Alasdair MacIntyre

Alasdair Chalmers MacIntyre (born 1929) is a • Arts & Sciences Professor of Philosophy, Duke Scottish[1] philosopher primarily known for his contri- University (1995–1997). bution to moral and political philosophy but known also for his work in history of philosophy and theology. He He has also been a visiting professor at Princeton Univer- is Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Contempo- sity, and is a former president of the American Philosoph- rary Aristotelian Studies in Ethics and Politics (CASEP) ical Association. In 2010, he was awarded the Aquinas at London Metropolitan University, and an Emeritus Pro- Medal by the American Catholic Philosophical Associa- fessor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame. tion. During his lengthy academic career, he also taught at Brandeis University, Duke University, Vanderbilt Uni- From 2000 he was the Rev. John A. O'Brien Senior Re- versity, and Boston University. Macintyre’s After Virtue search Professor in the Department of Philosophy (emer- (1981) is widely recognised as one of the most impor- itus since 2010) at the University of Notre Dame, Indiana tant works of Anglophone political philosophy in the 20th USA. He is also Professor Emerit and Emeritus at Duke century.[2] University. In April 2005 he was elected to the American Philosophical Society, and in July 2010 became Senior Research Fellow at London Metropolitan University's 1 Biography Centre for Contemporary Aristotelian Studies in Ethics and Politics. MacIntyre was born on 12 January 1929 in Glasgow, to He has been married 3 times. From 1953 to 1963 he was John and Emily (Chalmers) MacIntyre. He was edu- married to Ann Peri, with whom he had two daughters. cated at Queen Mary College, London, and has a Mas- From 1963 to 1977 he was married to Susan Willans, ter of Arts from the University of Manchester and from with whom he had a son and daughter. Since 1977 he has the University of Oxford. He began his teaching ca- been married to philosopher Lynn Joy, who is also on the reer in 1951 at Manchester University.[3] He taught at Philosophy faculty at Notre Dame. the University of Leeds, the University of Essex and the University of Oxford in the United Kingdom, be- fore moving to the US in around 1969. MacIntyre has 2 Philosophical approach been something of an intellectual nomad, having taught at many universities in the US. He has held the following positions: MacIntyre’s approach to moral philosophy has a number of complex strains that inform it. Although his project • Professor of History and Ideas, Brandeis University is largely characterised by an attempt to revive an Aris- (1969 or 1970), totelian conception of moral philosophy as sustained by the virtues, he nevertheless describes his own account of • Dean of the College of Arts and Professor of Phi- this attempt as a “peculiarly modern understanding” of losophy, Boston University (1972), the task.[4] • Henry Luce Professor, Wellesley College (1980), This “peculiarly modern understanding” largely concerns MacIntyre’s approach to moral disputes. Unlike some • W. Alton Jones Professor, Vanderbilt University analytic philosophers who try to generate moral con- (1982), sensus on the basis of an ideal of rationality, MacIn- • Professor of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame tyre presents a historical narration of the development of (1985), ethics to illuminate the modern problem of “incommen- surable” moral notions—i.e., notions whose value can not • Professor of Philosophy, Vanderbilt University be reduced to a common measure. Following Hegel and (1985), Collingwood he offers a “philosophical history” (which he distinguishes from both analytical and phenomenolog- • Visiting scholar, Whitney Humanities Center, Yale ical approaches to philosophy) in which he concedes from University (1988), the beginning that “there are no neutral standards avail- • McMahon-Hank Professor of Philosophy, Notre able by appeal to which any rational agent whatsoever Dame (1989), and could determine” the conclusions of moral philosophy.[5]

1 2 3 MAJOR WRITINGS

Indeed, one of MacIntyre’s major points in his most fa- MacIntyre was inspired to change the entire direction mous work, After Virtue, is that the failed attempt by of his thought, tearing up the manuscript he had been various Enlightenment thinkers to furnish a final univer- working on and deciding to view the problems of modern sal account of moral rationality led to the rejection of moral and political philosophy “not from the standpoint moral rationality altogether by subsequent thinkers such of liberal modernity, but instead from the standpoint of as Charles Stevenson, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Friedrich Ni- ... Aristotelian moral and political practice.”[9] etzsche. On MacIntyre’s account, it is especially Niet- In general terms, the task of After Virtue is to account zsche’s utter repudiation of the possibility of moral ratio- both for the dysfunctional quality of moral discourse nality that is the outcome of the Enlightenment’s mistaken within modern society and rehabilitate what MacIntyre quest for a final and definitive argument that will settle takes to be a forgotten alternative in the teleological ratio- moral disputes into perpetuity by power of a calculative [6] nality of Aristotelian virtue ethics. MacIntyre’s thought reason alone and without use of teleology. is revolutionary as it articulates a politics of self-defence By contrast, MacIntyre is concerned with reclaiming var- for local communities that aspire to protect their practices ious forms of moral rationality and argumentation that and sustain their way of life from corrosive effects of the claim neither ultimate finality nor incorrigible certainty capitalist economy.[10] (the mistaken project of the Enlightenment), but nev- ertheless do not simply bottom out into relativistic or emotivist denials of any moral rationality whatsoever (ac- 3.2 Whose Justice? Which Rationality? cording to him, the mistaken conclusion of Nietzsche, (1988) Sartre, and Stevenson). He does this by returning to the tradition of Aristotelian ethics with its teleological ac- Main article: Whose Justice? Which Rationality? count of the good and moral persons, which was origi- nally rejected by the Enlightenment and which reached MacIntyre’s second major work of his mature period a fuller articulation in the medieval writings of Thomas takes up the problem of giving an account of philosoph- Aquinas. This Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, he pro- ical rationality within the context of his notion of “tra- poses, presents “the best theory so far,” both of how ditions,” which had still remained under-theorized in Af- things are and how we ought to act. ter Virtue. Specifically, MacIntyre argues that rival and More generally, according to MacIntyre, it is the case largely incompatible conceptions of justice are the out- that moral disputes always take place within and between come of rival and largely incompatible forms of practi- rival traditions of thought that make recourse to a store cal rationality. These competing forms of practical ra- of ideas, presuppositions, types of arguments and shared tionality and their attendant ideas of justice are in turn understandings and approaches that have been inherited the result of “socially embodied traditions of rational from the past. Thus even though there is no definitive inquiry.”[11] Although MacIntyre’s treatment of traditions way for one tradition in moral philosophy to vanquish is quite complex he does give a relatively concise def- and exclude the possibility of another, nevertheless op- inition: “A tradition is an argument extended through posing views can call one another into question by vari- time in which certain fundamental agreements are de- ous means including issues of internal coherence, imag- fined and redefined” in terms of both internal and external inative reconstruction of dilemmas, epistemic crisis, and debates.[12] [7] fruitfulness. Much of Whose Justice? Which Rationality? is there- fore engaged in the task of not only giving the reader ex- amples of actual rival traditions and the different ways 3 Major writings they can split apart, integrate, or defeat one another (e.g. Aristotelian, Augustinian, Thomist, Humean) but also with substantiating how practical rationality and a con- 3.1 After Virtue (1981) ception of justice help constitute those traditions. Mac- Intyre argues that despite their incommensurability there Main article: After Virtue are various ways in which alien traditions might engage one another rationally – most especially via a form of im- Probably his most widely read work, After Virtue was manent critique which makes use of empathetic imagina- written when MacIntyre was already in his fifties. Up un- tion to then put the rival tradition into “epistemic crisis” til that time, MacIntyre had been a relatively influential but also by being able to solve shared or analogous prob- lems and dilemmas from within one’s own tradition which analytic philosopher of a Marxist bent whose inquiries [13] into moral philosophy had been conducted in a “piece- remain insoluble from the rival approach. meal way, focusing first on this problem and then on that, MacIntyre’s account also defends three further theses: in a mode characteristic of much analytic philosophy.”[8] first, that all rational human inquiry is conducted whether However, after reading the works of Thomas Kuhn and knowingly or not from within a tradition; second, that the Imre Lakatos on philosophy of science and epistemology, incommensurable conceptual schemes of rival traditions 3

do not entail either relativism or perspectivism; third, that central thesis of this book that the virtues that although the arguments of the book are themselves at- we need, if we are to develop from our ani- tempts at universally valid insights they are nevertheless mal condition into that of independent rational given from within a particular tradition (that of Thomist agents, and the virtues that we need, if we are to Aristotelianism) and that this need not imply any philo- confront and respond to vulnerability and dis- sophical inconsistency. ability both in ourselves and in others, belong to one and the same set of virtues, the distinc- tive virtues of dependent rational animals”[15] 3.3 Three Rival Versions of Moral Inquiry (1990) Engaging with scientific texts on human biology as well as works of philosophical anthropology, MacIntyre iden- Three Rival Versions of Moral Inquiry was first presented tifies the human species as existing on a continuous scale by MacIntyre as part of the Gifford lecture series at the of both intelligence and dependency with other animals University of Edinburgh in 1988 and is considered by such as dolphins. One of his main goals is to undermine many the third part in a trilogy of philosophical argu- what he sees as the fiction of the disembodied, indepen- mentation that commenced with After Virtue. As its ti- dent reasoner who determines ethical and moral ques- tle implies, MacIntyre’s aim in this book is to examine tions autonomously and what he calls the “illusion of self- three major rival traditions of moral inquiry on the in- sufficiency” that runs through much of Western ethics cul- tellectual scene today (encyclopaedic, genealogical and minating in Nietzsche's Übermensch.[16] In its place he traditional) which each in turn was given defence from tries to show that our embodied dependencies are a defini- a canonical piece published in the late nineteenth cen- tive characteristic of our species and reveal the need for tury (the Ninth Edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica, certain kinds of virtuous dispositions if we are ever to Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals and Pope Leo XIII's flourish into independent reasoners capable of weighing Aeterni Patris, respectively). MacIntyre’s book ultimately the intellectual intricacies of moral philosophy in the first conducts a complex series of both interior and exterior place. critiques of the encyclopaedic and genealogical positions in an attempt to vindicate philosophical Thomism as the most persuasive form of moral inquiry currently on offer. 4 Virtue ethics His critique in chapter IX of Nietzsche's and Foucault's genealogical mode as implicitly committed to an eman- cipatory and continuous notion of self which they cannot MacIntyre is a key figure in the recent surge of interest account for on their own terms has been of particular in- in virtue ethics, which identifies the central question of fluence. morality as having to do with the habits and knowledge concerning how to live a good life. His approach seeks to demonstrate that good judgment emanates from good 3.4 Dependent Rational Animals (1999) character. Being a good person is not about seeking to follow formal rules. In elaborating this approach, MacIn- While After Virtue attempted to give an account of the tyre understands himself to be reworking the Aristotelian virtues exclusively by recourse to social practices and the idea of an ethical teleology. understanding of individual selves in light of “quests” MacIntyre emphasises the importance of moral and “traditions,” Dependent Rational Animals was a self- goods defined in respect to a community engaged conscious effort by MacIntyre to ground virtues in an ac- in a 'practice'—which he calls 'internal goods’ or count of biology. MacIntyre writes the following of this 'goods of excellence'—rather than focusing on shift in the Preface to the book: “Although there is indeed practice-independent obligation of a moral agent good reason to repudiate important elements in Aristo- (deontological ethics) or the consequences of a partic- tle’s biology, I now judge that I was in error in supposing ular act (utilitarianism). Before its recent resurgence, [14] an ethics independent of biology to be possible.” virtue ethics in European/American academia had been More specifically, Dependent Rational Animals tries to primarily associated with pre-modern philosophers make a holistic case on the basis of our best current (e.g. Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas). MacIntyre has knowledge (as opposed to an ahistorical, foundational argued that Aquinas' synthesis of Augustinianism with claim) that “human vulnerability and disability” are the Aristotelianism is more insightful than modern moral “central features of human life” and that Thomistic theories by focusing upon the telos ('end', or completion) “virtues of dependency” are needed for individual human of a social practice and of a human life, within the beings to flourish in their passage from stages of infancy context of which the morality of acts may be evaluated. to adulthood and old age.[9] As MacIntyre puts it: His seminal work in the area of virtue ethics can be found in his 1981 book, After Virtue. “It is most often to others that we owe our MacIntyre intends the idea of virtue to supplement, rather survival, let alone our flourishing ... It will be a than replace, moral rules. Indeed, he describes certain 4 7 BIBLIOGRAPHY

moral rules as 'exceptionless’ or unconditional. MacIn- nomenological instead of being analytic, and the focus is tyre considers his work to be outside “virtue ethics” due on ontology rather than moral philosophy. to his affirmation of virtues as embedded in specific, his- [17] Fuller accounts of MacIntyre’s view of the relationship torically grounded, social practices. between philosophy and religion in general and Thomism and Catholicism in particular can be found in his essays “Philosophy recalled to its tasks” and “Truth as a good” 5 Politics (both found in the collection The Tasks of Philosophy) as well as in the survey of the Catholic philosophical tradi- [22] Politically, MacIntyre’s ethics informs a defence of the tion he gives in God, Philosophy and Universities. Aristotelian 'goods of excellence' internal to practices against the modern pursuit of 'external goods’, such as money, power, and status, that are characteristic of rule- 7 Bibliography based, utilitarian, Weberian modern institutions. He has been described as a 'revolutionary Aristotelian' because • 1953. Marxism: An Interpretation. London: SCM of his attempt to combine historical insights from his Press, 1953. Marxist past with those of Aquinas and Aristotle after his conversion to Catholicism. For him, liberalism and • 1955 (edited with Antony Flew). New Essays in postmodern consumerism not only justify capitalism but Philosophical Theology. London: SCM Press. sustain and inform it over the long term. At the same time, he says, “Marxists have always fallen back into rel- • 1966 A Short History of Ethics. London and New atively straightforward versions of Kantianism or utili- York: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Second edition tarianism” and criticises Marxism as just another form 1998. of radical individualism, saying about Marxists, “as they move towards power they always tend to become We- • 2004 (1958). The Unconscious: A Conceptual Anal- berians.” It is this reality of modern individualism in all ysis, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. its forms that gives MacIntyre’s critique its urgency and • power. Informed by this critique, Aristotelianism loses 1959. Difficulties in Christian Belief. London: SCM its sense of elitist complacency; moral excellence ceases Press. to be part of a particular, historical practice in ancient • 1965. Hume’s Ethical Writings. (ed.) New York: Greece and becomes a universal quality of those who un- Collier. derstand that good judgment emanates from good charac- ter. It has been argued that MacIntyre’s thought is unable • 1967. Secularization and Moral Change. The to provide a coherent and effective model for a justifiable Riddell Memorial Lectures. Oxford University and politically stable political order, due to its neglect of Press. political theology.[18] • 1969 (with Paul Ricoeur). The Religious Signifi- cance of Atheism. New York: Columbia University 6 Religion Press. • 1970. Herbert Marcuse: An Exposition and a MacIntyre converted to Roman Catholicism in the early Polemic. New York: The Viking Press. 1980s, and now does his work against the background of what he calls an "Augustinian Thomist approach to • 1970. Marcuse. London: Fontana Modern Masters. moral philosophy.”[19] In an interview with Prospect, • MacIntyre explains that his conversion to Catholicism oc- 1971. Against the Self-Images of the Age: Essays on curred in his fifties as a “result of being convinced of Ideology and Philosophy. London: Duckworth. Thomism while attempting to disabuse his students of its • 2007 (1981). After Virtue, 3rd ed. University of authenticity.”[20] Also, in his book Whose Justice, Which Notre Dame Press. Rationality? there is a section towards the end that is per- haps autobiographical when he explains how one is cho- • 2002 (with Anthony Rudd and John Davenport). sen by a tradition and may reflect his own conversion to [21] Kierkegaard After Macintyre: Essays on Freedom, Roman Catholicism. Parallel recent developments in Narrative, and Virtue. Chicago: Open Court the methods of philosophical research, which carry reso- nances with MacIntyre’s take on Thomism are witnessed • 1988. Whose Justice? Which Rationality?. Univer- with a modern approach to Avicennism (the historical sity of Notre Dame Press. legacies that were built upon the philosophy of Avicenna; Ibn Sina) as embodied in the works of Nader El-Bizri in • 1990. Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry. The connection with Islam, even though the orientation is phe- Gifford Lectures. University of Notre Dame Press. 5

• 1990. First Principles, Final Ends, and Contempo- 9 References rary Philosophical Issues. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press. [1] Kelvin Knight, The MacIntyre Reader, Notre Dame Press, 1998, “Interview with Giovanna Borradori,” pp. 255–56 • 1995. Marxism and Christianity, London: Duck- worth, 2nd ed. [2] Lackey, 1999, What Are the Modern Classics? The Baruch Poll of Great Philosophy in the Twentieth Cen- tury, The Philosophical Forum, Vol.30, Issue.4 • 1998. The MacIntyre Reader Knight, Kelvin, ed. University of Notre Dame Press. [3] Hauerwas, Stanley (October 2007). “The Virtues of Alas- dair MacIntyre”. First Things. Retrieved 16 June 2014. • 1999. Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human [4] After Virtue, (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Beings Need the Virtues. Chicago: Open Court. Press, 3rd edn, 2007) xii.

• 2005. Edith Stein: A Philosophical Prologue, 1913– [5] After Virtue, 3, xiii. 1922. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. [6] After Virtue, 257

• 2006. The Tasks of Philosophy: Selected Essays, [7] After Virtue, xii–xiii Volume 1. Cambridge University Press. [8] The Tasks of Philosophy: Selected Essays, Vol. 1 (Cam- bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) viii • 2006. Ethics and Politics: Selected Essays, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. [9] Ibid.

• 2008 (Blackledge, P. & Davidson, N., eds.), Alas- [10] Paul Blackledge; Kelvin Knight (15 June 2011). Virtue and Politics: Alasdair MacIntyre’s Revolutionary Aris- dair MacIntyre’s Early Marxist Writings: Essays and totelianism. University of Notre Dame Press. p. 31. ISBN Articles 1953–1974, Leiden: Brill. 978-0-268-02225-9. Retrieved 21 December 2012.

• 2009. God, philosophy, universities: A Selective His- [11] “Précis of Whose Justice? Which Rationality?" in Mac- tory of the Catholic Philosophical Tradition . Row- Intyre Reader, ed. Kelvin Knight (Notre Dame, IN: Uni- man & Littlefield. versity of Notre Dame Press, 1998) 107. [12] Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, IN: • 2009. Living Ethics. Excerpt, “The Nature of The University of Notre Dame Press, 1988) 12. Virtues”. Minch & Weigel. [13] Ibid., 361–362.

• “The End of Education: The Fragmentation of the [14] Dependent Rational Animals (Chicago: Carus Publishing, American University,” Commonweal, 20 October 1999) x, 2006 / Volume CXXXIII, Number 18. [15] Ibid., 1, 5

[16] Ibid., 127 8 See also [17] MacIntyre, “On having survived the academic moral phi- losophy of the twentieth century”, lecture of March 2009

• Virtue Ethics [18] Thaddeus J. Kozinski (2010). The Political Problem of Religious Pluralism: And Why Philosophers Can't Solve It. • Aristotelian ethics Lexington Books. p. 13. ISBN 978-0-7391-4168-7. Re- trieved 18 April 2013.

• Communitarianism [19] Solomon, David. “Lecture 9: After Virtue”, International Catholic University: Twentieth-century ethics • Modernity [20] http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2010/10/ alasdair-macintyre-on-money/ • Rationality [21] See pages 393–395 of “Whose Justice, Which Rational- • John F. X. Knasas ity?" 1988. [22] The Tasks of Philosophy: Selected Essays, Vol. 1 (Cam- • American philosophy bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); God, Philos- ophy and Universities (Plymouth, UK: Rowman & Little- • List of American philosophers field Publishers, 2009) 6 11 EXTERNAL LINKS

10 Further reading • “Nietzsche or Aristotle?" in Giovanna Borradori, The American philosopher: Conversations with • D'Andrea, Thomas D., Tradition, Rationality and Quine, Davidson, Putnam, Nozick, Danto, Rorty, Virtue: The Thought of Alasdair Macintyre, Burling- Cavell, MacIntyre, Kuhn (Chicago: University of ton, VT: Ashgate, 2006. Chicago Press, 1994) 137–152.

• Bielskis, Andrius, Towards a Post-Modern Un- derstanding of the Political: From Genealogy to 11 External links Hermeneutics, Basingstoke, New York: Palgrame- Macmillan, 2005. • Bibliographies of MacIntyre by: • Horton, John, and Susan Mendus (eds.), After Mac- • Scott Moore, Baylor University. Intyre: Critical Perspectives on the Work of Alasdair MacIntyre, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994. • William Hughes at the Wayback Machine (archived 6 September 2007), University of • Knight, Kelvin, Aristotelian Philosophy: Ethics and Guelph. Politics from Aristotle to MacIntyre, Cambridge: • Centre for Contemporary Aristotelian Studies Polity Press, 2007. in Ethics and Politics (CASEP) • Knight, Kelvin, and Paul Blackledge (eds.), Rev- • Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: olutionary Aristotelianism: Ethics, Resistance and Utopia, Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius, 2008. • Clayton, Edward. "Political Philosophy of Alasdair MacIntyre" • Lutz, Christopher Stephen, Reading Alasdair Mac- • Intyre’s After Virtue, New York: Continuum, 2012. Lutz, Christopher. "Alasdair Chalmers Mac- Intyre (overview)" • Lutz, Christopher Stephen, Tradition in the Ethics • of Alasdair MacIntyre: Relativism, Thomism, and International Society for MacIntyrean Enquiry. Philosophy, Lanham, MA: Rowman and Littlefield, • Schwein, Mark R. (1991) "Alasdair MacIntyre’s 2004. University", First Things. Review of Three Rival • Murphy, Mark C. (ed.), Alasdair MacIntyre, Cam- Versions of Moral Inquiry. bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. • Cowling, Maurice (1994) "Alasdair MacIntyre, Re- • Myers, Jesse, “Towards Virtue: Alasdair MacIntyre ligion & the University," The New Criterion 12:6. and the Recovery of the Virtues”, 2009 • Oakes, Edward T. (1996) The Achievement of Alas- • Nicholas, Jeffery L. Reason, Tradition, and the dair MacIntyre," First Things Good: MacIntyre’s Tradition-Constituted Reason • Times Literary Supplement:"Review of Selected and Frankfurt School Critical Theory, UNDP 2012. Essays Vols. I & II" – by Constantine Sandis. • Perreau-Saussine, Emile : Alasdair MacIntyre: une • Hauerwas, Stanley (2007) The Virtues of Alasdair biographie intellectuelle, Paris: Presses Universi- MacIntyre," First Things taires de France, 2005. • MacIntyre, Alasdair (2004) The Only Vote Worth • Seung, T. K., Intuition and Construction: The Foun- Casting in November dation of Normative Theory, New Haven: Yale Uni- versity Press, 1993. See chapter six: “Aristotelian • Dahlstrom, Daniel O. (2012) “Independence and Revival”. the Virtuous Community,” critique of MacIntyre’s “Dependent Rational Animals” (1999) in Reason • Skinner, Quentin. “The Republican Ideal of Politi- Papers: A Journal of Interdisciplinary Normative cal Liberty”, Machiavelli and Republicanism, edited Studies 34.2, October 2012, pp. 70–83 by Gisela Bock, Quentin Skinner and Maurizio Vi- roli; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 293–309 (critique of MacIntyre’s After Virtue) 11.1 Online videos of MacIntyre giving lectures

10.1 Interviews with MacIntyre • “A Culture of Death” – Notre Dame Center for Ethics and Culture, Fall 2000 • 'The Illusion of Self-Sufficiency' in A. Voorhoeve Conversations on Ethics (Oxford University Press, • “Catholic Instead of What?" – Notre Dame Center 2009). for Ethics and Culture, Fall 2012 11.1 Online videos of MacIntyre giving lectures 7

• “What Makes a Painting Religious?" – Notre Dame Center for Ethics and Culture, Fall 2004 • “On having survived the academic moral philosophy of the twentieth century” (scroll down) – Lecture at University College, Dublin, 2009

• “Newman’s Idea of a University” – Lecture at the Las Casas Institute, Oxford U, 2009

• “Ends and Endings” – Lecture delivered at The Catholic University of America for the series “The Issue of Truth – In Honor of Robert Sokolowski” • “Philosophical Education Against Contemporary Culture” – Lecture at Duquesne University, 2010

• “Intolerance, Censorship, and Other Requirements of Rationality” – Lecture at London Metropolitan University, 2010 • “Ends and Endings” – Lecture at Catholic Univer- sity, 2009 8 12 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

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