • Defi nition and evolution of geographical, oceanographic or meteorological product ranges, standards applied to storage, access, representation, and transformation of geographical, oceanographic or meteorological data, and more generally to geo-referenced data. 4 state of the ocean analysis and forecasting The sea state knowledge is gained through analysis and forecasting models by the SHOM, in coordination with the armed forces and DGA. In order to improve the analysis and forecasting systems performance, priority areas in the medium term are : swell representation (state of sea), extension of the operational system to coastal zones,
provision of environmental parameters linked to the sea water turbidity (coupling of hydrodynamic Technological analysis and bio-geochemical models), high performance computing means.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Representation of Complete control swell (state of sea) Altimetry, colour of information Analysis and Extension of the operational and temperature systems for decision- forecasting of the system to coastal zones measurements of making support water satellites state of the ocean Provision of environmental (performances, parameters linked to the Civilian cooperation (ESA) parameters of turbidity of sea water operation)
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 71 Weather forecasting Research and development efforts concern the local improvement of the resolution of models, via the merging of various models, and the improvement of the data assimilation into the models. A first operational version of a high-resolution model (a few kilometres) is planned by 2009-2011. At the same time, assimilation into the models should be enriched by the information accessible from the new geostationary meteorology satellites (MSG series), the first of which, MeteoSAT8, has been operational since 2003. As a whole, these efforts aim to improve the means of forecasting local phenomena in the lower layers of the atmosphere, such as fog or aerosols. A version of the defence meteorology R&D roadmap has been written in cooperation with Météo- France and has been presented to the Military. DGA intends to continue and consolidate the drafting of this roadmap in cooperation with Météo-France and the Military.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Weather forecasting in the medium and immediate term Medium scale modelling in the low layers
Fusion and assimilation of data Data routing and (coupling between models Via Météo-France formatting Weather forecasting and theatre measurements) Support to Modelling of rainfall, fog, diffusion NATO standards operational of contaminants, waves effects decision-making Remote sensing of weather parameters from ground or space Delocalisation of meteorological forecasting
Radiative and transmissive properties of the atmospheric environment and radiation of the natural environment The field of atmospheric propagation (UV, visible, IR, EM, laser, etc.) is more specific to defence applications. Except in the unlikely case of a technological breakthrough, significant and continuous progress is expected from: - The development of our understanding of the micro-physical processes determining the optical properties of clouds and aerosols; - The development of methods to obtain in-situ knowledge of atmospheric structures in order to evaluate the propagation conditions; - Generalisation of hybrid digital modelling.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Radiative and transmissive properties Propagation of UV, visible, of the atmospheric IR, EM, laser, etc. Open National expertise environment and Radiation of the Generalisation of hybrid natural environment digital modelling
Production of geographical information From a geometric viewpoint models are reasonably well controlled for optical and radar space sensors, but they do not usually allow carrying out local reconnaissance in hostile regions. On the other hand sensor agility, a quality valued by intelligence, introduces poorly controlled uncertainties regarding the geometric characteristics of the viewpoint. Other image sources are available in a defence context (air reconnaissance and UAVs: optics, videos, radar), but their geometric models are still poorly controlled. Achieve the best value from geometric models is a priority in order to
72 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 allow the producers of geo-referenced military information to benefi t from the rich quality of these sources (very high-resolution, all weather capability). Needs in reactivity involve identifi cation of solutions and rapid data production technology (guided data selection among an available set, geo-referencing). Since 2007, DGA has been implementing a new organisation for the production of geographical data making improved use of the National Geographical institute resources (Institut Géographique National, or IGN). The IGN also provides its skills in term of standardisation (IGN-Defence standardisation unit).
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Control of geometry and Control of localisation capability geographic database without local support Exchanges and Reactivity of Production of Geographic database comparison production geographical Fast production of products in Control of produced information cooperation (MGCP), images quality Extraction of semantic DGIWG (normalisation) Control of soils information, characterisation characteristics of media (soils surfaces, etc.) (mobility) rapid evaluation of the naval environment For the needs of underwater warfare, a deep understanding of the naval acoustic environment is essential.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
(at present) NATO Control of the REA (Rapid Acoustic naval evaluation by NURC research centre naval environment Environment discrete tomography, data- and European and as support for Assessment) fusion and inversion Canadian universities decision-making
geophysics Knowledge of bathymetry is essential to ensure the safe navigation of ships, submarines and towed devices as well as for amphibious operations. It must 4 be acquired in all of zones of interest for defence, at short notice. dga is directing its efforts, in civilian or military cooperation, towards the improvement of measurements and their processing and exploitation. We are constantly searching for either civilian or military cooperation. DGA / GESMA SPIV Robot Technological Technological analysis
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
National control Bathymetry, gravimetry, Bilateral agreements Geophysics of the exploitation magnetism or NATO of data
Management, access and representation of digital geo-referenced information The civilian and defence international community has, in recent years, been making signifi cant efforts to defi ne generic conceptual models enabling the cover of various elements entering into the constitution and management of digitized geographical data. International standards and
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 73 their adaptation to the defence context are emerging and should be able to be used to draw the basis of the joint information exchange datamodel for geo-referenced information. The subject of access to the data and diffusion introduces various themes such as geo-space service infrastructure, GHOM data fusion, decision making support tools and groupware (for easier data updates), in the context of REP (Recognized environmental picture). DGA will continue to participate in the groups defining the international standards. This issue also applies to oceanographical and meteorological data.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Management, NTIC International National control access, diffusion Geospace service infrastructure standards (generic of the technology and representation GHOM data fusion (REP) models, encryption) implemented in of digitalised Groupware (data updates NATO programmes (DNG3D geo-referenced and additions) and GEODE4D) information Decision support GMES
Characterisation of systems requirements, tactical assistance for use of the systems, qualification of available data The geo-referenced information or tactical assistance for use of the systems, based on the state of the environment, is a priority area of work.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Characterisation of Specification of the systems requirements, Cooperation on quality required for tactical assistance for Rough estimate of data quality various geographical weapon systems use of the systems, products (maps, etc.) Control of the qualification of available data quality available data In order to keep up with rapid changes in the field and support the transformation, DGA is jointly developing approaches such as CD&E (concept/design, development and experimentation) with mixed DGA-Armed Forces structures and the relevant centres of expertise.
4.6.3. COMMAND AND CONTROL INFORMATION SYSTEMS Command and Control Information Systems (C2IS) are systems for processing data at the tactical and strategic levels in various environments (land, sea, air and joint) and in various fields (command and control, mission planning, logistics, intelligence,…). These systems are software-intensive and part of complex organisations, which are often unstable and where the human role is essential. In addition, interoperability constraints are very common, vertically within systems in the same hierarchy and horizontally between several organisations. The need for complexity control and interoperability management has led to a joint and convergent approach (through the CTFSIA study) in order to establish a governance of those systems at technical and acquisition levels. The technical skills necessary to build seamless information systems cover mainly the following topics : - software architectures; - data and process models management; - secured mail service; - messaging on tactical data links.
4.6.3.1. Software architectures Basic IT architectures are increasingly used according to the widespread of internet technology. In spite of a strong «web-based services» trend, systems are still disparate due to heterogeneous
74 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 architectures and contexts. A major simplification of the complexity of this topic amounts to the design of a unique repository of core services, common to the different systems. The construction and management of this repository depends also on strategic choices related to the acquisition process. Other efforts are also in progress in order to control software complexity: • Usage of system engineering methods; • Design of new tools to improve software quality at different levels.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Civilian CTFSIA & STC-IA (Joint Core SOA & Web services NATO (NNEC) Software architectures Enterprise Services) Core enterprise services United States (NCES, Common Operating ATO TITAN) Environment
4.6.3.2. Data and process models management The key approach, led in coordination with the CIADIOS(25) Centre interarmées d’administration de l’interopérabilité opérationnelle) consists in defining a method to ensure and to manage the semantic interoperability of exchanged data. The french joint data model (MPIA model and XML-IA transport model) is now converging towards the NATO JC3IEDM meta-model (Joint C3 Information Exchange Dated Model). Some progresses have still to be made in order to simplify the model complexity (with help of ebXML technology for example) and to combine it with the other commonly exchanged data sets (such as formatted messages, MIP sets). The CTFSIA study will also help to build structured views of organizations, functions and processes. These views are necessary to complete the data model and the SOA services architectures. In addition, the efforts will be increased in the field of data storage and other advanced topics (semantic web).
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Methodology for data models Data models management Data and process NATO Standards XML views (MADIOS) models management Process models Civilian (ebXML) R&T programme MADIOS NG POS French MoD 4
4.6.3.3. Secured mail service Secured mail is a basic and essential operational service. The context of military mail is characterised by a variety of end-systems and data-links and by specific military constraints. “Quality of service” (interoperability, mail on constrained networks, trans-signature, trans-coding, secured gateway, instant messaging, etc.) must be given the biggest level of effort under that view. Some of these works are valuably done with help from the open source software community. Technological analysis
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
TrustedBird mail client Civilian Secured mail service Secured SMTP Security and NATO, MNE certification (XIMF, secure extension)
(25) CIADIOS : Centre interarmées d’administration de l’interopérabilité opérationnelle des systèmes d’information et de communication
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 75 4.6.3.4. Messaging on tactical data links Progress is sought along two ways. Firstly, enhancement of interoperability with allied forces will be sought throughout the examination of TDL standards to be used in France. At short or medium term, the goal should be to select NATO standards only (e.g. Link16, JRE) instead of national ones. This is likely to impact both host system architecture and media aspects of legacy platforms. Secondly, R&T is focusing on emerging technologies such as NTDES (NATO Tactical Data Enterprise Services) approach, SOA concepts, or Link 22 implementation. These avenues are explored under the aegis of the Joint TDL Interoperability Coherence Team involving several DGA expertise entities (Rennes, Istres, and Toulon). Technological moves are taken into account in studies such as CTFSIA, for which international cooperation and sharing of solutions is sought.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
NATO , USA Joint TDL IO Tactical data link Tactical Data Links Multinational Coherence Team messaging systems SOA Programs (Rennes, Istres, Toulon)
4.7. MISSILES, WEAPONS AND NUCLEAR DEFENCE TECHNIQUES The MAN technical area (Missiles, Armes et techniques Nucléaires de défense) covers tactical and strategic missile systems, missile propulsion and defence energetic materials, weapons (guns, rocket launcher, etc.), ammunition in the broad sense (shells, aeronautical bombs, rockets, etc.), and activities related to nuclear defence techniques. These are major components of combat systems or integrated weapon systems. They fulfi l a military function or a capability of deterrence. These systems of missiles, weapons and related technologies must evolve continuously to satisfy the armed forces’ needs in the short, medium and long term. The main issues for integrated combat systems upon which tactical missile systems and weapons depend, are: - effi ciency and speed of military action. This requires reduction in reaction times and adaptability to change (vis-à-vis moving or mobile targets); - control of strike chronology and rate of land operations; - o ptimisation of missiles systems’ use, within centralised means of command and real-time control of operations; - sustained action and aptitude to deliver a precise strike in all weather, from a safe distance (introducing diversifi cation of the carriers for deep strikes); - increasingly complex environment (civilian/military mix, legal framework requiring control of the level and effect of striking); capability to selectively impair various targets across an entire hostile space; measured use of force; and precision fi ring (guided ammunition; ammunition with target designation) for land combat; - evolution of threats and targets: • increased performance of targets (mobility, protection, jamming capability or deception of existing missile systems); • new threats on deep strike capability (surface-to-air, air-to-air or space threat); • new targets (e.g. for sea warfare,
small boats linked to an asymmetrical Armée de l’air threat or atypical air-to-air threats with low radar signature and low speed); ASMPA BA125
76 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 - preparation of possible anti-ballistic missile defence capability; - Ordnance safety level of missiles in their life cycles (storage, transport, handling, during carriage). Concerning strategic missile systems, national sovereignty is imperative. Beyond present developments and in spite of the absence of any prospect of major developments in the medium term, this national sovereignty imperative requires maintaining skills and industrial know-how as well as full test facilities (e.g. DGA Missiles Testing, BEM Monge) and appropriate national expertise.
4.7.1.1. sea-to-ground strategic ballistic missiles (MsBs) R&T aims to adapt these systems to the evolution of operational needs and threats. It concerns national sovereignty and the precise nature of the work is classifi ed.
4.7.1.2. cruise missiles
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Architecture of Subsonic combustion ramjet Cooperation on hyperspeed aerobic National control technology blocks propulsion missiles Supersonic combustion ramjet Bidirectional connexion for battle damage assessment and re-targeting Antijamming GPS(26) receiver Cooperation by Control of design Algorithms for navigation technological and integration of Architecture of Systems and algorithms contributions within technologies, cruise missiles for mission planning an integrated Expertise on prime contractor technology blocks Data link with satellite or UAV Architecture of the chain of lethality Missile turbojets
4.7.1.3. tactical missiles Air-to-ground missiles Work is directed primarily towards: 4 - addition of guidance functionalities or data links: bidirectional connexion for battle damage assessment and re-targeting, satellite connections, jamming hardened GPS navigation; - Penetration capacity of: furtive
architectural form, manoeuvrability Technological analysis to diversify trajectories of intrusion (hybridisation of guidance, navigation and altimetry sensor systems)
- Diversifi cation of warheads, reduction Wurtz MBDA / T. of collateral effects and processing of strongly hardened targets. Scalp under Rafale
(26) GPS: Global Positioning System
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 77 R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Air-to-ground Integration of GPS and semi- Defi nitions and mission armaments active fi nal laser guidance Cooperation on information, effects for theatres of devices for modular air-to- technology blocks control, integration operation ground armament (AASM) on platforms
Processing of mobile or Cooperation on Air-to-ground “time sensitive” target technology blocks Defi nitions and mission armaments information, effects for theatres of Pre-evaluation of the control, integration Concepts and technologies operation need and possible on platforms of “loitering” missile technological solutions
Air-to-air missiles Short-range air-to-air missile systems presently in service in Europe will have to be replaced around 2020-2025. DGA considers that dialogue with the European countries concerned for renewal of these weapon systems should be launched as of now.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Cooperation by Control of design technological Short-range air- Short-range air-to-air missile and integration of contributions within to-air missiles architectures and technologies technologies, expertise an integrated on technology blocks prime contractor
Ground-to-air missiles The short-range ground-to-air systems currently in service in Europe will have to be replaced around 2015-2025. Consequently, a future ground-to-air low layer system should be launched through European cooperation. MBDA / D. Lutanie
Mistral vehicle (RTD)
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Structure and technologies for integrated ground-to-air systems Ground-to-air missiles (internal European cooperation architecture, aerodynamic Defi nitions and mission on the defi nition of the Ground-to-air low confi guration, homing, information, controls possible needs between layer systems chain of lethality) effects, integration partners, production on platforms Launching device and entry into service Firing management system (command, control and communications)
78 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 4.7.1.4. anti-ballistic missile defence (BMd) The development of a possible capability for anti-ballistic missile defence in Europe fi rst requires the acquisition of industrial skills in key technologies of its main components (missiles interceptors in particular). The fi rst requirements are technological demonstrations on key design diffi culties for the fi nal stage of the missile, which provides the function of interception by direct impact on the target (“hit to kill”). Technologies or key functions of the terminal vehicle of an interceptor relate to homing, guidance/piloting and lethality. For defence against the threat of theatre ballistic missiles, in the short term France will have a capability with the SAMP/T Block 1, compatible of integration in the architecture of the NATO ALTBMD programme which can then evolve with the arrival of new systems: radars, command centres and missiles. DGA Missiles Testing Aster 30
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Take into account critical hard BMD – system points: alert, discrimination, studies real-time, communications, etc. Defi nition, Guidance-control device and manufacture, European control, associated motorisation implementation national expertise on the Homing Sensors and sharing of the critical performances BMD - technology blocks interception On-board real-time information and decision system within the EU Autonomous interception management
4.7.1.5. land combat missiles New generations of land combat missiles will have to be adapted to future networked operations and will benefi t from the distribution of functions for detection, decision 4 and action between the various platforms and, in particular, to enable fi ring beyond the direct line of sight (“non line of sight” - NLOS). It is in this context that European cooperation is built around future programs (MRCM(27)).
Eryx D / Caporal J. Salles ECPA Technological Technological analysis R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Modular architecture of the weapon system (missile and fi ring unit) Defi nitions and mission Land combat information, homing, Ad hoc cooperation missiles Guidance-navigation chain control of effects, integrating infrared imagery integration on platforms and semi-active laser bi- mode homing head.
(27) MRCM: Multi-Role Combat Missile
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 79 4.7.1.6. anti-ship missiles Exocet MM40 has recently been re-motorised with a turbojet, doubling its operational range. R&T studies will aim at preparing future trends: integration of a new homing head, preparation of post-2020 Air to Sea, Ground to Sea, Sea to Sea evolutions. To meet the need expressed by the Navy for a light anti-ship missile to equip embarked helicopters such as the Panther and the NH90, DGA is currently carrying out certain preliminary MBDA M. Hans work. Cooperation with European countries having comparable needs is encouraged. Exocet MM40 Block3
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Motorisation of the Exocet Sovereignty for electro- anti-ship missile by turbojet magnetic homing heads. Heavy anti- (Exocet MM40 Block 3) Defi nitions and mission ship missiles information, homing, control Integration of a coherent of effects, integration homing head on Exocet family on platforms, CCEM(28) Light anti-ship missiles from embarked helicopters: - System integration to the launch platform Defi nitions and mission Light anti- - Internal architecture (military Ad hoc cooperation information, homing, effects ship missiles charge weight, fuel weight, control, platforms integration and electronic components weight adequacy) - Guidance with operator in the loop, infra-red imagery
4.7.1.7. aeronautical bombs In order to better control the effects of strikes, we plan to study new generations of bombs with reduced unintended damage effects compatible with the AASM(29) guidance and propulsion family.
4.7.1.8. general munitions The main area of work is to design battle tank kinetic ammunition able to penetrate future armours, which will appear beyond 2015, taking environmental constraints into account. For specifi c urban environment ammunition (non-lethal or with reduced lethality), defence will rely on work carried out by the homeland security sector.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
New generation of armour piercing ammunition (sabots, lined penetrator, head structure, European control of auto-rotation device) European design and manufacture Tank ammunition Explosive ammunition cooperation National expertise of with programmable effects of weapons delay (chronometric fuse, insensitiveness)
(28) CCEM: Counter-Counter-Electromagnetic-Measures (29) AASM: Armement Air-Sol Modulaire (Modular Air-to-Ground Armament)
80 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Ammunition for crowd control European control of European design and manufacture Tank ammunition Ammunition for high lateral cooperation National expertise of effect without explosive effects of weapons Prediction of flight trajectories of armour piercing projectiles: Precision of European - internal ballistics National expertise kinetic munitions cooperation - intermediate ballistics - external ballistics
4.7.1.9. Intelligent ammunition and warheads Intelligent ammunition is equipped with systems enabling in-flight trajectory correction improving their precision. The technological challenge is to attain metric precision at reduced cost. These munitions will have to be implemented in existing weapon systems and integrate technologies such as semi-active laser guidance or electromechanical micro-systems in the guidance and piloting devices. The weapon systems concerned are: - Field artillery - Tank artillery for firing beyond line of sight - Mortars - Assault helicopters rockets. France is open to European cooperation in these fields. Steps have been initiated in this direction since 2006.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Semi-active laser final guidance for: - Artillery ammunition; Metric precision - Heavy tank ammunition ammunition - Mortar ammunition - Combat helicopter rockets Precision ammunition of Artillery increased range): ammunition of European control for - Navigation and guidance increased range design and manufacture system suitable in a shell; and decametric European cooperation National expertise 4 - System of spreadable control precision for the effects of surfaces to increase the lift the weapons New generation of general Tank ammunition purpose ammunition of increased - System of spreadable control range and surfaces to increase the lift decametric - Suitable inertial navigation device precision - Fire shock resistant
ammunition electronics Technological analysis General-purpose warheads with multipoint lightings (=TMPAM) for artillery shell or mortar; ammunition architecture European control for the integrating a TMPAM design and manufacture Warheads Diversification of ammunition European cooperation National expertise warheads of medium calibre: for the effects of - Ammunition with chronometric the weapons fuse and dense fragment warhead - Double safety fuse - Projectile with high lateral effect
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 81 4.7.1.10. diversifi cation of loads and their effects The stress is on support for technologies allowing to restrict the number of ammunition types necessary vis-à-vis a given number of targets. The integration of a general-purpose warhead is planned in the future metric precision artillery guided ammunition of 155 mm or 120 mm. Cooperation is being sought with interested European partners.
Trials to validate simulations DGA Land Systems
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Evolution of the warheads: - Fusing system functioning by measurement of distance into the target Warheads for - Anti power plant warheads cruise missiles - Models of evaluation of the lethal effects and unintended damages effects of cruise missiles Aeronautical European control for the bomb warheads Warheads with reduced design and manufacture and/or short collateral effects and National expertise for the range air- increased density explosive effects of the weapons ground weapons European cooperation (<60 km) Warheads with directional explosion: - Multipoint fuse Anti-aircraft - New concepts of warheads prefragmented warhead (material, form, etc.) - Increase the speed of fragments Evaluation of the processing Simulations of fast National expertise and the effects dynamics phenomena of the warheads
4.7.1.11. new concepts for launchers In the longer term, DGA is monitoring new concepts of launchers: chemical thermoelectric guns and electromagnetic launchers.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Future gun Guns and electric generators Open European control
4.7.1.12. Propulsion and explosives and new concepts Work is being carried out in the following areas: - New and more effi cient energetic molecules, in particular for pyrotechnical safety and ageing, propellants and explosives; - Improvement in the concepts and methods of loading propellants, robustness of the latter with respect to the mechanical and electromagnetic environments;
82 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 - Development or improvement of vulnerability models for tactical propellants and energetic materials as well as models for predicting the ageing of propellants; - Exploration and evaluation of processes for the destruction of the energetic materials at the end of their lifetime in order to prepare for possible change in legislation on environmental protection; - Technologies for modulation of thrust and guidance in force (pif/paf); - Methodology and test facilities.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Concepts of engines with Considered modulation of thrust (multi pulse, cooperation variation of the nozzle throat) Lifetime: - energetic material formulation for thermic cycles and ageing resistance European - predictive models for ageing of cooperation propellants (ideal model and digital) National control - new composite solid propellants Vulnerability: - characterisation of threats and architectures guaranteeing European the safety of solid propellant cooperation engines (database, modelling); Solid propellant - new composite solid propellants anaerobic propulsion with attenuated risk of tactical missiles Environment: - techniques for processing waste emitted during ground fires - technique for dismantling propellants - new composite solid propellants which can be recycled Cooperation in project-under National control Innovative propulsion the framework for tactical missiles: of the EDA - digital tools for diphasic flows to improve engine operation - new ignition systems for engine with an integrated firing device - manufacturing process optimised in cost 4 New concepts of European Detonation wave, liquid aerobic propulsion cooperation European control combustion engine for cruise missiles considered
Solid propellants: - combination of new energy polymers and new oxidants
- 4th generation propellants National control Technological analysis - new oxidising propellant - manufacturing processes of European new energetic materials cooperation under the framework of Energetic materials Nano-materials: the EDA, safety, - nano-particles energy ageing of energetic - non-energetic nano-particles materials (aluminium, catalysts of combustion) European control - simulation codes adapted to these materials - processes for obtaining formulations starting from nano-components
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 83 4.7.1.13. Explosives Work is being carried out in the following areas: - The application of composite explosives to the various weapon systems. This family of explosive optimises safety, lifetime and cost; - Obtaining compositions for Low Vulnerability Ammunition (LOVA) or Insensitive Munitions. - New processes using binders with shorter polymerisation times. They make it possible to reduce the costs of production for composite explosives; - Penetration capacities for hardened targets; - Phenomenological studies of certain families of explosives likely to be met in theatres of operations in order to protect our forces.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Composite explosives: - Supersonic penetrators - Small critical diameter explosives European control for the - Reduced collateral design and manufacture Energetic effect explosives European cooperation National expertise materials - Reinforced blast for the effects of the effect explosives weapons control - Energetic molecules - New High Energy Density Materials (HEDM)
4.7.1.14. Gun propellants Work on barrel weapons is being carried out in the following areas: - Increased embarked energy; - Improved ordnance safety and lifetime; - Development of “green” gun propellant; - Reduction of the erosion of the barrels.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Gun propellant: Energetic - New concepts of propellant; European cooperation European control materials - “Green” gun propellants
4.8. SENSORS, GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION (CGN) The Sensors, Guidance and Navigation area (Capteurs, Guidage et Navigation - CGN) covers the major part of the equipment of many weapon systems for the various possible battlefields: electromagnetic detection (détection électromagnétique - DE), electronic warfare (guerre électronique - GE), techniques for guidance and navigation (GN) and optronics (OP). The equipments involved are mainly radars and homing heads, systems of electronic and optronics warfare, thermal imagers, aiming sights, designators, systems of navigation using inertial technologies and radio-navigation. The area also addresses electromagnetic attack: resistance to strong fields, electromagnetic compatibility, level of damage induced by radiation on weapons and ammunition (DRAM), resistance to lightning strikes, etc. Environment knowledge (electromagnetic propagation, background signature, etc.) studied at the ASC area level is taken as an input for the equipments and systems performance evaluation. Likewise, microwave components and IR detectors are found in the MC area. The specific nature of the divisions comes mainly from its transversal nature – CGN equipment is to be found on the vast majority of carriers and weapon systems of the Military - and from
84 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 the increasing importance of the value of these equipments because they mainly condition the operational effi ciency and the survival of the systems relying on them. For these various capacities, the need to limit unintended damage effects and fratricidal effects has led to a race for high precision: DE, GE and OP long range identifi cations, precise and reliable hybrid navigation, high-precision designation, high and very high-defi nition radar and optronics imagery, etc. Moreover, the complexifi cation of the battlefi eld requires equipments with enhanced capabilities: multi-target (wide-fi eld imagery, digital beam forming,(30) IRM ) and generalised real-time. Lastly, the increasing importance given to human life has resulted in higher needs of survivability requiring top-level capacities for electronics and optronics warfare. As a consequence of all these elements, it has become necessary at the same time to push available technologies to their limits and develop breakthrough technologies to implement as soon as they reach suffi cient maturity in order to reduce costs with equal or even higher performance.
4.8.1. ElEctroMagnEtic dEtEction Electromagnetic detection is and will remain an essential function for a large proportion of our Weapon systems taking into account the possible ranges and all-weather capabilities. Thanks to the possibilities provided by the new electronic power components, the capacities for digitization and processing, new processing architectures and improved design and modelling tools, the fi eld should still evolve signifi cantly. A high level of Onera investment is nevertheless required, and the limited home markets cannot ensure the long-term Graves radar viability of a scattered DTIB at the European level. Thus, R&T in this fi eld, centred on technological innovation, will have to maintain real European momentum for cooperation and consolidation of the DTIB. The objectives of this technical area are as follows: - support technological innovation (digitalisation, algorithms, multifunction integrated systems, 4 etc.); - seek cost reductions for the electromagnetic detection function (modularity and standardisation, modelling and simulations, etc.); - support actions enabling real European dynamism at the DTIB level; - support actions enabling to federate at the European level actions concerning defence of the spectrum usable by radars; - support joint actions by DGA and ONERA concerning SAR data-processing, airborne radar antennas, Technological analysis to follow the development of skills in surface radars architectures.
4.8.1.1. observation information High-resolution imagery for surface monitoring radar It becomes necessary to satisfy increasing needs for all-weather imagery, of suffi cient quality to ensure the monitoring of ground areas even in complex environment (urban areas, forest zones,
(30) IRM: Intelligent Radar Management
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 85 presence of very slow or fast targets, fi xed or mobile, etc.). The modes and processing of very high- resolution SAR, STAP GMTI can meet these needs, thanks to improved performances of equipments and better processing, taking into account integration constraints (structures deformations). For the unmanned platforms (UAV or missile) low costs technologies are sought, with low weight, volume and power requirements. dga has been involved for a long time in this fi eld of European cooperation and wishes to continue an active policy of cooperation.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Very high-resolution SAR and GMTI/STAP Processing Specifi c waveforms Antennas and integration and processing. Radar imagery of antennas Large demonstrators Structure and global for surface (Europe and NATO) Low cost compact technologies performance monitoring Technology sharing with reduced weight, volume MoD expertise in and power consumption simulations High realistic simulation and modelling
4.8.1.2. space monitoring the monitoring of space will acquire increased importance. Beyond the capacities of monitoring and trajectory calculation provided by the GRAVES system, we should be able to acquire identifi cation and attitude estimation capabilities for satellites of interest. Research work will continue on radar concepts, technologies and processing. This fi eld is open to international cooperation.
R&T areas Key technologies Coopeation National capabilities
Radar architecture and concepts (including multistatic aspects) Satellite All aspects Exploitation of duality imagery radar Imagery processing (2D-ISAR, interferometric image processing)
4.8.1.3. remote engagement, various warfare, global security Active antennas Able to reach longer ranges and capable of agile modes for scanning, pointing and tracking, multifunction active antennas are key components of modern detection systems. in this domain, which is strategic at the European level, and taking into account the costs, dga supports structuring cooperation for the European dtiB, in particular capable of maintaining skills in research laboratories and industries for active antennas as well as European capabilities in power components for t/r(31) modules, specifi c to military applications. DR
GM400
(31) Transmission/Reception
86 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Electronic power components (GaN) 2D E/R(32) digital components Specific waveforms Active antennas Adaptive processing and dynamic and digital processing for airborne management of the radar modes Demonstrators, most or land Structure and global technology blocks multifunction Standardised “Open and performance radar modular” architecture MoD expertise in simulation Broadband conformal antenna
EM multifunctional systems
HF Radars for coastal monitoring Surface wave HF radars aim to extend the range of monitoring in a permanent way. Work underway concerns more control of radar parameters than basic technologies (precise performance evaluation, integration of environment constraints: management of frequency allocations, electromagnetic compatibility, sites of integration, etc.).
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
HF coastal Structure and integration All aspects Skills for acquisition monitoring radars of surface-wave radars
Radars in urban environments The need relates to the detection of unusual or suspect activities inside urban areas.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Modelling of propagation in urban areas and compatibility of required radar power Skills for acquisition Radars in urban Concepts, architectures Architecture and All aspects environments and processing possibly overall Miniaturisation and integration performance on mobile platforms (e.g. mini UAVs, robots, light vehicles, etc.) 4 Remote early warning and fire-control system for ABM defence The need implies capability in advanced and early warning, with a fire-control system, necessary for the implementation of weapon systems. Ongoing studies deal with the feasibility of an early warning system as well as of a target designation system.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Remote early Technological Technological analysis warning and target UHF Technologies antenna Large demonstrators Specific waveforms designation for and processing ABM Defence Architecture and Fire-control possibly overall system for S-Band Active antenna GaN performance Large demonstrators ABM Defence technology (GS 1000 - 15000) capability 2
(32) E/R: Transmission/Reception (Émission/Réception)
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 87 Electromagnetic detection - basic technologies: In addition to the various applications described above, the following areas should also be mentioned: - processing and waveforms for discretion and ECCM (electronic counter counter measures), adaptive modes, etc. - passive & multi-static radar modes (including synchronisation aspects) - radar modelling and simulation, necessary for a better understanding of the performance of radars and antennas in their environment as well as development cost reduction.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Processing and waveforms for discretion and adaptive Possibilities on most Counter Electronic Counter of the aspects Specifi c waveforms Radar techniques Measures, modes, etc Particular interest and processing Passive & multi-static radar modes for the defence of Some technology blocks (including synchronisation aspects) the EM spectrum Modelling and simulation
4.8.2. ElEctronic WarfarE The fi eld of Electronic Warfare is essentially a very restricted fi eld, belonging to national sovereignty because of the important links between the effi ciency of deployed countermeasures and the knowledge of the threats taken into account. Thus, the main axes of research aim to: - maintain a thorough understanding of the threats and their concepts of employment; - maintain the aptitude to react quickly and effectively to take into account new threats or new concepts of employment; - control architectures and the associated key components; - control the supply of “expandable” countermeasures (decoys, etc.). While cooperation between States is not excluded, the above aspects are very constraining and result in very limited technical interdependence between countries.
4.8.2.1. observation, intelligence Interception and identifi cation
Work in this area concerns technologies necessary for the architecture Vrignaud DGAcom -F. of Electromagnetic Intelligence systems (the systems aspects are dealt with by the Architecture and techniques for C3I systems (ASC) area). The emphasis is on the reactivity necessary to take into account the Antenna of La Fayette rapid evolution of threats encountered. class frigate
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
High precision goniometry and localisation(33) Demodulation, characterisation, Control global Interception and identifi cation of emissions Activities under performance identifi cation Exploitation of information national control Architecture of exploitation aspects Antennas and payload integration Architectures
(33) Including multi platforms
88 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 4.8.2.2. remote engagement, various warfare, global security Self-protection Work in this area concerns the whole interception-identifi cation-countermeasures loop, both on technologies, algorithms and architecture aspects as architectures around automatic and programmable systems. Credibility of the decoys (passive or active) is also studied. IED jamming is an important priority, as well as control of the effects of compatibility induced by these countermeasures
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Antennas and radomes Broad band reception Algorithms for tracking and identifi cation Global performance Systems architectures and Self-protection of Activities under & key technologies platform integration the platforms national control control for Techniques and technologies defence aspects. of jamming and deception Electromagnetic signatures (measurements, modelling and processing)
HPM weapons and intended electromagnetic aggressions The High Power Microwave (HPM) weapons, whose technology readiness level is very variable, are likely to be employed for any little or poorly protected electronic system. Knowledge of mechanisms of attack and levels of vulnerability is necessary. For
certain aspects, this fi eld can be open to international DGA cooperation. HYPERION test facility
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
HPM technologies (including HPM weapons 4 metrology aspects) Control of the and intended Possible on special vulnerability electromagnetic subjects of systems aggressions Measure and modelling of the effects
Electromagnetic compatibility and resistance to strong fi eld attacks This involves developing methodological aspects (simulations, tests) tied to these aspects. Technological analysis Work in this area mainly relates to the necessary tools to evaluate damage to the weapons and ammunitions due to Electromagnetic Radiation, electromagnetic compatibility and the evaluation of the effects of lightning
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Measure and modelling Compatibility of the effects Global control of Possible and strong fi eld EM compatibility Methodology
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 89 4.8.3. naVigation and guidancE control of localisation and fi nal precision according to the required level is an essential operational requirement, taking into account issues often associated with the deployment of forces and weapon systems of variable levels of autonomy. The development of deterrence has resulted in France developing international level skills in the fi eld of inertial guidance and navigation systems, which are advisable to maintain in order to attain cost-effectiveness and simplify their implementation. Radio-navigation by satellites offers increasingly powerful and sophisticated possibilities and services. The evolution of military standards of GPS, the developments of the Galileo system and of the PRS secure service are dimensioning elements. It is thus necessary to support the evolution of these systems from the point of view of precision, increased security/integrity and resistance to increasingly constraining electromagnetic environments (NAVWAR). Research for global coherency in the chain of precision and the development of modular and standardised architectures for tactical applications are also important areas of research.
4.8.3.1. remote engagement Integration of high effi ciency inertial technologies Inertial technologies and their associated techniques are used in the guidance and navigation systems to know the course, attitude and/or speed and position of a mobile weapon, in an autonomous, covert, and permanent way, robust to jamming and decoys. “Vibrating” technologies, like HRG(35) or MEMS(36), have made rapid progress in recent years. Work will now focus more on the problems of integrating these technologies within new generation navigation systems, taking DR into account constraints of cost containment, volume, reliability, consumption and robustness, while maintaining optimal performance. HRG - hemispherical resonator gyro/Wine glass resonator
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Vibrating inertial technologies Integration of high (37) (38) (VBA , CVG , HRG) Technologies for High effi ciency effi ciency inertial (39) including i-MEMS tactical applications control (deterrence) technologies Atomic interferometry
Means of recalibration As essential addition to inertial techniques are those relating to recalibration on given “ground data” (i.e. altimetry), stellar data or output from vision sensors, in this last case for future low-cost applications for UAVs.
(34) PRS: Public Regulated Service (35) HRG: hemispherical resonator gyro/Wine glass resonator (36) MEMS: Microelectromechanical systems (37) VBA: Vibration Beam Accelerator (38) CVG: Coriolis Vibrating Gyro (39) I-MEMS: Inertial Micro Electro-Mechanical Systems
90 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Techniques of recalibration: ground High performance data correlation - radio-altimetry Technologies for control including tactical applications Technologies and techniques space applications Means of for stellar aiming recalibration Integration of visual information in the guidance and navigation High performance To be developed loops (contribution in control autonomous navigation)
Radio-navigation by satellites The aim here is to accompany the evolution of the American military GPS (need for compatibility) but also in parallel to support the development of the PRS (Public Regulated Service) Galileo service, both with regard to the commitment concepts and more technological aspects linked to reception or local improvement of precision. The NAVWAR aspects are also taken into account, in particular in terms of resistance to jamming. In this context, miniaturisation of radio-navigation equipment is also being addressed.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Concepts and commitment (including NAVWAR) According to Integrity control Secure reception programmes, GPS Radio-navigation Resistance to or even Galileo (GPS & Galileo) Technologies and techniques electromagnetic Commitment concepts for antijamming and environments miniaturisation Related services code M GPS
Transverse functions for guidance, navigation and localisation - Overall performance and architecture: The objective of these activities is to control the chain of overall precision inside and between overlapping systems. The studies relate to architectures, the modelling of performances, coupling between sensors (hybridisation techniques) aiming to optimise, with reduced costs, the benefits of inertial approaches (sustainability and integrity of information) and of radio-navigation (precision and cost). This includes guidance techniques, in particular for strategic missiles. - Autonomous navigation: 4 The association of ground recognition means with all types of sensor, coupled with more traditional techniques of inertia and radio-navigation, can make it possible to localise in an effective way both familiar and unknown terrains, both inside or outside. The first applications planned relate to land UAVs and robots.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Hybridisation and techniques Technological analysis of coupling between inertia Architecture Modularity and and radio-navigation Control and coherency and overall standardisation Algorithms for navigation of overall performance performances of architectures Modelling and simulations at the system level Algorithmy and techniques for recalibration Autonomous Control of high Algorithms for autonomous To be developed navigation performance navigation Algorithms for guidance
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 91 Time stamping - Synchronisation The multiplication of networking requires the development of miniaturised, ultrastable time- stamping, as well as very high accuracy clocks necessary for the establishment of time references or for systems synchronisation.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Miniaturised ultrastable clocks Open Improvement of the reception of GPS and Time stamping - Galileo signals Synchronisation High accuracy compact clocks for No cooperation Control of high high performance applications possible performance
4.8.4. OPTRONICS Day-night detection and identification are major needs for military action, and have been at the origin of the spectacular development of optronics. The spectrum of applications has steadily broadened to functions of observation, information, guidance and optronic warfare. The joint use of vision and lasers has further increased the range of applications both for detection, telemetry and designation and for countermeasure lasers of medium or high energy. The optronics field is and will remain an important contributor to global security applications. With regard to the expansion of applications in the civilian field, it has been decided to focus R&T effort on innovative technologies enabling to obtain significant advantages in military terms and to use technologies from the civilian sector as much as possible when similar needs exist. This is the case in particular for visible window detection systems. Defence efforts aim to: - increase performances in detection/identification, beyond the enemy capacities of engagement (capacities of long range identification on non co-operative targets, remote sensors), - ensure force protection (self-protection of airborne, naval, armoured platforms, infrastructures and sites), - facilitate the operational use of optronics (cost, size, reliability and integration in chains of command and information). This field is generally very open to cooperation making it possible to consolidate the European DTIB (bilateral or multilateral within the EDA). European autonomy regarding technology access is also taken into account.
4.8.4.1. Observation Intelligence(40) The need relates in particular to multifunctional optronic means, which are compact and integrable with high performance on airborne platforms, able to supply data enhanced images for later graphical exploitation. Similar to electromagnetic detection, observation by satellites is an emerging need. The support of civilian technologies (space, astronomy) is required here. Lastly, while IR detection has already shown its potential contribution for military space observation, hyperspectral imagery is a field in which a great deal of progress is still required.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Very high resolution techniques (optical aperture synthesis, Observation & adaptive optics, etc.) Search for European Intelligence, Techniques enabling the independence on Very high performance Long range detailed characterisation of technology blocks and (strategic intelligence) identification scenes observed (hyperspectral large demonstrators imagery, vibrometry, etc.) Image processing (40) This paragraph does not consider space imagery, which is under the responsibility of EORD
92 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 4.8.4.2. Remote engagement, various warfare, safeguard and global security Navigation and attack systems The need here relates to capacities of engagement on small moving targets in stand off conditions from air defence systems (4th generation laser designation pods). In the field of image processing, work concerns improvement to the capacities of acquisition and identification of targets in complex environments. As for the medium and high energy laser weapons, they should, in the long term, fill important gaps for the protection of sites, explosive ordnance disposal or ABM Defence. These weapons will be quite complex and expensive to develop. One of the major critical points remains the laser source which must be compact, efficient and produce a high quality beam.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Line of sight stabilisation Active imagery On technology Control of final Navigation and blocks and large precision and of attack systems Lasers designation demonstrators capacity of integration Processing for identification and designation
Alert systems Concerning armoured, naval and airborne platforms, it is necessary to process threats in an omni directional manner, with ranges and false alarm rates compatible with these platforms’ countermeasures or self-defence systems.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Multi-spectral systems On technology Control of the Alert systems Omni-directional systems blocks and large false alarms rate demonstrators Specialised image processing
Night vision Not only for mobility but also for observation, the goal is to reduce the weight and power consumption of the devices without reducing performance and at reduced costs.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Very low light level On technology blocks Night vision detection technologies Integration and algorithms 4 Image Intensifier/Infra-Red fusion
Self-protection The fight against manpads and more generally against the missiles with infra-red (IR) guidance constitutes a major challenge to improving the safety of military and civilian aircraft. Nevertheless, civilian and military crisis-handling doctrines are based on different logics, and, as a result, a partial agreement has been reached on the recommended technological solutions. DGA wishes to increase European cooperation on this subject. Technological analysis
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Multi-spectral, with Self-protection and adapted kinematics, On technology Control of performance countermeasure morphological IR decoys blocks and large according to threat systems Laser jamming systems demonstrators (DIRCM(41))
(41) DIRCM: Directed Infra-red Counter Measures
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 93 In the domain of force protection, halfway between optronics and electromagnetic detection, tera-hertz detection seems to offer interesting potential for short-distance surveillance and the protection of restricted areas. The work supported by DGA is currently at the research level and will be able to lead to work of demonstration of feasibility.
Directed energy weapons and offensive laser Medium and high power laser directed energy weapons may offer high military potential, subject to considerable investment being made. The technologies used in civilian, industrial or scientifi c domains may lead to technological breakthroughs that will have to be analysed. In the long term, the development of laser weapons will require cooperation at the European level. Lastly, it is equally as important to develop protective systems against the military use of lasers and the DGA methods and means to guarantee the ocular safety of the combatant. Sphinx test facility
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Medium and High power and energy Laser Depending on access high energy laser Open Aiming systems and corrective to the technology weapon systems of the atmospheric disturbance Vulnerability and Control of performance protection against Nonlinear optical limiters Technology aspects according to threat laser weapons
Airborne ABM alert Airborne optronic systems can provide limited zone coverage in addition or substitution to space alert systems. Work currently underway concerns the demonstration of feasibility of such a system.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities On technology Knowledge of the Airborne ABM alert blocks and large Performance optimisation backgrounds and signatures demonstrators
4.8.4.3. optronics - basic technologies and human protection Miniaturisation of sensors (nano-technologies, on-focal plane integration of functions , etc.) The integration of miniaturised components to focal planes paves the way for sensors having multiple, specifi c and miniaturised functional capacities.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities Miniaturisation of sensors (nano- According to the technologies, MEMS and infra-red sensors Open possibilities of access on-focal plane, to technology integration of functions, etc.)
Multi-applications 2D or 3D laser active imagery The use of laser to scout out scenes with controlled types of illumination offers multiple possibilities to increase the range of detection, eliminate masks, discriminate in distance and allow specialised image processing. We need to develop basic blocks of detectors and sources: compact and universal laser sources for all military applications of telemetry, designation and active imagery.
94 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities Focal planes for 2D or Multi-application 3D active imagery 2D laser imagery Lasers for active imagery According to the Laser sources for Components for lasers (diodes, Open possibilities of access airborne TM/ fi bres, nonlinear crystals) to technology designator, laser imagery and active Military laser architectures homing heads
Optic materials, image processing and analysis, visualisation: R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities New infra-red materials (very broad band, resistant to aerothermic effets), multi- Innovative optical spectral optic materials components Fibres for infra-red optic According to the Open possibilities of access Frequency conversion crystals to technology Visualisation technologies Visualisation (OLED, LCD, etc.) Images processing Low level real-time processing and analysis
4.9. TELECOMMUNICATIONS The telecommunications fi eld covers transportation of the information necessary to operate and maintain the performance of the weapon systems, the operation of nuclear weapon, systems of command and intelligence for analogical and digital data services, phone and video on strategic, operational and tactical levels. Telecommunications are at the heart of the Network Centric Warfare concept which aims to enable the information sharing between the various players, the decision making according to available informations and, fi nally, a rapid reaction. The purpose is clearly to speed up the cycle “perception - decision – action”. Telecommunications are at the heart of joint and combined interoperability. They are essential to unify ad-hoc coalitions (NATO/EU/not-NATO). Requirements for telecommunications are linked to the digitization of the Military and operational issues to identify and localise in real time to avoid 4 friendly fi re. In addition, new needs appear in particular because of the multiplicity of small areas of operations in a large theatre of operation, which need to communicate with isolated soldiers, even if they are beyond the radio range. The main issues concerning the area are: - software defi ned and its potential; - UVs data links; Technological Technological analysis - SATCOM ground stations & the future post-Syracuse 3 space segment; - Air to Ground and Ground to Ground identifi cation; - IP network protocols; - Antennas - Frequency management, and radio spectrum engineering; - Meta-system [tactical radio / infrastructure network / long range] to connect;
- Telecommunication standards. Syracuse system Vrignaud DGA/Comm - F.
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 95 4.9.1. Architecture of telecommunications Secure architectures must meet the needs of sensor networking, the decision-making centres, and the weapon systems, in an area covering tactical, operational and strategic fields.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities Secure, global, coherent and Architecture evolutionary telecommunication Benchmarking Control of architecture architectures
4.9.2. Software Defined Radio (SDR) The advent of the software defined radio (SDR) follows the operational logic of interoperability and cost-reductions to rationalise stocks of radio equipments by implementing various wave- forms on the same telecommunication equipment, with at the same time standardisation of the software and hardware parts of the radio equipment. US efforts on net-centric operations and on telecommunications (SCA(42) standard, JTRS(43) program) have led the European countries to take the same route. The SDR offers the flexibility necessary for future net-centric operations by easy implementation of many wave forms (new or legacy) and interconnection of several networks. In addition, the SDR represents a major technical challenge. The success of the actions launched will have military and civilian impacts and important economic interests. Thus, the generic SDR platform will be part of future telecommunications, spectrum management, and electronic warfare equipments.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities EDA Intelligent purchaser Software defined radio Demonstration in National control on New HF/VHF/ European cooperation Information Security UHF radio with EDA-NATO Access to waveforms waveforms European cooperation (expertise on Waveforms Other international performances) cooperation Integration
France supports the European cooperation which resulted in November 2006 in the launch of the ESSOR project by the Ministers of Defence of 6 partner countries within EDA (Spain, Finland, France, Italy, Poland and Sweden). The purpose of this project is to: - define a European reference frame of secure software radio which relies on the SCA standard, of US origin; - develop a common European coalition wave-form; - carry out technological demonstrators of nodes of tactical communications; - carry out full-scale experiments.
4.9.3. Transmissions for airborne tactical data links Tactical data links are essential to the inter-operability of NATO air-forces. France has integrated link 16 on its Mirage 2000 and Rafale fighters. It has access to the MIDS/JTRS component in the context of the MIDS/JTRS agreement, making it possible to have interoperable equipment available and to incorporate standard evolutions in the medium-term. The change of the L16 wave form to the SDR standard is under consideration
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities Transceiver” part of the tactical Embedded equipment MIDS/JTRS agreement Control of use data links
(42) SCA: Software Communication Architecture (43) JTRS: Joint Tactical Radio System
96 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 4.9.4. SDR certification Certification to the ESSOR standard is a major issue for the SDR because of the ambitions of this technology and the extent of the capacities to be evaluated. In using an open standard, the capacities can be shared in Europe. The centre of reference in France is “DGA/Information superiority” located in Rennes (formerly CELAR). DGA wishes to develop relations with its counterpart certification centres in Europe with, at the same time, civilian and military prospects. The security aspects of the information systems will be dimensioning for defence applications.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Certification of Control of large object- EDA Contribution to the software oriented software European commissione European certification defined radio
4.9.5. Antennas A large variety of antenna technologies suitable for defence needs exist. The areas of interest are linked to problems of the integration of many antennas onto military platforms and relate to: the reduction of the dimensions of antennas, simulation, new materials, broadband antennas, control of electromagnetic couplings, propagation.
Axes R&T Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Expertise (integration, Antennas, Great diversity of technologies Open performances, electro- amplifiers, filters according to the platforms magnetic compatibility)
4.9.6. Radio spectrum engineering DGA recommends increasing cooperation between the European military institutions in particular within the EDA forum (Project Team “Radio Spectrum”) in synergy with civilian institutions. In the short term, military institutions would like to: - better manage the military uses of the spectrum while taking care to maintain permanent access to the frequencies (prospection and anticipation of the use of the frequencies); - develop common positions between European countries to improve interoperability; - extend the operational ranges of our respective systems; - have a common visibility with regard to the operating safety. 4 In the longer term, the cognitive radio, allowing a dynamic adaptation in frequency, is a very promising technology which must be studied in cooperation.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Static planning tools Open Control of tools
Management Expertise (impact of frequencies EDA - NATO
Cognitive radio (dynamic) on future Technological analysis European cooperation telecommunications)
4.9.7. Space communications The areas of interest are the use of frequency bands [7-8GHz], [20-30GHz], and 44 GHz (X , K Ka, Q), of the broadband communication protocols, and protected protocols, the “Satcom on the move” and the satcom laser communications. This last technology offering high throughput, long distance, point-to-point telecommunication is complementary to the first two. The technology in its satellite-to-satellite and satellite-to-UAV versions has been developed to a high TRL. It has important potential for improving performance,
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 97 with high throughput and low vulnerability of the beam. It also addressed important issues with respect to civilian problems (monitoring of fishing zones, coastal access security, customs, etc.).
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Control of EHF EHF technologies Telecommunications European cooperation by satellite Maintain space Integration to carrier telecommunications on a (antennas, solid state moving carrier (On The Move) amplifiers, etc.)
Waveform Identification of Optical link Open performance Hardware Expertise in integration
4.9.8. Airborne communication nodes The need for a local function of telecommunication processing data in “real time” has been underlined by: - the cohabitation of several different types of UAV in the land force zone of action; - the mutualisation of satellite resources to the benefit of different systems. “Airborne communication nodes” technology was thus developed to meet the need for increased traffic in a limited geographical area and has been developed to a high TRL. Civilian applications exist such as, for example, the provisional re-establishment of communications after a natural disaster.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities Control of integration Connections for National control European cooperation UAVs (standard) of Information Embedded terminal Systems Security
Airborne communication nodes Open Intelligent purchaser
4.9.9. IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) Interoperability and compatibility with civilian radiocommunications play a crucial role in this field. The arrival of the IFF mode 5, which is compatible with mode S installed on civil aircrafts, should satisfy the needs in the long term. In addition, DGA is involved in international discussions on reversed IFF projects (STANAG 5527). DGA needs to take part in the work for the standardisation of mode 5 (NATO) as well as in conducting interoperability tests. DGA supports the development, in cooperation, of European means of evaluation. DGA also supports technologies of low cost air-to-ground identification.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities IFF Signal Processing NATO Expertise
4.9.10. IP(44) and IPv6 migration technologies Future tactical networks will have to include radio equipments providing a point-to-point service like a true mobile IP network. Defence must monitor civilian technological change in order to anticipate needs. A tactical IP network approach aims to provide responses to the following technical issues:
(44) Internet Protocol
98 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 - Seamless interconnection of elements through standard mechanisms; - Support of various applications; - Increased throughputs and satisfaction of real-time needs. DGA intends to continue evaluation studies of IP technologies and to measure the impact of changes in standards on its own systems. The EDA forum makes it possible to address problems common to European telecommunications systems.
Quality of service (SLA, LAN, WAN, QoS IP aspects) DGA will benefit from technologies developed in the civilian sector and will devote special attention to the variety of throughputs necessary for operations, response times and processing security. DGA supports research into the application of future SLA tools (Service Level Agreement) for the defence purposes, SLA management methods (syntax, management, etc.) and application exercises.
Ad hoc networks (MANET, mobile IP) By 2015, the development of access networks equipment incorporating civilian technology blocks such as the MANET protocol will allow a dynamic reconfiguration of the networks. DGA will rely on academic work, in particular that carried out by the Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et Automatique (INRIA).
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities IPV6 Open NATO Interoperability standards European bilateral Implementation and cooperation use in weapon systems Tools for radio supervision Open IP Protocol Post-IPv6 networks Expertise (impact Mobile Ad hoc EDA on future networks (MANET) European cooperation telecommunications) Control of quality Quality of service (SLA, LAN, of service Open WAN, QoS IP aspects) Intelligent procurement of the tools 4 4.10. INFORMATION SYSTEM SECURITY 4.10.1. Cryptography (algorithms and protocols, cryptographic components, integration of cryptography in the equipment and systems) With regards cryptography, it is necessary to have: - National capability for the design of algorithms and cryptographic protocols (capability ensured
by “DGA/Maîtrise de l’information” in Rennes); Technological analysis - National industrial capability for the manufacturing of cryptographic equipments; - Good involvement of public and private research laboratories. It is essential to maintain a high level of skills in the design and evaluation of encryption algorithms in particular to enable the development of cryptographic components for future defence equipments. In order to maintain security performance at the highest level, DGA will undertake studies into the theoretical and applied mathematical disciplines of the design of the algorithms and the cryptographic protocols, as well as techniques to evidence the security of the protocols. If interoperability is sought, these protocols will have to take into account combined standards (NATO and the EU).
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 99 Technological monitoring must be carried out on the specification of the integration of cryptographic processes into equipments or systems with for example the follow-up of standards of security for telecommunications protocols (HAIPIS, SCIP, etc.), and architectures for the exchange and management of cryptographic keys. Technological evolution linked to cryptographic components must be watched with attention, such as for example the use of the FPGA or SoC (System on Chip) for all the functions of security concerned with cryptography.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities AQUA Countries Algorithmy of EU and NATO work in groups National control Possible for NATO- Hardware components EU equipments Cryptography Standards (data AQUA Countries of Control of a French transmission and phone) the EU and NATO implementation
AQUA countries in Evaluation (technology blocks, the framework of National control cryptographic equipment) double evaluation
4.10.2. Information Technology security Research in this field comprises: - Security of the operating systems and control of their interaction with applications and equipment such as virtualisation software: - Techniques and products for the set up of multi-level security (trusted visualisation of documents, certification, authentication, Key management infrastructure); - Identification and authentication systems (biometrics, etc.); - Contents Access control.
R&T areas Technologies déterminantes Cooperation National capabilities Access rights Biometrics, cryptography, NATO, EDA Expertise management smart card, etc Hardware partitioning Not necessary today National control components Management of multi level security Control of French Partitioning software NATO, EDA implementation
4.10.3. Means of defensive cyber warfare Defensive cyber warfare aims to keep operational networks and systems at a high security level, in a potentially hostile cyber-environment. The defence organisation will use intrusion detection techniques and inforensics tools in the watch/alert/react cycle, in order to be able to detect cyber attacks, and identify the perpetrators. Cyberdefense is a field where cooperation with NATO countries (technical exchanges, combined exercises, etc) is necessary to fight efficiently cybercrime or cyberwar actions
R&T areas Technologies déterminantes Cooperation National capabilities
Computer threat analysis Expertise Computer defensive NATO warfare Monitoring/detection/ Expertise and control of response tools French implementation
100 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 4.10.4. Systems of Systems security An important field in which DGA is involved is systems of systems security: the (layered) in- depth defence and supervision of complex networks of sensors, weapons, and communication & information systems. Security modelling and risk analysis are research topics of high interest for DGA, which can be addressed in collaboration with civilian research organisations. Other topics too, such as evaluation of the security breaches in dual-use technologies (RFID, WIMAX, WIFI, etc…).
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities Architectures of security Security of ad-hoc networks Security of infrastructure networks (Netsec) Security of systems Expertise and control of Management of Cooperation of systems identities/privileges French implementation Biometrics (for memory: see Architecture and techniques for C3I Systems, Social Sciences and Protection)
4.10.5. Security of Weapon systems Weapon systems (unmanned platforms, missiles, UAVs, sensors, etc.) use embedded hardware, software, and data, sensitive or classified, which must not be compromised, before, during, or after operation. The design of architectures and mechanisms able to protect executable code and mission data against such access, cloning, reverse engineering, or alteration, in operational environments is an unavoidable challenge, calling for specific techniques (obfuscation(46), cryptography, etc). Protection against compromising signals of systems is also an important subject for defence. It implies vulnerability analyses which can be taken into account by main defence equipment suppliers. The studies undertaken in this field must result in a transition from a “product” focus to a “system” focus..
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities Security of Technologies for security No National control weapon systems of weapon systems
4.11. HUMAN SCIENCES AND PROTECTION 4 The Human Sciences and Protection (SHP) area is structured around questions relative to humans in operational environment. The aim is to improve their safety and operational capability and, if necessary, provide the necessary care. This area addresses issues concerning Man faced with risk, in order to offer means of protection against the risks of complex socio-technical systems, with the aim of improving the effectiveness of soldiers. It is composed of two parts, SH (Human Sciences and Human Factors) and CBRN (Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defence). Technological analysis The purpose of research is to increase knowledge on CBRN agents and conventional hazards that soldiers may encounter. The first objective is then to be able to optimise the requirements for protection devices and more widely for the defence systems including medical counter-measures. Another objective is to improve medical support interfaces on the field in a global approach called “télésanté” (Health Information System). The major technological areas of work for this field are:
(46) Obfuscation is used to prevent reverse engineering of executable code
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 101 4.11.1. cBrn risK ManagEMEnt this fi eld is fundamental. firstly, dga is the recognised national authority (inter-ministerial) on chemical and biological risks assessment. The fi rst aim is to manage these hazards and risks. A system approach is currently carried out. A global architecture for an integrated system is currently being studied with various component functions: detection, identifi cation, neutralisation, individual and collective protection, decontamination and medical counter- measures. The system is completed with a forensic capability. At the industrial level, industrial integrator companies are developing the system with a network of small and medium businesses, start-up and research laboratories and institutes. They thus cover most of the technical functions cited above. Concerning cooperation, the system that is currently in place at the national level may be shared in mid-term at the European level except for biological reagents and some databases. The second objective of risk assessment capability is to actively participate in non-proliferation initiatives, which are of prime interest for dga. DGA contributes to work concerning international treaties and their Vrignaud DGAcom -F. verifi cation measures, export controls and discussions concerning reagents and sensors. DGA also participates in the G8 global partnership and other external CBRN risk assessment groups. Lastly, the DGA position as the French authority in B and C risk assessment renders it an essential actor in the fi ght against cBrn terrorism in an inter-ministerial framework. As in other areas concerning security, DGA can provide its expertise and know-how to the various ministries concerned (Homeland, Justice, Health, Transportation). With the lack of normalisation and standards for CBRN protection equipment, DGA may supply needs in the fi eld of tests and evaluation in representative operational conditions. The aim for
DGA is to make its reference tests and evaluations the DGA CBRN Defence standard for civilian as well as military CBRN security systems. Fulfi lling this purpose may make future interoperability between civilian and military security CBRN security exercise systems necessary, as mentioned in the White Paper. Moreover, DGA contributes to setting up a laboratory network, in particular the BIOTOX-PIRATOX network, for unknown sample analysis, especially through its chemical analysis laboratory for chemical warfare agents.
Cooperation DGA provides a subsidy to the CEA to carry out an inter-ministerial programme of research in the
fi eld of terrorism counter-measures CBRN-E. DGA is DGA CBRN Defence involved in directing the research in relation with the Secretary General of National Security and Defense (at the executive level, a DGA-CEA unit meets every 3 P3 aerosol chamber in DGA CBRN defense
102 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 months to direct the research). When this research will be completed, it is hoped to find emerging technologies that may be of interest for the future for CBRN security On sub-systems dedicated to specific technologies, DGA aims at prioritising cooperation, bilateral in the beginning. This might lead to the realisation of common demonstrators. A prototype has already been realised with Germany for the decontamination of sensitive equipment. Several projects are in preparation with the United Kingdom. DGA also advocates the participation in specific technical subjects under the umbrella of the European Security Research Programme (ESRP) of the European Union. The research will look at new technologies proposed by the industry, on the one hand, and at the development of standards or normalisation for CBRN security systems based on a reference frame constructed by DGA, on the other. In the specific field of medical countermeasures, DGA is planning on information exchanges with its European partners. Trilateral cooperation with the UK and US is under consideration. In the field of therapeutics and prophylaxis, the financial stakes imply that only a concerted civilian-military approach at the European level at least would be viable.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities Neutralisation of Bilateral cooperation improvised BC devices Intelligent purchaser Stand-off detection: LIDAR for the global system. and passive image sensors Expertise on the Local detection: spectrometry European cooperation performances to reach of flame, LIBS, LIF, Thz on the technology; and their evaluation. demonstrator in ad B&C monitoring Synthesis capacity of hoc cooperation except chemical warfare agents Biological identification: biological reagents at national level. genetic analysis, immunological analysis, mass spectrometry Bilateral NATO Control of decontamination cooperation
Personal and collective European cooperation protection on the technology Intelligent purchaser RBC protection of critical demonstrator in ad hoc for the global system. infrastructure NATO cooperation National expertise Architecture of alarm and Demonstrator in ad on performance. Control of RBC risk command RBC systems hoc cooperation National laboratory Architecture of protection Open to European capacity for biological of civilian sites cooperation and chemical analysis 4 for forensics Forensic capability NATO cooperation Integrated demonstrator of Demonstrator in ad future defence RBC: system hoc cooperation approach and coherency Intelligent purchaser Significant field being for the global system. Biology for detection: strains, able on a case-by-case National expertise Technological analysis reagents, protocols, databases basis to give place on performance. to cooperation Collection of agents
Skin decontamination Open to cooperation Diagnosis DGA and SSA(47) Medical countermeasures: official expertise Vaccines development Open to cooperation Therapeutic antibody Antibiotic and antiviral molecules
(47) Service de Santé des Armées – Joint Armed Forces Health Services
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 103 4.11.2. Depollution The depollution of chemical sites is of increasing concern. Research mainly concerns the rehabilitation of areas that have been polluted by explosives, sometimes in association with chemical agents. This type of pollution is specific to the Ministry. Otherwise, DGA aims at exploiting available technologies developed by civilian research first. DGA will direct research only for specific cases. European cooperation on technologies of depollution is possible.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Control of RBC risk Technologies of depollution Bilateral cooperation Control of architecture
4.11.3. TElEsantE systems The system called “Télésanté” refers to the application of medical instrumentation, communication and information technologies linked to medical support of the armed forces in operation. It aims at preparing future equipment, making it possible to facilitate the circulation of medical information and to optimise the use of skills and health support resources based on the theatre and at home. Work must be carried out on the health follow-up of personnel, on remote medical support technologies, and on means of tracing of invalids and injured and on health information circulation to the forces. The developed global system shall be able to integrate civilian technological innovations and to remain compatible with civilian organisations as they evolve. DGA wishes to open this field up to European cooperation, for both technological and systems aspects. A broader opening is possible for the technological and subsystems aspects.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities Functions of “Télésanté”: Remote follow-up of the combatant Help to the isolated health workforce Health follow-up of personnel Means of traceability Medico-surgical Information circulation support and Possible SSA major player Equipment: repair actions Management and communication equipment Sensors for the measurement of human physiological parameters Medical robotics Mini invasive surgery
4.11.4. Care of wounded in the theatre of operations and repair actions This field aims to develop the required capabilities to care of the wounded on the field and in hospitals. As a first step, it undertakes basic research and develops new technologies, if necessary, enabling the improvement of the rehabilitation of personnel wounded in operation (including trauma linked to combat and urgent medical aid). It is imperative to keep a global vision on the capacities to reach. The actions carried out aim at drawing from technologies developed in the civilian sector, except for certain specific pathologies. The fields receiving particular attention relate to the early processing of wounded (polytraumatised, traumatised cranial, burned), analgesia, cellular therapies and transgenesis, the regeneration of tissues, transplants and autografts, blood derivatives and substitutes, restoration of the auditory functions. This field benefits from the significant expertise of the Department of Health of the Armies (Service de Santé des Armées – SSA). DGA considers it possible to develop cooperation with countries having a similar health structure.
104 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Medico-surgical Analgesics support and Possible SSA major player repair actions Transplants Processing of traumatic brain injuries, processing Medico-surgical of wounded and burned support and Possible SSA major player repair actions “Clinical” follow-up (historical) of the combatant in a potentially toxic environment
4.11.5. Control of environmental and operational risks except CBRN This domain aims at a better understanding and analysis of the conventional risks facing the combatant: ballistic, toxicological, aural, visual, etc. It must take into account the socio-psycho- physiological characteristics of the combatant in his environment. The main objective is to adapt the soldier’s protection while limiting the operational constraints due to wearing such protection. Present research is oriented towards ballistic risks. It relates to weapons and technologies with reduced lethality. The effects of conventional weapons are also taken into account in research for new concepts of mixed protection vis-à-vis several effects. In addition, the effects of induced physical agents are evaluated to take into account new environmental factors generated by future weapons (new active auditory stopper to avoid aural traumatisms, uniforms and glasses to limit the effects of electromagnetic radiation and laser, etc.). At the technological level, particular effort is being made with regard to the sustainment of the combatant’s operational capabilities and the prevention and management of default risks due to exhaustion. In this field, DGA is open to cooperation in so far as it does not relate to research trespassing the legal standards enforced in France and in the European Union.
Axes R&T Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Analyses and Expertise within evaluation of the Environmental risks, Possible Ministry of Defence risks, except CBRN, Risks in operations (DGA and SSA) and protection
4.11.6. Human factors in weapon systems 4 For many years, systems have been conceived and optimised around their technology. With their increasing complexity, it is not anymore possible for users and organisations to regulate and adjust to their use. For that purpose, the combination of systems engineering and engineering of the human factor enables the engineering of complex systems covering all systems, i.e. including human and procedural components all too often neglected in the past. The systems being designed are not only weapon systems, IT systems transporting information, but also socio-technical systems linking human beings acting according to procedures in precise operational contexts able to produce determined effects. By increasing the number of systems in interaction, exploiting technological agents with Technological analysis adjustable or adjusted autonomy, seeking to encourage polyvalent platforms, synergising actions and placing greater value on IT, it is clear that it is no longer possible to easily take the human element and organisational and procedural considerations into account. The three components of the socio-technical system (man, technology and procedures), must be analysed equally. We should not limit ourselves to what is best understood by engineers, considering that “common sense” is sufficient to take the other two into consideration. This repositioning of engineering is essential in that what is at stake at the end of the day is the “applicability” of future systems. DGA is favourable to the establishment of cooperation as long as the studies remain coherent with the legal standards and rules in force in France and the European Union. They could be directed at the European level on a basis targeting a common future application.
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 105 R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Control of human risk factors: Methodologies Guide to taking human factors into consideration Expertise within the Demonstrators of studies Possible into the human component Ministry of Defence (ergonomics) in Weapon systems (IBEO) Advanced functionalities on headwear in aeronautics Integration of the Future trend in military human element into populations (anthropometry, Expertise within the Cooperation by the weapon systems biomechanics, cognitive Ministry of Defence project-base capacities, impact of (SSA and ISL) feminisation) Expertise within the Ergonomics of Ministry of Defence robotised systems (anthropometry: DGA and SSA) Possible Ergonomics of information systems Expertise within the Ministry of Defence Decision support systems
4.11.7. Methods of representation of information and sharing authority between men and automats The production of simulators of future complex socio-technical systems is targeted for the study of operational scenarios, the specification of man-systems interfaces, the organisation of work and certain elements of systems architecture. They aim to study and optimise the management of high flows of information (data fusion, intelligent interfaces), to establish models of distribution of authority between operators and automats (in particular for UAV). In this field,DGA considers that information exchanges and cooperation on technical sub-domains (such as UAV) and on human factors is possible. For high level systems and illustrators of operational exploitation needs the studies will remain national. In the case of work on new concepts, the framework of the European defence Agency appears very suitable.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities Innovative concepts in MMI Integration of the Share authority operators/ Expertise within the human element into system in the systems of UAVs Possible Ministry of Defence the weapon systems Ship with reduced manpower
4.12. MATERIALS AND COMPONENTS Materials and electronic components form the basic building blocks of all weapon systems and contribute in an important way to the cost of these systems (between 20% and 35% for materials, from 15% to 40% for components). The choices made strongly impact the capability to be functional under normal conditions but also under the extreme conditions, in training or in operation. All events occurring in the life of the weapon systems, either under expected normal operating conditions or close to and beyond their limits (behaviour under severe climatic or mechanical environments, combat damages, various upgrades with the integration of new armaments or equipment, ageing, lifetime extensions) significantly affect the behaviour of their materials and components.
106 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 4.12.1. MATERIALS (MA) Materials are the building blocks for the elementary mechanical functions of weapon systems: structure of ship hulls, aircrafts and armoured vehicles, aircraft engine components, propulsion systems for missiles and ships. They also take an active part in ballistic protection, control of signatures, sonar domes, radomes of aircraft and missiles, coatings for low observable (LO) technologies, and products for surface protection. The MA technical area covers materials for structures and functional materials, as well as the various associated specific processes. These are mandatory during the general contracting phase to provide operational capability at the best cost, to ensure operational availability and safety of weapon system objectives at every stages of the life of the current and future programs, taking into account maintenance under operational conditions and withdrawal from active service. It integrates the shock behaviour of materials being used into infrastructures. It addresses the whole industrial process leading to the final product in conformity with the requirements: employment, ISS as well as withdrawal from active service. It does not cover materials for electronics, optronics and energetic materials. Materials for nuclear installations and deterrence are not covered either by the “materials” technical division or by the “components” technical division. The area covers in particular topics linked to the control of integrity, fire behaviour, vulnerability and weight reduction of materials used for structures. For the benefit of armament operations, it manages the material obsolescence resulting from foreign dependence or the evolution of regulations, such as environmental, including the European regulation REACH which concerns the manufacture, trade and use of chemical substances presenting toxic effects and/or eco-toxicity. On all these topics, the “materials” division benchmarks technologies ahead of programs in order to identify technological risks.
4.12.1.1. Signature reduction The R&T priority areas relate to the search for new stealth material solutions with respect to the various electromagnetic and optical detection systems, either structural or in the form of coatings (films, paintings), in order to reduce the radar signatures or the infrared signatures of platforms. Research also relates to stealth transparent materials for radomes and high temperatures IRdomes compatible with an optimal operation of the systems, as well as materials solutions for aircraft canopy ensuring low observability, but also good visibility for the pilot.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities National control Radar and Infra-red Possible on a case- according to the weapon absorbing coatings by-case basis System considered National control of Acoustic absorbing coatings Under national control design and integration Control of EM, 4 IR and acoustics Paintings and films signatures Materials with controlled emissivity for high temperatures National control according to the weapon Materials for electro- system considered optical camouflage Electro-active materials Possible on a case- by-case basis
Materials for IR-domes Technological analysis (ceramic, etc.) National capability Materials for radomes of integration (composite materials Control with organic matrix, of global performance dichroic materials, etc.) Windows National control for Materials for sonardomes Under national control design and integration National capability Possible on a case- of integration Materials for canopy by-case basis Control of global performance
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 107 4.12.1.2. pErforation and arMour This topic includes: - materials for the protection of platforms and dismounted soldier - materials for penetrating rounds, shaped-charges and Energy Formed Projectiles (EFP).
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities National capability of integration Nano-materials Open Control of global performance High density metal alloys Perforation and armouring Composites with metal matrix National capability of integration Rolled homogeneous armour Open (RHA) Control of global performance Ceramics Technical textiles
4.12.1.3. structural MatErials - intEgrity and VulnEraBility Work is being carried out in the following priority areas: - Materials with high thermal and mechanical resistance for aircraft and missile engines; - Surface protection and corrosion control: work relates primarily to the acquisition of technologies for the corrosion control of maritime platforms and “sea water” piping. This action is particularly critical taking into account the imminence of the environmental, health and safety regulation evolutions, which will prohibit traditional technological solutions of protection in the next few years; DR - Weight reduction of aircrafts, armoured vehicles, ships and satellites structures; - Integrity, robustness, vulnerability and safety of structures; Lightning impact on material - Behaviour and damage models which take into account complex degradations under severe environments (thermo-mechanical, crash landing, impacts, etc.).
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Ceramic matrix composite European sharing Super alloys
High temperature Thermal barrier coatings European sharing materials for engines Open National capability and structures Carbon-carbon composites of integration
Metal matrix composites European sharing
Organical matrix composites European sharing
108 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Ecological antifouling paints
Scouring techniques Impact on through life Materials/Deposits/Coatings support (limitation of ISS) Corrosion control for surface protection Open military specificities Cathodic protection (long lifetime, speed, Noble materials/Composite maritime environments) materials for sea water circuits Integrated health monitoring Metal matrix composites Capacity of use for Aluminium alloys military systems Weight reduction Open Organical matrix composites Capacity of use for Magnesium alloys military systems Control of global Control of fatigue and damage performance control Techniques for control Control of through and repair life support Integrity & Fire resistance Control of safety vulnerability of Open structures Control of powerful Modelling and simulation tools tools for design, reliability and safety Control of through Integrated health monitoring life support
4.12.1.4. Advanced materials Various technological breakthroughs can come from evolution in materials. DGA is particularly interested in materials for sensors and actuators, health monitoring technologies integrated into the structures, active materials for the control of vibrations, nano-technologies, materials inspired by nature (artificial muscles for example), technologies for micro-drones inspired by dragonflies, etc. Technological watch, possibly followed by exploratory studies into their interest for defence should be carried out on the following subjects: meta-materials with singularity of index, materials for acoustic stealth, tools for the in-situ characterisation of EM properties (on equipment in service), protection against the directed energy weapons, consideration of vulnerability reduction in the dimensioning of structures, the state of the art in ceramic turbines, post-superalloy materials, thermal barriers, materials for the propulsion of missiles, super-hydrophobic materials. 4
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities Bio-inspired materials Nanomaterials(48) Metamaterials(48) New concepts Capacity of use for Open of materials Active materials military systems Technological Technological analysis Environmental- friendly materials Materials for energy storage
4.12.2. COMPONENTS This field is characterised by a large civilian market, with production volumes far larger than military needs, and rather short life cycles compared to the lifespan of a military system. However,
(48) open to wider cooperation for low TRL levels but restricted international cooperation if concerning warheads ( nanomaterials ) and integrated antennas (metamaterials)
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 109 the vast majority of components needed for weapon systems can be supplied by the civilian market for an obviously lower cost when the needs correspond to standard products, with the help of intelligent management of the resulting problems (obsolescence, reliability). The Ministry of Defence must thus monitor civilian innovation and adapt to the fast pace of its evolution, which requires architectures allowing technological insertion. It must examine the specifi c aspects of the military environment: extended temperature range, vibrations, small overall dimensions and an electro-magnetic environment. Some requirements such as component life and reliability (taking into account very long storage times) deviate from civilian applications. Their impact must also be carefully evaluated. During the lifespan of armament programmes, DGA seeks to control risks linked to the components, to predict their reliability, which conditions the availability and size of the replacement stocks as well as the management of obsolescence.
However, not all components can be supplied by the civilian market: some requirements concerning performance, reliability, etc. make it essential to use specifi c high performance components. These components are known as “critical”, because they have a direct infl uence on the operational performance of the systems which integrate them. We can distinguish two types: components using civilian technologies, with a specifi c design (for example, Analog-to-digital converters - ADC) and components using technologies primarily developed by the military (which does not exclude their use in the civilian world, but the latter is then not the driving force). This last case covers in particular high power microwave and broadband components and IR detectors. The Ministry of Defence must then anticipate new needs and launch technological studies very early, starting with low TRL studies, before the launching of programs. Actually, the total term of the cycle of R&T, R&D, industrialisation and entry in service can reach 15 to 20 years. Société UMS In addition, these critical components are subjected to thorough export controls: the Chip FH35 - Wideband mixer for electronic warfare availability and sustainability of European industrial sources for the whole chain (from wafer to packaging) are fundamental. The existence of a European capability for research on these subjects is obviously a requirement. These components include in particular: - The power MMIC (GaAs or GaN), from wafer to packaging; - Microwave power tubes; - High stability local oscillators; - High performance light intensifi ers; - High performance infra-red detectors, cooled and not cooled; - ADC and DAC (Converters); - Radiation-hardened components; - Some connectors; - Some types of batteries (thermal batteries for example); - High-speed alternators;
110 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 The following technologies are also employed, for certain specific applications - Packaging; - Interconnection; - Thermal management; - Strong integration technologies (SiP for example); - Microsystems. For all specific components, the purpose of R&T is to increase performance and/or reduce costs, in order to be able to satisfy the needs of future armament programs. For all components (specific or not), DGA must make sure to control the risks associated with their use. This implies work on management methodologies, prevention and cure of obsolescence, as well as on reliability prediction. Thus, DGA is extending the use of the Fides methodology for the evaluation of the reliability of components and the dimensioning of stocks for through-life support. In this framework, R&T is directed towards knowledge of the failure mechanisms and comparison with feedback from experience, in order to make reliability predictions more effective. All fields, with the exception of hardened components, are open to cooperation with European and even extra-European partners.
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities
Local oscillators
Monolithic microwave integrated circuits (MMIC) Microwave components Optical microwave components
Cold cathodes electron tubes
Microwave chains simulation
Visible light detectors Open (CCD, CMOS, etc.)
UV detectors Electro-optical Cooled IR detectors Capacity of detectors orientation, analysis Uncooled IR detectors and specifications 4 (bolometers) of R&T: Control of global performance Image intensifiers
Digital and/ ASIC FPGA or hardened components Hardened components No
Packaging Technological analysis Component Interconnections technologies Thermal management MEMS Open Reliability prediction Risk control methodologies Obsolescence management RoHS impact
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 111 4.12.2.1. Electrical engineering (management of power and energy, actuators of all types) Work is being carried out on the use and adaptation of civilian technologies to military constraints, in particular in the fields of conversion, storage and energy management, actuators and engines of all types:
R&T areas Key technologies Cooperation National capabilities Electrochemistry (batteries, primary and secondary, fuel cells) and energy sources Supercapacitors Superconductive storage Thermal batteries Superconductive machines Capacity of analysis Inertial alternators Electrical and specifications: Open engineering Materials for permanent control of global magnets performance Ferromagnetic materials Driving actuators Starter alternators High speed alternators Power electronics (SiC components, diamond, implementation, etc.)
4.13. TESTING METHODS R&T for test and evalution exists more specifically at the level of R&T studies aiming to obtain more efficient testing methods. This efficiency must be considered in terms of the provision of results adapted to the depth of expertise required and the reduction of costs. The latter could be obtained, for example, by reducing the number of the useful operators, or even by a simplification of equipments (such as measurement equipments). The “tests” area launched in 2008 a research programme (Programme d’études amont, or PEA), the purpose of which is to develop new methods of engineering and testing in order to reduce the technical and human cost of test services and be able to carry out development and qualification tests on new technologies at the appropriate time. To reduce costs and better adapt the results provided to what the experts really need, several approaches are possible: - to reconsider methods in order to limit the number of operators (automation of processes); - to adapt equipments in order to make them more general-purpose, or more flexible of use; - to resort to simulation, either to choose the essential configurations to test in reality, or reduce the duration of testing to a strict minimum; - to use sensors and innovative test facilities allowing faster and more efficient preparation of tests and/or exploitation of results. Other R&T subjects of potential interest concerning land weapon and ammunition trials (firing range observation, acquisition and processing measure) or applied environment and eco-design trials are developed. n
112 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 Test capacities Main areas of R&T work - Improvement of test conditions for small turbojets, according to several themes: maintenance of in-flight conditions, adapted measurement of the net thrust, improvement of the start-up conditions in simulated Mach (missile turbojet) - Reduction of the costs of tests on profile in icing conditions by the adaptation Simulated flight of the assembly to the S1 bench of DGA Aero-engine Testing (in Saclay) tests on engines or - Development study of the equipment necessary (including an innovative in icing conditions measurement tool by Laser-Induced Fluorescence) to carry out certification tests in icing conditions according to the future Appendix X (standardisation document in the process of international validation), relating to drizzle and rain (problem of generation of a new definition frosting cloud) - Innovation and rationalisation in future systems of trajectory - Improvement of the definition and safety gauges Missile flight tests adapted to the testing of high speed missiles - Improvement of telemetry equipment, both in terms of speed (according to the frequencies available) and data recording - Improvement of airframes tests (use of simulation), aerothermic tests (simulation Ground tests of air conditioning testing facilities), night vision device tests: evaluation of aircrafts and measurement equipment (wireless technologies for displacement measurements, non-destructive control system, system of stereo-correlation)
4 Technological Technological analysis
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 113 114 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 5 Appendices APPENDIX I: TRL SCALE (TECHNOLOGY READINESS LEVEL)
The TRL scale is a scale for rating the degree of maturity reached by a technology. It was initiated by NASA in order to manage the technological risk of its programmes. Initially composed of seven levels, since 1995, it comprises nine levels [1]: The TRL scale has been adopted by the defence sector with the same principal aim of technological risk management for programmes, with the help of some small adaptations (replacement of the concept of space by the concept of operational environment). It is officially applied in particular by: - the United States Department of Defense (DoD) since 2001, - the British Ministry of Defence since 2001, - the Australian DSTO (Defence Science and Technology Organisation) since 2003. The following defence organisations use it regularly: - DRDC (Defence Research and Development Canada), - TNO (Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research), - FMV (Försvarets Materiel Verks), - NURC (NATO Undersea Research Centre). Lastly, in the space sector, the biggest space agencies, ESA (European Space Agency), JAXA (Japanese Space Exploration Agency), have joined NASA in using the TRL.
Note : On the basis of the following reference grid which is well suited to hardware and equipment technologies, the DoD has developed specific grids [2] for software, manufacturing and biomedical technologies. A final scale has also been added [3] for technologies based on practices such as processes, methods, etc.
DoD EVALUATION GRID IN USE SINCE 1995
TRL Definition Description Supporting Information
Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific research begins Published research that identifies Basic principles to be translated into applied the principles that underlie 1 observed and research and development. this technology. References reported Examples might include paper studies to who, where, when. of a technology’s basic properties. 5 Invention begins. Once basic principles are observed, practical Publications or other references Technology concept applications can be invented. The that outline the application being 2 and/or application application is speculative and there considered and that provide formulated is no proof or detailed analysis to analysis to support the concept support the assumption. Examples Appendices are still limited to paper studies. Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 115 TRL Definition Description Supporting Information
Active research and development Results of laboratory tests is initiated. This includes analytical Analytical and performed to measure parameters studies and laboratory studies experimental critical of interest and comparison to to physically validate analytical 3 functions and/ analytical predictions for critical predictions of separate elements or characteristic subsystems. References to who, of the technology. Examples proof of concept where, and when these tests and include components that are not comparisons were performed. yet integrated or representative
System concepts that have been Basic technological components Component and/ considered and results from testing are integrated to establish that the or breadboard laboratory scale breadboards. pieces will work together. This is “low 4 validation in References to who did this work and fidelity” compared to the eventual laboratory when. Provide an estimate of how system. Examples include integration environment breadboard hardware and test results of “ad hoc” hardware in a laboratory. differ from the expected system goals
Results from testing a laboratory breadboard system are integrated Fidelity of breadboard technology with other supporting elements increases significantly. The basic in a simulated operational technological components are environment. How does the Component and/ integrated with reasonably realistic “relevant environment” differ or breadboard 5 supporting elements so that the from the expected operational validation in relevant technology can be tested in a environment? How do the test environment. simulated environment. Examples results compare with expectations? include “high fidelity” laboratory What problems, if any, were integration of components. encountered? Was the breadboard system refined to more nearly match the expected system goals?
Results from laboratory testing of a prototype system that is near the Representative model or prototype desired configuration in terms of system, which is well beyond the performance, weight, and volume. System/subsystem breadboard tested for TRL 5, is tested How did the test environment differ model or prototype in a relevant environment. Represents from the operational environment? 6 demonstration a major step up in a technology’s How did the test compare with in a relevant demonstrated readiness. Examples expectations? What problems, environment include testing a prototype in a high if any, were encountered? What fidelity laboratory environment or in are/were the plans, options, or simulated operational environment actions to resolve problems before moving to the next level?
Prototype near or at planned Results from testing a prototype operational system. Represents system in an operational a major step up from TRL 6, environment. Who performed the System prototype requiring the demonstration of tests? How did the test compare demonstration in 7 an actual system prototype in an with expectations? What problems, an operational operational environment, such if any, were encountered? What environment as in an aircraft, vehicle or space. are/were the plans, options, or Examples include testing the actions to resolve problems before prototype in a test bed aircraft. moving to the next level?
116 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 TRL Definition Description Supporting Information
Results of testing the system in Technology has been proven to work its final configuration under the in its final form and under expected expected range of environmental Actual system conditions. In almost all cases, this conditions in which it will be completed and TRL represents the end of true system expected to operate. Assessment of 8 “flight qualified” development. Examples include whether it will meet its operational through test and developmental test and evaluation requirements. What problems, demonstration of the system in its intended if any, were encountered? What weapon system to determine if are/were the plans, options, it meets design specifications or actions to resolve problems before finalising the design?
Actual application of the technology Actual system in its final form and under mission “flight proven” conditions, such as those encountered 9 OT&E reports. through successful in operational test and evaluation. mission operations. Examples include using the system under operational mission conditions.
The following table supplements the nature of TRLs by defining some of the terms used in the description of the latter.
Term Definition
Integrated components that provide a representation of a system/subsystem and that can be used to determine concept feasibility and to develop technical data. Breadboard Typically configured for laboratory use to demonstrate the technical principles of immediate interest. May resemble final system/subsystem in function only
A functional form of a system, generally reduced in scale, near or at operational Model specification. Models will be sufficiently hardened to allow demonstration of the technical and operational capabilities required of the final system.
A physical or virtual model used to evaluate the technical or Prototype manufacturing feasibility or military utility of a particular technology or process, concept, end item, or system.
Simple element of the technology. The smallest subsystem giving a Component sufficient granularity to identify technical risks and opportunities. 5 Sub-element of an overall system which can be limited/ Subsystem defined in terms of functionality
All technical elements constituting the project and acting like System a single group in order to deliver a definite capacity. Appendices
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 117 Term Definition
Systematic activity, structured and progressive of test, validation and checking Integration out of the interactions between subsystems until the complete system.
Addresses form, fit, and function. A high-fidelity laboratory High fidelity environment would involve testing with equipment that can simulate and validate all system specifications within a laboratory setting
A representative of the component or system that has limited ability to Low fidelity provide anything but first-order information about the end product. Low-fidelity assessments are used to provide trend analysis.
Operational Environment that addresses all the operational requirements and environment specifications required of the final system to include platform/packaging
Testing environment that simulates the key aspects Relevant environment of the operational environment
Either (1) a real environment that can simulate all the operational requirements and specifications required of the final system or (2) a Simulated operational simulated environment that allows for testing of a virtual prototype. environment Used in either case to determine whether a developmental system meets the operational requirements and specifications of the final system
Bibliography : [1] Technology Readiness Levels, A White Paper. John C. Mankins, NASA, 1995. [2] Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA) Deskbook. DoD, May 2005. [3] TRL Corollaries for Practice-Based Technologies. Carnegie Mellon Software Institute, 2003.
118 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 APPENDIX II: GLOBAL PROJECTS
A methodology for describing global projects and those relating to the technological base is being generalised within DGA. The roadmaps drawn up are mainly of internal use. Some versions are distributed more widely such as that presented below as an illustration of the method. General presentation of unifying project A global project is documented by technical specifi cations and a roadmap. These documents make it possible to describe: - c apability requirements and environmental constraints in the broad sense. This level of description makes it possible to answer the question “why this unifying project?” - technological, industrial and cooperation objectives to reach in order to meet these needs. This level of description makes it possible to answer the question “which products to produce in order to meet the capability requirements?” - actions to carry out to reach these objectives. This level of description indicates how to proceed in order to obtain the products listed at the former stage
High-level Roadmap (RM) Why: Platforms Platforms, equipment and their milestones and equipment interested by Links product
Why stages/objectives RM constraints
RM programmes Objectives What: Technologies “Products” to realise in response to “why”:
DTIB, cooperation What Links RM primary action How: actions/products Technological breakthroughs: required action How
5 Appendices
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 119 Example of the TELESANTE unifying project The environment and the capability need (the “why?”) is described as follows WHY ?
Products to be produced in order to answer the capability requirements (the “what?”) are then identified: WHAT ?
Lastly, the actions to carry out to meet these aims (the “How?”) are determined: HOW ?
120 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 APPENDIX III TECHNOLOGICAL BASIS
The technological basis is structured by technical areas. It is documented by the industrial and technological sector orientations roadmaps for each area. Its content is divided into two parts: the fi rst relates to breakthrough technologies, the second relates to specifi c constraints (technical authority, for example). The construction of the technological basis requires initially to identify the potential technological breakthroughs likely to be of interest for future defence equipments. The roadmap then describes: - the platforms that could integrate new very low TRL technologies. This level of description makes it possible to answer the question “why study this technology?”. - attainable technological, industrial and cooperation objectives. This level of description makes it possible to answer the question “which products to produce in order to assert the feasibility of a breakthrough technology?” - actions to advance breakthrough technologies to a TRL of 4 or 5
High-level Roadmap (RM) Why: Platforms PlatePlatforms, equipment and their milestones and equipment interested by Links development Why stages/equipments RM stages of development, What: DTIB, cooperation Products” to realise in response to “why”:
What feasibility stages in development
Links actions/stages of development RM action How : Technological breakthroughs: required action How
5 Appendices
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 121 APPENDIX IV TECHNICAL AERAS AND ITS R&T ACTIVITIES
Systems of force Technical areas Technical fields Products (programmes) concerned No product segment Key areas of research, Tools simulation excluding upstream studies: methods (MOS) Systems engineering support for Architecture All systems SdS Systems of systems operations, SCCOA, Scorpion… Assessment of forces and programmes in of Systems of preparation phase Systems (AESS) Battle Lab experimentations SASF’s unifying projects
Fighting vehicles Special vehicles Architecture and Land platforms (PFT) Engagement General purpose vehicles AST techniques for Land combat and combat and equipment land systems systems (SCT) Combat systems Autonomous systems
Combat aircrafts Transport aircraft Specialised aircraft Helicopters Aeronautical Combat aircraft engines platforms (PFA) Deterrence Engines for transport of Architecture and Aeronautical Protection mobility aircraft and derived products ASA techniques for platforms and support Helicopter engines air systems propulsion (PRA) Engagement Auxiliary Power units Aeronautical combat and combat Avionics and man- systems (SCA) system integration Aircraft equipments Aircraft aeronautical support systems
Surface ships Submarines Energy-propulsion- Deterrence Naval platforms installations except nuclear Architecture and Protection mobility (PFN) steam supply systems ASN techniques for and support Naval combat Naval combat systems naval system Engagement systems (SCN) Underwater naval and and combat mine warfare including underwater weapons Nuclear steam supply systems
Operational Tactical systems of UAVs information Systems of long endurance UAVs systems (SIO) Exploitation stations for Architecture and Command and Space, observation, observation data ASC techniques for information intelligence and UAV Systems of information C3R systems superiority systems (EORD) by satellites Geophysical Production of geographical data environment (EN) Operational information systems
122 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 Systems of force Technical areas Technical fields Products (programmes) concerned
Information Information system All systems Cryptography equipment SSI system security security (SSI) of forces Computer security equipment
Architecture and services of telecommunication systems Infrastructure networks Satellite telecommunications Telecommunications All systems TEC Telecommunications systems (TEC) of forces Tactical radio networks IFF equipment Communications for strategic systems
Ballistic missiles Ramjet missiles Tactical and strategic Antisurface missiles missiles (MTS) Anti-aircraft missiles Propulsion, energetic Deterrence Missiles, weapons Homing heads and radomes and explosive Engagement and nuclear of tactical missiles MAN materials (PE) and combat techniques of charges and final effect Nuclear techniques Protection and defence of tactical missiles of defence (NUC) safeguard Propulsion of tactical missiles Weapons and Propulsion of ballistic missiles ammunition (ARM) Aeronautical bombs and mines Munitions, rockets and weapons
Defence CBRN Human sciences Protection CBRN Defence Systems SHP (NRBC) and protection safeguards Télésanté system Human sciences (SH)
Airborne surveillance radars Ground battlefield radars Ground-air surveillance radars Naval radars Combat aircraft radars ESM systems or functions Optronics (OP) (electronic surveillance) and Electromagnetic ECM (electronic attack) COM Sensors, guidance detection (DE) All systems ESM systems or functions CGN and navigation Electronic war(GE) of forces (electronic surveillance) radar Guidance- ECM systems or functions radar Navigation (GN) and self protection systems Guidance, navigation and dating systems, except for deterrence Common and land optronic equipment Airborne optronic equipment Naval optronic equipment
No product segments Support to programmes for: 5 Structural and engines materials, Materials and Materials (MA) All systems functional materials, specific MC components Components (CO) of forces processes, Electronic processing, electro-optical sensors, hardening, electrical engineering. Energy coordination Appendices
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 123 aPPENDIX V glossaRY
2D 2 Dimensions 3D 3 Dimensions ADC Analog-to-Digital Converters ABM Anti Ballistic Missile AFIS Association Française d’Ingénierie Système, French association for systems engineering AGATE Atelier de Gestion des Architectures Techniques (de SIO), Management workshop for technical architectures (of CCIS) ALTBMD Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence ANR Agence Nationale pour la Recherche, National Research Agency ANVAR Agence Nationale de Valorisation de la Recherche, National research promotion agency AQUA Country with qualified authority in Information system security ASA Architecture et techniques de Systèmes Aéronautiques, Architecture and techniques for aeronautical systems ASC Architecture et techniques de Systèmes C3R, Architecture and techniques for C3R systems ASIC Application Specific Integrated Circuit ASN Architecture et techniques de Systèmes Navals, Architecture and techniques for naval systems AST Architecture et techniques de Systèmes Terrestres, Architecture and techniques for land systems AST Architecture et techniques de Systèmes Terrestres, Architecture and techniques for land systems B and C Biological and Chemical BDI Battle Damage Information BEM Bâtiment d’Essais et de Mesures, Testing and measurements ship BOA Bulle Opérationnelle Aéroterrestre, Land system transformation research programm C3 Command, Control and Communication BOA Bulle Opérationnelle Aéroterrestre C-BML Coalition Battle Management Language C2 Commandement et Conduite C3 Command, Control and Communication C3R Commandement, Communication, Conduite et Renseignement, Command, Control, Conduct and Intelligence C4I Command, Control, Communication, Computer and Intelligence CAD Centre d'Analyse de Défense, Defence Analysis Centre, part of DGA CBML Coalition Battle Management Language CBRN : Chemical, Bacteriological, Radiological, and Nuclear CCD Charge-Coupled Device CCIS or CIS Command and Control Information Systems CCRE Conseil Consultatif des Recherches et Etudes, ISL Research and study consultation council
124 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 CD&E Conception, Développement et Expérimentation, Concept, Development and Experimentation CEA Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique, French atomic energy centre CEA/DAM CEA/Direction des Applications Militaires, CEA/Military Applications Division CGN Capteurs, Guidage et Navigation, Sensors, Guidance and Navigation CGP Coût Global de Possession, Overall ownership cost CIADIOS Centre Interarmées d’Administration De l’Interopérabilité Opérationnelle des Systèmes d’information et de communication, Joint centre for the administration of the operational interoperability of IT and communications systems CIDEF Conseil des Industries de Défense Françaises, French Defence Industries Council CMC Composites with Ceramic matrix CMOS Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor CNES Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales, French national space research centre CNI Communication Navigation Identification CNRS Centre National pour la Recherche Scientifique, National Centre for Scientific Research COM Contrat d’Objectifs et de Moyens (ONERA), Objectives and Means Contract COMINT Communication Intelligence COP Common Operational Picture CNRS Centre National pour la Recherche Scientifique COP Common Operationnal Picture COS Commandement des Opérations Spéciales Special Operations Command COTS Commercial Off The Shelf CTA Case Telescope Ammunition CTFSIA Défense Anti- Missile Balistique CVG Coriolis Vibrating Gyro DAC Digital-to-Analog Converters DAMB Défense Anti-Missile Balistique, Anti-Ballistic Missiles Defence DE Détection Electromagnétique, Electromagnetic detection DGA Direction Générale de l’Armement, Directorate General of Armaments DGCIS Direction Générale de la compétitivité, de l’Industrie et des Services, Directorate for Competitiveness, Industry and Services, part of … DGIWG Working Group DGSIC Direction Générale des Systèmes d’Information et de Communication, Directorate for Information and Communications Systems, part of … DIRCM Directed Infrared Counter Measures DLR Deutsche Forschunganstalt für Luft und Raumfahrt, Germany DNG3D Données Numériques Géographiques et 3 Dimensions, Geographical and 3D Digital Data DoD US Department of Defense DRAM Dommages dus aux Rayonnements électromagnétiques sur les systèmes d’Armes et les Munitions, Damage induced by radiation on weapons and ammunition 5 DRI Détection Reconnaissance Identification, Detection Reconnaissance Identification DSL Domain Specific Language DTIB Defence Technological and Industrial Base Appendices
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 125 E/R Emission/Réception, Emission/Reception eb XML Electronic Business using extensible markup language ECCM Electronic Counter Counter-Measures ECM Electronic Counter-Measures EDA European Defence Agency EHF Extremely High Frequency ElInt Electromagnetic Intelligence EM Electromagnetic EMA Etat-Major des Armées, Joint Chiefs of Staff EN Geophysical environment ENSIETA Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Ingénieurs des Etudes et Techniques d’Armement, Armament engineering College ENSTA Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Techniques Avancées, Armament engineering College EORD Espace, Observation, Renseignement et systems de Drones, Space, Observation, Intelligence and UAV systems ESA European Space Agency ESM Electronic Support Measures ESRP European Security Research Programme ESSOR European Secured Software Defined Radio Referential EU European Union EVF Evasion de Fréquence, Frequency evasion FHSS Frequency-Hopping Spread Spectrum FIDES Guide allowing estimated reliability calculation for electronic components and systems FPGA Field Programmable Gate Array FR France FUI Fond Unique Interministériel, Single interministerial fund GaAs Gallium arsenide Galilleo European service of navigation by satellite for civilian and commercial use GaN Gallium nitride GE Guerre Electromagnétique, Electromagnetic warfare GHOM Géographie Hydro Océano Météorologique, Hydro-, Oceano- and Meteorological Geography GHz GigaHertz GIFAS Groupe des Industries Françaises Aéronautiques et Spatiales, French Aeronautical and Spatial Industries Group GMES Global Monitoring on Environment and Security programme GMTI Ground Moving Target Indicator GN Guidance - Navigation GPS Global Positioning System GRAVES Grand Réseau Adapté à la Veille Spatiale, Major network suitable for spatial monitoring GRID Grid computing HAIPIS High Assurance Internet Protocol Interoperability Specification HEDM High Energy Density Materials
126 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 HF High frequency HLA High Level Architectures HPM High Power Microwaves HRG Hemispherical resonator gyrometer HSCT Hygiène, Sécurité et Conditions de Travail, Hygiene, safety and working conditions HumInt Human Intelligence HVUHF High, Very, and Ultra High Frequency IBEO Illustrateur de Besoins d’Exploitation Opérationnelle, Operational application needs illustration ICET Innovative Concept and Emerging Technologies IED Improvised Explosive Device IETF Internet Engineering Task Force IFF Identification Friend or Foe, IGN Institut Géographique National, French National Geographical Institute IHM Interface Homme Machine, Man Machine Interface (MMI) II Image Intensifier , IL Intensificateur de Lumière, i-MEMS Inertial Micro Electro-Mechanical Systems INRIA Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatisme, French national institute for IT and automation research IP Internet Protocol IPM Integrated Power Module IPR Intellectual Property Rules IPSEC Internet Protocol Secure IPv6 Internet Protocol version 6 IR Infra-Red IRM Intelligent Radar Management ISAE Institut Supérieur de l’Aéronautique et de l’Espace, Aeronautics and Space Institute ISAR Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar ISL Institut franco-allemand de Saint Louis, French-German Institute of Saint Louis ISS In Service Support ITP Innovation Technology Partnership IVVQ Integration, Verification, Validation and Qualification JC3IEDM Joint C3 Information Exchange Data Model JIP Joint Investment Programme (EDA) JTRS Joint Tactical Radio System LAN Local Area Network LDT Liaison de Données Tactique, Tactical Data Link LIBS Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy LID Lutte Informatique Défensive, Computer defence LIDAR LIght Detection and Ranging 5 LIDAR Light Infrared Detection And Ranging LIF Laser Induced Fluorescence LOLF Loi Organique relative aux Lois de Finance, French Budget Law LPM Loi de Programmation Militaire, Military Planning Law Appendices
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 127 LTO Laboratoire Technico-Opérationnel, French MoD Battle Lab M88 Engine of the Rafale MAN Missiles, Armes et techniques Nucléaires de défense, Missiles, weapons and nuclear techniques of defence MANET Mobile Ad-Hoc Network MC Matériaux et composants, Materials and Components MEEDDM Ministère de l'écologie, de l'énergie, du développement durable et de la mer, Ministry of ecology, energy, sustainable development and the sea. MEMS Micro-Electro-Mechanical Systems MGCP Multinational Geospatial Coproduction Programme MIDCAS MID-air Collision Avoidance System MIDS Multi functional Information Distribution System MIRES Mission Interministérielle pour la Recherche et l’Enseignement Supérieur, Interministerial Mission for Research and Higher Education MMI : Man-Machine Interface MMIC Monolithic Microwave Integrated Circuit MNE MultiNational Exercise MOD Ministry Of Defence MOS Méthodes, Outils et Simulations, Methods, Tools, Simulations MPIA Modèle Pivot Inter Armées, Joint information exchange datamodel MRCM Multi-Role Combat Missile MSG Meteosat Second Generation MTI Moving Target Indicator MTMD Maritime Theatre Missile Defence MUSIS Multinational Space-based Imaging System NAF NATO Architecture Framework NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NAVWAR Navigation Warfare NCA Noeud de Communication Aéroporté, Airborne Node of communication NCES Net-Centric Enterprise Services NCW Network Centric Warfare NEMO NEtwork MObility protocol NLOS Not in Line of Sight NNEC NATO Network Enabled Capability NRBC Nuclear, Radiological, Bacteriological and Chemical (CBRN) NTIC Nouvelles Technologies de l’Information et de la Communication, New technologies of information and communication NURC NATO Undersea Research Centre ONERA Office National d’Etudes et de Recherches Aérospatiales, National office for aerospace studies and research OP Optronics OPEX Opérations Extérieures, External Operations OSEO Public institution: OSEO was born in 2005, by bringing together ANVAR (French innovation agency) and BDPME (SME development bank) OTAN Organisation du Traité de l’Atlantique Nord, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
128 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 PASR Preparatory Action on the enhancement of the European industrial potential in the field of Security Research (European Commission) PCRD Programme Communautaire de Recherche et Développement, European R&D framework programme PEA Programme d’Etudes Amont, R&T programme PERS Programme Européen de Recherche et de Sécurité, European Security Research Programme (ESRP) PF Projets Fédérateurs, Global projects PHOENIX Experimental land combat battle lab PME Petites et Moyennes Entreprises, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SME) POS document Politique et Objectifs Scientifiques, Basic Research Policy PP30 Plan Prospectif à 30 ans, 30-year Plan PRS Public Regulated Service PS R&T Plan Stratégique Recherches et Technologies de défense et de sécurité, Strategic plan for research and technology in defence and security QoS Quality of Service Quaero A collaborative program aiming at the development of new tools for navigation in large volumes of audiovisual content. R&D Research and Development R&T Research and Technology RAM Rockets, Artillery & Mortars (counter RAM) RAPID Régime d'Appui aux PME pour l'Innovation Duale, System of support to SMEs for Dual Innovation RBC Radiological, Bacteriological and Chemical RDFP Research and Development Framework Program REACH Registration, Evaluation and Authorisation of Chemicals RECO NG Reconnaissance de nouvelle génération, New generation reconnaissance pod REI Recherche Exploratoire et Innovation, Exploratory research and innovation REP Recognised Environment Picture RETEX Retour d’Expérience, lessons learned RFID Radio Frequency Identification RoHS Restriction of use of certain Hazardous Substances in electronic equipment RTO NATO Research & Technology Organisation SA2R Surveillance, Acquisition de cibles, Reconnaissance et Renseignement, Surveillance, target acquisition, reconnaissance and intelligence SAMP/T Sol-Air Moyenne Portée Terrestre, Land ground to air midrange missile SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar SATCOMS Satellite Communications SCA Software Communication Architecture SCIP Secure Communication and Interoperability Protocol SCN Systèmes de Combat Navals, Naval combat system SdS Systèmes de Systèmes, Systems of systems (SoS) 5 SDR Software Define radio SEAD Suppression of Enemy Air Defence SEDRIS Synthetic Environment Data Representation & Interchange Specification SGDN Secrétariat Général à la Défense Nationale, General Secretariat of National Defence (Prime Minister) Appendices
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 129 SH Sciences de l’Homme, Human sciences SHF Super High Frequency SHOM Service Hydrographique et Océanographique de la Marine, Marine hydrographic and oceanographic service SHP Sciences de l’homme et protection, Human sciences and protection SIO Systèmes d’Information Opérationnels, Operational information systems SIP Software Integration Plan SLA Service Level Agreement SLAMF Système de Lutte Anti Mines Futur, Future mine warfare system SME Small and Medium-sized Enterprises SOA Service Oriented Architecture SoC System on the Chip SoS Systems of Systems SPIRALE Système Préparatoire Infra-Rouge pour l’ALErte, Infra-red prototype system for alert SSA Service de Santé des Armées, French MoD Medical Service SSBM SSI Sécurité des Systèmes d’Information, Information systems security STANAG Standardisation Agreement STAP Spatial and Time Adaptative Processing T/R Transmission/Reception TCP/IP Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol TEC Telecommunications THR Très Haute Résolution, Very high resolution Thz TeraHertz TM Telemeter TMPAM Têtes Militaires Polyvalentes à Allumages Multi-points, Polyvalent multi-point initiation warheads TP 400 Turbopropellant of the A 400 M TRELIBS Time Resolved Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy TRL Technology Readiness Level TSV Technologie de Souveraineté, Sovereignty technology UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle UCAV Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle UHF Ultra-High Frequency USAR Unmanned aerial vehicle Systems Airworthiness Requirements USV Unmanned Surface Vehicle UUV Unmanned Underwater Vehicle UV Ultra-Violet UVs Unmanned Vehicles VBA Vibration Beam Accelerator VBCI Véhicule Blindé de Combat d’Infanterie, Armoured infantry combat vehicle VHF Very High Frequency VPN Virtual Private Network VTOL Vertical Take Off and Landing VVA Validation, Verification, Accreditation
130 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 WAN Wide Area Network WIFI Wireless Fidelity WIMAX Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave access XML Extensible Markup Language XML-IA Extensible Markup Language – Inter-army XSMTP Extensible Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
5 Appendices
Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 131 aPPENDIX VI DIFFERENT DGA LOCATIONS
This map shows the location of the different sites of DGA in France:
DGA Hydrodynamics (Val de Reuil) LRBA (Vernon) DGA Engineering and Integration GESMA DGA Aero-engine Testing (Bagneux) DGA Naval Systems (Saclay) (Brest) DGA Information Superiority DGA CBRN Defence (Rennes) (Vert le Petit)
ETAS DGA Land Systems DGA Land Systems (Bourges) (Angers)
CAEPE (Saint Médard)
DGA Flight Testing (Cazaux) DGA Missiles Testing (Biscarrosse) DGA Flight Testing (Istres) DGA Aeronautical Systems (Toulouse) DGA Naval Systems (Toulon) DGA Missiles Testing (Toulon + Île du Levant)
132 Strategic Plan for Research & Technology in defence and security • DGA 2009 SATISFACTION SURVEY
This questionnaire is aimed at improving the dialogue and tools set up by DGA as regards R&T To be returned to DGA/DS/SRTS fax no. = 33 (0)1 46 19 76 14) or mail: [email protected]
Organisation: :
DGA ❑ Military ❑
Administration ❑ indicate which one
Industrial prime contractor ❑ SME ❑ Research institute ❑
You are: French ❑ European ❑ Other country ❑
Which are your principal uses of this document? - It is a useful information document on the activity of DGA in technical areas other than mine or on transversal topics ❑ - It is an important information memorandum without being essential, which enables me to place my R&T activities with respect to the needs of DGA ❑ - It is an essential document, a systematic reference for each R&T meeting in which I take part with DGA ❑
Compared to the other reference documents on defence strategy, is the role of the PS R&T clear to you? - with regard to the 30-year plan (PP30): well-defined ❑ to specify ❑ - with regard to the basic research policy document (POS): well-defined ❑ to specify ❑ - with regard to other documents (space policy, etc.): well-defined ❑ to specify ❑ Areas of improvement
Appreciation of the various chapters: Chapter II issues: essential ❑ useful ❑ information available elsewhere ❑ Chapter III implementation of the PS R&T essential ❑ useful ❑ information available elsewhere ❑ Chapter IV technological analyses essential ❑ useful ❑ information available elsewhere ❑
Areas of work by divisions: Clear vision of the areas of work ❑ quite useful information ❑ does not address real R&T issues ❑ Technology tables: wording indicating the priorities: clear ❑ too precise ❑ not precise enough ❑ comprehension of expectations regarding cooperation: clear ❑ to improve ❑ comprehension of expectations regarding national capabilities: clear ❑ to improve ❑
Priority technology lists: sufficient ❑ too exhaustive ❑ too selective ❑ Comments (including other information that could be featured):
Innovation policy: Convincing ❑ clear ❑ not detailed enough ❑ not clear ❑ Presentation of the means implemented by defence: Convincing ❑ clear ❑ not detailed enough ❑ not clear ❑ Comments
Continuation of the dialogue with the ministry regarding R&T: After publication of the PS R&T, which are the topics that you consider a new R&T document should address? (please note by decreasing order of priority from 1 to 8 where 1 is high priority and 8 is low priority): Concrete implementation of the R&T strategy ❑ Transformation of operational needs into technological needs ❑ Representation of needs in priority technologies ❑ Global project ❑ Tools and methods of the ministry as regards R&T (procurement, etc.) ❑ Specify which: Policy of the ministry with respect to technological breakthroughs ❑ Cooperation ❑ National capabilities ❑ Relationship to civilian researche ❑ Other: :
Your general satisfaction with the publication of the PS R&T: Very Satisfactory ❑ Satisfactory ❑ Positioning to improve ❑ Disappointing ❑ COMMENTS : Service desrecherches ettechnologiesdedéfense etdesécurité Public procurementportal:www.achats.defense.gouv.fr The DGA’s ownwebsite:www.defense.gouv.fr/dga Industry portal:www.ixarm.com D irection 92 221Bagneux Cedex-France 7 ruedesMathurins
générale
de
l ’ armement
DGA Comm - 02 - 04.2010