WAR CRIMES Deutsche Bank Dresdner Bank

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WAR CRIMES Deutsche Bank Dresdner Bank WAR CRIMES of the Deutsche Bank and the Dresdner Bank OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT (U.S.) REPORTS Edited and with an Introduction by CHRISTOPHER SIMPSON HOLMES & MEIER NEW YORK / LONDON Contents Acknowledgments xi A Note on Editing xiii INTRODUCTION Buried Records and Modern Controversies 1 PART ONE OMGUS Report: The Deutsche Bank Chapter I: Recommendations 37 Chapter II: Summary 38 Chapter III: History 41 Chapter IV: Scope of the Institution 44 Chapter V: Management and Organization 49 Corporate Bodies and Functional Organizations 49 The Hauptversammlung 49 \ The Aufsichtsrat 50 The Beirat 50 The Vor stand 52 Chapter VI: Political Connections 56 Personal Political Ties 56 Deutsche Bank's Leader between the Wars 56 Connection with Nationalist Associations 57 Nazification of Management 58 The Aufichtsrat 58 Vorstand 62 Accounts of Political Significance 69 Chapter VII: Influence and Control 71 over Domestic Financial Institutions Local Commercial Banks 71 Regional Commercial Banks 72 vi Contents Banks for Overseas Operations 73 The Deutsche Ueberseeisch Bank, Berlin (DUB) 73 Mortgage Bond Institutions 73 Insurance Companies 74 Holding Companies 74 Financing Companies 75 Special Administrative Companies 76 Chapter VIII: Influence and Control over Industry 77 Means of Influence or Control 77 Interlocking Directorships 77 Proxy Voting 80 Stock Ownership 84 Loans and Syndicates 86 Special Industrial Ties 87 Mannesmann Roehrenwerke A.G. 88 Daimler Benz and Bayerische MotorenWerke (BMW) 92 I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. 95 H. F. and Ph. Reemtsma 97 Siemens Combine 99 Rheinische A.G. fuer Braunkohlengergbau und Brikettfabrikation (Rheinbraun) 102 Vereinigte Glanzstoff Fabriken and Its Dutch Associate AKU 103 Deutsche Erdoel A.G. 103 DemagA.G. 103 Hoesche A.G. and Its Subsidiaries 104 Chapter IX: Rearmament and War Financing 105 Financing the Reich 106 Treasury Paper 106 Work Creation Bills and Tax Remission Certificates 108 Mefo Bills 108 Delivery Notes 110 Dego Promissory Notes 111 Financing of Specific War Industries 113 Daimler Benz A.G. 114 Bayerische MotorenWerke A.G. (BMW), Munich 114 Mannesmann Roehrenwerke A.G., Duesseldorf (M/W) 116 Krauss-Maffei A.G., Munich-Allach 117 Air Rearmament 117 Financing of Synthetic Fuel Production 119 Contents vii Chapter X: Aryanization 125 Chapter XI: Slave Labor 135 Chapter XII: Foreign Operations of the Deutsche Bank 141 The Foreign Department of the Deutsche Bank 144 Expansion of Foreign Subsidiaries and Affiliates 148 Deutsche Ueberseeische Bank 148 Deutsch-Asiatische Bank 150 Deutsche Bank Branch in Turkey 151 Deutsche-Bulgarische Kreditbank, Sofia 154 Handel-Maatschappij H. Albert de Bary & Co., N.V., Amsterdam 155 Creditanstalt Bankverein,Wien [Vienna, Austria] 157 Boehmische Unionbank 164 Expansion into Lithuania and Poland 170 The Deutsche Bank and the Banque de la Societe Generale de Belgique 171 Acquisition of Credit Industriel d'Alsace et de Lorraine 175 Banque Generale de Luxembourg 176 Banca Comerciala Romana, Bucharest 177 AllgemeinerYugoslawischer Bankverein 180 Extension of Deutsche Bank Influence into Greece 183 Deutsche Bank fuer Ostasien 185 Financing of Foreign Trade as an Instrument for Furthering Nazi Political Objectives 186 DUB's Foreign Trade 187 Economic Penetration and Spoliation of German-Dominated \ Europe 190 I.G. Farben in Austria 191 Deutsche Umsiedlungs-Treuhandgesellschaft (DUT) 191 The Boehmische Unionbank and the Haupt-Treuhandstelle Ost 192 The Deutsche Bank and the Algemeene Kunstzijde UnieN.V. 194 The Deutsche Bank and Kontinentale Oel A.G. 199 Mines de Bor and Suedost Montan—Deutsche Bank Operations in Yugoslavia 201 Expansion of Mannesmann in Europe 205 Acquisition, Repatriation, and Sale of Foreign Government Securities 208 viii Contents Foreign Workers'Remittances 209 Cloaking 212 General Measures 213 Individual Cases 214 Cloaking Agencies 215 Chapter XIII: Deutsche Bank Today 218 Chapter XIV: Profiles 224 Gustav Brecht 224 Albert Pietzsch 231 Hans Rummel 238 Max H. Schmid 241 Hermann Werner von Siemens 244 PART TWO OMGUS Report: The Dresdner Bank Chapter XV: Recommendations 255 Chapter XVI: Summary 256 Chapter XVII: Growth of the Dresdner Bank 258 Chapter XVIII: Organization of the Dresdner Bank 263 The General Meeting 263 The Aufsichtsrat 263 The Arbeitsausschuss (Working Committee) 263 TheVorstand 264 The Landesausschuesse (Regional Advisory Boards) 266 Chapter XIX: The Dresdner Bank as 267 a Concentration of Economic Power Chapter XX: Operations of the Dresdner Bank in Germany 278 Air Rearmament 280 Procurement of Oil 284 The Dresdner Bank and the Hermann-Goering-Werke 291 Aryanization of German Economy 294 Nazification of the Dresdner Bank 299 Contents Chapter XXI: Operations of the Dresdner Bank 303 Outside Germany The Dresdner Bank as a Nazi Espionage and Propaganda Agency 304 The Dresdner Bank in Czechoslovakia 308 The Dresdner Bank in Poland 320 The Dresdner Bank in the Netherlands 326 The Dresdner Bank in Belgium 336 The Dresdner Bank in the Baltic States 342 The Dresdner Bank in Other Countries 345 Chapter XXII: The Dresdner Bank Today 353 Chapter XXIII: Profiles 358 Carl Friedrich Goetz 358 Wilhelm Kisskalt 365 Wilhelm Avieny 367 Friedrich Flick 370 Heinrich Koppenberg 374 Karl Lindemann 378 Wilhelm Marotzke 381 Walter Schieber 384 Hans Ullrich 387 HansWalz 389 Hans Pilder 392 KarlRasche 395 Hans Schippel 401 Hugo Zinsser 404 Index 407.
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