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Hideo Konishi Current Position Past Positions Education Hideo Konishi O¢ ce: Department of Economics, Boston College, 140 Commonwealth Avenue, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467-3806: (phone) 617-552-1209, (fax) 617-552-2308, (email)[email protected] Citizenship: Japan (US permanent resident) Marital Status: Married, two children Current Position Professor of Economics, Boston College (2005-) Past Positions 2015-18, Chairman, Economics Department, Boston College 1999-2005, Associate Professor, Boston College 1998-1999, Associate Professor, Southern Methodist University 1994-1998, Assistant Professor, Southern Methodist University 2002, Visiting Research Fellow, RIEB, Kobe University, Japan 1997-2001, 2007, 2008, Visiting Researcher, KIER, Kyoto University, Japan 1997, Visiting Scholar, Department of Economics, Boston University 1996, Visiting Researcher, GREQAM, University of Aix-Marseille, France 1996-1999, Nonresident Research Fellow, Tokyo Center of Economic Research. Education Ph.D. in Economics, University of Rochester, May 1994 M.A. in Economics, University of Rochester, May 1993 M.A. in Economics, Osaka University, Osaka Japan, March 1989 B.A. in Economics, Kyoto University, Kyoto Japan, March, 1987 Fields of Specialization Microeconomic Theory, Public Economics, Urban Economics, Game Theory, Industrial Organiza- tion, International Trade, Political Economy Teaching Graduate: Microeconomics I (consumer theory and producer theory), II (general equilibrium), III (game theory), Public Economics (expenditure), Public Economics (taxation), Industrial Or- ganization, Economic Theory (cooperative games) Undergrad: Intermediate Microeconomics, Public Finance, Urban Economics, Game Theory in Economics Professional Service Editorial Board, Social Choice and Welfare (Springer Verlag): 2008- Associate Editor, Journal of Public Economic Theory (Wiley): 1998- Associate Editor, Regional Science and Urban Economics (Elsevier): 2007-2018 Associate Editor, Economics Bulletin (http://www.economicbulletin.net/): 2000-2016 Honors Nakahara Prize (the Japanese Economic Association, 2009) Osaka University Global Alumni Fellow (Osaka University, Japan, 2015) Memberships of Academic Associations American Economic Association Econometric Society Society of Social Choice and Welfare Association for Public Economic Theory Japanese Economic Association Published and Accepted Papers Sharing Rules in Group Contests in the Presence of E¤ort Complementarity, (with Katsuya Kobayashi), forthcoming in Social Choice and Welfare. Partisan and Bipartisan Gerrymandering, (with Chen-Yu Pan), Journal of Public Economic The- ory 22, 1183-1212 (2020). Sequential Formation of Alliances in Survival Contests, (with Chen-Yu Pan), International Journal of Economic Theory 16, 95-105 (2020) (Festschrift in Honor of Marcus Berliant). Silent Promotion of Agendas: Campaign Contributions and Ideological Polarization, (with Chen- Yu Pan), Public Choice 182, 93-117 (2020). International Trade and Income Inequality, (with Taiji Furusawa and Duong Tran Lam Anh), Scandinavian Journal of Economics 122, 993-1026 (2020). Endogenous Party Structure, (with Katsuya Kobayashi), Economics of Governance 17, 317-351 (2016). Consumer Referrals, (with Maria Arbatskaya), International Journal of Industrial Organization 48, 34-58 (2016). Household Formation and Markets, (with Hans Gersbach and Hans Haller), Economic Theory 59, 461-507 (2015). Managing Consumer Referral on a Chain Network, (with Maria Arbatskaya), Review of Network Economics 13, 69–94 (2014). Voluntary Participation and the Provision of Public Goods in Large Finite Economies, (with Ryusuke Shinohara), Journal of Public Economic Theory 16, 173-195 (2014). Market Share Regulation?, (with Çaglar Yurtseven), Japan and the World Economy 29, 36-45 (2014). Choosing a Licensee from Heterogeneous Rivals, (with Anthony Creane and Chiu Yu Ko), Games and Economic Behavior 82, 254–268 (2013). Entrepreneurial Land Developers: Joint Production, Local Externalities and Mixed Housing De- velopments, Journal of Urban Economics 75, 68-79 (2013). Pro…t-Maximizing Matchmaker, (with Chiu-Yu Ko), Games and Economic Behavior 75, 217-232 (2012). Referrals in Search Markets, (with Maria Arbatskaya), International Journal of Industrial Orga- nization 30, 89-101 (2011). Contributing or Free-Riding? Voluntary Participation in a Public Good Economy, (with Taiji Furusawa), Theoretical Economics 6, 219-256 (2011). Carpooling and Congestion Pricing: HOV and HOT Lanes, (with Se-il Mun), Regional Science and Urban Economics 40, 173-186, (2010). E¢ cient Mixed Clubs: Nonlinear-Pricing Equilibria with Entreprenerial Managers, Japanese Eco- nomic Review 61, 35-63, (2010) (the 2009 JEA Nakahara Prize Lecture). The Unilateral Incentives for Technology Transfers: Predation by Proxy (and deterrence), (with Anthony Creane), International Journal of Industrial Organization 27, 379-389, (2009). Global Free Trade is in the Core of Customs Union Formation Game, (with Carsten Kowalczyk and Tomas Sjöström), Review of International Economics 17, 304-309, (2009), (special issue in memory of Koji Shimomura). Tiebout’s Tale in Spatial Economies: Entrepreneurship, Self-Selection and E¢ ciency, Regional Science and Urban Economics 38, 461-477, (2008), (special issue in honor of Masahisa Fujita). Decentralized Matching Markets with Endogenous Salaries, (with Margarita Sapozhnikov), Games and Economic Behavior 64, 193-218, (2008). Free Trade Networks, (with Taiji Furusawa), Journal of International Economics 72, 310-335, (2007); reprinted in “Coalition Theory Network: the 20th Anniversary Celebratory Volume”edited by Carlo Carraro (2015). Games of Capacity Manipulations in Hospital-Intern Markets, (with M. Utku Ünver), Social Choice and Welfare 27, 3-24, (2006). Credible Group-Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Problems, (with M. Utku Ünver), Journal of Economic Theory 129, 57-80 (2006). “Salience”: Agenda Choices by Competing Candidates, (with Marcus Berliant), Public Choice 125, 129-149, (2005). Concentration of Competing Retail Stores, Journal of Urban Economics 58, 488-512, (2005). Free Trade Networks with Transfers, (with Taiji Furusawa), Japanese Economic Review 56, 144- 164, (2005). A Welfare Decomposition in Quasi-Linear Economies, (with Taiji Furusawa), Economics Letters 85, 29-34, (2004). Uniqueness of User Equilibrium in Transportation Networks with Heterogeneous Commuters, Transportation Science 38, 315-330, (2004). Coalition Formation as a Dynamic Process, Journal of Economic Theory 110, 1-41, (with Debraj Ray), (2003). Anchor Stores, Journal of Urban Economics 53, 413-435, (with Michael T. Sandfort), (2003). Migration-Proof Tiebout Equilibrium: Existence and Asymptotic E¢ ciency, Journal of Public Economics 86, 241-260, (with John P. Conley), (2002). Expanding Demand through Price Advertisement, International Journal of Industrial Organiza- tion 20, 965-994, (with Michael T. Sandfort), (2002). Existence of Stationary Equilibrium in the Markets for New and Used Durable Goods, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 26, 1029-1052, (with Michael T. Sandfort), (2002). On E¢ cient Jurisdiction Structures in a Simple Local Public Goods Economy with Interjurisdic- tional Trade, Economics Bulletin, (2001), (http://www.economicsbulletin.com/2001/volume8/EB- 01H40001A.pdf). On the Shapley-Scarf Economy: The Case of Multiple Types of Indivisible Goods, Journal of Mathematical Economics 35, 1-15, (with Thomas Quint and Jun Wako), (2001). Core in a Simple Coalition Formation Game, Social Choice and Welfare 18, 135-153, (with Suryapratim Banerjee and Tayfun Sönmez), (2001). Formation of Hub Cities: Transportation Cost Advantage and Population Agglomeration, Journal of Urban Economics 48, 1-28, (2000). The Endogenous Formation of a City: Population Agglomeration and Marketplaces in a Location- Speci…c Production Economy, Regional Sciences and Urban Economics 30, 289-324, (with Marcus Berliant), (2000). Stable Cartels with a Cournot Fringe in a Symmetric Oligopoly, Keio Economic Studies 36, 1-10, (with Ping Lin), (1999). Endogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direct Investment, Journal of International Economics 47, 939-958, (with Kamal Saggi and Shlomo Weber), (1999). On Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria in Common Agency Games, Journal of Economic Theory 85, 122-139, (with Michel Le Breton and Shlomo Weber), (1999). Equilibrium in a Finite Local Public Goods Economy, Journal of Economic Theory 79, 224-244, (with Michel Le Breton and Shlomo Weber), (1998). Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in a Group Formation Game with Positive Externality, Games and Economic Behavior 21, 161-182, (with Michel Le Breton and Shlomo Weber), (1997); will be reprinted in “Coalition Theory Network: the 20th Anniversary Celebratory Volume”edited by Carlo Carraro (2015). Group Formation in Games without Spillovers: A Noncooperative Game-Theoretical Approach, in “New Directions in the Economic Theory of the Environment,”edited by Carlo Carraro, Cam- bridge University Press (London), (with Michel Le Breton and Shlomo Weber), (1997). Existence of Steady-State Equilibrium in an Overlapping Generations Model with Production, Economic Theory 9, 529-537, (with Fernando Perera-Tallo), (1997). Free Mobility Equilibrium in a Local Public Good Economy, Research in Economics 51, 19-30, (with Michel Le Breton and Shlomo Weber), (1997). Equilibrium in a Model with Partial Rivalry, Journal of Economic Theory 72, 225-237, (with Michel Le Breton and Shlomo Weber), (1997). Equivalence of Strong and Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria in the Games without Spillovers, Eco- nomic Theory 9,
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