Emerging Multi-Power Competitions in Latin America

R Evan Ellis

The competitions between the Italian city states of the 15th Centuries, and the European powers from the 16th through 19th centuries involved, as a key component, a maneuvering for influence and alliances. Such alliances were, by nature, pragmatic, shifting with the evolving calculations by each actor of their interest and the evolving balance of power between the dominant actors. Because questions of power in that system were often settled by wars, alliances were primarily pledges of support in military engagement.

Although such systems of multiple, competing powers are widely discussed in the literature on international relations,1 such an approach to politics has been relatively alien to the way that the United States has conducted its foreign policy. While the United States has arguably pursued its national interest with varying degrees of strategic sophistication and pragmatism, it has generally defined its position in the world in terms of two-sided moral issues such as democracy and human rights versus totalitarianism and communism,

capitalism versus socialism, and more recently, the struggle against global terrorism.

Perhaps the lack of a US tradition for relating to the world in terms of multi- power politics is most strongly illustrated in Latin America, where the US has traditionally been the dominant power. Historically, where the US has focused on Latin America’s relationships with extra-regional actors, it has been primarily to exclude them, as illustrated by the opposition to 19th century European adventurism in the region, enshrined in the famous Monroe Doctrine, or in the Cold War struggle to prevent the Soviet Union from establishing client states in the region.

The end of the cold war and the increasing viability of intercontinental economic relationships in the 1990s redefined Latin America’s relationship with the US and the world, at the very moment in which the US and its approach to democracy and development seemed most dominant. Reduced costs associated with the containerization of shipping, new communication and computing technology, and truly global financial markets created opportunities and imperatives for Latin America to participate in commerce with other regions, not only exporting its products, and importing goods from around the world, but also participating in integrated global production chains, attracting foreign capital, and building new ties that begun to undermine the historic pattern in which primarily US-dominated institutions invested in the region, purchased Latin American commodities, and sold Latin America US manufactured goods.

In the 1990s, the principal extra-regional actors in Latin America were Europe and Japan, and to a lesser extent, South Korea. Because the new actors were not geopolitical adversaries of the US, and because their ties were principally commercial, the strategic implications of the new dynamic received relatively little attention in the US. Since the early 2000s, however, as Russia, Iran, China and India have also made inroads in the region, US policymakers have registered growing concern.2

The emergence or re-emergence of external actors in Latin America such as Russia, China, India and Iran represents a new paradigm for the US, and for the region. On one hand, there has arguably not been a serious competition between multiple outside powers for influence in Latin America since those between the US, Spanish, French, English, and Portuguese, largely ending in the 19th century. On the other hand, the strategic imperatives and

considerations of the new competition are primarily economic in nature, rather than ideological or military, as was the case during the Cold War.

The purpose of this article is to analyze the dynamics between the emerging new set of external actors in Latin America with an emphasis on identifying the characteristics and dynamics of those interactions, as well as possible opportunities and challenges arising from them.

Emerging Multi-Power Competition in Latin America. Multi-power competition in Latin America in the context of globalization differs in many ways from the competition between states that characterized the 15th Century system of Italian City States that Machiavelli wrote about in The Prince,3 or the 16th-19th Century system of European states. In 21st Century Latin America, the goals of the actors are different, corresponding to changes in that which has strategic value in the contemporary international system: access to commodities, technology, markets for goods, and certain symbolic and ideological objectives which leaders hope will provide benefits with respect to internal audiences, or in a broader global struggles for position. Moreover, differences in what each external actor in Latin America is looking for and why, create the possibility for complex patterns of cooperation and competition.

The interaction between the new actors is driven by two overarching dynamics: (1) On traditional geopolitical issues, a series of coinciding cleavages divide the actors into two camps, with a strategically important shifting middle, depending on the issue. (2) On commercial issues, such as access to markets, sources of supply, and technology, a multi-way competition prevails, with national governments supporting their companies, in pursuit of strategic objectives such as national development or simply regime survival. The two dynamics are related in ways that depend on the initiative of each actor, since governments use alignment on geopolitical issues to secure commercial objectives, and growing alignment on commercial interests may impact positions on geopolitical issues.

Although there will be various types of violence within, and perhaps between, states in Latin America, it is important to emphasize, that the focus of interaction between states of the region and external actors will be primarily securing an advantage commerce and national development, rather than in war, with competitions for the signing of trade accords, and technology sharing agreements, investment, the granting of privileged access to develop a nation’s mineral and hydrocarbon resources, or who supports whom in multilateral institutions. It is possible that external powers could become involved in a

proxy war, in an attempt to hold up a regime in which they have strategic commercial interests, but such prospects remain distant at the present time.

Coinciding Cleavages on Geopolitical Issues. Traditional geopolitical issues will still tend to divide external actors in Latin America into two camps, although the lineup of actors will change according to the issue. On issues of democratization and human rights, the US and Europe are likely to be generally aligned in advancing an agenda that respects traditional Western norms, while Iran and the PRC, and often Russia, will emphasize the right of each state in the region to determine its own internal politics. India, depending on the specific issue, may or may not press for respect for such norms. Within this broad alignment, of course, differences will still exist, with Europe emphasizing human rights issues in select countries, such as Colombia, where the US does not, or overlooking human rights issues in others, such as Cuba, where the US places emphasis. The pursuit of commercial goals by some actors may motivate them to avoid positions on geopolitical issues that would separate them from potential business partners.

The second major cleavage dividing external actors in Latin America is the question of the developed world (North) versus the developing world (South). Particularly with left-of-center regimes in Latin America, countries such as China, India and Iran emphasize their common “South-South” ties as countries in development, generally in political meetings indirectly pursuing commercial deals for their companies. Russia often fits uneasily into this coalition, seeking to define itself, in its relations with populist countries such as Venezuela, as an up and coming power (eg. Part of the “BRIC” nations), or as alternative to the status quo powers (the US and Europe), even though it has not been traditionally categorized as a “developing” nation.

Within the political space created by such coinciding cleavages, Latin America also serves as a target for important, but differing internal and international agendas pursued by each actor. For the PRC, Latin America’s principal tie to domestic politics is Taiwan. 12 of the 23 nations in the world which continue to recognize the Republic of China (ROC) as the legitimate Chinese government are found in Latin America. Externally, the PRC also seeks to participate in the region’s institutions, such as the IADB and OAS, and prevent another power such as the US from dominating those institutions, or other regional structures, in such a way that could shut it out of the region and jeopardize its strategic commercial goals. None of other external actors in the region explicitly oppose these goals, but rather, each pursues its own goals in parallel. This include Iran, for which support from Latin America reinforces the

international stature of its leadership in the Iranian regime’s messianic efforts to advance its brand of radical Islam with Iran at its center. In a more pragmatic sense, Latin American ties, including financial institutions such as the International Development Bank in Venezuela, direct airline flights, factories in remote areas, and technology collaboration, help Iran to circumvent international sanctions to develop a nuclear capabilities, and possibly fund and create a logistics base for terrorist operations that could reach the United States, in the event that Iran wishes to wage such a conflict in the future. For Russia, in a manner similar to Iran, Latin American ties help the current regime to demonstrate to a domestic audience that Russia is once again playing a significant international role, harkening back to its height of Cold War power as the heart of the Soviet Union. Latin America also provides the platform for Russia to generate counter-pressures to US activities in Eastern Europe, the Caspian sea, and Central Asia, which Russia regards as its sphere of influence, such as November 2008, when Russia sent supersonic Tu-160 bombers and a squadron of ships to Venezuela for maneuvers in the Caribbean, as a counterpoint to the US projection of power in the Black Sea during the succession crisis in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Because of the shared “anti-western” focus and because the specific geopolitical agendas pursued by actors such as Russia, India and China in Latin America generally complement each other, these nations are not likely to come into conflict over their courtship of populist regimes such as Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia. The critical exception to this harmony, however, involves strategic commercial issues, such as which nation gets to develop the preponderance of Venezuela’s petroleum in the Orinoco belt, or the significant deposits of iron and lithium, and perhaps uranium, in Bolivia.

Commercial Competition. With respect to commerce, the goals of each external actor are defined by its position within the global economy and other elements of its national situation, as interpreted by its leadership. The PRC, because of its position as a global manufacturer, and because of its aggressive process of capital formation, looks to Latin America as a source of commodities, while its attitude toward markets focuses it on owning key parts of the production chain, or having strong contractual presence there where possible, as evidenced in interest by Chinese companies in Peruvian, Bolivian and Chilean mines, or Venezuelan and Ecuadorian oil fields. China’s combination of a large population and limited agricultural land also drives an interest in Latin America as a source of foodstuffs, particularly in countries with large tracts of

land usable for agriculture, such as Brazil and Argentina, which have become significant soy exporters for China.

Neither Russia, Iran, nor India have export-led manufacturing sectors which generate a level of demand for commodities similar to that of China. Nonetheless, as the Indian economy continues to grow, its companies will increasingly come into contact with those of China in Latin America as part of their global search for commodities. In the case of Russia and Iran, both have significant petroleum industries which them to participate in the petroleum sector of Latin America as part of larger global business strategies.

With respect to Latin American markets, China’s position in the world economy as manufacturer makes its ability to sell its products abroad and move up the value added chain a strategically critical objective, particularly as growth in traditional markets for Chinese exports, such as the US, Europe, and Japan, has slowed. Moreover, the middle-income nature of Latin America’s $3 trillion, 500 million person market, and its sensitivity to price creates particular opportunities as the PRC seeks to gain experience in a range of strategically important sectors such as cars, aircraft, computers, telecommunications, military goods, and space.

For similar reasons, Latin America is also an important market for India in select sectors, such as high-end manufactures and technology-intensive goods, laying the basis for an emerging competition in this area. Russia also competes for select segments of the high-end manufacturing market in Latin America, such as military end items and nuclear technology. Although Iran sells very few goods to Latin America, those purchases are important for its efforts to break free of the international isolation imposed on that country for its pursuit of a nuclear capability.

Beyond specific competitions for resources and markets, there are also areas in which the commercial objectives of external actors in Latin America coincide, creating opportunities for future collaboration. All generally benefit, for example, from efficient infrastructure in the region, although they may differ on the focus, with India and China arguably benefitting more than Russia and Iran from improved ports, roads and rail networks oriented toward the Pacific ocean. All generally benefit from respect for contractual and property rights, and predictable legal, regulatory, and political environments in the countries with which they wish to do business, although new entrants, such as China, Russia, India, and Iran, also tend to benefit initially from significant changes, since their commercial holdings in these countries have traditionally been

eclipsed by US and European companies, and changes such as those brought about by Latin American populist movements tend to open up new opportunities. On the other hand, such change also opens up potentially destabilizing new competitions between these players to see who will benefit most from the new actors and new rules of the game.

Sectorial Competitions The currently emerging competitions between external powers in key Latin American business and technology sectors are likely to intensify, with the possibility for combinations of direct competition and cooperation as the situation dictates, and with each country leveraging the weight of its government where possible.

The key players, their relative strengths, and their level of engagement will be different in each sector, reflecting the differing situation of each nation, and its companies, in the global economy. Emerging competitions include those for (1) oil and gas resources, (2) mineral resources, (3) agricultural goods, (4) high-end manufactured goods, (5) military goods, (6) infrastructure projects, and (7) telecom and technology services.

Oil and gas resources. All of the major external actors are positioning themselves for access to Latin American oil and gas, as part of national and corporate strategies for sourcing these strategic resources globally. In Venezuela, the Chinese have operated mature oilfields in the Maracaibo region since the late 1990s. In developing the oil-rich Orinoco belt, China National Petroleum Corporation committed $16.3 billion to develop the Junin-4 block of oilfields, while a 5-company Russian consortium committed to invest $18 billion to develop Junin-6. The Indian company ONGC Videsh has a presence in the Venezuelan San Cristobal project,4 has bid for the Junin Norte block, and has discussed the joint construction of refineries with Venezuela.5 Three Indian oil companies, in combination with a Spanish and a Malaysian firm, were awarded the development contract for the Carabobo-1 block,6 while the Iranian company Petropars is participating in the development of the Ayacucho oil fields.7

In Brazil’s oil sector, Chinese and Indian companies have also emerged as competitors within a broad field of companies. India has leveraged its strategic alliance with Brazil to obtain 20-30% stakes in three Brazilian offshore oil blocks,8 and in November 2009, was awarded a series of offshore deepwater blocks in the Santos basin.9 Chinese companies, by comparison, have used large loans to Brazil to gain a presence in the national oil sector, including $10

billion provided by China Development Bank to Petrobras in April 2010. One month later, the Chinese company Sinochem purchased a $3.1 billion interest in offshore oil blocks from the Norwegian company Statoil, while both China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) and China National Offshore Oil Corporation have been in talks to purchase a Brazilian company drilling in the Campos basin.

In Ecuador, Chinese companies have a dominant position in the oil sector, with a CNPC and a series of smaller petroleum and oil service companies controlling almost 40% of non-Petroecuador production, while a series of two $1 billion loans from China have created obligations for increasing oil exports to the PRC for repayment. Nonetheless, the Indian company ONGC Videsh has also signed collaboration agreements with the state oil company Petroecuador, and has bid for Ecuadoran oil blocks.

In Colombia, by contrast, the Chinese company Sinopec, and the Indian company ONGC Videsh, chose to cooperate rather than to compete, forming a joint venture in 2006, ultimately called Mansrovar Energy, to develop the mature oil resources of the Magdelena Media region.

Mineral resources. As in the oil sector, Chinese, Indian, and to some extent, Russian mining companies are increasingly running into each other as they expand their presence in Latin America, although, as in the petroleum sector, China is arguably far ahead in the number and size of Latin American initiatives.10

In Venezuela, although the Chavez government signed an agreement with Russia in January 2009 to jointly develop the Las Cristinas mine,11 the deal never came to fruition, and in June 2010, the Venezuelan government reversed itself and gave the green light for a Chinese company, China Railway Road, to develop the project.12

In Peru and Ecuador, the Chinese have dominated the competition. In Peru, Chinese firms have invested $1.4 billion to date,13 with commitments to invest up to $5.5 billion to develop mineral fields in Toromocho, Rio Blanco, Galleno, and Hierro Peru. In Ecuador, following the passage of a new mining law, the Chinese company Tongling purchased the local holdings of the Canadian firm Corriente for $646 million,14 and subsequently announced a plan to invest up to $3 billion to develop mineral resources in the country.15

In Jamaica, in 2005, the Chinese state firm Minmetals signed an agreement with the Jamaican government to establish a joint venture for bauxite

extraction and processing in the country,16 although it was ultimately a Russian aluminum company UC Russal that ultimately contracted with the Jamaican government and built a bauxite refinery in Jamaica. Nonetheless, by 2009, financial problems of UC Russal with the venture had prompted Chinese interest in taking over the facility.

In Bolivia, the Indian company Jindal initially beat out the Chinese company Shandong Llueng for a contract to develop the massive iron deposits of El Mutún, in the department of Santa Cruz, but when Jindal ran into problems with the Bolivian government that delayed its scheduled investments, the PRC re-entered the fray with a package in which China Development Bank would loan the Bolivian government $15 billion to develop the un-contracted portion of the Mutún reserves, with the possible involvement of the Chinese firm Chung Hsing.17 In addition, both Chinese and Russian companies are among those which have expressed interest in developing potential Bolivian deposits of lithium in the Uyuni salt flats, or helping the government to do so.

In Brazil, Chinese firms such as Minmetals are important customers for Brazilian iron, and Indian firms such as Tata Steel are looking to increase their role.18 While Tata has explored the possibility of mining joint ventures with Brazilian companies,19 it has ultimately been Chinese companies which have realized such projects, including the $5 billion joint venture between Wuhan Steel and the Brazilian firm MMX to develop a steel mill in conjunction with the Brazilian megaport of Açu.

Agricultural Goods. Both India and China have large populations and insufficient agricultural production, making both interested in importing foodstuffs from Latin America.20 Indeed, it was telling that when China ceased purchases of Argentine soy oil over a trade dispute, the willingness of India and Iran to purchase the soy oil that China rejected helped to mitigate the damage to Argentina.21

High-End Manufactured Goods Market. To date, the PRC has eclipsed other external actors in selling manufactured goods to Latin America, moving from low-value added goods such as toys, textiles and footwear, up the value added chain to motorcycles, cars, electronics, and even aircraft. The emerging competition is in the higher value added segment of the market. Indian motorcycle brands such as Bajaj and Mahindra have begun to enter Latin America, following the entry of Chinese brands, such as Jialing, Lifan, and Shinrey in the 2005 timeframe. In the automotive sector, the Indian firm Tata introduced the Nano into Latin American in 2010,22 competing against Chinese

brands such as Chery, Jialing, Geeley, FAW, Wuling, and Dongfeng, which had previously been the low-end option.

Military Goods. As Russia has sought to return to Latin America, sales of military hardware has been one of its most effective leverage points. Its leading client in the region has been Venezuela, selling with $9.4 billion in sales and credits to the Chavez regime since 2004, including rifles, helicopters, fighter aircraft, tanks, personnel carriers, air defense systems, submarines, and rocket launchers. Russia has also sold military aircraft to Bolivia, and less sophisticated goods to its former Cold War client Nicaragua. It has also marketed its military goods to less anti-US states, selling 8 MI-17 helicopters to Peru in April 2010,23 using funds initially earmarked to purchase Chinese tanks, but diverted to combat narcotrafficking in the Apurimac and Ene river valley (VRAE).24

The PRC, for its part, has sought to expand its presence from military non- lethal goods, such as clothing and night-vision goggles, to higher value-added goods, leveraging its special relationship with Venezuela to prove its products in the Latin American context and to sell to other populist nations in the region. Its sales of K-8 light attack aircraft sales to Venezuela have led to similar sales in Bolivia. Similarly the PRC parlayed its sale of radars to Venezuela into sales of similar equipment to Ecuador. In addition, the PRC has sold or leased its MA-60 military transport aircraft to both Bolivia and Ecuador.

With respect to India, as in other manufacturing sectors, the nation has concentrated on selling high-end goods in select sectors, including its DHRUV light helicopter, which it has sold to Ecuador and Peru, with prospects for sales to Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay.25 In addition, India’s BrahMos missile, co-developed with Russia, has attracted interest from both Brazil and Chile.26

Latin American Infrastructure Projects. Chinese companies have recently begun winning important infrastructure projects in Latin America, including airports in Colombia,27 a $7.5 billion railroad project28 and a powerplant29 in Venezuela, and two hydroelectric projects in Ecuador,30 beating out established Latin American firms, and leveraging their ability to provide massive self- financing, and the support of the Chinese government. The PRC has also used its companies to construct a number of new sports stadiums which it has built in recent years in Costa Rica, Granada and elsewhere in the Caribbean, as well as road projects, such as a $400 million program in Jamaica, to be executed by China Harbor Engineering Co.31

To date, China has been the only external power to take major Latin American infrastructure projects forward to execution. Russia has promised a number of major projects, including support for a trans-Nicaragua canal32 and a nuclear power plants in both Venezuela and Bolivia,33 but has not come through on the funding. Iran has focused on smaller scale infrastructure, such as hospitals and schools in Bolivia and Nicaragua, although it has also explored transportation infrastructure projects in the region, such as an ill-fated attempt to improve the Nicaraguan port at Monkey Point.34

As the Colombian and Jamaican examples illustrate, it is important to note that Chinese companies have had some success in winning infrastructure work influenced by, but not directly tied to, the initiatives of their own government, whereas Russia, Iran, and India, to date, generally have not.

Telecom and Technology Services. Particularly in South America, Chinese companies such as the telecom giants Huawei and ZTE have emerged as important players in the telecommunication sector as infrastructure and service providers, and sellers of cheap cellular telephone technology. They have also emerged to build and launch satellites for Venezuela and Bolivia, and collaborate with Brazil in its own space launch program through the CBERS project. India, although less advanced in penetrating the Latin American market in general, has particular strengths in technology services. Companies such as Tata Consultancy Services (TCS), with 5,000 Latin American employees and a presence in 14 states in the region,35 are both potential competitors of and partners to Chinese firms in the sector.

Likely Dynamics The analysis of the previous paragraphs suggests that over time, the maneuvering between external actors in Latin America is likely to play itself out as a two-level game: At one extreme, Iran, China, and occasionally Russia and India, will increasingly collaborate with Brazil, as an emerging regional power, as well as populist regimes such as Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, to pursue independent, but complimentary anti-establish quo alliances and activities, ultimately undercutting the position of the US, and to a lesser extent, the EU. Such policies and ongoing political change in Latin America will continue to shake up the status quo and create new opportunities for these “outside” states to position themselves in Latin American markets, and gain an investment foothold in Latin American commodity sectors. At the same time, an ever more intense competition will emerge for what is truly important: Latin America’s commodities and markets. This competition will primarily be fought out between China, which holds the overall advantage, and India, but will also

involve Russia in military sectors, and Russia and Iran with respect to energy. Both Chinese and Indian companies will likely position themselves as “third World” to win markets, particularly with Brazil and the populist regimes, yet each will struggle to define its “south-south” relationship with Latin America in a way that gives it strategic advantage vice its commercial rival. With more conservative regimes, for example, India may position itself as more democratic and “western,” to win points against China.

The limitations of each external actor in Latin America will also shape the dynamic of their interaction. Both China and India are highly sensitive to aligning themselves too closely with the anti-western political projects of populist regimes such as those currently in Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia. For Russia and Iran, by contrast, association with the more anti-US rhetoric of populist regimes in Latin America serves both domestic and foreign policy objectives, although the Russian posture is more complicated, seeking to associate itself with the community of “responsible, developed” European nations, even while participating in an alliance of developing nations unified by anti-US themes. It is likely that Iran, and occasionally Russia, will join the most vehement anti-US actions in the region, while China and India will principally attempt to remain “free riders,” taking advantage of the spaces opened up by these actors for doing business.

Conclusions The competition between external actors in Latin America is a concept relatively removed from the traditional US way of looking at the region, and at geopolitics in general. While the primarily economic nature of that conflict may appear reassuring, the erosion of the US commercial presence in Latin America will also undermine its ability to shape political and economic developments in the region. Although the US will remain equally tied to Latin America in geographic and human terms, its ability to shape outcomes unilaterally continues to decline, implying that the US must increasingly learn to work with partners, both within the region, and external to it. In this brave new world, Latin America will continue to develop a less US-centric image of the world, while the US will learn to develop new ways of being a partner, helping Latin America to make the most of what its other global relationships have to offer.

Notes

1. Some of the classics include: Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th Ed, Revised. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978. Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War. 3rd Ed. New York: Colombia University Press, 2001. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: University of Chicago, 2001. Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919- 1939. New York: Palgrave, 1981. Robert O. Keohane, ed. Neorealism and its Critics. New York: Colombia University Press, 1986. 2. See, for example, Paul Richter, “Clinton sees China, Iran inroads in Latin America.” Los Angeles Times. Los Angeles, CA. http://articles.latimes.com/2009/may/02/ world/fg-clinton-latin2. May 2, 2009. 3. Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince. London: Penguin, 2004. 4. “INDO Venezuela partnership goes a step further.” Press Release. ONGC Videsh. http://www.ongcvidesh.com/NewsContent.aspx?ID=760. July 29, 2010. 5. “Venezuela quiere construir refinerías petroleras con firmas de la India.” El Tiempo. Bogota, Colombia. http://www.eltiempo.com. May 13, 2010. 6. “Bloques Carabobo y Junín representan bonos por $5.730 millones para Venezuela.” El Universal. Caracas, Venezuela. http://www.eluniversal.com. February 10, 2010. 7. “Irán explotará yacimiento de petróleo en Venezuela.” El Universal. Caracas, Venezuela. http://www.eluniversal.com. February 10, 2010. 8. Hiral Vora, “Brazil Petrobras to get 40 pct in ONGC block-paper.” Reuters. March 2, 2008. 9. “ONGC Videsh wins two exploration blocks in Brazil.” Thaindian News. http:www.thaindian.com. November 28, 2009. 10. In Venezuela, in July 2010, China’s Wuhan Iron and Steel signed a long-term contract to purchase iron from Venezuela’s Corporacion Venezolana de Guayana (CVG), while in December 2009, CVG and China’s State Metallurgical Corporation forged a joint venture to develop an iron processing facility in Venezuela. In Ecuador, the Chinese firms Tongling and China Railway Road to invest $3 billion in the Ecuadoran mining sector, after Tongling’s purchase of the Canadian firm Corriente “Tongling, Partner to Spend $3 Billion in Ecuador Mine.” Businessweek. http://www.businessweek.com. August 13, 2010. 11. Steven Bodzin, “Venezuela, Russian Venture to Mine Las Cristinas Gold Deposit.” Bloomberg. http://www.bloomberg.com. January 13, 2009. 12. The Canadian firm Crystallex initially had rights to the mine, but ran into problems with the Venezuelan government, and with financing. 13. “Perú es el principal destino de la inversion china en América Latina al superar los US$ 1.400 millones.” El Comercio. Lima, Peru. http://elcomercio.pe. April 21, 2010. 14. “China quiere profundizar intercambio bilateral con Ecuador.” El Universo. Guayaquil, Ecuador. http://www.eluniverso.com. January 2, 2010. 15. “Tongling, Partner to Spend $3 Billion in Ecuador Mine.” Businessweek. http://www.businessweek.com. August 13, 2010. 16. Julian Richardson, “Jamaica Sure to Benefit from China’s Growth, Say Local Execs.” Jamaica Observer. Kingston, Jamaica. http://www.jamaicaobserver.com. August 23, 2006.

17. “China Development Bank offers $15 billion loan to Bolivia to develop world class iron ore deposit.” MineWeb. http://www.mineweb.com. May 28, 2010. 18. “Tata Steel looks at Brazil for raw material.” Business Standard. http://www.business-standard.com. January 6, 2008. 19. “Indian tycoon Tata plans to invest $15 bln in Brazil. China View. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-04/08/content_7939161.htm. 20. However India also competes with Latin America for Chinese markets in select products such as coffee. 21. “Más allá de China: el aceite de soja argentino encuentra nuevos mercados.” La Nacion. Buenos Aires. http://www.lanacion.com. July 12, 2010. “Chinese spat sees Iran soak up Argentine soy oil.” Agra Europe. http://www.agra- net.com/portal2/home.jsp?template=newsarticle&artid=20017808783&pubid=ag002. September 14, 2010. 22. “Tata to introduce Nano in Latin America.” Press Trust of India. July 23, 2009. 23. “Peru to buy eight Russian helicopters for anti-drug efforts.” RiaNovosti. http://en.rian/ru. April 23, 2010. 24. “Peru postpones purchase of MBT-2000 tanks.” Pakistan Defense. http://www.defence.pk. April 15, 2010. 25. Huma Siddiqui, “Dhruv likely to spread wings in Latin America.” The Financial Express. May 30, 2009. 26. “BrahMos order book swells to $13 billion.” The Economic Times. http://economictimes.indiatimes.com. September 2, 2010. 27. “Acuerdo Para Que Llegue Inversión China.” El Tiempo. Bogotá, Colombia. http://www.eltiempo.com. March 30, 2009. 28. “China Railway considers $7.5 bln Venezuela project.” Reuters. http://www.reuters.com. August 3, 2010. 29. In September 2010, China CAMC Engineering Co. signed a contract with Venezuela for $956 million to build a 500 kilowatt thermal powerplant. “CAMCE to plant thermal power station in Venezuela.” People.s Daily Online. Beijing, China. http://english.people.com.cn. September 8, 2010. 30. The Coca Coda Sinclar project, awarded to the Chinese firm Sinohydro, is estimated to be worth $1.7-$2 billion. “Estado, garante de préstamo para Coca Codo.” El Universo. Guayaquil, Ecuador. http://www.eluniverso.com. April 2, 2010. The Sopladora hydroelectric project, awaded to China’s Gezhouba group in August 2010, is valued at an additional $672 million. “El Eximbank financirá otros $600 milliones para central Sopladora.” El Universo. Guayaquil, Ecuador. http://www.eluniverso. com. June 14, 2010. 31. “Jamaica Development. China funds major road rehabilitation project.” Antigua Observer. http://www.antiguaobserver.com. August 20, 2010. 32. “Russia rows back on plans in Nicaragua cannel construction.” RiaNovosti. http://en.rian.ru. January 18, 2008. 33. “Rusia ofrece a Bolivia misiles y cooperación nuclear.” El Universal. Caracas, Venezuela. April 15, 2010. 34. Steve Stecklow. Farnaz Fassihi. “Iran’s Global Foray Has Mixed Results.” Wall Street Journal Online. http://online.wsj.com. September 29, 2009. 35. “Tata in South America.” Tata. Official Website. http://www.tata.com. Accessed 30 August 2010.

Dr. Evan Ellis is an assistant professor with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS). His research focus is on Latin America’s relationship with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran. His book “China and Latin America: the Whats and Wherefores” was published by Lynne Rienner press in April 2009. Dr. Ellis’ published articles include treatments of Latin America’s relationship with China, populism in the Andes, urban street gangs, military transformation, and regional energy security issues.

Dr. Ellis is also the technical lead for the center’s signature “NationLab” program of custom-designed, interactive exercise events, conducted by CHDS with partner institutions throughout Latin America on issues of strategic importance to the host countries. Dr. Ellis has presented his work on Latin America strategic issues and other topics in a broad range of business and government forums in the United States, Argentina, Bolivia, Belize, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela, France, and the United Kingdom, and is a frequent guest lecturer at the U.S. Air Force Special Operations School.