alerted the wider community to the Ignoring the lessons activities of Abu Hamza and like- minded extremists, the fact is that Abu Hamza (along with Abdullah of the past el Faisal and ) had by then assiduously cultivated small but strong UK followings over a Robert Lambert highlights the extent to long period of time. One of their which previous experiences of terrorism have great attributes as leaders was to been discounted by policy makers and opinion help young Muslims with a wide range of welfare issues. Very often formers in the aftermath of 9/11 and 7/7. new converts to , no less than Muslims newly arrived in , would need help with religious practice, diet, housing, benefits, relationships, employment and many ven though London had been Moreover, once Tony Blair other matters upon which their new the target of terrorist bomb demonstrated his willingness to stand leaders were adept at providing Eattacks since the end of the shoulder to shoulder with the US practical help often at times and in nineteenth century virtually all of the president, George Bush, in the war places where more conventional political and media responses to 7/7 on terror it became increasingly religious leaderships might be found chose to ignore that previous apposite for al-Qaida propagandists lacking (Lambert, 2008a). experience and to address it as an to describe the UK as an acolyte to Not least in the style and manner entirely separate phenomenon its US enemy. In this sense al-Qaida of his delivery, the 7/7 bomber (Phillips, 2006; Gove, 2007). This could be described as an adaptive Mohammad Siddique Khan reveals followed the pattern set by responses social movement with an ability to the influence Abu Hamza and to 9/11 and indicated the extent to engage with the domestic profiles of Abdullah el Faisal have had on him: which UK counter-terrorism strategy different countries and regions, as had become subsumed within a US David Lehany argues in respect of al- By turning our back on this work, led global (Berman, Qaida’s influence in South East Asia we are guaranteeing ourselves 2003). Tony Blair’s key role in (Lehany, 2005). Al-Qaida’s iconic humiliation and the anger of promoting al-Qaida as a new and spokesman Allah. is an obligation on exceptional terrorist threat was all the ensured that his UK supporters had every single one of us, men and more significant given his own templates to adopt and use as the women. …. our so-called scholars contemporaneous experience of terrorist movement stepped up its of today are content with their negotiating with an exponent of ‘old’ propaganda responses to the war on Toyotas and semi-detached terrorism, Sinn Fein, either the terror: houses. They are useless. They political representative of the should stay at home and leave Provisional IRA, or the IRA itself Our actions are a reaction to the job to real men – the true (Lambert, 2008a, 2008b). As Marie yours, which are destruction inheritors of the prophet. Breen Smyth notes, this view has and killing of our people as is (BBC news online) three problematic features: one, it happening in , Iraq, ‘tends towards a-historicity … and Palestine. By what measure To further illustrate this perspective ignoring the historical experiences of of kindness are your killed the case of Abdullah el Faisal is numerous countries’; two, it considered innocents while ours illuminating. By 9/11 el Faisal ‘exceptionalises the experience of the are considered worthless? By had become a familiar speaker US and al-Qaida’; and three, it ‘tends what school [of thought] is your on a national if fringe UK circuit towards “state-centrism”, with the blood considered blood while of Muslim student and Muslim “terrorist” defined as the (security) our blood is water? Therefore, it is community events. While some of problem and inquiry restricted to the [only] just to respond in kind, and these events would be public events assembling of information and data the one who started it is more to with audiences of up to 500, in most that would solve or eradicate the blame… (Lawrence, 2005: 234). cases they would consist of small “problem” as the state defines it’ study cricles, numbering around (Smyth, 2007:1). Of particular Osama bin Laden’s powerful twenty, where attendance was by relevance is Smith’s observation that propaganda messages provided fuel invitation and where young Muslims this new terrorism account ‘ignores for local events in London such as would be encouraged to adopt an al- the roots of terrorism and the Abu Hamza’s meeting at the Finsbury Qaida world-view. At different times contribution of the state itself to the Park on the fi rst anniversary el Faisal appeared with al-Qaida creation of the conditions in which of 9/11 which was provocatively propaganidists Abu Hamza and Abu terrorist action by non-state actors billed, ‘a towering day in history’ Qatada to whom he was unofficially occurs’(Smith, 2007:1). (Lambert, 2008a). While this event junior but with whom he agreed

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rCJM No 73.indd Sec1:22 07/08/2008 08:24:32: on key points and with whom he the significance of the Northern Qaida suicide bombers (or other enjoyed cordial relations. Unlike the Ireland experience of ‘suspect active terrorists) UK Muslim recruits other two however he was especially communities’ over thirty years in a have bought into an ideology and influential with members of the black counter-terrorist context. But while thus distorted strands of Salafi and Muslim convert community where all Northern Irish communities might Islamist thinking. That is why Salafis he enjoyed high status. Significantly, have suffered to some degree the and Islamists often have the best the UK Home Office narrative of evidence is clear in demonstrating antidotes to al-Qaida propaganda TERRORISM the July 7 bombings records that el that one religious group – Irish once it has taken hold. To conflate Faisal’s calls to violence had found a Catholics – bore the brunt of them with the problem is to inhibit willing audience in Jermaine Lindsay, stereotyping, profiling and their willingness to immunise their who killed himself and 26 others on stigmatisation. On this basis Tarique communities against it and to ignore a Piccadilly line underground train Ghaffur and Ali Dezai – senior previous experience. near Russell Square in the 2005 Muslim police voices in London – terrorist attack (Home Office 2006). make brave and important points in Robert Lambert is a Research Fellow at Since 9/11 UK counter-terrorism arguing against the blanket profiling the University of Exeter. He was co-founder has not been immune to the war on of Asian Muslim communities (Judd and head of the Metropolitan Police Muslim Contact Unit until retirement at the end of terror’s overarching ‘you are either 2006). In doing so, however, both 2007. with us or against us’ attitude to officers unintentionally compound Muslim communities. Politicians are the greater risk of minority sections certainly more of Muslim References: comfortable communities – Berman, P. (2003), Terror and Liberalism, when they can Since 9/11 UK counter- especially London: Norton. appear in the Salafis and BBC online, 2 September 2005, http:// media being terrorism has not been Islamists – being news..co.uk/1/hi/uk/4206708.stm tough on immune to the war on stigmatised in Gove, M. (2006), Celsius 7/7, London: terrorism. In the same way Weidenfield & Nicholson. most instances terror’s overarching Irish Catholics Hillyard, P. (1993), Suspect Community: this will manifest were. People’s Experience of the Prevention of itself in support ‘you are either with Certainly, it Terrorism Acts in Britain, London: Pluto for extended us or against us’ is misleading Press. powers of and counter- Innes, M. (2006), ‘Policing uncertainty: detention and attitude to Muslim productive to countering terror through community expanded police endorse the intelligence and democratic policing’, powers communities. stereotyping, Annals of the American Academy, 605, generally. profiling and pp. 1–20. Invariably police chiefs will mirror conflating of Salafis and Islamists Judd, T. (2006), ‘Police in public feud such postures just as the UK’s with al-Qaida terrorism. However, over profiling’, , 21 Association of Chief Police Officers the superficial argument that the root August. (ACPO) did in endorsing the causes of 7/7 lie with Islamists and Lambert, R. (2008a), Countering al-Qaida government’s call for a massively Salafis gained further ground when Propaganda and Recruitment in London: increased period of pre-charge Ed Husain and other former Islamists An Insider’s Interpretive Case Study. PhD detention in 2005. At such times launched the Foundation (a dissertation. Department of Politics, University of Exeter. there appears to be little self styled ‘counter-extremism think consideration of the likely impact of tank’ run by former members of Hizb Lambert, R. (2008b), ‘Empowering Salafis such measures on terrorist ut Tahrir) in 2008. Rather, the fact and Islamists against Al-Qaida: a London counter-terrorism Case study’, PS: recruitment. Instead the debate is that al-Qaida terrorists adapt and Political Science and Politics 41 (1). typically between ‘tough’ politicians distort Salafi and Islamist approaches and police chiefs – in one corner – to Islam does not mean that Salafis Lawrence, B. (ed). (2005), Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin and human rights lawyers and and Islamists are implicitly linked to Laden. London: Verso, p. 234. activists who are caricatured in the terrorism or extremism still less that Lehany, D. (2005), ‘Terrorism, social media as the ‘bleeding heart liberals’ individual Islamists and Salafis are movements, and international security: – in the other. Moreover, while likely to be terrorists or extremists. how Al Qaeda affects Southeast Asia’, counter-terrorism has long No more was Catholicism a key Japanese Journal of Political Science 6 recognised the value of community pointer to Provisional IRA terrorism. (1), pp. 87-109. intelligence it tends to see this role as Equally, it is true that UK recruits to Phillips, M. (2006), : How falling to non specialist colleagues – al-Qaida have a range of Britain Is Creating a Terror State Within, community or neighbourhood police backgrounds that will sometimes London: Gibson Square. officers (Innes, 2006). include prior affiliation to, or family Smyth, M. B. (2007), ‘A critical research However, when addressing association with Sufi or agenda for the study of terrorism’, Muslim community groups post 7/7 traditions. However, it is axiomatic European Consortium for Political Paddy Hillyard is right to highlight that by the time they become al- Research, Symposium paper, p.1.

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