Naval War College Review Volume 59 Article 17 Number 3 Summer

2006 Forging the Shield: Eisenhower and National Security for the 21st Century, Douglas Kinnard

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Recommended Citation Kinnard, Douglas (2006) "Forging the Shield: Eisenhower and National Security for the 21st Century,," Review: Vol. 59 : No. 3 , Article 17. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss3/17

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154 NAVALKinnard: WAR Forging COLLEGE the REVIEW Shield: Eisenhower and National Security for the 21st

War.” It was a conflict that Eisenhower inherited when elected and one that he knew he had to end. Millet traces Ike’s Showalter, Dennis E., ed. Forging the Shield: Eisenhower and National Security for the 21st indirect involvement from the period Century. Chicago: Imprint, 2005. 236pp. $24.95 when he was chief of staff after World War II until his pledge in the 1952 cam- Dwight D. Eisenhower’s greatest paign that if elected “I shall go to Korea,” achievement as president came in the a pledge that Eisenhower understood area of foreign policy and related de- needed rapid redemption. fense matters. In the making and man- aging of strategic policy he was a strong, With considerable insight Millet traces active, and effective leader. This book is Eisenhower’s efforts to end the war and an uneven collection of essays devoted provide a defense policy for the long to Eisenhower’s presidential influence haul, based on concepts that Ike later on foreign policy and national security, set forth in his memoir. These concepts essays that were presented at a sympo- relied on deterrence, stressed the role of sium held in January 2005 at the Na- nuclear technology, placed heavy reli- tional Defense University. ance on allied land forces around the Soviet periphery, and emphasized eco- The lead paper, “Reflections on Eisen- nomic strength through reduced de- hower, the , and My Father,” fense budgets. The outcome was the by Sergei N. Khrushchev, provides an New Look strategy of the 1950s. interesting recollection of ’s attitude toward Eisen- R. Cargill Hall’s essay, “Clandestine hower and the United States. According Victory,” is a competent account of the to Sergei Khrushchev, a Brown Univer- development of increasingly sophisti- sity professor and himself a veteran of cated aircraft and early satellites tasked the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces, his with aerial surveillance and of the intel- father, like many veterans of the “Great ligence they provided, as well as of their Patriotic War,” viewed Eisenhower as a influence on decision making. How- former comrade in arms and thus wel- ever, the paper deteriorates into an ar- comed his election as president. The el- gument for further eye-in-the-sky der Khrushchev was highly respectful of commitments to counter twenty-first- the danger posed by potential nuclear century terrorism. Hall’s argument war and sought only equality in relations seems more public relations for an in- with the United States and the Eisen- stitutional constituency than a reasoned hower administration. Questions emerge scholarly analysis and conclusion. Ter- as to how much new information Sergei rorism, at its most effective and fright- Khrushchev’s memoir-analysis reveals, ening, depends on surreptitious and how much is a son’s defense of a individual initiatives that in general father. However, to a large segment of defy large-scale overhead surveillance. students, Professor Khrushchev’s reflec- One area that perhaps could have been tions provide an interesting look at the developed more explicitly is Eisen- key foreign power’s opposing viewpoint hower’s role and technique in control- during the Eisenhower presidency. ling the defense budgetary process and The collection’s strongest work is Alan strategic dialogue within his adminis- Millet’s “Eisenhower and the Korean tration. His principal secretaries of

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Naval War College Review, Vol. 59 [2006], No. 3, Art. 17 BOOK REVIEWS 155

defense were functionalists, and Eisen- of the Japanese political system and the hower viewed their primary role as one evolution of both interservice rivalries of keeping the Pentagon programs and civil-military relations in the de- within the budget, which was important cades preceding World War II. He bases for carrying out his conservative fiscal his history on an impressive reading of goals. On strategic matters, Eisenhower Japanese and English-language primary dealt directly with the chairman of the and secondary sources to produce a Joint Chiefs of Staff and thus usurped story with political implications far be- an important portion of the secretary of yond the history of one service. defense’s role. He respected his secre- When the Meiji reformers took power taries as businessmen but in effect in- in 1868, their minimal naval forces sisted on being his own secretary of were part of their land forces. In 1871, defense. over the objections of the army, the Thematic throughout this collection is a Military Ministry was subdivided into focus on Asia and Europe. By stressing two ministries, army and navy. In order Eisenhower’s response to grand strategy, to secure funding to create a modern relations with , the interrela- fleet, the navy soon allied with the Sat- tionship of politico-military-industrial suma clans, while clans from ChÇshÇ and techno-scientific affairs, and trou- were already allied with the army. ble spots in Eastern Europe, the Middle Together these clans brought the Meiji East, and Asia, the book ignores the reformers to power. The opening of the twenty-first-century challenges posed Diet in 1890 brought fears among the for contemporary U.S. defense and for- clans that democracy would erode their eign policy in the Southern Hemi- power. Therefore, they solidified their sphere—Africa and Latin America. ties with the army and navy. Thus For the sophisticated and knowledge- highly politicized interservice rivalries able scholar, Forging the Shield likely were inherent in the Japanese political contains little new information, but it system. will prove valuable to defense policy Initial Diets were hostile to military and military history students needing funding. War with China in 1894–95, exposure to the Eisenhower era. however, transformed the public per- ception of the navy from a financial DOUGLAS KINNARD author of President Eisenhower burden into a service vital to Japan’s and Strategy Management national security and domestic prosper- ity. This, combined with the large war indemnity from China, produced mas- sive naval budgetary increases. The na- val mission expanded from defense of Schencking, J. Charles. Making Waves: Politics, the home islands to command of the Propaganda, and the Emergence of the Imperial sea and defense of the empire. The Japanese Navy, 1868–1922. Stanford, Calif.: Stan- navy continued to press for a combat ford Univ. Press, 2005. 283pp. $57.95 mission independent of the army, Charles Schencking, in charting Japan’s which retained responsibility for na- creation of the world’s third-largest tional defense and command over navy by 1922, illuminates the workings naval forces in wartime. Interservice

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