Voter Behaviour and Constitutional Change in Since 1967

By

Warren Keir BTh (ACT), BA(Hon), B SocSci QLD

A thesis submitted in full requirement for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

In the

Humanities Research Program

Queensland University of Technology

2009

Keywords

aggregate survey; attitudes to issues; constitution; democracy; ecological inference; elections; electorate; electoral and political behaviour; funnel of causality; federalism; Michigan Model; orientation to candidates; partisanship; party identification; ; representative democracy; voters; voter behaviour.

ii Abstract

Australian Constitutional referendums have been part of the Australian political system since federation. Up to the year 1999 (the time of the last in Australia), constitutional change in Australia does not have a good history of acceptance. Since 1901, there have been 44 proposed constitutional changes with eight gaining the required acceptance according to section 128 of the Australian Constitution. In the modern era since 1967, there have been 20 proposals over seven referendum votes for a total of four changes. Over this same period, there have been 13 federal general elections which have realised change in government just five times.

This research examines the electoral behaviour of Australian voters from 1967 to 1999 for each referendum. Party identification has long been a key indicator in general election voting. This research considers whether the dominant theory of voter behaviour in general elections (the Michigan Model) provides a plausible explanation for voting in Australian referendums.

In order to explain electoral behaviour in each referendum, this research has utilised available data from the Australian Electoral Commission, the 1996 Australian Bureau of Statistics Census data, and the 1999 Australian Constitutional Referendum Study. This data has provided the necessary variables required to measure the impact of the Michigan Model of voter behaviour. Measurements have been conducted using bivariate and multivariate analyses. Each referendum provides an overview of the events at the time of the referendum as well as the ‗yes‘ and ‗no‘ cases at the time each referendum was initiated.

Results from this research provide support for the Michigan Model of voter behaviour in Australian referendum voting. This research concludes that party identification, as a key variable of the Michigan Model, shows that voters continue to take their cues for voting from the political party they identify with in Australian referendums. However, the outcome of Australian referendums clearly shows that partisanship is only one of a number of contributory factors in constitutional referendums.

iii Abbreviations

ACRS Australian Constitutional Referendum Study

ACM for a Constitutional Monarchy

ARM Australian Republican Movement

AEC Australian Electoral Commission

AEO Australian Electoral Office

AES Australian Electoral Study

ABS Australian Bureau of Statistics

ALP

ATSI Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders

LP Liberal Party

MP Member of Parliament

MPs Members of Parliament

iv Statement of Original Authorship

The work presented in this thesis is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, original and my own work, except as acknowledged in the text. The material has not been submitted, either in whole or in part, for a degree at this or any other university.

Signature

Warren Keir

Date: 21 January 2009

v Acknowledgements

Writing this research would not have been possible without the guidance given by my principle supervisor, Professor Clive Bean. Other significant input and help has come from Dr David Gow of the University of - the person who first encouraged me to undertake PhD research. I would also like to thank Dr Gavin Kendell for his input into this research. Special mention goes to my wife (Deborah) and family and for their constant encouragement to complete this research.

I would also like to thank QUT for the opportunity to undertake this research as part of the QUTPRA scholarship program and the understanding and patience the Research Degrees Committee has shown.

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Table of Contents

Title Page ...... i Keywords ...... ii Abstract ...... iii Abbreviations ...... iv Statement of Original Authorship ...... v Acknowledgements ...... vi Table of Contents ...... vii CHAPTER ONE...... 1 1.0 The Research Problem ...... 1 1.1 The Australian Constitution ...... 3 1.2 The Referendum...... 5 1.3 Voter Behaviour ...... 7 Figure 1: The Michigan Model of Voter Choice (Gow & Stenner 1992: 8)...... 8 Figure 2: Pathways of voter choice (Marks 1993: 143) ...... 9 1.4 Problems Associated with Referendum Analysis ...... 11 CHAPTER TWO ...... 13 2.0 Literature Review and Previous Research ...... 13 2.1 Constitutionalism, the Australian Constitution and Constitutional Change ...... 14 2.2 Understanding the Australian Constitution ...... 17 2.3 Method of Alteration to the Constitution ...... 18 2.4 Federalism and the Constitution ...... 19 2.5 Formal Constitutional Amendment: The Referendum ...... 23 2.6 Democratic Theory and its Impact on Constitutional Change ...... 25 2.7 Democratic Practice in Australia ...... 26 2.9 Determinants of Voter Behaviour ...... 31 2.10 Issues Affecting Electoral Analysis ...... 32 2.11 The Michigan Model and the Funnel of Causality ...... 33 Figure 1.1 Funnel of Causality Predicting Vote Choice ...... 34 2.12 Issues Affecting Voting and Referendum Analysis ...... 39 2.13 Current Analyses of Referendum Voting ...... 41 CHAPTER THREE ...... 47 3.0 Methodology ...... 47 3.1 Data Collection Process ...... 47 3.2 Proposed Hypotheses ...... 48 3.3 Aggregate Level Data Hypotheses and Coding ...... 49 3.4 Hypothesis #1 ...... 50 3.5 Hypothesis #2 ...... 51 3.6 Hypothesis #3 ...... 52 3.7 Hypothesis #4 ...... 53 3.8 Hypothesis #5 ...... 54 3.9 Methods of Analysis ...... 55 3.10 The Bivariate and Multivariate Models ...... 56 3.11 Descriptive and Causal Inferences ...... 57 3.12 Aggregate Data Analysis and Ecological Inference ...... 58 Explanation and Coding of 1999 ACRS Variables ...... 62 3.13 Dependent Variables ...... 62 3.14 Independent Variables ...... 62 3.15 Variables Used from Aggregate Data ...... 63 3.16 Aggregate Data - Dependent Variable ...... 64 3.17 Aggregate Data - Independent Variables ...... 64

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CHAPTER FOUR ...... 66 4.0 The 1967 Referendum under Holt ...... 66 4.1 Background ...... 67 4.2 The ‗Yes‘ and ‗No‘ Cases ...... 71 1967 Results...... 72 4.3 Question One: The Nexus Issue ...... 72 Table 4.1 1966 Federal Electorate Information (Frequency and Percents) ...... 73 Table 4.2 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1967 Nexus Question by Geographical Location ...... 75 Table 4.3 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1967 Nexus Question by State Location of Electorates ...... 76 Table 4.4 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1967 Nexus Question by Elected Federal MP (2 party preferred) ...... 77 Table 4.5 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1967 Nexus Question by Safeness of Seat / Electorate (2 party preferred) ...... 78 Table 4.6 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1967 Nexus Question by similarity of Commonwealth / State political party ...... 79 4.4 Question Two: Aboriginal Citizenship ...... 80 Table 4.7 Mean percentage of electorate support for the 1967 Aboriginal Question by Geographical Location ...... 81 Table 4.8 Mean percentage of electorate support for the 1967 Aboriginal Question by State ...... 82 Table 4.8a Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Population ...... 82 Table 4.9 Mean percentage of electorate support for the 1967 Aboriginal Question by 1966 Elected MP (2 party preferred) ...... 83 Table 4.10 Mean percentage of electorate support for the 1967 Aboriginal Question by 1966 Safeness of Seat (2 party preferred) ...... 84 Table 4.11 Mean percentage of electorate support for the 1967 Aboriginal Question by State Government Political Party ...... 84 4.5 1967 Regression Analysis ...... 85 Table 4.12 Regression Table for Nexus and Aboriginal Questions at the 1967 Referendum ...... 86 Model Summary Results for Table 4.12 ...... 86 4.6 Discussion ...... 86 Figure 4.1 Comparison of Electorate Voting Trends at 1967 Referendum by geographical location of electorates...... 88 CHAPTER FIVE...... 91 5.0 The Whitlam Referendums: 1973 and 1974 ...... 91 5.1 1973 Results...... 93 Table 5.1 Federal Electorate Information (Frequency and Percents) ...... 94 5.2 Question One: Prices ...... 95 Table 5.2 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1973 Question on Prices by Geographical Location of Electorates ...... 96 Table 5.3 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1973 Question on Prices by State Location of Electorates ...... 97 Table 5.4 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1973 Question on Prices by Party Elected Federal MP (2 party preferred) ...... 98 Table 5.5 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1973 Question on Prices by Safeness of Seat / Electorate (2 party preferred) ...... 99 Table 5.6 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1973 Question on Prices by Federal / State Party Alignment ...... 99 5.3 Question Two: Incomes ...... 100 Table 5.7 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1973 Question on Incomes by Geographical Location of Electorates ...... 100 Table 5.8 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1973 Question on Incomes by State Location of Electorates ...... 101 Table 5.9 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1973 Question on Incomes by Elected Federal MP (2 party preferred)...... 102

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Table 5.10 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1973 Question on Incomes by Safeness of Seat / Electorate (2 party preferred) ...... 103 Table 5.11 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1973 Question on Incomes by Federal / State Party Alignment ...... 104 5.4 1973 Regression Analysis ...... 104 Table 5.12 Regression Table for Prices and Incomes Questions at the 1973 Referendum 105 5.5 The 1974 Referendum ...... 107 5.6 1974 Results ...... 110 Table 5.13 Federal Electorate Information Associated with the 1974 Referendum (Frequencies and Percents) ...... 111 5.7 Question One: Simultaneous Elections ...... 111 Table 5.14 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1974 Question on Simultaneous Elections by Geographical Location of Electorates ...... 112 Table 5.15 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1974 Question on Simultaneous Elections by State Location of Electorates ...... 112 Table 5.16 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1974 Question on Simultaneous Elections by Elected Federal MP (2 party preferred) ...... 113 Table 5.17 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1974 Question on Simultaneous Elections by Safeness of Seat / Electorate (2 party pref) ...... 114 Table 5.18 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1974 Question on Simultaneous Elections by Federal / State Party Alignment ...... 115 5.8 Question Two: Mode of Altering the Constitution ...... 115 Table 5.19 Proportion of electorates supporting the 1974 Question on the Mode of Altering the Constitution by Geographical Location of Electorates ...... 116 Table 5.20 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1974 Question on the Mode of Altering the Constitution by State Location of Electorates ...... 117 Table 5.21 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1974 Question on Mode of Altering the Constitution by Elected Federal MP (2 party pref) ...... 118 Table 5.22 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1974 Question on Mode of Altering the Constitution by Safeness of Seat ...... 118 Table 5.23 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1974 Question on Mode of Altering the Constitution by Federal / State Party Alignment ...... 119 5.9 Question Three: Democratic Elections ...... 120 Table 5.24 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1974 Question on Democratic Elections by Geographical Location of Electorates ...... 120 Table 5.25 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1974 Question on Democratic Elections by State Location of Electorates ...... 121 Table 5.26 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1974 Question on Democratic Elections by Elected Federal MP (2 party preferred) ...... 122 Table 5.27 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1974 Question on Democratic Elections by Safeness of Seat / Electorate (2 party preferred) ..... 123 Table 5.28 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1974 Question on Democratic Elections by Political Party of State Government ...... 123 5.10 Question Four: Local Government Bodies ...... 123 Table 5.29 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1974 Question on Local Governments by Geographical Location of Electorates ...... 124 Table 5.30 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1974 Question on Local Governments by State Location of Electorates ...... 125 Table 5.31 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1974 Question on Local Governments by Elected Federal MP (2 party preferred) ...... 126 Table 5.32 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1974 Question on Local Governments by Safeness of Seat / Electorate (2 party preferred) ...... 126 Table 5.33 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1974 Question on Local Government by Political Party of State Government ...... 128 Figure 5.1: Electorate Geographical Location by 1974 Referendum Question ...... 128 Figure 5.2: Location of Electorates within each State by Referendum Question ...... 129 Figure 5.3: Federal versus State Political Party by Referendum Question ...... 130 Figure 5.4: Marginality of Electorate Seat by Referendum Question ...... 130 5.11 1974 Regression Analysis ...... 131 Table 5.34 Regression Table of 1974 Referendum Questions ...... 132

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5.12 Discussion ...... 134 CHAPTER SIX ...... 138 6.0 The 1977 Referendum under Fraser...... 138 6.1 The ‗Yes‘ and ‗No‘ Cases ...... 139 1977 Results ...... 142 6.2 Question One: Simultaneous Elections ...... 142 Table 6.1 1975 Federal Electorate Information (Frequency and Percents) ...... 143 Table 6.2 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1977 question on Simultaneous Elections by Geographical Location ...... 144 Table 6.3 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1977 question on Simultaneous Elections by State ...... 144 Table 6.4 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1977 question on Simultaneous Elections by Elected Member of Parliament (1975) ...... 145 Table 6.5 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1977 question on Simultaneous Elections by Safeness of Seat (1975) ...... 146 Table 6.6 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1977 question on Simultaneous Elections by Federal / State Party Alignment ...... 147 6.3 Question Two: Senate Casual Vacancies ...... 147 Table 6.7 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1977 question on Senate Casual Vacancies by Geographical Location ...... 148 Table 6.8 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1977 question on Senate Casual Vacancies by State Location of Electorates ...... 148 Table 6.9 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1977 question on Senate Casual Vacancies by Elected Federal MP (2 party preferred) ...... 149 Table 6.10 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1977 question on Senate Casual Vacancies by Safeness of Seat / Electorate (2 party preferred) ...... 150 Table 6.11 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1977 question on Senate Casual Vacancies by Federal / State Party Alignment ...... 151 6.5 Question Three: Territory Vote in Referendums ...... 151 Table 6.12 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1977 question on Territory Vote in Referendums by Geographical Location ...... 152 Table 6.13 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1977 question on Territory Vote in Referendums by State Location of Electorates ...... 153 Table 6.14 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1977 question on Territory Vote in Referendums by Elected Federal MP (2 party preferred) ..... 153 Table 6.15 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1977 question on Territory Vote in Referendums by Safeness of Seat (2 party preferred) ...... 154 Table 6.16 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1977 question on Territory Vote in Referendums by Federal / State Party Alignment ...... 155 6.6 Question Four: Retirement Age of Judges ...... 155 Table 6.17 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1977 question on Territory Vote in Referendums by Geographical Location of Electorates ...... 156 Table 6.18 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1977 question on Retirement of Judges by State Location of Electorates ...... 156 Table 6.19 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1977 question on Retirement of Judges by Elected Federal MP (2 party preferred) ...... 157 Table 6.20 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1977 question on Retirement of Judges by Safeness of Seat (2 party preferred) ...... 158 Table 6.21 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1977 question on Retirement age of judges by Federal / State Party Alignment ...... 158 6.7 1977 Regression Analysis ...... 158 Table 6.22 Regression Table of 1977 Referendum Questions ...... 159 6.8 Discussion ...... 161 Figure 6.1 Mean Percentage of Yes Vote by Geographical Location of Electorate ...... 163 Figure 6.2 Mean Percentage of Yes Vote by State Location of Electorate ...... 164 Figure 6.3 Mean Percentage of Yes Vote by Two-party Preferred Electorate for 1977 Referendum Questions ...... 165 Figure 6.4 Mean Percentage of Yes Vote by Safeness of Seat for 1977 Referendum for Questions ...... 166

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CHAPTER SEVEN ...... 167 7.0 The 1984 and 1988 Referendums under Hawke ...... 167 7.1 The ‗Yes‘ and ‗No‘ Cases ...... 168 1984 Results ...... 173 7.2 Question One: Terms of Senators ...... 173 Table 7.1 1984 Federal Electorate Information (Frequency and Percents) ...... 173 Table 7.2 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1984 ‘Terms of Senators Question by Geographical Location ...... 174 Table 7.3 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1984 question on Terms of Senators by State Location of Electorates ...... 175 Table 7.4 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1984 question on Terms of Senators by Elected Federal MP (2 party preferred) ...... 176 Table 7.5 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1984 question on Terms of Senators by Safeness of Seat / Electorate (2 Party Preferred) ...... 176 Table 7.6 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1984 question on Terms of Senators by Federal / State Party Alignment ...... 177 7.3 Question Two: Interchange of Powers ...... 178 Table 7.7 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1984 question on Interchange of Powers by Geographical Location of Electorates ...... 178 Table 7.8 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1984 question on Interchange of Powers by State Location of Electorates ...... 180 Table 7.9 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1984 question on Interchange of Powers by Elected Federal MP (2 Party Preferred) ...... 181 Table 7.10 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1984 question on Interchange of Powers by Safeness of Seat / Electorate (2 party preferred) .... 182 Table 7.11 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1984 question on Interchange of Powers by political alignment of Federal/State Govt ...... 183 7.4 1984 Regression Analysis ...... 183 Table 7.12 Regression Table for Terms of Senators and the Interchange of Powers Questions at the 1984 Referendum ...... 184 7.5 Discussion ...... 185 The 1988 Referendum ...... 187 7.6 Background ...... 187 7.7 The ‗Yes‘ and ‗No‘ Cases ...... 188 7.8 1988 Results ...... 193 Table 7.13 1987 Federal Electorate Information (Frequency and Percents) ...... 193 7.9 Question One: Parliamentary Terms ...... 194 Table 7.14 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1988 question on Parliamentary Terms by Geographical Location of Electorates ...... 194 Table 7.15 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1988 question on Parliamentary Terms by State Location of Electorates ...... 195 Table 7.16 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1988 question on Parliamentary Terms by Elected Federal MP (2 party preferred) ...... 195 Table 7.17 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1988 question on Parliamentary Terms by Safeness of Seat / Electorate (2 party preferred) ...... 196 Table 7.18 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1988 question on Parliamentary Terms by Federal / State Party Alignment ...... 197 7.10 Question Two: Fair Elections ...... 197 Table 7.19 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1988 question on Fair Elections by Geographical Location of Electorates ...... 198 Table 7.20 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1988 question on Fair Elections by State Location of Electorates ...... 199 Table 7.21 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1988 question on Fair Elections by Elected Federal MP (2 party preferred) ...... 200 Table 7.22 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1988 question on Fair Elections by Safeness of Seat / Electorate (2 party preferred) ...... 201 Table 7.23 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1988 question on Fair Elections by political alignment of Federal/State govt ...... 201 7.11 Question Three: Local Government ...... 202

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Table 7.24 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1988 question on Local Government by Geographical Location of Electorates ...... 203 Table 7.25 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1988 question on Local Government by State Location of Electorates ...... 204 Table 7.26 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1988 question on Local Government by Elected Federal MP (2 party preferred) ...... 204 Table 7.27 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1988 question on Local Government by Safeness of Seat / Electorate (2 Party Preferred) ...... 205 Table 7.28 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1988 question on Local Government by Federal / State Party Alignment ...... 206 7.12 Question Four: Rights and Freedoms ...... 206 Table 7.29 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1988 question on Rights and Freedoms by Geographical Location of Electorates ...... 208 Table 7.30 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1988 question on Rights and Freedoms by State Location of Electorates ...... 209 Table 7.31 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1988 question on Rights and Freedoms by Elected Federal MP (2 party preferred) ...... 209 Table 7.32 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1988 question on Rights and Freedoms by Safeness of Seat / Electorate (2 party preferred) ...... 210 Table 7.33 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1988 question on Rights and Freedoms by Federal / State Party Alignment ...... 211 7.13 1988 Regression Analysis ...... 211 Table 7.34 Regression Table of 1988 Referendum Questions ...... 212 7.14 Discussion ...... 213 CHAPTER EIGHT ...... 215 8.0 The 1999 Referendum under Howard ...... 215 8.1 The Yes and No Cases ...... 216 8.2 1999 Results...... 221 Table 8.1 1998 Federal Electorate Information (Frequency and Percents) ...... 222 8.3 Question One: The Republic ...... 222 Table 8.2 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1999 question of an Australian Republic by Geographical Location of Electorates ...... 223 Table 8.3 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1999 question of an Australian Republic by State Location of Electorates ...... 223 Table 8.4 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1999 question of an Australian Republic by Elected Federal MP (2-party preferred) ...... 224 Table 8.5 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1999 question of an Australian Republic by Safeness of Seat (2-party preferred) ...... 225 Table 8.6 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1999 question of an Australian Republic by Federal / State Party Alignment ...... 226 8.4 Question Two: The Preamble ...... 226 Table 8.7 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1999 question of a Preamble by Geographical Location of Electorates ...... 227 Table 8.8 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1999 question of a Preamble by State Location of Electorates ...... 228 Table 8.9 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1999 question of a Preamble by Elected Federal MP (2-party preferred) ...... 229 Table 8.10 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1999 question of a Preamble by Safeness of Seat (2-party preferred) ...... 230 Table 8.11 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1999 question of a Preamble by Federal / State Political Party Alignment ...... 231 8.5 1999 Regression Analysis ...... 231 Table 8.12 Regression Table for Republic and Preamble Questions at the 1999 Referendum ...... 232 8.6 Michigan Model of Vote Choice - the 1999 Referendum ...... 233 Figure 8.1: Sociological Variables in the Michigan Model of Voter Choice ...... 234 8.6.1 Proposed Hypotheses ...... 234 8.6.2 Ethnicity Hypothesis ...... 235 8.6.3 Gender and Employment Hypotheses ...... 235

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8.6.4 The Age Hypothesis ...... 236 8.6.5 The Religion Hypothesis ...... 236 8.6.6 The Income Hypothesis ...... 236 8.6.7 The Education Hypothesis...... 237 8.6.8 The Occupation Hypothesis ...... 237 Bivariate Correlation Analysis ...... 238 8.7 Hypothesis #1: Ethnicity ...... 238 Table 8.13 Correlation Table of 1999 Referendum Questions by Ethnicity ...... 240 8.8 Hypothesis #2: Gender and Employment ...... 240 Table 8.14 Correlation Table of 1999 Referendum Questions by Gender and Employment Status ...... 243 8.9 Hypothesis #3: Age ...... 243 Table 8.15 Correlation Table of 1999 Referendum Questions by Age (Over 18) ...... 244 8.10 Hypothesis #4: Religion ...... 244 Table 8.16 Correlation Table of 1999 Referendum Questions by Religion ...... 247 8.11 Social Class ...... 248 8.12 Hypothesis #5: Income ...... 249 Table 8.17 Correlation Table of 1999 Referendum Questions by Income ...... 250 8.13 Hypothesis #6: Education ...... 251 Table 8.18 Correlation Table of 1999 Referendum Questions by Education ...... 252 8.14 Hypothesis #7: Occupation ...... 253 Table 8.19 Correlation Table of 1999 Referendum Questions by Occupation ...... 254 8.15 Regression Analysis of Census Data...... 254 Table 8.20 Regression Table of 1999 Referendum Question on Republic...... 255 Table 8.21 Regression Table of 1999 Referendum Question on Preamble ...... 256 CHAPTER NINE ...... 258 9.0 The 1999 Australian Constitutional Referendum Study ...... 258 Table 9.1 1998 Federal Electorate Information (Frequency and Percents) [Over 3 pages] ...... 258 Table 9.2 Proportion of respondents supporting change on the 1999 question of a REPUBLIC by Geographical Location of respondents ...... 260 Table 9.3 Proportion of respondents supporting change on the 1999 question of a REPUBLIC by State Location of respondents ...... 261 Table 9.4 Proportion of respondents supporting change on the 1999 question of a PREAMBLE by Geographical Location of respondents ...... 262 Table 9.5 Proportion of respondents supporting change on the 1999 question of a PREAMBLE by State Location of respondents ...... 262 Table 9.6 Proportion of respondents supporting change on the 1999 question of a REPUBLIC by self reported Party Identification of respondents ...... 263 Table 9.7 Proportion of respondents supporting change on the 1999 question of a REPUBLIC by who respondents voted for at the previous Federal Election ... 264 Table 9.8 Proportion of respondents supporting change on the 1999 question of a PREAMBLE by self reported Party Identification of respondents ...... 264 Table 9.9 Proportion of respondents supporting change on the 1999 question of a PREAMBLE by who respondents voted for at the previous Federal Election .. 265 Table 9.10 Proportion of respondents supporting change on the 1999 question of a REPUBLIC by Age Groups of respondents ...... 266 Table 9.11 Proportion of respondents supporting change on the 1999 question of a PREAMBLE by Age Groups of respondents ...... 266 Table 9.12 Proportion of respondents supporting change on the 1999 question of a REPUBLIC by Religious Affiliation of respondents ...... 267 Table 9.13 Proportion of respondents supporting change on the 1999 question of a PREAMBLE by Religious Affiliation of respondents ...... 268 9.1 Social Class Factors ...... 268 Table 9.14 Proportion of respondents supporting change on the 1999 question of a REPUBLIC by Reported Income PA of respondents ...... 269 Table 9.15 Proportion of respondents supporting change on the 1999 question of a PREAMBLE by Reported Income PA of respondents ...... 269

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Table 9.16 Proportion of respondents supporting change on the 1999 question of a REPUBLIC by Post Secondary Education of respondents ...... 270 Table 9.17 Proportion of respondents supporting change on the 1999 question of a PREAMBLE by Post Secondary Education of respondents ...... 271 Table 9.18 Proportion of respondents supporting change on the 1999 question of a REPUBLIC by Occupation of respondents ...... 271 Table 9.19 Proportion of respondents supporting change on the 1999 question of a PREAMBLE by Occupation of respondents ...... 272 Table 9.20 Proportion of respondents supporting change on the 1999 question of a REPUBLIC by Gender of respondents ...... 273 Table 9.21 Proportion of respondents supporting change on the 1999 question of a PREAMBLE by Gender of respondents ...... 273 9.2 Regression Analysis of 1999 ACRS ...... 273 9.3 MODEL #1: Self Reported Party Identification and Vote ...... 274 Table 9.22 Regression Table of 1999 Referendum Question on Republic By Party Identification ...... 274 Table 9.23 Regression Table of 1999 Referendum Question on Preamble by Party Identification ...... 275 9.4 MODEL #2 - Party Identification and Referendum Vote ...... 275 Table 9.24 Regression Table of 1999 Referendum Question on Republic by Party Identification ...... 277 Table 9.25 Regression Table of 1999 Referendum Question on Preamble by Party Identification ...... 278 9.5 MODEL #3 - Party Identification Vote and the Michigan Model ...... 278 Table 9.26 Regression Table of 1999 Referendum Question on Republic by Party Identification and Michigan Model Variables...... 279 Table 9.27 Regression Table of 1999 Referendum Question on Preamble by Party Identification and Michigan Model Variables...... 281 9.6 Discussion ...... 281 CHAPTER TEN ...... 287 10.0 Discussion ...... 287 10.1 Voter Behaviour and the Referendum ...... 289 10.2 The Michigan Model of Voter Behaviour ...... 295 10.3 Voter Choice in Referendums from 1967 to 1999 ...... 297 Figure 10.1 Percent of ‘yes’ vote for referendum questions from 1967 to 1999 ...... 299 Figure 10.2 Percentage of referendum ‘yes’ vote by Geographic Location from 1967 to 1999 ...... 300 Figure 10.3 Percentage of referendum ‘yes’ vote by State Location from 1967 to 1999 ...... 301 Figure 10.4 Percentage of referendum ‘yes’ vote by safeness of seat from 1967 to 1977 ...... 303 Figure 10.5 Percentage of referendum ‘yes’ vote by safeness of seat from 1984 to 1999 ...... 304 CHAPTER ELEVEN ...... 306 11.0 Conclusion and Implications...... 306 Figure 11.1 Model of Referendum Voter Behaviour ...... 314 Appendix 1 – State Election Dates ...... 316 Appendix 2 – Election Results ...... 319 Appendix 3 – Australian Prime Ministers (1901 to 1999) ...... 328 Appendix 4 – Australian Leaders (1901 to 1999) ...... 329 Bibliography ...... 330

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CHAPTER ONE

1.0 The Research Problem

Formal constitutional change in Australia has been virtually non-existent since the establishment of the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901. As such, the words of the Constitution have, in essence, remained unchanged (Booker et al 1994: 1). A brief overview of Australia‘s last one hundred years, though, reveals that in all facets of life, whether it is political, economic or social, there has been significant change in these areas since the enactment of the Constitution. The Great Depression, two World Wars, technological advancements and the internationalisation of global society are just some of the changes that have influenced life in Australia.

At a national referendum on 6 November 1999, Australians were required to vote on two constitutional questions. The first question asked voters to consider a proposal to alter the Constitution to establish the Commonwealth of Australia as a republic with the Queen and Governor-General being replaced by a president appointed by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Commonwealth Parliament. The second question asked voters to consider a proposal to alter the Constitution to insert a preamble. Both questions failed to gain the required double majority as required by section 128 of the Constitution.

Was the 1999 referendum a surprising result? A review of shows that there have been eight successful amendments to the Australian Constitution out of a possible 44 since 1901. The eight successful referendums are as follows: In 1906, an amendment to alter section 13 of the Constitution was passed which meant that Senate terms would commence on 1 January. The second successful amendment was in 1910 which allowed section 105 to be altered to allow the Commonwealth to take over State debts when ever they occurred. In 1928 there was further amendment to section 105 which introduced a loans council to manage State debt. This amendment passed with 74.3 percent of voters supporting the change. The fourth amendment took place in 1946 and extended the Commonwealth‘s power over the states financially. This amendment inserted section 51(xxiiiA) into the Constitution which allowed for the payment of social security benefits as authorised by the Commonwealth. This gave the Commonwealth power in the area of health and welfare which it had not previously had.

1

The fifth amendment was in 1967 with an alteration to section 51 (xxvi) granting power to the Commonwealth to enact special legislation with regard to the Aboriginal people. The sixth, seventh and eighth amendments occurred in 1977 which dealt with Senate Casual Vacancies (section 15); Referendums for Territories (section 128); and Retirement of Judges (section 72) (Bennett 2003: 9-14).

Many pundits have considered various explanations concerning the small success of constitutional change in Australia, providing various anecdotal explanations. Some have argued that voters are ignorant (Crisp) or confused due to exaggerated claims (Sharman). Others have said that there is too much information in one question (Uhr), whilst others have argued that voters lack trust in the motives of the government (Marshall). These issues are not without significance, but are not the main focus of this research. As with a general election, referendums require people to vote.

The central research question of this thesis is to determine if the Michigan Model of voter behaviour explains voting outcomes in Australian constitutional referendums. At the heart of the Michigan Model is the concept of ‗party identification‘. As part of this question, this research has sought to determine what factor or factors have prevented formal constitutional change in Australia. As formal constitutional change takes place through a referendum—a voting process, one question that has received little attention by political scientists over the years is whether accepted theories of voting behaviour are applicable to the referendum. One single salient truth, which is evident in respect to constitutional change, is that people have consistently voted against changing the Constitution (Craven 1992: 54). In order to answer the research question, three subsidiary issues need to be considered.

The first issue requires deliberation on the Australian Constitution; its nature, formation, structure and mode of alteration. If any amendments do occur, who are the key stakeholders and what vested interests do they have that would drive them to seek change to the Constitution?

The second issue centres on our understanding and the purpose of the referendum. Over the course of the past one hundred years, nineteen referendums have been held proposing 46 changes to the Australian Constitution. Only eight of these propositions have been passed. An overview of Australian politics shows that, since the formation of the Labor party, political debate has been dominated by party politics. A referendum, when called, is therefore tainted by party political motives, leading to various forms of criticism from other

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sections of society. Moreover, it is important that examination of any referendum takes into account the surrounding social, political and economic conditions at the time.

The third issue considers the concept of voting at a constitutional referendum. Does the Michigan Model of voting behaviour provide evidence that supports referendum voting behaviour? Clearly, the nature of elections is different to referendums. Current analysis of voting behaviour in elections focuses on individual level survey data. On the other hand, referendum data is limited. Consequently this thesis uses available aggregate level data and the 1999 Australian Constitutional Referendum Survey to analyse voter behaviour in Australian referendums.

1.1 The Australian Constitution

As a young nation at the turn of the twentieth century, displays of public enthusiasm in Australian society were commonplace. Loyalty for Australia was especially evident around the outbreak of the Great War. However, prior to federation, local loyalties in the colonies were strong, creating a persistent rivalry between the colonies (Alexander 1972: 5-6). This rivalry was carried into the new Federal Parliament, where competition between Sydney and Melbourne, and the other smaller states was evident. In spite of the local loyalties and state rivalry, Australia as a nation was formed as a federation. At this time, federations were considered to be a ―successful political solution for managing diversity, and for practicing what is now fashionably called ‗subsidiarity‘, that is, decision-making devolved to its most appropriate level‖ (Irving 1999: v). At the 1891 National Australasian Convention under Sir Henry Parkes, a series of resolutions were moved that sought to instil a federal principle into a Constitution for Australia. Part one of the resolution states:

That in order to establish and secure an enduring foundation for the structure of a Federal Government, the principles embodied in the Resolutions following be agreed to:

(a) That the powers and privileges and territorial rights of the several existing Colonies shall remain intact, except in respect to such surrenders as may be agreed upon as necessary and incidental to the power and authority of the National Federal Government.

The Australian Constitution which took effect in January 1901, based on this federal principle, is something that characterised the division of powers between the Federal and State Governments (McGarvie 1999: 39). Powers were allocated to the new central government, whilst the remainder of the powers were left with the states (Hughes 1998: 164). The question remains ‗why have a Federal Constitution‘? Traditional arguments were

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based on the notion of need for greater military security, but history demonstrates that Australia was not under any threat during the latter years of the nineteenth century. As Hughes rightly points out, the idea of a federation was a politician‘s reform that was intended to improve the machinery of government (Hughes 1998: 258-259). It was not until the latter stages of the debate that a popular groundswell took place that supported the federal ideal. In modern Australia, the importance of the federation has not diminished. McGarvie argues that ―Australians value their federation for a number of reasons, including the increased democratic participation in politics which it gives them through electing and influencing those who represent them in government of both the nation and the state‖ (McGarvie 1999: 40).

Over the past one hundred years, successive federal governments in their desire to capture power from the states, have eroded the federal principle. Methods of wresting power away from the states have been undertaken in one of four ways. Firstly, through the use of referendums as specified in section 128 of the Constitution; secondly, through High Court rulings; thirdly, through legislative changes; and fourthly, through the Federal Government‘s signing of international treaties under the ‗external affairs powers‘ section of the Constitution. In more recent times, the High Court has handed further power to the Commonwealth by interpreting the ‗corporations power‘ of the Constitution which will allow the federal Government to create a national industrial relations system (Norington 2006: 1). Of these four methods, referendums have been the least successful. The other three methods have essentially achieved their purpose and have meant that the states have had to fall into line or face certain consequences.

Constitutional change (whether formal or informal) is a matter that concerns the distribution of powers. Prominent political scientists such as Professor Greenwood once argued that the distribution of powers as constructed in the Australian Constitution ―has prevented and still prevents that amount of centralised direction of economic powers which is necessary for the efficient administration of the economy‖ (Partridge 1952: 175-76). The consequence of this view is that federal governments, in order to implement effective national policies, have been compelled to use clumsy, devious and inefficient methods of administration (Partridge 1952: 176). Others argue that to erode the federal principle any further and create a more centralised government should be rigorously resisted (Samuel Griffith Society). In retrospect, Morgan argues,

As we look back over the past seventy years I believe it is now impossible to avoid the conclusion that the High Court has acted in such a way as to set aside the fundamental purpose of the federal compact set down in the Constitution.

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Whether it has done so from a laudable desire to behave in a totally apolitical manner, or from innate centralist tendencies, is ultimately irrelevant (Morgan 1992: 12).

Despite the diminishing of states‘ powers and the growth of a more centralist government, the federal principle in the minds of the Australian people is as strong as ever (Irving 1999: vi).

1.2 The Referendum

The referendum is a mechanism in the Australian Constitution that provides for the formal amendment of the Constitution through the direct participation of voters on a particular issue (Jaensch 1997: 51). In Australia, the initiative to call a referendum effectively belongs to the federal government (Hughes 1994: 159). Section 128 of the Constitution provides the necessary conditions for amendment, although the referendum is not the last stage of this process (Waugh 1996: 106). Once the vote has been taken and passed the required double majority, the government makes a recommendation to the Governor-General for assent to the proposed amendment.

In some countries, the use of referendums has risen. In Australia however, the use of referendums to settle constitutional matters has declined. Reasons for not using the referendum have been canvassed by political scientists and experts in the field of constitutional law. From a political science view, referendums have declined due to the difficulty of obtaining the double majority necessary for the vote to be successful. From the constitutional view, the political elite realise that voters are not prepared to grant any further centralisation of power with the Federal Government if it can be avoided. Whatever the reason for the decline in the use of this instrument, research conducted by Butler and Ranney on referendums around the world show that most referendums fail.

In Australia, amendment to the Constitution, both in initiation and in execution, requires federal legislative action followed by a referendum (Stephen 1983: 174). The referendum is the mechanism that allows people to settle an issue directly as opposed to it being settled by an elected representative (Robertson 1985: 285). The purpose of the referendum is to ensure a check on unrestrained power (Walker 1987: 49; McGarvie 1999: 39) by the government of the day to alter the Constitution to suit its own purposes.

During the formulation of the Australian Constitution, the political leadership of the 1890s felt it necessary to include a section that would allow for any amendments to the Constitution

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which included popular participation (Russell 1988: 4). Framers of the Constitution such as Sir Samuel Griffith and Sir Edmund Barton did not regard the amending procedure unduly rigid.

Considering the regularity of , a referendum is a comparative rarity. Butler and Ranney have conducted significant research into the theory and practice of referendums. They argue that in a referendum, a mass electorate votes on some public issue that generally involves formal constitutional amendment (Butler and Ranney 1994: 1). In recent times however, the referendum has also been used for other purposes. Walker (1987: 1) and Hughes (1994: 166) argue that some governments are increasingly using referendums as a means of obtaining a popular mandate on a controversial issue.1 In effect, governments are using referendums to escape making the tough decision for fear of losing votes at the next general election (Butler and Ranney 1994: 3).

Arguments for and against referendums are at the core of the debate between representative democracy and deliberative democracy. Proponents for the referendum argue that it is essential to consult with the electorate directly if policy is to be truly democratic. An article in ‗The Economist‘ states that ―if popular sovereignty is really to mean anything, voters must have the right to set the agenda, discuss the issues and then themselves directly make the final decisions‖ (The Economist 1999: 45-47). The article goes on to say that delegating all policy and constitutional decisions to elected politicians, who have party interests of their own, inevitably subverts the wishes of voters. Walker (1987: 12) similarly argues that increased use of the referendum would weaken the grip of the party machine and minimise the influence of the bureaucratic elite and interest groups. Walker‘s view is similar to other elitists who argue, ―your representative owes you not his industry alone but his judgement; and he betrays, instead of serving, you if he sacrifices it to your opinion‖ (cited in Qvortrup 2005: 11).

Clearly, for constitutional and other legislative changes to be accepted by the majority of citizens, which have not been captured by ‗interest‘ groups, it is best resolved by the referendum.

Referendums, as a form of direct democracy, are not without their critics. (Marshall 1997), citing critics of the referendum, comments that those opposed to the referendum process

1 The has used the referendum to provide the necessary popular support for implementation of daylight saving. No support was forthcoming.

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maintain that it is hostile to parliamentary government and to the sovereignty of the Parliament. This is exactly what into AV Dicey said over one hundred years ago. He argued that the Parliament is sovereign. The Parliament can do anything, even if the purported statute was opposed to the customs and values of the people (Walker 1987: 22). Dicey‘s theory leaves little wonder why politicians are content to leave the state of representative democracy unchanged, as it leaves their power unchallenged. The Australian Labor Party had a similar view about the referendum procedure. Under Scullin in 1930, the Labor party proposed abolishing section 128 of the Constitution and removing judicial review from the High Court (Galligan 1990: 346).

1.3 Voter Behaviour

The third issue to be considered asks whether orthodox theories of electoral behaviour are applicable to the referendum vote.

When considering voter behaviour in terms of formal constitutional change, Dr. John Quick at the Corowa Conference of 1893 argued that any significant constitutional change can only be achieved if some attempt is made that includes the public in the processes of constitutional debate and consideration (McMillan et al 1983: 356). This is just as true today as it was one hundred years ago. The Australian electorate likes to be kept informed of change on important issues, why the change is necessary, and what benefits it might bring to them as individuals and to the nation as a whole.

The most generally accepted explanation for Australian electoral behaviour in both general elections and referendums is based on the Michigan Model. The Michigan Model argues that ‗party identification‘ is the key factor in vote choice. The theory behind the Michigan Model (also referred to as the social-psychological model) is based on three attitudes: ―the person‘s attachment to a party, the person‘s orientation toward the issues and the person‘s orientation toward the candidates‖ (Niemi and Weisberg 1993c: 8). Gow and Stenner (1992) illustrate this in Figure 1. The principle method for understanding and analysing voter behaviour at elections over the past fifty years has been through citizen surveys and interviews.

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Figure 1: The Michigan Model of Voter Choice (Gow & Stenner 1992: 8).

Gow and Stenner (1992: 12) argue that vote decision in the Michigan Model hinges on numerous influences which finally converge in a ―funnel of causality‖ and eventual vote choice. As the Michigan Model has been the orthodoxy of choice for political scientists since the 1960s, the majority of analyses have applied this model to all forms of voter behaviour. Party identification, therefore, is seen as a long-term force that underlies voters‘ choices at elections. Furthermore, the concept of party identification asks whether voting is an act of affirmation or of choice (Harrop and Miller 1987: 130). According to Campbell et al (1960), electoral choice is directly shaped by the voters‘ attitudes to three aspects of politics: candidates, policies, and links between parties and social groups.

Application of the Michigan Model of voter behaviour in Australia has been undertaken by a number of scholars since the 1970s. Kemp (1978) and Aitkin (1977 and 1982) have provided the early foundations of electoral behaviour in Australia. A more recent study is one undertaken by Marks in 1993. Marks examined partisanship and voting in Australia between 1967 to 1990 and found that most people vote according to their partisan preference without reference to other contemporary political issues (Marks 1993: 142). Marks found that the strength of the relationship between party identification and vote was stronger than any other relationship in predicting voter behaviour. However, as the diagram in Figure 2 illustrates, other factors such as leader effect, contemporary issues and social background all have a direct influence on electoral choice.

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Vote (last election) Liberal Leader Partisan Background Occupational Class Religion

Region (Urban/Rural) Region (State) Ethnicity Labor Leader Trade Union Member

Class Identification Sector Party Identification Gender Age Cohort VOTE Education Class Background Ideology Income Business Religiosity Welfare/Tax Issues Death Penalty Censorship

Figure 2: Pathways of voter choice (Marks 1993: 143)

This model by Marks stems from the Michigan Model showing two way causal links between party identification, which includes both issues and leader evaluations. ―Without this specification, the effects of partisanship on the vote are likely to be exaggerated‖ (Marks 1993: 143). The research conducted by Marks shows fairly conclusively that party identification has had a significant impact on voting at elections, both in terms of standardised and non-standardised estimates.

It is the author‘s contention that party identification is just as critical when voting at a referendum as an election for the following reasons. Firstly, the nature of a referendum is similar to a general election (Walker 1987: 49). For example, at a general election, the electorate is asked to cast their vote for the political party they would prefer to represent their interests in government for the next three years. The voter has a choice. Each candidate represents their political party appealing to the voter to accept their arguments. The referendum similarly is about the voter making a decision based on the appeals from the political parties associated with the referendum issue which voters can choose to support or oppose.

Whether an election or a referendum, decision-making models of vote choice assume that the decision to vote is made on the basis of alternative choices. The voter is somehow able to

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anticipate the preferred future offered by each alternative (party) based on the paths that he or she has taken to arrive at that decision. Therefore we can argue that the anticipated future is based on which party each voter would prefer to win after careful consideration of the issues. We can also assume that voters consider the issues rationally, where a rational decision-making process is any process that leads a value-maximising decision. Lau and Redlawsk argue that the voter who desires to make the right decision when voting does so based on available information about the issues, the candidate and one‘s party identification (Lau and Redlawsk 2006: 224, 227).

Down‘s ‗rational choice model‘ (otherwise known as the ‗consumer model of vote choice‘) of voting would appear to support this line of reasoning. This model stands in contrast with the ‗Michigan Model‘ in which the motivations of individuals are taken into account when casting their vote. These motivations are generally understood to be issue-oriented where, ―there must be some ‗overriding‘ issue in the election, and the parties must offer a clear alternative on that issue‖ (Verba and Nie 1972: 27-28).

Why is the ‗issue‘ the motivating factor? Research conducted by Downs (1957: 36) and Himmelweit et al (1993: 118) suggests that a voter will vote for a particular party whose expected utility for him/her is greater than voting for another party. In a referendum the choice is not between parties but between the competing sides on a particular issue. Therefore we can assume that when voters consider what is at stake in a referendum vote, support or opposition for the proposed constitutional change is dependent on the perceived benefits for them as individuals. On the basis of Down‘s and Himmelweit‘s rationale, one can argue that the ‗issue‘ under consideration at a referendum better explains the decision- making process for voters.

Issue voting is not the only motivating factor with the electorate. Analysis of Australian voting trends over the past century has shown that a majority of the population votes according to party lines when voting for government in the . However, this trend does not explain voting patterns in the Upper House, nor does it explain voting trends at referendums. For example, election returns show that a significant number of people believe that voting for another party or a minor party in the Upper House will provide some form of check on the excesses of the party in power (Walker 1987: 49). This concept of increasing the ability of the elected representatives to ensure that there is openness and accountability was a principle of Madison. Madison‘s approach was that there should be sufficient numbers of Parliamentarians so that there is some capacity to resist (Uhr 1998b: 88). In Australia, the framers of the Constitution built in the ability to resist via checks and

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balances ―in relation to ‖ (Uhr 1998b: 89). Hugh Mackay similarly observes that many electors who vote one way in the Lower House and another way in the Upper House ―are actually thinking about what they are doing‖ (Sydney Morning Herald, April 27- 28: 2). That is, many voters consider it legitimate to use their vote to provide a brake on the government in the Lower House. One researcher argues that,

whether by conscious calculation or intuition, voters are hedging their bets in something of a variation of the ‗split ticket‘ phenomenon whereby some electors, desirous of the check and balance provided by governments not controlling both houses of parliament, vote one way in the House of Representatives and another in the Senate (Strangio 2006: 4).

1.4 Problems Associated with Referendum Analysis

Previous and current research into voting behaviour predominantly focuses on general elections and the various models that critically analyse election outcomes based on survey results (King 1997b: 5). These models of voting behaviour are also spoken of when referring to referendum voting, yet little empirical research has been done into the area of referendum voting (Nilson 1986: 265).

Referendums within the Australian context have been difficult to analyse. The primary reason for this difficulty is due to the limited time frame for constructing a suitable survey instrument which would provide the necessary data to undertake an analysis. A secondary reason is due to the fact that referendums (state or federal) are not a regular occurrence in Australian political life. On this point, Christin et al argue that, while voting behaviour in Parliamentary elections is well established, ―systematic studies on voting behaviour in referendums is much rarer‖ (Christin et al 2000: 1). The reason for this is similar to the Australian context—that referendums are not as common as Parliamentary elections.

On this second point, the author would argue that the difficulty associated with referendum voting analysis is structural. That is, due to the philosophical reasoning behind the framework of the Constitution, it was thought that the electorate should trust the elected representatives to handle these, so-called, ‗constitutional intricacies‘. Such reasoning is at the heart of the debate over representative and deliberative democracy.

Those proponents of representative democracy argue that there is no need for the electorate to be involved in direct legislation. Too much input could lead to intolerance with the mass public, and possibly undermine minority rights. On the other hand, for a political system to be truly democratic, deliberative democracy allows the people to have direct input to the

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decision making process. These proponents argue that referendums and the subsequent campaigns increase politicisation, political knowledge and efficacy (Mendelsohn and Cutler 2000: 686).

Plausible as these claims may be, whether one adopts a pro-representative perspective or an anti-deliberative perspective, any such claim at present is largely speculative. Furthermore, claims as to why referendum proposals have failed to gather the necessary double majority are only anecdotal, as they have not been subject to empirical investigation. On the other hand, Mendelsohn and Cutler argue that political scientists have built up a substantial body of knowledge concerning electoral behaviour across time and space. Therefore, there is no compelling reason as to why the same cannot be accomplished with respect to referendum behaviour (Mendelsohn and Cutler 2000: 688).

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CHAPTER TWO

2.0 Literature Review and Previous Research

Previous research in the field of formal constitutional change through the referendum process in Australia is minimal.2 Research that has been conducted in this field, however, is mainly theoretical in nature. These limitations are mainly due to the lack of essential empirical evidence necessary to analyse formal constitutional change. This situation has meant that formal examination into voter behaviour in referendums has been limited, restricting many political analysts into making anecdotal conclusions only.

This chapter commences by providing an overview of the nature of constitutions (part one) and referendums (part two). Essentially, a constitution is not an electoral instrument that requires any critical examination; however, the understanding of how a constitution serves its citizens is very important. Many countries, including Australia have formal written constitutions with the means inscribed in them to make amendments.

Part three of this chapter critically examines research undertaken in the area of elections and voter behaviour. The primary issue to be considered in this section is whether or not it is appropriate to analyse referendum voting in the same way as a general election.

The approach adopted for this review firstly examines research that has been undertaken in terms of constitutional theory, written constitutions and constitutional amendments in Australia. The writing of the Australian Constitution owes it creation to the development of these theories and, as such, has influenced current thought.

The next step has been to focus on research that has examined the nature and purpose of referendums. There is a body of research that has accepted that the referendum is the means of providing citizens with the ability to have direct input into the political process. This review examines research undertaken in advanced industrial societies that have referendums as part of their political process. In effect, the referendum stands in stark opposition in practice to general elections as the referendum is a product of the theory of ‗direct

2 Research that discusses the referendum processes from a European and US perspective is plentiful. The area of research that surrounds referendum voting is where the void exists (Nilson 1986: 265). The most recent research from an Australian perspective was that conducted by RB Miles as fulfilment of the degree for Master of Arts (1997) from the University of .

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democracy‘ and a general election is a product of ‗representative democracy‘. This distinction is important to understand when attempting to understand and analyse referendum outcomes.

The third section provides an overview of the theories of electoral behaviour, with particular attention given to Australia. This section provides the ground work to determine whether the orthodox theory of the Michigan Model used to analyse general elections is applicable to referendums.

In drawing these three sections together, the purpose of this chapter to provide the necessary framework to adopt the best method of analysis for referendum voting, thereby provide the antecedents for the author‘s own empirical research.

With a suitable framework settled upon, the goal of this research can be realised by the supply of empirical evidence. Empirical evidence will provide a more conclusive answer to the current situation in terms of lack of formal constitutional change in Australia than is currently available.

2.1 Constitutionalism, the Australian Constitution and Constitutional Change

This research is specifically about voting behaviour in constitutional referendums. The importance of this next section is underlined by the fact that a referendum concerns the alteration of a constitution, and any change will have democratic implications for voters. Our understanding of the nature and character of the constitution, democracy, federalism and trust in the government are paramount and precede the actual referendum vote. Changing the constitution involves an alteration to the foundational document that affects all citizens. Changing the constitution can alter the federal balance. Changing the constitution can decrease the voters‘ democratic opportunities. Changing the constitution determines how much voters trust the government. The importance of constitutional change therefore cannot be over-stated.

Debate amongst constitutional and political theorists surrounds the nature of the Australian Constitution and whether it is operating in practice as was intended by the framers, or whether there been some tampering and intentional misunderstanding of the ‗spirit‘ of the Constitution (Aroney 2000: 14). If the answer to this debate is in the affirmative and the electorate is aware of tampering and deliberate mis-interpretation of the Australian

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Constitution over the past 100 years, such action could provide an explanation as to why the majority of proposed constitutional changes have been rejected by the voters (Campbell 1989: 3-4). A development of this question is whether the federal government has been able to undermine the division of powers between the Commonwealth of Australia and the states.

What is the purpose of a constitution, and how is one defined? When referring to a constitution in terms of the nation-state, it can be defined as the rules, practices, and facts concerning the foundation, limitation and function of the state authority. To paraphrase LJM Cooray, a constitutional system of government exists where the constitution is considered supreme and regulates the exercise of power by the main organs of government, and every act is carried out in accordance with the law and authorised by the law (Cooray 1992: 107). A constitution primarily should control the state whilst allowing the state to control society. It is essential, however, to understand that a constitution is essentially a piece of paper with words. Whilst the most a constitution can ever achieve is the distribution of power within society, general acceptance of the constitution by the public will depend on its effectiveness (Howard 1980: 15). Similarly, it is argued that ―a constitution is a set of basic rules adopted virtually by consensus as the foundation of the system through which future political differences will be decided and the community governed‖ (McGarvie 1999: 5-6).

The ideas of what a constitution is and how, in fact, it is enacted has been at the heart of many intense debates since the 1700s. Some of the more notable contributors to the constitutional debate have been Thomas Paine, Lord Bolingbroke, John Locke and Montesquieu.

Thomas Paine in ‗The Rights of Man‘ defined a constitution as:

A constitution is not a thing in name only, but in fact. A constitution is a thing antecedent to a government, and a government is only the creature of a constitution. The constitution of a country is not the act of its government, but of the people constituting a government (Paine 1989: 81).

The fundamental point of Paine‘s definition of a constitution is that a true constitution is antecedent to the government (Paine 1989: 180), which provides the citizenry (a nation) with a definitive historical compact between the government and those being governed. This compact can only exist in the form of a written constitution with acceptance of and by the citizenry.

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Bolingbroke in his ‗Dissertation upon Parties (1733-1734)‘ argued that a constitution is nothing in isolation—for the constitution to work effectively, the societal structure (laws, institutions and customs) must be adhered to by its citizens (Bolingbroke 1733: 88).

John Locke had considerable influence upon the concept of the constitution in contemporary society. Locke‘s argument is clear. For any constitutional government to act, authority must come from the majority of the people. It is the established constitutional framework, which defines the authority and limits of the government. He stated,

132. THE majority having, as has been showed, upon men's first uniting into society, the whole power of the community naturally in them, may employ all that power in making laws for the community from time to time, and executing those laws by officers of their own appointing, and then the form of the government is a perfect democracy … (Locke 1924).

One further pre-eminent constitutional theorist is Montesquieu. Montesquieu argued that the ‗separation of powers‘ was essential for any constitutional framework where distinct bodies would exercise powers through a system of checks and balances (Lumb 1983: 23-24).

The common theme with Paine, Bolingbroke, Locke and Montesquieu is that a constitution is the property of the people, not of the government. Some of this constitutional tradition became part of the logic for framing the Australian Constitution (Lumb 1983: 25). The government, whom the people elect is similarly governed by the rules and procedures agreed upon by the authority of the people. The people thereupon subject themselves by way of a social contract to the natural rights and responsibilities of civil society. No government therefore may exercise any power that has not been delegated to it that would be inconsistent with the structures and procedures as defined in the constitution.

A constitution, however, is not written in stone and will require changes to address developments and changes in society. Failure to realise constitutional change is due to a central government assuming that it should have certain powers under the constitution.3 If those powers do not exist, gradual erosion of the federated states powers takes place. The consequences of this abuse are reflected in the reluctance of the people to accept constitutional change. In support, Cooray argues that the pro-Commonwealth ‗activist‘ High Court has contributed to the reluctance of the public to endorse formal constitutional change

3 The centralisation of power and the powers that governments would like to assume is a key argument that has been used to explain why Australians have not accepted many proposed constitutional changes.

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(Cooray 1992: 127). We need to ask therefore, what is or has been the role of a constitution within a political system such as Australia. In a fundamental way, the Constitution describes ―the formalisation of the power structure of the given country‖ (Blackshield and Williams 1998: 4).

2.2 Understanding the Australian Constitution

The Australian Constitution is federal in nature where the intention of the framers was to provide a system of government that gave federal representation within the system of representative government between the Commonwealth and State Governments (Aroney 2000: 14-15). In the words of Sir Ninian Stephen, federalism is ‗the foundation upon which rests our whole Australian polity, our system of government‘ (Galligan 1989: 2). The federal nature of the Australian Constitution is proclaimed in the first paragraph of the preamble, which ―refers to the agreement on the part of the people of the colonies to unite in ‗one indissoluble Federal Commonwealth‘ … ‖ (Lumb and Moens 1995: 14).

The Australian Constitution consists of both a written constitution with a set of rules, and unwritten conventions4. The written constitution is that which is known as the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 – an Act of the British Parliament. It is divided into eight chapters. The written constitution is also complemented by the Statute of Westminster 1931 (UK) and the Australia Act of 1986. The conventions are those laws and procedures that direct government and Parliamentary practice. The term ‗convention‘ is used in two main contexts in Australia. These conventions are established to regulate the manner in which, firstly, discretionary powers are exercised (otherwise known as constitutional conventions), and, secondly, conventions which relate to the working of government (otherwise known as governmental conventions) (Cooray 1979: 68; Blackshield and Williams 1998: 7).

Whether written or unwritten, a constitution employs certain ideals. These ideals give expression to the needs of society to limit the power of governments, with the ability for a society to pursue its collective goals through the sovereign nation-state. The fundamental

4 Conventions, in the strict sense, are rules which can be written or unwritten, enacted by statue or derived from custom, tradition or judgement. These rules constitute ‗constitutional law‘ in the proper sense of that term, and may for the sake of distinction be called collectively ―the law of the constitution‖ (Dicey 1885 as cited in Blackshield and Williams 2005: 113).

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aim of the nation-state, therefore, is to promote the common good. Governments under the authority of the citizenry aspire to the common good within the rules of the constitution.

The current constitutional framework, which governs the Australian system of government, is based upon two inherited principles (Parkin 1997: 5). This hybrid system5 is concerned with the principle of responsible or representative government as established under the Westminster system, which is a combination of constitutional law and convention (Howard 1985b: 2, James, 1982: 9; James 1982), and, the American principle of a federal system of government.6

The Australian Constitution was enacted by the British Parliament in 1900 at the request of the then six self-governing colonies (Howard 1985b: 1). Under the Constitution, each of the colonies had equal representation in the Senate. On 1 January 1901, the Australian Constitution came into effect, and has remained in use and virtually unchanged for 100 years. The powers and rules that prescribe the composition of the government, the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, as described in the Constitution, continue to this day.

The Australian Constitution is uniquely bound by the two aforementioned principles in one document. The Commonwealth of Australia as established by the Constitution, is made up of three arms of government. Firstly, Australia has a bicameral parliament which consists of the House of Representatives and the Senate; secondly, there is an executive; and thirdly, a federal judiciary.

2.3 Method of Alteration to the Constitution

Despite the dynamic of the Australian federal system (Galligan 1989: 2) there are times when an alteration to the Constitution is required. The framers wrote into the constitution the mode for alteration which is governed by section 128. By convention, the government in power must first initiate any proposed constitutional change. An absolute majority in each House of Parliament must next pass the proposed amendment. Following this, the proposal

5 Elaine Thompson has characterised the Australian Constitution as a ―Washminster Mutation‖ of the Westminster Model and Washington‘s system of federalism. Thompson argued that constitutional devices of federalism and the separation of powers between the Lower and Upper Houses of Parliament diminished the central principle of the Westminster system—that of . 6 Further comment is made on the theory of federalism a little later.

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must be put by ballot to the Australian electorate where a majority of voters in a majority of states must vote in favour in order for the change to take place. A review of Australian political history reveals that Australians, generally speaking, have been hesitant in accepting formal constitutional change. The small number of proposals that have been accepted by the Australian electorate provides evidence of this. Many proposals have been put to a referendum on more than one occasion. There have been five attempts to extend the corporations power as found in section 51; six attempts to increase the power of the Commonwealth in relation to employment; and four attempts to bring the Senate and the House of Representatives elections together. None of these proposals have been successful.

The fact that section 128 was incorporated into the Constitution shows that the framers clearly anticipated that amendments to the Constitution would in time be necessary.

Over the course of the past 100 years, the constitution has had direct impact on intergovernmental economic arrangements, media and business regulation, industrial disputes, the environment, international relations, aboriginal policy and many other things (McMillan et al 1983: 3). Despite the significance of the constitution, the majority of Australians know little about it (Macintyre 1994: 18). Such lack of knowledge could be a reflection of the confidence Australians have in the stable system of government, therefore there is no need for concern. Conversely, one could argue that the education system has been negligent in its role in informing the masses concerning the Australian system of government.

Regardless of any explanations, research has shown that the knowledge Australians have of the Constitution and federal system of government is minimal at best (Macintyre 1994: 133). Despite this lack of knowledge, Australian‘s have an inherent sense that their ‗rights‘ and ‗freedoms‘ are a given norm of Australian society. These rights and freedoms have been established through the development and traditions of western democracy, and to tamper with the Constitution requires serious consideration. Moreover, the Australian Constitution is exceptional in that it encapsulates the British principles of Westminster and the American principle of federalism, thereby continuing the character and autonomy of the Australian states.

2.4 Federalism and the Constitution

For a federal state to be successful, two conditions are necessary. Firstly, there must exist a body of distinct groups or colonies that are connected by a common cultural heritage,

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language and their locality. Secondly, there must exist among the groups a desire for union, not unity (Hughes 1998: 258).

The federal movement began as the colonies contemplated their separation from each other, and moved to establish their own representative and responsible governments (Coper 1988: 59). The majority of colonists in Australia had much in common such as their ancestry, their language and their culture. Despite these commonalities, differences and rivalries between the colonies was an obstacle to federation.7

It was not until the 1890s when under the vision of Sir Henry Parkes, the move towards Australia becoming a federation gathered momentum, although not without some difficulty. After several conventions, and much discussion, a Constitutional Bill was approved by five colonies via the referendum. This Bill was then taken to the British Parliament for enactment, and on 9 July 1900 it received . On 31 July 1900 Western Australia gave an affirmative vote for the Bill and on 17 September 1900 Queen signed the proclamation which fixed the date when the Constitution would come into effect (Coper 1988: 71).

The idea of Australia becoming a federated union uniting the five independent colonies under one nation was an idea that is almost as old as the colonisation of Australia (La Nauze 1972: 1-5; Howard 1985a: xv). However, federation was not a pressing issue, as there appeared to be no external pressure or impending danger.8 Hughes argues that was not brought about by any high ideal or any external threat, nor for any agreed upon reason. Rather, the federal system occurred more to do with improving the machinery of government (Hughes 1998: 258-259).

Over time, the ‗federal‘ concept became more important for Australia. This is illustrated where the word ‗federal‘ appears fifteen times in the Act9. The Constitution of Australia

7 Scott Bennett in ‗The Making of the Commonwealth‘ elaborates clearly on some of the difficulties that existed between the colonies. One of the major sticking points was on the issue of tariffs, where some colonies argued for ‗free-trade‘ between colonies, whilst others wanted protectionist tariffs. It was the view of those fighting for federation that the problem of the tariff needed to be resolved before federation could be secured. Coupled with this issue of tariffs was the question of how monies raised by the new Federal Government would be distributed amongst the colonies (Bennett 1971: 3-8). 8 It is important to note here that as much as the Australian colonies felt there was no impending danger, there was an expectation that Great Britain had a duty to protect its colonies (Bennett 1971: 28). 9 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act (UK): An Act to constitute the Commonwealth of Australia, 9th July, 1900.

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states that ―if Her Majesty is satisfied that the people have agreed thereto, … the people10 shall be united in a Federal Commonwealth under the name of the Commonwealth of Australia.‖ Quick and Garran make the point that these words are forcible, striking, and significant.

They indicate the fundamental principle of the whole plan of government, which is neither a loose confederacy nor a complete unification, but a union of the people considered as citizens of various communities whose individuality remains unimpaired … (Quick and Garran 1994: 332)

Quick and Garran emphasise that the federal principle as developed by the framers of the Australian Constitution, is key to understanding the relationship between the central and the state governments. They state that ―the Federal idea … pervades and largely dominates the structure of the newly created community, its Parliamentary executive and judiciary departments‖ (Quick and Garran 1994: 332).

By 1914, many people held the conviction that federalism was the key to solving recurrent governmental problems. As a principle, it enabled local allegiances to be reconciled with national unity through the division of powers (Greenwood 1976: 1). Dicey, on the other hand, was a strong critic of the federal principle due to its restrictive nature on the central government. The difficulty arises when the central government desires more power. As the Constitution stands, a shift in the constitutional power structure between the federal and state governments is theoretically achieved through formal constitutional amendment. Practically, however, this procedure for amendment is not always the preferred method. Dicey states,

Experience has shown that, when the need for a radical change in the relations between federal and member states is felt by the former, its Cabinet will proceed, not by direct constitutional amendment, but by way of legislation framed to achieve the purpose of national unity without directly infringing the express or implied terms of the constitution (Dicey 1885: lxxvii-lxxviii).

More often than not, such actions inevitably lead to a judicial challenge. In Australia, many High Court challenges have been mounted by the states as the Federal Government has gradually decreased the powers of the states (Solomon 1999: 79). The success of High Court challenges from the Federal Government, in effect, has altered the balance of power between the Commonwealth and State Governments by using the High Court to bring about informal

10 The author‘s italics.

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constitutional change. In support of this view, Solomon (1989: 80) argues that the High Court expanded the ambit of Commonwealth constitutional powers. For example, in 1982 (Koowarta Case), the High Court re-defined the external affairs power of the constitution to enable an interpretation that had not been intended by the framers. The Commonwealth Government could now override state laws in order to implement an international treaty (Solomon 1989: 80).

Clearly, at the turn of the twentieth century, federalism was a key principle that brought the colonies of Australia together to form the Commonwealth of Australia. One hundred years on, however, constitutional lawyers and political theorists observe a marked shift away from the original nature of federalism in Australia to the point where federalism is seen by many as a hindrance to good government. As early as 1946, Greenwood argued that federalism in Australia had outlived its usefulness (Galligan 1995: 58). There have been expressions by some prominent persons, such as Brisbane‘s former Lord Mayor Jim Sorley, for the abolition of the States under the guise that replication could be avoided if state governments were abolished. In response, it can be argued that the original intent of the federal structure of the Australian Constitution sees the Commonwealth Government replicating state government functions. Section 51 of the Constitution specifies the legislative powers of Commonwealth of the Federal Government, with all other powers belonging to the states. Over the course of the past one hundred years, the unspecified powers of the states have gradually passed over to the Federal Government—many through High Court challenges.

Finally, there are claims that the benefits of federal structures have diminished, and that the costs associated with a federal system could be better directed toward new structures more suited to the community‘s needs (Saunders 1995: 61). The Honorary Murray Gleeson (Chief Justice of the High Court) commented, in 1999 in reference to Australia‘s federal system that ―if efficiency were the main objective, there would be better ways of running a country than by a federal representative democracy‖ (Govey 2001: 1). There may be some validity in this argument for a better national structure; however, until the citizens of Australia come to agree on this view, the erosion of the states role and powers should not be altered without approval from voters. Similarly, as Galligan argues, federalism was adopted in Australia due to the checks and balances, and the accountability associated with a federal structure. In Galligan‘s view, ―federalism has continued to flourish in Australia because it increases democratic participation in politics through representation of the people in both national and State governments‖ (Galligan 1995: 51).

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2.5 Formal Constitutional Amendment: The Referendum

Changing the constitution is not a simple matter. The Australian Constitution was written to establish and preserve a set of values that are of universal significance (Emy 1978: 16). Most choices in politics are framed in terms of a new proposal being pitted against the status quo (Christin et al 2000: 4). Nevertheless, as a referendum asks citizens to consider formal amendment to the Constitution, the issue of how voters decide is crucial.

The underlying issue in referendums in Australia is whether or not the Constitution needs changing. The question that accompanies this issue is whether such a change will be beneficial to the majority of the citizenry. Maddox puts it in terms of the ‗wearer principle‘—only the wearer knows where the shoe pinches (Maddox 1991: 90), and therefore voting to change the Constitution for perceived benefit or loss is something that all voters consider when given the opportunity. Furthermore, as the Australian Constitution is a federal document designed to distribute power between the Commonwealth and the states (Maddox 1991: 121), any attempt to alter the balance of power is a significant issue. Influential referendum questions that have the potential to affect the constitution and the operation of the federal structure, and the delivery of effective representative democracy as initially intended by the framers are important considerations for any constitutional change. These issues are critical to any amendment and or reform of the constitution. In support of the importance of federalism and the role of the Senate, Quick and Garran (1901) argue,

The Senate is one of the most conspicuous, and unquestionably the most important, of all the federal features of the Constitution, using the word federal in the sense of linking together and uniting a number of co-equal political communities, under a common system of government. The Senate is not merely a branch of a bicameral Parliament; it is not merely a second chamber of revision and review representing the sober second thought of the nation, such as the House of Lords is supposed to be; it is that, but something more than that. It is the chamber in which the States, considered as separate entities, and corporate parts of the Commonwealth are represented (cited by Lumb and Moens 1995: 57-58).

The right of reform of the constitution lies with the nation in its original character. That is, reform or amendment to a constitution is the right of the people who constitute the government (Paine 1989: 83). The framers of the Australian Constitution provided the mechanism for amendment to the constitution. They were determined that it could not be as easily amended as an Act of Parliament. Professor Geoffrey Sawer concluded that when it came to amending the Australian Constitution, Australia is the frozen continent (Sawer 1967: 208), although Sawer is a strong advocate of centralisation where the states are no longer equal in the federal structure (Galligan et al 1990: 66). Difficult or not, one has to agree with

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the view that any amendment to the constitution should be recognised as democracy in action.

For over one hundred years, federal politics has been conducted under the authority of the Constitution. Throughout this same one hundred years, the Australian people have demonstrated that they are reluctant to alter the way in which federal politics is conducted. As Howard argues, this may be due to a ―prevailing uncertainty about constitutional reform‖ (Howard 1980: 14). This uncertainty, argues Howard, is a product of the absence of a tradition of critical and constructive political thought. How this has happened is a matter for conjecture. Possible explanations are that there are vested interests by particular groups for the status quo, or that many see the government merely as managers—nothing more.

The referendum as provided for in section 128 of the Australian Constitution is the mechanism that is available for formal amendment to the Constitution. The Australian Constitution, which was drafted by an elected convention in the 1890s can only be changed with the approval of the electorate—a popular vote. Hughes argues that the initial drive to include an amending formula came from the populist movements of North America, where distrust of professional politicians became evident as they exploited the system to ensure their own economic wealth (Hughes 1994: 158).

There are some constitutionalists, however, who argue that this method of amendment is cumbersome and impractical. Howard (1980: 48) argues that the amendment process is ―excessively and unrealistically cautious‖. In effect, the framers of the constitution were attempting to entrench existing institutions and power centres. According to Howard, at the time of federation the framers placed every structural obstacle necessary so as to make formal constitutional change almost impossible. However, a constitution that can be changed in response to every perceived crisis would endanger the stability that a formal constitution brings to society (Emy 1978: 17).

There is an important logic however to the referendum process. That is, in the same way as the Constitution acts as the basis of the Australian federal system, the Constitution should not be able to be altered by any single order of government (Saunders 1995: 64). Whether the Australian voter understands this principle or not, the fact that amendment to the Constitution has been minimal suggests that it was an important factor which enshrined the democratic ideals of the Constitution for future generations.

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Is there evidence that points to the Australian voters‘ hesitancy to alter the Constitution? Enid Campbell argues that there are certain reasons why there has been minimal constitutional change in Australia. From 1906 to 1988, the majority of proposed changes attempted to enlarge the legislative powers of the Commonwealth Government. Of these proposals, only two were accepted by the voters (Campbell 1989: 3). As Campbell intimates, Maddox argues that the change in the federal power balance (―the struggle for supremacy between the two tiers of government‖) is a factor that causes voters to be cautious about accepting constitutional change (Maddox 1991: 151). Campbell also argues that constitutional change generally occurs when there is bipartisan support (although not always), and when there is support from the state governments. Further support for this view is heard by Kirby J. who states that decisions fought for in the past have turned out to be a waste of time as the Commonwealth continues to centralise power. Kirby J. states,

The voice of voters in past referendums opposing commonwealth takeovers had been ignored, while the intentions of the founding fathers had been abandoned. Truly, this reveals the apogee of federal constitutional power and a profound weakness in the legal checks and balances which the founders sought to provide to the Australian Commonwealth (Norington 2006: 2).

2.6 Democratic Theory and its Impact on Constitutional Change

Theoretically, democracy is a system that provides the citizenry with the opportunity to influence public decisions (Maddox 1991: 64). Democracy as a system aims to aggregate individual preferences into a collective choice that is both fair and efficient (Miller 1992: 55) for all citizens. For most, democracy means that government and its institutions are led by the people and for the people, or, as Uhr argues, ―the rule of the people‖ (Uhr 1998a: 878). In practice however, democracy varies from country to country and state to state. The Australian practice of democracy, argues Maddox, ―stands squarely in the tradition set in train by the Greeks in the fifth century BC‖ (Maddox 1991: 64). This tradition rejects the belief that any class has a monopoly to make political decisions, or possesses the absolute truth concerning values that will engender what is best for society (Walker 1987: 4).

In assessing Australian democracy, Charlesworth argues that it is based on the culture of utilitarian confidence (1993: 201). Citing Hancock, McAllister similarly argues that Australian democracy has come to look upon the state as a vast public utility, whose duty it is to provide the greatest good for the greatest number (McAllister 1997: 243-244). Utilitarianism, therefore, allows the state to resolve problems and disputes using collectivist

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action to achieve its goals. For example, in order to achieve an acceptable standard of living, the part of the government‘s role is to ensure that jobs are available (McAllister 1997: 244).

Despite the goals and ideals of democracy, elitist groups have dominated the political decision making processes of society. Walker argues that elites hold to the belief that the idea that the common person could govern, ―is contrary to experience and absurd‖. Elites, therefore, argue that, for democracy to survive, an enlightened minority is necessary (Walker 1987: 4-5), and consequently are not supportive of the referendum process.

2.7 Democratic Practice in Australia

One of the most recognised principles of democracy is the right of the citizenry to cast a vote. In Australia, the opportunity to vote is given in two circumstances—a general election (Commonwealth, state and local government) and a referendum. Voting in a general election is considered an institutional process where voters are able to choose who they want to represent them in the Parliament (Catt 2000: 5). Voting in a referendum, also an institutional process as written in section 128 of Australia‘s Constitution enables voters to determine if a proposed constitutional change is to be accepted or rejected. Uhr argues that both voting practices are what is known as participatory democracy (―democracy with deliberation‖), where citizens are given the opportunity for active political participation through the voting process—an essential component of democracy and popular sovereignty (Uhr 1998b: 11). One of the more recent demonstrations of deliberative democracy was the Constitutional Convention held in 1998 to debate the best method of Australia‘s transition to a republic. Uhr argued that the convention was democracy in action where public deliberation and public participation and open argument were embraced (Uhr 1998a: 1). As Uhr argues, the Constitutional Convention demonstrated a commitment to democracy more so than the question of a republican head of state (Uhr 1998a: 875-876).

Australian democracy is based on the Westminster inspired system of government, which has been extremely influential in shaping the Australian politic (Lijphart 1999: 313, 314). Regardless of the ideals of the Westminster system, many consider that democracy really only takes place at the ballot box once every three years for the general election and once whenever the government decides to hold a referendum (Uhr 1998a: 878). However, Australians are required to vote in three tiers of government, at times making their way to the ballot box on an annual basis.

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A parliament which is elected by its citizens has vast power (Marchant 1999: 26). However, the only check on that power is a vote in the next election or on the proposal to alter the constitution at the next referendum. The difficulty is that, between elections, the government appears to be un-interested in the views of the individual (although one must acknowledge that there are potentially thousands of views), resulting in a dissatisfied electorate (Kemp 1979: 19). The consequence of government practice is that many voters are aggrieved with the government, especially when decisions are made without consultation. Furthermore, decisions that are made between elections remain hostage to elite groups with their own interests (Gava 1998: 932; O'Brien 1995: 44). Such action demonstrates that the government does not value individual opinions unless they are voiced through politically-organised units such as trade unions or the Business Council of Australia. Marchant argues that Australia is in danger of becoming a corporate state where ‗experts‘ advise government on required changes with little or zero input from the voting public (Marchant 1999: 152-154). Gava similarly argues that unless the power that is wielded by elites is recognised and steps are taken to bring these people to public accountability, the meagre participation in the decision making process will be nothing more than a sham (Gava 1998: 934).

Papadakis has argued that there is a frustration for voters as there is a perception that politicians act without integrity and behave as though they live by a different set of rules to the rest of the citizenry (Papadakis 1999: 77). Even when some Members of Parliament are found to have misled the Parliament or the public, it appears that they get away with a stern word or a side-ways shift in position without any real penalty. If they face criminal or civil charges, the tax payer funds their legal costs. There is further voter scepticism when cabinet documents are kept hidden away from freedom of information searches. Finally, one of the biggest frustrations facing the voting public is the fact that their elected representatives are beholden to the party platform—an allegiance to the party rather than to the citizens (Aitkin 1978: 129). The political parties are similarly beholden to the groups where the majority of the financial funding comes from: - trade unions, farmer‘s federation and the ‗big end of town‘.

One fact that helps maintain a healthy democracy is the increased education of the population (Dalton 1996: 21) resulting in a more politically aware voting public (Papadakis 1999: 79). Australian voters, generally speaking, are well educated and as such require autonomy and self-determination in their daily lives. As Beetham argues, autonomy allows for collective and individual decision making (Beetham 1992: 45). When a voter has their interests disregarded, people want to have more say in the matters of government, as demonstrated in the Australian Election Studies (AES) results on a regular basis. For the

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voter to be ignored, democracy faces the danger of minimising collective interests and collective decision making. The difficulty that faces government and the bureaucracy is that there has also been a culture shift in advanced industrial societies, resulting in a greater determination by voters to have more say in the decision making process (Inglehart 1990). The culture shift and changing values have given rise to reduced levels of confidence in government institutions (Papadakis 1999: 79).

In a democratic system of government, voters want to be able to determine the priorities of their own life rather than be told what to do based on the privilege of one group over another. In a democracy, voters have the right to take part in the decision-making process as an acknowledged equal (Beetham 1992: 46). Beetham further argues that decision-making with regard to how one‘s life is affected by government policy and legislation is in everyone‘s capacity (Beetham 1992: 46).

Habermas supports Beetham‘s view when he argues that it is wrong to assume that in a complex modern society, the legislature is the only locale for the deliberation of the decision making process, ―given the importance for self-government of vibrant ‗associations of civil society‘ and their ‗culturally mobilised publics‘ ‖ (Habermas cited by Uhr 1998b: 8). Understandably, there is resistance by those in power (the elites) to allow for the increase of deliberative democracy. The common argument against allowing citizens to participate in a greater way in the decision-making process is based on what is termed ―‗majoritarian democracy‘ in which law and policy are formed on the basis of the preferences of the majority‖ (Uhr 1998b: 10).

Thus the relationship between the people (the voters) and the Parliament is one that will exist (and does exist) in tension, which quite often leads to ill-feeling and friction. The problem with the binary choice system, as Miller argues, is that no vote will keep all voters happy (Miller 1992: 58-59). Despite this difficulty, a fundamental rule in this relationship between the voters and the legislature is that the Parliament is a servant to the people, and that the power the legislature holds is held in trust (Byers 1997: 5). When the power is taken for granted, or the people are denied fundamental rights, or are told what is good for them, democracy is weakened, leading to distrust and cynicism. Neville Wran, a leading Australian politician from 1976 to 1986 highlights this problem when he says, ―…the average Australian remains suspicious of the motives of political parties and distrustful of those who exercise power through high political office, notwithstanding that that power has been conferred through the democratic process‖ (Wran 1997: 196).

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2.8 Informal Amendment of the Constitution: The High Court and Parliament

The was constitutionally established in 1901 (Sawer 1987: 9). It‘s primary role is to provide interpretation on matters of the Australian Constitution, and to adjudicate on issues of dispute arising between the Commonwealth and the states and territories (Solomon 1999: 5). Another way of explaining the role of the High Court is that it is involved ―in deciding on the distribution of political power and the legal propriety of the exercise of that power‖ (Solomon 1997: 113-114).

The High Court also rules on matters of common law—those laws inherited from Britain which still govern certain aspects of Australian civil and criminal law (Solomon 1997: 113). Solomon (1997: 113) argues that, as the High Court exercises its authority on constitutional matters, the inherent powers of the commonwealth and the states is diminished. This procedure was clearly intended by the framers of the constitution. The implication of the relationship between the High Court and the parliaments is that the High Court not only interprets the meaning of the Constitution, but also exercises significant political power. When understanding that the High Court has a role in providing judicial review (McMillan 1991: 64), we come to understand how the meaning of the Constitution can be altered by a literal and legalistic interpretation. The consequence of this review is that the Commonwealth Government has become dependent on using the High Court to ensure that its enumerated powers are upheld. Since 1920, the High Court has accepted that direct grants of power to the Commonwealth should prevail when there are disputes between the commonwealth and the states (Emy 1978: 22-24) as determined in the Engineers Case. In this case, it was argued that state laws are not binding on the Commonwealth; however, the High Court argued that this is inconsistent with Commonwealth law. The Engineers Case resulted in a broader interpretation available regarding commonwealth power on constitutional matters. The states prior to this decision had relied on the doctrine of reserved powers which the High Court determined to be too restrictive for the Commonwealth (Booker et al 1994: 41-42). In support of this view, McGarvie argues that, in the 1940s there were claims that the Commonwealth had broken the federal compact, ―and that the High Court‘s interpretation of the Constitution continually increased the power of the Commonwealth at the expense of the states‖ (McGarvie 1999: 254).

As history has demonstrated, Australia has obtained few changes to the Constitution through referendums. Campbell argues that one possible explanation for the few amendments is that the High Court has re-interpreted the ambit powers given to the Government—in effect this

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practice has enabled federal legislation to remain within the scope of existing powers (Campbell 1989: 4; McMillan 1991: 64). Prior to the recent 1999 referendum, research has shown that the percentage of affirmative votes has actually decreased, with the highest ‗yes‘ vote in the 1988 referendum only accounting for 37.6 percent of the vote. In accounting for this low affirmative vote, Saunders notes that constitutional change has been a preoccupation by some (1995: 65). However, as federal governments have been able to use the ‗external affairs‘ powers and the favourable interpretations by the High Court, the Constitution can now be interpreted in such a way that there are few enforceable limits on federal power (Saunders 1995: 65). The result was that this new interpretation greatly expanded the power of the federal government in areas of state jurisdiction (Galligan 1990: 347). As Zines argues, ―for nearly eighty years we have witnessed the steady and seemingly inevitable increase in federal power in Australia and, therefore, the reduction and decline of the exclusive legislative and executive power of the States‖ (Zines 2000: 98). As McMillan argues, the powers that the Commonwealth Government once sought in referendums, is now available as a result of High Court interpretations of ―external affairs, corporations, executive power, and the appropriations power‖ (McMillan 1991: 64). The result of this informal change is summarised by J.C. Finmore,

The voters do not go to a referendum in a vacuum, but with some consciousness of Australian history and politics. They have seen the Constitution in effect substantially amended in the High Court on many occasions. They have seen a constant growth in the legislature of the Commonwealth Parliament being given extraordinarily wide interpretations. They have seen the zeal with which the existing powers are exploited by Commonwealth governments and Parliaments of whatever political complexion. Perhaps they have suspected on many occasions that proposals have been put forward for short-term party political purposes rather than to make the Constitution more efficient or equitable. Perhaps they know or at least feel that there is a difference in nature between a power that may be exercised by six State Parliaments and that same power being exercised by the central Parliament. Perhaps they realise that any power conferred upon the federal Parliament can never be recalled. Perhaps they feel that whenever there is a real need for a power in the central Parliament the ingenuity of the government‘s advisers aided by a sympathetic High Court will find that the central Parliament has already got that power. Perhaps they realise that there are virtually no constitutional guarantees in the Australian Constitution and that the High Court would be powerless to restrain any high handed or unjust use of the power. Perhaps they believe that they can exercise more control over State Parliaments both at the ballot box and in other ways. Even if many of these matters are logically irrelevant to the question of whether the Constitution should be amended, they are very real to the voter and perhaps if the voter feels strongly about any of these matters he is entitled to vote ‗No‘ (Finemore 1977: 94).

Over the past several decades in Australian political history, the High Court has come to have an increasing impact on legislation as a policy-reviewing institution (Sawer 1987: 13).

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Mason CJ11 has argued that there is a problem in the way the High Court interprets the constitution, and its ―willingness to use a dynamic approach to constitutional interpretation‖ (Solomon 1999: 243-244). Such interpretation has led to the role and function of the High Court becoming a law-maker and a constitutional reviser, with political ramifications (Solomon 1999: 245) for governments, political parties and the citizens.

2.9 Determinants of Voter Behaviour

In a democratic society, voting is a process where individual members of society seek to resolve a potential conflict of opinion between the members of the overall group, into a single choice of the group. It is through the act of voting that a government is able to govern with the consent of the people (Bogdanor 1983: 1). Elections and voting are at the heart of the democratic process. A vote, therefore, is the act of the voter choosing their preferred candidate at an election, or their preferred outcome at a referendum. The issue of analysing the voter behaviour has been a cause for significant research over the past 50 to 60 years.

In Australia, the predominant method of voting in the Lower House is based on a preferential system resulting in a two party preferred outcome. Multiple candidates stand for election. One person is elected after the distribution of all preferences and one person is left with a majority of votes. This method for the allocation of votes is a variation of the ‗plurality method‘12. The ‗preference vote‘ requires that an individual voter‘s ballot must list each candidate in order of preference from first to last. A candidate is elected when, after the distribution of as many votes as required, one person has an absolute majority of the total vote (Bogdanor 1983: 5).

A majority of election studies considers issues such as parties, partisanship, political leadership, campaign strategies of parties and any specific or general issues that a particular

11 The High Court under Mason was characterised by judicial activism and implied rights. Mason CJ had come into the High Court as an extremely cautious judge with clear views on principles of common law. However, Mason CJ served during a time of significant change in Australia. Changes included the abolition of appeals to the Privy Council. Another change was the introduction of the procedure for special leave to appeal the High Court. Thirdly, Australia‘s adherence to international human rights treaties launched a new path for considering the law, rather than ‗strict and complete legalism‘ (Kirby CJ 1996: 1-18). Lastly, Australia adopted the where the British Parliament no longer held any legislative power in Australia (Aitkin and Orr 2002: 154). 12 The plurality method is where a candidate with a plurality of the votes has more votes than any other candidate. It is a system that is linked to the notion of territorial representation by a single candidate. However, due to the growth of political parties and multi-member constituencies, the plurality system could no longer provide the representation of communities as initially intended (Bogdanor 1983: 2-4).

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party may be promising. These same issues can affect the outcome of a referendum. There is, however, one important difference between an election and a referendum: that is, the referendum is exclusively about the formal amendment of the constitution and the issue surrounding such. The voter therefore has to consider the implications of such change. The election on the other hand is about deciding which political party the electorate prefers to have as the government for the next term of parliament. It is these differences, specifically, that have led to this research and the issue of whether the theory of the Michigan Model of voting behaviour in general elections applies to voting behaviour in constitutional referendums.

This section considers these two theories of voting behaviour in order to answer this question, as well as consider other differences between general elections and referendums.

2.10 Issues Affecting Electoral Analysis

Downs argues that in order for a political party to gain votes, it (the party) must discover the relationship between what it does and what the people want (Downs 1957: 37). In a two party preferred political system such as in Australia, there are two basic measures that characterise the relationship between a party‘s vote and its share of parliamentary seats: partisan bias and swing ratio. Tufte (cited in Grofman 1997) argues that the swing ratio is a measure of electoral volatility. In other words, ―the swing ratio is taken to be the expected size of the percent point increase in seat-share for each percentage point increase in a party‘s share of the aggregate vote above 50 percent‖. Partisan bias, in a two party preferred system, can be understood as the expected advantage or disadvantage in the distribution of seats in the Parliament above or below 50 percent, received by a given party that wins 50 percent of the vote (Grofman et al 1997: 457-458).

Taking Tufte‘s and Grofman‘s argument as a measure of voter behaviour, we can be confident that application of their analyses can be applied to any general election where the electoral system favours the two party system which displays the following characteristics: Firstly, as a party‘s share of votes increases, its share of seats similarly increases; secondly, the party that receives a majority of votes will usually hold a majority of the parliamentary seats; thirdly, the party that wins a majority of votes generally wins a majority of seats; lastly, in most elections, the winning party receives less than 65 percent of the overall vote, while the losing party generally never gets less than 35 percent of the overall vote (Tufte 1973: 540, 543). These characteristics are an apt description of Australia‘s political and electoral system, and can be accepted as a suitable framework for referendum analysis.

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To draw the parallel, Australian constitutional referendums are conducted within the same parliamentary and political framework. On the first characteristic, as the ‗yes‘ vote increases, the share of electorates in the affirmative increases. Secondly, the political party holding a majority of seats in the Parliament has an incumbent advantage with the electorate to promote the ‗yes‘ case. Thirdly, if the ‗yes‘ case can gain a majority of votes, the Government is able to pass the relevant constitutional change. Fourthly, for the proposed change to be accepted, the ‗yes‘ case (generally supported by the Government) must receive 50 plus one votes, together with a majority of the six states (a majority of votes from a majority of states).

2.11 The Michigan Model and the Funnel of Causality

Analysis of voting behaviour prior to the 1950s was undertaken utilising aggregate data. One seminal study is that of Herbert Tingsten whose work detailed electoral behaviour and party attitudes of women, political preferences of age groups and electoral participation within social groups in Europe and the United States (Tingsten 1963: 7). Evidence gathered from aggregate election statistics has shown that partisan preferences are stable between elections (Campbell et al 1964: 67). Since the 1950s, the predominant method used to understand voter behaviour has been through the use of surveys. Other methods used to understand voter behaviour are newspaper polling, historical analysis and analysis of aggregate election results (Niemi and Weisberg 1993b: 1). These earlier methods have been an historical source for understanding party identification prior to the Michigan Model.13 Similarly, these results allowed researchers to make inference about their findings. For example, Key (1966) argued that ―voters are not fools‖. The electorate, by and large, behaves in a rational and responsible manner, and voters have a desire for policy-relevant choices (Key 1966: 7). In some cases, aggregate analysis of electoral outcomes continues to be utilised as it is an accepted method of analysis (King 2001).

The Michigan Model of voter behaviour is essentially constructed of social and psychological factors, which commences with the early years of maturation (Campbell et al 1964: 86) through to the person casting their vote. The basis of partisanship and the reason for its long running stability is realised through previous research which shows that party

13 The initial research was carried out by Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes. Their work was first published in the book entitled ‗The American Voter‘ in 1960.

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identification responds to changes in the environment and the party system (Campbell et al 1964: 67; Jensen 1976: 48).

Ongoing research of the Michigan Model has shown that there are five predominant factors which affect voter behaviour. These factors are encapsulated in the funnel of causality. Dalton‘s diagram of the funnel of causality demonstrates where each of the socio- psychological factors fits in the spectrum, from early influence to actual vote. To understand the funnel of causality, the dominant variables are: parties and partisan stability, social class, issues, the impact of the economy, and party leaders (McAllister 1997; Kemp 1979). The socio-economic factors are characterised by explanatory variables such as economic class, religion, ethnicity, education, gender and age, which provides a strong explanation for the way individuals vote (Gow and Stenner 1992: 3). However, the Michigan Model recognises that analysis of social factors does not provide a full explanation of voter behaviour (Gow and Stenner 1992: 5). For example, why does belonging to one social group, such as a trade union, mean that the majority of these people will vote for the Labor party? Dalton argues that the social position of a person will influence his or her values and political beliefs. Therefore, traits of one who is opposed to same sex marriages is more likely to be a Christian voter and, therefore, is more likely to vote for a party that favours the traditional understanding of marriage. As Dalton states, ―social characteristics are an indirect measure of attitudinal differences between groups of voters and their perceptions of which party best represents these policy positions‖ (Dalton 1996: 165). These social characteristics then provide the voter with their political cues at the opening of the funnel of causality. The result is that voters look to those political parties that best represent their values.

Figure 1.1 Funnel of Causality Predicting Vote Choice

Source: Dalton 2008: 171.

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Of all the social indicators, the class cleavage has been considered the primary basis for political alignments and an indicator of voter decision (Weakliem and Western 1999: 609). As Lazarsfeld et al argued, ―the social group you belong to, be it defined by class, religion, race or whatever; determines whom you vote for, because during the campaign social groups imbue their individual members with the accepted political ideology of the group‖ (Lazarsfeld et al, 1948: 147 as cited by Catt 1996: 4). The Michigan Model recognises that it is not possible to have a purely sociological approach to voter behaviour, and that there is a psychological dimension to a person‘s vote choice. The socio-psychological model (as demonstrated by the funnel of causality) shows that at the opening are those socio-economic conditions that affect each person in society. For example, the sociological characteristics of a person‘s father are influential to their own political behaviour (Goldberg 1966: 914). Other factors in the funnel are age, ethnicity, gender and class background. These variables are what Bartle defines as stable variables that precede any other changeable social mechanism (Bartle 1998: 504). The political socialisation of the person, therefore, is critical to their background, ―encapsulated in party identification, against which partisan attitudes are formed and operate‖ (Goldberg 1966: 921).

Political scientists have long recognised that elections have significant consequences (Bartels 2008: 35). The Michigan Model of voting behaviour has been central to electoral research since the 1950s (Bartels 2008; Rosema 2006: 468; Rosema and Krochik 2009: 1). ―In the study of voting, no concept has been more central than party identification‖ (Rosema and Krochik 2009: 2). The scholars of the Michigan Model argued that the key to understanding the stability of US presidential elections was tied to the concept of party identification (Campbell et al 1964: 67). The conceptualisation of the Michigan Model has continued to be foundational in the study of electoral behaviour and has been one of the most widely used theories of voter behaviour (Jenson 1976: 27). Political scientists still consider that party identification is a key concept in the study of voter behaviour (Rosema 2006: 468). One of the reasons given for the importance of the Michigan Model is the stability of party identification (Rosema and Krochik 2009: 3).

Researchers of the Michigan Model have demonstrated through their research in The American Voter (1960 and 1964), that there are a number of issues that affect voter behaviour. Firstly, the voter has to consider the candidate and the political party, and that there needs to be an orientation between the voter and party on those issues to give the voter coherence before casting their vote. This process requires a transfer of cognitive attributes and affective values by the voter, which has been understood as a psychological transfer

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from one object to another (Campbell et al 1964: 27). The result is the development of partisan attitudes that reflect party loyalty governed by psychological forces.

For the psychological forces to be acted upon there must be causality at the psychological level which affects the voter. Campbell et al argue that the elements of politics—candidates, group interests, domestic and foreign policy and the performance of the political party—are what the voter must evaluate. ―Orientations to these objects, seen by the voters as positive or negative, comprise a system of partisan attitudes that is of primary importance for the voting act‖ (Campbell et al 1964: 32). The Michigan researchers realised that partisan attitudes are not the only psychological force at work in the voters‘ minds. Voters are influenced by family, work associates and friends, and each one will exert some form of psychological force (Campbell et al 1964: 33). The potential is for psychological conflict to develop for various reasons such as ideological differences, or there could be social pressures caused by the person‘s own sociological roots (ethnicity, religion, occupation). Other researchers have shown that social background, social status and inherited parental characteristics all affect the person‘s party identification and, ultimately, their vote (Niemi and Weisberg 1993c: 8).

The party identification theory has had a profound impact on electoral research. Partisan preferences have proven to be stable from election to election. Campbell et al (1964: 67) citing Key, argues that voters have a ―standing decision‖ to support one political party as evidenced by aggregate election statistics. These results show that there is a strong correlation between political party division and vote; and that a change in candidate in the electorate does little to alter the correlation or the partisanship of the voter (Campbell et al 1964: 67). Attachments to political parties have been similarly confirmed by survey research. These lasting attachments are important and provide a basic division of electoral strength for campaigns and provide an affective tie to a party (Jensen 1976: 28). A key finding of the Michigan Model is that these attachments ―are an important factor in assuring the stability of the party system itself‖, and that ―the importance of stable partisan loyalties has been universally recognised in electoral studies‖ (Campbell et al 1964: 67-68).

The concept of party identification is captured in three ways: (a) voting record, (b) attitude to issues and (c) self classification. Party identification provides the link between the voter and the political party, where the voter is able to use the party for cues in casting their vote. Campbell et al argue that the political party and the candidate are an opinion form agency. The strength of the relationship between party identification and the partisan attitude suggests that how the party responds on various elements of politics will impact on the enduring party attachment of voters (1964: 75). At the aggregate level, we can argue that the

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safer the electorate, the stronger the attachment of voters to that party. Party identification therefore provides the screen through which voters are able to assess what is favourable to their partisan orientation (Campbell et al 1964: 76).

The work by Campbell et al portrays the electorate as having orientations toward politics that are strongly influenced by partisan loyalties, which develop during the social maturation stage of life (Campbell et al 1964: 86; Bartels 2008: 10). The psychological attachment is expressed as the tendency of the voter being able to evaluate the entity (the political party or candidate) with some degree of favour or disfavour (Campbell et al 1964: 32; Rosema 2006: 470). As a result of this psychological attachment, the partisanship of the voter acts as a filter through which the person is able to cast their vote. This process is encapsulated in the image of the funnel of causality (Jenson 1976: 28; Rosema 2006: 470).

As we move closer to the pointy end of the funnel of causality, voters‘ loyalty to their party is important. The political party should provide the necessary cues on the issue of concern. In the election, the voter must consider many issues, but there are three conditions that must be fulfilled. Firstly, the issue must be cognised—in other words, the voter must recognise the issue as important. Secondly, the issue must arouse minimal intensity of feeling where the voter senses an importance about the issue. Thirdly, the issue must be accompanied by some perception that the party represents the person‘s own position better than any other political party (Campbell et al 1964: 98). The main emphasis of the Michigan Model is on three attitudes: the voter‘s attachment to a party, the voter‘s orientation toward the issues, and the voter‘s orientation to the candidates (Niemi and Weisberg 1993c: 8).

McAllister notes that the concept of party identification has subsequently become the major theory for analysis of voting behaviour in western democratic general elections (McAllister 1992: 5). Party identification is a ―pervasive measure of partisan sentiment‖ and has been accepted as providing a stable psychological attachment to a political party (Bean 1997: 115). This attachment develops through the influences and socialisation of a person‘s life in their early years and later through membership of various social groups. Numerous analyses of election results in Australia have concluded that party identification, which is understood as a person‘s psychological attachment to a political party (Bone and Ranney 1971: 7; Lewis-Beck et al 2008: 111), is the most important predictor of voting (Bean 1997; Aitkin 1977). Bone and Ranney argue that party identification closely resembles the development of religious attitudes, where preferences for a particular religious denomination are inherited rather than rationally selected (Bone and Ranney 1971: 8). Evidence from elections in the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia show that the strength of party

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identification has helped maintain a stability in Australian voting patterns at elections over long periods of time (Aitkin 1977: 36, 41; Lewis-Beck et al 2008: 111).

Since the 1950s, the nature of party identification has been shown to be stable over time. That is, party loyalty has remained fairly consistent. Miller argues that,

The evidence of relative stability, and the absence of incremental change over time, is of great theoretical importance. It adds support to the hypothesis that party identification is normally a very stable, virtually exogenous variable which interacts with political events to create the short-term perceptions and evaluations that are, in turn, the proximate causes of many voters‘ election day choices between candidates … (Miller 1995: 14).

Clearly, voters do not always vote according to their preferred party for any number of reasons. This sentiment gives rise to an alternative argument, which says that partisanship and voter behaviour does change over time. Marks (1993) argues that there has been fundamental change in Australian politics, noting that there has been a marked decline in the major party vote, as indicated by low percentage of primary votes gained (Marks 1993: 137), and an increase in the number of votes received by Independents and the minor parties. Marks further argues that voters, rather than showing a continuing loyalty to their preferred political party, have been influenced more by issues and their evaluation of party leaders (Marks 1993: 137).

Counter to this, the Michigan Model argues that party identification is an important long- term factor. That is, as much as there are short-term changes in voting behaviour, party identification will remain stable over the long-term. For example, research has shown that even though there may be a change of a candidate in an electorate, the level of vote for a particular party remains fairly constant (Campbell et al 1964: 67). The result of this partisan stability is that party identification has a profound impact on voter behaviour. These partisan loyalties help predict voter behaviour to the point where once party identification is established, the attachment is not easily changed (Campbell et al 1964: 82, 87).

In summary, party identification is not thought of as a direct determinant of vote choice, but rather, as a long-term factor that provides a filter for voters.

This was specified in terms of the ‗funnel of causality‘. Voting behaviour was seen as a direct consequence of attitudes towards candidates, policies and group benefits. These attitudes are largely influenced by voters‘ party identification, which, in turn, is determined by social characteristics that are located in the mouth of the funnel. Hence, the theoretical

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function of party identification is to explain particular attitudes and to explain how social characteristics influence vote choice (Rosema 2006: 470).

2.12 Issues Affecting Voting and Referendum Analysis

Sections 7 and 24 of the Australian Constitution require Members of Parliament (House of Representatives and Senate) to be ―directly chosen by the people‖. The holding of the election is governed by the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth). For successful changes to the Constitution, section 128 says: ―This Constitution shall not be altered except in the following manner. 1. Passed by an absolute majority of both Houses of the Federal Parliament, or by one House twice; and 2. At a referendum, passed by a majority of the people as a whole, and by a majority of the people in a majority of the states (that is, in at least four of the six States).‖ The holding of the referendum is governed by the Referendum (Machinery Provisions) Act 1984, or before 1984, the Referendum (Constitution Alteration) Act 1912 (No. 2) (Bennett 2003: 4).

In Australia, the mechanics of holding an election and a referendum are virtually identical. As a comparison: the date of the election (although dictated by the term of three years) is called at the Prime Minister‘s and Government‘s choosing; that is, the referendum is generally initiated by the Prime Minister and Government. Secondly, the political parties and candidates are the same for both the election and the referendum. There is one exception as observed with the 1999 referendum where two groups led the campaign. Thirdly, the location to place the vote is held in the same premises for both the election and the referendum. Fourthly, the same officials from the Australian Electoral Commission are used for both the election and the referendum. These factors lead one to argue that the voter does not see much difference between an election and a referendum. Furthermore, it is generally accepted that issues affecting the analysis of general election voting can be equally applied to referendum voting, despite the fact that referendums are a rare occurrence in Australian politics. However, recent studies conducted in other western democracies suggest otherwise (see following section on Current Analyses of Referendum Voting below).

More often than not, the issue or issues confronting the voter at the referendum ballot box have been heavily influenced by competing arguments advocated by various interest groups (including political parties) in the campaign period leading up to the vote. Voters have heard arguments for and against, and could possibly be in two minds as to how they should cast their vote. Clearly, capturing this element of voter behaviour at referendums will be difficult.

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A further issue affecting referendum analysis is the difference in the method of distribution of votes. In an Australian general election, votes are distributed based on the preferential method. However, there is no distribution of votes in referendum voting. Voting requirements at referendums in Australia gives voters only two choices.14 They can either vote ‗yes‘ in support of the proposed constitutional change, or they may vote ‗no‘ in opposition of the proposed constitutional change. This difference raises an important point as, in each electorate at a general election, voters choose from one of a number of candidates, thereby providing a multiple choice for voters. The arguments for each case are provided for in section 11 of the Constitution where the Electoral Commissioner must send to each elector a pamphlet showing the proposed amendment with relevant arguments as authorised by those members of the Parliament who forwarded those arguments (Blackshield and Williams 2005: 1302).

Is the binary choice of ‗yes‘ or ‗no‘ the best approach when holding a referendum?15 Voting in a general election in Australia involves casting a vote for one‘s preferred candidate within a bicameral system—the House of Representatives (Lower House) and the Senate (Upper House). Having this dual vote provides voters with the knowledge that voting one way in the Lower House allows them to vote in an entirely different way in the Upper House (Brams et al 1997: 360). This added choice is generally referred to as split ticket voting. However, this option is not available in referendum voting.

This issue is especially important when a voter wants to support a particular referendum proposal, but does not agree with the way the questions have been worded, or the potential implications of the wording. Such a consideration highlights the dilemma many voters faced at the 6 November 1999 referendum on the issue of Australia becoming a republic, and on whether Australians should adopt a new preamble for the Constitution. Regular opinion polling throughout the 1990s had shown that there was an increasing acceptance for Australia to become a republic with a president as the head of state. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the 1999 constitutional referendum failed due to the design and implications of the question. The second issue concerned whether Australia should amend the preamble to the constitution. A specific part of the proposed new preamble was to acknowledge prior

14 The conduct of a referendum is regulated by the Referendum (Machinery Provisions) Act 1984 (Aitkin and Orr 2002: 153). 15 The question of a binary choice had not been an issue until the 1999 referendum when there were multiple options for Australia becoming a republic. Ultimately, Australians were only able to vote on one model.

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ownership (deep kinship) of the Australian continent by Australia‘s Indigenous people. General public sentiment since the Mabo (1993) and Wik (1996) decisions of the High Court and the ‗Bringing Them Home’ Report (1997) on the showed that many Australians had become increasingly aware that the doctrine of terra nullius was false. To acknowledge that the Aboriginal people were the first inhabitants and owners of this continent had gained significant support. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the reason for the rejection of this proposed change is due to the concerted efforts of conservative governments around Australia to undermine the Mabo and Wik decisions. With both 1999 questions, there was an alternative choice ––vote for the model presented or nothing.

2.13 Current Analyses of Referendum Voting

I would like to recall the research question at this point––that is, does the Michigan Model of voter behaviour explain voting outcomes in Australian referendums? The Michigan Model is made up of three features––party identification, attitude to issues and orientation to candidates. Clearly, referendums deal specifically with issues (one of the key components of the Michigan Model) however, voters still receive cues from political parties and the Members of Parliament (the candidates). In support of this view, Aimer and Miller argue, ―if there is any consistency between voting behaviour in referendums and elections, it is likely to be found in people‘s need, when called to vote, to ‗understand‘ and take positions on complex issues with the minimum of effort and their urge to harmonise their choices‖ (Aimer and Miller 2002: 795). That is, whether the vote is at a general election or a referendum, the factors that influence the voter remain the same––political parties, leaders, issues, campaign, long and short term forces (LeDuc and Pammett 1995: 4-5).

Unlike decisions made in Parliament on a day to day basis, a referendum is a mechanism that allows for the direct participation of voters on a particular issue (Jaensch and Teichmann 1992: 51). In Australia, the initiative to call a referendum belongs to the Parliament (Walker 1987: ix) and, more specifically, to the political party in power. The government will have a perceived need to alter the constitution and will, therefore bring a recommendation to the Parliament. To be sure, section 128 provides a constitutional provision that allows for the referendum to be initiated by the Commonwealth Parliament. The proposal to amend the Constitution must first take the form of a Bill submitted to the Parliament, which is then presented to the people to vote on in a referendum between two to six months after it leaves the Parliament (Bennett 2003: 1,4).

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This system of democracy within Australia‘s political system suggests that there is tension between representative parliamentary democracy and deliberative democracy. When we relate the styles of democracy to constitutional change, Australians who may want change to the Constitution will never see a proposal enacted unless that proposal is initiated by the Parliament. It can be argued, therefore, that any change that would reflect a greater say by the citizens in constitutional matters and the willingness of the citizens to have a greater say in government decisions, will cause friction between the Parliament and the people. Is this a possible explanation for the small percentage of change to the Australian Constitution?

Various political scientists have attempted to provide an explanation for the low success rate of referendums, both in Australia and other western democracies. However, there is no clear agreement for any one particular explanation. One explanation offered by LeDuc and Pammett suggests that the lack of analysis is due to the irregularity of referendums in parliamentary democracies and, as such, the question of whether they fall outside the theoretical framework of elections is an issue that needs careful consideration (LeDuc and Pammett 1995).

The following political scientists have conducted several studies of interest to this research. The first notable study was conducted by Parker on Australia‘s early referendums in 1949. A more recent study was undertaken by Kemp in 1978 on voting in Australian referendums. There have also been studies on voter behaviour in referendums in Europe and Canada. Research was conducted in Norway of a referendum held in 1994 (Midtho and Hines 1998). A Canadian study was undertaken in the province of Quebec by (Pammett and LeDuc 2001) on the long and short term factors important to voting in referendums. Analysis of Swiss voters also examined the interests and information in referendum voting (Christin, Hug and Sciarini 2000).

Parker found that ―the fundamental fact does seem to be the importance of party allegiance in determining the distribution of public attitudes‖ (Parker 1949: 12). Kemp similarly argued that referendum voting was a product of partisanship (Kemp 1978: 247) and argued that the party position taken on a referendum issue will have an effect in determining the level of support or opposition to the referendum proposal. Kemp‘s position is similarly supported by Aitkin (1978), Hughes (1994) and Galligan (1990). Aitkin argues that one of the possibilities of a low acceptance of constitutional change is due to the high level of partisanship in Australia (Aitkin 1978: 124). Evidence for the influence of partisanship is demonstrated by the fact that the Australian Labor party has been more willing to support

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constitutional change than the (Hughes 1994: 160; Galligan 1990: 345). On this point, Galligan et al argue that,

The Australian Labor Party, which draws its inspiration from a tradition of reformist and majoritarian democracy, has traditionally resented both federalism and the Senate, preferring a centralization of power in the national government and its concentration in a dominant House of Representatives (Galligan et al 1990: 67).

In support of the partisanship view, Hughes suggests that political partisanship in Australia might help to explain 40 to 60 percent of acceptance of the proposed constitutional changes (Hughes 1994: 162).

Although partisanship is argued as being a factor that influences referendum voting, Kemp argues that evidence to date on the partisanship argument has not been thoroughly tested when speaking of voting behaviour in a referendum. Kemp demonstrated on the basis of correlational evidence, that referendum outcomes generally followed party identification lines. His evidence was based on aggregate data and analysis of comparison with the ALP party identifiers as opposed to other party identifiers. Kemp states,

Since party support is distributed territorially, any significant impact of party positions on referendum voting will also have an effect in distributing levels of support or opposition to referendum proposals across constituencies on foundations defined by levels of party support. Indeed, we would predict that the greater the success of the parties in persuading their supporters to follow the party position the closer will be the correlation between party support in a constituency and the vote in that constituency for or against referendum proposals (Kemp 1978: 247).

Kemp‘s analysis of referendum voting is similar to that conducted in Norway. Based on aggregate data, Midtbo and Hines argue that political parties could influence the outcome of a referendum. As their research notes, the question that parties play a crucial role in referendum outcomes is often asked, but rarely tested (Midtbo and Hines 1998: 77). Citing previous research conducted in the 1970s of a Norwegian and a British referendum, it was found that partisanship strongly influenced vote (Midtbo and Hines 1998: 78). On this issue, they suggest that there may be a paradox as, not only can political parties affect how voters look at the referendum issue but, the issue itself may also influence how the voters look at the parties (Midtbo and Hines 1998: 78).

Empirical analysis of Norwegian referendums found that factors such as social cleavages and economic variables affect both referendum and election outcomes. However, as was the case

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in the recent Australian referendum, Midtbo and Hines observe that it is unusual for a referendum to be a clear choice on party lines. They argue that,

If all political parties fall on the same side on a dichotomous issue, voters have to use other cues than party identification to come up with their referendum choice (Midtbo and Hines 1998: 80).

Midtbo and Hines conclude that even though factors such as regional cleavages and unemployment account for much of the variation in referendum and election outcomes, a two-way effect remains. That is, depending on the issue, a political party can influence a referendum outcome whilst correspondingly, the referendum issue can affect the support of the same party (Midtbo and Hines 1998: 92).

Research conducted by Pammett and LeDuc (2001) similarly suggests that parties and leaders affect voter decision making in referendums in much the same way as an election. Citing Butler and Ranney, they argue that, in a referendum, long and short term factors influence voter behaviour (Pammett and LeDuc 2001: 265). Using two referendum questions on the same issue 15 years apart16, they analyse these two effects using a logistic regression model with three sets of predictors. The research conducted by Pammett and LeDuc found that as with elections, the Quebec referendums were decided by several factors acting in conjunction with each other (Pammett and LeDuc 2001: 278). These factors were basic social cleavages combined with attitudinal factors such as feelings of warmth or coolness toward the political leaders (Pammett and LeDuc 2001: 278).

There two final studies of relevance to this research. One is that of Christin et al on the interests and information in referendum voting at a national level in Switzerland17. This study considered whether voters were sufficiently well informed to make reasonable choices at a referendum, capturing Down‘s rational choice theory18. Information cues such as endorsements by political parties or interest groups are there to provide relevant information to voters—not unlike a general election (Christin et al 2000: 1). The other study is that conducted by Tonsgaard (A Theoretical Model of Referendum Behaviour). Tonsgaard cites Bunge‘s (1973: 130-42) migration model [choice no. 1] where a voter seeks to maximise his or her utility––given a belief system and a preference system. He then proposes that the

16 The Canadian referendum question in 1980 and 1995 considered the sovereignty of Quebec. The 1995 survey data utilised the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) – a yearly comparative survey. The 1980 analysis was conducted using the Quebec Referendum studies conducted by Harold D. Clarke, Jane Jenson, Lawrence LeDuc and Jon H. Pammett (Pammet and LeDuc 2001: 268). 17 This study analysed 23 referendum issues between 1981 and 1999. 18 Refer back to page 32

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migration model (Collins: 1975: 73) should be considered in light of sociological conflict theory, which states that ―each individual attempts to maximize his subjective status to the degree allowed by the resources available to himself and others he contacts‖ (Tonsgaard 1992: 134-135) [choice no. 2]. Tonsgaard argues that the central mechanism that explains a voters‘ choice in the referendum can be expressed in the following way: The behavioural intention of an individual in a binary choice situation will be determined by the difference between the subjective welfare of choice no. 1 and choice no. 2 (Tonsgaard 1992: 135). In other words, what Tonsgaard is arguing is that voter decision at the referendum is based on whether there is a perceived personal benefit, whether or not he or she can explain that benefit (Tonsgaard 1992: 137-138). Tonsgaard further argues that variables such as age and income (social references) have little effect on the final vote choice, although this research will examine these variables to determine the impact on referendum vote.

A further factor in Christin‘s research is whether the voter is informed or uninformed. In support of Christin, Lau and Redlawsk indicate that a majority of voters process information on ―complicated‖ issues before casting their vote, notwithstanding the importance of political interest, experience and knowledge (Lau and Redlawsk 2006: 22, 264). Similarly, the author would argue that uninformed citizens are more likely to adopt partisan cues in referendum voting as they do for election voting. One can infer, therefore, that voters who ignore partisan cues are more likely to support the status quo.19 Furthermore, the uninformed voter tends to follow partisan cues or the government endorsements of a particular view (Christin et al 2000: 14). This second finding supports the party identification model of voter behaviour whilst, at the same time, does not dismiss the ability of voters to make an informed decision.

This literature review has provided the background in understanding the importance of the referendum vote. Constitutional change can have unintended consequences and voters have but one choice and opportunity when voting in a constitutional referendum. The Australian Constitution can be changed according to section 128, however voters have proven to be cautious in accepting change, especially when the change alters the federal balance, and thereby the nature of the constitution.

19 Whether a voter is informed or uninformed is not an issue for analysis in this research. However, as Lewis-Beck et al argue, the uninformed voter is more likely to follow partisan cues in order to cast their vote (Lewis-Beck et al 2008: 124-126).

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The second aspect to this review is that voters are inherently influenced by political parties, political leaders and the very issues they are asked to vote on in a referendum. Since 1960, the dominant theory, which has directed research into the field of voter behaviour in general elections is the Michigan Model. Through analysis of election and referendum data, this research will assess whether this model provides an adequate explanation for the way people vote in Australian constitutional referendums from 1967 to 1999.

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CHAPTER THREE

3.0 Methodology

The research question of this thesis is to determine if the Michigan Model of voting behaviour provides an explanation for voting outcomes in Australian constitutional referendums. Political scientists have clear views on the Michigan Model, where it is stated that, ―no explanatory variable is more pervasive than party identification‖ (Gerber and Green 1998: 794). Similarly, Holmberg (1995: 23) argues that party identification, in an aggregated form, is a very useful indicator of voter behaviour. Political scientists throughout advanced industrial societies accept this model as the best available indicator of voter behaviour (Campbell et al 1960; Aitkin 1977: 37; Feldman 1982: 453; Lau and Redlawsk 2006: 10). This research similarly adopts the Michigan Model as the framework of analysis in determining voter behaviour in Australian constitutional referendums.20

3.1 Data Collection Process

Analysis of the Michigan Model has been applied in two ways. Firstly, the 1999 Australian Constitutional Referendum Study21 has been used to conduct an analysis of the responses of randomly selected individuals on their opinions and attitudes surrounding the 6 November 1999 referendum. The collection of data was based on a random sample drawn from those able to vote at the referendum. A mail out survey was sent to those selected. The survey was conducted by Gow, Bean and McAllister. Responses from the survey were collated and this data set is available from the Social Science Data Archives of the Australian National University. An analysis of this data has been undertaken to test the appropriateness of the Michigan Model‘s measure of party identification at referendum voting in Australia. This referendum survey is the first such survey to have been conducted in Australia.

The second method of analysis of the Michigan Model is the application of King‘s (1997b) ecological inference of aggregate data. Here, aggregate data has been collated from general

20 The longevity and credibility of the Michigan Model has inspired and informed analysis of voter behaviour in a variety of countries (Mackie and Marsh 1995: 177). 21 The 1999 Australian Constitutional Referendum Study (ACRS) was after the 1999 Australian referendum. The principal investigators are: David J Gow (The University of Queensland); Clive Bean (Queensland University of Technology) and Ian McAllister (The Australian National University). ―The 1999 ACRS was conducted to investigate the Australian electorate‘s attitudes towards significant political issues surrounding the 1999 constitutional referendum‖ (Gow et al 2000a).

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election and referendum results from the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC)22. The general election data used are from the election which immediately preceded each referendum. In order to measure the Michigan Model from these aggregate data sets, variables such as geographical location of electorates, whether a state was large or small in respect to population, the incumbency of an elected member, the safeness of the seat for each Member of Parliament, and whether there was alignment of opinion between state and federal governments at the time of the referendum have been utilised. These variables were applied to referendums held between 1967 and 1999.

In order to determine the impact of socio-economic factors of the 1999 referendum, indicators representative of the Michigan Model have been taken from the Australian Bureau of Statistics 1996 census data. Census data at the electorate level is not available (without incurring significant cost) for referendums held prior to 1999. These three sources of data form one large data set for the November 1999 referendum. Analysis has been undertaken at a federal electorate level.

3.2 Proposed Hypotheses

Hypotheses have been divided into two groups using the aggregate data. The first set applies to all referendums from 1967 to 1999 for this thesis. These consist of five hypotheses in all. The second set applies only to the 1999 referendum, as socio-economic variables are available that utilised the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 1996 census data. The 1999 referendum, using the 1999 Australian Constitutional Referendum Study (ACRS) also has allowed the application of these same hypotheses from an individual level survey. By being able to use both aggregate and individual level data for the 1999 referendum, the research has been able to establish whether the analyses complement or contradict one another.

The second set of hypotheses is presented in Chapter 8 where available data allows further testing of the Michigan Model of voter behaviour.

22 Prior to 1984 the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) was known as the Australian Electoral Office (AEO).

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3.3 Aggregate Level Data Hypotheses and Coding

The aggregate level hypotheses, as explained above, utilise variables available for the Michigan Model of voter behaviour and are as a proxy for analysis. Variables were constructed from data from the Australian Electoral Office / Commission for referendums from 1967 to 1988. For the 1999 referendum, data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics was also used. Further information on the construction of the variables from the aggregate data is found in section 3.13.

In summary, the following five hypotheses have been used to analyse the Michigan Model of voter behaviour at constitutional referendums.

Hypothesis #1: Those electorates that are closer to major capital cities such as Sydney and Melbourne are more likely to support proposed constitutional change than electorates further away.

Hypothesis #2: Larger populated states such as and Victoria are more likely to support constitutional change than smaller populated states.

Hypothesis #3: ALP held electorates are more likely to support proposed constitutional change than non-ALP electorates.

Hypothesis #4: The higher the percentage of first preference votes received by an ALP Member of Parliament at the immediately preceding or concurrent federal election, the more likely that the electorate will support constitutional change.

Hypothesis #5: If state governments perceive that a proposed constitutional change will reduce state power, these states will oppose constitutional change, no matter what political party is in office at the time.

Each of the above hypotheses has been constructed to test the Michigan Model of voter behaviour. Campbell et al argue that there are various factors that influence voters associated with the model. Firstly, there are the political attitudes of vote choice. For elections and referendums, the perception of the political party and the local candidates, the partisanship of the voter (reflected by their individual choice) and voter turnout are influential indicators (Campbell et al 1964: 13-64). Secondly, there is the political context of vote choice. Campbell et al argue that party identification––the policy concerning the issue and associated ideology of the party––are key indicators of vote choice (Campbell et al 1964: 65-156). The third factor of the Michigan Model is the social and economic context of the vote. For example, what role does social class play? What are the differences in voter behaviour between rural and urban voters? How do social characteristics such as education,

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occupation, gender and age influence voter behaviour (Campbell et al 1964: 157-265). These factors have been applied to the following hypotheses.

3.4 Hypothesis #1

Demographer Bernard Salt observes that at the time of federation, the rural areas of Australia had the larger population (61 percent rural; 32 percent city). However, populations have gradually shifted with the suburbs and the cities now dominate (17 percent rural; 64 percent city) (Salt 2003:2). Research by Singh demonstrates that the location of a voter is related strongly to vote choice (2009: 421, 424). Singh‘s research findings support Campbell et al who argue that there are differences in voter behaviour between metropolitan and non- metropolitan electorates (1964: 243). Their research found that inhabitants of urban areas are more likely to enjoy higher occupational status, have higher family incomes and receive better educations (Campbell et al 1964: 243). Clearly these issues are of significance in voter behaviour due to the socio-economic construct of electorates.

This research proposes that those electorates that are closer to major cities are more likely to support proposed constitutional change than electorates further away. This hypothesis is based on the findings of Campbell et al and on the research of Lipset and Rokkan who argue that there is a centre-periphery effect of electoral behaviour as it relates to the sociological context. Isolation is considered to factor into voting behaviour. For example, conflict over policies and value commitments with deals done with political parties can translate into how voters perceive their position when it comes to the vote (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 5). The result is that voters from provincial and rural electorates (the periphery) are more likely to oppose constitutional change and voters from urban-metropolitan electorates are more likely to support constitutional change.23 We can argue, therefore, that periphery voters will assume that the centre voters receive benefits not available to the periphery. With the political party structure in Australia, this perception by the voter is not allayed. The one political party that is said to represent the periphery (the provincial and rural voter) is the National Party. However, as the smaller National Party is in coalition with the Liberal Party (who have the dominant numbers in the relationship), the periphery are constrained in policy representation (Kim et al 2008: 137). As Lipset and Rokkan argue, regions become

23 The majority of the Australian population is based around the six capital cities. These cities are similarly the centres for the state governments, the sites for the major media outlets, and the bases for the majority of the pressure groups. Each of these cities have dominated Australian political life since federation and continue to do so.

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polarised and the periphery populations feel threatened (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 6, 10). Salt, in assessing the city rural differences, argues that there is a crisis in the bush observed by a diminishing population since the mid 1970s. Those who have relocated are younger people (under 35) with the older people remaining (Salt 2003: 68). This shift in population has seen a centralisation of services to larger populated centres, with an obvious effect on those remaining in the rural areas. As Salt argues, ―this structural social shift has an impact on the economic wellbeing of a community and also on the sense of vitality within the community‖ (2003: 68).

In order to test this hypothesis for each referendum based on AEC classifications of electorates, four categories of electorate variables have been analysed as a comparison with majority voter preference for each electorate. These categories are: inner metropolitan, outer metropolitan, provincial and rural.

3.5 Hypothesis #2

Campbell‘s research recognised that there was a geographically uneven distribution of representation of politicians in the Congress (1964: 287). Their research found that individual partisan choice at the ballot box was not necessarily reflected by the outcome where a major party finds itself in a minority position (Campbell et al 1964: 287). When examining Australia‘s population distribution, one quickly recognises that the demographic centre of Australia is the eastern seaboard, extending across the south to take in Victoria (Salt 2003: 116). Similarly, the majority of the population is located in New South Wales and Victoria.

This hypothesis argues that voters from larger populated states such as New South Wales and Victoria, are more likely to support constitutional change than voters from smaller populated states (Sharman 1981: 265). A review of prime ministers and opposition leaders from 1901 to 1996 provides support for this hypothesis with a majority of leaders coming from New South Wales and Victoria.24 Similarly, a majority of opposition leaders have derived from New South Wales or Victoria with one opposition leader from Queensland. Mayer has also highlighted that the majority of federal representatives within the Liberal- Country (National) Party generally come from New South Wales, Victoria or Queensland

24 For greater detail on the state, and party of the prime ministers and leaders of the opposition, see Appendix B.

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(Mayer 1956: 262). This hypothesis is an extension of the centre-periphery hypothesis, where access and allocation of resources, products and other benefits to the economy serve as a source of conflict, contributing to cleavages between the centre and the periphery. These cleavages translate into partisan preferences (Amorim Neto and Cox 1997: 152). Other causes for a divided vote are due to the location of the national bureaucracy where power (political and financial) is controlled (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 13) providing potential for opposition to constitutional change.

In order to test this hypothesis, electorates were divided into their various states and analysed in relation to the support or rejection of the proposed constitutional changes. The six states are Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, , and Western Australia. The two Australian territories ( and the Australian Capital Territory) were not included in referendum voting until 1984.

3.6 Hypothesis #3

In the Michigan Model of voter behaviour, Campbell et al argue that there are distinctive differences between the two major political parties, reflected by definitive support from the voting public (1964: 181). Historically, the Labor party has had an enduring influence on Australian politics and is the longest running political party in Australia. The Labor party has had traditional support from various secondary groups throughout its history. Traditional support has come largely from male, trade unionist, blue-collar, Catholic voters (Aitkin 1977: 168; Bean 2000: 73). Historically, Australian Labor Governments have been more adventurous in constitutional reform as demonstrated by the Fisher, Chifley and Whitlam periods (Crommelin and Evans 1977: 24). The historical attachment of the voter, argues Campbell, is one of the enduring factors of party identification. This research hypothesises that ALP held electorates are more likely to support proposed constitutional change than non-ALP held electorates. This hypothesis has two bases. First, the Labor party tend to be pro-republican and desire separation from the British monarchy. The second basis is historical on two levels. Firstly, members of the early Labor party were excluded from negotiations and debate on the formation of Australia‘s Constitution (Galligan 1995: 92-94; Bennett 2003: 17), resulting in the Labor party being committed to the abolition of federalism (Galligan 1997: 29)—similar to the Queensland unitary system of government. Secondly, from 1918 to 1971, one of the tenants of the Labor party platform was the abolition of a federal constitution and the vesting of sovereign power in the Commonwealth Parliament (Sawer 1977: 3; Galligan et al 1990: 67). On the other hand, the Liberal Party is contrasted with the ALP as being the protectors of the Constitution with the determination to

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preserve the federal system (Bennett 2003: 18). After the difficulties faced by Mr Whitlam in 1975 with the breaking of convention, the Labor party stated that, when given the opportunity, it should pursue constitutional reform (Elias 1977b: 7). Therefore expectation is that those voters who identify with the Labor party will be more likely to accept constitutional change, no matter which political party initiates the referendum.

In order to test this hypothesis, the variable has been constructed from election results from each federal election immediately preceding the referendum. The variable has classified whether the electorate is held by the Australian Labor party, the Coalition (Liberal or National / Country Party), or Other (Democrats, Greens, Independent or other Minor Party).

3.7 Hypothesis #4

This hypothesis examines the strength of partisanship at the aggregate level. As a proxy for the strength of party identification, this variable has been utilised to determine whether there is strength of party identification in effect at the aggregate level in terms of support or rejection of proposed constitutional changes. Campbell argues that the strength of party identification results in differences in motivational forces and contrasting party loyalties (1964: 81). The variable is constructed by examining the percentage of first preference votes received by the Labor party candidate at the immediately preceding or concurrent federal election. The expectation is that the higher the level of first preference votes for the ALP candidate, the more likely that a majority of voters in those electorates will support constitutional change. Historically, the Labor party has been recognised as the party that is pro-change. The ‗initiative-resistance‘ hypothesis (Mayer 1956: 254) may not be as critical to contemporary electoral behaviour studies, however as constitutional change requires ‗initiative‘ by the government, this issue is an important factor in voter behaviour in a referendum. As Mayer argues, if it is recognised that the Labor party is ―a positive party of initiative‖ (Mayer 1956: 256), then those voters who identify with the Labor party will be more likely to accept constitutional change. Indeed, Kemp argues that there is a greater opportunity for success if a party can persuade their supporters to follow the party position on the referendum proposal (Kemp 1978: 247). This hypothesis is an extension of the previous hypothesis and a proxy for the strength of party identification at the aggregate level. Previous referendums have shown that level of support in referendum voting tends to be higher in safe Labor seats (Rydon 1988b: 16). The question arises, however: do voters who identify with a political party vent their frustration by voting ‗no‘ to a proposal as a way of indicating to the Government that they are not happy (Chubb 1988: 18)?

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In order to test this hypothesis, the margin held by candidates in each electorate has been used to construct a six-point scale. The scale is based on categories and results from the Australian Electoral Commission (Office). The categories of the scale are: safe Labor, fairly safe Labor, marginal Labor, marginal Coalition, fairly safe Coalition, safe Coalition.

3.8 Hypothesis #5

This hypothesis is not part of the Michigan Model. Due to the nature of constitutional referendums and the power implications of constitutional change, how the electorate perceives the relationship between Federal and State Governments is of interest. Federal- state relations have traditionally been a source of debate over the allocation of funding. In a federal system, the national government must deal with funding of the states (McAllister 2003: 263). McAllister argues that the relationship between the commonwealth and the state governments is often difficult (2003: 263). ―While the party holding office in each of the states is obviously out of the Prime Minister‘s hands, we might expect that the Prime Minister would have more stable relations with State governments of the same party‖ (McAllister 2003: 263). Aitkin argues that ―all proposed changes to the federal constitution involve the transfer of power from the states to the federal sphere‖, or the creation of new commonwealth powers where none had previously existed (Aitkin 1978: 129). The relationship between the state and commonwealth governments is a continual battleground. Since the Engineers Case of 1920, the States have had to continually assert their position in the Federal-State relationship. Legal commentators have argued that the Engineers Case undermined Australian federalism, and that the decision dealt a permanently debilitating blow to federalism (Blackshield and Williams 2002: 305). If state governments observe that a proposed constitutional change will reduce state power, these states will oppose the change no matter what political party is in office at the time. This hypothesis seeks to determine if there is a ‗state effect‘. Does party discipline carry over from the federal to the state arena, and are there patterns of state voting? Sharman and Stuart argue that any state effect is based on state self interest (Sharman 1981: 268) and would, therefore, expect to see a pattern of state voting. Galligan similarly argues that ―state political parties had an important influence on State voting patterns‖ (Galligan 1990: 502). It is expected that this state effect will be especially evident at the time of the Whitlam referendums. The ALP under Whitlam was clearly centralist on their views regarding the constitution which caused some concern for the state governments. Whitlam‘s view was,

My support for constitutional amendments to give greater powers and my exploration of the limits of its existing powers have left me with a reputation of a committed centralist. … Certainly I believe that the

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Constitution ought to be amended to give the Australian government powers of comparable to those of other democracies, particularly in the area of economic regulation (Whitlam 1977: 306).

Whitlam had previously qualified this argument by recognising the importance of Australia‘s federal structure. He states,

Each of our three levels of government has functions which it is best able to perform. The key to effective performance is not domination but consultation, not centralisation but co-ordination (Whitlam 1971: 17).

This hypothesis can be considered an evaluation of partisanship at a nation level in Australia. On this point, Bennett argues that there is a party political character associated with constitutional change and that there is a clear partisanship exhibited from the states (Bennett 2003: 15). Traditionally, voters use parties to simplify their electoral choices (McAllister 2003: 275) and referendum voting does not alter this fact. Specifically, it is expected that, if the political parties between federal and state are from the same party, there will be higher levels of support for constitutional change. In support of this hypothesis, McAllister shows that when a state government shares the same party as the Prime Minister, the Prime Minister receives higher approval from voters (McAllister 2003: 270-271).

In order to test this hypothesis, electorates have been classified as either being held by the same political party as the federal government or from the opposing political party to the federal government.

3.9 Methods of Analysis

Two methods of analysis have been undertaken for this research where the author has utilised individual level and aggregate level data analysis. The first method employs the linear regression model of analysis, while the second method utilises ecological inference of aggregate data. The units of analysis of the aggregate data are the Australian federal electorates and the yes-no vote in each constitutional referendum.

The bivariate-multivariate method of analysis adopted in this research is similar in approach to Oesch (2008). Oesch examined the changing nature of class voting between Great Britain, Germany and Switzerland. His empirical analysis was structured by examining dependent and independent variables in a bivariate context, followed by a multivariate analysis (Oesch 2008: 339).

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3.10 The Bivariate and Multivariate Models

To better understand the relationship between votes cast during a referendum and the socio- economic factors that affect voters, a bivariate model based on indicators that influence voters has been used. This research is primarily interested in whether or not indicators used to predict voter behaviour in general elections also are suitable as indicators to predict voter behaviour in referendums.

Indicators adopted by Campbell et al (1960) and ‗the funnel of causality‘, as outlined by Dalton (1996: 196-199), illustrate the socio-economic factors that influence voter behaviour. Within the bivariate model, the goal has been to determine the strength of each indicator and determine what influence any or all specific indicators have on the referendum vote.

The methods of analysis chosen to understand voter behaviour are: first, a bivariate analysis using cross-tabulations with a chi-square and associated p-value to determine statistical significance. The second method is a multivariate linear regression analysis. The dependent variable for all referendum questions from 1967 to 1999 is the vote for or against the proposal.

For the 1999 referendum, analysis has been conducted on a broader data set, allowing for the testing of both aggregate and survey level data. Bilinear models have been used to explore the relationship between vote and socio-economic factors. In turn, this will model the statistical association between vote and the independent variables providing scores that are analogous to the correlation coefficient at both the individual and aggregate level (Western and Tranter 2001: 442-445). This model also generates an overall ‗goodness of fit‘ statistic that can be used to determine whether the model fits the data (Western and Tranter 2001: 443).

For the 1999 Australian Constitutional Referendum Survey data, party identification is measured using the question that asked respondents to identify the party they most identify with: ―B1 – Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as Liberal, Labor, National, or what?‖ The independent variables are those that align with the indicators in the funnel of causality.

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3.11 Descriptive and Causal Inferences

Reporting of inferences are necessary ways of describing observations via summaries. The primary goal of inference concerns the process of using the facts we know to learn about facts we do not know (King 2001: 21). The facts available to us can be assessed and described at a population (aggregate) or sample (individual) level. King argues that the critical first step in making any inference is to identify the target of the inference. ―Indeed, without an unambiguously identified target of inference, a research project cannot be reasonably evaluated and, hence, cannot be successful‖ (King 2001: 21-23).

The research question is to determine whether the Michigan Model of voter behaviour can be applied to referendum voting as well as general election voting. As referendums are about constitutional change, we are also able to make inference concerning the effectiveness of the referendum process as a democratic principle when proposing formal amendment to the Australian Constitution. The target of inference in this research therefore is voter willingness to amend the Australian Constitution through a referendum—the ‗yes‘ vote.

When making causal inference, the key question to be considered is whether a particular event (the key causal variable),—caused a particular outcome (the dependent variable) (King 1997a: 25). As King (1997: 26) correctly argues, it is not possible to directly observe history, therefore we are compelled to rely on causal inference.

A causal inference is the difference between two descriptive inferences—the average value the dependent variable takes on when a ―treatment‖ is applied and the average value the dependent variable takes when a ―control‖ is applied. The causal effect—the goal of the process of causal inference—is this difference (King 1997a: 26).

Difficulties exist, however, with causal inference due to the fact that, no matter how much time and effort, no matter how much information is collected, researchers are not able to make a causal inference with certainty. On this point, King argues,

Learning the values of the dependent variable when the key causal variable indicates treatment and when it indicates control requires two inferences since neither quantity typically can be directly observed. But there is an additional complication: Researchers can only estimate directly the actual value of the degree of deference when either the treatment or the control is applied but not both… This is known as the fundamental problem of causal inference (King 1997a: 26).

This fundamental problem leaves researchers in a bind where it might be suggested that research should not be framed in terms of causal questions, hypotheses or statements. On the

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contrary, King argues that, ―simply because uncertainty cannot be eliminated does not mean we cannot or should not draw causal inferences when the research necessitates it‖ (King 1997a: 27).

Taking the principle of causal inference and making application to referendum outcomes in Australia‘s political history has led this research to ask the question of why the overwhelming majority of proposed constitutional changes have failed to gain the necessary votes for constitutional change to be implemented. Some might suggest that there is a general conservatism with the Australian voter. Others might argue that there is a lack of trust with the government, whilst others could argue that there is a vested interested in the political elites to make change, therefore change, on this basis, has been rejected.

If political scientists generally accept that the Michigan Model is a reliable measure of voter behaviour, is it not possible to theorise that this same model can be applied to referendum voting? If the results provide supporting evidence of partisanship in voter behaviour at referendums, then political parties have the opportunity of building on this fact for future proposed constitutional changes.

A question that deserves attention is whether an inference can be made about individual behaviour from aggregate data, as this research will do. Gary King (1997a) argues that it is possible to infer individual behaviour from aggregate data by use of ecological inference.

3.12 Aggregate Data Analysis and Ecological Inference25

A review of previous research shows that there is a history of testing aggregate data. Testing of aggregate data is valid when survey data is not available (Fairbaugh 1978: 558). However, aggregate data analysis is also conducted when survey data is available. Weisberg and Smith conducted aggregate data analysis on party identification in 1991 which examined the effects of partisanship on presidential approval (Weisberg and Smith 1991: 1077-1092).

25 ―The term ecological inference refers to the problem of inferring bivariate or multivariate individual level relations in the absence of data on individuals‖ (Langbein and Lichtman 1978: 63).

―What is ‗ecological‘ about the aggregate data from which individual behaviour is to be inferred? The name has been used at least since the late 1800s and stems from the word ecology, the science of the interrelationship of living things and their environments. Statistical measures taken at the level of the environment, such as summaries of geographic areas or other aggregate units, are widely known as ecological data. Ecological inference is the process of using ecological data to learn about the behaviour of individuals within these aggregates‖ (King 1997b: xv).

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Kemp (1978: 221) adopted this approach in the early analysis of referendums in Australia. Kemp found that there was a correlation between referendum proposals and partisanship (1978: 233). With the 1967 referendum, Kemp (1978: 295) also found that there was a strong tendency for referendum voting to follow party support at the aggregate level.

Aggregate data analysis will never become obsolete as there is a richness of analysis that is only possible with aggregate-level data (Rattinger 1997: 87). Further support is realised with Kramer who argues that aggregate level data performs an important service whereby the results provide evidence of macro-level findings (Kramer 1983: 92). Kramer further argues that survey data is not always able to detect any comparable relationship as may be found in aggregate data (1983: 92). One of the conclusions drawn from aggregate research is that the results do not yield biased estimates of individual-level relationships when there is a clear understanding of variables being assessed and the methods being used (Fairbaugh 1978: 558; Johnson et al 2002: 222). Research conducted by Johnson et al (2002) addresses specific issues associated with contextual / aggregate data analysis. Johnson argues that there are clear methodological rules that govern aggregate data analysis. He states that,

Rules governing the aggregation of votes (by plurality, simple majority, or super-majority), the method of representation (at-large versus single member), and the scope of the franchise (white male versus universal suffrage) have been found to directly influence the outcome of elections and the behaviour of individual voters (Johnson et al 2002: 220).

Johnson further argues that,

Rules are taken to be exogenous to individual behaviour; and the level at which we measure institutional rules is determined by the unit and level of analysis at which research is being conducted. Institutional measures of context are readily available and have been routinely included in national election surveys since 1960s (Johnson et al 2002: 220).

One of the issues surrounding aggregate data analysis is the ability to infer to the general population. Johnson et al argue that application of aggregate data to the general population is based on the contextual model known as ‗behavioural contagion‘. This effect is realised by the fact that people cluster together which may correlate with political choice (Johnson et al 2002: 222). For example, a person will vote for a Labor candidate because a significant proportion of his or her neighbours vote the same way. ―Underlying contextual explanations of individual behavior, is the process of social interaction among individuals‖ (Johnson et al 2002: 221). The outcome of the aggregation should realise recognisable correlations between individual attitudes, behaviour, and group messages (Johnson et al 2002: 221).

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Aggregate data analysis essentially provides opportunity for the results to be inferred to the general population. Governments regularly utilise aggregate data for providing infrastructure or social services based on census data. However, for this research, what do the aggregate results tell us about voter behaviour? This involves the process of ecological inference. Ecological inference can be defined as ―the process of using aggregate data to infer discrete individual-level relationships when individual-level data are not available‖ (King 1997b: xv; Langbein and Lichtman 1978: 61). When conducting empirical analysis of referendums, individual level survey data are generally unavailable.

Empirical research at an aggregate level allows researchers to make claims or inferences based on observations about the real world (King 2001:1). For example, real world observations, such as voting behaviour at referendums, allow governments, institutions and the public to determine the effectiveness of the referendum as a democratic principle. In light of the 1999 referendum that asked Australians to vote on whether they wanted to adopt a particular model of republicanism, thereby fundamentally altering the Australian Constitution, analysis through ecological inference is able to play an important role in public discourse.

Any alteration to the Australian Constitution has the potential to affect public policy as well as the division of power between the government, the courts and the legislature. Evaluating the impact of the division of power on Australian democracy through referendums is therefore necessary ―regardless of the purpose, effect, or intended audience of the research…‖(King 2001: 6).

Is there a precedent for conducting analysis of referendums of aggregate data? The first analysis of referendums using aggregate data was conducted by Parker in 1949. Parker‘s research examined the Australian public‘s attitudes to the Constitution—in particular, the development of the distribution of powers between the commonwealth and state parliaments (Parker 1949: 1). As previously highlighted, Kemp undertook referendum analysis of aggregate data in 1978 and found that there was a statistically significant correlation between referendum proposal and partisanship. King (1997a: 3) citing previous research conducted by Ogburn and Goltra (1919) established that an indirect method, which estimated women‘s votes and then correlated them with the percent of women voting in each precinct in Portland, Oregon, demonstrated that ecological inference can be used to make inferences. King states that these researchers reasoned that individual women were probably casting ballots against the referendum question at a higher rate than men. In those precincts, where large percentages of women were voting, women voted in larger percentages against a

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measure than those precincts that consisted of smaller percentages of women (King 1997b: 3).

Difficulties arose with Ogburn‘s and Goltra‘s research in that they recognised that there may have been a negative correlative effect. King, citing Ogburn and Goltra argued that even though men and women are inclined to distribute their votes 50 to 50 on a given measure, the true individual level relationship could have been the reverse of the observed aggregate correlation (King 1997b: 3). To overcome some of the difficulties associated with aggregate data analysis, various scholars have used regression models rather than correlation to analyse aggregate data in order to avoid aggregation bias (Langbein and Lichtman 1978: 10).

Australia‘s system of , whereby a stronger relationship should exist between ecological and individual correlations, helps to avoid aggregation bias as Australia does not experience bias in voter turnout. One of the foremost experts of aggregate research in political science is Gary King, who has helped resolve some of the problems experienced with ecological inference. King‘s work ‗A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem: Restructuring Individual Behavior from Aggregate Data‘, clearly presents how individual behaviour can be inferred from aggregate data. He argues that there are seven characteristics26 that are necessary, which have not been used in previous inference models.

In summary, ―the solution is scientifically validated with real data‖ (King 1997b: 17). What this means is that researchers should be able to crosscheck the aggregate data being analysed with other public records to verify results. King demonstrates this method by citing data from a U.S. census which have been aggregated into what is known as ‗precinct‘ sizes in order to study certain phenomena (King 1997b: 17). King argues that a key component of ecological inference is to include correct uncertainty estimates. Finally, as King acknowledges, local knowledge of the researcher will enable him or her to make a valid ecological inference. The basic problem ―is a lack of information‖ (King 1997b: 21).

26 First, the solution is scientifically validated with real data where cells can be cross-tabulated with publicly available data. Second, the method should offer realistic assessments of uncertainty of the ecological estimates. Third, the basic model should be robust to compensate for any aggregation bias (to avoid methods that provide answers that have no bearing on the relationship). Fourth, all components of the model should be verifiable. Fifth, the model should correct for unrelated aggregation bias such as heteroskedasticity. Sixth, the method should provide accurate estimates of the cross-tabulation cells not only at a state wide level, but also at the precinct level. Finally, the solution to the ecological inference problem is in the ―modifiable areal unit problem‖, where the more contextual knowledge a research makes use of, the more likely the ecological inference will be valid (King 1997b) Pages 17-21.

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King‘s model of ecological inference uses Goodman‘s model, which is based on a straight forward linear regression and effectively assumes that the variables of interest are constant within each federal electorate (King 1997b: 26-27). For example, the Australian Electoral Commission has established parameters that determine whether an electorate is rural or provincial.

This research on the Michigan Model of voter behaviour at referendums in Australia at the aggregate level has utilised Census data released by the Australian Bureau of Statistics at an electorate district level (a geographical unit). This level of analysis provides a direct relationship with the Australian Electoral Commission‘s data collated from federal elections and national referendums.

Explanation and Coding of 1999 ACRS Variables

3.13 Dependent Variables

The dependent variables utilised for this research from the survey data asked the following questions:

The first question (A12): In the Constitutional Referendum held on Saturday 6 November, did you vote ‗yes‘ or ‗no‘ for Australia to become a Republic? The three responses available to respondents were: ‗yes‘, ‗no‘, Voted informal/did not vote.

The second question asked (A 13): And did you vote ‗yes‘ or ‗no‘ for the addition of a Preamble to the Constitution? The three available responses were the same as the republic question.

3.14 Independent Variables

The following independent variables have been used:

B1. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as Liberal, Labor, National or what? B2. Would you call yourself a very strong, fairly strong, or not very strong supporter of that party?

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B5. In the last Federal election in October 1998, when the Liberals were led by John Howard and Labor by Kim Beazley, which party got your first preference in the House of Representatives election? E1. How old were you when you left secondary school? E2. In all, how many years of tertiary study have you completed since you left secondary school? If your tertiary study was part-time, give the number of years of equivalent full-time study. E3. Have you obtained a trade qualification, a degree or a diploma, or any other qualification since leaving school? What is your highest qualification? E4. Now some questions about the work you are doing now. Last week, what were you doing? E5c. What kind of business or industry is (or was) your job in? E5d. Which of the following best describes the position that you hold (or held)? F1. Firstly, what is your sex? F2. When were you born? F5. What is your religion or faith? F6. Apart from weddings, funerals and baptisms, about how often do you attend religious services? F7. What is your current marital status? F12. What social class would you say you belong to? F13. Would you say you now live in… F14. What is the gross annual income, before tax or other deductions, for you and your family living with you from all sources?

3.15 Variables Used from Aggregate Data

The variables used from the AEC and ABS aggregate data are dependent on the time of the referendum. Census data availability for referendums held before 1990 was not readily obtainable for electorate divisions27. Therefore, the 1999 referendum is the only referendum where analysis took into account socio-economic variables at an aggregate level. The analysis of the 1999 referendum utilising the 1996 ABS census data should be considered as a case study or a model for testing the hypotheses for referendum voting, as well as providing a parallel analysis of referendum voting from the 1999 ACRS.

27 ABS data prior to 1991 at the electorate level is available from the ABS, however costs were prohibitive.

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The aggregate variables chosen from the AEC and ABS are those that provide consistency in reliability and validity for analysis with the variables from the ACRS.

3.16 Aggregate Data - Dependent Variable

Two variables were used to undertake analysis of the aggregate data in each referendum. Using AEC results, the author recorded whether an electorate voted in favour or against the proposed constitutional change. Numeral 1 = supported change; numeral 0 = rejected change. The second dependent variable (using AEC results) used the percentage of ‗yes‘ votes received in each electorate. This figure was achieved by dividing the total number of valid votes into the total number of ‗yes‘ votes and then multiplying by 100. This allows for consistency across referendums and years when comparing aggregate data.

3.17 Aggregate Data - Independent Variables

Five variables used for aggregate data analysis were based on AEC classifications.

First independent variable: Geographical location. The task was to categorise whether an electorate is inner metropolitan (1), outer metropolitan electorate (2), provincial (3) or a rural electorate (4). A dummy variable was created to compare all metropolitan electorates (1) with non-metropolitan electorates (0).

Second independent variable: Location of each electorate according to state. The majority of electorates (over 50 percent) are located in New South Wales and Victoria. With this variable, the research has attempted to determine the effect of voting preferences between larger populated states compared to smaller populated states. A dummy variable was created where New South Wales and Victoria were coded (1), and all other states were coded (0).

Third independent variable: In order to determine electorate preference with regard to the elected Member of Parliament (MP), the author has recorded the party of the elected MP from the preceding or simultaneous federal election. This variable recognises the partisanship effect at the aggregate level. A dummy variable was created and coded ALP (1) and others – Coalition, Minor Parties or Independents (0).

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Fourth independent variable: This variable is a measure of the strength of partisanship. The analysis of this variable has set out to determine if the safeness of a seat is influential on the voting intentions of constituents in an electorate. Coding was undertaken in two ways. For bivariate analysis, the author took AEC categorisations of safe seat, fairly safe seat, and marginal seat and coded these for ALP and Coalition on a six point scale. For the multivariate analysis, the author took the percentage of first preference votes cast for ALP members / candidates as a measure of safeness of seat. This figure was calculated by dividing the total number of valid votes from the federal election into the total number of first preference votes given to the ALP candidate and then multiplying by 100. The ALP is the only political party to stand a candidate in every Australian electorate.28

Fifth independent variable: Does the political party of the state government at the time of the referendum have an influence on voting preferences? This variable has been included to measure whether there is a state effect (based on political party grouping) at the time of a referendum. Coding was done by determining whether a state government was of the same political party as the federal government or the opposing political party, where the same political party was coded as (1) and the opposing political party coded as (0).

3.18 Socio-Economic Independent Variables for 1999 Referendum Analysis (according to ABS classifications)

Age Groups: 18 to 24; 25 to 34; 35 to 44; 45 to 54; 55 to 64; 65 to 74; 75 plus Education: Postgraduate, Post Bachelor, Undergraduate, Vocational, Not Stated Employment Status: Unemployed or Employed Occupation Type: Professional / Business, Trade, Clerical, Not Stated Annual Income: Negative to $159; $160 to 399; $400 to 599; $600 to 799; $800 to 999; $1000 and above; missing or not stated Religion: Protestant, Catholic, None or Other Ethnicity: Indigenous, Australian born, Western born, Non-Western born

28 The Labor Party run a candidate in every electorate (even in blue-ribbon Liberal electorates) this helps to increase the chances of a higher Senate vote for the Labor Party candidates.

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CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 The 1967 Referendum under Holt

Research into the voting behaviour in Australian Constitutional referendums commences with the 1967 referendum. The new government under Harold Hold was a change from the long term Prime Ministership of (1949-1966). The 1967 referendum was the first to be held in Australia since 1951—a sixteen year gap. The history of constitutional change in Australia since federation had been modest; however a ground swell of support for change that recognised the Aboriginal people as citizens prompted the government to initiate this referendum (Attwood and Markus 2007: 35).

On 27 May 1967 a referendum under the Holt led Coalition Government was held to resolve two issues. The first issue dealt with increasing the number of members of the House of Representatives, without proportionally increasing the number of Senators (known as ‗breaking the nexus‘). This proposal had bi-partisan support from the Government and the Opposition. There was however opposition to this change from a small number of dissident Liberals and the Democratic Labor party (DLP) Senators due to the fact that any issue which the Labor party supported, the DLP opposed.29 One particular DLP member swore vengeance and undying hostility against the Labor party (Love 2005: 11).

Question One: Parliament – The first proposal was to amend section 24 and delete section 25 and section 26 of the Constitution in order that the House of Representatives member numbers could be increased without necessarily increasing the number of Senators.

The second issue was one that had been causing concern for many Australians—that is, that the Aboriginal people should be counted in the reckoning of the Australian population, and that two references in the Australian Constitution, which discriminated against Aboriginal people, should be removed (National Archives of Australia 1998). The two proposals were as follows:

Question Two: Aborigines – The second proposal was to remove grounds for the belief that the Constitution discriminated against people of the Aboriginal race. It proposed to remove the words ‗other than the Aboriginal race in any

29 The purpose of the nexus ratio, according to section 24 of the Constitution is to ensure that the House of Representatives be, as near as practicable, twice the size of the Senate. The intent of this section in the Constitution is to prevent a swamping of the Senate‘s power in the case of a joint sitting. The Government and the Opposition supported the change to break the ratio so that numbers could be increased in the Lower House without a proportional increase in numbers in the Upper House.

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state‘ from section 51(xxvi) of the Constitution and to delete section 127 which stated that ‗aboriginal natives‘ were not to be counted in determining the population of the Commonwealth.

The federal election preceding the 1967 referendum was held on 26 November 26 1966. The 1967 referendum (after a period of sixteen years since the previous referendum) was proposed by a Coalition Government under the leadership of Prime Minister . At the time of the referendum, the Liberal / Country Party controlled four state governments (Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria and Western Australia), while the Labor party controlled both South Australia and Tasmania.

4.1 Background

A referendum in Australia is the only method of bringing change to the Australian Constitution. All proposed changes to the Constitution are about a clearly defined issue. All proposed changes require the electorate to accept or reject the proposed change. In order to bring about any change to the Constitution, the political party holding government must initiate the referendum. Accordingly, referendum voting in Australia has traditionally followed views promoted by the two major political parties. As such, certain trends are evident among electorates. For example, as electorates accept the party line, issues become imbued with partisan qualities (Markus and Converse 1993: 142). A further trend, as seen from the following results, is that support for proposed changes is highest among metropolitan electorates. On this issue, Kemp argues that it is not surprising that rural electorates are more inclined to oppose constitutional change than urban electorates (Kemp 1978: 295), as the majority of proposed changes tend to advantage non-rural areas. Further observation on the history and opposition of proposed constitutional changes can be explained by the fact that the majority of proposals to alter the constitution have occurred during Labor‘s time in office. Kemp‘s assertion is supported by the outcome of the two referendum questions proposed in 1967, as shown by the results section later in this chapter.

Prior to the 1967 referendum, the Australian Constitution excluded Aboriginal people by way of sections 51 (xxvi) and 127. On 27 May 1967, 90.77 percent of Australian electors voted in favour of altering the Constitution so that the Commonwealth Government had jurisdiction over Aboriginal people by removing discriminatory laws from the Australian

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Constitution as found in section 51 (xxvi).30 The history leading up to this proposed change shows that there was strong opinion in the community. However, there was misunderstanding in the community at the time of this debate. In 1962, amendments were made to the Commonwealth Electoral Act which allowed all adult Aborigines to vote without restriction (Chesterman and Galligan 1997: 60, 162). The 1967 referendum was more of a symbolic act of something that had already been formulated—but one which nevertheless converted the section 51(xxvi) race power into an effective Commonwealth power (Chesterman and Galligan 1967: 60). The proposal was to repeal section 51(xxvi) and replace it with a new section which stipulated that ―the race power could only be used to pass laws for the advancement of Aboriginal people‖ (Attwood and Markus 2007: 37). Aboriginal leaders such as Kath Walker called for this section to be repealed as the issue of whether Australian Aboriginals were citizens of the Commonwealth of Australia or not was unresolved (Attwood and Markus 2007: 112). When Harold Holt came to power, he distinguished himself by signing the accord for the ‗Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination‘ and, in February 1967, the Holt government proceeded with the referendum proposal that saw the amendment of section 51 (xxvi) and the repeal of section 127. The Holt government observed that, ―the Coalition had been persuaded there was a popular and deeply rooted opinion that sections 51(xxvi) and 127 of the Constitution were discriminatory and that it had decided to remove these so there would be no grounds for any one to claim that racial discrimination continued to exist in Australia‖ (Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates 1967 as cited by Attwood and Markus 2007: 42).

The ‗yes‘ vote recorded at this referendum is the highest vote ever achieved in favour of a proposed constitutional change. On 10 August 1967 the Constitution Alteration (Aboriginals) Act 1967 altered section 51 of the Australian Constitution and repealed section 127. The effect of these amendments was to eliminate those sections of the Constitution that discriminated against Aboriginal people. Since the arrival of white Europeans in Australia in 1770 and the as a nation in 1901, Indigenous people had not been counted in the national census. By recognising Indigenous people in the Constitution, the

30 Section 51 – The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to: (xxvi) the people of any race, other than the aboriginal race in any State, for whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws. Section 127 – In reckoning the numbers of the people of the Commonwealth, or of a State or other part of the Commonwealth, aboriginal natives shall not be counted (cited by Chesterman and Galligan 1997: 58).

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government intended that Indigenous people with full citizenship would be subject to, and have access to all Commonwealth and State services.

To the extent that there was an overwhelming ‗yes‘ vote, the path to achieving this result did not come without a lot of lobbying from various activists in the Australian community. For example, campaigning by various academics and church leaders in the 1940s (as a result of a petition to the King of England being ignored by the Australian Government) saw pressure mount for changes regarding the disenfranchisement of the Aboriginal people. This pressure resulted in the passage of the 1949 Commonwealth Electoral Act which ―enfranchised all in States that gave them franchise‖ (Chesterman and Galligan 1997: 118). In 1965 Senator WC Wentworth presented a private members bill to the Parliament to press for constitutional change to remove discriminatory laws regarding the Aboriginal people (Attwood and Markus 2007: 37). A further example is seen when the ABC reported that one politician stung into action was the Labor party‘s Gordon Bryant. He became one of the most influential white activists in the ten year push for the referendum. The need to organise nationally led to the establishment of the Federal Council for the Advancement of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders, known for short as FCAATSI. FCAATSI‘s main task for 1958 was to get 100,000 signatures on petitions to present to Parliament. This would give Parliament a basis to vote for holding of a referendum. Notwithstanding the growing community support for a referendum on Aboriginal civil rights, it would take ten years of signature-gathering and political lobbying before the referendum was held (ABC 1997).

The main cause of concern for the constitutional change was that the states had responsibility for the aboriginal people, and that section 127 of the Constitution was racially discriminatory. There was growing international pressure on Australia to provide equitable civil rights for the Aboriginal people (Attwood and Markus 2007: 25).

The difficulty associated with the initiation of a referendum can be seen with the understanding that appears to be prevalent at a senior level within the public service. A search of the Australian Archives of the Attorney-General‘s Department (file no: A432 or 61/3189) revealed that, in a letter from the Prime Minister‘s Department on 12 December 1963, addressing the concerns of Rev G Nash (Secretary) of the Methodist Church of Australia, EJ Bunting (Secretary to Cabinet) wrote,

The government has made it abundantly clear that it opposes discrimination against the Aboriginal citizens of Australia. However, any proposal to alter Section 127 of the Constitution needs very careful consideration if only to establish the feasibility of determining that portion of the population which

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normally lives under nomadic conditions some distance from settled areas (Bunting 1963).

From the same file (61/3189), in a memorandum from LD Lyons (the Secretary, Prime Ministers Department) in reference to a letter received from the Secretary of the Aborigines Advancement League of Tasmania, Lyons wrote,

Point 3: My understanding is the aborigines were in fact included in the census, that is that, wherever this could be done, they were required to fill in census forms like everyone else. There are still, I understand, numbers of nomadic aborigines who are not counted simply because of the physical impossibility of reaching them. You will, no doubt, wish to check the correctness of the factual position as above stated with the Commonwealth Statistician (Lyons 1964).

These communications indicate that prior to the 1967 referendum, not only was there a clear misunderstanding at a federal government level as to the status of Aboriginal people as illustrated in the above quotes, but there was also a reluctance to alter the Constitution to recognise Indigenous people in Australia as citizens.

Dr John Gardiner-Garden similarly argues that this referendum was not as widely supported as the results indicate. He argues that,

It is … widely believed that the referendum was whole-heartedly supported by both sides of politics, that it ended legal discrimination, conferred the vote, equal wages and citizenship on , and that it permitted for the first time Commonwealth government involvement in Aboriginal Affairs. None of this was the case (Gardiner-Garden 2001: 1-2).

This account by Gardiner-Garden contradicts a report contained in the Courier-Mail dated 26 May 1967. The article reads, in targeting the second question on the Aboriginals to be put to the people at Saturday‘s referendum, that there was not a ‗no‘ argument in any party in the Federal Parliament. In fact, all political parties, churches, welfare organisations, and through their spokesmen, the Aboriginals themselves had indicated that they support this proposed change (Courier-Mail 1967).

In 1965, the Attorney–General Bill Snedden submitted a recommendation to the cabinet for changes to the constitution. Due to public pressure about the Aboriginal people, the Holt Government considered that if they coupled the nexus question with the Aboriginal question, voters would adopt both proposals. Sneddon‘s presentation to the cabinet argued,

In support of repealing section 127 he (Snedden) pointed out that the Constitutional Review Committee had recommended this several years previously; asserted that the original reasons for this section no longer held; argued that Aboriginal people should be counted as they now had the vote; and

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suggested that it would win international approval…It‘s repeal could remove a possible source of misconstruction in the international field (Attwood and Markus 2007: 36-37).

Snedden‘s proposal was accepted. However, the proposed constitutional change on the first question did not receive anywhere near the same amount public of attention, despite speeches by both Holt and Whitlam promoting the nexus question. In summary, the nexus proposal was defeated with just 40.25 percent of the electorate voting in favour of the change.

4.2 The ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ Cases

At a constitutional referendum, a ‗yes‘ and ‗no‘ case is generally prepared for distribution to the electorate (Bennett 1999)31. On the nexus question, the main arguments from the Parliament favouring the ‗yes‘ case was to increase the number of members in the House of Representatives without necessarily increasing the number of Senators was presented as follows:

To remove the need for the Parliament to increase the number of Senators when the number of Members of the House of Representatives is increased.

To impose a limit on the extent to which the membership of the House of Representatives can be increased. (There is no such limit at present).

To protect the States—and the Senate—against any reduction of their State representation in the Senate—that is, ten Senators from each State. (There is no such protection at present) (Australian Electoral Office 1967: 2).

Each of the above three recommendations was supported by the three major parties – the Liberal Party, the Australian Country Party and the Australian Labor party in the Parliament. ―They were in substance recommended by an All-Party Committee—the Constitutional Review Committee—which examined the Constitution in great detail‖ ( Australian Electoral Office 1967: 5).

31 In most referendums since the Referendum (Constitution Alteration) Act 1912 (No. 2), each elector has received a pamphlet containing arguments in favour of, or against, any proposal upon which s(he) is voting. Normally, these arguments must be no more than two thousand words in length, and must be authorised by a majority of those parliamentary members who voted for or against the proposed law. When more than one referendum is held on the same day, a particular argument may be more than two thousand words, provided that the average of ‗yes‘ or ‗no‘ arguments is not greater than two thousand words. In some cases, ‗no‘ arguments are not produced. In 1967, for instance, arguments for and against the Nexus alteration were produced, but only a ‗yes‘ argument in relation to the Aborigines amendment. The Referendum (Machinery Provisions) Act 1984 (s 11) states that such arguments as are produced must be submitted to each voter 'not later than 14 days before the voting day for the referendum'.

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The main points for the ‗no‘ case as provided by the Australian Parliament were presented as follows:

We do not need more parliamentarians.

Australia is already over governed.

A Yes vote would be a vote against the interests of the States, particularly the small States and country districts.

A No vote will tell the Government that you do not want an increase in the size of either the House of Representatives or the Senate (Australian Electoral Office 1967: 6).

On the matter of question two – removing discriminatory sections from the Australian Constitution regarding the status of Aboriginal people, only a ‗yes‘ case was presented, as this proposal was supported by an overwhelming majority of parliamentarians, therefore a ‗no‘ case was never formulated (AEC 1998). The ‗yes‘ case on the Aboriginal question was presented as follows:

The proposal will remove words from the constitution that discriminate against Aboriginal people.

The proposal will allow the Commonwealth to cooperate with the states to ensure that the actions which are taken are in the best interests of the Aboriginal people.

Justice, common sense and Australia‘s international reputation require that we get rid of the out-moded provision that prevents Aboriginal people from being counted in the census (Andrews 1997: 93).

1967 Results

4.3 Question One: The Nexus Issue

Results on question one show that 40.25 percent of Australian electors voted in favour of accepting the change to increase the ratio of Members of Parliament to the number of senators. When these results are analysed at an electorate (aggregate) level, a majority of voters in 26 percent of all electorates combined, supported the proposed increase in the number of Members of Parliament without necessarily increasing the number of Senators. The range in support varied between 18 percent (or 82 percent opposed) with the highest level of voter support for the proposed change within an electorate being 63 percent.

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Voter behaviour at any referendum, however, cannot be looked at in isolation. Other issues such as the geographical location of the electorate, the influence of the state or state government in power at the time, and the safeness of the seat32 of the sitting federal member need to be taken into account. Table 4.1 provides descriptive data on these variables.

Table 4.1 1966 Federal Electorate Information (Frequency and Percents) Category Frequency Percent Geographical Location Inner Metro 48 39.3 Outer Metro 23 18.9 Provincial 15 12.3 Rural 36 29.5 State Electorates New South Wales 45 36.9 Victoria 34 27.9 Queensland 18 14.8 South Australia 11 9.0 Western Australia 9 7.4 Tasmania 5 4.1 Party Electorates ALP 40 32.8 (2-party preferred) Coalition 82 67.2 Safeness of Seat Based on Safe Labor 6 4.9 1966 Federal Election Fairly Safe Labor 8 6.6 Marginal Labor 26 21.3 Marginal Coalition 33 27.0 Fairly Safe Coalition 16 13.1 Safe Coalition 32 26.2 Independent 1 0.8 State Government Political Same party as Federal 4 66.6 Party in Office Government Opposite party as 2 33.3 Federal government Source: Australian Electoral Commission Federal Election Results - 26 November 1966

Results in Table 4.1 show, firstly, that metropolitan electorates make up nearly 60 percent of total electorates with provincial and rural seats making up the remaining 40 percent. Secondly, that New South Wales and Victoria combined make up almost 65 percent of the total number of electorates33. Thirdly, the Coalition held a significant balance of power in the House of Representatives holding two thirds of the seats. Fourthly, of the total number of electorates, 26 percent were safe Coalition seats whereas five percent of the electorates were safe ALP seats. Lastly, the makeup of the state governments shows that four out of six were of the same political party as the federal government. The four states that were of the

32 ‗Safeness of seat‘ is classified by the Australian Electoral Commission according to the margin by which the elected member of the Lower House holds that particular seat on a two-party preferred basis. Seats are classified as follows: Marginal Seat 50 to 55.9 percent; Fairly Safe Seat 56 to 59.9 percent; Safe Seat 60 percent or more. 33 The numerical size and therefore the representation of these states in the Parliament are important as the smaller states feel under represented.

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same political party made up 106 of the total number of electorates (87 percent), while the other two states made up a total of 16 electorates (13 percent).

A more complete picture regarding the level of support or rejection for the proposed constitutional change is shown in the form of a cross tabulation. Taking the dependent variable as vote for or against the proposed change, results have been cross-tabulated in order to test the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis #1: Those electorates that are closer to major capital cities such as Sydney and Melbourne are more likely to support proposed constitutional change than electorates further away.

Hypothesis #2: Larger populated states such as New South Wales and Victoria are more likely to support constitutional change than smaller populated states.

Hypothesis #3: ALP held electorates are more likely to support proposed constitutional change than non-ALP electorates.

Hypothesis #4: The higher the percentage of first preference votes received by an ALP Member of Parliament at the immediate preceding or concurrent federal election, the more likely that the electorate will support constitutional change.

Hypothesis #5: If state governments perceive that a proposed constitutional change will reduce state power, these states will oppose constitutional change, no matter what political party is in office at the time.

Table 4.2 examines the hypothesis that referendum vote and geographical location are dependent. The rationale for this hypothesis is that the further away an electorate is from the centre of power (Canberra), the more likely that voters in these electorates will feel isolated or removed from the proposed change (Salt 2003: 36). Furthermore, voters in provincial or rural electorates may consider that if the number of Lower House Members of Parliament (MPs) should increase, the influence of provincial and rural electorates would decrease in the Federal Parliament.

Results in Table 4.2 show that there was a much higher level of support for the proposed constitutional change for an increase in the number of Lower House MPs among inner metropolitan electorates than in the other three geographical areas (42 percent of inner metropolitan electorates supported change, whereas only 26 percent of outer metropolitan electorates supported change). The aggregate percentages also show that the more isolated an electorate is from the major capital cities geographically, the more these electorates opposed the change (91.7 percent of rural electorates were opposed to change). The p-value of 0.002 and a chi-square value of 14.863 show that the relationship is statistically significant providing evidence that supports the first hypothesis. We could argue therefore

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that the geographical location of an electorate may serve as a predictor in future referendums.

Table 4.2 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1967 Nexus Question by Geographical Location Column Percents Geographic Location of Electorates Inner Metro Outer Metro Provincial Rural Support change 43.8 26.1 13.3 8.3 Against change 56.3 73.9 86.7 91.7 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 48 23 15 36 Mean Percent of Electorate 42.8 39.9 40.3 36.7 ‗yes‘ Votes34 Source: AEC 1967 Referendum Results and AEC 1966 Federal Election Results

N = 122 Chi Sq = 14.863 P = 0.002 df = 3

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 40.2

Missing = 2 (NB: there were 124 electorates in 1966/67. ACT and NT were not entitled to vote in referendums)

Examination of the mean percent of electorate ‗yes‘ votes in the four different geographical locations adds some further support to the above relationship. The bottom row in Table 4.2 highlights the gradual decrease in support for the proposed constitutional change from inner metropolitan electorates where that mean average was 42.8 percent (centre) to rural electorates, which had mean average support of 36.7 percent (periphery).

Table 4.3 addresses the hypothesis that the states with smaller populations are more likely to reject constitutional change due to the belief that the larger states such as New South Wales and Victoria will dictate policy. In 1967 New South Wales and Victoria held a majority of electorates (79) within the Commonwealth. The other four states held a total of 43 electorates. This hypothesis proposes that as a result of section 128 of the Australian Constitution (the requirement of the double majority for constitutional change to be enacted), a majority of voters in the smaller states have the power to prevent a New South Wales / Victorian coalition from passing constitutional change.

Statistically, the results in Table 4.3 support this hypothesis for New South Wales only, where 67.4 percent of these electorates supported the proposed change for an increase in the

34 The mean has been calculated by taking the number of ‗yes‘ votes from each electorate and dividing this by all valid referendum votes (excluding informal votes), then multiplying by 100, thereby providing a figure that is comparable between categories within variables and across years.

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number of MPs in the Lower House. However, when examining the outcome for Victoria, the hypothesis is not supported with all electorates rejecting the proposed change. The hypothesis is also supported in terms of the smaller states where the South Australian, Western Australian and Tasmanian electorates voted overwhelmingly against this change. Six percent of Queensland electorates supported the proposal.

Table 4.3 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1967 Nexus Question by State Location of Electorates Column Percent STATE NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS Support change 67.4 0.0 5.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 Against change 32.6 100.0 94.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 46 33 18 11 9 5 Mean Percent of Electorate 50.7 31.2 43.8 33.5 29.2 22.9 Yes Votes Source: as for Table 4.1

N = 122 Chi Sq = 64.877 P < 0.001 df = 5

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 40.2

The chi-square value of 64.877 with an associated p-value < 0.001 shows that there is a significant relationship between state and support for the nexus question. Accordingly, the relationship between referendum vote and state could function as a predictor in understanding the vote in other referendums. This result can be explained by understanding that voters in New South Wales (which makes up the largest component of the Commonwealth‘s electorate) had realised that any constitutional change that favoured Canberra and the federal government would also be of advantage to the state (Sharman 1981: 265). Conversely, the smaller states of Western Australia and Tasmania do not gain any advantage from constitutional change that favours the central government—a credible explanation for the lesser support shown by the smaller states.

Lack of bi-partisan support for referendums in Australia is an argument that has been made by various scholars (Bennett and Brennan 1999: 20; Campbell 1989: 6; Saunders 1994: 53) as an explanation for the electorate‘s hesitancy in accepting constitutional change. However, such rationalisation may only partially explain why voters and electorates oppose (have opposed) many constitutional changes. Numerically, it is possible to analyse whether a partisan effect at the aggregate level contributes to the outcome of referendum results. Table 4.5 presents the results within those electorates that were held by either the ALP or Coalition

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at the previous federal election cross-tabulated with support or rejection for the proposed change.

The 1967 referendum was held under the leadership of a Coalition led Government. Prior to 1967 the Australian electorate had accepted only six proposals for constitutional change. One reason advanced for the difficulty experienced by Australian governments in implementing constitutional change centres on the issue that the ‗left‘ of Australian politics was not involved in the formation of the original compact (Russell 1988: 13). In light of this detail, it needs to be determined whether or not partisanship is an influential factor in referendum voting behaviour. The following three tables throw some light on various aspects of the partisanship debate.

Table 4.4 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1967 Nexus Question by Elected Federal MP (2 party preferred) Column Percents Elected Federal Member 1966 (2 Party Preferred) ALP Coalition Independent Support change 35.0 22.2 0.0 Against change 65.0 77.8 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 40 81 1 Mean Percent of 41.5 39.6 28.4 Electorate Yes Votes Source: as for Table 4.1

N = 122 Chi Sq = 2.618 P > 0.05 df = 2

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 40.2

Results in Table 4.4 show a slightly higher level of support from voters in Labor-held electorates (35 percent) than Coalition-held electorates (22 percent). However, whether the electorates were Labor or Coalition held, there was overwhelming rejection of this proposal. The chi square test of statistical significance, with an associated p-value greater than 0.05, indicates that the relationship between partisanship of an electorate and support or rejection for this proposed change was not statistically significant.

Results in Table 4.5 are similarly reflected in Table 4.6, which compares electorate support or opposition to the proposed constitutional change by the ‗safeness of seat‘. Results show that there was overwhelming opposition to the change, regardless of which party held the seat. ‗Safe Labor‘ electorates alone showed much greater support (83.3 percent) for the proposed change than any other category of electorate, however it must be noted that this category constitutes just six electorates (4.9 percent) out of 122. Conversely, safe Coalition

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electorates were strongly opposed to the change (81.3 percent against). As with the previous relationship, safeness of seat on the referendum question of breaking the nexus between the Senate and the Lower House is shown to be statistically insignificant with a p-value greater than 0.05.

Table 4.5 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1967 Nexus Question by Safeness of Seat / Electorate (2 party preferred) Column Percents Safeness of Seat from 1966 Federal Election (2 Party Preferred) Safe Fairly Safe Marginal Marginal Fairly Safe Safe Labor Labor Labor Coalition Coalition Coalition Support Change 83.3 12.5 30.8 18.2 37.5 18.8 Against Change 16.7 87.5 69.2 81.8 62.5 81.3 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 6 8 26 33 16 32 Mean Percent of 53.2 36.1 40.4 37.7 43.5 39.7 Electorate Yes Votes Source: as for Table 4.1

N = 121 Chi Sq = 14.603 P = 0.24 df = 6

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 40.2

The final point to be addressed is linked with the intensity that is displayed over the shift in power between the Commonwealth and the States on referendum issues. Section 128 clearly indicates that changes to the Constitution lie with the Federal Parliament where the voters serve as the ultimate reconcilers of the proposed change (Blackshield and Williams 2005: 1302). This structure can leave the States and voters feeling somewhat disempowered, especially when the proposed constitutional change means removing state power and putting that same power into the hands of the Commonwealth. The shifting of power issue strikes at the heart of the federal structure and the division of powers between the Commonwealth and the States. Therefore, the campaigning of the states on referendum issues could have a strong influence of how voters indicate their preference.

The above points provide the rationale for two hypotheses. Firstly, the more pronounced the proposed change in the shift of power away from the States to the Commonwealth, the more likely voters in those States will vote against the proposal. This hypothesis is difficult to operationalise due to the problems associated with measuring power, as the majority of proposed constitutional changes in Australia‘s political history have primarily involved a potential shift in power. Any arguments are, therefore, based on anecdotal reasoning.

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The second hypothesis addresses the partisanship issue, which argues that a state political party of the same political persuasion as the Federal Government is more likely to support a proposed constitutional change than a State Government of an opposing political party. The ‗nexus question‘ as proposed by the Federal Coalition Government under Prime Minister Holt was convincingly defeated. Results in Table 4.7 show that 30.2 percent of voters in electorates with State Governments of the same political persuasion supported the proposed change. Voters in 70 percent of these same state electorates were opposed to the change. Where state governments were of the opposite political persuasion as the federal government, a majority of voters in all electorates were opposed to the change. These results complement the results as shown in Table 4.5. These results therefore indicate that partisanship at an aggregate level was quite weak, and the hypothesis is not supported for this referendum. Statistical results show that the relationship was not statistically significant (p = 0.10; chi sq = 6.55).

Table 4.6 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1967 Nexus Question by similarity of Commonwealth / State political party Column Percents State Government Political Party in Office Same political party as Opposition political party Federal Government to Federal Government Support Change 30.2 0.0 Against Change 69.8 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 n 106 16 Mean percent of 41.7 30.2 Electorate ‗yes‘ votes Source: as for Table 4.1

N = 122 Chi Sq = 6.55 P = 0.11 df = 1

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 40.2

Results in Table 4.1 showed that four out of the six state governments were of the same political party as the federal government. This fact could have led to state governments being more receptive to the proposed change. However, this was not the case with a majority of voters in all states except New South Wales not supporting this proposal. The mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes (42 percent) of electorates from those states that were of the same political persuasion similarly shows that support by state electorates for the ‗nexus question‘ was insufficient for the proposal to pass. This figure is skewed when taking into account that electorates in New South Wales accounted for 37 percent of all electorates. To recall, the Federal Government at the time was Liberal; state by state governments: New South Wales (Labor); Victoria (Liberal); Queensland (Country); South Australia (Liberal); Western Australia (Liberal); Tasmania (Labor). Overall, we can conclude that state

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governments that were of the same polity (Liberal / Country) were more supportive of this change than a majority of voters from electorates in the Labor led States.

4.4 Question Two: Aboriginal Citizenship

Official figures from the 1967 referendum on the Aboriginal citizenship question show that there was unprecedented support by all voters in all states with 90.77 percent of all voters supporting this change. All electorates supported the proposed change to Australia‘s Constitution, which removed discriminating phrases from the Constitution. Despite the overwhelming support for this change, results reveal that this change was not unanimous, nor was it supported at the same level in each electorate. It is important to note that this particular outcome in referendums within western democracies is considered an anomaly, as no state or country has or had ever registered such a high ‗yes‘ vote. Geographical differences between electorates and the variation in socio-economic make up are good indicators for understanding variation in electoral behaviour, however the recorded results for both questions in the 1967 referendum indicates that voting behaviour was fairly consistent between electorates.

There is no value in showing results dealing with the status of Aboriginal people (the second question) in a cross tabulation as all electorates supported (albeit with different majorities) the proposed constitutional change. However, examination of the proportion of the mean number of ‗yes‘ votes for question two provides some insight into the differences between voters in electorates. When examining this data at an aggregate level (by electorate), the mean value varies slightly (from the official 90.77 percent support) due to the effect of variation in electorate size.

As the 1967 referendum on the status of Aboriginal people was not argued along party lines, Kemp points out that this proposed constitutional change provides ―an unusual opportunity to examine the nature of the rural-urban dimension on a mass political response when the effect of party competition has been to a large extent removed‖ (Kemp 1978: 295).

Table 4.7 shows the mean value of aggregate votes for each electorate in their respective geographical location by the level of support for the referendum question on Aboriginal citizenship. What we observe is that there is higher support on the Aboriginal question from voters in metropolitan electorates as opposed to voters in provincial or rural electorates. As much as a majority of voters in all electorates supported this constitutional change, those voters in those electorates located further from the centres of power showed less support than

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voters in those electorates closer to the main power bases. Notice also that there are similar variations between the means in this question across geographical location of electorates to those observed for question one (see Table 4.2).

Table 4.7 Mean percentage of electorate support for the 1967 Aboriginal Question by Geographical Location Geographical Statistic Percentage of Yes Votes on Location Aboriginal Citizenship Inner Metro Mean 92.472 N 53 Outer Metro Mean 92.649 N 20 Provincial Mean 88.715 N 26 Rural Mean 85.035 N 23 Total Mean 90.298 N 122 Source: as for Table 4.1

Hypothesis number two states that voters in the larger populated states are more likely to support constitutional change than voters in small states. Results in Table 4.9 reveal some interesting outcomes. Firstly, in support of Kemp‘s previous findings, the larger populated states were more supportive of this constitutional change than the smaller states with both the New South Wales and Victorian average being above the national average. Secondly, Tasmania (with only five electorates) was almost the same as the national average, which is in contradiction to how the smaller states perceive the impacts of constitutional change. One explanation for the higher Tasmanian vote among the smaller states is that the majority of Aboriginal people resided on Cape Barren Island35 and there was no further implication for the state. The third aspect worthy of note is that the average aggregate vote of Queensland, South Australia and Western Australia fell below the national average. Once again, these results support Kemp‘s (1978) findings.

35 The ‗Bringing Them Home‘ report shows that Indigenous people were initially removed from the mainland of Tasmania and relocated to Flinders Island up until 1843. By the 1870s, the moved the Indigenous people to Cape Barren Island. In 1912, the Cape Barren Island Reserve Act was implemented (www.humanrights.gov.au/education/bth).

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Table 4.8 Mean percentage of electorate support for the 1967 Aboriginal Question by State State Statistic Percentage of Yes Votes on Aboriginal Citizenship NSW Mean 91.018 N 45 VIC Mean 94.309 N 34 QLD Mean 86.618 N 18 SA Mean 85.900 N 11 WA Mean 80.347 N 9 TAS Mean 90.183 N 5 Total Mean 90.298 N 122 Source: as for Table 4.1

Simple analysis of the distribution of the Aboriginal population in 1966 yields some interesting observations. Firstly, those states that had the lowest number of Aboriginal people residing in the state had the highest level of support. This is especially evident with Victoria where support was higher than the national average at 94 percent, with one of the lowest Aboriginal populations of 2.2 percent. Similarly, voters from Tasmania showed quite high support for this change with 90 percent. One must keep in mind that the majority of aboriginal people had been relocated to Cape Barrow Island which accounts for the negligible percentage of Aboriginal people living in Tasmania. Conversely, Western Australia with one of the highest aboriginal populations—23 percent of the Australian total—had the lowest level of support for this proposed change. Queensland similarly had a lower level of support for this change with one of the higher percentages of the Aboriginal population in that state. These results indicate that there was resistance to this constitutional change by voters who were most likely to interact with the aboriginal people.

Table 4.8a Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Population State Percentage Number New South Wales 17.7 14 219 Victoria 2.2 1 790 Queensland 23.7 19 003 South Australia 6.9 5 505 Western Australia 23.0 18 439 Tasmania - 36 Northern Territory 26.3 21 119 Australian Capital Territory 0.1 96 Australia (Total) 100.0 80 207 Source: Australian Year Book 2004: 123

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The Aboriginal citizenship question had the potential to divide the community. However, there was no clear evidence to suggest that any divide occurred in Australia over this issue. There was bipartisan support on this issue, with both the Coalition Government and the Labor Opposition providing support for the proposed change. Furthermore, on this occasion, no ‗no‘ argument was produced as was (is) required for all proposals to alter the constitution (see footnote 1). Results in the following table illustrate that there is a negligible partisan effect on this issue.

Table 4.9 Mean percentage of electorate support for the 1967 Aboriginal Question by 1966 Elected MP (2 party preferred) Elected MP from 1966 Federal Statistic Percentage of Yes Votes on Election (2-party preferred) Aboriginal Citizenship ALP Mean 89.955 N 40 Coalition Mean 90.416 N 81 Total Mean 90.298 N 121 Source: as for Table 4.1

N = 121 due to one electorate being held by an independent MP.

The average aggregate values in Table 4.10 reveal that there is less than half of one percentage point difference between the Coalition and the Labor party electorates, providing evidence that there was no partisan effect on this issue. Examination of the results of the two party preferred ‗safeness of seat‘ variable reveals a similar outcome as shown in Table 4.11 with minor variations downwards in the fairly safe Labor held electorates (86 percent) and the safe Coalition held electorates (88 percent). We also note that the independent electorate (94 percent) was approximately four percentage points higher than the national average.

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Table 4.10 Mean percentage of electorate support for the 1967 Aboriginal Question by 1966 Safeness of Seat (2 party preferred) Safeness of Seat from 1966 Statistic Percentage of Yes Votes on Federal Election (2-party Aboriginal Citizenship preferred) Safe Labor Mean 90.074 N 6 Fairly Safe Labor Mean 86.054 N 8 Marginal Labor Mean 91.127 N 26 Marginal Coalition Mean 91.265 N 33 Fairly Safe Coalition Mean 91.743 N 16 Safe Coalition Mean 88.877 N 32 Independent Mean 94.499 N 1 Total Mean 90.298 N 122 Source: as for Table 4.1

The final hypothesis considers whether the political party of the State Government was influential in affecting voter preferences on the question of Aboriginal citizenship. The difficulty associated with this analysis is that there were no electorates that opposed this proposal, therefore, state effects will be minimal. The following table (Table 4.11) shows the relationship between the State Government political party and the Federal Government political party.

The figures highlight that whether state governments were of the same or opposing political party to the federal government, support for the aboriginal question was high. There is a minor difference of three percentage points between the two groups—not significant, but an indicator of Coalition support from the States for the Federal Coalition Government.

Table 4.11 Mean percentage of electorate support for the 1967 Aboriginal Question by State Government Political Party State Government Political Party Statistic Percentage of Yes Votes on Aboriginal Citizenship Same Political Party as Federal Mean 90.7 Government N 106 Opposition Political Party to Mean 87.2 Federal Government N 16 Total Mean 90.298 N 122 Source: as for Table 4.1

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4.5 1967 Regression Analysis

A multiple regression analysis was conducted to evaluate how well the geographical location of electorates, the population size of each state, the incumbency effect of elected federal members, the political party of each state government in power at the time and the safeness of seat for each sitting MP perform as predictors of the electorate referendum vote. The predictor variables are shown in the following table. The combination of these variables as proposed by the previous hypotheses provides a model for determining the impact of each variable when voters in electorates decide their referendum preference.

The results in Table 4.12 indicate that the model for both the nexus question and the aboriginal question is statistically significant as indicated by the R-Square and the F-change results where both figures exceed the critical values. The F-change is not strong, but does allow us to argue that the four hypotheses regarding centre-periphery and the proxy for party identification is supported.

With regard to the nexus question, there are two variables that require comment. The first is that geographical location of electorates (p = 0.056) indicates that voters from metropolitan electorates were more likely to support the proposed change on the nexus question than voters from non-metropolitan electorates. The t-test (1.927) does, however, show that there was not a lot of difference in vote behaviour within the geographical location variable. A second independent variable (federal versus state political party alignment) reveals that party discipline did not influence voter behaviour between the federal and state political parties in government. Results show a statistically significant negative co-efficient indicating a weak negative causal effect on voter behaviour.

The explanatory variables in the regression model for the Aboriginal question show that the model explains approximately 53 percent of voter behaviour (R Square -0.536), with a moderate F-Change (above the critical value of 2.37). The regression analysis for the Aboriginal question was conducted in the same manner as the nexus question. The linear regression results on the Aboriginal question show notable differences from the nexus model. Both geographical location and the large state variables were significant in predicting voter behaviour. The safeness of seat (based on the percentage of ALP first preference votes) and the federal versus state political party alignment were not predictors of voter behaviour on the Aboriginal question. It must be kept in mind that 95 percent of the voting population supported the Aboriginal question.

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Table 4.12 Regression Table for Nexus and Aboriginal Questions at the 1967 Referendum Q #1 Q #2 Nexus Question Aboriginal Question Standardised Coefficients Standardised Coefficients Model Beta t Beta t

Geographical Location .162* 1.927 .463** 7.258 (All Metropolitan Electorates) Large States v Small .159 1.598 .534** 7.078 States (NSW & VIC) Federal v State Political -.293* -2.992 .069 .924 Party (Same) Safeness of Seat (Percent .103 1.212 -.097 -1.497 of ALP 1st preference votes) Source: as for Table 4.1

Q #1 – Dependent Variable: Mean percent of ‗yes‘ votes on the Nexus Question Q #2 – Dependent Variable: Mean percent of ‗yes‘ votes on the Aboriginal Question

N = 122

Model Summary Results for Table 4.12 Q #1 Q #2 Nexus Question Aboriginal Question R .440 .732 R Square .193 .536 Adjusted R Square .166 .520 SEE 9.65 3.56 F Change 7.008** 33.774**

** = Significance at the 0.001 level * = Significance at the 0.05 level

In explaining the differences for the two outcomes, both referendum proposals were unrelated and considerably different. Secondly, the ‗nexus question‘ meant that, if passed, more power would have been granted to the Federal Government, whereas the ‗Aboriginal question‘ was concerned with granting full citizenship rights to Australia‘s Indigenous people—a minority group. Due to these differences, the fact that there was a totally different outcome on each question is evidence that the Australian electorate is capable of voting in an informed manner.

4.6 Discussion

The 1967 referendum presented two very different proposed constitutional changes to the Australian voters. The first proposal was to give the government the ability to increase the

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number of Members of Parliament in the Lower House without necessarily increasing the number of senators in the Upper House, thereby eroding some of the power the constitutional framers gave to the Senate. The change in power would be most noticeable whenever a joint sitting of both Houses of Parliament was required. Clearly, a majority of voters in a majority of electorates were opposed to this change and voted overwhelmingly against this proposal, with the ‗no‘ vote being one of the highest in Australia‘s referendum history—where only a majority of voters in electorates from NSW voted in favour of this change. Strongest opposition came from voters in rural electorates and those voters in electorates from the smaller states, with a majority of voters in all electorates from South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania opposing the nexus question. The second question was in distinct contrast to the first, with the highest ever ‗yes‘ vote recorded for any referendum question both prior to 1967 and to the present.

Strongest support was received from voters in electorates from the larger states and the metropolitan based electorates. Figure 4.1 illustrates the similarities (according to shape) between questions on the variable of geographical location.

Most discussion of the 1967 referendum has tended to focus on the second question, which symbolically recognised Australian Aboriginal people as citizens and removed discriminatory language from the Constitution (Chesterman and Galligan 1997: 60). This result ―did not restore Aborigines to citizenship as it had never excluded them‖; the exclusion was a result of the 1902 Commonwealth Franchise Act (Chesterman and Galligan 1997: 60, 59). However, it is important to emphasise the importance of the ‗nexus‘ question as analysis of both questions indicates a certain level of discernment throughout the electorate when considering constitutional change.

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Figure 4.1 Comparison of Electorate Voting Trends at 1967 Referendum by geographical location of electorates.

100

90

80

70

60

Nexus 50 Aboriginal

Percentage of vote YES of 40Percentage

30

20

10

0

Inner Metro Outer Metro Provincial Rural Geographical Location of Electorates Source: as for Table 4.1

Reports from Cabinet records from this period indicate that the Coalition Government had been opposed to the Aboriginal question, ―but its hand had been forced by growing public interest and by ‘s private member‘s bill‖ (Hancock 1997). In actual fact, the Government was much more interested in getting the ‗nexus question‘ passed. The Courier- Mail on 26 May 1967, reported that a ‗no‘ vote on the nexus issue would allow for an ―unwarranted and unjustified‖ increase in the Senate, and therefore calls were made for people to vote ‗yes‘ on this issue (Courier-Mail 1967). The result recorded on the ‗nexus question‘ strongly suggests that the majority of electorates and voters did not accept this argument, and viewed this proposal as a potential erosion of power in the Senate.

As we review the results in the preceding sections, certain trends are evident. Firstly, support for constitutional change is higher from voters in metropolitan electorates than voters in provincial or rural electorates on both questions. Results in Table 4.2 show that the ‗yes‘ vote was highest in inner metropolitan electorates with 41.5 percent of electorates supporting the proposal, down to a low of 4.3 percent support in rural electorates. Similarly, the mean ‗yes‘ vote (see Tables 4.3 and 4.7) was higher from voters in metropolitan electorates as opposed to voters from provincial and rural electorates as illustrated in Figure 4.1 above.

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A second trend that is evident is the greater acceptance of constitutional change from voters in the larger populated states than the smaller states. As previously discussed, such acceptance is possibly due to the realisation that Canberra (the seat of power) is more likely to benefit the larger states than the smaller states, as this is where the majority of the population is located, and therefore the larger populated states are more influential in affecting the outcome of a general federal election. Results show that voters from New South Wales electorates were more supportive of constitutional change than voters from any other state. On the ‗nexus question‘, voters in 66.7 percent of NSW electorates voted ‗yes‘, whereas a majority of ‗yes‘ votes was not received from South Australian, Western Australian and Tasmanian electorates. There appears to be an anomaly with Victoria with just 2.9 percent of electorates supporting the proposed change. However, this could be explained by the political power of the DLP at the time (who were based in Victoria)—that is, anything the ALP supported, the DLP opposed. This rivalry between the ALP and the DLP had an enduring effect on the Labor party (Love 2005: 17) and the opportunity for electoral success. Concerning the second question on the removing of citizenship restrictions of Australia‘s Indigenous people, based on the mean values, the range is much smaller with voters from Victorian electorates providing the highest support, while voters from Western Australian electorates provided the least support (see Table 4.8).

The third noticeable trend is that voters from ALP-held electorates showed higher levels of support for constitutional change than did voters from Coalition held electorates. This trend is evident only with the ‗nexus question‘ and could be due to historical circumstances, which saw the Australian Constitution written without the input of Labor or the Protectionists. Support for constitutional change based on the safeness of an electorate seat (whether Labor or Coalition), showed that voters from ‗safe Labor‘ held electorates were more likely to support the proposed change than voters from ‗fairly safe Labor‘ or even ‗marginal Labor‘ held electorates. Analysis of following referendums should reveal whether these trends are consistent.

A final point to be raised with regard to the Aboriginal question is that there was unparalleled bipartisan support from the politicians and the voters. From a theoretical perspective, this outcome is problematical in that the left-right political divide did not vanish due to this question. For some party identifiers, this would have created internal conflict

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(cognitive dissonance) resulting in temporary voter de-alignment (Dalton 2008: 144, 183).36 Cognitive dissonance theory argues that an uncomfortable tension develops as a result of holding conflicting thoughts at the same time, or inconsistency in views or behaviour on the same issue (McAllister 1992: 77). The traditional political party and social group cues were no longer available. As the Holt Coalition Government initiated this referendum, the missing cues would have caused some angst for Labor party identifiers. As Dalton argues, partisanship binds individual voters to a preferred party. However, Dalton qualifies this argument by stating that when social-cues lose importance, the decision making process for the voter shifts toward the issue rather than the party or candidate (Dalton 2008: 185). We can argue therefore that voter behaviour on the Aboriginal question was one that specifically directed the electorate to consider the issue rather than the politics.

36 Dalton argues that social cues based on a person‘s social group attachments are an important influence in voting behaviour. Many voters decide on who they will vote for based on the cues from those social groups (2008: 144, 145). When those cues dissolve, cognitive dissonance can be an issue in the mind of the voter.

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CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 The Whitlam Referendums: 1973 and 1974

The 1973 referendum has been described as being the start of a dark phase in Australia‘s referendum history (McMillan 1991), where all proposals put forward by Whitlam were rejected by the Australian electorate. Was this a reflection on the leadership of Whitlam? Results from the 1973 and 1974 referendums are comparable with previous proposals to change the Constitution, so it can be argued that results in 1973 and 1974 were not a direct reflection of the Whitlam leadership. Referendum results prior to 1973 show that just five out of 26 proposed changes to the Constitution had been accepted by a majority of voters from a majority of states.

On 8 December 1973, a referendum was held that asked Australian voters to consider two proposed constitutional changes—the first referendum to be held in approximately six and a half years. The Whitlam Labor Government (the first Federal Labor Government since 1949), which was first elected in 1972, held a referendum after 12 months in office. The purpose of the referendum was to extend the constitutional powers of the Federal Government by gaining control over prices and incomes (Groenewegen 1983). Groenewegan argues that the policies of the sought to alter the scope of federalism by reducing the powers of the states and centralising control with the Commonwealth. A direct consequence of this policy was that the states actively campaigned to remove the Whitlam Government from office, and in fact, the New South Wales and Queensland State Premiers were instrumental in the constitutional crisis of 1975 (Groenewegen 1983) by filling a Senate casual vacancy with a member not from the same political party, thereby changing the balance of power in the Senate.

Circumstances throughout the world in the early 70s saw steady increases in the cost of living through rising inflation and increased wages. The Whitlam Government argued that an amendment to the Constitution would help keep prices and incomes in check and therefore protect Australians from unnecessary hardship by bringing balance to the income and prices scale.

The political balance between the State Governments at the time was not particularly helpful, despite three of the six states being controlled by Labor Governments. The states of New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland were all Coalition held states and, according to liberal ideology, these proposals put forward for the Australian electorate to vote on were an

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unnecessary interference by government in the self-administration of the market (Groenewegen 1983).

Two questions were asked of the electorate at the 8 December 1973 referendum. The two proposed constitutional changes were to provide legislative powers to government to set prices and incomes, and were presented to the Australian electorate as follows.

Question 1. Prices – The first proposal was to add a new power to section 51 of the Constitution allowing the Federal Government to control prices.

Question 2. Incomes – The second proposal was also to add a new power to section 51 of the Constitution to empower the Federal Government to make laws with respect to incomes.

Both proposals failed to gain the necessary majorities to allow the Government to alter the Constitution. On the question of ‗Prices‘, 43.81 percent of voters were in favour of change. On the second question of ‗Incomes‘, 34.42 percent of voters voted in favour.

Arguments for and against the proposed amendments, provided by the government to the voting public, appeared to be quite rational. The ‗yes‘ campaign asked voters to vote ‗yes‘ if they wanted to control inflation and make incomes fairer for all. However, the ‗no‘ campaign was hard hitting and, in effect, scared voters by warning them over the dangers of giving the Federal Government a permanent power over prices and incomes. The ‗no‘ campaign asked voters to consider the possible future abuse of these powers.

The Whitlam Labor Government during the early 1970s was under intense scrutiny from the Federal Opposition. Whitlam was accused of allowing inflation to get out of control; there was pressure to allow wages to increase; the Watergate scandal was in full swing and raised the level of scrutiny of the Government; Australian soldiers were still serving in Vietnam; and there was a worldwide threat of an oil shortage.

Whitlam was attempting to take control of the spiralling inflation rate by introducing the prices and incomes referendum. However, there were many in Australia who were quite opposed to these proposals. The leader of the Country Party, Doug Anthony argued that if the Commonwealth is given power over prices, Australians should expect a shortage of goods. Price control would result in a reduction in the supply of goods, the range of goods, and a destruction of manufacturers‘ incentives to increase production. Anthony further argued (contrary to current Liberal policy) that if the government was allowed to put a cap on prices and incomes, productivity would decrease (The Australian 6 Dec, 1973: 2).

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Whitlam pledged that if the referendum was accepted, the Government would legislate to provide the Prices and Justification Tribunal with the necessary power to curb the increase in prices and incomes. Whitlam also promised that he would legislate on equal pay for equal work policy. However, Bill Snedden was sceptical about the government‘s potential use of the prices and incomes power (The Australian, 7 Dec 1973: 2).

During the lead up to the referendum, media reports revealed that there were other groups debating over the necessity of control over incomes and prices. Economists from various tertiary institutions argued in favour, whilst others argued against the introduction of an incomes and prices control. Trade unions, whilst in favour of a prices control were opposed to an incomes control. Undoubtedly, no clear argument was presented to the Australian voter as to why these proposals should be accepted.

John Edwards (editor of The Australian), on the day before the referendum summarised the debate succinctly. He argued that the government had not adequately addressed the realities of the prices and incomes proposals, especially in terms of how the powers would be used. However, he appears to be one voice that recognised that the problems Australia faced were not unique to Australia. In his editorial he wrote:

The fact is that Australia is not facing its intolerable 14 per cent inflation rate in a vacuum. Our problems are inextricably linked with an international economy which, thanks to the energy crisis and also to less dramatic factors, is fast becoming chaotic. The immediate global prospect is for even greater inflationary pressures and after that we will be struggling to avert a recession. The Australian government of the day will need every democratic device available to it and prices and incomes control is such a device (Edwards, The Australia 1973a: 10).

After all votes were counted, the referendum failed to gain the necessary double majority. However, due to the increasingly reactionary stance of the Opposition and the obstructionist stance of the DLP in the Senate, the referendum was always going to face an uphill battle. The results in the following section provide some figures to show how the Australian electorate voted in the 1973 incomes and prices referendum.

5.1 1973 Results

Examination of electorate characteristics, as displayed in Table 5.1 shows that metropolitan electorates substantially outnumbered the provincial and rural electorates (metropolitan 59 percent; provincial and rural 41 percent). We also note that, since the previous referendum in 1967, there had been a change in government and consequently a shift in the ALP /

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Coalition balance of electorates (ALP 52.8 percent; Coalition 47.2 percent). This change was a significant turnaround from the results in the 1966 federal election where the ALP held 33 percent of electorates and the Coalition held 66 percent of the electorates. Furthermore, this was the first time the Labor party had been in government for over 20 years.

Table 5.1 Federal Electorate Information (Frequency and Percents) Category Frequency Percent Geographical Location Inner Metro 45 36.6 Outer Metro 28 22.8 Provincial 15 12.2 Rural 35 28.5 State Electorates NSW 45 36.6 VIC 34 27.6 QLD 18 14.6 SA 12 9.8 WA 9 7.3 TAS 5 4.1 Party Electorates ALP 65 52.8 (2-party preferred) Coalition 58 47.2 Safeness of Seat Based on the Safe Labor 27 22.0 1972 Fairly Safe Labor 12 9.8 Federal Election Marginal Labor 27 22.0 Marginal Coalition 44 35.8 Fairly Safe Coalition 10 8.1 Safe Coalition 3 2.4 State Government Political Party Same party as Federal Government 2 33.3 in Office Opposite party to Federal 4 66.6 Government Source: Australian Electoral Commission Federal Election Results 2 December 1972

The number of electorates from New South Wales and Victoria combined (79) significantly overshadows the number of electorates in the other states (44). John Edwards, in his analysis of the 1973 referendum, comments that there was an overwhelming rejection of the two constitutional proposals by the smaller states. ―This conforms to the usual pattern of small- state rejection of greater powers for the Commonwealth‖ (Edwards 1973b).

When examining the safeness of seat result, 22 percent of electorates were safe ALP seats as opposed to 2.4 percent of electorates being safe Coalition seats. There was also a significant difference in the percentage of marginal electorates each political party held (35.8 percent of all electorates were marginal Coalition seats and 22 percent of all electorates were marginal ALP seats).

The final point to be made from the above table is that two thirds of state governments were Coalition led, with the Whitlam Labor Government being ALP led. The federal election had

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been held in 1972 bringing to power a Labor Government for the first time since in 1949. There had been no change in the leadership of State Governments from the previous referendum held in 1967.

1972 electoral data have been cross-tabulated with the 1973 referendum results for each question, which provide the following bivariate results. Each table also includes the mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes for each subcategory of each variable allowing for a more detailed comparison within each bivariate relationship.

5.2 Question One: Prices

In determining the strength of the centre-periphery hypothesis ‗that voters from metropolitan electorates are more likely to support constitutional change than voters from other electorates‘, the results in Table 5.2 show that a majority of electorates were opposed to the proposed change that would allow the federal government to control prices. However, closer scrutiny shows that of those electorates that were in favour of the proposed change, there was a significantly higher level of support from inner metropolitan and provincial electorates as opposed to the outer metropolitan and rural electorates. A p-value of 0.001 shows that the relationship between support or rejection for question one, and geographical location of the electorate is statistically significant. Similarly, the high chi-square value provides evidence that this relationship is not a random occurrence. Results tend to support the centre- periphery hypothesis, especially when inner metropolitan and rural electorates are compared.

However, it is important to note that voters from provincial electorates showed higher levels of support for the proposed constitutional changes than voters from outer metro electorates. This finding could lead one to reconsider outer metro and provincial electorates under the centre-periphery theory, where it could be argued that voters from provincial electorates form part of the ‗centre‘ group and voters from outer metro electorates form the ‗periphery‘ group.

The following table (Table 5.2) examines the relationship between support for the question of prices and the geographical location of electorates. A majority of voters in 40 percent of both inner metropolitan and provincial electorates supported the proposed change, compared to 25 and three percent support coming from a majority of voters in outer metropolitan and rural electorates respectively.

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Table 5.2 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1973 Question on Prices by Geographical Location of Electorates Column Percents Geographic Location of Electorates Inner Metro Outer Metro Provincial Rural Support change 40.0 25.0 40.0 2.9 Against change 60.0 75.0 60.0 97.1 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 45 28 15 35 Mean Percent of Electorate 47.5 45.8 47.6 35.0 ‗yes‘ Votes Source: AEC 1973 Referendum Results and AEC 1972 Federal Election Results

N = 123 Chi Sq = 15.863 P = 0.001 df = 3

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Vote = 43.6

Missing = 2 (NB: there were 125 electorates in 1972. The ACT and the NT were not entitled to vote in referendums)

Analysis of the mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes by electorate for each geographical location provides further insight into this centre-periphery hypothesis, as figures in the bottom row in the above Table 5.2 reveal. That is, there is minor variation between the metropolitan electorates and the provincial electorates; significantly, voters from rural electorates were less supportive of this proposed change.

Table 5.3 shows the relationship between state electorates and support or rejection of the proposed introduction of the prices control. This change was argued by the government as a means of controlling inflation and preventing prices from spiralling out of control. The hypothesis that voters from those states with greater populations are more likely to support constitutional change (an extension of the centre-periphery hypothesis) is partially supported on this question. The expectation is that the majority of support will come from a majority of voters in New South Wales and Victorian electorates.

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Table 5.3 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1973 Question on Prices by State Location of Electorates Column Percents STATE NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS Support change 44.4 29.4 0.0 16.7 0.0 0.0 Against change 55.6 70.6 100.0 83.3 100.0 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 45 34 18 12 9 5 Mean Percent of Electorate 48.3 44.9 38.4 40.6 31.9 38.2 Yes Votes Source: as for Table 5.1

N = 123 Chi Sq = 19.941 P = 0.001 df = 5

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Vote = 43.6

Examination of the results shows that support for the hypothesis comes predominantly from New South Wales where 44 percent of NSW electorates supported the proposed change. This result is significantly higher than that of other states. A majority of voters in 29 percent of Victorian electorates supported the change, with minor support coming from South Australian electorates (16.7 percent). A majority of voters from Queensland, Western Australian and Tasmanian electorates were unanimously opposed to the change. Results also show that this is a statistically significant result with a chi-square of 19.941 with an associated p-value of 0.001, adding further support to the state size effect hypothesis.

When examining the mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes from each state, there was greater support for the proposed change to introduce a control on prices from the larger states of New South Wales (48.3 percent) and Victoria (44.9 percent) compared with Western Australia (31.2 percent) and Tasmania (38.2 percent). This outcome adds further support to the centre-periphery hypothesis which, proposes that voters in those electorates closer in distance to the Federal Government are more likely to support constitutional change than voters in those electorates located further away from Canberra.

Consideration of whether there is a partisan effect for the support of the introduction of price controls by the federal government shows that there is a significant difference between voters from Labor party held electorates and Coalition held electorates. A majority of voters from all Coalition held electorates were opposed to this change. However, support was fairly evenly divided among voters from Labor held electorates. Statistical results support the partisanship hypothesis with a chi-square value approximately 10 times higher than the critical value for one degree of freedom and an associated p-value significantly less than 0.05.

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Table 5.4 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1973 Question on Prices by Party Elected Federal MP (2 party preferred) Column Percents Elected Federal Member 1973 (2 Party Preferred) ALP Coalition Support change 49.2 0.0 Against change 50.8 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 n 65 58 Mean Percent of 50.5 35.8 Electorate Yes Votes Source: as for Table 5.1

N = 123 Chi Sq = 38.595 P < 0.001 df = 1

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Vote = 43.6

Examination of the proportion (mean percentage) of ‗yes‘ voters within electorates in Table 5.4 shows that a majority of voters from those electorates whose incumbent member was from the Labor party provided greater support for the proposed change (50.5 percent) as opposed to 36 percent support for the proposed change from a majority of voters in Coalition held electorates.

When examining the safeness of seat by support or rejection of the proposed introduction of price controls, results in Table 5.5 show a similar outcome to the previous table. We need to remember on this point that the Labor party, under Whitlam initiated this referendum. Observations of the Labor held electorates show an interesting outcome with a majority of voters from 81.5 percent of safe Labor electorates supporting the proposed change. Conversely, a majority of voters from marginal Labor electorates were opposed to the proposed change (81.5 percent against). This outcome suggests a strong partisan effect. Statistical figures add further support to this hypothesis with significant results (chi-square = 65.514; p < 0.001). Therefore one can argue that, as support for Labor decreases, the less likely the proposed change would be accepted by these electorates.

Table 5.5 also shows the mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes by each category of ‗safeness of seat‘. Results show significantly higher levels of support from a majority of voters from ALP held electorates—the greater the margin the Labor Member of Parliament (MP) holds his or her seat, the higher the level of support given by their respective electorates. Conversely, within Coalition held electorates, support for the proposed change becomes progressively weaker, indicating a noticeable partisan effect.

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Table 5.5 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1973 Question on Prices by Safeness of Seat / Electorate (2 party preferred) Column Percents Safeness of Seat from 1972 Federal Election (2 Party Preferred) Safe Fairly Marginal Marginal Fairly Safe Labor Safe Labor Coalition Safe Coalition Labor Coalition Support Change 81.5 41.7 18.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 Against Change 18.5 58.3 81.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 27 12 27 44 10 3 Mean Percent of 57.1 47.8 44.7 37.1 32.4 26.4 Electorate Yes Votes Source: as for Table 5.1

N = 123 Chi Sq = 65.514 P < 0.001 df = 5

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Vote = 43.6

The final aspect of the partisanship hypothesis on the prices question is to determine whether there was a Federal versus State political party effect. Table 5.1 shows that two thirds of the state political parties were from the opposition party (Liberal or Country Party). The following table provides detail for an analysis of this division.

Table 5.6 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1973 Question on Prices by Federal / State Party Alignment Column Percents State Government Political Party in Office Same political party as Opposition political party Federal Government to Federal Government Support Change 7.7 30.9 Against Change 92.3 69.1 n 26 97 Total 100.0 100.0 Mean percent of electorate 37.1 45.3 ‗yes‘ vote Source: as for Table 5.1

N = 123 Chi Sq = 5.751 P = 0.016 df = 1

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Vote = 43.6

Results show that a majority of voters from electorates in states that had the same Federal- State political party in power did not support the proposed prices change. Voters from a majority of electorates (92.3 percent) were opposed to this change. On the other hand (and surprisingly), a majority of voters in electorates from Coalition led State Governments provided higher levels of support. A majority of voters in 31 percent of electorates from an

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opposing Federal-State political party supported the proposed change. The result is statistically significant with a chi-square value of 5.751 and an associated p-value of 0.016.

The mean percentage of electorate ‗yes‘ vote supports this outcome with 45 percent of electorates from opposing Federal-State political parties supporting the proposed change as opposed to 37 percent support coming from voters of the same Federal-State political party. One explanation for this outcome is that a majority of the State Governments were opposed to this change as it would have provided a significant power shift for the Federal Government, thereby highlighting the Federal-State conflict.

5.3 Question Two: Incomes

Table 5.7 deals with the second question proposed in the 1973 referendum, which asked voters to consider allowing the government to have control of incomes. Results are considerably different to question one. Electorates in all geographical locations were strongly opposed to this proposed change. The centre-periphery hypothesis is not supported here, with no significant difference between variable categories. Statistical results support this finding with a very weak chi-square and an associated p-value greater than 0.05.

Table 5.7 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1973 Question on Incomes by Geographical Location of Electorates Column Percents Geographic Location of Electorates Inner Outer Provincial Rural Metro Metro Support change 6.7 3.6 13.3 5.7 Against change 93.3 96.4 86.7 94.3 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 45 28 15 35 Mean Percent of Electorate 37.9 34.9 36.9 27.9 Yes Vote Source: AEC 1973 Referendum Results and AEC 1972 Federal Election Results

N = 123 Chi Sq = 1.584 P = 0.663 df = 3

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Vote = 34.3

The mean percentage of electorate ‗yes‘ vote in Table 5.8 indicates a fairly even distribution in support for the proposed constitutional change on incomes by a majority of voters in state electorates, with the highest percentage coming from New South Wales electorates (40.2 percent). Overall, a majority of voters in all state electorates except New South Wales rejected this proposed change. The hypothesis being tested here argues that electorates in larger populated states are more likely to support proposed constitutional change. To a small

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degree, this hypothesis is moderately supported with a majority of voters from 17.8 percent of electorates in New South Wales showing support for this change, as opposed to a majority of voters from all other electorates voting against the change. The chi-square value above the critical value and an associated p-value of less than 0.05 supports this finding.

Table 5.8 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1973 Question on Incomes by State Location of Electorates Column Percents STATE NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS Support change 17.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Against change 82.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 45 34 18 12 9 5 Mean Percent of Electorate 40.2 33.4 31.7 27.9 25.2 28.2 Yes Votes Source: as for Table 5.1

N = 123 Chi Sq = 14.831 P = 0.011 df = 5

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Vote = 34.3

Examination of the results in Table 5.9 shows that an overwhelming majority of voters in a majority of electorates were opposed to the introduction of controls on incomes. The political preference of the electorate, in this case, does not appear to support a partisanship hypothesis. Despite the fact that a Labor party Government proposed this question, a majority of voters from 9.2 percent of ALP held electorates supported the change. This outcome is similarly reflected within Coalition held electorates, with a majority of voters from 3.4 percent of Coalition electorates supporting the change. Based on these figures, a p- value greater than 0.05 and a weak chi-square show that the relationship between political party and support for the proposed change is not statistically significant, and therefore the partisanship hypothesis is not supported.

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Table 5.9 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1973 Question on Incomes by Elected Federal MP (2 party preferred) Column Percents Elected Federal Member 1972 (2 Party Preferred) ALP Coalition Support change 9.2 3.4 Against change 90.8 96.6 Total 100.0 100.0 n 65 58 Mean Percent of 39.1 28.9 Electorate Yes Votes Source: as for Table 5.1

N = 123 Chi Sq = 1.685 P = 0.194 df = 1

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Vote = 34.3

The mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes provide a slightly different perspective with voters from Labor party held electorates showing greater support for control on incomes. This is just over 10 percentage points difference from voters in Coalition held electorates. Some would speculate that this outcome is an indicator of the socio-economic class differences (the haves and the have nots), where voters from Labor party held electorates (the blue-collar worker) would be more accepting of controls of incomes.

When comparing these results with those for question one, on prices, we have a significantly different outcome with clear partisan differences being displayed on the prices question. Depending on the margin by which each party holds their respective seats, a partisan effect may be more evident utilising the safeness of seat variable. Examination of results in Table 5.10 supports this proposal, with a majority of voters from 22.2 percent of safe Labor held electorates showing support for this proposed change, whereas a majority of voters from all safe Coalition held electorates were opposed to the change.

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Table 5.10 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1973 Question on Incomes by Safeness of Seat / Electorate (2 party preferred) Column Percents Safeness of Seat from 1972 Federal Election (2 Party Preferred) Safe Fairly Safe Marginal Marginal Fairly Safe Safe Labor Labor Labor Coalition Coalition Coalition Support Change 22.2 0.0 3.7 0.0 10.0 0.0 Against Change 77.8 100.0 96.3 100.0 90.0 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 27 12 27 44 10 3 Mean Percent of 43.5 37.6 35.3 29.8 26.1 21.6 Electorate Yes Votes Source: as for Table 5.1

N = 123 Chi Sq = 15.623 P = 0.008 df = 5

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Vote = 34.3

These results also show that a majority of voters from 10 percent of fairly safe Coalition held electorates supported the proposed change on incomes. Tests of statistical significance show that this result is statistically significant (chi-square = 15.623; p-value = 0.008).

Similar variation occurs between safeness of seat categories when examining the mean percentage of electorate vote—that is, a much higher proportion of voters in Labor held electorates supported the proposed change than in Coalition held electorates. The mean values resemble a sliding scale from a high of 43.5 percent down to 21.6 percent. It is this mean percentage value that gives a truer reflection of the level of support for the proposed change on the control of incomes, providing evidence of a partisan effect.

The final results, as revealed in Table 5.11, show the relationship between the Federal versus State government governing political party. As the Federal Labor party proposed this referendum, one would expect to see stronger support from a majority of voters in electorates where State Governments were of the same political party. However, no support was forthcoming indicating that there was no partisanship alignment between the Federal and State Governments.

Examination of the mean scores similarly supports this result. The mean percent of electorate ‗yes‘ votes received shows that those State Governments that were of the same political party as the Federal Government received an average of 27 percent support. However, and contrary to expectations, electorates in states with Coalition led State Governments received 36 percent support—9 percentage points higher.

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Table 5.11 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1973 Question on Incomes by Federal / State Party Alignment Column Percents State Government Political Party in Office Same political party as Opposition political party Federal Government to Federal Government Support Change 0.0 8.2 Against Change 100.0 91.8 Total 100.0 100.0 n 26 97 Mean percent of electorate 27.0 36.2 ‗yes‘ vote Source: as for Table 5.1

N = 123 Chi Sq = 2.294 P = 0.13 df = 1

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Vote = 34.3

This outcome leads one to consider possible explanations. First, the mean percentage of electorate vote on ‗incomes‘ is an indicator of the centre-periphery hypothesis, where voter preferences are strongly influenced by social groups the voters belong to (Anderson and Yaish 2003: 400) as indicated by the higher level of voter support for the introduction of an incomes control. Second, as an alternative explanation to the partisanship hypothesis, it is generally recognised that State Governments are more protective of the power granted to them through the ‗Division of Powers‘ in the Constitution than they are of party allegiances. At this point this argument is no more than speculative; however, further testing of this relationship in later referendums will help provide support or rejection of this argument.

5.4 1973 Regression Analysis

A multiple regression analysis was conducted to evaluate: geographical location of electorates, state population size, the federal versus state political party alignment; and the safeness of seat as indicated by ALP first preference votes at the previous federal election; with the percentage of ‗yes‘ vote by electorate for each question.

The predictor variables on the price and incomes control questions are shown in Table 5.12. The combination of these variables, as proposed by the previous hypotheses (centre- periphery and proxy party identification), provides a model for determining the impact of each variable on voter preference on the questions of prices and incomes.

Unlike the 1967 referendum, with only two significant independent variables in the regression model, this model shows that all independent variables were significant in predicting the referendum vote in 1973. One of the major differences between 1967 and

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1973 was that there had been a comprehensive swing away from the Coalition to the Labor party at the 1972 federal election. The Labor party held 67 seats while the Coalition held 58 seats. For the first time since Ben Chifley in 1949, the Labor party had opportunity to pursue their party platform of constitutional reform. The large swing away from the Coalition may have prompted the Labor Government to propose these constitutional changes, hoping that the same level of support would flow onto the referendum vote.

With both questions, the predictor variables are quite similar. Metropolitan electorates were more likely to support the two proposed changes than non-metropolitan electorates. The beta scores indicate a weak causal, statistically significant link with voter behaviour on both questions. Results are similar with the large populated state influence, with voters from New South Wales and Victoria more likely to vote for the proposed changes than the smaller states. The safeness of seat variable based on ALP first preference votes provides the strongest causal link with voter behaviour. The t-scores also indicate a significant difference in voter behaviour within this variable (t = 22.173 and 18.744). The federal versus state political party alignment variable indicates a negative causal link on voter behaviour. This result suggests that electorates in states that were of the same political persuasion did serve as a predictor of voter behaviour, but in the opposite direction. This outcome is to be expected as these proposals would have provided the Federal Government with enhanced powers over the states.

Table 5.12 Regression Table for Prices and Incomes Questions at the 1973 Referendum Q #1 Q #2 Prices Question Incomes Question Standardised Standardised Coefficients Coefficients Model Beta t Beta t

Geographical Location .194** 5.481 .194** 5.029 (All Metropolitan Electorates) Large States v Small .236** 4.876 .176** 3.338 States (NSW & VIC) Federal v State Political -.173** -3.594 -.336** -6.403 Party (Same) Safeness of Seat (Percent of .780** 22.173 .719** 18.744 ALP 1st preference votes)

Question #1 – Dependent Variable: Mean percent of ‗yes‘ votes on the Control Question Question #2 – Dependent Variable: Mean percent of ‗yes‘ votes on the Incomes Question

N = 123

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Model Summary Results for Table 5.12 Q #1 Q #2 Prices Incomes R .927 .913 R Square .860 .833 Adjusted R Square .855 .828 SEE 4.13 3.60 F Change 180.915** 147.504**

** = Significance at the 0.001 level * = Significance at the 0.05 level

The fourth independent variable (safeness of seat based on the percentage of first preference ALP votes) is the strongest factor in this regression model (B = 0.780; t = 22.173; p < 0.001 and B = 0.719; t = 18.744; p < 0.001). From this result, we can argue that the higher the level of first preference votes for the ALP, the more likely that the electorate would support constitutional change. This result is a good indicator of the partisan effect. A review of the distribution of safe seats shows that the Labor party held 27 safe seats and that of these 27 electorates, 81.5 percent were in favour of introducing the prices control change and 22 percent were in favour of introducing an incomes control. The significance of this variable is understood when taking into account that the only electorates that supported these changes were Labor party held electorates, with one exception.

The federal versus state government political parties variable shows that no support existed for this constitutional change where Federal and State governments were both ALP (B = - 0.173; t = -3.594; p < 0.001 and -0.336; t = -6.403; p < 0.001). The negative standardised coefficient for both questions on this variable indicates that State Governments that were of the same political party were not a predictor in providing support for constitutional change.

In summary, the model used for both questions was statistically significant. The model summary results add further weight to this outcome with strong R-squared values, indicating that the relationship between the dependent variable (percentage of electorate ‗yes‘ vote) and the independent variables is significant where R-square equals 86 percent on prices and 83 percent on incomes. The extremely small p-value (< 0.001) for the F-change statistic also provides evidence that the independent variables in the above models are related to the level of ‗yes‘ votes in each electorate.

A discussion on the 1973 referendum can be found in the discussion section towards the end of this chapter.

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5.5 The 1974 Referendum

Since federation in 1901, the referendum held on 18 May 1974 was the first time a referendum had been held in less than one year from the previous referendum (8 December, 1973). The closest time period between referendums prior to 1973 and 1974 were two referendums held in 1910 and 1911. A review of Australia‘s political history during the 1970s reveals that this was a turbulent time for the Whitlam Labor Government who went to the people with a reform agenda. Whitlam‘s reforms were strongly opposed by the Coalition, which may be the reason for the frequency of referendums; that is, the Whitlam Labor Government wanted a mandate from the Australian electorate through the referendum.

In the 1974 referendum, Australian voters were asked to consider four proposed constitutional changes. The referendum and federal election were held concurrently—the first referendum and election to be held concurrently since 28 September 1946. A direct consequence of this dual event was that the majority of media coverage went directly to issues surrounding the general election—referendum issues were given little coverage.

As with the referendum in 1973, the Labor Government under Whitlam, proposed these constitutional changes. Similarly, the State Governments had all remained the same, apart from Western Australia where a state election was held and the party in office changed from Labor to Liberal. At the time of the referendum, Coalition Governments controlled four states, while South Australia and Tasmania had Labor party led governments.

Many of the social and economic circumstances facing voters at the 1973 referendum had not changed. Inflation was rising both in Australia and throughout the western world, the Watergate Affair was not over; Australians were still fighting in Vietnam; and the Government was constantly dealing with industrial unrest. There was a realisation, however, that this federal election and referendum was going to have a significant effect on Australian democracy. The previous federal election had been held just 16 months prior, on 2 December 1972. The Government opted for an early poll due to the obstructionist nature of the Senate under Coalition control, which refused to pass the Government‘s supply bills. The editorial in The Australian (18 May 1974) reads,

If Labor wins, all its frustrated and controversial legislation – for a national health scheme, for an expanded, entrepreneurial Australian Industry Development Corporation, for a Minerals and Energy Authority, for electoral change which will strengthen Labor rule and weaken the Country Party – all this and more will be in force by the end of the year.

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If the Liberal-CP Coalition wins Australia will be safe from radical innovations, but the price will be a bitter backlash from a Labor Opposition which will question the legitimacy of a team which came to power through the unprecedented device of denying the Government the money to pay its bills (The Australian 1974: 18).

The Labor party was returned to power in the 1974 election with a reduced majority. The Opposition continued to issue warnings to the Labor party that they need to moderate their policies, or possibly face another (Political Staff 1974: 1). The Labor party had brought about significant change in a short time demonstrating their commitment to social welfare programs and to curbing the excesses of a capitalist free market enterprise system. A caveat to explain the Coalition‘s obstructionist policy might be understood by acknowledging that, prior to Labor winning Government in 1972, the Labor party had been in opposition for 23 years, and it would appear that the Coalition found it difficult to accept their new position. Conversely, many of the changes the Labor Government had introduced were now accepted in Australian society as commonplace and could not have been withdrawn, even if the Coalition won office, despite the Coalition‘s ideological opposition to the social democratic policies of the Whitlam Government. Changes such as free education, land rights for Aborigines, and the rights of women in society had won majority support by the electorate.

With this election, the Labor party was committed to a bicameral Parliament that reflected the will of the people—the main purpose of the first referendum question. On the other hand, the Coalition‘s position was to retain the intention of the founding fathers in the Constitution—that the Senate should act as a brake on an over-enthusiastic Government and not as a rubber stamp. Hence, the advertising campaign from the Institute of Public Affairs, which argued that if the referendum proposals were approved, power would be concentrated in Canberra and would greatly weaken the safeguarding powers of the States (Irvine 1974: 7).

Four questions were asked of the electorate in the joint federal election and referendum held on 18 May 1974. The Whitlam led Labor party won the election with a reduced majority, however support was not forthcoming for the proposed constitutional changes. The four referendum questions were as follows:

Question 1: Simultaneous elections – An Act to alter the Constitution so as to ensure that Senate Elections are held at the same time as House of Representatives elections.

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Question 2: Mode of altering the Constitution – An Act to facilitate alterations to the Constitution and to allow electors in Territories, as well as electors in the States, to vote at referendums on proposed laws to alter the Constitution.

Question 3: Democratic elections – An Act to alter the Constitution so as to ensure that Members of the House of Representatives and of the Parliaments of the States are chosen directly and democratically by the people.

Question 4: Local Government Bodies – An Act to alter the Constitution to enable the Commonwealth to borrow money from, and to grant financial assistance to, local government bodies.

Each of the proposed laws for the alteration of the Constitution had ‗for‘ and ‗against‘ arguments published in a pamphlet to inform the Australian electorate. In summary, the arguments in favour of simultaneous elections were to reduce the frequency of elections, thereby lowering the costs incurred for each election, and that the Parliament should be a true reflection of the will of the people—in order to reduce the chances of a hostile Senate being elected. The principal argument against simultaneous elections was that if this proposal passed, the Senate would become a rubber-stamp, whereas the framers of the Constitution had always intended that the Senate would act as a brake on an over- enthusiastic Government (The Australian 1974: 18). The second argument against this proposal was that the Senate being established under the Constitution as an equal to the House of Representatives, should be able to remain independent—simultaneous elections would destroy this independence.

On the second question, the arguments in favour of the ‗mode of altering the Constitution‘ were that no Australian should be denied a vote in a referendum. At the time, residents in the ACT and the Northern Territory were unable to vote in referendums. This question also involved changing the mode for approving a referendum question. Approval of a referendum question required a majority of voters in a majority of states for the question to pass. The government wanted to leave the majority of voters and change the approval of states to half the states as a means of meeting modern needs. Arguments against the ‗mode of altering the Constitution‘ were that, if implemented, this change would reduce the value of a voter‘s voice in a referendum, as well as reduce the significance of the states (Askin 1974: 8).

Arguments in favour of the third proposal (democratic elections) were given in order to guarantee equal voting rights for all Australians. The ‗yes‘ campaign argued that the Constitution in its present format did not guarantee equal voting rights for all Australians. Evidence of this was seen in the way political parties manipulated electoral boundaries for

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their own advantage. This change would be applied to the Commonwealth and to all States, where legislation would be introduced that would see all electorates in Australia equal on the basis of population. Arguments against this proposal (as presented in the official booklet on the ‗yes‘-‘no‘ arguments) were: ―this is a giant Labor gerrymander‖, ―democracy could not survive under this deceitful proposal‖, ―it would make a mockery of one vote-one value‖ (Yes-No Booklet 1974). Such a change goes against the spirit of the Constitution—by dictating how elections should be carried out.

The final referendum question proposed that the Constitution recognise local government bodies. Arguments put forward in favour of this proposal were that local facilities (roads, health, the environment) could be improved by allowing the Commonwealth to provide funding directly to the local government authorities—in other words, to provide a direct financial link. Arguments against were that this change would see Canberra have a finger in every council in Australia, add to Canberra‘s centralist domination, and add another level of red tape (Yes-No Booklet 1974).

Each of the four proposed changes failed to gain the necessary majorities to pass. Official figures from the AEC show that 48.3 percent of voters were in favour of introducing simultaneous elections, 47.99 percent of voters were in favour of changing the mode of altering the Constitution, 47.2 percent favoured including the guarantee of democratic elections in the Constitution, and 46.85 percent were in favour of recognising local government bodies in the Constitution.

5.6 1974 Results

An overview of the results in Table 5.13 shows that a majority of Australia‘s electorates in 1974 were metropolitan – making up almost 60 percent of all electorates. Of all electorates, New South Wales and Victoria make up a combined total of 63 percent of Australia‘s electorates. The 1974 federal election saw the Labor party hold a majority of electorates (53.2 percent), and of these, 21 percent were considered to be safe Labor seats. The Coalition held the balance of the seats with only 11 percent of Coalition seats considered as ‗safe seats‘. The makeup of the governing political parties had one change in Western Australia and the Whitlam Labor Government was returned to power with a one seat gain from the 1972 election. Four states—New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and Tasmania were Coalition led, while South Australia and Western Australia were Labor party led. Western Australia had a state election just five weeks prior to the 1974 federal election - referendum.

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Table 5.13 Federal Electorate Information Associated with the 1974 Referendum (Frequencies and Percents) Category Frequency Percent Geographical Location Inner Metro 45 36.3 Outer Metro 29 23.4 Provincial 15 12.1 Rural 35 28.2 State Electorates NSW 45 36.3 VIC 34 27.4 QLD 18 14.5 SA 12 9.7 WA 10 8.1 TAS 5 4.0 Party Electorates ALP 66 53.2 (2-party preferred) Coalition 58 46.8 Safeness of Seat Safe Labor 26 21.0 Based on the 1974 Fairly Safe Labor 8 6.5 Federal Election Marginal Labor 30 24.2 Marginal Coalition 33 26.6 Fairly Safe Coalition 11 8.9 Safe Coalition 14 11.3 Independent 1 0.8 State Government Political Same party as Federal 2 33.3 Party in Office Government Opposite party as Federal 4 66.6 Government Source: Australian Electoral Commission Federal Election Results 1974

When cross-tabulating these results with whether electorates were in support or against the proposed changes, the following results were revealed.

5.7 Question One: Simultaneous Elections

Question 1: Simultaneous elections – An Act to alter the Constitution so as to ensure that Senate Elections are held at the same time as the House of Representatives elections.

Table 5.14 shows that, on the question of simultaneous elections, majority support was realised in the inner metropolitan (53 percent) and provincial (53 percent) electorates. Rural electorates showed minimal support for this change, whereas 38 percent of outer metropolitan electorates showed support. The centre-periphery hypothesis is supported with statistically significant results (chi-square 24.701; p < 0.001). However, one can argue that compared to results from the 1973 referendum, the centre-periphery hypothesis is not as strong with a more even distribution of voter support for the proposed change on simultaneous elections as indicated by the mean percent of ‗yes‘ votes.

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Table 5.14 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1974 Question on Simultaneous Elections by Geographical Location of Electorates Column Percents Geographic Location of Electorates Inner Metro Outer Metro Provincial Rural Support change 53.3 37.9 53.3 2.9 Against change 46.7 62.1 46.7 97.1 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 45 29 15 35 Mean Percent of 51.7 50.5 51.4 39.8 Electorate Yes Votes Source: AEC 1974 Referendum Results and AEC 1974 Federal Election Results

N = 124 Chi Sq = 24.701 P < 0.001 df = 3

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Vote = 48.02

The relationship between variables in Table 5.15 also addresses the centre-periphery hypothesis, which argues that the more highly populated states, such as New South Wales and Victoria are more likely to support constitutional change than the smaller states. Despite the fact that a majority of voters in all states did not support this change, results do support this hypothesis with higher support from New South Wales and Victorian electorates. Voters in South Australian electorates (one of the smaller states) showed higher support (41.7 percent) for the introduction of simultaneous elections. These results are statistically significant, and it can be argued that the centre-periphery hypothesis is supported in this relationship. Further support is added to the hypothesis upon examination of the mean percent of ‗yes‘ votes. Results show a gradual decline in voter support as the population of the state gets smaller.

Table 5.15 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1974 Question on Simultaneous Elections by State Location of Electorates Column Percents STATE NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS Support change 48.9 38.2 11.1 41.7 20.0 0.0 Against change 51.1 61.8 88.9 58.3 80.0 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 45 34 18 12 10 5 Mean Percent of 50.9 48.8 44.2 46.6 43.9 41.4 Electorate Yes Votes Source: as for Table 5.1

N = 124 Chi Sq = 12.313 P = 0.031 df = 5

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Vote = 48.02

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The relationship between support for the proposed constitutional change of simultaneous elections and partisanship of electorates is shown in Table 5.16. The Labor party won the federal election and results show that ALP held electorates provided greater support for the proposed change than Coalition held electorates. However, 34 percent of Labor party held electorates opposed the change together with 98.3 percent of Coalition held electorates. Statistical results are significant in this relationship with a strong chi-square of 54.251 and associated p-value < 0.001. These results are further supported by the mean percent of ‗yes‘ votes showing that a much higher percentage of support for the proposed change to introduce simultaneous elections came from voters in ALP held electorates. Therefore we may argue that the partisanship hypothesis is supported.

Table 5.16 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1974 Question on Simultaneous Elections by Elected Federal MP (2 party preferred) Column Percents Elected Federal Member 1974 (2 Party Preferred) ALP Coalition Support change 65.2 1.7 Against change 34.8 98.3 Total 100.0 100.0 n 66 58 Mean Percent of 54.9 40.1 Electorate Yes Votes Source: as for Table 5.1

N = 124 Chi Sq = 54.251 P < 0.001 df = 1

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Vote = 48.02

Examination of the electorate safeness of seat (Table 5.17) based on the two party preferred member, shows a strong partisanship effect. Labor party held electorates (see also Table 5.4) were more likely to support the proposed change than Coalition held electorates. Safe Labor held electorates and fairly safe Labor held electorates supported the change with 96.2 percent and 100 percent respectively. Marginal Labor electorates were less supportive of the change with only 30 percent support. The only support from Coalition held electorates came from marginal Coalition electorates, which showed just three percent support. The difference between the marginal electorates, however, is surprising in that there would only be a minor difference between whether an electorate (based on a two party preferred result) is marginal Labor or marginal Coalition. There is some difficulty in explaining, therefore, why a majority of voters from marginal Labor electorates show a 30 percent support compared to marginal Coalition electorates with only a three percent support.

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Table 5.17 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1974 Question on Simultaneous Elections by Safeness of Seat / Electorate (2 party pref) Column Percents Safeness of Seat from 1974 Federal Election (2 Party Preferred) Safe Fairly Marginal Marginal Fairly Safe Indepen- Labor Safe Labor Coalitio Safe Coalitio dent Labor n Coalitio n n Support Change 96.2 100.0 30.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Against Change 3.8 0.0 70.0 97.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 26 8 30 33 11 14 1 Mean Percent of 63.6 54.9 47.7 43.1 39.1 35.2 32.4 Electorate Yes Votes Source: as for Table 5.1

N = 123 Chi Sq = 86.799 P < 0.001 df = 6

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Vote = 48.02

These results are statistically significant with a p-value < 0.001 and a very strong chi-square of 86.799. Based on the two party preferred result of safeness of seat, we can conclude that the partisanship hypothesis is strongly supported in this relationship. When examining the mean percent of ‗yes‘ votes, it is observed that there is a high of 63.6 percent support from voters in safe Labor held electorates down to 35.2 percent from voters in safe Coalition held electorates. This result indicates a clear party identification effect, where the safer the Labor party held seat, the stronger the support for the proposed constitutional change.

The final aspect on the issue of simultaneous elections examines the political party alignment of the Federal versus State Governments as shown in Table 5.18. Recall that at the time of the 1974 referendum (18 May 1974), there were three Labor State Governments and three Coalition State Governments. Results indicate that cooperative federalism was not at play in this case—as shown in Table 5.19.

Table 5.18 shows that there was little alignment for voters between Federal and State Governments. In fact, the States actively campaigned against this change for fear that the introduction of simultaneous elections would minimise their influence in the federal structure. The most noticeable aspect is that, when taking political alignments into account, a majority of voters in a majority of electorates were opposed to this change. The second noticeable aspect is that a majority of voters from just 17 electorates (13.7 percent) from states that were politically aligned to the federal government supported this proposed change. The electorates in states politically aligned with the Federal Government were not supportive

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of the change where a majority of voters from 70.6 percent of electorates were against introducing simultaneous elections. Thirdly, a majority of voters from those states that were not politically aligned with the Federal Government showed higher levels of support (36.4 percent) than the politically aligned states (29.4 percent).

Statistically, the chi-square value is weak with an associated p-value greater than 0.05 and can argue that there is little influence (association) for voters between the Federal and State Governments on this proposed change. The mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes further supports this finding with just 3.4 percentage points separating the two groups.

Table 5.18 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1974 Question on Simultaneous Elections by Federal / State Party Alignment Column Percents State Government Political Party in Office Same political party as Opposition political party Federal Government to Federal Government Support Change 29.4 36.4 Against Change 70.6 63.6 Total 100.0 100.0 n 17 107 Mean percent of electorate 45.1 48.5 ‗yes‘ votes for Question #1 Source: as for Table 5.1

N = 124 Chi Sq = 0.317 P = 0.577 df = 1

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 48.02

5.8 Question Two: Mode of Altering the Constitution

Question 2: Mode of altering the Constitution – An Act to facilitate alterations to the Constitution and to allow electors in Territories, as well as electors in the States, to vote at referendums on proposed laws to alter the Constitution.

The second proposal in the 1974 referendum asked voters to consider two factors. First, whether electors in the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory (as well as other Australian territories) should be allowed to vote at referendums. Since 1901, the Constitution only allowed registered voters from the States to vote in referendums. Second, whether the mode of altering the Constitution should be altered where a majority of voters and only half the states would be required for a referendum proposal to pass. The second part of the question asked voters to amend section 128 of the Constitution. This question, therefore, could be considered as a double-barrelled question. Voters were left in a conundrum. Yes, voters from the Australian Territories should be able to vote in a

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referendum. On the other hand, support for the proposal also meant removing one of the safe guards contained in section 128. The proposal was not accepted.

Results in Table 5.19, which considers the relationship between geographical location and support for the second proposal on the mode of altering the Constitution, show that a majority of voters from all geographical areas were opposed to this proposed change. Closer examination shows that inner metropolitan, outer metropolitan and provincial areas were fairly similar in the spread of results. Rural electorates were dissimilar with an overwhelming majority (97 percent) opposed to this change. Clearly there was an overall rejection by a majority of voters from a majority of electorates for this proposed constitutional change.

Table 5.19 Proportion of electorates supporting the 1974 Question on the Mode of Altering the Constitution by Geographical Location of Electorates Column Percents Geographic Location of Electorates Inner Metro Outer Metro Provincial Rural Support change 48.9 41.4 46.7 2.9 Against change 51.1 58.6 53.3 97.1 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 45 29 15 35 Mean Percent of 51.6 50.1 51.2 39.2 Electorate Yes Votes Source: AEC 1974 Referendum Results and AEC 1974 Federal Election Results

N = 124 Chi Sq = 21.388 P < 0.001 df = 3

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Vote = 47.7

The above results are statistically significant with a moderately strong chi-square of 21.388 and an associated p-value < 0.001 indicating support for the centre-periphery hypothesis. Rural electorates were more opposed to the introduction of this change than all other geographical areas. This result is reflected in the mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes which was considerably lower from voters located in the rural electorates (39.2 percent).

Table 5.20 examines the centre-periphery hypothesis at a state level. Results show that a majority of voters from electorates in both New South Wales (48.9 percent) and Victoria (41.2 percent) provided a much higher level of support than all other states. Similarly, a majority of voters from all other states rejected this proposal, thereby providing evidence that the larger states are more likely to support a proposed constitutional change than the smaller states. Statistical results provide further support for this hypothesis with and a chi- square of 15.031 and an associated p-value of 0.010. On the surface, the Whitlam

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Government may have been disheartened by this result, however the mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes shows that the combined average from voters was 47.7 percent, with the lowest coming from Tasmania. Once again, the mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes shows a decline in acceptance from the larger populated state of New South Wales with 51.2 percent to a low of 40.7 percent from Tasmanian voters.

Table 5.20 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1974 Question on the Mode of Altering the Constitution by State Location of Electorates Column Percents STATE NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS Support change 48.9 41.2 11.1 25.0 10.0 0.0 Against change 51.1 58.8 88.9 75.0 90.0 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 45 34 18 12 10 5 Mean Percent of 51.2 48.8 44.2 43.8 42.4 40.7 Electorate Yes Votes Source: as for Table 5.1

N = 124 Chi Sq = 15.031 P = 0.010 df = 5

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Vote = 47.7

Was there a partisan effect associated with the proposal that would change the way the Constitution could be altered and allow electors in Australia‘s territories to vote at referendums? Results in Table 5.21 show that Labor held electorates (62.1 percent) were more likely to support this proposed change than Coalition held electorates (Liberal Party electorates 2.6 percent; Country Party electorates 0.0 percent). The chi-square of 50.314 and associated p-value < 0.001 are statistically significant—that is, there was a significant difference in electorate behaviour between ALP and Coalition held seats. We can, therefore, argue that the partisanship hypothesis is supported.

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Table 5.21 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1974 Question on Mode of Altering the Constitution by Elected Federal MP (2 party pref) Column Percents Elected Federal Member 1974 (2 Party Preferred) ALP Liberal Party Support change 62.1 1.7 Against change 37.9 98.3 Total 100.0 100.0 n 66 58 Mean Percent of 54.6 39.8 Electorate Yes Votes Source: as for Table 5.1

N = 124 Chi Sq = 50.276 P < 0.001 df = 1

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Vote = 47.7

The mean percent of electorate ‗yes‘ votes also shows that Labor party held electorates were more supportive, being seven percentage points above the mean, while Liberal and Country Party held electorates were seven and nine percentage points respectively below the mean.

Results in Table 5.22 highlight the extent of the partisanship effect on party held electorates. Voters from safe Labor party held electorates provided much higher support (96 percent) for this change than any other category of electorate. The more marginal the Labor seat, the less support that voters from these electorates gave for the proposed change. The only support for this proposed change to come from Coalition held electorates was in three percent of marginal Coalition electorates. One would expect, however, that there would only be a minor difference between the marginal electorates in terms of support, but this was not the case.

Table 5.22 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1974 Question on Mode of Altering the Constitution by Safeness of Seat Column Percents Safeness of Seat from 1974 Federal Election (2 Party Preferred) Safe Fairly Margina Margina Fairly Safe Indepen- Labor Safe l Labor l Safe Coalitio dent Labor Coalitio Coalitio n n n Support Change 96.2 87.5 26.7 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Against Change 3.8 12.5 73.3 97.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 26 8 30 33 11 14 1 Mean Percent of 63.4 54.7 47.2 42.8 39.2 34.7 30.1 Electorate Yes Votes Source: as for Table 5.1

N = 123 Chi Sq = 83.972 P < 0.001 df = 6

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Vote = 47.7

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These results clearly support the partisanship hypothesis. Further support for this hypothesis is provided by the statistically significant results with a p-value < 0.001 and a strong chi- square of 83.972. We notice also that voters from safe (63.4 percent) and fairly safe (54.7 percent) Labor held electorates were significantly higher than the overall mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes (47.7 percent). Voters from all Coalition held electorates were below the overall mean percent. Results from the strong chi-square and the mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes provide support for a partisan effect on this referendum question.

Results in Table 5.23 are very similar to results in Table 5.18 where political party alignment between the state and federal governments shows a weak relationship in terms of providing support for changing the way the Constitution could be altered. The potential outcome of this proposal is that the influence of the states in a referendum would be minimised. It is of interest that greater support (36.4 percent) came from voters in those electorates in states where State Governments were Coalition led.

Table 5.23 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1974 Question on Mode of Altering the Constitution by Federal / State Party Alignment Column Percents State Government Political Party in Office Same political party as Opposition political party Federal Government to Federal Government Support Change 17.6 36.4 Against Change 82.4 63.6 n 100.0 100.0 Total 17 107 Mean percent of electorate 45.1 48.5 ‗yes‘ votes for Question #2 Source: as for Table 5.1

N = 124 Chi Sq = 2.315 P = 0.128 df = 1

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 47.7

The hypothesis that similarly aligned political parties will support one another is not supported. Furthermore, as each state is part of the federal structure, anything that weakens the power of the states appears to be a stronger motivating factor for rejecting proposed constitutional change than political alignment (Andrews 1997: 60).

These results are not statistically significant with a chi-square value less than the critical value and an associated p-value greater than 0.05. Similarly, the mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes is not significantly different between states that were of the same political party in office and states that were of opposing political parties in office.

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5.9 Question Three: Democratic Elections

Question 3: Democratic elections – An Act to alter the Constitution so as to ensure that Members of the House of Representatives and of the Parliaments of the States are chosen directly and democratically by the people.

Question three of the 1974 referendum asked voters to consider whether ‗members of the House of Representatives and of the State Parliaments should be chosen directly and democratically by the people‘. This statement, or anything similar, is not written in Australia‘s Constitution. The intention was to guarantee that all parliamentary elections in Australia would be democratic. This proposal would, therefore, directly affect the State Constitutions. The Prime Minister, Mr Whitlam, argued that this proposal was core to electoral justice and was included to remove the mal- in Australia where rural electorates had unfair bias (Whitlam 1974: 7).

Table 5.24 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1974 Question on Democratic Elections by Geographical Location of Electorates Column Percents Geographic Location of Electorates Inner Metro Outer Metro Provincial Rural Support change 46.7 37.9 40.0 2.9 Against change 53.3 62.1 60.0 97.1 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 45 29 15 35 Mean percent of electorate 50.5 49.1 50.7 38.9 ‗yes‘ votes for Question #3 Source: AEC 1974 Referendum Results and AEC 1974 Federal Election Results

N = 124 Chi Sq = 19.179 P < 0.001 df = 3

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Vote = 46.94

Results in Table 5.24 show the distribution of electorates by geographical location and their support or rejection of the proposed change that would officially write into the Constitution that Australia would have equal electorates. Not one category of electorate supported this change. When considering the centre-periphery hypothesis, we see that a majority of voters from inner metropolitan electorates provided higher support (46.7 percent) than other electorates. In light of Mr Whitlam‘s comments, it is not surprising that a majority of voters from rural electorates (2.9 percent) showed much less support for this proposal. The chi- square of 19.179 and associated p-value < 0.001 indicate that this relationship is statistically significant and offers support to the centre-periphery hypothesis where there is considerable association between geographical location of electorate and vote. The mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes provides further support for the centre-periphery hypothesis with the percentage

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of voters from rural electorates (38.9 percent) falling below the overall average of 46.9 percent.

Table 5.25 shows the results of state electorates cross-tabulated with support or rejection on the question of altering the constitution so that the constitution clearly states that Australia should have democratic elections. Despite the fact that a majority of voters in a majority of electorates in all states opposed this constitutional change, New South Wales (48.9 percent) and Victoria (35.3 percent) showed much higher support than the smaller states. These results provide support for the hypothesis. The centre-periphery hypothesis argues that the more densely populated states are more likely to accept the change than the smaller states. The results are statistically significant with a chi-square of 16.838 and associated p-value of 0.005 providing further support to this hypothesis. The mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes mirrors this finding with voters from both New South Wales and Victoria showing support greater than the overall average.

Table 5.25 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1974 Question on Democratic Elections by State Location of Electorates Column Percents STATE NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS Support change 48.9 35.3 5.6 25.0 10.0 0.0 Against change 51.1 64.7 94.4 75.0 90.0 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 45 34 18 12 10 5 Mean percent of 50.4 47.4 43.6 43.6 42.6 40.8 electorate ‗yes‘ votes for Question #3 Source: as for Table 5.1

N = 124 Chi Sq = 16.838 P = 0.005 df = 5

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Vote = 46.94

The partisan effect is quite evident in Table 5.26 with a majority of voters in no Coalition Party held electorates providing support for the Whitlam Labor Government‘s proposed constitutional change of including democratic elections. Conversely, a majority of voters in 59.1 percent of Labor party held electorates supported introducing democratic elections in written form into the Constitution. A further noticeable outcome of this relationship is that, in Labor party held electorates, the mean percentage of Yes votes is above the national average by eight percentage points, whereas the mean percentage of Coalition held electorates is approximately eight percentage points below the national average. This result is statistically significant with a very strong chi-square of 49.998 and an associated p-value <

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0.001 and it provides evidence in support of the partisanship hypothesis. It must be noted here that one of the key elements to the Michigan Model of voter behaviour is the attitude the voter has to the candidate. In this relationship, it is evident that there were clear cues given by the Labor party and Mr Whitlam which Labor party identifiers followed.

Table 5.26 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1974 Question on Democratic Elections by Elected Federal MP (2 party preferred) Column Percents Elected Federal Member 1974 (2 Party Preferred) ALP Liberal Party Support change 59.1 0.0 Against change 40.9 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 n 66 58 Mean percent of electorate 54.1 38.8 ‗yes‘ votes for Question #3 Source: as for Table 5.1

N = 124 Chi Sq = 49.998 P < 0.001 df = 1

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Vote = 47.93

The safeness of a Member of Parliament‘s seat can sometimes reveal the strength of the electorate‘s feelings for constitutional change. In Table 5.27, results show that the greater the margin by which Labor party candidates held their seat, the more likely that voters from those electorates would support the proposed change. On this issue of democratic elections, no majority of voters in Coalition held electorates provided support to this proposed change. When viewing the mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes, we notice that safer Labor party held electorates (62.9 percent) were significantly higher than Coalition held electorates (33.9 percent). In fact, all Coalition held electorates fell below the national average (46.9 percent) on this proposal. The results are statistically significant (chi-square = 83.972; p < 0.001), therefore we can argue that the hypothesis is supported whereby, the safer the seat for the Labor party, the more likely that a majority of voters in these electorates will support a proposed constitutional change, depending on the political party in government.

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Table 5.27 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1974 Question on Democratic Elections by Safeness of Seat / Electorate (2 party preferred) Column Percents Safeness of Seat from 1974 Federal Election (2 Party Preferred) Safe Fairly Margina Margin Fairly Safe Indepen Labor Safe l Labor al Safe Coalitio -dent Labor Coalitio Coalitio n n n Support Change 96.2 87.5 20.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Against Change 3.8 12.5 80.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 26 8 30 33 11 14 1 Mean percent of 62.9 54.2 46.5 41.7 38.1 33.9 31.3 electorate ‗yes‘ votes for Question #3 Source: as for Table 5.1

N = 123 Chi Sq = 83.972 P < 0.001 df = 6

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Vote = 46.94

Results in Table 5.28 are similar to those in Tables 5.18 and 5.22, showing no relationship between referendum vote and federal-state government political party alignment.

Table 5.28 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1974 Question on Democratic Elections by Political Party of State Government Column Percents State Government Political Party in Office Same political party as Opposition political party Federal Government to Federal Government Support Change 17.6 33.6 Against Change 82.4 66.4 Total 100.0 100.0 n 17 107 Mean percent of 42.8 47.6 electorate ‗yes‘ votes for Question #3 Source: as for Table 5.1

N = 124 Chi Sq = 1.74 P = 0.187 df = 1

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 46.9

5.10 Question Four: Local Government Bodies

Question 4: Local Government Bodies – An Act to alter the Constitution to enable the Commonwealth to borrow money from, and to grant financial assistance to, local government bodies.

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Question four of the 1974 referendum asked voters to alter the Constitution to enable the Commonwealth to recognise local governments in the Constitution whereby the Commonwealth could borrow money from, and grant financial assistance to local government bodies. Overall, this proposal failed with 87 electorates opposing the change and 37 electorates favouring the change.

Table 5.29 shows the results of electorates that either supported or opposed this change by their geographical location. The location of electorates shows that the category of geographical location was a factor in the level of support for this referendum question. Voters from inner metropolitan electorates were more supportive of the change (44.4 percent) than any other category of electorate, with rural electorates showing the least amount of support (2.9 percent). These results support the centre-periphery hypothesis.

Table 5.29 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1974 Question on Local Governments by Geographical Location of Electorates Column Percents Geographic Location of Electorates Inner Metro Outer Metro Provincial Rural Support change 44.4 34.5 40.0 2.9 Against change 55.6 65.5 60.0 97.1 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 45 29 15 35 Mean percent of 50.1 48.6 50.6 38.7 electorate ‗yes‘ votes for Question #4 Source: AEC 1974 Referendum Results and AEC 1974 Federal Election Results

N = 124 Chi Sq = 17.795 P < 0.001 df = 3

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Vote = 46.58

Results are statistically significant with a chi-square of 17.795 and an associated p-value less than 0.001, highlighting the differences between geographical locations. The differences in mean percentage of electorate ‗yes‘ votes are not as marked with 50.1 percent of inner metropolitan electorates supporting the change. Outer metropolitan and provincial electorates varied marginally from inner metropolitan electorates, with the main difference seen in rural electorates (12 percentage points lower).

All four proposed changes in the 1974 referendum show a distinct division, where a majority of voters from rural electorates were less likely to support constitutional change than voters from all other geographical electoral categories.

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When considering whether the larger states were more likely to support this proposed change, results in Table 5.30 show that New South Wales and Victorian electorates were more likely to support the change than did the smaller states. Electorates in the smaller states, apart from South Australia, showed little support for this change. These results support the hypothesis that those states with densely populated areas are more likely to support constitutional change. The results are statistically significant (chi-square = 19.487; p = 0.002). The mean percentage of electorate ‗yes‘ votes also supports this hypothesis with higher support coming from electorates in New South Wales (50.7 percent) and Victoria (47.1 percent). These results show a variation of almost 11 percentage points between New South Wales, as the largest state, and Tasmania, as the smallest state.

Table 5.30 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1974 Question on Local Governments by State Location of Electorates Column Percents STATE NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS Support change 48.9 32.4 5.6 25.0 0.0 0.0 Against change 51.1 67.6 94.4 75.0 100.0 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 45 34 18 12 10 5 Mean percent of 50.7 47.1 43.6 42.1 40.6 40.0 electorate ‗yes‘ votes for Question #4 Source: as for Table 5.1

N = 124 Chi Sq = 19.487 P = 0.002 df = 5

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Vote = 46.58

Table 5.31 shows the results of Labor party and Coalition Party electorates cross-tabulated with support or rejection of the proposal that would allow the Commonwealth to borrow money from, or grant financial assistance to, local government bodies. Under the Whitlam Labor Government, results show that Labor party electorates were much more likely to support the change (56.1 percent) than Coalition electorates (0.0 percent).

These results are statistically significant (chi-square 50.314; p < 0.001), therefore we can argue that the partisan hypothesis is supported. When looking at the proportion of electorate mean ‗yes‘ votes, results clearly show a partisan effect with much higher support from Labor held electorates (53.6 percent) as opposed to lower support from Coalition held electorates (Liberal = 38.9 percent and Country Party 37.6 percent).

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Table 5.31 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1974 Question on Local Governments by Elected Federal MP (2 party preferred) Column Percents Elected Federal Member 1974 (2 Party Preferred) ALP Liberal Party Support change 56.1 0.0 Against change 43.9 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 n 66 58 Mean percent of 53.6 38.5 electorate ‗yes‘ votes for Question #4 Source: as for Table 5.1

N = 124 Chi Sq = 46.34 P < 0.001 df = 1

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Vote = 46.58

The variable ‗safeness of seat‘, cross-tabulated with support or rejection for this proposed change, shows a further partisan effect as shown in Table 5.32. The safer the Labor seats, the more likely voters from these electorates were to support the proposed change. At the opposite end, a majority of voters from all safe Coalition held electorates (no matter how safe) did not provide support this proposal.

Table 5.32 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1974 Question on Local Governments by Safeness of Seat / Electorate (2 party preferred) Column Percents Safeness of Seat from 1974 Federal Election (2 Party Preferred) Safe Fairly Margina Margina Fairly Safe Indepen Labor Safe l Labor l Safe Coalitio -dent Labor Coalitio Coalitio n n n Support Change 96.2 75.0 16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Against Change 3.8 25.0 83.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 26 8 30 33 11 14 1 Mean percent of 62.6 53.6 45.9 41.4 38.1 33.6 29.8 electorate ‗yes‘ votes for Question #4 Source: as for Table 5.1

N = 123 Chi Sq = 90.983 P < 0.001 df = 6

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Vote = 46.58

Voters from safe Labor electorates provided 96.2 percent support for this proposed change; fairly safe Labor electorates, 75 percent; and, marginal Labor electorates, just 16.7 percent

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support. Conversely, a majority of voters from all Coalition held electorates opposed this change.

This is a statistically significant result with a very strong chi-square of 90.983 and an associated p-value less than 0.001 indicating a high level of association between referendum vote preference and partisanship. We may therefore, argue that the partisanship hypothesis is supported. Examination of the proportion of the mean electorate ‗yes‘ vote also shows a partisan effect with a downward trend from safe Labor electorates, with a mean value of 62.6 percent to 33.6 percent, in safe Coalition electorates.

The bivariate table (Table 5.33) examines the political relationship between federal versus state governments with regard to amending the Constitution to recognise local government bodies. When the Constitution was drafted, local government bodies were recognised by State Constitutions. This structure determines how the three tiers of government relate to one another. The fear by the States was that, by the Commonwealth Government recognising Local Governments in the Constitution, there was potential to minimise the influence of State Governments as the Commonwealth would have the constitutional power to deal directly with the Local Governments. Clearly, this is not a situation that State Governments would like see develop as reports in the media of the day indicated.

As with previous analyses, we once again examine the federal versus state divide to determine if party political alignment was influential in the outcome. Overall, results show that an overwhelming majority of voters from a majority of electorates were opposed to this change. In those states where the Government was of the same political alignment as the Federal Government, a majority of voters from just 17 percent of these electorates voted in favour of the proposed change. Where the State Government was of the opposing political party, support for the change was 31.8 percent. When examining the mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes, results are quite similar with just five percentage points separating the two groups. Overall results are not statistically significant (chi-sq = 1.39; p-value = 0.237).

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Table 5.33 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1974 Question on Local Government by Political Party of State Government Column Percents State Government Political Party in Office Same political party as Opposition political party Federal Government to Federal Government Support Change 17.6 31.8 Against Change 82.4 68.2 Total 100.0 100.0 n 17 107 Mean percent of electorate 42.8 47.6 ‗yes‘ votes for Question #4 Source: as for Table 5.1

N = 124 Chi Sq = 1.39 P = 0.237 df = 1

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 46.58

The following graphs provide a representation of the bivariate results as described above. Each graph was constructed by taking the mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes of electorates and graphing them in a relationship with each referendum question. Based on mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes for each electorate, Figure 5.1 shows the support for the proposed changes for each question by the electorate‘s geographical location. The most noticeable aspect of this graph is the division between rural and non-rural electorates, where voters in rural electorates provided less support for all proposed changes. The second noticeable aspect is that the level of ‗yes‘ votes for all questions has a slight downwards trend with a slightly higher percentage of ‗yes‘ votes achieved for the simultaneous election question.

Figure 5.1: Electorate Geographical Location by 1974 Referendum Question

60

50

40

30 Inner Metro Outer Metro Provincial Rural

Mean Percent of Electoate YES Votes YES Electoate of Percent Mean 20

10

0 Referendum Question Simultaneous Elections Mode of Altering Con Democratic Elections Local Govt Bodies

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The third aspect that bears mentioning is that of the 16 divisions at the 1974 referendum— ten of the possibilities received an average of 50 percent or over. When considering the centre-periphery hypothesis, it is clear that there was a divide between voters from rural electorates and all others, supporting the argument that the further removed a voter is from the seat of power, the less likely they are to support constitutional change.

The second graph (Figure 5.2) shows the relationship between states and acceptance on each of the proposed changes. Results in this graph are mixed, although there is a marked downward trend in acceptance of the proposed changes from larger states to smaller states. The state factor and amendment to the Constitution would appear to be critical, as the Constitution requires that, not only there be an acceptance by a majority of voters, but a majority of states. New South Wales electorates were the only ones where a majority of voters in those electorates supported the proposed changes.

Figure 5.2: Location of Electorates within each State by Referendum Question

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50

40 NSW VIC QLD 30 SA WA 20 TAS

10 Percent Mean of Electorate YES Votes

0

Simultaneous Elections Mode of Altering Con Democratic Elections Local Govt Bodies State

The third graph (Figure 5.3) shows that Labor party held electorates were much more supportive of the proposed constitutional changes than the Coalition held electorates. However, it is important to remember that an ALP held electorate was not enough to swing the referendum in favour of the government.

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Figure 5.3: Federal versus State Political Party by Referendum Question

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50

40

1974 ALP Members 30 1974 Coalition Members

20

Vote ofYES Electorate Percent Mean

10

0 Referendum Question Simultaneous Elections Mode of Altering Con Democratic Elections Local Govt Bodies

The fourth graph (Figure 5.4) illustrates the relationship between ‗safeness of seat‘ and referendum question. The graph quite clearly shows that there was a partisan effect between safe Labor held electorates and safe Coalition held electorates, where the further removed an electorate was from the safe Labor held electorates, the less likely voters from the other electorates would support the proposed constitutional changes. It must also be noted that a majority of voters from all safe and fairly safe Labor held electorates supported the proposed changes. Another noticeable factor on this issue is that there was more support for the proposal to hold simultaneous elections in each category of seat—something at the time that the Coalition were quite opposed to. Conversely, the lowest level of support of all the questions was on the issue of recognising local government bodies.

Figure 5.4: Marginality of Electorate Seat by Referendum Question

70

60

50 Safe Labor Fairly Safe Labor 40 Marginal Labor 30 Marginal Coalition Fairly Safe Coalition 20 Safe Coalition

10

Mean Mean Percent Electorateof YES Votes 0 Simultaneous Mode of Altering Democratic Local Govt Bodies Elections Con Elections Safeness of Seat

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5.11 1974 Regression Analysis

The four proposed constitutional changes in the 1974 referendum, if passed, would have granted the Commonwealth Government increased legislative powers. An article published in The Australian quotes four Coalition Party premiers as saying that voting ‗yes‘ on these four proposals was about the Federal Labor Government expanding and centralising political power in Canberra (The Australian 1974). The four questions put to the Australian electorate were of critical importance in the federal relationship between the Commonwealth and the States. When considering the five independent variables together in one model for each question, there is marginal variation between the four proposals indicating stability in the way people voted—a stability based on partisanship rather than the issues themselves.

Table 5.34 provides the results of the regression model, which shows the statistical significance of each independent variable when combined into one model. The figures that are marked with an asterisk are considered to be statistically significant when p < 0.05. For each of the four questions, results vary as to the most important predictors of the ‗yes‘ vote.

In the first model on the referendum question on introducing simultaneous elections, the most significant variables are geographical location, safeness of seat and whether the State Government was of the same political party as the Federal Government. The figures reveal that the metropolitan electorates are a good predictor for expecting a ‗yes‘ vote, whereas safeness of seat shows that the further an electorate is removed from a safe Labor seat, the more likely that a majority of these voters will not support the referendum question. Similarly, voters from electorates that were of the opposite political party to the Federal Government were also more likely to provide no support for the question on simultaneous elections.

Without analysing the table cell by cell, there were two significant variables in each model that are best predictors of the ‗yes‘ vote: they are the safeness of seat based on first preference votes for the Labor party; and the State versus Federal political party alignment. For safeness of seat, all four questions were statistically significant as a predictor of the ‗yes‘ vote where, on a continuum scale from safe Labor through to safe Coalition, the further the electorate is away from the safe Labor held electorate, the more likely voters in those electorates will not support the proposed change. There was a negative effect with the State versus Federal political party alignment. Being of the political party between Federal and State was not a predictor of ‗yes‘ vote for constitutional change.

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On the issue of metropolitan electorates, these electorates were more supportive of constitutional change on the issue of simultaneous elections and the mode of altering the constitution. Geographical location did not serve as a predictor for ‗democratic elections‘ and ‗local government bodies‘. Associated with the centre-periphery hypothesis, the larger populated states of New South Wales and Victoria were more supportive of the ‗mode of altering the constitution‘ and ‗local government bodies‘. The other results were not statistically significant as a predictor of the ‗yes‘ vote.

Table 5.34 Regression Table of 1974 Referendum Questions Q #1 Q #2 Q #3 Q #4 Simultaneous Mode of Democratic Local Elections Altering the Elections Government Constitution Bodies Standardised Standardised Standardised Standardised Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Model Beta t Beta t Beta t Beta t Geographical .070* 2.581 .076* 2.990 .031 1.232 .018 .716 Location (All Metropolitan Electorates) Large States v .054 1.756 .085* 2.960 .043 1.538 .081* 2.857 Small States (NSW & VIC) Federal v State -.107* -3.522 - -5.594 - -5.591 -.170** -6.052 Political Party .159** .155** (Same) Safeness of Seat .918** 33.321 .904** 35.165 .937** 37.309 .926** 36.485 (Percent of ALP 1st preference votes)

Question #1 DV: Mean Percentage of Yes Votes on Simultaneous Elections Question #2 DV: Mean Percentage of Yes Votes on Mode of Altering the Constitution Question #3 DV: Mean Percentage of Yes Votes on Democratic Elections Question #4 DV: Mean Percentage of Yes Votes on Local Government Bodies

N = 124

* indicates statistically significant at p < 0.05 * indicates statistically significant at p < 0.001

Model Summary Results for Table 5.34 Q #1 Q #2 Q #3 Q #4 Simultaneous Mode of Democratic Local Elections Altering the Elections Government Constitution Bodies R .960 .965 .967 .966 R Square .922 .932 .935 .933 Adjusted R Square .919 .929 .933 .931 SEE 2.97 2.82 2.79 2.83 F Change 349.645** 406.255** 427.423** 417.548**

** = Significance at the 0.000 level

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There are several conclusions that can be drawn from these models. Firstly, the centre- periphery hypothesis is not as critical as might first be anticipated, as was shown in the bivariate tables. The variable ‗geographic location‘ (metropolitan electorates as opposed to non-metropolitan electorates) shows statistical significance on the questions associated with introducing simultaneous elections, and on the question of changing the mode of altering the Constitution. Of the four questions asked, these two questions were among the most critical in terms of the style of democracy experienced in Australia, which may explain why metropolitan electorates were more supportive of this change than non-metropolitan electorates. Non-metropolitan electorates may have felt that to accept these changes would potentially enhance the power of the city electorates and conversely ignore the desires of the provincial and rural electorates.

The model also shows that ‗safeness of seat‘ was a statistically significant variable in each proposed change. This finding indicates two important points in terms of voter behaviour. Firstly, in the 1974 referendum, safe Labor held electorates were more likely to support the proposed constitutional change than other electorates. Voters decided, at the previous general election, who they wanted to represent them in the Parliament. Therefore the political party (the governing party) suggesting the proposed constitutional changes was more likely to receive support for those changes from the voters who elected them in the previous election. This type of voter behaviour is a probable predictor with regard to the ‗safeness of seat‘ variable, where the safer the ALP held electorate, the more support the electorate will give to the proposed change.

On the state versus federal party alignment, this variable served as a negative predictor of ‗yes‘ vote. The probable explanation for this variable is that the states were looking out for themselves. More power to the Federal Government means less power for the State Government. Power issues appear to over-ride party alignment loyalties.

It is important to recognise the ‗state effect‘. At the time of the 1974 referendum, the South Australian (Don Dunstan) and Western Australian (John Tonkin) Governments were Labor,37 while Coalition parties controlled all other State Governments. Campaigning by the State Governments in general showed opposition to these changes, as evidenced in various

37 It is important to note that during the referendum campaign, the Western Australian Government was a Liberal Government under the leadership of David Brand. The referendum, which was held on 8 December, 1973, was during the campaign period for the WA State election held on 30 March, 1974. At the WA State election, there was a change in government from Liberal to Labor Party.

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media reports, arguing that such changes, if implemented would reduce the effectiveness of the Senate (the States House), and centralise power in Canberra—a common attack by the Coalition with regard to constitutional change advocated by the Labor party (Galligan 1990: 350). The question on recognising local government bodies in the Federal Constitution also meant that, if the Federal Government achieved some of its future aims, it would have minimised the role of State Governments in some matters. The 1974 position on the recognition of Local Government bodies is that they were (and still are) only recognised by State Government Constitutions, and as such are able to be abolished, merged or suspended by State Governments. The negative coefficient values indicate that where electorates were situated in those states that had the same political party as the Federal Government, support for the proposed changes was more forthcoming—however, the reverse is also true with a clear call by the Coalition led State Governments to reject the Whitlam Government‘s proposed constitutional changes.

Overall, each model on all questions is statistically significant. Each R-square (between 0.922 and 0.935) indicates that the predictor variables in the model explain approximately 90 percent of electorate behaviour. The strong F-change statistic similarly allows us to claim that the hypotheses of electorate behaviour (centre-periphery and the partisanship) are supported for the 1974 referendum results.

5.12 Discussion

The outcome of the two referendums of 1973 and 1974 conducted by the Whitlam Labor Government failed to gain the necessary support for the proposed constitutional changes. Whitlam considered that the Constitution was ―a political structure that is outdated, reactionary and resistant to change‖ (Bennett and Brennan 1999: 26). Despite the frequency of two referendum votes in two years, each referendum contained completely different proposals.

Firstly, in 1973 the proposals on prices and incomes were an attempt by Whitlam to curb the rate of inflation. Whitlam argued that if a ‗yes‘ vote were given, he would implement equal wages for men and women as well as provide the Prices Justification Tribunal with some teeth. There were some who argued that the proposed changes were too vague, and that, if passed no-one knew what the Government would do with the powers.

If the electorate gives the Government power over prices it, the Government, will have a unique sort of political mandate. Referendums are normally about specific issues and specific proposals. The fact that the Government can carry a

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vote for a constitutional alteration on a vague proposal [when] much more specific solutions to more easily identified problems have been rejected with monotonous regularity by the electorate at previous referendums – underlines the general gut feeling in the electorate about inflation (Walsh 1973: 8).

Despite the general feelings about inflation, Whitlam was unable to convince voter opinion and referendum outcome. One argument that opposed the control on prices is that the exact opposite would occur. Based on the price controls of the past, black marketing would increase.

Butter, tea and other necessary commodities were unobtainable at the fixed prices but could be procured in quantity by those who had the money to buy on the black-market. … Price control is presented as a means of restricting profits, but the opposite is the case. A former Commonwealth price controller has explained how price control works. He said: ―Your price will be your cost plus a gross profit of 20 percent‖. If therefore you increase your cost from $2 to $2.50 your gross profit will rise from 40 cents to 50 cents. The higher the cost the greater the profit. Thus, nobody has any incentive to be efficient and as a consequence prices rise (McGillick 1973: 6).

The Opposition similarly argued that price controls of the past resulted in unplanned distortions in the allocation of resources and were no substitute for proper management of responsible monetary policy (Lynch 1973: 9). Further opposition came from academics, professional economists and others working in the finance industry. They argued that, ―prices and incomes controls are not a useful means of combating inflation and have effects which can be damaging‖. In support of their argument they cite the experiences of the USA and Britain—two countries that had introduced price controls to control inflation. The evidence ―shows that there is not a single case on record where they have permanently lowered the rate of inflation‖ (Parkin et al 1973: 6).

Voters at the 1973 referendum were clearly opposed to the proposed changes. The arguments provided by Whitlam were not convincing. Support was much higher on the price control proposal than on the incomes control. On the issue of price controls, majorities were achieved in a number of electorates based on their geographical location (see Table 5.2). The strength of support for income controls, however, was minimal, with voters in 13 percent of provincial electorates being the most supportive (see Table 5.6). Results were similar in terms of voter support by state, where there was a much higher level of support for price controls. On both issues, voters in New South Wales electorates were more supportive of these referendum proposals.

A partisan effect is evident on the prices control proposal with a majority of voters in 49 percent of ALP held electorates supporting this change (Table 5.4). The strength of the

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partisan effect on price controls is more evident when taking the safeness of seat into account, with a majority of voters in 82 percent of safe Labor electorates supporting the change (see Table 5.5). The partisan effect was minimal on the incomes control (see Tables 5.8 and 5.9), but still evident. Despite the evidence of partisan support for these proposals (mainly from New South Wales voters), the level of support was insufficient to carry either of the proposed constitutional changes. One analyst suggests that the outcome was not as bad as the Opposition had claimed. However, the real question some were asking was whether the referendum was a measure of anti-government protest rather than the traditional ‗no‘ vote (The Australian 1973: 10).

The four questions of the 1974 referendum received mixed support as has been argued. The proposed changes had been argued as representing fundamental democratic rights of all Australians and gave the electorate the opportunity to entrench these rights in the Constitution (Whitlam 1974: 7). However Mr. Snedden, Leader of the Opposition, was not convinced. He argued that if these proposals were accepted, they would transfer more power to Canberra away from the states. One example was the proposal to recognise Local Government in the Constitution. It was argued by the Opposition that, if this proposal was accepted, it would serve as a means of by-passing the States and concentrating more power in Canberra (Snedden 1974: 7). The State Premiers similarly were not supportive of the 1974 proposed changes. In a statement issued by the premiers, they state,

―As State leaders, close to local democracy, we believe Australia would suffer greatly if any central government were granted the powers sought in the referendum‖, they said. The statement said that the dangers inherent in the referendum dramatised the key issue of the election itself—the Labor Party‘s commitment to expanding and centralising power in Canberra. A ―yes‖ vote would achieve this aim immediately. A ―no‖ vote would block the power grab and continue existing protection of individual rights (The West Australian 1974: 8).

Results of the 1974 referendum revealed some clear lines of division. On each of the questions, there was noticeably less support from voters in rural electorates. On the question of simultaneous elections, a majority of voters in 53 percent of inner metropolitan and provincial electorates supported this change. In comparison, a majority of voters in three percent of rural electorates supported simultaneous elections. This result supports the centre- periphery hypothesis, as did the level of support between States. On all four questions, voters in New South Wales and Victorian electorates showed greater support than voters in all other states. Tasmanian voters provided the lowest level of support.

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The Michigan Model of voter behaviour argues that there are three compelling attitudes that affect a persons vote: – party identification, attitude to the issues, and attitude to candidates. As we review the results from the 1973 and 1974 referendums, there is evidence that voters have taken their cues from the major political parties. Results showed this to be the case with significant support from a majority of voters in Labor held electorates. This was especially evident when analysing the safeness of seat, where a majority of voters in over 60 percent of safe ALP electorates supported all proposals. The bivariate results were reflected in the regression analysis in two of the four proposals. Despite the partisan support for the proposals, the Whitlam Government did not gain the necessary double majority.

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CHAPTER SIX

6.0 The 1977 Referendum under Fraser

On 21 May 1977, a referendum was held that asked Australian voters to consider four proposed constitutional changes. The Coalition Government, led by Malcolm Fraser, initiated this referendum. Historically, Coalition Governments have not proposed many constitutional changes. The previous referendum held by the Coalition Government was in 1967.

Significant political change had occurred since the previous referendum. The Governor General, Sir John Kerr, had dismissed the Whitlam Labor Government and Malcolm Fraser was appointed caretaker Prime Minister. A fresh federal election was called on 13 December 1975. Under Malcolm Fraser, the Coalition was elected to office. In the previous federal election, held on 18 May 1974, the Labor party was returned to office with a five-seat majority. This outcome was reversed in 1975 with the Coalition winning 71.6 percent of available seats and holding a 55 seat majority.38

The states had also held some fresh elections. New South Wales had changed hands and was now a Labor party led state together with South Australia and Tasmania; while Victoria, Queensland and Western Australia remained Coalition led States.

On 21 May 1977, four referendum questions were put to the Australian people under the Fraser led Coalition Government. The referendum was held approximately 18 months after the previous federal election (13 December 1975). The four referendum proposals were:

Question 1: Simultaneous Elections – An Act to alter the Constitution so as to ensure that Senate elections are held at the same time as House of Representative elections.

Question 2: Senate Casual Vacancies – An Act to alter the Constitution so as to ensure so far as practicable that a casual vacancy in the Senate is filled by a person of the same political party as the Senator chosen by the people and for the balance of his term.

38 The number of ALP seats in the House of Representatives fell from 66 in 1974 to 35 at the 1975 election. From a state perspective, the number of ALP Members of Parliament in all states was significantly weakened.

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Question 3: Territories Vote in Referendums – An Act to alter the Constitution so as to allow electors in Territories, as well as electors in the States, to vote at referendums on proposed laws to alter the Constitution.

Question 4: Retirement Age of Judges – An Act to alter the Constitution so as to provide for retiring ages for judges of Federal Courts.

It is interesting to note that question one, on simultaneous elections, in this (1977) referendum is virtually the same as question one in the previous referendum held in 1974. The primary difference was that a Labor Party Government proposed the change in 1974 and a Coalition Government proposed the change in 1977. Independent Senator JD Turnbull comments that the Liberal Party was exhibiting hypocritical values. When the Labor party attempted to have the same constitutional amendment, the Liberal Party campaigned against the change, but two years later, they had become adamant that the change was essential (Turnbull 1977: 8). Another similarity between the 1974 and 1977 referendums was the proposal that would allow Australian territories to vote in Constitutional Referendums. Under the Labor Government, both proposals failed to gain the necessary majorities. One of the primary differences between this referendum and the previous referendum is that it was not held in conjunction with a general election. Apart from general day-to-day news, the media were able to report on the referendum without being diverted by election issues.

6.1 The ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ Cases

The months leading up to the 1977 referendum show that there was conflict between the Federal Government and the Union movement led by Bob Hawke. The Government proposed some new industrial relations legislation, which Hawke said, was designed to ruin the trade union movement (Southey 1977: 1). Fraser had introduced a freeze on wages and prices in order to bring inflation under control—a move similar to that which Whitlam attempted in the 1973 referendum. Industrial strikes were commonplace—especially the air traffic controllers‘ strike—whilst unemployment continued to be a problem. From a sporting perspective, Kerry Packer made front-page news when he announced the introduction of World Series Cricket—a rival competition to the country based cricket associations (Bolton 1977: 1).

With the 1977 referendum not being held in conjunction with an election, an abundance of opinion was offered in the media on the pros and cons of the referendum proposals. From a campaign perspective, the Federal Government was said to have spent countless hours and $9 million on the ‗yes‘ campaign, devoting pages of newspaper space and hours of media time in order for the Government‘s message to be accepted by voters (Singleton 1977: 6).

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Campaigning for this referendum by Malcolm Fraser commenced in March 1977. In the days leading up to the referendum vote, the leader of the Opposition, Mr Whitlam said that this was one of the best prospects Australia had at amending the Constitution. He also said ―no other proposal had been argued for so long nor had been so overwhelmingly supported‖. Similarly, the Prime Minister said, ―our arguments are being accepted – and they are being accepted because of their fairness, logic and plain Australian common sense‖ (The West Australian 1977: 2). On the other hand, prominent members of society were campaigning against the constitutional changes. One such person was Sir Mark Oliphant who believed that implementing such changes would give greater powers to Canberra rather than retain it for the people of the States (Knez 1977: 4). Similarly, Sir Robert Menzies was opposed to the introduction of a mandatory retirement age of judges.

Arguments for and against the proposed Constitutional changes were published by the Australian Electoral Office to inform voters of the issues surrounding each alteration. On the question of introducing simultaneous elections, the main argument given was that ―unless this referendum succeeds, there could be as many as four federal elections in four years‖ (Pearson 1977: 3). The proposal of simultaneous elections was intended to reduce the cost and time involved in having frequent elections. While the constitution does not prevent simultaneous elections, since 1961 the elections for both Houses of Parliament have been out of step (Cameron 1979: 71-72). Some commentators, however, saw this argument as a veiled threat—that unless you vote ‗yes‘ for this proposal, electors will go to the polls more often (Hooper 1977: 2). In Queensland, the Premier was accused by the Federal Government of scaring voters where if the ‗yes‘ vote was to succeed, Queenslanders would be stripped of powers that kept Canberra in check (Colless 1977: 4). However, it was later reported in The Australian on 18 May (1977: 4) that, at the Constitutional Convention held in Hobart in 1976, the Queensland Premier had voted in favour of simultaneous elections.

The second question asked voters to consider how Senate casual vacancies should be filled. This question was in response to the situation that arose in 1975 when a Queensland Senator died. In a series of events, a Senator from another party replaced him, thereby altering the balance of power in the Senate and, in effect, leading to the blocking of money bills. The argument to vote ‗yes‘ was that ―if a Senator dies or resigns, a Senator of the same political party will be appointed for the remainder of that Senator‘s term‖ (Pearson 1977: 4). The ‗no‘ argument was based on the fact that political parties were not part of the written constitution. Any replacement of Senators in the past was based on constitutional convention, which political parties had always observed. Furthermore, to vote ‗yes‘ on this

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proposal would take power from the State Parliaments and transfer it to the political parties (Pearson 1977: 18-20).

The third question was a proposal to allow citizens who lived in the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory the right to vote in referendums—a right denied when they had separated from the States. The ‗no‘ case on this proposal argued that the Constitution in its current format did allow Territories to vote in referendums. The Constitution Act, section 6 provides that— ―‗The States‘ shall mean…(the original States)…and such territories as may be admitted into or established by the Commonwealth as States‖ (Pearson 1977: 21). If this proposal passed, the potential was there to allow other Australian territories, which are not part of the federal compact to vote in referendums.

The final question on the retirement age of judges received some negative press. This question was specifically aimed at Federal and High Court judges who up until this time held office with life tenure.39 The main argument presented in favour of this change was that Federal Court Judges should be subject to the same requirements as the rest of society. Some felt that remaining in office after the age of 70 could mean that judges would lose touch with current attitudes and trends in the community—particularly in matters relating to the Family Court. To some extent, motivation for this question was due to the fact that Justice McTiernan had served on the bench for 46 years (from December 1930 to 1976). At the time of his forced retirement (due to a broken hip), McTiernan was 84 years of age. There was no ‗no‘ case presented on this issue as no Members of Parliament voted against the bill (Slattery 1977: 9), however there were some who argued that such a change would lead to political parties eroding the independence of the High Court by allowing a party to appoint a judge with the same political philosophy (Lane 1977: 2)—in effect, one party could stack the Court (Slattery 1977: 9).

Opinion polls taken before the referendum expected all questions to be accepted and gain the necessary double majority. A referendum survey conducted by Morgan Gallop showed that the ‗yes‘ campaign by the Federal Government and the ALP had greater support in NSW and Victoria, and less support in Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia. Polls also showed that, as the campaign progressed, the ‗no‘ campaign gained momentum (Elias 1977a: 3).

39 Australia‘s requirement for judges to retire at 70 years of age is in contrast to the United States system where there is no statutory age of senility. It is not uncommon to hear of US justices continuing to serve on the bench into their 80‘s (Callinan J 1999: 7).

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Overall, all questions except the question on simultaneous elections passed, indicating that the defeat of this proposal was an example of the awareness of the electorate in a referendum, not of political apathy as some would so accuse Australians (The Australian 1977: 7; Crisp 1983: 51).

In summary, three of the four questions received the required majority of votes from the electorate as well as a majority of states. On the question of ‗simultaneous elections‘, the overall percentage of ‗yes‘ votes received was 62.22 percent—an overall majority of votes. However a majority of votes was not obtained in Queensland, Western Australia or Tasmania. On the question of ‗senate casual vacancies‘, the overall percentage of ‗yes‘ votes received was 73.32 percent, together with a majority of votes received in each state. On the question of ‗referendums to allow electors in Territories to be included‘, the overall ‗yes‘ vote was 77.72 percent with a majority of votes received in each state. On the question of the ‗retirement age of judges‘, the overall percentage of ‗yes‘ votes was 80.10 percent, with a majority of ‗yes‘ votes received in all states.

1977 Results

6.2 Question One: Simultaneous Elections

Examination of results in Table 6.1 show that approximately 60 percent of Australian electorates were located in the metropolitan areas, 28 percent in rural areas and 12 percent in provincial areas. The larger states of New South Wales and Victoria made up approximately 64 percent of the total number of electorates. In contrast to the previous federal election, the Coalition held a majority of the electorates with 71.8 percent. Further analysis shows that of the total number of electorates, 27.4 percent were safe Coalition seats compared to the Labor party holding only 7.3 percent safe seats. Overall, when comparing the 1975 federal election to the previous federal election held in 1974, there was a significant swing by voters away from the Labor party.

When comparing the level of support for the proposed change to introduce simultaneous elections with the geographical location of an electorate, results in Table 6.2 show that there was much higher support in the metropolitan areas (93 percent inner metropolitan and 86 percent outer metropolitan) than in the rural (68 percent) and provincial areas (73 percent). These results support the centre-periphery hypothesis that those electorates in geographical

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areas closer to the centres of power are more likely to support change than those electorates that are more isolated.

Table 6.1 1975 Federal Electorate Information (Frequency and Percents) Category Frequency Percent Geographical Location Inner Metro 45 36.3 Outer Metro 29 23.4 Provincial 15 12.1 Rural 35 28.2 State Electorates New South Wales 45 36.3 Victoria 34 27.4 Queensland 18 14.5 South Australia 12 9.7 Western Australia 10 8.1 Tasmania 5 4.0 Party Electorates ALP 35 28.2 (2-party preferred) Coalition 89 71.8 Safeness of Seat Safe Labor 9 7.3 Based on 1975 Fairly Safe Labor 11 8.9 Federal Election Marginal Labor 15 12.1 Marginal Coalition 35 28.2 Fairly Safe Coalition 20 16.1 Safe Coalition 34 27.4 State Government Political Same party as Federal 4 66.0 Party in Office Government Opposite party as 2 33.0 Federal government Source: Australian Electoral Commission Federal Election Results, December 1977

Examination of the mean ‗yes‘ score shows that inner metropolitan electorates were above the mean average of 62 percent by approximately four percentage points, whereas rural electorates fell below the mean average of all ‗yes‘ votes by approximately seven percentage points. Results are statistically significant with a chi-square of 9.403 and associated p-value of 0.024 indicating that geographical location of electorates impacts on referendum decisions.

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Table 6.2 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1977 question on Simultaneous Elections by Geographical Location Column Percents Geographic Location of Electorates Inner Metro Outer Metro Provincial Rural Support change 93.3 86.2 73.3 68.6 Against change 6.7 13.8 26.7 31.4 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 45 29 5 35 Mean Percent of 66.78 63.67 59.37 55.37 electorate ‗yes‘ Votes40 for Question #1 Source: AEO 1977 Referendum Results and AEO 1975 Federal Election Results

N = 124 Chi Sq = 9.403 P = 0.024 df = 3

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 61.93

Results in Table 6.3 show support for simultaneous elections by state electorates in three states—New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia. Queensland and Western Australian electorates provided some support (38.9 and 40 percent respectively), whilst all Tasmanian electorates were opposed to this change. This is a statistically significant result. The fact that the larger states of New South Wales and Victoria supported the change substantiates the hypothesis that the larger populated states are more likely to support constitutional change than smaller states, which is supported by the tests of statistical significance (chi-square = 19.487; p = 0.002).

Table 6.3 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1977 question on Simultaneous Elections by State Column Percents STATE NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS Support change 100.0 100.0 38.9 100.0 40.0 0.0 Against change 0.0 0.0 61.1 0.0 60.0 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 45 34 18 12 10 5 Mean Percent of 70.56 65.03 47.06 65.80 48.57 34.22 electorate ‗yes‘ Votes for Question #1 Source: as for Table 6.1

N = 124 Chi Sq = 19.487 P = 0.002 df = 5

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 61.93

40 The mean has been calculated by taking the number of ‗yes‘ votes from each electorate and dividing this by all valid referendum votes (excluding informal votes), then multiplying by 100, thereby providing a figure that is comparable between categories within variables and across years.

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The mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes shows a clear delineation in support for the proposal to introduce simultaneous elections with significantly higher support coming from the larger populated states. Three states (New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia) all had a percentage of ‗yes‘ votes above the overall average.

Results presented in Table 6.4 examine whether there was partisan effect with respect to the question to introduce simultaneous elections. Examination of these results shows that there is a moderate partisan effect with a majority of voters in all Labor party held electorates supporting the change, whereas only 75 percent of Coalition held electorates supported the change. Recall that a Coalition Government initiated the referendum. We notice also that the mean percent of electorate ‗yes‘ votes is approximately 10 percentage points higher in ALP held electorates as opposed to Coalition held electorates being four percentage points lower than the mean. Results are statistically significant (chi-square = 10.518; p-value = 0.001) supporting the hypothesis that there is a partisan effect.

Table 6.4 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1977 question on Simultaneous Elections by Elected Member of Parliament (1975) Column Percents Elected Federal Member 1975 (2 Party Preferred) ALP Coalition Support change 100.0 75.3 Against change 0.0 24.7 Total 100.0 100.0 n 35 89 Mean Percent of 71.44 58.20 electorate ‗yes‘ Votes for Question #1 Source: as for Table 6.1

N = 124 Chi Sq = 10.518 P = 0.001 df = 1

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 61.93

In the following table (Table 6.5), it is possible to observe that none of the categories of Labor party held electorates determined the outcome of the vote on simultaneous elections, as all Labor party held electorates voted in favour of this proposed change. The story is different with the Coalition, with the highest level of support (80 percent) coming from those electorates that were ‗fairly safe‘ Coalition electorates. Once again, we notice that the mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes in all categories of Labor party held electorates were noticeably higher than the overall mean, whereas the ‗yes‘ vote in each category of Coalition held electorates fall below the national average. The results are statistically significant (chi-

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square = 11.419; p = 0.044), with significant differences in electoral behaviour between Labor party and Coalition held electorates.

Table 6.5 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1977 question on Simultaneous Elections by Safeness of Seat (1975) Column Percents Safeness of Seat from 1975 Federal Election (2 Party Preferred) Safe Fairly Marginal Marginal Fairly Safe Labor Safe Labor Coalitio Safe Coalitio Labor n Coalitio n n Support Change 100.0 100.0 100.0 77.1 80.0 70.6 Against Change 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.9 20.0 29.4 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 9 11 15 35 20 34 Mean Percent of 75.02 73.28 67.93 58.87 59.94 56.47 electorate ‗yes‘ Votes for Question #1 Source: as for Table 6.1

N = 124 Chi Sq = 11.419 P = 0.044 df = 5

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 61.93

At the time of the previous federal election, the state governments were: New South Wales (Coalition); Victoria (Coalition); Queensland (Coalition); South Australia (Labor); Western Australia (Coalition) and Tasmania (Labor). The division of state governments had changed since the previous referendum, when four state governments were of the same political group as the federal government. Results in Table 6.6 show that there was a lower proportion of electorates that supported this proposed change from states whose government was of the same political party as the federal government. This indicates that there was less support (73 percent) for the introduction of simultaneous elections from electorates in Coalition governed states—namely New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and Western Australia. Support from electorates in Labor governed states was higher (92 percent). The hypothesis that political loyalties are stronger (and therefore influential on electorate choice) between those of the same political party in office does not appear to hold true here. This outcome can be accounted for by the vigorous campaigning against the changes from the states of Queensland and Western Australia. The results are statistically significant with (chi-sq = 7.957; p < 0.05). Results also show that the mean percent of ‗yes‘ votes is five percentage points higher than the overall average in states with opposition led political parties.

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Table 6.6 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1977 question on Simultaneous Elections by Federal / State Party Alignment Column Percents State Government Political Party in Office Same political party as Opposition political party Federal Government to Federal Government Support Change 72.6 91.9 Against Change 27.4 9.1 Total 100.0 100.0 n 62 62 Mean percent of 57.1 66.7 electorate ‗yes‘ votes for Question #1 Source: as for Table 6.1

N = 124 Chi Sq = 7.957 P = 0.005 df = 1

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 61.93

6.3 Question Two: Senate Casual Vacancies

Question two on the issue of Senate Casual Vacancies and the geographical location of electorates (Table 6.7) shows, once again, that there was greater support for this change from metropolitan electorates (100 percent). Compared to the results from the first question in this referendum, support from rural electorates (91.4 percent) was significantly higher than the question on simultaneous elections (68.6 percent). A majority of voters from the rural electorates also showed higher levels of support than voters from the provincial electorates. Despite these differences, there was considerable support from a majority of voters from all electorates for this proposed constitutional change, partly due to circumstances surrounding the Constitutional crisis of 1975.

When examining the mean percent of ‗yes‘ votes, results reveal a trend that is consistent with previous referendum results where higher levels of support came from both inner and outer metropolitan electorates. The percentage of ‗yes‘ votes for both categories of these electorates were above the mean average, whereas provincial and rural electorate ‗yes‘ votes were below the mean average. The centre-periphery hypothesis proposes that electorates closer to the seats of power are more likely to support constitutional change. The results are statistically significant (chi-square 9.403; p = 0.024) and thus support the centre-periphery hypothesis.

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Table 6.7 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1977 question on Senate Casual Vacancies by Geographical Location Column Percents Geographic Location of Electorates Inner Metro Outer Metro Provincial Rural Support change 100.0 100.0 80.0 91.4 Against change 0.0 0.0 20.0 8.6 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 45 29 15 35 Mean Percent of 77.39 76.09 69.56 66.26 electorate ‗yes‘ Votes for Question #2 Source: AEO 1977 Referendum Results and AEO 1975 Federal Election Results

N = 124 Chi Sq = 9.403 P = 0.024 df = 3

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 73.0

In Table 6.8, state electorates cross tabulated with support for question two on Senate Casual Vacancies shows that all electorates from New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia supported this change. Queensland (77.8 percent) and Tasmania (60 percent) were the two states where support from electorates was down. This hypothesis argues that the larger populated states (New South Wales and Victoria) are more likely to support constitutional change than the smaller states. The hypothesis is supported, although there is also majority support for this change from the smaller states.

Table 6.8 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1977 question on Senate Casual Vacancies by State Location of Electorates Column Percents STATE NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS Support change 100.0 100.0 77.8 100.0 100.0 60.0 Against change 0.0 0.0 22.2 0.0 0.0 40.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 45 34 18 12 10 5 Mean Percent of 81.41 75.95 58.27 76.39 57.14 53.73 electorate ‗yes‘ Votes for Question #2 Source: as for Table 6.1

N = 124 Chi Sq = 30.373 P < 0.001 df = 5

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 73.0

When taking the mean percent of ‗yes‘ votes into account, New South Wales electorate ‗yes‘ votes were eight percentage points higher than the national average, with Victoria and South Australia also above 73 percent. These results are statistically significant (chi-square = 30.373; p < 0.001) suggesting that ‗large states‘ are more supportive and therefore influential in referendum outcomes.

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The results in Table 6.9 are quite remarkable. An overwhelming majority of all electorates supported this change, with only 6.7 percent of Coalition electorates opposing this change. The partisan hypothesis argues that voters are more likely to take their cues from their representative Member of Parliament. Results support this hypothesis with a majority of voters from all Labor party held electorates supporting the proposed change. Similarly, a majority of voters from 93.3 percent of Coalition held electorates supported this change. The mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes also shows higher levels of support from ALP held electorates. Statistically, the result is not significant (chi-square = 2.48; p > 0.05).

Table 6.9 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1977 question on Senate Casual Vacancies by Elected Federal MP (2 party preferred) Column Percents Elected Federal Member 1975 (2 Party Preferred) ALP Coalition Support change 100.0 93.3 Against change 0.0 6.7 Total 100.0 100.0 n 35 89 Mean Percent of electorate 79.98 70.25 ‗yes‘ Votes for Question #2 Source: as for Table 6.1

N = 124 Chi Sq = 2.48 P = 0.115 df = 1

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 73.0

Results in Table 6.10 show the effect of safeness of seat on referendum voting on the issue of senate casual vacancies. This question was a significant issue for the Labor party as it was the replacement in the Senate of a non-Labor party member from Queensland that contributed to the constitutional crisis of 1975. With this event fresh in the minds of voters, it is not surprising that results show that a majority of all Australian voters supported this change.41 What is noticeable is that some Coalition held electorates did not support this change. When taking the mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes into account, we also notice that all categories of Coalition held electorates were a couple of percentage points below the national average, whereas all categories of Labor party held electorates were above the national average. These results are statistically significant with a moderate chi-square of

41 Since 1949 and up until 1975, there had been 25 casual vacancies in the Senate. Each of these vacancies had been filled by the state choosing a senator (endorsed by the Federal Government) from the same political party as the vacating senator. Section 15 of the Constitution had been used to subvert democratic principle through a ―capricious use of the power‖ (Hanks 1977: 187, 190) by the appointment of the new senator from a different political party from the outgoing senator.

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11.419 and an associated p < 0.05, although there is no substantive difference between the electorate categories. The hypothesis here argues that the safer the electorate, the more likely voters from those electorates will support or reject the proposed change, depending on the political party holding office compared to the party holding each electorate. The hypothesis is supported with a majority of voters from all Labor party electorates supporting the change, whereas there were a number of voters from Coalition held electorates that did not support the change. Results show that the safer the Coalition seat, the more likely that voters would not support the proposed constitutional change. This finding is highlighted by the decline in mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes from safe Labor held electorates through to safe Coalition held electorates.

Table 6.10 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1977 question on Senate Casual Vacancies by Safeness of Seat / Electorate (2 party preferred) Column Percents Safeness of Seat from 1975 Federal Election (2 Party Preferred) Safe Fairly Marginal Marginal Fairly Safe Labor Safe Labor Coalition Safe Coalition Labor Coalition Support Change 100.0 100.0 100.0 97.1 95.0 88.2 Against Change 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.9 5.0 11.8 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 9 11 15 35 20 34 Mean Percent of 82.29 81.81 77.26 70.94 71.78 68.64 electorate ‗yes‘ Votes for Question #2 Source: as for Table 6.1

N = 124 Chi Sq = 11.419 P = 0.044 df = 5

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 73.0

The question of Senate casual vacancies was an issue that Queensland had played a critical role in during 1975. According to the Constitution, when a Senate casual vacancy occurs, someone is nominated and replaced by the State whom the previous Senator represented (section 15.8). The situation that gave rise for this referendum question is that the newly appointed Senator from Queensland was not from the same political party as the preceding Senator, which ultimately tipped the balance of power in the Senate to the Coalition Opposition. Despite this situation benefiting the Coalition, constitutional crises are circumstances that governments want to avoid—hence the inclusion of this question.

The results in Table 6.11 examine whether the state versus federal party alignment effect had any impact on this proposed change. There are minor differences (three percentage points) in the percentage of electorates that supported the change, with States that were governed by opposition political parties (State Labor Governments) showing slightly greater support than

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States with the same political party government as the Federal Government (State Coalition led Governments). This finding is supported when observing the mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes with voters from State Labor party led governments showing 78.2 percent as opposed to Coalition led State Governments at 67.8 percent. Statistically, the results are not significant (chi-square = 0.7; p > 0.05) with no significant difference between categories, as a majority of voters in all electorates were supportive of this proposed change.

Table 6.11 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1977 question on Senate Casual Vacancies by Federal / State Party Alignment Column Percents State Government Political Party in Office Same political party as Opposition political party Federal Government to Federal Government Support Change 93.5 96.8 Against Change 6.5 3.2 Total 100.0% 100.0% n 62 62 Mean percent of 67.8 78.2 electorate ‗yes‘ votes for Question #1 Source: as for Table 6.1

N = 124 Chi Sq = .701 P = 0.403 df = 1

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 73.0

6.5 Question Three: Territory Vote in Referendums

Question three in the 1977 referendum proposed that voters in the Australian territories be given the right to vote in referendums. This issue was addressed in the 1974 referendum and failed to gain the necessary support. Under the Coalition Government, the outcome was entirely different—possibly due to the seats gained by the Coalition in the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory in the previous election.

Recall that the centre-periphery hypothesis for geographical location of electorates argues that referendum vote and the location of an electorate are statistically dependent. Specifically, the more isolated an electorate from the centre of power (Canberra), the more likely a majority of voters in those electorates will vote against constitutional change. Results in Table 6.12 show that all electorate categories were supportive of allowing the territories to vote in referendums, although level of support from voters in the metropolitan electorates was higher.

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Table 6.12 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1977 question on Territory Vote in Referendums by Geographical Location Column Percents Geographic Location of Electorates Inner Metro Outer Metro Provincial Rural Support change 100.0 100.0 93.3 97.1 Against change 0.0 0.0 6.7 2.9 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 45 29 15 35 Mean Percent of electorate 81.82 80.74 72.85 71.12 ‗yes‘ Votes for Question #3 Source: AEC 1977 Referendum Results and AEC 1975 Federal Election Results

N = 124 Chi Sq = 3.969 P = 0.265 df = 3

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 77.5

The mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes shows that there was a gradual decline in the level of ‗yes‘ votes from inner metropolitan electorates (81 percent) to rural electorates (71 percent). The mean percent of ‗yes‘ votes in all metropolitan electorates (81.8 and 80.7 percent) were above the national average (77.5 percent), whereas provincial (72.8 percent) and rural (71.1 percent) electorate ‗yes‘ votes fell below the national average. Results are not statistically significant (chi-square = 3.969; p > 0.05).

Results in Table 6.13 consider the centre-periphery hypothesis in terms of large populated states versus small populated states and the acceptance of constitutional change. We notice that a majority of voters from all state electorates were supportive of this change. One noticeable difference is with Queensland where a majority of voters from 11 percent of electorates rejected the proposed change.

When examining the mean value of ‗yes‘ votes, there is a distinct trend, which shows that electorates in the larger populated states (New South Wales – 83.7 percent and Victoria – 80.6 percent), were more supportive of this change than the smaller states. Again, voters from Queensland electorates had the lowest ‗yes‘ vote (59 percent) compared to the overall average of 77.5 percent. From these results, it can be argued that the centre-periphery hypothesis is supported. The results are statistically significant (chi-square = 11.971; p < 0.05) further supporting this hypothesis.

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Table 6.13 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1977 question on Territory Vote in Referendums by State Location of Electorates Column Percents STATE NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS Support change 100.0 100.0 88.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 Against change 0.0 0.0 11.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 45 34 18 12 10 5 Mean Percent of 83.71 80.59 59.03 83.13 72.70 62.17 electorate ‗yes‘ Votes for Question #3 Source: as for Table 6.1

N = 124 Chi Sq = 11.971 P = 0.035 df = 5

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 77.5

Table 6.14 shows the distribution of two party preferred electorates by support for the proposed constitutional change to allow territories to vote in future referendums. Just 2.2 percent of a majority of voters from Coalition held electorates were opposed to this change—there was no opposition to this change from Labor party held electorates. The mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes reveals eight percentage points difference between Labor and Coalition held electorates with greater support coming from voters in Labor party held electorates. Statistically, there is no substantive difference between partisan support for this proposed change. Results are not statistically significant (chi-square 0.799; p = 0.371).

Table 6.14 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1977 question on Territory Vote in Referendums by Elected Federal MP (2 party preferred) Column Percents Elected Federal Member 1975 (2 Party Preferred) ALP Coalition Support change 100.0 97.8 Against change 0.0 2.2 Total 100.0 100.0 n 35 89 Mean Percent of 83.63 75.03 electorate ‗yes‘ Votes for Question #3 Source: as for Table 6.1

N = 124 Chi Sq = 0.799 P = 0.371 df = 1

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 77.5

The hypothesis associated with safeness of seat argues that the safer the seat, the more likely that voters from these electorates will support or reject the proposed change depending on the party in government proposing the change. Results in Table 6.15 show that all electorates, apart from 5.9 percent of safe Coalition electorates supported granting territories

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the right to vote in subsequent referendums. Interestingly, the mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes reveals that there were higher levels of support from the safe Labor held electorates than there was from the safe Coalition held electorates. The results are not statistically significant (chi-square = 5.381; p = 0.371), hence no political alignment hypothesis is established.

Table 6.15 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1977 question on Territory Vote in Referendums by Safeness of Seat (2 party preferred) Column Percents Safeness of Seat from 1975 Federal Election (2 Party Preferred) Safe Fairly Marginal Marginal Fairly Safe Labor Safe Labor Coalition Safe Coalition Labor Coalition Support Change 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 94.1 Against Change 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.9 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 9 11 15 35 20 34 Mean Percent of 85.17 84.46 82.09 76.38 76.50 72.79 electorate ‗yes‘ Votes for Question #3 Source: as for Table 6.1

N = 124 Chi Sq = 5.381 P = 0.371 df = 5

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 77.5

The proportion of electorates that were supportive of this change from each state, when taking into account the political alignment of the State and Federal governments shows very little difference between the two groups. The most noticeable difference can be observed from the mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes which shows that electorates in those states that were governed by the opposing political party from the Federal Government, were more supportive (82 percent) than those electorates that were situated in states that were governed by the same political party as the Federal Government (73 percent) – a difference of nine percentage points. Results are not statistically significant with a weak chi-square and an associate p > 0.05.

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Table 6.16 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1977 question on Territory Vote in Referendums by Federal / State Party Alignment Column Percents State Government Political Party in Office Same political party as Opposition political party Federal Government to Federal Government Support Change 96.8 100.0 Against Change 3.2 0.0 Total 100.0 100.0 n 62 62 Mean percent of 73.1 81.8 electorate ‗yes‘ votes for Question #3 Source: as for Table 6.1

N = 124 Chi Sq = 2.033 P = 0.154 df = 1

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 77.5

6.6 Question Four: Retirement Age of Judges

Question four of this referendum asked voters to consider whether Federal Court judges should be required to retire at 70 years of age. Up until this time, no retirement age for judges had existed in order to ensure the impartiality of the court system through the Westminster Convention of the ‗Separation of Powers‘.

The results of this question are significant in that the outcome was unanimous across all electorates. This result is similar in outcome to the question in 1967 on Aboriginal citizenship in that no electorate opposed this proposed constitutional change. The following four tables illustrate the unanimity of all electorates on this issue. Tables 6.17 through to 6.21 show the results of question four from the 1977 referendum. Due to the fact that no electorates were opposed to this change, it is not possible to conduct a statistical analysis by way of a p-value or chi-square. Figures that examine the mean values of electorate ‗yes‘ votes for each referendum question provide an alternative method of analysis.

In Table 6.17, as much as all electorates supported the introduction of a retirement age of judges, the mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes validates the centre-periphery hypothesis with a higher percentage of ‗yes‘ votes among metropolitan electorates as opposed to provincial and rural electorates.

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Table 6.17 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1977 question on Territory Vote in Referendums by Geographical Location of Electorates Column Percents Geographic Location of Electorates Inner Metro Outer Metro Provincial Rural Support change 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Against change 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 45 29 15 35 Mean Percent of 82.93 82.66 76.57 75.12 electorate ‗yes‘ Votes for Question #4 Source: AEC 1977 Referendum Results and AEC 1975 Federal Election Results

N = 124 Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 80.0

NB: No statistic can be computed for this relationship as the Yes/No result for question 4 is a constant.

The small state-large state hypothesis that smaller populated states are more likely to oppose constitutional change based on the mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes is supported by the results in Table 6.18. There is an anomaly here, in that Queensland (as a larger populated state) had electorates with the lowest of all ‗yes‘ votes. South Australia (one of the smaller populated states) showed that voters from these electorates had the highest mean percent of ‗yes‘ votes of all the states. Overall results show that all electorates supported this change. Electorates in New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia had mean percentages of ‗yes‘ votes in excess of the national average, while the mean percent of ‗yes‘ votes from electorates in Queensland, Western Australia and Tasmania fell below the national average.

Table 6.18 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1977 question on Retirement of Judges by State Location of Electorates Column Percents STATE NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS Support change 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Against change 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 45 34 18 12 10 5 Mean Percent of 84.65 81.23 64.78 85.38 78.32 72.44 electorate ‗yes‘ Votes for Question #4 Source: as for Table 6.1

N = 124 Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 80.0

NB: No statistic can be computed for this relationship as the Yes/No result for question 4 is a constant.

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The results in Table 6.19 show that a majority of voters in all Australian electorates (whether Labor party or Coalition) were supportive of this proposed change. The mean percent of ‗yes‘ votes also show that there were higher levels of ‗yes‘ votes in ALP held electorates (85 percent) while the ‗yes‘ vote in Coalition held electorates was 78 percent—a difference of seven percentage points. Although not statistically significant, the mean percent of ‗yes‘ votes reveals a partisan effect.

Table 6.19 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1977 question on Retirement of Judges by Elected Federal MP (2 party preferred) Column Percents Elected Federal Member 1975 (2 Party Preferred) ALP Coalition Support change 100.0 100.0 Against change 0.0 0.0 Total 100.0 100.0 n 35 89 Mean Percent of 84.80 77.97 electorate ‗yes‘ Votes for Question #4 Source: as for Table 6.1

N = 124 Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 80.0

NB: No statistic can be computed for this relationship as the Yes/No result for question 4 is a constant.

The partisan effect based on safeness of seat and the mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes is evident in Table 6.20. Safe ALP electorates were nearly 11 percentage points higher than safe Coalition held electorates. In light of the fact that the Federal Coalition Government initiated this referendum, an expected partisan effect should have seen higher support from safe Coalition electorates.

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Table 6.20 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1977 question on Retirement of Judges by Safeness of Seat (2 party preferred) Column Percents Safeness of Seat from 1975 Federal Election (2 Party Preferred) Safe Fairly Marginal Marginal Fairly Safe Labor Safe Labor Coalition Safe Coalition Labor Coalition Support Change 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Against Change 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 9 11 15 35 20 34 Mean Percent of 86.20 85.08 83.76 79.48 79.07 75.76 electorate ‗yes‘ Votes for Question #4 Source: as for Table 6.1

N = 124 Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 80.0

NB: No statistic can be computed for this relationship as the Yes/No result for question 4 is a constant.

Six percentage points separate the two groups as shown in Table 6.21. The ‗yes‘ vote from electorates in states that were ALP governed was higher than those states that were governed by the Coalition—the same political party as the federal governing party.

Table 6.21 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1977 question on Retirement age of judges by Federal / State Party Alignment Column Percents State Government Political Party in Office Same political party as Opposition political party Federal Government to Federal Government Support Change 100.0 100.0 Against Change 0.0 0.0 Total 100.0 100.0 n 62 62 Mean percent of 76.0 83.8 electorate ‗yes‘ votes for Question #1 Source: as for Table 6.1

N = 124 Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 80.0

NB: No statistic can be computed for this relationship as the Yes/No result for question 4 is a constant.

6.7 1977 Regression Analysis

A multiple regression analysis was conducted to evaluate the effect that each predictor variable had on electorate choice in each of the four questions at the 1977 referendum.

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These variables are based on the bivariate tables and related hypotheses as investigated in the previous section. Results of the regression analysis are shown in Table 6.22.

Results show the statistical significance for each independent variable when combined into one model. The figures marked with an asterisk are considered to be statistically significant at p < 0.05. In comparison with the referendums held in 1973 and 1974, the variables here show a much higher level of influence on electorate behaviour.

Examination of the results shows that the standardised coefficient values associated with each variable range in strength from weak to moderate with the highest value linked to the large-state versus small-state variable. Table 6.22 Regression Table of 1977 Referendum Questions Q #1: Q #2: Senate Q #3: Q #4: Simultaneous Casual Referendums Retirement of Elections Vacancies Territories Judges Standardised Standardised Standardised Standardised Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Model Beta t Beta t Beta t Beta t Geographical Location (All .242** 4.958 .336** 7.896 .393** 7.319 .373** 6.453 Metropolitan Electorates) Large States v Small States .599** 12.580 .620** 14.916 .528** 10.059 .421** 7.460 (NSW & VIC) Federal v State - - - - Political Party -5.253 -8.140 -6.060 -6.951 .251** .340** .320** .394** (Same) Safeness of Seat (Percent of ALP .261** 5.237 .116* 2.666 .084 1.523 .123* 2.081 1st preference votes)

Question #1 DV: Mean Percentage of Yes Votes on Simultaneous Elections Question #2 DV: Mean Percentage of Yes Votes on Senate Casual Vacancies Question #3 DV: Mean Percentage of Yes Votes on Referendums Territories Question #4 DV: Mean Percentage of Yes Votes on Retirement of Judges

N = 124

* indicates statistically significant at p < 0.05 * indicates statistically significant at p < 0.001

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Model Summary Results for Table 6.22 Q #1: Q #2: Senate Q #3: Q #4: Simultaneous Casual Referendums Retirement of Elections Vacancies Territories Judges R .863 .898 .831 .801 R Square .745 .806 .690 .642 Adjusted R Square .737 .799 .680 .630 SEE 5.99 4.92 5.78 4.82 F Change 87.103** 123.544** 66.252** 53.296** ** = Significance at the 0.000 level

From these results it is possible to make a number of points. Firstly, the geographical location of electorates was the most significant predictor of electorate behaviour in the 1977 referendum vote. This variable had a somewhat moderate influence on the referendum outcome on all questions where voters from metropolitan electorates were more supportive of the proposed changes than provincial or rural electorates. Secondly, electorates from New South Wales and Victoria were shown to be more supportive of each proposed change than the smaller states. Of all the variables in the model, this one was the most statistically significant. Finally, the variable that determined political party alignment between State and Federal Governments showed that electorates in states led by a government of the opposite political persuasion to the federal government was not a predictor of support for the proposed constitutional changes. In all models, the negative coefficient and t-values are of a moderate strength, which allows one to conclude that the States do not endorse power gains sought by the Federal Government at the expense of the States.

When taking the model summary results into account, the R-square (between 0.642 and 0.806) and the small standard error of the estimate (SEE) indicate that each regression model provides support for the centre-periphery and partisanship hypotheses. These results, in conjunction with the bivariate analyses, lead to several conclusions. Firstly, the centre- periphery hypothesis in 1977 was an important factor in terms of the referendum outcome. On the question of the introduction of simultaneous elections (a question that had been asked three times now), metropolitan electorates were more open to accepting this change. This acceptance could be explained by the fact that the media coverage in the metropolitan areas was more intensive. The corollary is that metropolitan electorates would have been better informed about the benefits of this change than their provincial or rural counterparts.

The large-state versus small-state variable is an extension of the centre-periphery hypothesis, where results revealed that electorates in the larger states of New South Wales and Victoria were more open to all the proposed changes. After reviewing state and national newspapers, it is evident that the larger states viewed the referendum differently to the smaller states.

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The Australian, the Sydney Morning Herald and the Melbourne Age all had quite extensive coverage of the referendum issues, whereas the Queensland Courier-Mail, the Adelaide Advertiser and the Perth West Australian seemed to focus more on state issues. Emy provides a further explanation where he argues that the smaller states have their one opportunity in Australia‘s political life to exert their influence in the referendum process due to the double majority requirement of the Australian Constitution (Emy 1978: 200). However, three of the four proposals in the 1977 referendum did not appear to alter the Constitution in terms of affecting the balance of power between the State and Federal Governments.

6.8 Discussion

The outcome of the 1977 referendum was encouraging for the Coalition Government with three of the four questions gaining the necessary double majority. Political analysts at the time made some interesting observations. Firstly, on the question of simultaneous elections, 62.22 percent of all Australian voters were in favour of this change, however, a majority of states were not. From this result, it is fair to argue that the defeat of the question on simultaneous elections was an example of the Constitution working in the way that the framers had intended, not because the Australian voting public was apathetic about constitutional change (The Australian 1977: 7). Prior to the voting day, observations were made that there had been bipartisan support for the simultaneous elections proposal due to the fact that this change, which had similarly been put to the Australian electorate in 1974 had been initiated by the Coalition this time. Despite the bipartisan support at the federal level, there were some state politicians (Charles Court – Western Australia and Joe Bjelke- Petersen – Queensland) who were vehemently opposed to this change due to the perception that such a change would minimise the effectiveness of the Senate as the ‗states‘ House. Analysis of results shows that approximately 19,000 more ‗yes‘ votes from Western Australia would have seen this question pass (Strangman 1979: 346). Overall, results show that there was greater support for the introduction of simultaneous elections from New South Wales and Victoria than the other states, indicating that the smaller states did not accept this change as being in their best interests. Peter Rae, writing for the Australian, argued that the structure of the Constitution provides key checks and balances, which are worth remembering:

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They (political parties)42 can operate only through an independent Senate and an independent High Court. With regard to the Senate, so many of the checks and balances are able to be exercised because of the fact that the States can ensure that Senate elections will be held. In the ultimate, the people and the States have their opportunity to ensure that the national executive‘s power is not absolute executive power. The Constitution ensures that no one can prevent that safeguard from operating (Rae 1977: 9).

Contrary to the framers original intention, the Senate does not function as a states‘ House per se due to the dominance of the party structure (Emy 1978: 196; Galligan et al 1990: 65). However, the Senate has consistently had a pervasive influence on legislation. Emy (1978: 197) recounts that when the issue of ‗simultaneous elections‘ first went before the Senate in 1975, the Bill had been passed in the House of Representatives twice and rejected both times by the Senate. However, as a result of the Constitutional Convention held in October 1976, both major parties agreed to this proposal, and that it should be put to a referendum (Jaensch 1997: 387). The rationale for this proposed change was that if the Senate was,

…capable of forcing the House to the polls without necessarily having to submit itself to election, simultaneous elections would ensure that at least half the Senate would have to be re-elected…The Constitution Alteration (Simultaneous Elections) Bill was intended to make the Senate at least partly responsible for the consequences of any action it took to reject supply (Emy 1978: 197).

These comments are clearly a reflection of the crisis sparked by the Senate in 1975 that acted to block supply to the Whitlam Government (Maddox 1991: 432).

Despite the amount of attention given on the question of simultaneous elections, the other three questions were passed with sizeable majorities in all states. On senate casual vacancies, 73.32 percent voted in favour; on territories and referendum vote, 77.72 percent voted in favour; and on retirement age of judges, 80.1 voted in favour (Australian Electoral Commission).

From an aggregate perspective, results at the electorate level provide some explanation of the factors that influenced voters. In order to capture the essence of these key factors, graphs have been used which clearly show the difference in the role of these factors.

42 Italics mine

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Figure 6.1 illustrates the difference in support for each proposed constitutional change in the 1977 referendum according to each geographical category. In all cases, each category of electorate voted in favour of the proposed change. When examining the data in relation to the centre-periphery hypothesis, results show that for each question, inner metropolitan electorates provided greater support (a higher mean value) than outer metropolitan electorates, provincial and rural electorates. On question one (simultaneous elections), there was an 11-percentage point difference between inner metropolitan and rural electorates. Similarly, on question two (senate casual vacancies), there was an 11-percentage point difference between inner metropolitan electorates and rural electorates. On question three (territories vote in referendums), the margin was 10.7 percentage points, and on question four (retirement age of judges), the margin between inner metropolitan and rural electorates was 7.8 percentage points.

Figure 6.1 Mean Percentage of Yes Vote by Geographical Location of Electorate

90 80 70

60 Inner Metro

50 Outer Metro 40 Provincial 30 Rural 20 10 0 Simultaneous Senate Referendums Retirement Elections Casual Territories Judges Vacancies

Apart from question four, all questions (either directly or indirectly) were understood to influence the federal bargain between the Commonwealth and the States. The issue of the retirement age of judges is an interesting question as the result did not impact directly on the functioning of, or powers associated with the Federal Parliament—a possible explanation for the smaller difference between inner metropolitan and rural electorates in acceptance of the proposed change as well as the provision of the highest acceptance of any proposed constitutional change since the 1967 vote on Aboriginal citizenship.

The influence of each state on the referendum outcome was not unexpected. The following graph (Figure 6.2) shows the mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes for electorates when broken

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down into the various states. The results as shown in Figure 6.2 are not as discreet as anticipated. However, support for the centre-periphery hypothesis is present with the larger states (New South Wales and Victoria), providing a higher mean ‗yes‘ vote on each question than the smaller states. There is one exception to this outcome with electorates in South Australia having a higher mean value than Victorian electorates. Generally speaking, Tasmanian electorates had the lowest mean value for each referendum question except for questions three and four, when their mean score was greater than Queensland and Tasmanian electorates.

Figure 6.2 Mean Percentage of Yes Vote by State Location of Electorate

100 90

80 NSW 70 VIC 60 QLD 50 SA 40 WA 30 TAS 20 10 0 Simultaneous Senate Casual Referendum Retirement Elections Vacancies Territories Judges

The difference between electorate voting at the 1977 referendum appeared to be influenced by the partisan character of the electorate, as measured by political party membership of the elected Member of Parliament. 1977 saw the Coalition introduce a referendum for the first time in ten years. The previous two referendums, held in 1973 and 1974, were both put forward by Labor Governments. All questions in these two referendums failed to gain the necessary support from voters and states in order for the government to enact the change, although greater support came from the Labor electorates.

With the 1977 referendum being initiated by a Coalition government, according to the partisanship hypothesis, we would expect there to be greater support from Coalition electorates. The difficulty with this hypothesis was that both major federal parties were in favour of the changes. Lack of bipartisan support came from the states. Results and analysis have clearly shown that the hypothesis is not supported in this case where all Labor party electorates gave greater support for the proposed constitutional changes than the Coalition electorates. The following graph (Figure 6.3) illustrates this point most aptly.

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An extension of the partisanship hypothesis in the 1977 referendum concerns the safeness of seat. According to the hypothesis, we would expect there to be greater support from safe- seat electorates if from the same political party as the party proposing the change. Conversely, we would expect there to be less support from the opposing party‘s safe electorates.

Figure 6.3 Mean Percentage of Yes Vote by Two-party Preferred Electorate for 1977 Referendum Questions

100 90 80 70 60 ALP 50 40 COALITION 30 20 10

0 Mean Percent of Yes Votes Mean Percent

Casual Senate

Judges

Vacancies

Retirement

Elections Territories Referendums Simultaneous 1977 Referendum Questions

Examination of Figure 6.4 does not support this hypothesis. When comparing each electorate category, we notice that, in all cases, greatest support for the proposed change came from safe Labor electorates and the least support came from safe Coalition electorates. On the issue of simultaneous elections (question one), there is a 19 percentage point difference between safe Labor (75.02 percent) and safe Coalition electorates (56.47 percent). Safe Labor electorates (82.29 percent) were also 14 percentage points higher in support of the change on senate casual vacancies than were safe Coalition electorates (68.64 percent).

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Figure 6.4 Mean Percentage of Yes Vote by Safeness of Seat for 1977 Referendum for Questions

Overall, we can conclude from the 1977 referendum that, notwithstanding the fact that a majority of voters were in favour of these referendum proposals, the centre-periphery hypothesis (geographical location and population size of states), and the partisan effect hypothesis provide support for the Michigan Model of party identification.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

7.0 The 1984 and 1988 Referendums under Hawke

Seven years had passed since the previous referendum held in 1977. On 1 December 1984, a referendum was held that asked Australian voters to consider two proposed constitutional changes. The Labor Government under Bob Hawke initiated this referendum, which was held in conjunction with a federal election. At this time, the political parties governing the states was predominantly Coalition led. New South Wales and Tasmania were Labor party led, while Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia and Queensland were Coalition led states.

With the election of the in 1983 came significant amendment to the Electoral Act on the distribution-redistribution of electoral boundaries. The intention of the ALP Government was to remove partisanship (AEC Research Report 4) and rural ‗weightage‘ (Economou and Ghazarian 2006: 22) as the grounds for electoral boundaries. The process (as governed by independent Commissioners) was deliberately impartial by removing the approval / disapproval for redistribution from the Parliament. In the words of Senator Robert Ray, ―We instituted the fairest redistribution system in the world. We instituted the ‗overs and unders‘ system, so that on average every seven years [all] electorates would be of equal size‖ (Ramsey 2006). The result of the re-distribution saw an increase of 115 electorates at the 1977 election to 147 electorates at the 1984 election.

The Hawke Government had served one term (albeit for only one year) and was seeking re- election for a second term. A review of media publications shows that circumstances at the time saw a number of pressing issues for the government. Firstly, the government had to deal with a row over an ASIO phone tap (Staff Reporter - The Australian 1984: 1; Peterson 1984: 1), Australia‘s current account deficit was on the rise (Wentworth 1984: 9), and AIDS was starting to have an impact on society (Rice 1984: 1). Secondly, on the international scene, nuclear disarmament was being discussed whilst, at the same time, Pakistan was close to having nuclear capabilities (Loudon 1984: 1), and Russia had increased its defence budget, whilst upgrading its forces in the North Pacific (Samuel 1984: 1; Owen 1984: 1).

Out of the intended five proposed constitutional changes, two referendum questions were put to the Australian electorate on 1 December 1984. They were as follows:

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Question 1: Simultaneous Elections – An Act to change the term of Senators so that they are no longer of fixed duration and to provide that Senate elections and House of Representatives elections are always held on the same day.

Question 2: Interchange of Powers – An Act to enable the Commonwealth and the States to voluntarily refer powers to each other.

For the third time in succession, a referendum question had been put to the Australian electorate on the issue of simultaneous elections, albeit with slightly different wording. In 1974, the issue of simultaneous elections was proposed by the Labor Government and defeated; in 1977 it was proposed by the Coalition Government and defeated; and in 1984 it was proposed for a third time by the then Labor Government—it too was defeated. In each case, a majority of New South Wales electorates supported this change; in 1977 and 1984, a majority of Victorian electorates supported simultaneous elections; the only other majority support on this issue came from South Australian electorates in 1977.

Unlike the 1977 referendum, this referendum was held simultaneously with the federal election. The campaign for both the Federal Labor Government and Opposition concentrated on election issues more than on promoting or opposing the referendum issues. Having a simultaneous election and referendum was intended to save money while minimising the amount negative publicity on the proposed changes, especially since one of the changes had already been rejected on two previous occasions. Despite the election focus, the referendum did receive some coverage, although nothing like the 1977 referendum. Opinion on the referendum was sceptical concerning the purpose of the proposed changes. For example, on 29 November 1984 in the ‗Letters to the Editor‘ section of The Australian (p.8), public opinion was aimed at voting against the proposed changes. One writer argued that supporting the change on simultaneous elections would give the government of the day a greater chance to control the Senate. ―The Senate was never meant to be a rubber stamp for the government, but rather a house of review to amend and even reject legislation if necessary for the nation‘s wellbeing‖. Two other letters strongly opposed the introduction of simultaneous elections on the premise of saving a few million dollars. If successful, the savings would be achieved at the expense of depriving future Australians the right to keep governments accountable.

7.1 The ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ Cases

The ‗yes‘ case was based on the premise that the two proposed changes would mean better government for Australia. The first issue, on having simultaneous elections, had a two- pronged argument. Firstly, there was the cost of holding elections. Since 1972, Australians

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had been to the polls seven times (inclusive of 1972 and the 1984 elections). Clearly, in the space of twelve years, there should have been four federal elections based on three year terms of Parliament as written in section 23 of the Constitution, which states, ―Every House of Representatives shall continue for three years from the first meeting of the House, and no longer, but may be sooner dissolved by the Governor-General‖.

As has been previously noted, the Constitution does not prevent simultaneous elections. However, since 1961 the elections for both Houses have been out of step. Consequently, elections for the two houses fall on different dates requiring elections to be held at separate times. Costs cited at the time were that each half-Senate election costs $19.2 million. Therefore, by making sure that the House of Representatives and Senate elections are held on the same day, taxpayers would save millions of dollars. The second aspect of this proposed change was that by enshrining simultaneous elections into the Constitution, the ability of the Senate to disrupt government policy would be minimised, although this aspect was not part of the ‗yes‘ case.

The simultaneous elections proposal had had bipartisan support at the 1977 referendum as well as receiving majority support at the Constitutional Conventions. Arguments in the Yes/No booklet stated,

These changes to the Constitution make good sense. Both the simultaneous elections and interchange of powers proposals have had unanimous or strong majority support from the Commonwealth, States and Territories meeting at all- party sessions of the Australian Constitution Convention over the last 10 years (Australian Electoral Commission 1984: 4).

The ‗no‘ case for simultaneous elections supplied by the Coalition was in distinct contrast to their 1977 referendum campaign on the same issue, although similar to their 1974 arguments. If the simultaneous election proposal passed, one can expect to see a reduction in the checks and balances provided by the Senate. They argued that this proposal would see the end of the fixed term of the Senate and make it easier for the government to turn the Senate into a rubber stamp. The fixed term clause in the Constitution was designed to give the Senate independence, and to prevent Canberra from holding absolute power. Furthermore, if passed, the federal government could ignore the smaller states by undermining the constitutional independence of the Senate. On this point Emy (1978: 199) argues that evidence exists which shows that the Senate serves ―as a channel for keeping the national political process informed of the concerns of the peripheral states in the federation‖. Emy goes on to point out that smaller states constantly put pressure on both houses of Parliament to consider regional issues (Emy 1978: 199). Sharman, also points out,

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There is no guarantee that the smaller states will use their advantage to push their regional view of party priorities, but there is no denying that the Senate significantly increases their ability to do so (cited in Emy 1978:199).

And finally, holding simultaneous elections would not guarantee fewer elections (Hughes 1984: 10) as the federal government would still retain the power to call a general election whenever it wanted to with respect to section 28 of the Constitution.43

The second proposed change regarding the interchange of powers between the State and Commonwealth Governments was proposed in order to improve the law-making process in Australia by reducing the problems of jurisdiction associated with the legal system— especially in the areas of industrial relations, child custody and family law, and insurance and business law, which would enable for the first time two-way exchanges of Commonwealth and State responsibilities (Australian Electoral Commission 1984: 3, 7). The Prime Minister also argued that the interchange of powers proposal would ―help eliminate over-regulation and inefficiency…it would provide for the systematic removal of unnecessary institutional and legal impediments to economic recovery‖ (O'Reilly 1984: 10). If the proposal was passed, ―the Commonwealth would be able to confer power on all the States to legislate on matters over which only the Commonwealth now has power‖ (Australian Electoral Commission 1984: 7). Due to the ‗division of powers‘ as laid out in the Constitution, the States advantage held an advantage over the Federal Government, where the States were able to refer powers to the Commonwealth, but not visa versa. The argument in support of this proposal was that, if accepted, it would be a practical benefit to the community, avoid duplication, and would lead to a much more integrated and flexible legal system (Australian Electoral Commission 1984: 8).

The ‗no‘ case for the interchange of powers argued that this proposal would allow politicians to covertly change the Constitution without the need of a referendum. The ‗no‘ case argued that, on the face of it, this change would allow the Federal Government to refer powers to the States. However, the Federal Government would not give powers away without something in return. The offer of matters to be referred to the States could be used to blackmail the States into referring important powers to Canberra and making decisions favourable for Canberra. Once powers had been exchanged, in practice it would be very difficult to get them back (Australian Electoral Commission 1984: 12). Consequently, the Coalition and the

43 Every House of Representatives shall continue for three years from the first meeting of the House, and no longer, but may be sooner dissolved by the Governor-General (s28).

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States were sceptical of this proposed change, as cooperative arrangements between the Commonwealth and State Governments were already in operation.

Public opinion in the lead up to the referendum appeared to support the ‗no‘ case argument. For example, it was argued that the true purpose of the ‗yes‘ vote was not to provide for future simultaneous elections, but to ensure that such elections are held strictly on the Prime Minister‘s terms (Mackerras 1984a: 9). Mackerras argues that the true purpose of codifying simultaneous elections ―is to give the prime minister more power over the Senate‖ (Mackerras 1984a: 9). The editorial in the Australian on 1-2 December similarly highlighted the deficiencies of accepting the proposed changes. The present structure separates the Senate from the Prime Minister and reinforces the independence of the Senate. The difficulty experienced by governments is that an independent Senate ―is often regarded as an impediment to decisive government as it hampers the passage of government legislation‖ (The Australian 1984c: 14). On the second question, concerning the transfer of powers, it was argued that, if it is thought that there ought to be major, specific changes in the balance of constitutional power, these ought to be put to the people separately at referendums. They should not be simply enacted in cosy arrangements between politicians. Both the referendum proposals can be seen as giving greater power to politicians, and taking power away from the people at large. For that reason both proposals should be defeated (The Australian 1984c: 14).

As for the benefits for business as argued by the Prime Minister (O'Reilly 1984: 10), the two most influential business organisations, the Confederation of Australian Industry and the Business Council of Australia avoided taking sides on the issue, in an effort that they not be seen supporting the Liberal party, nor risk being left out (Burton 1984: 7).

The outcome of this referendum saw both proposals (‗terms of senators‘ and ‗interchange of powers‘) fail to get the required double majority. On the ‗terms of senators‘ proposal, a majority of voters in New South Wales (52.86 percent), Victoria (53.20 percent) the ACT (56.68 percent) and the Northern Territory (51.87 percent) supported the change while a majority of voters in all other states rejected the change: – Queensland (45.65 percent); Western Australia (46.47 percent); South Australia (49.98 percent) and Tasmania (39.29 percent).

On the ‗interchange of powers‘ proposal, majority support for this change only came from the ACT (56.10 percent). A majority of voters in all other states rejected this proposal: – New South Wales (49.04 percent); Victoria (49.86 percent); Queensland (41.69 percent);

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Western Australia (44.28 percent); South Australia (45.94 percent); Tasmania (34.65 percent) and the Northern Territory (47.78 percent).

Media reports prior to the referendum show that both proposals had bipartisan support, but that unanimity evaporated when a Labor party government proposed the changes. Vigorous opposition came from State Premiers in Queensland and Western Australia. Queensland Premier Bjelke-Petersen was opposed to the changes arguing that this would allow the proposed Human Rights Commission powers to investigate state affairs. The Canberra Times reported that this was ―an audacious attempt to restructure Australian political and social life to meet the demands of a power-hungry Commonwealth Government bent on the destruction of the states and the establishment of a socialist republic (cited by Galligan et al 1990: 60). A report in The Australian said that the voting trends in the referendum were a setback for the Government‘s program of constitutional change (The Australian 1984: 9). One explanation mooted for the setback was that there were too many informal votes. However, this did not explain why the proposals were rejected. The editor of The Australian suggested that the rejection of the proposals by voters is cause for the Government to reconsider the introduction of its proposed Bill of Rights (The Australian 1984b: 12).

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1984 Results

7.2 Question One: Terms of Senators

Table 7.1 1984 Federal Electorate Information (Frequency and Percents) Category Frequency Percent Geographical Location Inner Metro 46 31.1 Outer Metro 43 29.9 Provincial 19 12.8 Rural 40 27.0 State Electorates New South Wales 51 34.5 Victoria 39 26.4 Queensland 24 16.2 South Australia 13 8.8 Western Australia 13 8.8 Tasmania 5 3.4 ACT 2 1.4 Northern Territory 1 0.7 Party Electorates ALP 82 55.4 (2-party preferred) Coalition 66 44.6 Safeness of Seat Safe Labor 37 25.0 Based on 1984 Fairly Safe Labor 17 11.5 Federal Election Marginal Labor 28 18.9 Marginal Coalition 28 18.9 Fairly Safe Coalition 14 9.5 Safe Coalition 24 16.2 State Govt Political Party in Same party as Federal 4 66.6 Office (ACT & NT not included) Government Opposite party to 2 33.3 Federal Government Source: Australian Electoral Commission Federal Election Results, December 1984

When comparing the number of electorates to the 1977 referendum, there was an increase from 124 electorates in 1977 to 148 electorates in 1984, an increase of 8.3 percent. The main difference between these two referendums is that voters from both the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory were included in the vote, although their inclusion did not alter the requirements of section 128. Basic frequencies in Table 7.1 show that, with redistributions, the number of electorates between metropolitan areas and rural areas has become a little more balanced from the previous referendum.44 Metropolitan electorates represent 60 percent of all electorates. Provincial electorates are under- represented as a geographical area.

44 See reference to redistributions on page 174.

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Due to the increase in the number of electorates, New South Wales electorates made up 34.5 percent of the total, with Victoria having 26.4 percent of the total number of electorates. When comparing the number of party held electorates in 1984 to the previous 1975 election associated with the 1977 referendum, there had been a significant swing away from the Coalition. In 1977, the Coalition held 89 (71.8 percent) electorates and the Labor party 35 (28.2 percent) electorates. Similarly, the number of safe Labor seats increased from nine (7.3 percent) in 1977 to 37 (25.0 percent) in 1984, while safe Coalition seats fell from 34 (27.4 percent) in 1977 to 24 (16.2 percent) in 1984. This shift in voter behaviour could be telling in how voters and electorates viewed this referendum.

Table 7.2 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1984 ‘Terms of Senators Question by Geographical Location Column Percents Geographic Location of Electorates Inner Metro Outer Metro Provincial Rural Support change 58.7 60.5 47.4 32.5 Against change 41.3 39.5 52.6 67.5 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 46 43 19 40 Mean percent of 53.4 53.0 52.4 44.8 electorate ‗yes‘ votes for Question #1 Source: AEC 1984 Referendum Results and AEC 1984 Federal Election Results

N = 148 Chi Sq = 8.202 P = 0.042 df = 3

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 50.7

The results in Table 7.2 indicate that there was greater support to introduce simultaneous elections among inner (58.7 percent) and outer (60.5 percent) metropolitan electorates, as opposed to provincial electorates (47.4 percent) and rural electorates, which had one-third support (32.5 percent). This result would indicate that the proposal to introduce simultaneous elections between the Senate and the House of Representatives could have been successful, however, as results in Table 7.3 show, a majority of states did not accept this change. Results in Table 7.2 are statistically significant with a moderate chi-square value of 8.202 and an associated p-value of 0.042, indicating that the centre-periphery hypothesis is supported with greater support coming from the metropolitan electorates. The mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes further supports this finding with voters from rural electorates (44.8 percent), the only group to fall below the overall average of 50.7 percent.

The results in Table 7.3 show that support for simultaneous elections was evenly divided between the states. However, as this hypothesis proposes, support for proposed constitutional change will be higher among the larger states (especially New South Wales

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and Victoria) than the smaller states. Examination of the individual cells shows this to be the case with higher support for this change coming from New South Wales (58.8 percent) and Victoria (61.5 percent). Voters in South Australian electorates, although not considered to be a large state, supported this proposal (53.8 percent), whereas voters in Queensland, Western Australian and Tasmanian electorates were all opposed to the introduction of simultaneous elections. This relationship is statistically significant with a moderate chi- square value of 18.411 and an associated p-value of 0.010. These results provide support for the hypothesis that larger states are more likely to support constitutional change than smaller states.

Table 7.3 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1984 question on Terms of Senators by State Location of Electorates Column Percents STATE NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS ACT NT Support Change 58.8 61.5 25.0 53.8 38.5 0.0 100.0 100.0 Against Change 41.2 38.5 75.0 46.2 61.5 100.0 0.0 0.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 51 39 24 13 13 5 2 1 Mean percent of 53.0 53.5 45.6 50.1 46.6 39.3 56.6 51.9 electorate ‗yes‘ votes for Question #1 Source: as for Table 7.1

N = 148 Chi Sq = 18.411 P = 0.010 df = 7

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 50.7

The results in Table 7.4 show a significant difference between Labor party and Coalition held electorates. Supporting the change were 86.6 percent of Labor party electorates, whilst only 6.1 percent of Coalition electorates supported the change. This is a statistically significant result (chi-square = 94.682; p < 0.001) providing support for the hypothesis that that there is a partisan divide in referendum voting, and that voters take their cues from political party leaders as highlighted in the Michigan Model.

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Table 7.4 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1984 question on Terms of Senators by Elected Federal MP (2 party preferred) Column Percents Elected Federal Member 1984 (2 Party Preferred) ALP Coalition Support change 86.6 6.1 Against change 13.4 93.9 Total 100.0 100.0 n 82 66 Mean percent of electorate 57.2 42.6 ‗yes‘ votes for Question #1 Source: as for Table 7.1

N = 148 Chi Sq = 94.682 P < 0.001 df = 1

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 50.7

When considering whether safeness of seat had an effect on this referendum question to introduce simultaneous elections, the results in Table 7.5 show that there was a definite partisan effect with all Labor electorates supporting the change and all Coalition electorates opposed to the change. Examination of Labor party held electorates also shows that the less marginal the seat, the more support there was for this proposed change. Conversely, the safer a Coalition electorate, the more likely voters in those electorates were opposed to the change.

Table 7.5 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1984 question on Terms of Senators by Safeness of Seat / Electorate (2 Party Preferred) Column Percents Safeness of Seat from 1984 Federal Election (2 Party Preferred) Safe Fairly Marginal Marginal Fairly Safe Labor Safe Labor Coalition Safe Coalition Labor Coalition Support Change 100.0 94.1 64.3 14.3 0.0 0.0 Against Change 0.0 5.9 35.7 85.7 100.0 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 37 17 28 28 14 24 Mean percent of electorate 63.1 55.2 50.1 45.8 43.4 38.4 ‗yes‘ votes for Question #1 Source: as for Table 7.1

N = 148 Chi Sq = 104.799 P < 0.001 df = 5

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 50.7

These results are statistically significant (chi-square = 104.799; p < 0.001), and support the hypothesis of a partisan effect. The partisan hypothesis is further supported when the mean

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percentage of ‗yes‘ votes is taken into account with support from safe Labor held electorates at 63.1 percent as opposed to 38.4 percent from voters in safe Coalition held electorates.

The state versus federal government divide argues that, when political parties (state and federal) are of the same political persuasion, support for proposed constitutional change will be more forthcoming. At the time of the 1984 referendum, a general election was also held. The Australian Labor party was re-elected under the leadership of Bob Hawke with a majority of 82 seats (55.4 percent) to the Coalition‘s 66 seats (44.6 percent) on a 2-party preferred basis. The results, as shown in Table 7.6, examines the political alignment of federal and state political parties at the electorate level on the issue of altering the ‗terms of senators‘. Figures show that there was greater support from voters in those states that had State Governments of the same political party as the Federal Government. It is important to keep in mind that 80 percent of electorates were located in states that were of the same political standing at the Federal and State level. From this group, voters in 57 percent of electorates supported the change, whereas 77 percent of voters in electorates that were from states governed by the opposing political party did not support this change.

Table 7.6 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1984 question on Terms of Senators by Federal / State Party Alignment Column Percents State Government Political Party in Office Same political party as Opposition political party Federal Government to Federal Government Support Change 56.9 23.3 Against Change 43.1 76.7 Total 100.0 100.0 n 116 30 Mean percent of electorate 52.1 44.8 ‗yes‘ votes for Question #1 Source: as for Table 7.1

N = 146 Chi Sq = 10.740 P < 0.001 df = 1

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 50.6

NB: N=146 as the ACT did not gain self-government until 1989

The mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes similarly shows that voters in states that were of the same political party as the Federal Government were more likely to support the change than states that were governed by the political opposition. The partisan relationship between the two levels of government is statistically significant with a moderate chi-square of 10.740 and an associated p-value < 0.001, providing some evidence that partisanship influenced voters at the 1984 referendum. The mean percent of ‗yes‘ votes supports this finding showing that

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voters in electorates from those states that were politically aligned with the Federal Government were more likely to support proposed constitutional change.

7.3 Question Two: Interchange of Powers

The second question in the 1984 referendum asked voters to consider allowing the Commonwealth and States to voluntarily refer powers to one another (interchange of powers). Opinion prior to this referendum being held was mixed. The editorial in the West Australian commented that this issue was not ―clear-cut‖, and that in some areas, an interchange of powers could make for a more cooperative approach to federalism (The West Australian 1984a: 8). On the other hand, with the Franklin dams case fresh in the minds of voters (where the Federal Government under the ‗external affairs‘ power of the Constitution, prevented the Tasmanian Government from constructing a dam), removing constitutional restraints that would allow Governments more freedom was not going to be readily accepted. It was argued that the action taken by Hawke in Tasmania had ―an obvious element of subterfuge‖ which denied the people the ability to express their wishes (The Australian 1984b: 12).

The relationship between geographic region and referendum vote on the interchange of powers proposal (Table 7.7) shows that a majority of voters in all four geographical locations were opposed to this change. We note, however, that the level of support declines from a high of 46 percent with inner metropolitan regions, to a low of five percent with rural regions – a difference of approximately 40 percentage points.

Table 7.7 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1984 question on Interchange of Powers by Geographical Location of Electorates Column Percents Geographic Location of Electorates Inner Metro Outer Metro Provincial Rural Support change 45.7 44.2 36.8 5.0 Against change 54.3 55.8 63.2 95.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 46 43 19 40 Mean percent of electorate 50.5 49.1 48.3 41.0 ‗yes‘ votes for Question #2 Source: AEC 1984 Referendum Results and AEC 1984 Federal Election Results

N = 148 Chi Sq = 20.040 P < 0.001 df = 3

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 47.1

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Results are not as distinct on the mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes, with a range between 50.5 percent (inner metropolitan) and 41 percent (rural) – a difference of 8.5 percentage points. The overall mean value of ‗yes‘ votes was 47 percent. These results are statistically significant with a moderate chi-square of 20.040 and an associated p-value < 0.001.

Table 7.8 focuses on the relationship between states and support for the issue on the ‗interchange of powers‘ between the State and Federal Governments. For the States, this was an important issue, as implementing such a change had the potential to radically alter the federal-state ‗division of powers‘.

The hypothesis that larger state populations influence referendum votes is addressed in the following table. Results support the hypothesis that voters of electorates from the larger populated states of New South Wales (47 percent support) and Victoria (41 percent support) offer greater support for constitutional change than voters from smaller states. Stronger opposition came from voters in Queensland, Western Australia and Tasmania. When comparing the total mean percent of electorate ‗yes‘ votes (47 percent) with the mean percent of ‗yes‘ votes for each state, Victoria was the only state with more than 50 percent of ‗yes‘ votes, followed by New South Wales voters with 49 percent—two percentage points higher than the national average45. Overall, the results are statistically significant with a moderate chi-square of 23.072 and an associated p-value of 0.002.

45 There appears to be a discrepancy in results which shows a majority of voters from 41 percent of Victorian electorates providing support for the interchange of powers proposal, whereas the mean percent of ‗yes‘ votes shows 50.1 percent. This apparent discrepancy can be explained in the same way as the distribution of the population in Australian electorates where a large proportion of the population reside in metropolitan electorates. At the time of the referendum, there were a total of 39 Victorian federal electorates. Of these 39 electorates, 25 were inner-outer metropolitan, three provincial and 11 rural. In total, 23 Victorian electorates did not support the change whilst 16 did. Of the electorates that rejected the proposed change, 10 were metropolitan electorates whilst two were provincial and all rural electorates similarly rejected the proposal.

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Table 7.8 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1984 question on Interchange of Powers by State Location of Electorates Column Percents STATE NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS ACT NT Support Change 47.1 41.0 8.3 30.8 7.7 0.0 100.0 0.0 Against Change 52.9 59.0 91.7 69.2 92.3 100.0 0.0 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 51 39 24 13 13 5 2 1 Mean percent of electorate 49.2 50.1 41.6 46.0 44.4 34.6 56.1 47.8 ‗yes‘ votes for Question #2 Source: as for Table 7.1

N = 148 Chi Sq = 23.072 P = 0.002 df = 7

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 47.1

Table 7.9 shows the result that examines the relationship between the elected federal member and support or rejection for this change. It is important to remember that this referendum was held in conjunction with the federal election. If party identification is critical in voter behaviour, we should expect to see a clear partisan divide. The rationale for this argument is that the Labor party under Bob Hawke initiated this proposed change, and the Coalition was vehemently opposed to the changes. Results support this hypothesis with voters in Coalition held electorates opposed to the change with no Coalition held electorates gaining more than 50 percent. Labor party held electorates show that voters in 60 percent of electorates were supportive of the interchange of powers proposal. Support from ALP voters alone, however, was insufficient for this proposal to pass. The mean value of ‗yes‘ votes adds further weight to this finding with voters in ALP held electorates providing higher levels of support than Coalition held electorates, with a variation of 14 percentage points. This result is statistically significant with a strong chi-square of 58.959 and an associated p- value < 0.001.

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Table 7.9 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1984 question on Interchange of Powers by Elected Federal MP (2 Party Preferred) Column Percents Elected Federal Member 1984 (2 Party Preferred) ALP Coalition Support change 59.8 0.0 Against change 40.2 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 n 82 66 Mean percent of electorate 53.4 39.4 ‗yes‘ votes for Question #2 Source: as for Table 7.1

N = 148 Chi Sq = 58.959 P < 0.001 df = 1

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 47.1

The results in Table 7.10 examine the second aspect of the partisanship hypothesis that the safer a seat held by a Member of Parliament, the more likely voters will support or will not support constitutional change. Recall that the Hawke Labor Government initiated this referendum (held in conjunction with the general election), therefore if the partisanship hypothesis holds true, the expectation is that there will be greater support for this change from voters in Labor held electorates. An examination of the results supports this hypothesis, where all safe Labor electorates supported this change. This support is evidenced by the mean percent of ‗yes‘ votes, which shows that 59 percent of voters were supportive of the ‗interchange of powers‘ proposal. When compared with safe Coalition electorates, we notice that no electorate supported this change, and the mean percent of ‗yes‘ votes was 35 percent— 24 percentage points difference.

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Table 7.10 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1984 question on Interchange of Powers by Safeness of Seat / Electorate (2 party preferred) Column Percents Safeness of Seat from 1984 Federal Election (2 Party Preferred) Safe Fairly Marginal Marginal Fairly Safe Labor Safe Labor Coalition Safe Coalition Labor Coalition Support Change 100.0 64.7 3.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 Against Change 0.0 35.3 96.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 37 17 28 28 14 24 Mean percent of 59.0 51.3 47.3 42.0 40.1 35.4 electorate ‗yes‘ votes for Question #2 Source: as for Table 7.1

N = 148 Chi Sq = 126.116 P < 0.001 df = 5

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 47.1

When examining the ‗fairly safe‘ and ‗marginal‘ Labor electorates, it would appear that the level of partisanship falls away. No category of Coalition held electorates supported this change. The relationship between safeness of seat and support for this change is statistically significant, adding further support for the hypothesis with a very strong chi-square of 126.116 and an associated p-value < 0.001.

The final bivariate relationship on the ‗interchange of powers‘ considers the alignment of federal and state political parties—that is, were voters and electorates that were in states that were of the same political affiliation as the federal government political party more supportive than voters who resided in states that were of the opposing political party? The hypothesis is supported, however the range of mean percent of ‗yes‘ votes is quite disparate. For example, the variation in the mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes between electorates located in states of the same political party compared to electorates in opposing political parties is eight percent.

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Table 7.11 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1984 question on Interchange of Powers by political alignment of Federal/State Govt Column Percents State Government Political Party in Office Same political party as Opposition political party Federal Government to Federal Government Support Change 38.8 6.7 Against Change 61.2 93.3 Total 100.0 100.0 n 116 30 Mean percent of 48.6 40.7 electorate ‗yes‘ votes for Question #2 Source: as for Table 7.1

N = 146 Chi Sq = 11.27 P < 0.001 df = 1

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 47.0

NB: N=146 as the ACT did not gain self-government until 1989

This result is similarly reflected by a majority of voters in electorates that were located in states with the opposite political party, with just 6.7 percent of those electorates supporting the proposed change. This relationship is statistically significant (although not strong) as shown by the chi-square value of 11.27 and the associated p-value < 0.001. This result was not surprising given the opposition expressed by Coalition State Premiers.

7.4 1984 Regression Analysis

A multiple regression analysis has been conducted to test how influential each of the above variables is when combined into one model. The research problem of this thesis seeks to understand if the Michigan Model of party identification explains voter behaviour at referendums. At the aggregate level, the best measure of party identification is the number of votes each candidate received at the preceding federal election, understanding that this measure is a proxy for party identification when measured at the aggregate level. In this case, the referendum and the general election were held concurrently.

Table 7.12 provides results for the proposed constitutional changes on the ‗terms of senators‘ and the ‗interchange of powers‘ questions. All variables were statistically significant as predictors of electorate behaviour on these two questions (apart from the federal versus state party alignment). In terms of the party identification variable for voter behaviour, the safeness of seat variable (based on the percentage of ALP first preference votes) was a strong predictor of referendum vote (Beta = 0.867 and 0.835; p < 0.05). This variable also shows

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that there was significant independence in the relationship between vote and partisanship with t = 30.240 and 28.039 with an associated p-value < 0.001. We also notice for the first time that the federal versus state variable was statistically significant—the predictive nature of the variable shows a weak causal link with electorate support (Beta = 2.13; associated p < 0.05).

With regard to the centre-periphery hypotheses, both the geographical location and large state variables were statistically significant for both models (p < 0.001). Metropolitan electorates were more likely to support the proposed changes than the provincial or rural electorates; similarly, electorates from New South Wales and Victoria were more supportive of the proposed changes.

Table 7.12 Regression Table for Terms of Senators and the Interchange of Powers Questions at the 1984 Referendum Q #1 Q #2 Terms of Senators Question Interchange of Powers Question Standardised Standardised Coefficients Coefficients Model Beta t Beta t

Geographical Location .070* 2.437 .111** 3.725 (All Metropolitan Electorates) Large States v Small .185** 5.124 .178** 4.732 States (NSW & VIC) Federal v State Political .037 .998 .081* 2.130 Party (Same) Safeness of Seat (Percent .867** 30.240 .835** 28.039 of ALP 1st preference votes)

Question #1 – DV: Mean percent of ‗yes‘ votes on the Terms of Senators Question Question #2 – DV: Mean percent of ‗yes‘ votes on the Interchange of Powers Question

N = 146

Model Summary Results for Table 7.12 Q #1 Q #2 Terms of Senators Interchange of Powers R .945 .941 R Square .894 .885 Adjusted R Square .891 .882 SEE 3.15 3.12 F Change 296.156** 272.188**

** = Significance at the 0.001 level * = Significance at the 0.05 level

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The model on the terms of senators demonstrates that three of the four variables were influential in the 1984 referendum vote supported by the Pearson R-square value of 0.894 and the associated large F-change statistic far exceeding the critical values for four degrees of freedom and the small standard error of the estimate value of 3.625. On the ‗interchange of powers‘, all variables are predictive of electorate behaviour. The models, therefore, allow the conclusion that the centre-periphery and partisanship hypotheses were supported at the 1984 referendum.

7.5 Discussion

When this referendum was initially proposed, the government intended to put five proposals for consideration to the Australian people. These five proposals, which initially had bipartisan support as endorsed by the Australian Constitutional Convention, would make some ―very significant changes to the Constitution‖ and give stimulus for future constitutional reform (Evans 1983: 690). Due to difficulties in the Senate, only two of the five proposals were voted upon.

On the whole, arguments for and against these two proposals were overshadowed by the 1984 election campaign. Despite the difficulties associated with the election, a number of articles were written in defence of, or in opposition to, the two proposed changes. One such article was quite critical of the government‘s intentions. On the first proposal to alter the terms of Senators (Simultaneous Elections), one commentator argued that the proposal in question is to alter the Constitution so that senators should no longer normally serve for fixed terms of six years but should, instead, normally serve for two terms of the House of Representatives.

The purpose of this change was to make it convenient for the Prime Minister to go to the Governor-General and ask for an early dissolution of the House of Representatives knowing that this would automatically now involve a dissolution of half the Senate. However, Mackerras argued that the main purpose of the proposal was to increase the power of the Prime Minister over the Senate. ―Since I believe the Senate performs a useful function as part of the checks and balances of the Constitution I see no good reason why its power should be reduced‖ (Mackerras 1984b: 13).

Views from voters, as expressed in letters to the editor, were similarly opposed to the referendum proposals (Winterburn 1984: 15). Despite public opinion, polls conducted prior to the referendum had shown that New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia would

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support the proposed changes, while initial expectations were that Queensland and Tasmania would oppose the change. However, four days before the referendum, opinion polls had shown that Tasmania would probably carry the national ‗yes‘ vote on simultaneous elections (Montgomery 1984: 4). The preferences of Western Australian electorates were an unknown.

The outcome of this referendum saw four states out of six reject the ‗terms of senators‘ change, while all states rejected the ‗interchange of powers‘ proposed change (although as has been discussed earlier, not a majority of voters from Victoria). Official results show that New South Wales and Victoria were the two states that supported the change to the terms of senators, while no support was forthcoming on the interchange of powers.

Closer scrutiny of the results shows that a majority of voters were not opposed to both changes, as the ‗terms of senators‘ proposal received 50.64 percent support. From the results based on the hypotheses in the previous section, the geographical location of voters (electorates) showed to be significant in the overall result with metropolitan electorates much more supportive of the proposed changes. This outcome would suggest that the centre- periphery theory effect plays some role in referendum voting.

The issue of the larger state was also shown to impact on the referendum vote. More often than not, it has been shown that the larger states of New South Wales and Victoria are more supportive of constitutional change than the smaller states. Results on this issue did show that a majority of voters in Tasmanian electorates were opposed to the proposed changes, whereas voters in South Australian electorates were more supportive of the changes. The number of ‗yes‘ votes in Queensland and Western Australian electorates was significantly lower than the other states (apart from Tasmania). One possible explanation for this outcome is the proactive role taken by both State Premiers in campaigning against the proposed changes.

Campaigning in the lead up to this referendum was not bipartisan despite bipartisan agreement at the Constitutional Conventions. Results on how voters voted at the election (as the proxy measure for party identification), compared with how they voted at the referendum showed a clear partisan trend with higher support for the proposed changes coming from voters in ALP electorates. The second aspect to the partisanship hypothesis was the safeness of seat variable, which highlighted partisan differences. The variable ‗safeness of seat‘ based on ALP first preference votes also supported the partisanship hypothesis, although not enough to carry the proposals for the Labor Government led by Mr Hawke.

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The 1988 Referendum

7.6 Background

1988 was a time for national celebration. This was Australia‘s bicentennial year. Brisbane hosted the World Expo and the new Parliament House was opened. 1988 was also a year in which there was much anticipation of bringing about constitutional reform (Galligan 1990: 498). Based on two years of intensive work by the Constitutional Commission, the Labor Government recommended four amendments to the Constitution (Chubb 1988: 14). These four proposals were the Labor party‘s attempt at introducing a mini Bill of Rights. However, from the start of the referendum campaign, the Liberal Party had geared itself to oppose all proposed changes. As a result of the Liberal Party stance, Chubb argued that where there has been disagreement on proposed changes to the Constitution in the past, voters had been cautious in accepting the changes, and not without justification, as ―in many cases the politicians opposing change have been propelled by motives that are cynical and manipulative, and that have nothing to do with the actual merit of the proposals themselves‖ (Chubb 1988: 14).

On 3 September 1988 a referendum was held that asked Australian voters to consider four proposed constitutional changes. The Labor Government under Bob Hawke initiated this referendum, and unlike the previous referendum, this one was not held in conjunction with a federal election. Like the Fraser Government at the 1977 referendum, the intention of the Hawke Government was to promote and educate the Australian electorate on the advantages of accepting these proposed changes, to what some had called an ‗outdated Constitution‘. The previous federal election was held on 11 July 1987—the only federal election since the 1984 referendum. With Australian voters re-electing the Hawke Labor Government for the third time, the Government would have had a certain aura of confidence in proposing these constitutional changes. Similarly at a state level, the political parties governing the States had remained virtually unchanged except for New South Wales, which had become a Coalition governed state.

The four proposed constitutional changes that were put to the Australian people were:

Question 1: 4-Year Terms – To alter the Constitution to provide for 4-year maximum terms for Members of both Houses of the Commonwealth Parliament.

Question 2: Democratic Elections – To alter the Constitution to provide for fair and democratic parliamentary elections throughout Australia.

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Question 3: Local Government – To alter the Constitution to recognise local government.

Question 4: Rights and Freedoms – To alter the Constitution to extend the right to trial by jury, to extend freedom of religion, and to ensure fair terms for persons whose property is acquired by any Government.

7.7 The ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ Cases

The four questions that were put to the Australian people appeared to be relatively simple and straightforward. However, the constitutional implications of the proposed changes that they were linked to were not (Galligan 1990: 498).

The ‗yes‘ or ‗no‘ case booklet published by the Australian Electoral Commission provided, in detail, the accepted arguments ‗for‘ and ‗against‘ these four proposals. As with previous referendums, the ‗no‘ case focused on the theme that these proposals were about centralising power in Canberra, and that there was more to these proposals than ―meets the eye‖ (Australian Electoral Commission 1988: 5). The ‗yes‘ case argued that, unlike previous referendums, these proposed changes to the Constitution were not attempts at increasing power to governments and politicians. The proposals ―are the result of an extensive process of consultation with ordinary Australians‖ that will mean fewer elections, fair elections, recognition of local government and the rights of people (Australian Electoral Commission 1988: 4).

The Constitution at the time of the 1988 referendum provided for three-year terms for members of the House of Representatives and a six-year term for Senators. It also contained a mechanism which ensured that half of the members of the Senate come up for re-election every three years, intended to promote consistency in review of legislation (Ford 1988: 842). The ‗yes‘ case on four year terms focussed on fewer elections. Legislative change would mean that federal governments would move to four-year maximum terms, with the Senate sitting for the same four year period as the House of Representatives. This proposed change effectively meant that there would be simultaneous elections for both houses of Parliament. If this proposal was accepted, the ‗yes‘ case argued that an environment would be created that would allow for a more responsible long-term Government, which would assist both the private and public sectors (Australian Electoral Commission 1988: 6). The Business Council of Australia supported this view and argued that, four year terms would enhance the Government‘s capacity for long-term decision making and facilitate the making of necessary but unpopular decisions (Juddery 1988: 30).

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Mindful of the ‗no‘ case, the government argued that there would be many benefits of four- year parliamentary terms. The change would ―not touch the powers or independence of the Senate‖, nor would the Senate‘s powers be weakened in any way (Australian Electoral Commission 1988: 7). Examples provided by the government to ensure the role of the Senate would not change were, firstly, the Senate would continue to review, amend or reject legislation; secondly, the Senate‘s power over supply bills would not change; and thirdly, the Senate would still be able to force the Government to an election (Australian Electoral Commission 1988: 7).

On the question of introducing four year parliamentary terms, the Liberal party, under the leadership of John Howard, had a curiously hostile attitude toward this change considering that at the state level, they were supportive of four year terms. The ‗no‘ case, advocated by the Liberals, argued that this proposal would not mean fewer elections as the Government said, as the Prime Minister still had the power to call an early election if so desired (Australian Electoral Commission 1988: 8). By introducing four year terms in the Lower House, it would also be necessary to abolish the fixed six year term of the Senate, with staggered Senate terms so that there was a half Senate election every three years. In effect, if accepted, it ―would strip the Senate of its powers and independence‖ ( Australian Electoral Commission 1988: 9; Galligan 1990: 498). One of the arguments pushed by the ‗no‘ case was that the real intention of this change was an attempt at introducing simultaneous elections, which had the potential to limit the checks and balances of the Senate by giving the Federal Government more power (Australian Electoral Commission 1988: 9). On this point, Howard stated that he wanted four year terms but opposed them for the Senate. His view was that the Government was damaging bipartisan support for the proposal by trying to ―emasculate and reduce the role and the function of the Senate‖ (Chubb 1988: 15). In contrast to the Government‘s view, no matter what the reason for four-year terms, ―its main attraction is the greater discretion given to the government of the day to call an election at a time that favours it‖ (Sharman 1988: 14; Ford 1988: 842). Sharman further argues that the main reason for the Government‘s support for this change is ―the subordination of the timing of Senate elections to the partisan needs of the government‖ (Sharman 1988: 14).

The second question on introducing ‗fair elections‘ into the Australian Constitution was an attempt at introducing equality in voting, as well as ensuring that every Australian citizen had the right to vote in elections. At the time of the 1988 referendum, the ―qualifications for voting in any election for a Parliament are whatever the Parliament chooses‖ (Australian Electoral Commission 1988: 12), despite the convention that all Australian citizens (without qualification) were able to vote. The ‗yes‘ case argued that this change would guarantee all

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Australians of their right to vote in fair elections, and would ―prevent States and Territories from having unfair electoral laws‖ (Australian Electoral Commission 1988: 12). In effect, this change was concerned with abolishing electoral malapportionment at all levels of Government (Ford 1988: 842). One such example of unfair electoral laws was published in the ‗yes‘ ‗no‘ case booklet where, in Queensland, three country electorates of just over 8,000 voters (25,000 voters altogether) elect three representatives, whilst one city electorate of 25,000 electors elects one. Vote values vary by three to one (Australian Electoral Commission 1988: 12).

The ‗yes‘ case argued that if this change was accepted, the number of voters in each electorate would be within 10 percent of the average number of voters in all electorates in that State (Australian Electoral Commission 1988: 13). In terms of the make-up of the Parliament, the ‗yes‘ case argued that the proposed changes would not interfere with the then current representation of the States in the Senate or the House of Representatives, nor would they affect the preferential voting system (Australian Electoral Commission 1988: 13).

The ‗no‘ case on ‗fair elections‘ argued that this change was about the Federal Government imposing control over State elections and, in effect, it would override the powers of State Parliaments by enforcing a rigid numerical system. This amendment, if accepted, had the potential for Commonwealth-State High Court challenges if the Federal Government was to interfere in State electoral matters. The main slogan for the ‗no‘ campaign against this change was: ―don‘t let Canberra run your State‖ (Australian Electoral Commission 1988: 15). Political analysts however argued that the ‗no‘ campaign waged by the Coalition was done in an effort to ensure the National Party‘s Queensland power base, the Coalition stranglehold in Western Australia and the comfort of Tasmanian Independents in the Tasmanian Upper House (Juddery 1988: 30).

The third proposed change was to recognise Local Government in the Constitution. A similar question was proposed and defeated at the 1974 referendum under Whitlam. The ‗yes‘ case argued that, for the first time, the Constitution would recognise the three tiers of government in Australia. The existing situation (still current today) was that Local Governments exist and are regulated by State constitutions. Recognition of local government in the Australian Constitution had the intention of ensuring that greater consultation would take place between all three levels of government, and to ensure that Local Governments could not be replaced with State appointed administrators (Hughes 1988: 16). Local Governments are democratically elected. On this issue, Prime Minister Hawke makes the point that,

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Above all it is important for Australian democracy that we accept the fact that Local Government bodies have authority derived from the communities that elect them, to whom they are accountable and which they represent (Hawke 1988: 14).

A further benefit of this proposed change was that it would ―strengthen the system of decentralised community-based government‖. The Federal Government made the point that this proposal would provide a national perspective in the development of policy (Hawke 1988: 11). Local Governments were that tier of government that were required to implement policy at a community level. The recognition of Local Governments would enable the provision of a wider range of services to meet community needs, and would be an acknowledgment of the ―fundamental realities of our contemporary federal system‖ (Hawke 1988: 12). The ‗yes‘ case assured voters that acceptance of this proposal would not give extra power to Canberra at the expense of State powers (Australian Electoral Commission 1988: 17).

The ‗no‘ case, on recognition of Local Government as argued by the Coalition Opposition, was in stark contrast to the bipartisan support given at the 1985 Constitutional Convention and their 1987 election platform which had included constitutional recognition of Local Government (Hawke 1988: 13). The ‗no‘ case argued that, if this proposal were accepted, it would see the introduction of regional authorities, where the Federal Government could directly intervene in local matters and ignore the states. They argued that this proposal did nothing to protect Local Government bodies from arbitrary dismissal or forced amalgamation (Hughes 1988: 19). The ‗no‘ case further argued that this change would threaten the independence of the States, and ―would encourage the Federal Government to use the open-ended ‗external affairs‘ power of the Constitution to intrude into Local Government‖, as happened in the Tasmanian dams case (Australian Electoral Commission 1988: 19; Galligan et al 1990: 59). The ‗no‘ case also pointed out the hypocrisy of this proposal as the Federal Government was not ―fair dinkum‖ about working with Local Governments. The example given says that the Federal Government ―abolished the Advisory Council for Inter-Governmental Relations, the major forum which gave Local Government an equal voice with State and Federal Governments in resolving problems between the three tiers of Government‖ (Hughes 1988: 20), as well as cutting funding to Local Governments in the May federal budget. The Federal Government acknowledged this point, but countered it by arguing that general road funding had been maintained in real terms (Hawke 1993: 11).

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The fourth proposal had three aspects to it. Firstly, that there should be trial by jury; secondly, that property owners would be entitled to fair compensation where the Commonwealth Government acquires their property; and thirdly, the right to freedom of religion. These rights, however, were already entrenched in the Constitution. The ‗yes‘ case argued that the introduction of the ―guarantee of people‘s rights‖ was due to the limited protection of three basic rights and freedoms in the Australian Constitution (Australian Electoral Commission 1988: 21). The ‗no‘ case argued that this proposal was based on a series of three ‗take it or leave it‘ proposals. Firstly, freedom of religion was not under threat and this change would do more to introduce uncertainty (Australian Electoral Commission 1988: 25). Secondly, the trial by jury element ―would undermine our existing rights for seven centuries since Magna Carta‖, and would enshrine in the Constitution lower standards of rights (Australian Electoral Commission 1988: 25). The ‗no‘ case for the third aspect argued that Australians already had adequate safeguards in the Constitution for compensation from Governments acquiring property—the problems of compensation lie with inadequate Commonwealth laws (Australian Electoral Commission 1988: 27).

The outcome of these referendum proposals saw each question rejected comprehensively by the Australian voters. On the question of introducing four year parliamentary terms, the total percentage of ‗yes‘ votes was 32.91 percent. Not one state or territory received over 50 percent. The lowest recorded vote was from Tasmania with 25 percent and the highest was from the ACT with 43.62 percent. On the question of codifying fair and democratic parliamentary elections, the overall percentage of ‗yes‘ votes was 37.59 percent. A majority of ‗yes‘ votes was not recorded in any of the states, however the ACT recorded a high of 51.99 percent. The highest state ‗yes‘ votes came from Queensland with 44.81 percent and the lowest came from Tasmania with 28.89 percent. The percentage of support for the third question (recognise local government) was 33.61 percent. Again, no state or territory was able to acquire over 50 percent. The lowest support came from Tasmania with 27.5 percent while the highest support came from Queensland with 38.31 percent. The final question on ‗the right to trial by jury‘, extend ‗freedom of religion‘ and to ‗ensure fair terms for acquired property‘ received a ‗yes‘ vote of 30.79 percent (the lowest support of all four questions). The lowest ‗yes‘ vote came from Tasmania with 25.49 percent. The highest state ‗yes‘ votes came from Victoria with 33.42 percent.

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7.8 1988 Results

The data in each of the variables used for the aggregate analysis of the 1988 referendum is shown in Table 7.13. Support for the proposal to alter parliamentary terms from three to four years was 32.92 percent – one of the lowest affirmative results ever received.

The distribution of categories for each variable had not altered significantly from the 1984 referendum. The frequency and percentages of electorates in each geographical location and state had not altered since the previous referendum. However, there had been a shift in the distribution of ‗safe seats‘. The number of safe Labor seats had decreased by ten (7 percentage points), whereas the Coalition had increased its share of safe seats by three (2 percentage points). Fairly safe Labor seats had increased by six (4 percentage points) as opposed to a decline of two seats (1.3 percentage points) in fairly safe Coalition seats. The main difference was in marginal seats. In 1984, the number of marginal seats was equal, whereas the balance had swung to Labor in 1987 (Labor up eight; Coalition down nine).

Table 7.13 1987 Federal Electorate Information (Frequency and Percents) Category Frequency Percent Geographical Location Inner Metro 46 31.1 Outer Metro 43 29.1 Provincial 19 12.8 Rural 40 27.0 State Electorates New South Wales 51 34.5 Victoria 39 26.4 Queensland 24 16.2 South Australia 13 8.8 Western Australia 13 8.8 Tasmania 5 3.4 ACT 2 1.4 Northern Territory 1 0.7 Party Electorates ALP 86 58.1 (2-party preferred) Coalition 62 41.9 Safeness of Seat Safe Labor 27 18.2 Based on 1987 Fairly Safe Labor 23 15.5 Federal Election Marginal Labor 36 24.3 Marginal Coalition 19 12.8 Fairly Safe Coalition 16 10.8 Safe Coalition 27 18.2 State Govt Political Party in Same party as Federal 4 66.6 Office (ACT & NT not included) Government Opposite party as 2 33.3 Federal Government Source: Australian Electoral Commission Federal Election Results, 11 July 1987

In terms of the partisan balance, Labor had increased its share of electorates by four, giving it a total of 58 percent of all electorates. The governing parties in the states had changed

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from the 1984 situation with four Labor led states (New South Wales, Western Australia, South Australia and Victoria) and two Coalition led states (Queensland and Tasmania).

7.9 Question One: Parliamentary Terms

The results in Table 7.14 show that a majority of electorates in all categories were opposed to this change. The mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes shows that there was a minor difference (9.5 percentage points) in the level of support of electorates based on geographical location. These results are not statistically significant with a weak chi-square and an associated p- value of 0.2. We can argue therefore that the centre-periphery hypothesis has not been supported.

Table 7.14 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1988 question on Parliamentary Terms by Geographical Location of Electorates Column Percents Geographic Location of Electorates Inner Metro Outer Metro Provincial Rural Support change 6.5 2.3 0.0 0.0 Against change 93.5 97.7 100.0 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 46 43 19 40 Mean percent of electorate 36.8 34.6 33.2 27.3 ‗yes‘ votes for Question #1 Source: AEC 1988 Referendum Results and AEC 1987 Federal Election Results

N = 148 Chi Sq = 4.213 P = 0.239 df = 3

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 33.05

An extension of the centre-periphery hypothesis sought to determine whether voters in those states that were closer to Canberra would vote differently than voters in states further away from Canberra. Results in Table 7.15 show that voters in ten percent of electorates from Victoria were the only electorates that supported the proposed change to alter parliamentary terms to four years. When taking the mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes into account, there are small differences between each state. Tasmania and South Australia had the lowest mean score. When considering the pattern of referendum votes in South Australia in the previous two referendums, this outcome in South Australia went against the trend. Surprisingly, voters in Queensland electorates were among the strongest supporters of this change at 35.2 percent. The results are not statistically significant with a weak chi-square and an associated p-value greater than 0.05. The centre-periphery hypothesis therefore is rejected.

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Table 7.15 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1988 question on Parliamentary Terms by State Location of Electorates Column Percents STATE NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS ACT NT Support Change 0.0 10.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Against Change 100.0 89.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 51 39 24 13 13 5 2 1 Mean percent of 31.7 36.5 35.2 26.8 30.7 25.4 43.6 38.1 electorate ‗yes‘ votes for Question #1 Source: as for Table 7.1

N = 148 Chi Sq = 11.490 P = 0.119 df = 7

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 33.05

The results in Table 7.16 address the partisanship hypothesis that voters are more likely to support constitutional change due to their own party identification, understanding that the aggregate measurement, based on who the voters voted for at the previous federal election, is a proxy for party preference. These results do not support the partisanship hypothesis with a majority of voters from 4.7 percent of Labor held electorates supporting this proposed change. In numerical terms, a majority of voters in 144 electorates opposed the change whilst a majority of voters from four electorates supported the proposal.

Table 7.16 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1988 question on Parliamentary Terms by Elected Federal MP (2 party preferred) Column Percents Elected Federal Member 1987 (2 Party Preferred) ALP Coalition Support change 4.7 0.0 Against change 95.3 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 n 86 62 Mean percent of electorate 37.1 27.4 ‗yes‘ votes for Question #1 Source: as for Table 7.1

N = 148 Chi Sq = 2.964 P = 0.085 df = 1

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 33.05

The mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes does reveal a difference in voting between Labor and Coalition electorates with 10 percentage points difference. Statistically, these results are not significant with a weak chi-square and an associated p-value greater than 0.05.

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The results in Table 7.17 show that a majority of voters in most electorates were opposed to this change. The only support came from a majority of voters from safe Labor party held electorates. Examination of the mean percent of ‗yes‘ votes provides support for the partisan hypothesis with 42.7 percent from the safe Labor party held electorates to 24.6 percent from safe Coalition held electorates. These results are statistically significant with a chi-square of 18.424 and an associated p-value < 0.001.

Table 7.17 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1988 question on Parliamentary Terms by Safeness of Seat / Electorate (2 party preferred) Column Percents Safeness of Seat from 1987 Federal Election (2 Party Preferred) Safe Fairly Marginal Marginal Fairly Safe Labor Safe Labor Coalition Safe Coalition Labor Coalition Support Change 14.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Against Change 85.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 27 23 36 19 16 27 Mean percent of electorate 42.7 36.6 33.1 30.7 28.3 24.6 ‗yes‘ votes for Question #1 Source: as for Table 7.1

N = 148 Chi Sq = 18.424 P < 0.001 df = 5

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 33.05

Results in Table 7.18 determine whether partisan preference is present in relation to the state versus federal political party alignment. The descriptive statistics in Table 7.14 shows that the same political party as the Federal Government was present in four states. The four ALP governed states were New South Wales (51 electorates), Victoria (39 electorates), South Australia (13 electorates) and Western Australia (13 electorates)—a total of 119 electorates or 80 percent of the total number of electorates. The results, however, do not reflect this distribution with a majority of voters in just 3.4 percent of all electorates supporting this change.

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Table 7.18 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1988 question on Parliamentary Terms by Federal / State Party Alignment Column Percents State Government Political Party in Office Same political party as Opposition political party Federal Government to Federal Government Support Change 3.4 0.0 Against Change 96.6 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 n 119 29 Mean percent of 32.9 33.5 electorate ‗yes‘ votes for Question #1 Source: as for Table 7.1

N = 148 Chi Sq = 1.002 P = 0.317 df = 1

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 33.05

The mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes shows that there was slightly more support from those states that were governed by opposing political parties. Results are not statistically significant (chi-square = 1.002; p-value of 0.317), which does not support the partisanship hypothesis at an aggregate level.

7.10 Question Two: Fair Elections

Question two on ‗fair elections‘ asked voters to consider the codification of democratic elections. As noted in the arguments for and against, the intention of this proposal was to remove malapportionment that had allowed an unequal weighting of votes in some states.

The results in Table 7.19 compare the support for this change with the geographical location of electorates. Support for this proposal was not forthcoming. Voters in provincial and rural electorates did not give majority support. However, there was majority support from voters in 24 percent of inner metropolitan electorates and 16 percent of outer metropolitan electorates. The mean percentage of electorate ‗yes‘ votes provides a more accurate reflection of voting trends with 42 percent of voters from inner metropolitan electorates supporting this proposal. Results show a decrease in support the more removed electorates are from city centres, with a low of 31 percent from rural electorate voters. The statistical results support the hypothesis that there is an association between referendum vote and geographical location of electorates where the chi-square value equals 14.797 with an associated p-value < 0.002.

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Table 7.19 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1988 question on Fair Elections by Geographical Location of Electorates Column Percents Geographic Location of Electorates Inner Metro Outer Metro Provincial Rural Support change 23.9 16.3 0.0 0.0 Against change 76.1 83.7 100.0 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 46 43 19 40 Mean percent of 42.1 40.2 37.8 30.6 electorate ‗yes‘ votes for Question #2 Source: AEC 1988 Referendum Results and AEC 1987 Federal Election Results

N = 148 Chi Sq = 14.797 P < 0.002 df = 3

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 37.7

Table 7.20, based on the centre-periphery hypothesis, provides some interesting results. Firstly, a majority of voters in both Australian Capital Territory electorates supported the idea of codifying democratic elections. Secondly, a very small proportion of voters in two percent of New South Wales electorates supported this change. Thirdly, voters from Queensland electorates provided the highest level of support of all states on this proposal. It is important to note that the results from electorates in New South Wales and Queensland do not follow the voting trend of past referendums, where support for constitutional change has generally come from electorates in New South Wales and opposition from electorates in Queensland. In the minds of Queensland voters were the recent Fitzgerald Enquiry and Electoral and Administrative Review Commission. The commission had investigated the ―zonal‖ electoral system which allowed the majority party to win without a majority of votes. In the 1983 and 1986 Queensland elections, and the 1990 Federal election, the National-Liberal Coalition with a majority of seats, fell well short of a majority of votes.

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Table 7.20 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1988 question on Fair Elections by State Location of Electorates Column Percents STATE NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS ACT NT Support Change 2.0 15.4 37.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 Against Change 98.0 84.6 62.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 51 39 24 13 13 5 2 1 Mean percent of 35.6 40.5 45.0 30.7 32.1 29.0 52.0 43.0 electorate ‗yes‘ votes for Question #2 Source: as for Table 7.1

N = 148 Chi Sq = 38.646 P < 0.001 df = 7

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 37.7

These results in Table 7.20 are statistically significant as indicated by the strong chi-square value of 38.646 and an associated p-value < 0.001, indicating that there are significant differences in voting patterns between states.

Results thus far in the 1988 referendum suggest that there will be a minimal partisan effect due to significant opposition on these proposals (Brennan 1992: 206; Stone 1988: 8). Results in Table 7.21 support the minimalist view when taking previous referendum voting patterns into account. ALP held electorates were more supportive of this proposal. When taking the mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes into account, the electorate trend is similarly reflected with average support for democratic elections at 42 percent from ALP held electorates, as opposed to 31 percent from Coalition held electorates. Overall, this relationship is statistically significant with a moderate chi-square value of 5.357 and an associated p-value < 0.05 highlighting the differences in voting patterns.

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Table 7.21 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1988 question on Fair Elections by Elected Federal MP (2 party preferred) Column Percents Elected Federal Member 1987 (2 Party Preferred) ALP Coalition Support change 17.4 3.5 Against change 82.6 96.5 Total 100.0 100.0 n 86 62 Mean percent of 42.0 31.4 electorate ‗yes‘ votes for Question #2 Source: as for Table 7.1

N = 148 Chi Sq = 5.357 P < 0.05 df = 1

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 37.7

When taking the ‗safeness of seat‘ into account, the partisan effect becomes more evident, as shown in Table 7.22 where voters in safe Labor held electorates were more supportive of this proposal than voters in other electorates. Surprisingly, support was higher from marginal Coalition held electorates than marginal Labor held electorates. However, when taking the mean percent of ‗yes‘ votes into account, the previously established trend between safe Labor held electorates and support for constitutional change continues to be evident. The overall mean value of ‗yes‘ votes (37.7 percent) shows that votes in all Labor held electorates were above the average and votes in all Coalition electorates were below the mean, with a downward gradient from safe Labor to safe Coalition held electorates. As much as the proposal on democratic elections was soundly defeated, there was a clear partisan effect. The association between the two variables is statistically significant (chi-sq = 21.436; p < 0.001).

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Table 7.22 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1988 question on Fair Elections by Safeness of Seat / Electorate (2 party preferred) Column Percents Safeness of Seat from 1987 Federal Election (2 Party Preferred) Safe Fairly Marginal Marginal Fairly Safe Labor Safe Labor Coalition Safe Coalition Labor Coalition Support Change 37.0 13.0 5.6 10.5 6.3 0.0 Against Change 63.0 87.0 94.4 89.5 93.8 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 27 23 36 19 16 27 Mean percent of 47.4 41.2 38.2 35.6 33.4 28.4 electorate ‗yes‘ votes for Question #2 Source: as for Table 7.1

N = 148 Chi Sq = 21.436 P = 0.001 df = 5

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 37.7

Analysis of results on support for the codification of democratic elections based on political party alignment between federal and state governments is shown in Table 7.23. Voters from electorates in states governed by Coalition parties were slightly more supportive (31 percent) than the same in ALP governed states (7.6 percent). This variation is reflected in the mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes with 42.2 percent support coming from Coalition governed states as opposed to 36.6 percent support from ALP governed states. Results are statistically significant (chi-square 12.025; p-value < 0.001) again, indicating a divergence in voting patterns.

Table 7.23 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1988 question on Fair Elections by political alignment of Federal/State govt Column Percents State Government Political Party in Office Same political party as Opposition political party Federal Government to Federal Government Support Change 7.6 31.0 Against Change 92.4 69.0 Total 100.0 100.0 n 119 29 Mean percent of 36.6 42.2 electorate ‗yes‘ votes for Question #2 Source: as for Table 7.1

N = 186 Chi Sq = 12.025 P < 0.001 df = 1

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 37.7

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7.11 Question Three: Local Government

A similar proposal to this was put to a referendum vote under Whitlam in 1974. At that referendum, the percentage of voters in favour of the proposal was 46.85 percent. Since that time, the recognition of Local Government in the Australian Constitution had been a topic of debate at Constitutional Conventions, culminating in this proposal. However, New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia, had already amended their Constitutions to recognise Local Government. Conversely, the Queensland and Tasmanian Constitutions did not recognise Local Governments in their Constitutions (Ford 1988: 841). According to Senator John Stone46, this proposal was nothing more than political tokenism. Stone argued that, if the proposal was accepted, nothing would change as the proposal provides no guarantees ―against wrongful dismissal, enforced amalgamation or the abolition of local government in parts of States‖ (Stone 1988: 8). For Hawke, this change was fundamental to the realities of a contemporary federal system (Hawke 1988: 12). Consequently, one can speculate that, with the lack of recognition of Local Governments in the Constitution, the smaller less financial councils (predominantly in rural electorates) would be supportive of this change.

The relationship between support for recognition of Local Government and geographical location of electorates is shown in Table 7.24. Results clearly show a strong rejection of this proposal. A majority of voters in provincial or rural electorates did not support this change, while voters in two percent of inner metropolitan and outer metropolitan electorates supported the change.

46 Senator John Stone was leader for the National Party in the Senate from 1987 to 1990 and, therefore, would have politically aligned with Queensland National Party leader Sir Joh Bjelke- Peterson

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Table 7.24 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1988 question on Local Government by Geographical Location of Electorates Column Percents Geographic Location of Electorates Inner Metro Outer Metro Provincial Rural Support change 2.2 2.3 0.0 0.0 Against change 97.8 97.7 100.0 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 46 43 19 40 Mean percent of 37.0 35.3 34.1 28.6 electorate ‗yes‘ votes for Question #3 Source: AEC 1988 Referendum Results and AEC 1987 Federal Election Results

N = 148 Chi Sq = 1.348 P > 0.05 df = 3

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 33.7

The mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes supports the centre-periphery hypothesis, where higher support came from metropolitan electorates and least support came from rural electorates. However, the association between these two variables is not statistically significant (chi- square = 1.348; p-value > 0.05).

Results in Table 7.25 show, quite clearly, that voters in electorates of all states and territories were opposed to the recognition of local government bodies in the Constitution. Two Victorian electorates (5.5 percent) were the only group to favour this change. The mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes does not exactly follow previous trends, where larger states have been more supportive of constitutional change than the smaller states. We notice that Queensland (a state where, traditionally, the majority of voters in electorates vote ‗no‘), voters from these electorates provided the highest level of support of all states (38 percent), followed by Victoria (36 percent) then New South Wales (32 percent).

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Table 7.25 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1988 question on Local Government by State Location of Electorates Column Percents STATE NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS ACT NT Support Change 0.0 5.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Against Change 100.0 94.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 51 39 24 13 13 5 2 1 Mean percent of 31.8 36.4 38.4 29.9 29.8 27.5 39.7 38.8 electorate ‗yes‘ votes for Question #3 Source: as for Table 7.1

N = 148 Chi Sq = 5.666 P = 0.579 df = 7

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 33.7

The mean percent of ‗yes‘ votes in South Australian and Western Australian electorates was two percentage points lower than the New South Wales mean, with the Tasmanian mean percentage being two percentage points lower again. The association between state and support for constitutional change is not statistically significant (chi-square = 1.46; p-value > 0.05). We therefore argue that the centre-periphery hypothesis is not supported at the state level on this issue.

The relationship between voter support for the recognition of local government, based on the two party preferred vote for each Member of Parliament from the 1987 federal election, is shown in Table 7.26.

Table 7.26 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1988 question on Local Government by Elected Federal MP (2 party preferred) Column Percents Elected Federal Member 1987 (2 Party Preferred) ALP Coalition Support change 2.3 0.0 Against change 97.7 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 n 86 62 Mean percent of 37.4 28.6 electorate ‗yes‘ votes for Question #3 Source: as for Table 7.1

N = 148 Chi Sq = 1.462 P = 0.482 df = 2

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 33.7

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The results reveal that there was virtually no partisan effect on this referendum vote, where a majority of voters from 2.3 percent of ALP electorates supported the change. The mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes, on the other hand, does show a nine-percentage point variation between ALP and Coalition held electorates with greater support coming from ALP held electorates. This relationship is not statistically significant with a weak chi-square of 1.462 and an associated p-value > 0.05.

Table 7.27 provides results of the strength of association between voter support of local government bodies and safeness of seat. Results from the 1987 federal election show that the ALP and the Coalition each held 27 safe seats (36 percent of the total). The hypothesis here is that, the safer the seat, the more likely voters will support or oppose the proposed constitutional change (depending on which political party proposes the change). In other words, as voters take their cues from the party they identify with, we should expect to see greater support from Labor voters for a Labor party initiated referendum. The distribution of results shows that voters in seven percent of safe Labor held electorates were the only voters that favoured this change. An affirmative majority was not achieved in any other electorate in Australia. The mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes reveals 17 percentage points difference between safe Labor and safe Coalition held electorates. There is also a noticeable downward trend in constitutional support as the number of Labor votes decreases. As there is little variation in these figures, the relationship is not statistically significant and we therefore conclude that there was no significant partisan effect.

Table 7.27 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1988 question on Local Government by Safeness of Seat / Electorate (2 Party Preferred) Column Percents Safeness of Seat from 1987 Federal Election (2 Party Preferred) Safe Fairly Marginal Marginal Fairly Safe Labor Safe Labor Coalition Safe Coalition Labor Coalition Support Change 7.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Against Change 92.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 27 23 36 19 16 27 Mean percent of 42.3 37.0 34.1 32.2 29.6 25.4 electorate ‗yes‘ votes for Question #3 Source: as for Table 7.1

N = 148 Chi Sq = 9.086 P = 0.106 df = 5

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 33.7

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Table 7.28 provides figures that assess the association of Federal and State governing political party alignment. Specifically, we want to determine whether the same political party at both the Federal and State level provides a basis for support of constitutional change. Results show that a majority of voters in electorates from states that were governed by the same political party were marginally more likely to support the proposed change than voters from states governed by an opposition political party. The mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes shows a minor variation between the two groups. Overall, this result is not statistically significant and it can be concluded that the federal / state political alignment had little effect.

Table 7.28 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1988 question on Local Government by Federal / State Party Alignment Column Percents State Government Political Party in Office Same political party as Opposition political party Federal Government to Federal Government Support Change 1.7 0.0 Against Change 98.3 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 n 119 29 Mean percent of 33.07 36.5 electorate ‗yes‘ votes for Question #3 Source: as for Table 7.1

N = 148 Chi Sq = 0.494 P = 0.482 df = 1

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 33.7

7.12 Question Four: Rights and Freedoms

When the Australian Constitution was framed, one exclusion was a Bill of Rights. Historically, the 1951 referendum, which failed to abolish the communist party in Australia, demonstrated that Australian voters do not support legislation that discriminates against minorities (Qvortrup 2005: 19). Did Australia really need this constitutional change, as sections 80 and 116 of the Constitution respectively guarantee the right to a jury trial for indictable offences, and freedom of religion (Blackshield and Williams 2005: 150). Most of the Australian States had similar freedoms in their State Constitutions, however, as in the case of Tasmania, these freedoms were not entrenched and could be amended by an ordinary Act of the Tasmanian Parliament (Blackshield and Williams 2005: 1099). In 1989, in Street v Queensland Bar Association, Deane J argued that the Australian Constitution has a significant number of express or implied guarantees or rights and immunities (Blackshield

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and Williams 2005: 1105). In the Crown v Snow, Griffith CJ argued that the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury was to protect the citizens against those who customarily exercise the authority of government who might seek to abolish or undermine that right (Blackshield and Williams 2005: 1108). The motive of the Hawke Labor Government was to extend (trial by jury only applied to indictable offences which was at the discretion of the Commonwealth Parliament) and entrench these rights and freedoms in the Commonwealth Constitution which would then be binding on all States. However, as Galligan et al correctly acknowledges, these rights were already entrenched in the Federal Constitution—the purpose was to make them binding on the states (1990: 65).

This proposal asked voters to consider adding three guarantees to the Constitution; further the right to trial by jury, the right to fair compensation on the acquisition of property, and the right to freedom of religion. As a package, this proposal was viewed as a miniature ―Bill of Rights‖ (Rydon 1988a: 358). Rydon argues that one of the reasons that these ‗rights‘ may have been included in this referendum is because ―they are already mentioned in the Constitution and the proposals can be seen as merely extending their operation from Commonwealth activities to cover those of the States‖ (Rydon 1988a: 358). If adopted, these rights will bind the States, and inconsistent state laws would become invalid. They might also be used by the Commonwealth as heads of power under which legislation could be passed, displacing state legislation on the same topic (Ford 1988: 840).

This assessment had clear ramifications for the states. The intention of the changes appeared to be to ensure that these three guarantees would not be broken by any State Government. However, from a state perspective, these changes would remove some of the independence of the States and force each State Government to comply with the Commonwealth and High Court understanding and interpretation of the law, much the same way as the ‗external affairs‘ power has been interpreted (Stone 1988: 8). However, Kirby, J argued that the hidden potential to enact laws with respect to ‗external affairs‘ is a power that has enabled the expansion of federal legislation based on international human rights treaties (Kirby 1995: 276). Opposition to the these changes was also heard from the Catholic Bishops who argued that granting religious freedom in the Constitution could have the opposite effect by providing the government with the power to limit state funding to the Catholic schools (The Age 1988: 13).

In light of these criticisms, analysing the role of the centre-periphery hypotheses and the partisan hypotheses should prove interesting. The figures in Table 7.29 show the relationship between the geographical location of voters in each electorate and their

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preferred preference on the mini ‗Bill of Rights‘. Voting on this issue has followed the same pattern with the previous three questions. An overwhelming majority were not in favour of this change, with voters in two percent of inner metropolitan electorates being the only group to give support. A majority of voters in the other electorate categories did not approve of this change.

The mean value of ‗yes‘ votes does however show some support for the centre-periphery hypothesis, with voters from inner metropolitan electorates providing more support than voters in other electorates. Interestingly, the mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes shows a gradual decline in support between voters from inner metropolitan electorates to rural electorates with a nine percentage point variation in level of support. That is, the further the electorate is situated from the cities, the less likely that voters supported this change. This outcome is not statistically significant with p > 0.05.

Table 7.29 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1988 question on Rights and Freedoms by Geographical Location of Electorates Column Percents Geographic Location of Electorates Inner Metro Outer Metro Provincial Rural Support change 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 Against change 97.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 46 43 19 40 Mean percent of electorate 34.4 32.2 31.0 25.8 ‗yes‘ votes for Question #4 Source: AEC 1988 Referendum Results and AEC 1987 Federal Election Results

N = 148 Chi Sq = 2.232 P = 0.526 df = 3

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 31.0

The results in Table 7.30 show the voting outcome by electorate based on state. A majority of voters in 2.6 percent of Victorian electorates were the only group to support this proposal. No majority of voters in any other state or territory electorate voted in favour of the mini ‗Bill of Rights‘. According to the centre-periphery hypothesis, we should expect there to be a higher affirmative vote from those states that have the larger populations. There is some support for the hypothesis when comparing the mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes. There is, however, a variation in the level of support as seen in the slightly higher level of ‗yes‘ votes from Queensland voters as opposed to New South Wales voters. Overall, the relationship between state size and support for this proposed change is not statistically significant.

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Table 7.30 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1988 question on Rights and Freedoms by State Location of Electorates Column Percents STATE NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS ACT NT Support Change 0.0 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Against Change 100.0 97.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 51 39 24 13 13 5 2 1 Mean percent of 29.7 33.7 33.0 26.1 28.2 25.5 40.7 37.1 electorate ‗yes‘ votes for Question #4 Source: as for Table 7.1

N = 148 Chi Sq = 2.814 P = 0.902 df = 7

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 31.0

The hypothesis that voters take their cues based on their partisan preference is examined in the following three tables. Results in Table 7.31 show that a majority of voters in one percent of Labor held electorates supported this change. The mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes shows that there is a nine percentage point difference between Labor and Coalition held electorates. These results are not statistically significant.

Table 7.31 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1988 question on Rights and Freedoms by Elected Federal MP (2 party preferred) Column Percents Elected Federal Member 1987 (2 Party Preferred) ALP Liberal Support change 1.2 0.0 Against change 98.8 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 n 86 62 Mean percent of 34.6 25.7 electorate ‗yes‘ votes for Question #4 Source: as for Table 7.1

N = 148 Chi Sq = 0.726 P = 0.394 df = 1

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 30.9

The results in Table 7.32 are similar to the previous table. In terms of voters in each category of electorate, a majority of voters in safe Labor held seats were marginally more supportive than voters in all other electorates. When examining the mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes, there is a wide variation in results. The mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes from safe Labor held seats was 40 percent support, declining to an average of 23 percent support

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from voters in safe Coalition held seats—a significant difference of 17 percentage points. Once again, these results are not statistically significant.

Table 7.32 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1988 question on Rights and Freedoms by Safeness of Seat / Electorate (2 party preferred) Column Percents Safeness of Seat from 1987 Federal Election (2 Party Preferred) Safe Fairly Marginal Marginal Fairly Safe Labor Safe Labor Coalition Safe Coalition Labor Coalition Support Change 3.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Against Change 96.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 27 23 36 19 16 27 Mean percent of 40.0 34.0 31.0 28.9 26.5 23.1 electorate ‗yes‘ votes for Question #4 Source: as for Table 7.1

N = 148 Chi Sq = 4.512 P = 0.478 df = 5

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 31.0

The final partisan effect examines the relationship of State and Federal political party alignment. It is expected that the same political party alignment between State and Federal Governments will realise a higher level of support from voters in those states than from voters in electorates from non-party aligned state governments.

Results show that there was almost 100 percent rejection of this proposal from all electorates. Those voters from electorates that supported this proposal were from a state that was of the same state / federal political party alignment. The mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes shows that there was a negligible difference between these groups, and it can be argued that political alignment of State and Federal Governments did not influence voters on this issue. The results are not statistically significant.

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Table 7.33 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1988 question on Rights and Freedoms by Federal / State Party Alignment Column Percents State Government Political Party in Office Same political party as Opposition political party Federal Government to Federal Government Support Change 0.8 0.0 Against Change 99.2 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 n 119 29 Mean percent of 30.7 31.6 electorate ‗yes‘ votes for Question #4 Source: as for Table 7.1

N = 148 Chi Sq = 0.245 P = 0.620 df = 1

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Votes = 30.9

7.13 1988 Regression Analysis

A regression analysis was conducted in order to determine those variables that were the best predictors of vote at the 1988 referendum. The model as shown in Table 7.35 was constructed based on variables that were examined in the previous bivariate tables. These predictor variables are: the geographical location of electorates (metropolitan and non- metropolitan); the size by population of each state (the larger states of New South Wales and Victoria compared with the other smaller states); the safeness of each electorate (based on the percentage of ALP first preference votes received); and the political party alignment of each State Government with the Federal Government counterparts. The combination of these variables provides a model for measuring electoral behaviour at the 1988 referendum.

There are two aspects to the model. Firstly, does the proxy partisanship variable associated with the Michigan Model of party identification adequately explain voter behaviour in the 1988 referendum, or are there other factors that provide a better explanation, such as regional differences as described by the centre-periphery cleavage (Dalton 1996: 149)?

Examination of the results shows that the partisanship variable (percentage of ALP first preference votes) is statistically significant for each model and supports the hypothesis that partisanship was a determining factor in vote decision in the 1988 referendum. The t-scores also reveal clear independence within the proxy partisanship variable indicating that vote for or against these proposed constitutional changes were quite dissimilar. Results also reveal that the geographical location variable is similarly statistically significant for all models,

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indicating that the rural / urban divide was influential in the 1988 referendum vote. The two remaining variables—large state and federal versus state party alignment—were not statistically significant, where p > 0.05.

Table 7.34 Regression Table of 1988 Referendum Questions Q #1 - Q #2 - Fair Q #3 - Local Q #4 - Rights Parliamentary Elections Government and Terms Freedoms Standardised Standardised Standardised Standardised Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Model Beta t Beta t Beta t Beta t Geographical .281** 5.04 .338** 5.386 .251** 4.212 .268** 4.728 Location (All Metropolitan Electorates) Large States v .084 1.544 -.032 -.520 -.032 -.554 .056 1.004 Small States (NSW & VIC) Federal v State -.065 -.736 -.143 -1.438 -.133 -1.416 -.067 -.747 Political Party (Same) Safeness of Seat .689** 7.834 .633** 6.371 .726** 7.717 .693** 7.747 (Percent of ALP 1st preference votes)

Question #1 DV: Mean Percentage of Yes Votes on Parliamentary Terms Question #2 DV: Mean Percentage of Yes Votes on Fair Elections Question #3 DV: Mean Percentage of Yes Votes on Local Government Question #4 DV: Mean Percentage of Yes Votes on Rights and Freedoms

N = 148

* indicates statistically significant at p < 0.05 * indicates statistically significant at p < 0.001

Model Summary Results for Table 7.34 Q #1 Q #2 Q #3 Q #4 Parliamentary Fair Elections Local Rights and Terms Government Freedoms R .762 .682 .721 .752 R Square .580 .466 .520 .566 Adjusted R Square .569 .451 .507 .554 SEE 5.04 6.82 5.23 4.73 F Change 49.418** 31.154** 38.776** 46.629**

** = Significance at the 0.000 level

On the centre-periphery hypothesis: coefficient values for geographical location of electorates are not strong; however the values indicate that voters in metropolitan electorates are more likely to support constitutional change than voters in non-metropolitan electorates. The second variable considered whether the size of the state by population was influential in

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electorate behaviour, and shows that large states were not a predictor of constitutional change. The third variable determined whether the state versus federal party alignment had any form of effect on voter choice. The coefficient values for each of the four questions indicate that this was not the case, and that in fact, voters tended to vote in an opposite manner to the state / federal party alignment. The final variable—‗safeness of seat‘, shows that coefficient values had a moderately strong effect indicating that voters were influenced by partisan cues in referendum voting as in previous referendums.

Summary results reveal that each model is statistically significant with a Pearson R-square value between 0.466 and 0.58 across the four models. These values indicate that the model explains approximately 46 to 58 percent of electorate behaviour at the 1988 referendum—the proportion of variation on vote choice. The statistical significance (p < 0.001) of the F- change figure shows that this result did not occur by chance and allows us to conclude that these results support the partisanship and centre-periphery hypotheses of electorate behaviour at the 1988 referendum.

7.14 Discussion

Prior to the 1988 referendum, previous Labor governments had attempted to nationalise rights by binding the states under the external affairs power (Galligan et al 1990: 57). Each proposal failed to gain the necessary support from the voting public. The purpose of any constitutional referendum is for the Government to convince the electorate that Constitutional change is needed (Luxton 1993: 148). The poor affirmative for the 1988 referendum questions clearly showed to the Hawke Government that it had not achieved this. One explanation for the low ‗yes‘ vote could be due to the Coalition seizing the opportunity to oppose simply for the sake of opposing (Hutchison 1988: 8) despite their previous agreement on two of the proposals (Hawke 1988: 13). In response, Hawke argued that the Coalition had a patronising belief that Australian voters were not able to discriminate between issues (Hawke 1988: 13). Partisan lines had been drawn and records show that the Coalition‘s shadow cabinet had met after the Government had introduced the Bill‘s into Parliament and had agreed to oppose the first two proposals and support the third and fourth (Hutchison 1988: 6). However, when it came time for the campaigning, the Opposition did what most oppositions do—they opposed for the purpose of scoring political points. This view is reflected in Brennan‘s comments, where he argues that the low ‗yes‘ vote could be associated with the ‗no‘ campaign (Brennan 1992: 206), where the Coalition ―persisted in virulent attacks‖ on the proposals (Galligan 1990: 501). The Coalition argued:

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Labor‘s Referendum questions are a dangerous attempt to centralise more power in Canberra, destroy the power and independence of the Senate and the States, and foist on to society Bill of Rights-type ideals, already rejected by the Australian people (Hutchison 1988: 5).

For the Coalition, to see the proposals defeated meant that they had won a political victory. Naturally, members of the Government were concerned that the referendum would be taken as an opportunity by the electorate to vote against the Government (Chubb 1988: 18), whilst other Labor politicians said very little in order to avoid the public perception that this was a politician‘s referendum. Hawke wanted the electorate to accept that this was a non-partisan approach to constitutional reform (Galligan 1990: 498; Luxton 1993: 151). The problem with this approach was that voters gave ―undue credence to the fears, doubts and objections raised by those opposed‖ to the constitutional reforms (The Age 1988b: 13). Contrary to Hawke‘s opinion, the Constitutional Commission sent out mixed messages. The Commission‘s independence had been compromised as the chairman had endorsed the Government‘s proposals (Galligan et al 1990: 61).

The outcome of the 1988 referendum proposals clearly shows that there was overwhelming opposition to these changes with the lowest support received for a proposed constitutional change. In the aftermath of the 1988 referendum, those who opposed the changes were delighted. However, they received strong criticism as they were prepared to oppose whatever was proposed, and were prepared to distort the proposals and stir up fear (Rydon 1988b: 16). Criticism was also forthcoming about the electorate‘s inability to accept constitutional change. Despite these analyses, ―few congratulated the electorate or saw the rejection of the proposals as a triumph for democracy‖ (Rydon 1988b: 16). Furthermore, as Hutchinson argues, Governments have been myopic in not being able to recognise that voters are able to assess each proposition on its merits (Hutchison 1988: 8).

Rydon‘s view is supported by Sharman who argued that constitutional politics of both political persuasions has remained constant—―the protection or enhancement of central executive power‖ (Sharman 1988: 14). Three of the four proposals presented to the electorate were viewed in this way, and the Australian people were not prepared to accept so many changes to the Constitution without knowing the consequences (Luxton 1993: 150). In terms of the hypotheses, the variable for partisanship (safeness of seat) and the centre- periphery hypothesis (urban-rural divide) have continued to be good indicators for support for constitutional change. However, these variables were not enough to bring about the proposed changes that the Hawke Labor Government was seeking.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

8.0 The 1999 Referendum Under Howard

On 6 November 1999 a referendum was held that asked Australian voters to consider two proposed constitutional changes. The first of these changes was one in which Australians were asked to consider whether Australia should become a republic with a President as the new Head of State, thereby removing the Governor General as the Queen‘s representative. The second of these proposals asked Australians to vote on whether they wanted a new Preamble to the Constitution. Both proposals failed to gain the necessary double majority.

The two questions put to the Australian electorate on 6 November 1999 were as follows:

Question 1: Establishment of Republic – To alter the Constitution to establish the Commonwealth of Australia as a republic with the Queen and Governor- General being replaced by a President appointed by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Commonwealth Parliament.

Question 2: Preamble – To alter the Constitution to insert a preamble. (Australian Electoral Commission 1999)

The Coalition Government, under John Howard, initiated the 1999 referendum. This referendum was unique when compared to previous referendums. Firstly, the reason for holding this referendum was the result of an election promise given by Howard during the 1998 election campaign. Secondly, the previous Prime Minister, Paul Keating, instigated recent debate on Australia becoming a republic. Thirdly, Howard made it clear to the Australian electorate that he was opposed to Australia becoming a republic. Fourthly, news gathered from opinion polls had established that the majority of Australians wanted the nation to become a republic. Finally, the proposed model for a republic chosen from the 1998 Constitutional Convention caused division amongst republicans.

In effect, Australians were faced with a referendum initiated by a Prime Minister who was obliged to honour an election promise, but who opposed Australia becoming a republic (The Australian 1999a: 12). Furthermore, the majority of the electorate was opposed to the chosen model, despite the majority of Australians wanting a republic. When comparing this referendum with previous referendums, each proposal was initiated by a Prime Minister who supported the changes, and provided argument in support of the changes. Secondly, no formal stance was taken by either of the major political parties, nor were there any clear partisan cues on the republic debate (Bean 2002: 459; McAllister 2001: 247). Government

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ministers were divided on the republic issue. Some supported the republican model; others voiced their opposition, although the majority of Labor MPs supported the proposed model.

In the past, criticism has been made concerning the lack of understanding of the Australian electorate on constitutional issues as a reason for the high number of ‗no‘ decisions (Suter 2000: 148). However, the electorate in 1999 was confronted with a divided government unable to decide whether Australia would be better served by becoming a republic. Thirdly, rather than the political parties carrying the burden of the argument for and against the proposed changes, two proactive interest groups took up the mantle of arguing for and against Australia becoming a republic. These were the Australian Republican Movement (ARM) headed by Malcolm Turnbull, and Australians for a Constitutional Monarchy (ACM) headed by Kerry Jones. The second question of Australia adopting a new preamble was largely ignored for the majority of the referendum campaign period.

The majority of State and Territory Governments were governed by Coalition parties. New South Wales and Queensland were the only Labor party governed states.

8.1 The ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ Cases

The November 1999 referendum was the first federal referendum to be held in eleven years. This situation is unlike other western democracies where referendums are held with greater frequency to help politicians make tough decisions of national importance (Mendelsohn and Cutler 2000: 685). Unlike other countries, Australian Governments have avoided the use of deliberative democracy through referendums.

The ‗yes‘/‘no‘ case booklet was published and provided information to the Australian electorate on the pros and cons of the proposed changes as argued by members of the Commonwealth Parliament.

The main features of the republic model which was put forward in the 1999 referendum were as follows:

The President would become Australia‘s head of state, replacing the Queen and the Governor- General.

The President would have the same powers as the Governor- General and, like the Governor- General, would, in almost all cases, act on the advice of Ministers.

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The Federal Parliament would establish a broadly representative nominations committee to invite public nominations for the office of President and to prepare a report and shortlist for the Prime Minister. After taking into account the committee‘s report, the Prime Minister would present a single nomination for the office of President, seconded by the Leader of the Opposition, to the Federal Parliament. The nomination would require affirmation by a two- thirds majority of a joint sitting. If the Prime Minister nominated a person not short listed by the committee, he would need to inform Parliament of the reasons.

The term of office of the President would be five years. The Prime Minister could remove the President, but would then have to seek the approval of the House of Representatives for this action within 30 days, unless an election was called. (Australian Electoral Commission 1999)

The ‗no‘ case as presented in the ‗yes‘/‘no‘ booklet provided reasons why people should vote against this proposal. The focus of the ‗no‘ case was on the inadequacies of the chosen republican model, and the fact that this model did nothing to enhance democracy in Australia. The ‗yes‘ case on the other hand considered that this model was a closer reflection of the constitutional procedures that were already in place and that a ‗minimalist‘ republic would be more acceptable to all Australians. The ‗yes‘ case envisaged a new future with an Australian as Head of State, whereas the ‗no‘ case focused on the status quo and pointed to the fact that the existing Constitution had served Australians well since federation.

In all, the ‗no‘ case gave ten reasons why Australians should vote ‗no‘ on the republic. These are as follows:

The proposed Constitutional changes allowed for the Prime Minister to dismiss the President instantly.

The choice of who would be President would be left in the hands of politicians rather than the people.

The current system had served Australia well, and the phrase ―if it ain‘t broke, don‘t fix it‖ was given as an apt reason to maintain the status quo.

Many had argued that the proposed changes were minimalist. However, it was pointed out that this model necessitated 69 changes to the Constitution that were untried and untested.

The fifth reason pointed to the division that this model was causing amongst republicans. A constitution should unite a nation rather than divide.

Australia is already an independent nation. Full independence was achieved with the passing of the Australia Act in 1986 affirming Australia as a sovereign nation. This change would not make Australia any more independent.

Many people asked, how will this benefit us? The reply was that it would not benefit Australia at all – it would not create jobs, it would not improve trade, and it would not improve the economy.

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The term in office of the President was uncertain, where if Parliament was unable to agree on a replacement, the President could have a job for life.

There was a fear that nominations put forward by the people for the appointment of the President would be ignored by the Prime Minister.

Why should Australians accept the politicians‘ republic? Political deals would be done where a politician could resign from Parliament and later become President (Australian Electoral Commission 1999: 5-21).

These reasons, which were strongly verbalised in the Australian media, were used to influence voters to vote ‗no‘. Some have argued that the ‗no‘ case was designed to engender an element of fear of the unknown (Sommerfield 1999a: 7)—similar to that which had been employed successfully in previous referendum ‗no‘ cases.

One could argue that the ‗yes‘ case was visionary in approach. The idea of Australia becoming a republic was thought to be a sign of maturity, and confirmation to the world of Australia‘s independence. The ‗yes‘ case arguments were as follows:

Australia has over the past 100 years matured into a vibrant growing nation, and it‘s now time to look to the future.

Australia is no longer a British colony, and the British Monarchy is no longer relevant to Australians—we should have an Australian Head of State that represents Australians.

If Australia were to become a republic, it would confirm to the world our independence. The proposed constitutional changes are minimal and symbolic and would not affect our relationship within the Commonwealth.

An Australian President would have the same powers as the Governor- General. His or her role would be very different to the US President.

All Australians will have the opportunity to nominate a fellow Australian for President making this process more democratic than the current system. A short list would be prepared where upon the Prime Minister and the Opposition Leader will agree on a nominee. This person would then need to be approved by a two-thirds majority of a joint sitting of both Houses of Federal Parliament. This person cannot be a member of a political party.

The chosen model preserves the integrity of Australia‘s current stable parliamentary system due to its minimalist nature (Australian Electoral Commission 1999: 4-10).

These ‗yes‘ arguments appear to have more of a psychological appeal than a reasoned argument and are therefore not able to show any demonstrable benefit. That is, acceptance of this model for an Australian republic would allegedly enhance our national identity. In appealing to the Australian psyche, Malcolm Turnbull argues,

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This is your opportunity to make your mark on Australia‘s history and show the world that we are capable of standing on our own two feet … Tomorrow, we can honour our nation and its people by ensuring that every child can aspire to every public office under our Constitution … A proud nation should vote Yes for Australia, vote Yes for a head of state who is one of us (Turnbull 1999: 42).

The outcome of the referendum vote on the republic issue saw approximately 54 percent of Australians vote ‗no‘. However, reasons given for the majority ‗no‘ vote were not explained in terms of previously failed referendum proposals—that Australians are conservative and do not like change. The dominant reasons given for the ‗no‘ vote were that the majority of voters were opposed to the model (Charlton 1999: 6; Monk 1999: 40) and that voters were disillusioned with, and distrusted, the ‗politicians republic‘ (McKenna 1999: 9; Howard 1999: 7; Murray 1999: 7).

The second question to add a new preamble to the Australian Constitution, was drafted by the then Prime Minister, Mr Howard, with assistance from Senator Ridgeway and poet Les Murray. As with the republic question, the proposed preamble was not well supported by the . The lack of support for this change resulted in the preamble proposal being soundly rejected at the 6 November referendum. Debate on the preamble proposal was scant, and in effect played ―second fiddle‖ to the republic issue (McPhedran and Heywood 1999: 10; Stone 2000: 291). In fact, the Coalition Government ―did little to advocate a yes vote on the preamble until the last week of the referendum campaign‖ (Attwood and Markus 2007: 80-81). The purpose of the preamble question, argued the Prime Minister was to unite constitutional debate in Australia (Odgers 1999: 1) and serve as a nation building device (Stone 2000: 292). Mr Howard argued that the proposed preamble would help in the reconciliation process, and ―for the first time in 100 years there will be a positive, gracious, decent statement going into our constitutional document, regarding the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people of this country‖ (Odgers 1999: 1).

The proposed preamble read:

With hope in God, the Commonwealth of Australia is constituted as a democracy with a federal system of government to serve the common good. We, the Australian people, commit ourselves to this Constitution:

proud that our national unity has been forged by Australians from many ancestries;

never forgetting the sacrifices of all who defended our country and our liberty in time of war;

upholding freedom, tolerance, individual dignity and the rule of law;

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honouring Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders, the nation‘s first people, for their deep kinship with their lands and for their ancient and continuing cultures which enrich the life of our country;

recognising the nation- building contribution of generations of immigrants;

mindful of our responsibility to protect our unique natural environment;

supportive of achievement as well as equality of opportunity for all;

and valuing independence as dearly as the national spirit which binds us together in both adversity and success.

The arguments as presented in the ‗yes‘/‘no‘ pamphlet were much more evenly weighted than those of the republic. In summary, the ‗yes‘ case argued that the inclusion of a preamble in the Constitution would enable all Australians to physically identify the values that unite Australians. Secondly, this preamble would contribute to the reconciliation process. Thirdly, it would recognise the end of the first century of federation and the enduring influences that helped shape Australia as a nation (Australian Electoral Commission 1999: 22).

Despite there being little debate on the preamble, most of the rhetoric focussed on the ‗no‘ campaign. One of the major concerns of this preamble was that it would open up the Government to litigation through the recognition of Australia‘s Indigenous people as original inhabitants (Australian Electoral Commission 1999: 30). In response, it was argued that the preamble would have no legal force, as it would not state legal rules, and that, if accepted, a provision would be included in the Constitution to ensure that the preamble had no legal effect (Australian Electoral Commission 1999: 22). In response to the ‗no legal effect‘, it was argued that the inclusion of a section in the Constitution would ―demean the values set out in, and the symbolic force of, the proposed preamble‖ (Williams 1999: 17). A second attack on the preamble came in the form of the idea that the preamble was a politician‘s preamble and as a result, people were uncertain about what it might mean in the future (Sommerfield 1999b: 47), thus trying to capitalise on the low public opinion of politicians (The Courier-Mail 1999b: 22). Other criticisms noted were that the proposed preamble lacked inspiration (Sommerfield 1999b: 47; Maddox 2000: 561) and that Howard‘s real purpose in supporting the preamble was to confuse the republican issue (The Courier Mail 1999b: 22; Maddox 2000: 561). After the referendum, Mr Howard blamed ignorance and apathy as the main reasons for the defeat of the proposed preamble (McPhedran and Heywood 1999: 10).

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Further argument against the proposed preamble focused on the existing preamble of the Australian Constitution, which states:

Whereas the people of New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Queensland, and Tasmania, humbly relying on the blessing of Almighty God, have agreed to unite in one indissoluble Federal Commonwealth under the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland …

What we find here is that the existing preamble is essential to the structure of the Federal Commonwealth of Australia. To break any part of the preamble would be tantamount to unravelling the Constitution that is uniquely Australian (Flint 1995: 1). However the recommendations from the Constitutional Convention were that a new preamble would be inserted at the beginning of the Constitution rather than the replacement of the existing preamble, where the new preamble would become part of the Imperial Statute (Aroney 1998: 263). It is likely that the majority of the Australian electorate were unaware of this point and, in fact, were uninformed on the full extent of both proposed constitutional changes.

The outcome of the referendum vote on the proposed preamble saw one of the lowest ‗yes‘ votes for any referendum question, with 39 percent voting in favour of the change. We also note that no state recorded a majority, although Victoria was closest with a majority of voters in 18 out of 37 electorates returning an affirmative result.

8.2 1999 Results

Based on the 1998 federal election, the majority of electorates were held by the Coalition (80 Coalition held electorates to 67 ALP held electorates). Of all electorates, 56 percent were classified as either inner or outer metropolitan, 14 percent provincial and 30 percent rural (see Table 8.1). If the geographical location of electorates is determined to be influential in voter behaviour, then these figures would lead us to conclude that metropolitan electorates have the opportunity of affecting the overall referendum vote. Similarly, electorates from the two larger populated states of New South Wales and Victoria make up over 50 percent of all electorates and have the ability to influence the outcome. Combined, metropolitan electorates in New South Wales make up 18 percent of all electorates while Victoria has 16 percent of all metropolitan electorates. New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland hold the lion‘s share of rural electorates, with a combined total of 24 percent.

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Table 8.1 1998 Federal Electorate Information (Frequency and Percents) Category Frequency Percent Geographical Location Inner Metro 41 27.7 Outer Metro 42 28.4 Provincial 20 13.5 Rural 45 30.4 State Electorates New South Wales 50 33.8 Victoria 37 25.0 Queensland 27 18.2 Western Australia 14 9.5 South Australia 12 8.1 Tasmania 5 3.4 ACT 2 1.4 Northern Territory 1 0.7 Party Electorates ALP 67 45.3 (2-party preferred) Coalition 80 54.1 Independent 1 0.7 Safeness of Seat Safe Labor 36 24.3 Based on 1998 Fairly Safe Labor 9 6.1 Federal Election Marginal Labor 22 14.9 Marginal Coalition 40 27.0 Fairly Safe Coalition 17 11.5 Safe Coalition 23 15.5 Independent 1 0.7 State Government Political Party Same party as Federal Govt 4 66.6 in Office (ACT & NT not Opposition party to Federal Govt 2 33.3 included) Source: Australian Electoral Commission Federal Election Results, 2 October 1998

The federal electorates based on the two party preferred vote show that the Coalition holds a majority of seats, while safeness of seat shows that there are more safe Labor party held seats than and safe Coalition seats. One other significant factor to note is that the Coalition held twice as many marginal electorates than the Labor party.

If partisanship is a significant factor in influencing referendum vote, the characteristics of Australia‘s electorates would lead one to hypothesise that there will be a clear partisan effect.

8.3 Question One: The Republic

The results in Table 8.2 examine the centre-periphery hypothesis that voters in metropolitan electorates are more likely to support constitutional change than voters from non- metropolitan electorates. The distribution of results clearly supports this hypothesis. A majority of voters from sixty-six percent of inner metropolitan electorates supported Australia becoming a republic—the one geographical category to support the proposed change. Support was much lower from voters in outer metropolitan electorates (27 percent), although this was significantly higher than the low level of support from voters in provincial and rural electorates. When taking the mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes into account, both

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inner and outer metropolitan electorates were above the national average (44.85 percent), while provincial and rural electorates were below the average. The results are statistically significant with a strong chi-square of 46.4 and an associated p-value < 0.001.

Table 8.2 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1999 question of an Australian Republic by Geographical Location of Electorates Column Percents Geographical Location of Electorates Inner Metro Outer Metro Provincial Rural Support Change 65.9 28.6 5.0 4.4 Against Change 34.1 71.4 95.0 95.6 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 41 42 20 45 Mean percent of ‗yes‘ 55.0 46.1 40.1 36.5 votes on Republic Source: AEC 1999 Referendum Results and AEC 1998 Federal Election Results

N = 148 Chi Sq = 46.391 P < 0.001 df = 3

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Vote = 44.85

The results from earlier referendums show that, in most cases, large states are more likely to support constitutional change than smaller states. Table 8.3 provides results of support for an Australian republic by location of electorate within each state. Based on the percentage of ‗yes‘ votes, results show that majority electorate support was not achieved in any state. A majority of voters from electorates in Queensland (seven percent) and Western Australian (seven percent) offered the least support for the proposed republican model. Support from South Australian (25 percent) and Tasmanian (20 percent) electorates were moderate.

Table 8.3 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1999 question of an Australian Republic by State Location of Electorates Column Percents STATE NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS ACT NT Support Change 30.0 48.6 7.4 25.0 7.1 20.0 100.0 0.0 Against Change 70.0 51.4 92.6 75.0 92.9 80.0 0.0 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 50 37 27 12 14 5 2 1 Mean percent of 46.3 49.7 37.2 43.5 41.4 40.3 63.3 48.8 ‗yes‘ votes on Republic Source: as for Table 8.2

N = 148 Chi Sq = 22.177 P = 0.002 df = 7

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Vote = 44.85

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Results from New South Wales electorates do not follow the trend of previous referendum results, with a smaller than expected majority of voters from 30 percent of New South Wales electorates supporting the republic question. The highest level of support came from a majority of voters in Victorian electorates. Overall, these results support the centre- periphery hypothesis that voters from electorates of larger populated states are more likely to support constitutional change than voters from electorates of smaller states. When taking the mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes into account, higher levels of support came from voters in New South Wales and Victoria, as evidenced by the fact that the average in these two states was greater than the national average. The results are statistically significant with a moderate chi-square value of 22.2 with an associated p-value of 0.002.

Figures in Table 8.4 provide results in support of the proposed republic by the two party preferred outcomes from the 1998 federal election. We need to keep in mind that the Coalition Government under Prime Minister John Howard initiated this referendum. Evidence from past referendums has shown that the party initiating the referendum has generally attracted a majority of support from those voters who identify with that party. The results in this case do not follow this trend. Support for the republic proposal was higher in Labor party held electorates than Coalition held electorates. Overall, a majority of voters in a majority of electorates were opposed to the republic model. Examination of the mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes reveals greater support from Labor party held electorates (48 percent)—approximately three percentage points higher than the national average. The results are not statistically significant with a p-value greater than 0.05. In this tabulated form, statistical results show that the partisanship hypothesis is not supported, although there are indications of a partisan division.

Table 8.4 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1999 question of an Australian Republic by Elected Federal MP (2-party preferred) Column Percents Elected Federal Member 1998 (2 Party Preferred) ALP Coalition Independent Support Change 37.3 21.3 0.0 Against Change 62.7 78.8 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 67 80 1 Mean percent of ‗yes‘ 48.1 42.2 36.9 votes on Republic Source: as for Table 8.2

N = 148 Chi Sq = 5.028 P = 0.081 df = 2

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Vote = 44.85

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The partisanship hypothesis is further tested with an examination of the figures produced from the ‗safeness of seat‘ data. Results in Table 8.5 show that voters from 47 percent of safe Labor party held electorates provided the highest level of support followed by voters from 41 percent of fairly-safe Coalition held electorates. The least support came from a majority of voters located in marginal Coalition electorates with 10 percent of these electorates supporting the republic change.

Table 8.5 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1999 question of an Australian Republic by Safeness of Seat (2-party preferred) Column Safeness of Seat from 1998 Federal Election Percents (2 Party Preferred) Safe Fairly Marginal Marginal Fairly Safe Indepen- Labor Safe Labor Coalition Safe Coalition dent Labor Coalition Support Change 47.2 22.2 27.3 10.0 41.2 26.1 0.0 Against Change 52.8 77.8 72.7 90.0 58.8 73.9 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 36 9 22 40 17 23 1 Mean percent of 50.5 45.2 45.5 41.8 45.4 40.4 36.9 ‗yes‘ votes on Republic Source: as for Table 8.2

N = 148 Chi Sq = 14.943 P = 0.021 df = 6

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Vote = 44.85

The mean value of ‗yes‘ votes provides further insight into the voting patterns of the safe- seat variable. With a national average ‗yes‘ vote of 44.8 percent, a majority of voters from safe ALP held seats provided greater support for the proposed republic than the national average. These results are statistically significant (chi-square = 14.943; p-value < 0.05), providing support for a partisan effect.

Argument has been made that party factors are important in shaping the outcome of a referendum at the electorate level (McAllister 2001: 255). That is, once the party leadership determines a policy line, all other politicians must toe the line. This kind of direction also helps voters to make their decisions. At the time of the 1999 referendum, Coalition parties governed four states (Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia and Western Australia). It is widely accepted that the hierarchical direction applies within political parties through the three tiers of government. This practice ensures that there is unity between the three tiers of government on issues and policy. However, due to the nature of this referendum, federal Coalition MPs were not restricted on expressing an opinion contrary to other Coalition MPs. Consequently, there were no clear guidelines to which the state political parties could align

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themselves. This was a critical decision taken by the Coalition Government, as the usual signposts that helped to shape the decision making process of political colleagues and voters were absent.

The results in Table 8.6 show that support was marginally higher from a majority of voters in electorates that were located in those states that were governed by Coalition parties (a majority of voters in 35 percent of electorates). This result provides some indication of a partisan effect at the state level, as a majority of voters in electorates from ALP governed states provided less support for the proposed republic (a majority of voters in 22 percent of electorates). The mean level of ‗yes‘ votes provides further indication of a partisan effect, with a higher percentage being recorded from states governed by the same political party as the federal government. Results, however, are not statistically significant with a weak chi- square and an associated p-value greater than 0.05.

Table 8.6 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1999 question of an Australian Republic by Federal/State Party Alignment Column Percents State Government Political Party in Office Same political party as Opposition political party to Federal Government Federal Government Support Change 35.2 22.1 Against Change 64.8 77.9 Total 100.0 100.0 n 71 77 Mean percent of ‗yes‘ 46.7 43.1 votes on Republic Source: as for Table 8.2

N = 148 Chi Sq = 3.135 P = 0.077 df = 1

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Vote = 44.85

8.4 Question Two: The Preamble

The proposed preamble was not strongly promoted in the media campaign leading up to the actual vote. As a consequence, little debate was conducted on the issue. However, in the last couple of weeks leading up to the referendum vote, the Prime Minister and Senator Aden Ridgeway47 tried to sway public opinion on the merits of this proposed change. Critics of

47 Senator Aden Ridgeway is an Indigenous Gumbaynggir man from northern New South Wales. The then Prime Minister John Howard enlisted Senator Ridgeway to support the preamble as a means to show that there was support from leaders within the Indigenous community.

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the proposed preamble argued that the wording was poor and not suitable for a contemporary constitution.

The centre-periphery hypothesis that metropolitan electorates are more likely to support constitutional change is supported from the results in Table 8.7. The results clearly show that a majority of voters in a majority of electorates were opposed to this change. Despite the opposition to the preamble, a majority of voters in 32 percent of inner metropolitan electorates were the main group to provide majority support. Surprisingly, support from outer metropolitan electorates was small (a majority of voters in five percent of outer metropolitan electorates).

Table 8.7 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1999 question of a Preamble by Geographical Location of Electorates Column Percents Geographical Location of Electorates Inner Metro Outer Metro Provincial Rural Support Change 31.7 4.8 0.0 2.2 Against Change 68.3 95.2 100.0 97.8 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 41 42 20 45 Mean percent of 46.4 41.0 35.5 32.5 ‗yes‘ votes on Preamble Source: AEC 1999 Referendum Results and AEC 1998 Federal Election Results

N = 148 Chi Sq = 46.391 P = 0.000 df = 3

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Vote = 39.2

The mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes (national average of 39 percent) reveals that voters in both the inner (46 percent) and outer (41 percent) metro areas were more supportive of the change than voters in provincial (35.5 percent) and rural (32.5 percent) electorates. These results are statistically significant with a moderately strong chi-square and an associated p- value of less that 0.05, supporting the hypothesis that metropolitan electorates are more supportive of constitutional change.

The results in Table 8.8 examine the relationship between states and support for the preamble. These results show that a majority of voters in all states were opposed to the preamble. The hypothesis being tested is whether larger states are more likely to support constitutional change than smaller states. In terms of the hypothesis, higher levels of support were shown from voters in New South Wales and Victorian electorates. A majority of voters in 14 percent of New South Wales electorates supported the proposed preamble, and a majority of voters in 24 percent of Victorian electorates similarly supported the proposed

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preamble. Majority support for the preamble was not achieved in any electorate in any other state or territory. Support for the preamble by state electorate is reinforced when taking the mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes into account. The national average of voter support was 39 percent. Support from New South Wales and Victorian voters was 42 percent—three percentage points above the national average, whereas support from voters in all other states (not including territories) was below the national average. This result is statistically significant with a moderate chi-square and an associated p-value of less than 0.05.

Table 8.8 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1999 question of a Preamble by State Location of Electorates Column Percents STATE NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS ACT NT Support Change 14.0 24.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Against Change 86.0 75.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 50 37 27 12 14 5 2 1 Mean percent of 42.0 42.4 32.6 38.1 34.6 35.6 43.6 38.5 ‗yes‘ votes on Preamble Source: as for Table 8.2

N = 148 Chi Sq = 14.929 P = 0.037 df = 7

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Vote = 39.2

The first of the partisan hypotheses on the preamble question is tested based on data shown in Table 8.9. Results from the 1998 federal election cross-tabulated with the referendum vote, based on a two party preferred result shows that there were higher levels of support from Labor party (13.4 percent) held electorates than from Coalition electorates (8.8 percent).

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Table 8.9 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1999 question of a Preamble by Elected Federal MP (2-party preferred) Column Percents Elected Federal Member 1998 (2 Party Preferred) ALP Coalition Independent Support Change 13.4 8.8 0.0 Against Change 86.6 91.3 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 67 80 1 Mean percent of ‗yes‘ 41.5 37.3 33.2 votes on Preamble Source: as for Table 8.2

N = 148 Chi Sq = 0.951 P = 0.621 df = 2

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Vote = 39.2

The mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes shows a similar pattern of voter support. Voters from ALP held electorates (41.5 percent) were two percentage points above the national average (39.2 percent) in level of support for the proposed preamble, whereas voters in Coalition electorates (37.3 percent) were two percentage points below the national average. This minor variation indicates a small partisan effect from voters in Labor party electorates towards accepting constitutional change. Overall, results in support of the preamble question were not statistically significant by the two party preferred vote. We therefore argue that the hypothesis is not supported.

The second aspect of the partisan hypothesis (Table 8.10) at the aggregate level is the safeness of seat based on the two party preferred vote. The expected partisan effect is that Coalition identifiers will support the proposed constitutional change more than Labor party identifiers due to Labor party opposition to the preamble. The hypothesis is not supported. Figures in Table 8.10 show that a majority of voters in 17 percent of ‗safe Labor‘ party held electorates supported the preamble, compared to 13 percent of ‗safe Coalition‘ held electorates. Fairly safe seats show a reversal with a majority of voters in ‗fairly safe Coalition‘ held electorates supporting the preamble compared to no majority in ‗fairly safe Labor‘ party held electorates. Marginal electorates are similar in pattern to safe seats with a majority of voters in 14 percent of marginal Labor held electorates supporting the change as opposed to a majority of voters in three percent of marginal Coalition electorates with an 11 percentage point difference.

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Table 8.10 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1999 question of a Preamble by Safeness of Seat (2-party preferred) Column Percents Safeness of Seat from 1998 Federal Election (2 Party Preferred) Safe Fairly Marginal Marginal Fairly Safe Indepen- Labor Safe Labor Coalition Safe Coalition dent Labor Coalition Support Change 16.7 0.0 13.6 2.5 17.6 13.0 0.0 Against Change 83.3 100.0 86.4 97.5 82.4 87.0 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 36 9 22 40 17 23 1 Mean percent of 43.3 40.8 39.0 36.6 39.8 36.5 33.2 ‗yes‘ votes on Preamble Source: as for Table 8.2

N = 148 Chi Sq = 6.483 P = 0.371 df = 6

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Vote = 39.2

The distribution of results by the mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes shows higher levels of support from safe Labor held electorates (43 percent) than support from safe Coalition held electorates (37 percent). There is a one-percentage point difference in favour of fairly safe Labor held electorates, and a three percentage point difference in favour of marginal Labor held electorates. Overall, these results are not statistically significant, and thus indicate that the hypothesis is not supported.

The final aspect of partisanship at the aggregate level is the alignment of political elites between state and federal governments. The hypothesis argues that similarly aligned political parties between state and federal governments will support one another based on party alignment. In effect, state governments have an opportunity to influence voters within their relevant state. The Coalition initiated the proposed preamble and therefore we should expect to see higher levels of support from voters where states are governed by Coalition parties. The results in Table 8.11 show slightly higher support from a majority of voters in those states that are of the same political party as the federal government (Coalition) by approximately 3.5 percentage points. There is a similarly higher mean percentage of ‗yes‘ votes from voters in states that were governed by Coalition parties. The low chi-square and associated p-value (0.483) indicate that this relationship is not statistically significant.

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Table 8.11 Proportion of electorates supporting change on the 1999 question of a Preamble by Federal/State Political Party Alignment Column Percents State Government Political Party in Office Same political party as Opposition political party Federal Government to Federal Government Support Change 12.7 9.1 Against Change 87.3 90.9 Total 100.0 100.0 n 71 77 Mean percent of ‗yes‘ 39.6 38.7 votes on Preamble Source: as for Table 8.2

N = 148 Chi Sq = 0.492 P = 0.483 df = 1

Total Mean Percent of Electorate Yes Vote = 39.2

8.5 1999 Regression Analysis

As with each previous referendum, a regression analysis has been undertaken examining those variables included in the bivariate analysis in the previous section. This analysis allows us to examine the interrelationship between referendum vote and partisanship, as well as to determine whether the geographical location and State linked with each electorate was influential in referendum vote choice.

The multiple regression model for the republic question as shown in Table 8.12, indicates that there are two statistically significant variables that were influential on the ‗yes‘ vote for an Australian Republic at the aggregate level. Firstly, the geographical location of electorates was a key determinant of voting preferences. The coefficient of 0.587 for geographical location indicates that voters from metropolitan electorates were more likely to support this proposed constitutional change than voters from provincial or rural electorates. This result was significant with a p-value < 0.001. The correlation figure between ‗yes‘ vote and geographical location is further indication of the influential nature of this variable. The Pearson R-value is quite strong (0.643) and with the associated p-value < 0.001 provides evidence of the significance of the geographical location of voters within their various electorates, and therefore support for the centre-periphery hypothesis.

The second statistically significant variable was the respective location of voters by state. The proposed centre-periphery hypothesis is that voters from the larger states (New South Wales and Victoria) are more likely to accept constitutional change than voters from the

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smaller states. This hypothesis is supported on the republic question with a coefficient of 0.374 and an associated significance level at < 0.001.

A further variable of interest and of focus for this research, is the partisanship variable based on the percentage of first preference votes each Labor party candidate received at the 1998 Federal election. Within the regression model, this variable allows us to test whether our proxy measure of party identification, at the aggregate level, was influential in acceptance of constitutional change through the referendum. It is important to acknowledge, that one of the difficulties surrounding this referendum, is that Prime Minister John Howard was not supportive of the Australian Republic proposal. The Labor party, on the other hand, was united in its support for an Australian Republic. Results however, indicate that partisanship was not statistically significant. The small positive coefficient of 0.048 and associated p > 0.05 indicate that Labor party voters (identifiers) were no more supportive of this proposed constitutional change than non-Labor party voters. The other variable in this model was not statistically significant.

Overall, the model explains approximately 56 percent of the variance in acceptance of the proposed constitutional change (‗yes‘ vote) by the Australian electorate (Pearson R-square = 0.561) as explained by the four independent variables. The model is statistically significant with a p-value < 0.001, and it is, therefore, reasonable to conclude that this result did not occur by chance.

Table 8.12 Regression Table for Republic and Preamble Questions at the 1999 Referendum Question #1 Question #2 Republic Question Preamble Question Standardised Standardised Coefficients Coefficients Model Beta t Beta t

Geographical Location .575** 9.819 .589** 10.992 (All Metropolitan Electorates) Large States v Small .374** 6.594 .448** 8.650 States (NSW & VIC) Federal v State Political .080 1.352 -.027 -.488 Party (Same) Safeness of Seat (Percent .117* 1.911 .137* 2.450 of ALP 1st preference votes) Source: as for Table 8.2

Question #1 – DV: Mean percent of ‗yes‘ votes on the Republic Question Question #2 – DV: Mean percent of ‗yes‘ votes on the Preamble Question

N = 148

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Model Summary Results for Table 8.12 Question #1 Question #2 Republic Question Preamble Question R .749 .795 R Square .561 .633 Adjusted R Square .549 .622 SEE 6.65 4.82 F Change 44.754** 60.296**

** = Significance at the 0.001 level * = Significance at the 0.05 level

The regression analysis on the proposed preamble shows similar results to the republic question model. Geographical location of electorate, electorates from larger populated states; and safe ALP electorates were statistically significant variables on the proposed preamble. Firstly, voters from metropolitan electorates were more supportive of this change than voters from non-metropolitan electorates as indicated by the positive coefficient of 0.589 and the associated p-value < 0.001. Secondly, voters who came from the large states as opposed to voters from the smaller states, in terms of population, were more likely to accept the proposed preamble. The coefficient and correlation values and associated p- values provide evidence for the significance of the large state hypothesis. Thirdly, voters from safe ALP held electorates were more supportive of the proposed preamble than other electorates (beta = 0.137; p < 0.05). The federal versus state party alignment variable was not a predictor of electorate behaviour for the preamble question.

Overall, the model explains approximately 63 percent of the variance in acceptance of the proposed constitutional change by the Australian electorate as indicated by the Pearson R- square value of 0.633 (see model summary results for Table 8.12) as explained by the four independent variables. The model is also statistically significant with a p-value < 0.001 and it is, therefore, reasonable to conclude that the centre-periphery and partisanship hypotheses are supported. It is important to keep in mind that, even though the hypotheses are supported, both proposals failed to gain the necessary support for the changes to be enacted.

8.6 Michigan Model of Vote Choice - the 1999 Referendum

This section of the analysis utilises the aggregate data from 1996 Australian Census with the 1999 Referendum data. The analysis tests several hypotheses associated with the Michigan Model of voter choice. These hypotheses examine certain socio-demographic characteristics

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of voters in their respective electorates.48 Each hypothesis, as detailed below, is based on the socio-economic variables of the Michigan Model of voter choice (see Figure 8.1). In isolation, analysis of a single hypothesis does not provide adequate evidence to base an argument on voter choice as the primary factor influencing referendum outcome. However, each hypothesis allows one to gain an insight into those factors that may be stronger or weaker in affecting voter choice in referendum voting.

Figure 8.1: Sociological Variables in the Michigan Model of Voter Choice

Source: Gow and Stenner 1992: 4.

8.6.1 Proposed Hypotheses

The following hypotheses have been proposed based on the Michigan Model of voter behaviour, at an aggregate and an individual level. The aggregate data has been collated from the Australian Bureau of Statistics 1996 Census and, from the Australian Electoral Commission—the 1998 federal election results and the 1999 referendum results. The survey data is from the 1999 Australian Constitutional Referendum Study. The survey data analysis is found in Chapter 9.

48 For further reference to the socio-demographic variables, please refer to pages 8 and 9.

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8.6.2 Ethnicity Hypothesis

The ethnicity hypothesis proposes that western born migrants are more likely to support constitutional change than non-western born migrants. This hypothesis is based on factors of early socialisation, where people in their pre-adult years are socialised providing cues and understanding within the political culture (Campbell et al 1964: 86). Building on the party identification model, Franklin argues that predispositions such as party identification, race and nationalism, persist from childhood (Franklin 1984: 462). More specifically, it is argued that ethnicity exerts a strong influence on vote choice (Norris and Mattes 2003: 1). As the majority of Australian migrants were from western democracies during the period of this research, the partisan link of migrants has been towards the Labor party. The Australian Labor party has provided a clearer link for those migrants from similar advanced industrial democracies when considering referendum vote choice.

8.6.3 Gender and Employment Hypotheses

Social roles, traditionally, are deeply engrained in western democracies (Campbell et al 1964: 255). The differences in gender, party preference and vote choice is generally well accepted (Trevor 1999: 62). Trevor argues that any differences in vote choice tend to be due to the issue concerned or differences in socio-economic status (1999: 62). Earlier research conducted by Campbell et al reveals that there is a discrepancy in political behaviour between men and women. However, their research found that there is no evidence of difference in party loyalty or strength of party identification between men and women (Campbell et al 1964: 259). Research in Australia has shown that the gender gap is in decline resulting in a convergence of political behaviour between men and women (Bean 1991: 289). One can hypothesise that there will be minimal differences in support or opposition for constitutional change.

The economic condition of the voter is critical to their material needs. Research by Campbell et al showed that unemployed voters were more likely to support the party that supports the blue-collar worker (Campbell et al 1964: 91). Clearly, whether a person is employed or unemployed will impact on their perception of the health of the economy. Weisberg and Smith found that, the higher the level of unemployment in the community, the greater the political consequences (Weisberg and Smith 1991: 1079). The hypothesis of employment is an acknowledgement that social conditions of voters influence opinions concerning proposed constitutional change. We can hypothesise that employed voters are more likely to accept constitutional change than unemployed voters.

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8.6.4 The Age Hypothesis

The age hypothesis argues that younger cohorts are more likely to accept constitutional change than older ones, as there is a visible increase in political participation as the person ages (Campbell et al 1964: 262). The research of Campbell et al found that political orientation towards the liberal side of politics increases as a person ages (1964: 95). However, this finding is not supportive of the Michigan Model of party identification which argues that party identification is typically life-long. This is explained as a function of age in that ―individuals become increasingly identified with their political party the longer they have remained committed to it psychologically (Campbell et al 1964: 264). Campbell‘s research found that the Labor side of politics (Democrats) tends to attract the younger voter; however this age advantage diminishes as the person gets older (Campbell et al 1964: 95). Converse found that party identification intensifies over time as a result of experiences with voting and the political system (Converse 1969, 1976 cited by Wong 2000: 343). We would expect therefore, that the results will reveal higher levels of support for constitutional change from younger voters.

8.6.5 The Religion Hypothesis

Political scientists argue that religious support for a political party is based on reference group membership (Campbell et al 1964: 177; Jacoby 1988: 644). Religion has been a major influence on political behaviour, where class is often reinforced by religion (McAllister 1992: 139). Research by Aitkin found that Irish settlers to Australia were predominantly Roman Catholic, who were disproportionately concentrated in the working class (Aitkin 1977: 162). This link between social class, religion and political party has remained influential in Australian political behaviour. Scholars, however, have found that the significance of religion on political behaviour has been in decline (Crabb 2009: 259). Despite this apparent declining significance, religion still exerts some influence upon voter behaviour in Australia, with Catholics identifying with the Labor party, and Protestants identifying with the Liberal-National Party (McAllister 1992: 141). The religious hypothesis proposes that voters who identify as Catholic are more likely to accept constitutional change than voters from Protestant backgrounds.

8.6.6 The Income Hypothesis

Scholars argue that there has been a convergence in social class (Weakliem and Western 1999: 609), therefore the income hypothesis argues that there will be little or no difference in

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the level of support for constitutional change between high and low income earners. This hypothesis takes has its basis in Inglehart‘s ‗materialist-postmaterialist‘ theory in which income and class are no longer critical in advanced industrial democracies where there is political stability and overall economic security (Inglehart 1990: 261). Australia, between 1967 and 1999. had become an affluent society that was protected by a welfare safety net. Research by Campbell et al similarly demonstrated that there is an association between economic prosperity and political behaviour where greater economic security is experienced (Campbell et al 1964: 19), which supports Inglehart‘s scarcity hypothesis.49

8.6.7 The Education Hypothesis

The education hypothesis proposes that voters with higher levels of education are more likely to support constitutional change than others. This hypothesis is based on research which shows that higher levels of education provide voters with clearer abilities to assess the benefits of constitutional change (Jenson 1976: 30). Education levels, argues Dalton, ―are related to political norms and social group activity‖ (2008: 62). Taking the Campbell et al Michigan Model theory of ‗reference group membership‘, we can envisage that higher levels of education will be influential in voting in referendums. Understanding the funnel of causality, which shows that social divisions are part of the maturation process, the social situation of the family of origin will be of influence on each person‘s vote decision. Shively (1979: 1039) argued that ―children share their parent‘s social situation‖, of which education is a critical factor. Shively‘s research examined the ability of the voter to gather and process information and argued that if party identification is the primary reason for decision making, then education will have little effect on vote decision. Although Shively found that party identification was a strong predictor of vote, level of education showed that the higher the level of education, the more likely the voter would support the conservative side of politics (Shively 1979: 1047-1048).

8.6.8 The Occupation Hypothesis

The occupation hypothesis is similarly based on education and social groupings (Campbell et al 1964: 208). The status of a voter‘s occupation is generally a reflection of their education. We can hypothesise, therefore, that those who were identified as white-collar workers were

49 The scarcity hypothesis argues that where a society experiences higher affluence, it is more likely to adopt post-materialist values than those societies that have high levels of deprivation.

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more likely to support constitutional change than blue-collar workers. Campbell et al argues that occupation affects a person‘s partisanship as it defines the group of people ―with whom the individual works‖ (1964: 254), as shown in the funnel of causality. The occupation factor is also a matter of involvement and understanding of political issues. What Campbell‘s research highlights is that the higher the stakes for the voter, the more a person has to lose, therefore there is a greater willingness to be involved in the political process (Campbell et al 1964: 208).

The methodology for the analysis of the 1996 census data has been undertaken in two parts. Firstly, a bivariate correlation analysis has been conducted which examines the strength of the relationship between the dependent variable (percentage of ‗yes‘ votes for each question at the 1999 referendum), and each independent variable with the various categories contained in each. Secondly, a multivariate analysis has been conducted of each independent variable from the census data. A prominent category of variable has been chosen to conduct the multivariate analysis. This methodology of analysis is similar to research conducted by Oesch (2008) who utilised bivariate followed with multivariate analysis.

Bivariate Correlation Analysis

8.7 Hypothesis #1: Ethnicity

The idea that ethnic groups are political actors, that can influence political decisions (either negatively or positively) within a democratic system, is an important consideration in the analysis of constitutional change. Like Australian born voters, non-Australian born ethnic voters are citizens engaged in politics, whose significance is derived from their claim to be heard as a group (Crowley 2001: 107). Research has shown that, within the ethnic group, there are significant differences in political party support and affiliation (Hajnal and Baldassare 2001: 2). Over extended periods of time, partisan preferences become more evident, where ethnicity ―has the potential to be a highly polarised cleavage because it may involve sharp social differences and strong feelings of group identity‖ (Dalton 1996: 186). Crowley (2001: 108) further argues that prevalent patterns of inequality and exposure to marginalisation in democratic societies, provide reasons for ethnic groups to be conservative in approach on political matters. This marginalisation is based on the centre-periphery theory where the ethnic voter forms part of the periphery (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 10). For Australia, research from the 1960s and 1970s has shown that new migrants to Australia from Eastern European countries had reservations about politics—partly due to the political

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system failing them from their home country (Jupp 1984: 2; McAllister 1992: 145). Many of these people came from countries where it was dangerous to be involved in politics and hence gravitated towards the Coalition. However, as the ethnic minority increased in number, the Labor party made efforts to attract voters from western European countries (McAllister 1992: 146), which as McAllister argues provided a net benefit to Labor. As a result of previous research and the ability of migrants to identify with the Australian culture, the ethnicity hypothesis proposes that there will be higher levels of support for constitutional change from western born migrants than non-western born migrants.

In Australia, immigration has not had a significant impact on the political party system (McAllister 1992: 142). Previous research has shown that party support varies between ethnic groups but, overall, Labor has had a slight advantage in level of support (McAllister 1992: 143, 146). The increase in post-war immigration due to various hardships experienced by migrants from communist nations, has seen steady increases in non-Australian born voters taking residence in Australia. Australia, at the start of the 21st century was one of the most ethnically diverse societies in the world today. Census data reveals that nearly one quarter of Australia‘s population has been born overseas. As a result of the background of non-Australian born residents, we can hypothesise that these people (the periphery) are more likely to reject constitutional change than Australian born voters. The first issue of Australia becoming a republic may have influenced migrant voters and vote choice based on their country of origin. If these voters had fled a country because of a despotic regime, removing the upper layer (the Monarch) from the Constitution and replacing with a President may have caused some fear in these ethnic voters minds and, therefore, they would be more likely to vote ‗no‘. On the other hand, it is possible that a number of these people would support Australia becoming a republic as they do not have an allegiance to the monarchy.

Results of the ethnicity and referendum votes are presented in Table 8.13. This table examines the differences in votes at the aggregate level for Australian born voters, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders, non-Australian born westerners, and other non- Australian born voters.

On the republic question, the correlation result for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander (ATSI) born voters (r = -0.229) shows that a majority of this group was moderately opposed to this change. This result is statistically significant (p < 0.001) indicating that a majority of ATSI people, at the aggregate level were opposed to this constitutional change. Similarly, Australian born voters were not supportive of the referendum proposal (r = -0.618 with

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associated p-value < 0.001). Non-western overseas born voters showed support for the republic proposal (r = 0.65 with an associated p-value < 0.001).

Table 8.13 Correlation Table of 1999 Referendum Questions by Ethnicity Q #1 - Republic Q #2 - Preamble Statistical Significance Model r r Percent of ATSI Born -0.229** -0.295** Percent of Australian Born -0.618** -0.681** Percent of Western Born 0.040 0.032 OS Percent of Non-Western 0.650** 0.731** Born Source: as for Table 8.2

** = Significance at the 0.001 level * = Significance at the 0.05 level

Question #1 DV: Mean Percentage of Yes Votes on Republic Question #2 DV: Mean Percentage of Yes Votes on Preamble

N = 147 (NB: The seat of Blair was not in existence at the time of the Census in 1996)

The results are similar on the pre-amble proposal with statistically significant negative correlations from ATSI and Australian born voters. The relationship between referendum vote and western-born, overseas people indicates no statistical significance with this group. Non-western overseas born voters again showed support for the preamble (r = 0.73; associated p-value < 0.001). These results lead us to conclude that the ethnicity hypothesis associated with the centre-periphery is not supported and that, in actual fact, resistance to the republic and preamble changes came from Australian born voters.

8.8 Hypothesis #2: Gender and Employment

Gender and employment are understood by researchers to be two of the most significant factors that influence electoral behaviour. The view held by most scholars has been that women are more conservative than men on political issues. Gender may influence political behaviour for a variety or reasons. Culturally and biologically, men and women behave differently in a range of social roles, including political roles. Socio-economically, until relatively recently, considerably fewer women than men have worked in the paid workforce, and those who have often experienced interrupted careers due to childcare and other domestic responsibilities (McAllister 1992: 135). This situation is as a result of sex-based segregation in the workforce, which Leithner argues is visible through the number of men employed in the professions and blue-collar trades, while women dominate the nursing,

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clerical and secretarial positions resulting in a gender gap with possible partisan consequences (Leithner 1997: 36, 41).

However, as more women participate in political parties and the workforce, the gender gap is not as clear cut, with evidence of a narrowing of male/female voting differences (Dalton 1996: 186). This view is explained by the convergence thesis, which states that ―the gender gap in political attitudes and behaviour is disappearing as the structural impediments to women decline and the social location of women improves‖ (Renfrow 1993: 119; McAllister 1992). This view is similarly supported by McAllister, who argues that broader social changes within Australian society since the late 1960s has contributed to a decline in the gender gap (McAllister 1992: 138). Renfrow explains that convergence in political behaviour is due to ―a process of generational replacement‖ (Renfrow 1993: 119) with women entering the workforce educated and qualified similarly to men. Renfrow‘s research found that, despite there being marked differences in perceptions of political party policy, there was no substantive difference between men and women on economic and social issues (Renfrow 1993: 127).

Gender, as a unit of analysis, is important in terms of understanding the differences between men and women in society and their participation in the political arena (Bean 1991: 276). For example, men and women have different roles in society and, as a result, have different knowledge and insights into matters that the other gender does not have (Darcy et al 1994: 16). This role, argues White, is ‗two-edged‘, in that, on the one hand, women were central to the identity of post-war Australia, whilst on the other hand, the role has been perceived as restrictive with the view that women should remain at home (White 1981: 165). White‘s analysis of gender however brings us back to the view of Darcy et al that men and women each have a unique contribution to make to Australian society and that, therefore, women will view political matters differently to men. In terms of the 1999 referendum questions, it is reasonable to speculate that women might possibly consider that the proposed changes are a means of further entrenching males in the political process. On the other hand, due to the fight for equal rights of women and subsequent legislation since the 1970s, women have had more of an opportunity to participate and contribute at all levels of society. The role of Ms Kerry Jones in the 1999 referendum campaign, period as head of the Australians for a Constitutional Monarchy (ACM) is testament to the role and impact women can make in Australian politics. This gradual change in the role that women play might, therefore, show that women view many things in the same way as men—including political attitudes—which Renfrow argues is a consequence of the convergence thesis. In support of the convergence

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thesis, Palan argues that cultural transitions have blurred traditional gender roles, even though gender categories remain intact (Palan 2001: 16).

Based on the convergence thesis and a declining gender gap (Bean 1991: 289), it can be hypothesised that there will be minimal differences in acceptance of constitutional change between males and females. This outcome will be more evident between employed males and females. A second aspect to this hypothesis, is that employed voters are more likely to accept constitutional change than the unemployed.

The second variable in analysing this hypothesis, considers the effect of unemployment on vote choice in the 1999 referendum. Research has shown that personal economic self- interest in political behaviour is an important determinant of vote (Monroe 1979: 137-174; Kiewiet: 1981: 448). This assertion is supported by results from Kinder and Kiewiet (1979). They found that personal grievances and economic conditions affect election outcomes (Kinder and Kiewiet 1979: 521, 523). Further research, however, has found that economic self-interest is not as important in electoral behaviour. Feldman argues that the relationship between private concerns (unemployment) and political activity (vote) ―depends on how the individual interprets the nature of the problem and where he assigns responsibility‖ (Feldman 1981: 463). Feldman concluded that ―personal economic grievances are not connected to political activity and have little effect on voting decisions‖ (1981: 464). Feldman acknowledged that party identification continued to have a pervasive influence on vote choice over personal economic conditions. The importance of party identification is due to the stable base of party support from election to election (Powell and Whitten 1981: 394).

Considering the importance of party identification as argued above, it can be hypothesised that unemployed voters are more likely to oppose constitutional change, as any change has the potential to bring about further economic uncertainty.

Examination of the correlation values in Table 8.14 shows that aspects of both gender and employment are statistically significant. Firstly, correlation results on the republic question for gender shows that, for males over the age of 18, there is a negative correlation of –0.70 with an associated p-value < 0.001. This result indicates moderate opposition to the proposed republic model by a significant number of the male population. Females show a different trend than males with a positive correlation on the republic question (r = 0.167; p- value = 0.043), indicating that females were more supportive of the proposed republic

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model. On the question of female relationship to the proposed preamble, the relationship was not statistically significant (r = 0.107; p-value = 0.198).

The second aspect being tested is whether employment status impacts on referendum vote choice. Results show that for both the republic and the preamble questions, an employed voter shows moderate support for both questions. On the other hand, results regarding the unemployed voter show no statistical significance. Based on these results, we can argue that the convergence theory-hypothesis is not supported, as there is a statistically significant difference in voting behaviour on these two constitutional issues between men and women, and between employed and unemployed.

Table 8.14 Correlation Table of 1999 Referendum Questions by Gender and Employment Status Q #1 - Republic Q #2 - Preamble Statistical Significance Model r r Percent of Male Citizens -0.70** -0.140 Percent of Female Citizens 0.167* 0.107

Percent of Employed 0.339** 0.277** Percent of Unemployed -0.070 -0.130 Source: as for Table 8.2

** = Significance at the 0.001 level * = Significance at the 0.05 level

Question #1 DV: Mean Percentage of Yes Votes on Republic Question #2 DV: Mean Percentage of Yes Votes on Preamble

N = 147

8.9 Hypothesis #3: Age

It is worth recalling, at this point, that the demographer Bernard Salt observed significant shifts in population from the 1950s through to 2000. Part of the reason for the shift has been due to greater opportunities offered in the cities. As Salt argues, the shift has mainly been the younger people under 35 leaving an aging population in the rural areas. One of the implications of the population shift is what Salt calls ‗intergenerational tension‘, as a result of the way the government allocates budgets (Salt 2003: 98). There is an expectation therefore that there will be a clear delineation in the distribution of results.

Younger aged cohorts may be more likely to accept constitutional change than older aged cohorts. This hypothesis is reinforced by research conducted by Inglehart. Inglehart‘s

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research, based on changing values between younger and older aged cohorts, shows that younger aged cohorts are less likely to be materialistic than older aged cohorts in advanced industrial societies (Inglehart 1990: 77-78).

Table 8.15 Correlation Table of 1999 Referendum Questions by Age (Over 18) Q #1 - Republic Q #2 - preamble Statistical Significance Model r r Percent of 18-24 0.506** 0.422** Percent of 25-34 0.358** 0.271** Percent of 35-44 0.004 -0.041 Percent of 45-54 0.072 0.059 Percent of 55-64 -0.105 -0.089 Percent of 65-74 -0.014 -0.008 Percent of over 75 0.238* 0.227* Source: as for Table 8.2

** = Significance at the 0.001 level * = Significance at the 0.05 level

Question #1 DV: Mean Percentage of Yes Votes on Republic Question #2 DV: Mean Percentage of Yes Votes on Preamble

N = 147

On the republic question, correlation results in Table 8.15 show that the 18 to 24 year old age group and the 25 to 34 year old age group were more supportive of both the republic and preamble questions. The other group indicating support for both questions was the over 75 year‘s age group. All other age groups were not statistically significant and we cannot claim any relationship between aged and vote within these groups. One possible explanation for this outcome is that the younger age groups are much more open to change and were prepared to give the proposed changes an opportunity, whereas the middle aged groups are more conservative (Lewis-Beck et al 2008: 148). Research has shown that, as people age, attachments tend to take hold (Lewis-Beck et al 2008: 149). As the majority of the campaigning for the republic was conducted by two non-political parties, the attachment factor was not as prevalent. The over 75 year olds and their support for both changes could be explained by the realisation that change at this stage of the life-span will not have any serious impact and that, with hindsight, the changes could be good for Australia.

8.10 Hypothesis #4: Religion

Historically, religion has been viewed in Australia as a secondary socio-political cleavage which cuts across the class divide (Bean 1999: 553). The separation of church and state has

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been valued by all Australians over the past two centuries and, in most cases, the church has had little overt influence on Australian politics. In terms of the Australian Constitution, sovereignty rests with the Australian people which, is recognised by the very fact that any changes to the Constitution must be approved by the people of Australia (section 128). The Christian Church, in its broadest definition (which encompasses all Christian denominations) has no role to play in the affairs of the Australian Constitution, however, religion is considered by some scholars to be an influential determinant in Australian politics.

Australia is not immune to the influence of religious attitudes on politics. Religion has been a cause of division between Australian political parties and continues to be of influence in contemporary Australian polity (Bean and McAllister: 2002: 276). These divisions are centuries old and can be traced back to the time of the Reformation, which subsequently became the source of political alignments. For Australia, the most prominent religious influence on politics was the split in the ALP resulting in the formation of the Democratic Labor Party (DLP) and the Movement of BA Santamaria in the 1950s. The influence of the DLP and Santamaria was such that it forced Catholics and others to consider the relationship between religion and politics (Duncan 2005: 221; Lyons 2008: 438). One of the key characteristics of the DLP was their desire to defend traditional moral values, which appealed to Catholic voters (Weakliem and Western 1999: 612). Lipset and Rokkan argue that modern party alignments were developed at the start of the twentieth century based on religious cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 15-16, 53). Consequently, there can be large differences in voting behaviour based on religion, although each nation will display its own unique pattern (Dalton 1996: 177).

Religious cleavages are exhibited in Australian political party alignments, and at times have been the source of political conflict (McAllister 1992: 139). However, religion has ceased to be an influential factor in Australian politics since the 1980s (Jones and McAllister 1989: 16). Reasons for this are that religion has been in decline and the church has diminished as a focal point of social life whilst society has become more mobile resulting in ―the erosion of community integration and conformity to group norms‖ (McAllister 1992: 139, 140). Despite the decline in religion, McAllister (1992: 141) notes that religion still exerts some influence on the vote.

In Australia, religious groups can be divided into three groups. The two dominant groups are Catholics and Protestants. The third group represents those people who identified themselves in the 1996 Census as either having ‗no religion‘ or a ‗religion other than Christianity‘ (for example, Hindu, Jewish, Islam, Baha‘i). Traditionally, Catholics have

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aligned themselves with the Labor party, while Protestants have aligned themselves with the Coalition (Bean 1999: 551, 567). Recent trends show that the third group tend to align with either the Labor party or with minor parties such as the Democrats (McAllister 1992: 141). It has been argued by some that there has been a decline in the religious cleavage due to changing societal values and, as such, it is now less important in terms of electoral analysis (Kemp 1978: 215). This change in values is captured by what Inglehart has termed ‗postmaterialist‘ values where factors such as the authoritarian nature of the church are rejected and replaced with a desire for self-expression and self-realisation (Inglehart 1997: 219-220). However, analysis of the 2004 election campaign shows that attracting the religious vote was important to both major parties. The ALP and the Coalition formulated policies to attract the Christian vote; and Peter Costello (then Coalition Treasurer) attended one of the largest Pentecostal churches in Australia. The 2004 election also saw the rise of the (FFP) which had links with the Assembly of God Church (Manning and Warhurst 2005: 263- 265).

With the negative issue surrounding the 1999 referendum—a referendum not supported by the Prime Minister and without strong partisan cues (McAllister 2001)—voters received mixed signals on the two questions, thereby making analysis unclear. If Catholic voters are committed to bringing about Constitutional change but do not support a Protestant backed political party, how should they vote? The referendum campaign saw the Labor party and the minor parties back the referendum question on the republic and encouraged voters to vote ‗yes‘. Senator Ridgeway (Democrats) encouraged voters to support the preamble question.

Despite these mixed signals, it could be argued that voters from Catholic backgrounds are more likely to accept constitutional change (no matter what political party is in power at the time of the referendum) than voters from Protestant backgrounds. This assertion is based on Catholic voters‘ identification with the Labor party and their stated aim to bring about constitutional amendment. It is anticipated that there will be higher levels of support for the republic question from those people who identified themselves as having ‗no religion‘ in the census, based on the declining nature of religion in Australian society as there is no direct allegiance to either major political party based on religion.

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Table 8.16 Correlation Table of 1999 Referendum Questions by Religion Q #1 - Republic Q #2 - Preamble Statistical Significance Model r r Percent of Protestants -0.696** -0.661** Percent of Catholics 0.295** 0.377** Percent of None/Other 0.382** 0.243* Religious Affiliation Source: as for Table 8.2

** = Significance at the 0.001 level * = Significance at the 0.05 level

Question #1 DV: Mean Percentage of Yes Votes on Republic Question #2 DV: Mean Percentage of Yes Votes on Preamble

N = 147

Data in Table 8.16 provides results of correlation analyses. Correlations have been provided for the three major religious groups – Protestants, Catholics, none or other religious groups. The results in Table 8.18 on the republic question, show that there was a moderate positive correlation between citizens who identified themselves as Catholics (r = 0.295; p-value < 0.00a) and none or other religious groups (r = 0.382; p-value < 0.001) and support for an Australian republic. This result was statistically significant. A similar correlation result for these two groups is seen on the Preamble question, although the stronger correlation is with Catholic identifiers (r = 0.377). This shift in scores could be attributed to the direct reference in the proposed preamble to ―with hope in God…‖—a phrase acceptable to Catholic voters, but not as palatable for those who identify themselves as having no religion or are from other religious groups. With this line of reasoning in mind, it is surprising to find such a high negative correlation from Protestant identifiers on both questions. The correlation scores for the Protestant group is statistically significant with moderately strong opposition to both questions: – republic proposal (r = -0.696; p-value < 0.001); preamble proposal (r = -0.661; p-value < 0.001).

Overall, we can conclude that religious identification was influential in voter choice on both referendum questions.

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8.11 Social Class

Bartle argues that social class is the pre-eminent ‗long-term‘ determinant of vote choice (Bartle 1998: 501).50 New conventional wisdom argues that social divisions are on the decline. Parties that represent social strata have now lost much of their relevance for vote choice (Weakliem and Western 1999: 609; Elff 2009: 297). The traditional view is that class has been a dominant feature of Australian politics since the establishment of Australia‘s party system (Bean 1999: 551). However, our understanding of ‗class‘ has always been a little obscure. More often than not, class is thought of in terms of a social phenomenon, where the ―inequalities of wealth, financial security and occupation produce feelings of class awareness‖ (Aitkin 1977: 120). Aitkin makes the point that ‗class-in-politics‘ is important in understanding Australian class-consciousness, which consists of three elements: inequality, consciousness and competition (Aitkin 1977: 121). The work by Lipset and Rokkan provide the basis for social cleavages as a unit of analysis, which explains the long-standing existence of the party system based on the traditional cleavage structures in society (Bittner 2007: 937). Conflict created by social division, employer versus worker and centre versus periphery continues to provide a framework to understand voter behaviour (Norris 1996: 123). It is only right therefore that social class indicators should be included as part of the analysis of voting behaviour at the 1999 referendum. As part of the Michigan Model, Campbell et al argue that social class provides the link to partisan attachments (Campbell et al 1994: 90). As Bean argues, ―class is still treated as being of some considerable importance as a cornerstone of the party system‖ (Bean 1999: 552).

Recent debate about class has taken on two broad views in advanced industrial societies. Firstly, as much as class hostilities have diminished over the past fifty years, class boundaries remain. These class boundaries are evidenced by the wide variance in social and economic circumstances within society (Kemp 1978: 2). Secondly, with the minimisation of class hostilities has come a blurring of the class difference boundaries, which can be explained as occurring by absorption or convergence (Kemp 1978: 2). According to Kemp, there are several reasons for the change in class boundaries. Firstly, the world has undergone massive technological development. This has led to higher standards of living and a better quality of life. Secondly, there has been a greater emphasis on education. An offshoot of this has been easier access to information,—especially with the advent of the Internet (although it was not in existence when Kemp wrote his book). Thirdly, as employment

50 Bartle‘s research is based on vote choice in Britain, however the direct and indirect effects of social class in Australia cannot be ignored.

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opportunities have diminished in rural areas, the migration of the rural population to urban areas has been a significant factor in the minimisation of class differences (Kemp 1978: 3).

Other scholars support Kemp‘s view. Inglehart argues that the class-conflict model of politics, up until a few decades ago, provided an accurate description of reality in the social, economic and political realm, however the polarisation caused by class has become less and less (Inglehart 1990: 261). For Inglehart, this shift has resulted in a value shift within society, a convergence in class boundaries moving towards a new type of politics known as the materialist/postmaterialist divide. Alternatively, there are those that argue that class- based voting continues to be of influence. Oesch argues that the class basis of voting can be seen in two cleavages—the economic, and the cultural divide (2008: 331). The economic cleavage in terms of political preference shows that employers and managers are more conservative and will continue to support conservative parties. The second cleavage, the cultural divide, shows that differences are based on work skill and educational attainment (Oesch 2008: 332-333). As much as these cleavages are important, Oesch‘s research found that they do not account for significant differences in voter behaviour (2008: 345).

The following hypotheses are based on traditional ‗class‘ theory, which argues that the social class of citizens shapes political behaviour and, ultimately, how people vote. A long- standing view of class is that people from working class backgrounds tend to support political parties from the ‗left‘, whereas people from middle class (and upper class) backgrounds tend to support political parties from the ‗right‘ (Inglehart 1990: 260; Anderson and Yaish 2003: 419). In Australia this would equate to the Labor party representing the working class (otherwise known as the ‗Aussie ‘) and the Coalition parties representing the middle and agrarian class (Sartori 1969: 74). According to the arguments of Lipset and Rokkan (1967), the fact that Australia has two major political parties is a reflection of the number of social cleavages (Anderson and Yaish 2003: 400).

8.12 Hypothesis #5: Income

Income as a unit of analysis in voting behaviour typically highlights the class cleavage within or between electorates. Over the past decade, some scholars argue that the class differences between people are diminishing, especially in terms of political behaviour. For example, Dalton argues that, due to the changing nature of contemporary society, class groupings around political parties are no longer significant (Dalton 1996: 174). This change is evidenced by the rise of the new middle class who have mixed policy positions, and therefore do not have clear partisan leanings (Dalton 1996: 174). Further support for the

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argument that class differences and voting behaviour are nominal in western society, is the ―general narrowing in the life conditions‖ of all citizens, evidenced by a class overlap in lifestyle, income and social characteristics (Dalton 1996: 174). McAllister similarly conveys Dalton‘s view and argues that, where once, class voting was a significant factor (based on religion and urban-rural divisions), voting trends since the 1970s show a marked decline in class voting differences in Australia. By the mid-1980s, the difference was virtually zero (McAllister 1992: 160-161). McAllister‘s view is based on research, which shows that there has been a convergence of economic lifestyles of the old class structures. This view is supported by Inglehart‘s theory of a shift in value priorities in advanced industrial societies.

Taking income as an indicator of class, and the above arguments as the basis for this hypothesis, we can hypothesise that there will be little or no difference in level of support for constitutional change between higher-income and low-income earners due to the convergence in class boundaries. An alternative hypothesis might be that the higher the level of income, the more likely that these voters would oppose constitutional change as a method of maintaining the status quo, rather than run the risk of altering the societal structure that has enabled them to attain their current lifestyle.

The data in Table 8.17 records results after collapsing census figure data for income into three categories. These are: low income earners with a negative income to $399 per week; middle-income earners with an income of $400 to $799 per week; and high-income earners with an income from $800 to greater than $1000 per week.

Table 8.17 Correlation Table of 1999 Referendum Questions by Income Q #1 - Republic Q #2 - Preamble Statistical Significance Model r r Percent of Low Income -0.59** -0.55** (negative to $399/week) Percent of Middle Income 0.35** 0.38** ($400 to $799/week) Percent of High Income 0.60** 0.54** ($800 to more than $1000/week) Source: as for Table 8.2

** = Significance at the 0.001 level * = Significance at the 0.05 level

Question #1 DV: Mean Percentage of Yes Votes on Republic Question #2 DV: Mean Percentage of Yes Votes on Preamble

N = 147

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Correlation results in Table 8.17 on the proposed republic and preamble questions are interesting. Voters from the lowest income-earning group (negative income to $399 per week) show a statistically significant negative correlation (r = -0.586). Voters from the middle and high income-earning groups both show statistically significant positive correlations. However, the correlation value is much higher for the higher income group (almost the exact opposite as the low income earning group). This result causes one to consider whether there is a class divide on referendum issues. The correlation results on the republic issue are similarly reflected on the preamble question with the same level of significance.

Citizens from the census who did not state their income still recorded a positive correlation on both questions, although statistical significance (p < 0.05) occurred on the republic question only.

8.13 Hypothesis #6: Education

Education has a profound impact on political behaviour, understanding of class differences and partisan preference (Campbell et al 1964: 251). As the level of education increases, so too does one‘s understanding of societal structure and the machinery that governs the structure. This hypothesis proposes that the higher the level of education, the more these voters would understand that change is necessary if crucial instruments of society, such as the constitution, are to remain relevant in contemporary society (Emy and Hughes 1991: 294). Hence, voters with a higher education are more likely to accept constitutional change than voters with a lower education, as they will understand the importance and necessity of the change.

Higher levels of education, however, do not always mean that change will be adopted by society as a whole. Inglehart has argued that, as advanced industrial societies such as Australia have become more secure, the level of education within younger aged cohorts has resulted in the ability of parents to give (pay for) their children a better education (Abramson and Inglehart 1995: 75). The result is that through generational replacement, the overall level of education within society increases. One of the distinct values that education taps is the ability of people to acquire information (Abramson and Inglehart 1995: 86). With a plethora of information available to Australians in the lead up to the 1999 referendum, the expectation is that those voters who have the ability to process and understand the intricacies of the arguments for and against the proposed constitutional changes will make a more

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informed decision. In keeping with the current constitutional structure of a Constitutional Monarchy (Galligan 1995: 21), the rationale for the proposed model of an Australian Republic was based on keeping as much of the current structure as possible—otherwise known as a minimalist Republic. However, there are some who argued that this was an elitist model that entrenches the control and dominance of government within a select group of society (O'Brien 1995: 41-42). In support of the elitist view, Patrick O‘Brien points out that the model put forward by the ARM was, in their opinion the best model for the people to understand, as any shift from what is known would confuse the people and cloud debate (O'Brien 1995: 43). From a different perspective, this view is reinforced by Inglehart‘s argument that advanced industrial societies have become more ‗elite directed‘ due to a dramatic rise in the level of education, despite the fact that it has become easier for the mass public to become more involved in politics (Inglehart 1990: 335-336).

Based on these arguments, the education hypothesis contends that higher levels of education provide greater acceptance of constitutional change due to, what Campbell et al argue, provides feelings of greater confidence in the political process (Campbell et al 1964: 253). The rise in education levels in Australia has effectively given the capacity for some to handle abstractions and provide more of a willingness to accept change. Here, Kemp argues that ―for the more educated… change and response to new claims is easier … the more educated have higher status, are more articulate, and hence are more likely to be opinion leaders‖ (Kemp 1978: 327-329; Campbell et al 1964: 251).

Table 8.18 Correlation Table of 1999 Referendum Questions by Education Q #1 - Republic Q #2 - Preamble Statistical Significance Model r r Percent of Higher Degrees, 0.80** 0.68** Graduate Diplomas, Post Bach Percent of Undergrads, 0.21* 0.25* Associate Diplomas Percent of Skilled and -0.78** -0.70** Basic Vocational Education Percent of No education, -0.48** -0.39** Inadequate or not stated Source: as for Table 8.2

** = Significance at the 0.001 level * = Significance at the 0.05 level

Question #1 DV: Mean Percentage of Yes Votes on Republic Question #2 DV: Mean Percentage of Yes Votes on Preamble

N = 147

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Correlation results in Table 8.18 support the above arguments that more highly educated voters are more likely to support constitutional change. Voters with higher degrees, graduate diplomas or post-bachelor degrees showed a statistically significant positive correlation of 0.793 on the republic question and 0.683 on the preamble question. Those with undergraduate degrees or associate diplomas also showed a statistically significant correlation in support of both the republic and the preamble questions at 0.208 and 0.246 respectively. The remaining two groups—voters with a ‗skilled and or basic vocational education‘, and voters who did not provide adequate information or their education—were statistically significant with corresponding negative correlations on both questions. These voters are almost the reverse of those from the higher education group, indicating a clear rejection of the republic and preamble proposals.

8.14 Hypothesis #7: Occupation

There has been a view among political scientists since the 1970s that there has been diminishing effect of class in Australia (McAllister 1992: 157-161), the result of which can be attributed to an overall increase in materialism. This increase in materialism has led to an interaction between the traditional class boundaries—especially in the work context (Kemp 1978: 4). Despite the fact that Kemp‘s main work was published in 1978, his point continues to be applicable. Kemp, in citing Wedderburn, argues that,

Technological change has been viewed as producing ―a narrowing of traditional differentiation in terms of job content. What have hitherto been manual jobs, albeit with a high degree of skill, have an increasing conceptual content, and an increasing emphasis on formal knowledge…In the future there may develop a new strata of workers whose special employment conditions will be closer to, or the same as, ‗white-collar‘ conditions (Kemp 1978: 4).

This hypothesis argues that white-collar (managerial, professional based) workers are more likely to accept constitutional change than blue-collar (construction, manual labour, service industry) workers.

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Table 8.19 Correlation Table of 1999 Referendum Questions by Occupation Q #1 - Republic Q #2 - Preamble Statistical Significance Model r r Percent of Professional, 0.44** 0.33** Managerial, Administrators Percent of Clerical, Sales 0.35** 0.41** and Service Percent of Trade, Labour, -0.62** -0.53** Transport Percent of Occupation not -0.20* -0.20* Stated or missing Source: as for Table 8.2

** = Significance at the 0.001 level * = Significance at the 0.05 level

Question #1 DV: Mean Percentage of Yes Votes on Republic Question #2 DV: Mean Percentage of Yes Votes on Preamble

N = 147

Correlation results in Table 8.19 show that a positive relationship exists on both referendum questions between those with white-collar occupations (at both the professional/managerial level and at the clerical/sales level). This relationship is statistically significant (p < 0.000), providing support for the above hypothesis. Those people from a blue-collar occupation show a statistically significant negative correlation to both the republic and preamble questions. Similarly, people who did not report their occupation (whether intentional or by mistake) also show a negative correlation, although not as statistically significant (p < 0.05 for both questions). The majority of this group could primarily be made up of retired people or parents at home raising a family.

8.15 Regression Analysis of Census Data

Each of the above correlation analyses have consisted of two or more categories within each variable. To conduct a multivariate analysis for each of these variables, inclusive of all categories, would have led to statistical errors due to multi-colinearity. In order to conduct this analysis, just one key indicator from each variable has been included in the multivariate analysis. In each case, the chosen indicator represents a particular subset of the variable and is based on strength of the correlation.

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Table 8.20 Regression Table of 1999 Referendum Question on Republic Q #1: Republic Statistical Significance Model r Beta t % of Australian Born -0.638 -0.332** -6.294 % of male citizens -0.462 -0.114* -2.430 % of employed 0.225 -0.288** -3.663 % of young (18-24) citizens 0.474 -0.023 -0.464 % of none or other religion 0.462 -0.039 -0.763 % of higher degrees/post grad 0.793 0.584** 8.710 % of low income (under -0.586 -0.271* -2.702 $400/w) Source: as for Table 8.2

Question #1 DV: Mean Percentage of Yes Votes on Republic

Model Summary Results for Table 8.20 R 0.89 R Square 0.79 Adjusted R Square 0.78 SEE 4.64 F Change 75.793**

** = Significance at the 0.001 level * = Significance at the 0.05 level

Based on the results in the bivariate correlations, the regression model utilising the variables ‗Australian born‘, ‗males over 18 years‘, ‗employed citizens‘, ‗18 to 24 year olds‘, ‗belonging to none or other religious groups‘, have a reported low income, and have a higher degree. These groups make up the following average percentages per electorate: Australian born people represent 75.9 percent; male citizens make up 48.7 percent; employed workers represent 90.6 percent; 18 to 24 year olds make up 13.7 percent; those from ‗none‘ or ‗other‘ (non-Christian) religions are 29.6 percent; higher degree/post graduates make up 23.1 percent; and low income earners (less than $400 per week) represent 57.5 percent.

Correlation and regression results in Table 8.20 are consistent with the bivariate correlation results. An overall observation shows that five of the seven variables are statistically significant where p < 0.05. Of these five variables, Australian born, employed, on a low income of less than $400 per week, male citizens were (are) the most statistically significant predictors of vote against the republic referendum question. The only variable that showed support for the republic question, when controlled by all other variables, is higher education. Age and religion were found to be of no statistical significance.

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The model summary results for the percentage of people within each electorate that favoured the proposed constitutional change on the republic question explains 89 percent of the variance (R-square = 0.79) with a statistical significance of p < 0.001. Therefore, we can argue that, based on the chosen variables, the outcome on the republic question did not occur by chance.

Correlation and regression results for the preamble question are shown in Table 8.21. Overall, these results are not dissimilar to the republic question. The model summary statistics show that the chosen variables account for 86 percent of the variance on the preamble question (R-square = 0.74) with an associated p-value < 0.001.

Table 8.21 Regression Table of 1999 Referendum Question on Preamble Q #2: PREAMBLE Statistical Significance Model r Beta t % of Australian Born -0.678 -0.545** -9.366 % of male citizens -0.500 -0.207** -3.999 % of employed 0.244 -0.204* -2.349 % of young (18-24) citizens 0.411 -0.100* -1.813 % of none or other religion 0.307 -0.227** -3.988 % of higher degrees/post grad 0.683 0.411** 5.551 % of low income (under -0.545 -0.284* -2.564 $400/w) Source: as for Table 8.2

Question #2 DV: Mean Percentage of Yes Votes on Preamble

Model Summary Results for Table 8.21 R 0.86 R Square 0.74 Adjusted R Square 0.73 SEE 3.96 F Change 58.75**

** = Significance at the 0.000 level * = Significance at the 0.05 level

Of these five variables, Australian born, employed, on a low income of less than $400 per week, male citizens belonging to no religious group were (are) the most statistically significant predictors of vote against the preamble referendum question. As with the republic question, the only variable that showed support for the preamble question when controlled by all other variables, is higher education. Age was the only variable found to be of no statistical significance.

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In order to make a comparison with survey data, this research has made use of the first ever Australian survey conducted immediately preceding the 1999 referendum—the 1999 Australian Constitutional Referendum Study (ACRS).

Aggregate data analysis has been criticised for not being truly representative of individuals. This argument is based upon what is known as the ecological inference fallacy, as it is argued that the application of aggregate data analysis results do not always provide an accurate reflection of individual behaviour. King, however, argues that aggregate data can be a useful source of information not only about populations, but also how individuals within the population behave (King 2000: 341). Katz and King further argue that survey research has enormous advantages for studying individual level preferences. However, this type of analysis in isolation fails to capture the electoral politics. ―As such, they are often best completed with studies of aggregate electoral returns (Katz and King 1999: 15).

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Chapter Nine

9.0 The 1999 Australian Constitutional Referendum Study

This section uses both aggregate and survey level data providing a comparative analysis of the voter behaviour from the 1999 constitutional referendum. Aggregate data used is from the 1999 Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) electoral data, and the 1996 Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) census data. The survey data used is the 1999 Australian Constitutional Referendum Survey (ACRS).

In this section on the 1999 referendum, an analysis has been conducted using similar representative variables from the 1999 ACRS. This approach allows close comparison with the aggregate data, and allows one to establish a link with the aggregate results. Due to the detail contained in the 1999 ACRS, further analyses have been undertaken in order to provide evidence for or against the Michigan Model of voter behaviour in referendum voting.

The 1999 ACRS data also allows direct analysis of the Michigan Model of electoral behaviour, while the aggregate data allowed for an indirect analysis. For example, the chosen variable from the aggregate data (percentage of electorate first preference votes received by each candidate at the previous federal election to the referendum) acted as a proxy for party identification.

A representation of the univariate results from the 1999 ACRS is shown in Table 9.1.

Table 9.1 1998 Federal Electorate Information (Frequency and Percents) [Over 3 pages] Category Frequency Percent

Geographical Location Inner Metro 634 27.4 Outer Metro 650 28.1 Provincial 298 12.9 Rural 702 30.4 Missing 28 1.2

State Electorates New South Wales 763 33.0 Victoria 584 25.3 Queensland 410 17.8 Western Australia 216 8.2 South Australia 190 9.4 Tasmania 60 2.6 ACT 239 1.7 Northern Territory 120 0.9 Missing 28 1.2

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Category Frequency Percent

Who Voted For Last Election ALP 874 37.8 Coalition 962 41.6 Minor 234 10.1 One Nation 88 3.8 Not Vote 68 2.9 Missing 86 3.7

Party Identification ALP 870 37.6 Coalition 786 34.0 Nationals 78 3.4 Democrats 84 3.6 Greens 51 2.2 One Nation 46 2.0 Other party 11 0.5 No party 308 13.3 Missing 78 3.4

Republic Referendum Vote Yes 1052 45.5 No 1126 48.7 Missing 134 5.8

Preamble Referendum Vote Yes 796 34.5 No 1352 58.5 Missing 163 7.0

Gender Males 1091 47.2 Females 1216 52.6 Missing 5 0.2

Religion ID Roman Catholic 602 26.1 Protestant 983 42.6 None/Other 672 29.1 Missing 53 2.3

Ethnicity Australian Born 1683 76.9 Western Born Overseas 206 15.0 Non Western Born Overseas 178 8.1 Missing 122 5.3

Occupation Blue-collar 496 21.5 White-collar/Others 1815 78.5

Annual Income $0 to $20 000 533 23.0 $20 001 to $45 000 591 25.6 $45 001 or more 937 40.6 Missing 250 10.8

Age Groups 18 to 24 274 11.8 25 to 34 377 16.3 35 to 44 421 18.2 45 to 54 424 18.4 55 to 64 277 12.0 Over 65 334 14.4 Missing 204 8.8

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Category Frequency Percent

Highest Education Tertiary Degree/Postgraduates 398 17.2 Diploma & Non Trade Qualification 507 21.9 Trade Qualification 444 19.2 No Tertiary Qualification 811 35.1 Missing 151 6.5

Source: 1999 Australian Constitutional Referendum Study (ACRS)

In order to provide the above results recoding was necessary. The recoding of each variable into the various categories has been done in order to achieve as close as possible a representation of the categories as found in the aggregate results. In terms of the distribution of results within each variable, there is a comparative balance in most of the socio-economic variables. Other variables that assess fixed physical characteristics are presented without any manipulation apart from recoding to replicate the aggregate variable categories.

Using the same approach as in previous chapters, an analysis of the relationship between ‗support for the proposed republic‘ by the geographical location of respondents has been conducted. Results in Table 9.2 show that respondents from inner metropolitan areas were more supportive than respondents from all other areas (59 percent). The highest level of opposition came from respondents in rural areas (59.8 percent). Respondents from outer metropolitan and provincial areas were almost evenly divided with a slight majority voting against the proposed republic in both areas. These results are statistically significant with a strong chi-square of 54.27 and an associated p-value < 0.001. These results support the centre-periphery hypothesis.

Table 9.2 Proportion of respondents supporting change on the 1999 question of a REPUBLIC by Geographical Location of respondents Column Percents Geographical Location of Electorates Inner Metro Outer Metro Provincial Rural Support Change 60.0 47.8 43.8 40.2 Against Change 40.0 52.2 56.2 59.8 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 610 605 281 657 Source: 1999 Australian Constitutional Referendum Survey

N = 2177 Chi Sq = 54.27 P < 0.001 df = 4 Missing = 134

NB: 24 respondents indicated their vote but not their region.

Figures in Table 9.3 provide results on the relationship between respondents and support for the proposed republic by state location. These results reveal that majority support came from

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respondents who reside in Victoria. Although majority support was also achieved by respondents in the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory; in terms of section 128 of the Constitution, territories, unlike states, cannot affect the outcome at an aggregate level. The next highest level of state support came from respondents in Western Australia with 50.2 percent supporting the proposed republic. Respondents from New South Wales (47 percent) and South Australia (46 percent) were similar in support. Respondents from Queensland (42.3 percent) and Tasmania (43.9 percent) provided the lowest level of support for the proposed republic.

Table 9.3 Proportion of respondents supporting change on the 1999 question of a REPUBLIC by State Location of respondents Column STATE Percents NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS ACT NT Support Change 47.3 53.1 42.3 46.2 50.2 43.9 68.4 52.9 Against Change 52.7 46.9 57.7 53.8 49.8 56.1 31.6 47.1 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 717 559 378 182 205 57 38 17 Source: as for Table 9.2

N = 2177 Chi Sq = 19.4 P < 0.05 df = 8 Missing = 134

NB: 24 respondents indicated their vote but not their state.

Overall, the results are statistically significant with a moderate chi-square value of 19.4 and an associated p-value < 0.05. Although these results are statistically significant, the relationship indicates that the differences are attributable to the strength of opinion (the issue) toward the proposed changes rather than any state population size effect.

The ACRS also asked respondents to answer how they voted on the preamble question. Table 9.4 provides results on how respondents supported the proposed preamble by their geographical location. An overview of the results shows that a majority of support was not achieved in any geographical location. As with responses on the republic question, the highest level of support came from inner metropolitan respondents (43.9 percent) with lowest support from rural respondents. These results are statistically significant with a moderate chi-square of 20.36 and an associated p-value < 0.001. This result provides evidence that supports the centre-periphery hypothesis, where the further the distance voters are located from the main political power, the more likely voters will oppose constitutional change.

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Table 9.4 Proportion of respondents supporting change on the 1999 question of a PREAMBLE by Geographical Location of respondents Column Percents Geographical Location of Electorates Inner Metro Outer Metro Provincial Rural Support Change 43.9 37.5 33.7 32.3 Against Change 56.1 62.5 66.3 67.7 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 602 595 276 651 Source: as for Table 9.2

N = 2148 Chi Sq = 20.36 P < 0.001 df = 4 Missing = 163

NB: 24 respondents indicated their vote but not their region.

The figures in Table 9.5 examine whether there was a state size effect on the preamble vote. Excluding the ACT and the Northern Territory, results show that the highest level of support came from respondents in one of the smaller states, South Australia (39.2 percent). The lowest level of support for the preamble question came from Queensland respondents (34 percent).

Table 9.5 Proportion of respondents supporting change on the 1999 question of a PREAMBLE by State Location of respondents Column STATE Percents NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS ACT NT Support Change 38.2 37.2 34.9 39.2 37.3 35.7 37.8 17.6 Against Change 61.8 62.8 65.1 60.8 62.7 64.3 62.2 82.4 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 730 562 385 183 208 57 37 18 Source: as for Table 9.2

N = 2148 Chi Sq = 4.95 P = 0.76 df = 8 Missing = 163

NB: 24 respondents indicated their vote but not their state.

Overall, the results of both 1999 referendum questions by state were similar in outcome. Clearly, the proposed preamble was unacceptable to a majority of respondents (voters). Overall, the results are not statistically significant with a p-value > 0.05 and, therefore, evidence that the hypothesis about state population size is not supported in this proposal.

The issue of party identification is critical to the electoral behaviour of voters in any election. This thesis proposes that, not only does the theory of party identification affect voting outcomes, but also which political party a person identifies with (their partisan preference) is

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just as critical to the outcome of a referendum. As argued in the literature review, party identification is a product of an attachment that develops through maturation and persists through time (Campbell et al 1964: 67).

The results in Table 9.6 show that respondents who identified with the Labor party, the Democrats and the Greens were supportive of the proposed republic. The highest level of support came from Democrat identifiers at 69 percent. Respondents who identified with the Liberals, Nationals and One Nation were opposed to the proposed republic. These results are statistically significant with a very strong chi-square value of 178.87 and an associated p- value < 0.001, providing evidence that supports the partisanship hypothesis.

Table 9.6 Proportion of respondents supporting change on the 1999 question of a REPUBLIC by self reported Party Identification of respondents Column Party Identification Percents Labor Liberal Nation- Demo- Greens One Other No al crats Nation Party Support Change 62.1 35.5 22.1 69.1 62.0 23.9 16.7 39.3 Against Change 36.3 63.4 74.0 29.6 36.0 76.1 58.3 56.3 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 840 769 74 80 49 46 9 287 Source: as for Table 9.2

N = 2154 Chi Sq = 178.87 P < 0.001 df = 7 Missing = 157

Results in Table 9.7 have been presented in a slightly different manner to Table 8.28. The purpose of this variation is to provide a replication of the tables and variables as presented in the aggregate data. When comparing the above results with how respondents voted at the previous federal election held in 1998 as shown in Table 8.29, we find that the results are similar. The highest level of support came from respondents who identified with Labor, the Democrats and the Greens. Highest level of opposition came from respondents who identified with the Coalition and One Nation identifiers. Overall, the results are statistically significant with a strong chi-square value of 240.63 and an associated p-value < 0.001.

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Table 9.7 Proportion of respondents supporting change on the 1999 question of a REPUBLIC by who respondents voted for at the previous Federal Election Column Percents Party Identification Labor Coalition Minor One Nation No Party Support Change 62.5 35.9 57.7 22.9 50.9 Against Change 37.5 64.1 42.3 77.1 49.1 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 825 760 74 77 49 Source: as for Table 9.2

N = 2151 Chi Sq = 155.54 Missing = 163 P < 0.001 df = 4

When comparing the shape of how respondents voted in the 1998 federal election with respondents‘ self-reported party identification, we notice that levels of support on the republic proposal are fairly consistent with major political parties (Labor and Coalition), and that party identification between the 1998 general election and the 1999 referendum remained consistent.

The results in Table 9.8 show some similarity to the previous results as reported in Table 9.7, on party identification. Firstly, in terms of similarity, the proportion of Liberal, National and One Nation party identifiers that did not support the proposed republic were also opposed to the preamble. Secondly, in terms of dissimilarity, Labor, Democrat and Green identifiers were not supportive of the proposed preamble. The lowest support for the preamble question came from One Nation and ‗other‘ identifiers. These results are statistically significant with a solid chi-square of 61.47 and an associated p-value < 0.001, however, we have to conclude that the differences in either support or rejection of the preamble proposal are not based on party identification, but rather on the proposal itself.

Table 9.8 Proportion of respondents supporting change on the 1999 question of a PREAMBLE by self reported Party Identification of respondents Column Percents Party Identification Labor Liberal Nation- Demo- Greens One Other No al crats Nation Party Support Change 38.0 39.1 23.7 37.5 40.8 13.6 9.1 29.9 Against Change 59.3 59.3 73.7 58.8 59.2 86.4 63.6 66.4 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 848 772 76 80 49 44 11 298 Source: as for Table 9.2

N = 2124 Chi Sq = 26.17 Missing = 187 P < 0.001 df = 7

Results in Table 9.9 address the relationship of how respondents voted at the 1998 federal election by their level of support for the proposed preamble. The publicity for the preamble

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had been in the media for some time prior to the November 1999 referendum, and it is expected that voter trends should be fairly consistent. The results show that this is correct, with minor variation in results between the general election and the referendum. The relationship between party identification and support for the preamble are statistically significant (chi-square = 12.43; p-value < 0.05), indicating the differences in support or rejection of the preamble proposal.

Table 9.9 Proportion of respondents supporting change on the 1999 question of a PREAMBLE by who respondents voted for at the previous Federal Election Column Percents Party Identification Labor Coalition Minor One Nation No Party Support Change 38.5 37.4 37.0 19.3 41.1 Against Change 61.5 62.6 63.0 80.7 58.9 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 833 933 219 83 56 Source: as for Table 9.2

N = 2124 Chi Sq = 12.43 Missing = 187 P < 0.05 df = 4

Younger voters tend to be disinterested in politics—not due to general apathy, but rather due to the political process itself where young voters feel alienated. The political parties tend to be ―self-serving, unrepresentative and unresponsive to the demands of young people‖ (Henn, Weinstein and Forrest 2005: 573-574). The research of Henn et al also showed that young people prefer to be involved in the political process through the values of ‗new politics‘. The findings of Henn et al indicate that young voters are committed to elections and the democratic process (2005: 573). Further research has shown that younger people are more likely to accept change than older people,—or we become more conservative as we get older (Lewis-Beck et al 2008: 148). More often than not, change involves new issues that some people would say they are not ready to accept. Constitutional change, such as that being proposed in 1999, fits into this category. The results in Table 9.10 show the relationship between age groups and the 1999 referendum vote on the proposed republic. Examination of the results provides a clear line of separation between those aged under 54 and those aged over 55. We notice that a majority of respondents in each age group between the 18 to 25s and the 45 to 54s were supportive of the proposed republic, whereas no majority acceptance was achieved in the two older age groups. The highest level of support came from 25 to 34 year olds at 55.8 percent. These results are statistically significant (chi-square = 56.9; p- value < 0.001). We can, therefore, argue that these results add support to the theory that younger people are more likely to accept change—which, in this case, was the proposal for Australia to become a republic.

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Table 9.10 Proportion of respondents supporting change on the 1999 question of a REPUBLIC by Age Groups of respondents Column AGE GROUPS Percents 18 to 24 25 to 34 35 to 44 45 to 54 55 to 64 Over 65 Support Change 51.4 55.8 53.3 53.6 37.0 34.1 Against Change 48.6 44.2 46.7 46.4 37.0 34.1 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 253 362 403 401 262 317 Source: as for Table 9.2

N = 2176 Chi Sq = 56.91 Missing = 178 P < 0.001 df = 6

It would appear, however, that the question of age and vote is somewhat affected by the issue people are voting on, as the results in Table 9.11 show. On this point, Aitkin argues that symbols of the past (for example, the monarchy) become less relevant to the younger generations (Aitkin 1977: 96). The age group with the lowest percentile support for the proposed preamble was the 55 to 64 age group. Overall, the variation between the lowest and highest support for the preamble question was nine percentage points. The highest level of support came from the 45 to 54 age group. These results have a similar distribution to the republic question. Overall, the results are not statistically significant as there are minor differences between cells and between groups.

Table 9.11 Proportion of respondents supporting change on the 1999 question of a PREAMBLE by Age Groups of respondents Column AGE GROUPS Percents 18 to 24 25 to 34 35 to 44 45 to 54 55 to 64 Over 65 Support Change 36.3 37.0 39.2 39.5 30.7 34.7 Against Change 63.7 63.0 60.8 60.5 69.3 65.5 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 251 359 401 400 257 308 Source: as for Table 9.2

N = 2149 Chi Sq = 8.49 Missing = 187 P = 0.204 df = 6

In the previous section on aggregate data analysis, it was argued that those respondents who identified as Roman Catholic were more likely to align themselves with the Labor party and the working class, whereas, Protestants tend to align themselves more with the Coalition and white-collar workers (Bean 1999: 551; Graetz and McAllister 1994: 371). Some contend that religion, as an influence on vote, has declined (McAllister 1992: 141), however McAllister also acknowledges that the religious cleavages of the past continue to impact on political behaviour (Graetz and McAllister 1994: 371-372). These findings are further supported by research conducted by Bean and McAllister on the 2001 federal election. They

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argue that religion continues to impact Australian politics where Protestants are more likely to support the Coalition and Catholics more likely to support the Labor party (Bean and McAllister 2002: 276). Their research reinforces the traditional cleavages of the Labor party-Coalition divide in Australia. The results in Table 9.12 show that a majority of respondents who identified as having no religion or of another religion were more supportive (58 percent) of the proposed republic than those who identified as Catholic (50 percent) or Protestant (41 percent).

Table 9.12 Proportion of respondents supporting change on the 1999 question of a REPUBLIC by Religious Affiliation of respondents Column Percents Religious Affiliation Roman Protestant No Religion / Catholic Other Religion Support Change 49.7 41.0 57.8 Against Change 50.3 59.0 42.2 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 567 941 631 Source: as for Table 9.2

N = 2311 Chi Sq = 43.46 Missing = 172 P < 0.001 df = 2

These figures support the argument that religious affiliation does not have the same influence on vote choice. Throughout the referendum campaign, the Labor party supported the move to Australia becoming a republic, whereas prominent politicians from the Coalition sent out mixed messages where some were in support of the change whilst others opposed the change. The referendum campaigning was not reflected in how Catholics supported the proposed republic. Overall, the results are statistically significant with a strong chi-square of 43.5 and an associated p-value < 0.001 with noticeable difference being shown by respondents who either had no religious affiliation or belonged to different religious group.

The results in Table 9.13 on the proposed preamble, cross-tabulated with religious affiliation, shows that religion was not evidence of a religious cleavage as a majority of respondents in all groups did not support the preamble proposal. The highest level of support did however come from those who reported that they had no religion or were from the ‗other religion‘ group (39.4 percent), although there are just four percentage points difference between the three groups. Overall, these results are not statistically significant with a very weak chi- square and an associated p-value greater than 0.05.

This result of the preamble vote and religion provides evidence that the nature of the proposed change is a strong determinant of how people will vote.

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Table 9.13 Proportion of respondents supporting change on the 1999 question of a PREAMBLE by Religious Affiliation of respondents Column Percents Religious Affiliation Roman Protestant No Religion / Catholic Other Religion Support Change 37.8 35.3 39.4 Against Change 62.2 64.7 60.6 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 566 920 625 Source: as for Table 9.2

N = 2311 Chi Sq = 2.72 Missing = 200 P = 0.257 df = 2

Preamble results cross-tabulated with religious affiliation in Table 9.13 compared to the republic/religions affiliation relationship, shows clear differences in voter behaviour. The first difference is that no majority of support for the preamble was recorded for any religious category, compared to the ‗no religion‘ ‗other religion‘ group showing majority support for the republic (57.8 percent support). Secondly, the level of support for the preamble shown by Roman Catholics (38 percent) and the combined ‗no religion‘ ‗other religion‘ group (39 percent) is significantly lower with a 12-percentage point drop in support from both groups on the republic issue. Thirdly, Protestant support for the preamble, although lower (35 percent), was not as marked as the other two groups. Overall, the results are not statistically significant, however the distribution of results shows a clear reaction by each group on the preamble question, providing support for the Michigan Model which argues that voters take into account their attitudes to particular issues when casting their vote.

9.1 Social Class Factors

Class factors such as income, education and occupation are three of the indicators that make up the socio-economic identifiers of the Michigan Model. These are what Dalton considers to be the economic, social and historical conditions that influence voter behaviour in the funnel of causality (Dalton 1996: 198).

The previously stated hypothesis between income and referendum vote is that those with higher incomes are more likely to support constitutional change than those on lower incomes. In effect, income tends to reflect one‘s education and understanding of the social, economic and political environment. The results in Table 8.36 show that a majority of voters with incomes over $45000 were more supportive of the proposed republic than the other two lower income-earning groups. These results show an overall difference of 15 percentage points between the lowest to the highest income earning groups with regard to support for

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the republic. These figures support the above hypothesis. Statistically, the results are significant with a moderately strong chi-square of 36.65 and an associated p-value < 0.001, providing further support for the hypothesis.

Table 9.14 Proportion of respondents supporting change on the 1999 question of a REPUBLIC by Reported Income PA of respondents Column Percents Reported Annual Income $0 to $20000 $20001 to More than $45000 $45001 Support Change 41.1 46.9 56.4 Against Change 58.9 53.1 43.6 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 499 565 903 Source: as for Table 9.2

N = 2311 Chi Sq = 32.64 Missing = 344 P < 0.001 df = 2

The results in Table 9.14 firstly show that a majority of respondents from each income- earning category did not support the proposed preamble. Secondly, the results point to a similar trend as the results in Table 9.15 where respondents from the highest income-earning category provided higher levels of support for the proposed preamble. Conversely, the highest level of opposition came from respondents in the lowest income-earning category. These results are statistically significant with a moderate chi-square value of 12.71 and an associated p-value < 0.002. Based on these results, we cannot argue that income was a determinant of voting behaviour on the preamble question, as the reason for the statistical significance lies with the differences between support and rejection of the preamble question.

Table 9.15 Proportion of respondents supporting change on the 1999 question of a PREAMBLE by Reported Income PA of respondents Column Percents Reported Annual Income $0 to $20000 $20001 to More than $45000 $45001 Support Change 34.2 34.2 42.0 Against Change 65.8 65.8 58.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 488 562 899 Source: as for Table 9.2

N = 2311 Chi Sq = 12.71 Missing = 362 P < 0.002 df = 2

Like income, education is an important factor that requires examination to determine its influence on voting behaviour in constitutional referendums. As has been argued previously, the rise in educational levels in Australia has effectively provided the capacity for many more citizens to handle political complexities (Held 1996: 117) and afford more of a

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willingness to accept constitutional change. Results in Table 9.16 support this argument with a significant majority of respondents with tertiary or postgraduate degrees supporting the proposed republic (70 percent). The range of support for the republic question is from 41 percent, for those with a trade qualification, through to 71 percent, for those with a tertiary qualification. Opposition to the proposed republic was consistently above 50 percent in all categories of education, apart from those with a tertiary education.

Table 9.16 Proportion of respondents supporting change on the 1999 question of a REPUBLIC by Post Secondary Education of respondents Column Percents Post Secondary Education Tertiary and Diploma and Non- Trade No Tertiary Postgraduate Trade Qualifications Education Degree Qualifications Support Change 70.3 46.2 41.0 43.8 Against Change 29.7 53.8 59.0 56.2 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 381 487 424 753 Source: as for Table 9.2

N = 2311 Chi Sq = 89.76 Missing = 266 P < 0.001 df = 3

These results are statistically significant with a strong chi-square of 89.76 and an associated p-value < 0.001. These results give support to the argument that the level of education of a voter will influence their referendum vote and willingness to accept change.

A majority of support for the proposed preamble was not achieved in any of the education categories, as shown in Table 9.17. The highest level of support, however, came from respondents who had a tertiary or postgraduate degree (46.6 percent). This difference is nine percentage points higher than those with a diploma or a non-trade qualification (37.6 percent). As much as a majority of respondents were opposed to the preamble, the argument stands that those with higher levels of education are more likely to accept constitutional change. Tests of significance show that these results are statistically significant with a moderate chi-square of 19.45 and an associated p-value < 0.001.

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Table 9.17 Proportion of respondents supporting change on the 1999 question of a PREAMBLE by Post Secondary Education of respondents Column Percents Post Secondary Education Tertiary and Diploma and Trade No Tertiary Postgraduate Non-Trade Qualifications Education Degree Qualifications Support Change 46.6 37.6 33.9 34.1 Against Change 53.4 62.4 66.1 65.9 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 n 380 482 419 743 Source: as for Table 9.2

N = 2311 Chi Sq = 19.45 Missing = 287 P < 0.001 df = 3

The next bivariate relationship examines the effects of occupation on voting behaviour at the 1999 referendum. Past studies have shown that occupation has a direct consequence on voting (Graetz and McAllister 1994: 375). For example, many blue-collar workers tend to identify with the Labor party because these people identify with them instrumentally—that is, the Labor party, trade unions and blue-collar workers all have a link (Catt 1996: 87).

Many categories of occupation were reported in the 1999 ACRS. As a result, coding was conducted using a traditional dividing of occupation: white-collar and blue-collar. The difficulty with this division is that there is a much stronger weighting numerically favouring white-collar workers. As with other socio-economic factors, such as education and income, it is expected that higher levels of support for constitutional change will come from white- collar workers.

Table 9.18 Proportion of respondents supporting change on the 1999 question of a REPUBLIC by Occupation of respondents Column Percents Occupation White-collar Blue-collar Support Change 50.3 41.1 Against Change 49.7 58.9 Total 100.0 100.0 n 1712 465 Source: as for Table 9.2

N = 2311 Chi Sq = 12.44 Missing = 134 P < 0.001 df = 1

The results in Table 9.18 reveal that there was a higher level of support from white-collar workers on the republic question, showing nine percentage points difference between blue and white-collar respondents. A majority of support was achieved from white-collar respondents only. The test of statistical significance (chi-square 12.45 and associated p-

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value 0.002) shows that the results did not occur by chance, and that the differences between the groups and level of support are significant.

Although results in Table 9.19 are similar in shape to the previous table with a higher ‗yes‘ vote, a majority of support for the preamble was not achieved in either category. The differences in level of support between white and blue-collar respondents on both referendum questions, shows that occupation can play a significant role in voter behaviour at referendums. Six percentage points difference is a significant variation. Based on the chi- square of 6.61 and associated p-value < 0.05, we can argue that the issue provides the statistical significance rather than occupation status.

Table 9.19 Proportion of respondents supporting change on the 1999 question of a PREAMBLE by Occupation of respondents Column Percents Occupation White-collar Blue-collar Support Change 38.5 32.0 Against Change 61.5 68.0 Informal/Did not vote 2.5 2.5 Total 100.0 100.0 n 1689 460 Source: as for Table 9.2

N = 2311 Chi Sq = 6.60 Missing = 162 P = 0.010 df = 1

Researchers have established that gender is one of the most important factors that influence voter behaviour in general elections (Bochel and Briggs 2000: 63; Darcy et al 1994). We want to find whether this influence extends to voting in constitutional referendums. In the aggregate results, it was found that a negative correlation existed on both questions for men, with an equal opposite positive correlation for women. This outcome could lead one to speculate that women are more accepting of constitutional change.

The results in Table 9.20, from the 1999 ACRS on gender and support for the republic, reveal that there was a slightly higher level of support from males (50 percent), as opposed to females (46 percent). However, the distribution of results and support for the republic proposal is not significant as there is minor variation between the cells. It would appear that gender is not as influential in referendum voting as researchers have found in general election voting. It can be argued here that, as referendums are primarily about issues, it is much harder for political parties to court the female vote. These results are not statistically significant, as evidenced by the lack of disparity between the cell groups.

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Table 9.20 Proportion of respondents supporting change on the 1999 question of a REPUBLIC by Gender of respondents Column Percents Gender Male Female Support Change 50.2 46.6 Against Change 49.8 53.4 Informal/Did not vote 2.4 1.5 Total 100.0 100.0 n 1029 1145 Source: as for Table 9.2

N = 2311 Chi Sq = 2.96 Missing = 137 P = 0.085 df = 1

The same can be said for gender and level of support for the proposed preamble. Four percentage points separates males and females on support for the preamble, and 0.5 percentage point separation on support for the preamble. With such minimal differences, as expected, these results are not statistically significant.

Table 9.21 Proportion of respondents supporting change on the 1999 question of a PREAMBLE by Gender of respondents Column Percents Gender Male Female Support Change 36.8 37.3 Against Change 63.2 62.7 Informal/Did not vote 2.8 2.3 Total 100.0 100.0 n 1023 1122 Source: as for Table 9.2

N = 2311 Chi Sq = 0.080 Missing = 166 P = 0.778 df = 1

9.2 Regression Analysis of 1999 ACRS

Three models are utilised for this multivariate analysis. The first model consists of party identification categories only. The second model contains variables included in the bivariate analyses in the above tables. The dependent variables are the ‗yes‘/‘no‘ vote for each referendum question. The independent variables for the second model are: geographical location, state and party identification. For the third model, the dependent variables remain the same. The independent variables are: party identification, years of tertiary education/highest qualification, age, gender, religion, class and income. These variables reflect the 1996 census variables from the aggregate data.

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9.3 MODEL #1: Self Reported Party Identification and Vote

This model examines the relationship between party identification and support for the proposed republic. The model has removed those respondents who identified with the Liberal Party to act as a reference category. During the campaign, Labor party politicians were consistent in their calls for a republic, whereas the Liberal Party sent mixed messages. For example, Peter Reith supported a Republic, but not this model. Peter Costello supported the proposed model. The Prime Minister did not support a Republic, but, if there was going to be one, the minimalist model was the model of choice.

Table 9.22 Regression Table of 1999 Referendum Question on Republic By Party Identification Q #1: REPUBLIC Statistical Significance Model r Beta t Sig Party ID – Labor Party 0.246** 0.271** 11.445 0.000 Party ID – National Party -0.110** -0.052* -2.285 0.022 Party ID – Democrats 0.089** 0.140** 6.166 0.000 Party ID – Greens 0.045* 0.088** 3.902 0.000 Party ID – One Nation -0.083** -0.038 -1.698 0.090 Source: as for Table 9.2

Question #1 DV: Yes/No Vote on Republic Question

Model Summary Results for Table 9.22 R 0.303 R Square 0.092 Adjusted R Square 0.090 SEE 0.477 F Change 37.540**

** = Significance at the 0.001 level * = Significance at the 0.05 level

In Table 9.22, statistically significant figures show that there was a causal link between vote on the referendum and party identification for all groups. Labor party identifiers were the most supportive (r = 0.246; B = 0.271; p < 0.001) of the proposed republic, followed by Democrat identifiers, then Green party identifiers. National and One Nation party identifiers show a negative correlation, indicating that the majority of these identifiers were opposed to the republic. The coefficient values (Beta) similarly reflect the correlation results when each category is combined into one regression model. Each coefficient value is statistically significant in terms of the relationship between party identification and support for the republic, except for One Nation party identifiers with a significance level greater than 0.05.

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Overall, the party identification model describes approximately nine percent of the variation in support for the proposed republic (R square = 0.09). We can argue therefore that there are other intervening variables that need to be taken into account as an explanation for voter behaviour on the republic question.

The results of the regression model in Table 9.23 provide a different picture on the influence of party identification in relation to the preamble proposal. Two groups were shown to be statistically significant: – those that identify with the National Party and those that identify with One Nation. In terms of political classifications, both the National Party and One Nation are conservative and, therefore, results should be similar. Figures from both of these groups show a negative causal link between vote and the preamble question. No causal link is established between vote on the preamble and other political party identifiers.

Table 9.23 Regression Table of 1999 Referendum Question on Preamble by Party Identification Q #1: PREAMBLE Statistical Significance Model r Beta t Sig Party ID – Labor Party 0.016 -0.007 -0.298 0.766 Party ID – National Party -0.058* -0.063* -2.617 0.009 Party ID – Democrats 0.003 -0.004 -0.157 0.876 Party ID – Greens 0.009 0.004 0.158 0.875 Party ID – One Nation -0.082** -0.085** -3.581 0.000 Source: as for Table 9.2

Question #2 DV: Yes/No Vote on Preamble Question

Model Summary Results for Table 9.23 R 0.102 R Square 0.010 Adjusted R Square 0.008 SEE 0.484 F Change 3.862*

** = Significance at the 0.001 level * = Significance at the 0.05 level

9.4 MODEL #2 - Party Identification and Referendum Vote

With the previous model, we found that party identification was not a significant predictor for voting in the 1999 referendum. In model two (Table 9.24), the same party identification categories have been retained and two further variables have been added. These two variables (which capture the centre-periphery hypothesis variables) are geographical location

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of respondents and state location of respondents. The geographical location variable has been coded in the same way as the aggregate data analysis by separating respondents into metropolitan (value of one) and non-metropolitan categories (value of zero). The state location variable has been coded to assess the impact of vote on whether they come from larger populated states (New South Wales and Victoria) as opposed to the smaller states (Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania).

Correlation results (r ) show that there is a statistically significant positive relationship between support for the proposed republic and Labor party identifiers (r = 0.246; p < 0.001), Democrat party identifiers (r = 0.089; p < 0.001) and Green party identifiers (r = 0.043; p < 0.05). We notice also that there is a statistically significant positive correlation shown from metropolitan voters (r = 0.115; p < 0.001) and voters from the larger states (r = 0.04; p < 0.05) and support for the republic. It is important to note that National party identifiers (r = - 0.114; p < 0.001) and One Nation party identifiers (r = -0.085; p < 0.001) show a negative correlation (were clearly opposed to the proposed republic).

Coefficient values (beta) similarly reflect the correlation values. However, the level of statistical significance shows some variation. The model indicates that, when party identification is taken into account with geographical location and state population size, the significance of some variable categories alters. Metropolitan voters are shown to be a significant predictor in the referendum vote on the republic (b = 0.084; p < 0.001). National party and One Nation party identifiers are no longer statistically significant (p > 0.05). A further difference occurs with state location of respondents where results show that the effect on referendum vote was not significant (p > 0.05), with respondents from large states as opposed to respondents from smaller states.

Overall, the results in this model explain approximately 10 percent of the variance in vote on the proposed republic at the 1999 referendum when taking into account party identification, geographical location and state size (R-square = 0.101; p-value < 0.001). Clearly, there are other factors that need to be taken into account to help explain referendum voting.

Correlation and regression results in Table 9.25, on support for the proposed preamble are quite different from the republic vote result. Firstly, there is only one statistically significant positive correlation, which is the geographical location variable. This variable indicates that metropolitan voters (r = 0.083; p < 0.001) were more supportive of the preamble than non- metropolitan voters. Other statistically significant variables (negative correlations) come

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from National party identifiers (r = -0.057; p < 0.05) and One Nation party identifiers (r = - 0.079; p < 0.001).

Table 9.24 Regression Table of 1999 Referendum Question on Republic by Party Identification Q #1: REPUBLIC Statistical Significance Model r Beta t Party ID – Labor Party 0.246** 0.270** 11.412 Party ID – National Party -0.114** -0.039 -1.691 Party ID – Democrats 0.089** 0.138** 6.066 Party ID – Greens 0.043* 0.083** 3.701 Party ID – One Nation -0.085** -0.031 -1.385 Geographical Location (metro voters) 0.115** 0.084** 3.713 Voters from Large States (NSW/VIC) 0.040* 0.037 1.653 Source: as for Table 9.2

Question #1 DV: Yes/No Vote on Republic Question

Model Summary Results for Table 9.24 R 0.317 R Square 0.101 Adjusted R Square 0.097 SEE 0.475 F Change 29.363**

** = Significance at the 0.001 level * = Significance at the 0.05 level

Coefficient values show that there was opposition to the proposed preamble from Labor party identifiers (b = -0.008) and Democrat party identifiers (b = -0.007), although neither value is statistically significant with p-values > 0.05. When controlling for all other variables included in this model, there are two statistically significant values. Firstly, metropolitan voters (b = 0.069; p < 0.005) were more supportive of the proposed preamble than non-metropolitan voters and, secondly, One Nation party identifiers (b = -0.075; p < 0.005) showed more opposition than all other party identifiers.

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Table 9.25 Regression Table of 1999 Referendum Question on Preamble by Party Identification Q #1: PREAMBLE Statistical Significance Model r Beta t Party ID – Labor Party 0.015 -0.008 -0.327 Party ID – National Party -0.057* -0.049* 2.013 Party ID – Democrats 0.002 -0.007 -0.307 Party ID – Greens 0.012 0.004 0.186 Party ID – One Nation -0.079** -0.075** -3.163 Geographical Location (metro voters) 0.083** 0.069** 2.883 Voters from Large States (NSW/VIC) 0.015 0.006 0.271 Source: as for Table 9.2

Question #2 DV: Yes/No Vote on Preamble Question

Model Summary Results for Table 9.25 R 0.120 R Square 0.014 Adjusted R Square 0.011 SEE 0.484 F Change 3.786**

** = Significance at the 0.001 level * = Significance at the 0.05 level

With low levels of statistical significance, the predictor variables in this model on the vote for the proposed preamble, explain a very small proportion of the variation (one percent) of the vote (R-square = 0.014; p-value < 0.001). We can argue, therefore, that party identification was not a deciding factor in the preamble referendum vote.

9.5 MODEL #3 - Party Identification Vote and the Michigan Model

Regression results in Table 9.26 provide data for the third model, which includes variables associated with the Michigan Model of voter choice as examined in the bivariate cross- tabulations. The variables included in this model also replicate the aggregate variables previously chosen and shown in Table 8.22. The party identification variable has removed the conservative vote (Coalition and One Nation) as a control for other party identifiers. The ethnicity variable focuses on Australian born respondents. The education variable has focussed on those respondents with higher degrees. For the age variable, the author has removed all respondents aged over 25 as a control for age. The gender variable examines the differences between males and females, with females as the control group. Religion as a variable has removed those that identify with the main religious denominations as the control group in order to determine how those with no religion or are from other religious

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backgrounds influence vote choice. Occupation (blue-collar workers) and low income (less than $20,000 per year) are the other two independent variables of interest.

Table 9.26 Regression Table of 1999 Referendum Question on Republic by Party Identification and Michigan Model Variables Q #1: REPUBLIC Statistical Significance Model r Beta t Party ID – Labor Party 0.239** 0.286** 10.677 Party ID – Democrats 0.098** 0.132** 5.155 Party ID – Greens 0.059* 0.068* 3.004 Australian Born -0.047 -0.042 -1.702 Higher Degree Qualifications 0.205** 0.132** 5.026 Age (18-25 year olds) .003 -0.005 -0.218 Gender (Males) 0.000 0.013 0.493 Religion (None or Other) 0.118** 0.063** 2.503 Occupation (Blue-collar) -0.105* -0.083 -3.104 Low Income (< $20000 pa) -0.079** 0.132** 5.026 Source: as for Table 9.2

Question #1 DV: Yes/No Vote on Republic Question

Model Summary Results for Table 9.26 R 0.370 R Square 0.137 Adjusted R Square 0.131 SEE 0.466 F Change 22.772**

** = Significance at the 0.001 level * = Significance at the 0.05 level

Correlation results in Table 9.26 show that all variables, apart from gender are statistically significant. The categories of party identification all show to be of statistical significance in support for the proposed republic. Coefficient results are similarly reflected with the correlation scores (except for occupation). In breaking the table down by correlational, statistical significance, respondents who had either a university undergraduate degree or postgraduate degree were more supportive of the proposed republic than respondents who had no university education (r = 0.205; p < 0.001). Respondents who identified themselves as having no religious group affiliation, or who identified themselves as part of an ‗other‘ religious group were more supportive (r = 0.118; p < 0.001) than those respondents who were from the main stream western religious groups (Roman Catholic and Protestant). The blue-collar variable shows that this group was more opposed (r = -0.105; p < 0.05) to the proposed republic than white-collar respondents. The final group that is deemed to be statistically significant in this model are the low income earners. This group were more opposed to the proposed republic (r = -0.079; p < 0.001) than higher income earners.

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When each variable is assessed together in a regression model, all variables apart from occupation, were statistically significant and provide support for the Michigan Model of voter behaviour. The statistically significant positive coefficients are: Labor party identifiers (b = 0.286; p < 0.001), Democrat party identifiers (b = 0.132; p < 0.001) and Greens party identifiers (b = 0.068; p < 0.05). Respondents with higher degrees (b = 0.132; p < 0.001) and respondents with religion as ‗none‘ or ‗other‘ (b = 0.063; p < 0.001) were supportive of the proposed constitutional change. The one statistically significant negative coefficient was the group of respondents with incomes below $20,000 (b = 0.132; p < 0.001), indicating the disapproval of this proposed change. All other variables (ethnicity: – Australian born; age: – 18 to 25 year olds; gender: – males; occupation: – blue-collar) revealed no statistical significance in this model.

Overall, this regression model explains approximately 14 percent (R-square = 0.137) of the variation in voter behaviour on the proposed republic question at the 1999 referendum, which is statistically significant (p < 0.001).

As with the results in the previous models on the preamble question, correlation results in Table 9.27 show that very few of the variables are statistically significant. The statistical significance of coefficient values in the regression model show that on the preamble question, the chosen variables associated with the Michigan Model do not support the theory of voter behaviour on this referendum question.

Three statistically significant variables require comment. Those respondents with higher degrees (b = 0.064; p < 0.05) were the only group that were more supportive of the preamble than those respondents without university qualifications and with lower incomes. The other statistically significant group were those that identified as Australian born showing a negative coefficient (b = -0.057; p < 0.05). No group of party identifiers was shown to be statistically significant in this model and, therefore, does not provide support for the hypothesis in the Michigan Model of voter behaviour on this referendum question. With the limited statistical significance of this model, as can be expected, this model is weak in explaining voter behaviour on the proposed preamble.

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Table 9.27 Regression Table of 1999 Referendum Question on Preamble by Party Identification and Michigan Model Variables Q #2: PREAMBLE Statistical Significance Model r Beta t Party ID – Labor Party 0.017 0.015 0.554 Party ID – Democrats -0.006 -0.009 -0.333 Party ID – Greens 0.022 0.014 0.520

Australian Born -0.058* -0.057* -2.132 Higher Degree Qualifications 0.075** 0.064* 2.248 Age (18-25 year olds) -0.022 -0.022 -0.825 Gender (Males) -0.015 -0.014 -0.490 Religion (None or Other) 0.027 0.015 0.563 Occupation (Blue-collar) -0.042* -0.025 -0.882 Low Income (< $20000 pa) -0.019 -0.009 -0.342 Source: as for Table 9.2

Question #2 DV: Yes/No Vote on Preamble Question

Model Summary Results for Table 9.27 R 0.105 R Square 0.011 Adjusted R Square 0.004 SEE 0.487 F Change 1.590

** = Significance at the 0.001 level * = Significance at the 0.05 level

9.6 Discussion

The 1999 referendum was held on the back of a controversial 1998 federal election. During the 1998 election, One Nation made a number of controversial statements with regards to immigration. ―Never before have so many parties and organisations tried to put ethnic and immigration issues at the centre of the campaign‖ (Jupp 2000: 159). These issues would not have been forgotten when voters considered the proposed constitutional changes. Similarly, the ACM and the ARM knew that the controversies of the 1998 election were fresh in the minds of voters. It has been argued that the 1999 referendum was not unlike a general election. McAllister argues, ―despite the referendum displaying all the characteristics of a second-order election, voter interest and attentiveness … compares very favourably with that of a federal election‖ (McAllister 2001: 252).

The November 1999 referendum, however, is unique when compared to previous federal referendums. This uniqueness had an impact on voter behaviour when it came time to

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casting the vote. The two main differences are evident in two ways. Firstly, there was no clear partisan approach across the two questions from the major political parties in the campaign period during the lead up to the vote. Labor party MPs were in favour of the proposed republic, but were somewhat opposed to the preamble. Coalition MPs were divided. Some Liberal MPs were in support of the proposed republic, some were in support of Australia becoming a republic, but not the proposed model, and some were clearly opposed to the whole idea of Australia becoming a republic. Support by the Coalition was somewhat divided on the preamble issue, with some National Party MPs opposing the change. A second major difference was that the campaign was not led by either of the two main political parties, but by two interest groups (the Australian Republican Movement [ARM] and Australians for a Constitutional Monarchy [ACM]) that were passionate about the republic issue.

The evidence questioning whether there was an ‗influential‘ partisan effect at the November 1999 referendum has demonstrated that a majority of Australian voters appeared to vote according to what they might have considered best for Australia, not what the political parties pushed, or in this case, not what the ARM wanted. One must acknowledge, however, that the ALP were strongly supportive of Australia becoming a republic and, on this aspect, a majority of Australian voters were not convinced.

There are scholars who have argued that voter acceptance of the party line in general elections, based on social cleavages, has been in decline since the mid 1970s (Aitkin 1977, Kemp 1978). For example, with an improved standard of living in Australia, the occupational class divide that helped created Australia‘s two main political parties might no longer be as prominent as it was in the 1940s. Further research conducted by Jones and McAllister (1989), however, has demonstrated that the structural class divide is just as important as it has ever been. The class divide is, therefore representative of the partisanship effect. Voting results from the November 1999 referendum, on this point, provide evidence that the class divide is still evident, particularly when correlations between vote and class indicators are taken into account.

Aggregate data analysis of the 1998 AEC federal election data, cross-tabulated with the 1999 AEC referendum data, has shown a moderate partisanship effect. Although a majority of voters did not support the proposed preamble, there was a clear division between the level of support shown by Labor party voters and Coalition voters. For example, in ALP held electorates at the time of the 1999 referendum, a majority of voters were more supportive of the proposed republic than voters in Coalition held electorates (16 percentage points

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difference). This result is supported by the relationship between support for the proposed republic and how safe a federal seat was in 1999. Furthermore, these results have shown that the safer an ALP seat was, the higher the level of support for the republic.

The final aspect that adds further weight to the partisan effect is in terms of state political party alignment with the federal government. We noticed that, despite mixed messages from the Coalition led federal government on the republic issue, support was higher from a majority of voters in electorates located in states that were led by Coalition governments than states that were governed by opposition Labor party governments, although one cannot consider this statistically significant.

At the aggregate level, we also wanted to determine whether location of electorate and state had any impact on referendum vote (the centre-periphery hypothesis). Results showed that there were higher levels of support for the republic from voters in metropolitan electorates than the provincial and rural electorates. The state effect (assessed as state size in terms of population and closeness to Canberra) showed that there were higher levels of support from a majority of voters in electorates in New South Wales and Victoria than the other states.

Results on the proposed preamble generally showed little support. Although support for the preamble was considerably lower across all electorates, the same patterns are evident as was highlighted on the republic question, but on a much smaller scale.

When each of the key variables were combined into a regression model, we found that the partisanship effect diminished. Recall that first-preference votes for each candidate were used as the proxy for party identification. The statistically significant variables were geographical location of electorates and location of electorates within New South Wales and Victoria. This result was evident for both the republic and preamble questions.

The second section of the analysis of the 1999 referendum examined the characteristics that have shown to be influential at voting in general elections. These characteristics are the key socio-economic variables that have helped to mould Australian politics. We would otherwise understand these characteristics as the factors that influenced the social and political cleavages in Australian politics. The data used to make this analysis comes from the 1996 Australian Census. The main areas of analysis were: ethnicity, gender and employment, age, religion, income, education, and occupation. Although these variables do not pick up every possible characteristic, as shown in Figure 8.1, they do pick up the essential features of the Michigan Model.

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On the ethnicity issue, bivariate correlation results show that this is an important indicator where a majority of both Australian born voters on the republic and preamble questions disagreed with these proposals. It was also shown that a majority of non-western born voters were more supportive of the proposed constitutional changes than western born voters. The second and third indicators (gender and employment status) show that males were slightly more opposed to both referendum questions, as were the unemployed. It is possible to argue therefore, that employed females were more supportive of both referendum proposals.

The age of respondents was divided into seven categories. It was expected that younger voters would be more supportive of constitutional change than older aged voters. The expectation was correct, with higher levels of support coming from 18 to 25 year olds (indicated by statistically significant positive correlations) than all other age groups. With significant opposition verbalised in the lead up to the referendum vote on the preamble, it was surprising that younger aged voters were more supportive on both constitutional proposals.

The religious factor is one variable that has shown to reinforce the Australian class cleavage (Bean 1999: 551). By tradition, support for constitutional change has been stronger from Catholic identifiers, although, as was highlighted earlier, a Coalition government proposed this referendum, which has traditionally gained much of its support from Protestant voters. Results supported historical trends, with a majority of Catholic voters supporting constitutional change on both questions. Those voters who identified as either having no religious affiliation or came from another religious group were also more supportive of constitutional change on both questions.

The class issues of income, education and occupation all provided evidence that indicated that, the higher a voter‘s income, the higher a person‘s level of education and, if the voter was a white-collar worker, the more likely that voter would support constitutional change.

Based on the 1999 ACRS results, when combining each of these variables into one model (the Michigan Model), it was shown that four variables were statistically significant on the proposed republic. They were party identification, higher education, no religion or other religion and low income. Based on these results on the republic question, we can argue that the stronger a person identified with the Labor party (or non-Coalition), the more likely they were to vote in an affirmative manner in the referendum. Secondly, the higher a respondent‘s education, the more likely they are to vote in an affirmative manner in a

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referendum. Thirdly, those respondents who did not identify with the traditional religions were more likely to vote for constitutional change. Lastly, the higher a person‘s income, the more likely they were to accept constitutional change.

Analysis of the preamble regression results showed a slightly different outcome. Non- western born residents were more supportive of the proposed preamble—more so than their support for the republic question. Similarly, those voters with postgraduate education were more supportive of the proposed preamble, as they were with the proposed republic. All other variables were not statistically significant.

In summary, there were higher levels of support from respondents located in inner metropolitan electorates on both questions. It was also found that support for the republic was higher among New South Wales and Victorian respondents. It is not possible to make any assertions on voting preferences based on the results of the preamble question and state location due to the lack of any statistical significance.

On the significance of party identification and the 1999 referendum, results clearly indicate that support was higher amongst Labor party identifiers on the proposed republic; however, this was not the case on the proposed preamble, where there was no discernable difference between ALP, Democrat and Green identifiers. We can deduce, therefore, that the preamble as proposed in the referendum was not acceptable.

The socio-economic indicators associated with the Michigan Model tend to support results from the census data. For example, the younger age groups were more supportive of the proposed republic, although a higher level of support was evident for respondents who were in their mid-50s, with a sharp drop off amongst the older age groups. On the preamble question, there was little variance in the level of support across all age groups with the highest level of support coming from the 38 to 47 year age group.

Religion over the past decades has generally influenced partisan support. Respondents from the 1999 ACRS who identified as having no religious affiliation or identified with a non- traditional western religion showed the highest level of support for the republic (57.8 percent)—nearly eight percentage points higher than the Catholic identifiers. Protestants were the least supportive of the republic. On the preamble question, support was highest amongst the ‗no religion and other religion‘ group, although support overall for the preamble did not break through the 40th percentile.

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As with the aggregate data, level of income and education were key indicators that influenced the referendum vote on both questions. One result that stands out is with respondents with tertiary or postgraduate qualifications. This group showed a significantly higher level of support for the proposed republic (70 percent), while those who had trade qualifications were approximately 30 percentage points lower (41 percent). The difference was not as stark on the preamble question, with a smaller 13 percentage points difference between the same two groups. These differences were reflected in occupation status with white-collar workers more likely to support the constitutional change.

The 1999 ACRS regression results on party identification confirmed the bivariate results showing Labor party identifiers more willing to support the proposed republic. This outcome was not reflected on the preamble question, although one could argue that conservative identifiers were more likely to oppose constitutional change.

When combining party identification with previous socio-economic indicators, the picture that it provided shows that those respondents who identify with the Labor party, claim to have no religion or identify with a non-mainstream Christian religion, have a higher education and income are more likely to support constitutional change. This summary is true for the republic question, but far from accurate on the preamble question. One could argue that the proposed preamble produced no partisan effect and certainly did not capture the support of the majority of Australians.

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CHAPTER TEN

10.0 Discussion

This chapter discusses the similarities and differences associated with voting behaviour between a constitutional referendum and a general election in Australia. The task is to determine whether the dominant theory of voting behaviour (Michigan Model) in general elections can be applied to voting in a constitutional referendum (Kelly 1999: 26).

In order to address the Michigan Model of voting behaviour, this discussion adopts the following outline. Firstly, an overview is provided outlining some of the similarities and differences associated with referendum and general election voting. Secondly, the author discusses the referendum vote from 1967 to 1999 in relation to the variables that have provided the necessary units of analysis for the Michigan Model. Lastly, this chapter compares results from this research with previous general election research.

There are three unequivocal factors that must be acknowledged when considering any discussion or analysis of referendum voting behaviour. Firstly, we must acknowledge that a referendum concerns amendment to the constitution, whereas a general election is concerned with the election of nominated representatives to form government. Section 128 of the Australian Constitution clearly states that a referendum must be held before any formal changes can be made to the Constitution. A second factor of the referendum is that it requires voters to cast their vote on any proposed constitutional change(s). In Australia, both referendum and general election voting is compulsory for all registered voters. This factor does not provide any significant effect on the act of voting. A third factor affecting referendums is that there are a number of intrinsic and extrinsic influences that affect the way people cast their vote, not unlike a general election. These influences have been well established through the theories of political behaviour.

The previous chapters on each referendum since 1967 have considered key independent variables, at both an individual and aggregate level to determine the level of influence of these intrinsic and extrinsic forces in referendum voting.

In Australia between the years 1967 to 1999, there were seven occasions when a referendum was held linked with 20 proposed constitutional changes. Of the 20 proposed changes, only four have been successful, representing a 20 percent success rate which has allowed the elected government to enact the proposed constitutional changes. Conversely, voters may

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argue that they have had an 80 percent success rate in preventing the elected government from bringing about constitutional change during this time.

Over this same period, there have been 13 full federal general elections of both houses. The first election in this time frame occurred in 1969 and the last in 1998. Of these 13 elections, the Coalition have been elected or re-elected six times and the ALP have been elected or re- elected seven times. Of all the elections won and lost between 1967 and 1999, the political party forming government has changed hands four times, representing a 30 percent rate of change51.

When comparing the rate of change in political party forming government and the number of constitutional changes through referendum, we can clearly see that there is little variation between the two. On this point, however, it must be acknowledged that the opportunity for change is more frequent in a general election than via a referendum and one would, therefore, expect a higher rate of change in governance.

The purpose of this initial comparison and discussion may appear simplistic. However, it is important to make this comparison as critics have long argued that Australians do not readily accept constitutional change (Sawer 1967). In fact, Australians do not readily accept any form of recurrent political change, which leads one to conclude that elitist criticism of the Australian electorate on constitutional change is unwarranted when change is compared with a similar unit of measure.

One further comment on this comparison is that in all cases (the referendum and the general election), political leaders and nominated candidates attempt to influence voters to cast their vote in a particular manner via their election and referendum campaigns. On proposed constitutional changes, the government, as the initiator, generally supports the ‗yes‘ vote position, whereas the opposition party tends to support the ‗no‘ vote position. For a general election, each political party attempts to sway voters to cast their votes in their (the political party‘s) favour. Between 1967 and 1999, there have been two anomalies in the referendum vote outcome. The first anomaly was at the 1967 referendum on the question of removing the discriminatory section from the Constitution regarding Aboriginal people. This proposal

51 Although this point is not critical to understanding voter behaviour in a constitutional referendum, it is significant when critics argue that the voting public does not readily accept change. The argument, however, is only used in reference to constitutional change, and it appears that the issue of change in governance is forgotten.

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received bipartisan support, effectively eliminating the partisanship divide. All other referendum questions (no matter which government was the initiator) have had a virulent opposition from the opposition party. The second anomaly is in relation to the 1999 referendum on Australia becoming a republic. The initiator (the Coalition Government under the leadership of Prime Minister John Howard) did not fully support Australia becoming a republic. According to the Prime Minister, to change the current Australian constitutional system would run the risk of weakening some of the checks and balances that are part of the current system (Irving 2004: 94). On 23 January 1998, Howard explained his opposition to Australia becoming a republic. In summary, he argued that a better system could be delivered and that to make such a change will affect the long-term political health and stability of Australia (Irving 2004: 95).

The proposed change saw approximately two-thirds support from elected Members of Parliament for Australia becoming a republic. A further anomaly with the 1999 referendum was that the campaign for the ‗‗yes‘‘ and ‗‗no‘‘ vote was headed up by two interest groups led by people who were not political party leaders. The interest groups were the Australian Republican Movement under Malcolm Turnbull, and Australians for a Constitutional Monarchy under Kerry Jones.

10.1 Voter Behaviour and the Referendum

The common denominator in all referendums is that it is only ever initiated by the political party that has a majority in the House of Representatives. This fact alone leads one to hypothesise that, as the political party in power was elected by a majority of voters (preferences or otherwise), similar levels of support should carry over in support of the proposed constitutional changes at referendums. This reasoning is based on the premise that a majority of people voted in the previous general election to give a particular political party the power to govern Australia in Australians‘ best interests. This is representative democracy.

However, evidence has shown that the level of voter support experienced by major political parties in general elections has not carried through to the referendum. One explanation for this shift is that the general election and the referendum are based on two different democratic principles. The general election is built on representative democracy, whereas referendums, in Australia are recommendations brought before the citizenry to debate and consider the merits of the proposed change. Clearly, the constitution is a document that must be considered in a manner that is best for all its citizens. The amendment of the constitution

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through the referendum allows for popular debate concerning the democratic legitimation of proposed constitutional changes (Ackerman 1991: 54). A second, less critical (but nonetheless important) factor, is that preferential voting does not apply in referendum voting, as the referendum requires a majority of votes and a majority of states to support the proposed change. At the personal level, each vote is one value with no opportunity for preferences. In effect, an impasse exists between representative and deliberative52 democracy. The outcome of this impasse is more readily understood from the 1999 ACRS survey which shows that 28 percent of respondents indicated that their first priority aim for Australia should be to allow all people to have ‗more say in important government decisions‘. A further 26 percent rated ‗more say in important government decisions‘ as their second priority. These results suggest that there is a significant proportion of Australia‘s population that would appreciate the opportunity to be more involved in the democratic process.

Within a representative democracy, such as Australia, a majority of voters understand that ‗having more of a say in important government decisions‘ is not possible. Clearly, the majority of voters do not have the time nor the inclination to research all policy matters that face the Parliament. Some would argue that many voters are apathetic on the majority of issues and rarely consider a genuine position (Aitkin 1977: 18). As evidence supporting this view, Campbell et al argue,

A substantial portion of the public is able to respond in a discrete manner to issues that might be the subject of legislative or administrative action. Yet it knows little about what government has done on these issues or what the parties propose to do. It is almost completely unable to judge the rationality of government actions; knowing little of particular policies and what has led to them, the mass electorate is not able to appraise either its goals or the appropriateness of the means chosen to serve these goals (Campbell et al 1964: 282).

An opposing view is that voters do consider their position and have valid reasons for their views (Sniderman et al 1991: 1). They argue that ―the mass public could tie their political ideas together and that whether, and how far, they did so is not a constant, but varies with, among other things, the amount of schooling they have had‖ (1991: 3). This concept is directly tied to what some refer to as the sophistication of the electorate. Others argue that the desire by voters to have a greater say in the decision-making process is as a result of the

52 The origin of deliberative democracy was devised to focus attention on the importance of effective democracy, where there would be fair and open community deliberation about the merits of competing political arguments (Uhr 1998b: 4).

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expansion of education, with the consequence that the electorate has become more sophisticated (McAllister 1992: 15). Results from various AES studies show that, on the whole, the Australian public has a moderately high level of interest in politics. ―By historical standards, then, contemporary levels of popular interest in politics is high‖ (McAllister 1992: 33).

Some scholars argue that the issue which the electorate is asked to vote on (whether by policy in a general election or constitutional change in a referendum) is affected by a conscious calculation of policy benefits (Carmines and Stimson 1980: 114, 117). Voters have a natural self-interest in an outcome that will benefit themselves and their family. One difficulty associated with analysis of this argument is that policy benefits vary amongst voters, and what might be perceived as a benefit by a majority of voters in one electorate will not be perceived as a benefit in another electorate (Markus and Converse 1993: 142). This problematic issue brings us back to vote determinants associated with the Michigan Model of voter choice.

Regardless of any argument, when a referendum is held, voters have the constitutional right to have a direct say on one or more important decisions. The referendum in modern western democracies is the only mechanism where this is available if one does not want to become directly involved in the political sphere. However, through legislative change and legal interpretation of the Constitution, there has been de facto change to the Constitution and a shift in the balance of power between the Commonwealth and the States. One constitutional scholar argues,

For nearly eighty years we have witnessed the steady and seemingly inevitable increase in federal power in Australia and, therefore, the reduction and decline of the exclusive legislative and executive power of the States … In Australia it has been the result of a broad interpretation of various federal powers, but particularly the corporations power (s.51 (xx)) and, to a lesser extent, the external affairs power (s.51 (xxix)) (Zines 2000: 98).

In support of Zines, it can be argued that voters have become cynical of the motives of Australia‘s federal political masters. One argument put forward in support of this point is that Australian voters have achieved higher levels of education and, consequently are less inclined to trust government. On this issue, Nye (1997: 1) argues that public confidence in western governments and major institutions has been in decline since the 1960s. Paul Kelly similarly supports this view when he writes,

The defeat of the republic exposes Australia as two different societies—a confident, educated, city-based middle class and a pessimistic, urban and rural battler constituency hostile to the 1990s change agenda…This was not a vote

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for the Queen; it was not just a vote against the republic on offer; it was, on a deeper level, a vote of distrust in the political class and its agenda of 1990s reform … (Kelly 1999: 1,4).

The issue of political trust is at the core of democracy. Questioning whether the government can be trusted to ‗do the right thing‘ by voters is at the heart of their cynicism. Results from a 1988 study (IMAS) show that voter trust was particularly low among Australian voters with only three out of ten indicating that government can be trusted to do the right thing (McAllister 1992: 45).

The Government does not stand alone when it comes to voter distrust. The public have lost confidence in major institutions (Papadakis 1999: 75). Recent incidents in Australia contribute to this sense of distrust by voters.53 For example, the HIH collapse, the collapse of Ansett, the past superannuation rort by Australia‘s politicians, the three tiers of tax on taxpayers‘ superannuation contributions and, in more recent times, the Howard Government‘s willingness to abolish the Industrial Relations Commission and minimise the effectiveness of trade unions. Furthermore, there are the economic decisions made by governments where voters perceive that governments do not have their interests at heart. For example: the introduction of a new tax, (the GST), with the promise that all other hidden taxes would be removed; the decisions to privatise government business enterprises and utilities in the name of competition policy; the decisions to deregulate various markets; and decisions to remove local tariffs whilst producers from other countries receive subsidies. One of the biggest areas of cynicism lies with the fact that the federal government opposes four percent wage increases for those on the minimum wage, yet says nothing when CEO salary packages increase by 25 percent.

Situations such as those listed above do not occur by chance. Government policy that has a narrow focus on economic competitiveness has led to higher levels of cynicism amongst voters and is ―contributing to a legitimation crisis‖ (Papadakis 1999: 76). Public opinion has shown that many voters feel that government is run by business interests, that government officials do not care what the public think, and that the government as a whole cannot be trusted (Orren 1997: 81). Furthermore, the concentration of power within the federal government has allowed successive governments to abuse this power in the name of representing the people, when in actual fact successive governments appear to show a certain level of favouritism to those organisations that have the most power.

53 Although governments cannot be directly blamed for these incidents, government policy and deregulation opened the way for these situations to develop.

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Australia‘s Constitution has a two fold function. The first function is to provide a stable and secure system of government with checks and balances, within a federal context, to make laws for its citizens, to provide essential freedoms and protections that would realise good and responsible government. The second function is a limiting function that provides a check on the power of the government by preventing a concentration of power (Blackshield and Williams 2005: 67). These functions were written into the constitution in two direct ways. Firstly, by way of having an Upper House (Senate) that would act as a ‗House of Review‘ where government action can be scrutinised (Blackshield and Williams 2005: 511) and, secondly, the referendum. The first check has failed due to political party domination of the Senate. Consequently, whenever a proposed constitutional change is put to the people through the referendum, the definitive check and balance on government power, voters have predominantly voted ‗no‘. , through deliberative or direct democracy, trumps representative democracy every time. These remarks are anecdotal and provide but one explanation for the inability of governments to achieve a double majority ‗yes‘ vote in a referendum.

This leads to the question of why a majority of proposed constitutional changes have failed to pass the required double majority. There are two possible answers to this. The first is that states have been divided over the perceived benefits of the proposed constitutional changes and, consequently, there has been a reluctance by the states to allow a transference of power (Aitkin 1978: 129). The second answer stems back to the desire of federal governments of all persuasions to enhance their powers, which, as highlighted earlier by Finmore (1977), alerts the voter to proceed with caution. Enhancement of federal powers has been attempted numerous times through the referendum process since 1901. On three occasions, governments attempted to minimise the power of the Senate and, on each occasion, voters have given a clear ‗no‘. However, federal governments have been able to enhance their powers in other ways. As mentioned earlier, two effectual ways have been to seek High Court rulings on federal matters, or through legislative changes. The consequence of this approach is that as governments have gained more power, the level of public/voter trust has diminished.

Further understanding of voter mistrust of government relate to three immediate short-term processes (Orren 1997: 88). These are, the public‘s appraisal of government performance, the public‘s ideological views on certain policies, and the public‘s assessment of the ethics and integrity of the people and processes of government (Orren 1997: 88, 92-94).

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With these processes in the minds of voters at the time of a referendum, it is not too difficult to understand the reluctance of voters to vote ‗yes‘ on constitutional changes that enhance the power of government. Of course, on each of these processes, there has been division of opinion amongst voters and elites.

As much as these points on trust and power have some credibility in describing the referendum outcome, this research is concerned with determining if the Michigan Model of voter behaviour provides support for voter behaviour in referendum voting. One of the key planks of the Michigan Model is party identification, which is important in understanding voter behaviour in the referendum (as well as the general election). Research into voter behaviour over the past forty years has shown that there has been a gradual decline in the strength of party identification in western democracies (Holmberg 1992: 25). Holmberg argues that the decline in party identification is linked to the notion of voter distrust, although as Bean argues, the decline and de-alignment of party identification in Australia has not been as strong (Bean 1997: 103). Previous research using the Michigan Model of voter behaviour has shown that as partisanship declines, so too has the level of trust in governments (Holmberg 1992: 25). According to Holmberg, trust in parties and politicians are related to the strength component of party identification; that is, party identifiers tend to be more politically trusting than non-party identifiers. Holmberg recognises, however, that party identification and trust are measures of two different phenomena, indicating ―people‘s varying degrees of attachment to their preferred party on the one hand and people‘s general trust in parties and politicians on the other‖ (Holmberg 1992: 26). Despite the two different phenomena, there is a connection in voter‘s minds. Holmberg attempts to provide an explanation for the link between party identification and distrust of parties and politicians. He concludes that ―the increasing political distance (ideologically and policy-wise) between voters and parties is one of the explanatory factors behind the recent years of decline in partisan ties …‖ (Holmberg 1992: 28-29).

This research has found that the Michigan Model of voter behaviour provides valid and reliable concepts to make this assessment by providing an explanation regarding the factors that influence citizens when they cast their votes. These factors are party identification, social class, religion, ethnicity, occupation, geographical location, level of education, gender and age. When these characteristics are taken together as a whole, vote choice can be assessed in constitutional referendums. The literature review in chapter two discussed the dominant theory of voting behaviour. The Michigan Model has been accepted by the majority of political scientists as being the most accurate in understanding voter behaviour in

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elections (Rosema 2006: 468). The following section will discuss the Michigan Model in relation to the results obtained for each referendum.

One difficulty that this research has taken into account is lack of availability of survey data. For those who do not support aggregate data analysis, criticism arises surrounding issues of ecological inference, and therefore, to conduct analysis of referendum-voting through the use of aggregate data does not allow inference to individual level voter behaviour. However, when survey data is not available, aggregate data can be used. Historically, aggregate data has been used to make assessments about individual behaviour in the field of political science. For example, the work by Tingsten in 1963 (Political Behavior: Studies in Election Statistics) and Parker in 1949 (The People and the Constitution) have been accepted as ground-breaking studies based on aggregate data analysis. Consequently, in accepting that individual level data is not available, as King has argued, if the correct principles of aggregate research are adhered to, the results are a valid measure of individual preferences. This research has been dependent on aggregate level election and referendum data to make a suitable assessment. It has been argued that, as much as voting is an individual act, ―it is the collectivity of voters that makes the electoral decision‖ (Campbell et al 1964: 267).

The previous chapters on referendum analysis from 1967 to 1999 have used as the proxy determinant (dependent variable) of voter choice, the ‗yes‘/‘no‘ vote. The main independent variables—the socio-demographic factors—are geographical location, state location, the political party currently in office at the time of the referendum, the level of safeness of each federal electorate, and whether state and federal governments were of the same political party. The 1999 referendum allowed for the additional use of 1996 ABS Census data, which made available the other socio-demographical variables such as ethnicity, age, gender, education, religion and income.

10.2 The Michigan Model of Voter Behaviour

Does the Michigan Model of voter behaviour provide an adequate explanation for referendum vote outcomes? The key to answering this question lies with the knowledge that political behaviour and partisan preferences have shown great stability between elections (Campbell et al 1964: 67; Aitkin 1982: 1), where support for one party or another remains fairly constant, seemingly unaffected by a change in candidates or an alteration to the election issues (Aitkin 1982: 36; Bean 1997: 112). ―Its mark is readily seen in aggregate election statistics‖ (Campbell et al 1964: 67). In this manner, this research has utilised aggregate electoral division data, aggregate general election data, and aggregate referendum

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data surrounding each referendum. It is important to note that party identification, as a marker, is based on ‗self-classification‘ and, as such, the concept of party identification is argued as being a psychological attachment (Campbell et al 1964: 68; Lewis-Beck et al 2008: 111).

Research conducted by Campbell et al, and more recently by Lewis-Beck et al, shows that the role of party identification has wide effects on attitudes toward things that are visible in the political world (Campbell et al 1964: 273; Lewis-Beck et al 2008: 116). However, party identification is not the sole indicator of voter preference.

In some elections the public‘s evaluations of the current elements of politics may not agree with its predominant partisan allegiances, and when they do not, in a system where the standing balance of party identification is not too uneven, the difference between evaluations of current political objects and long-term partisan loyalties may be wide enough to elect the candidate of the minority party (Campbell et al 1964: 273).

Results from this research show support for this argument. However, in the case of the referendum, partisan allegiance is based on support (or not) for constitutional change as endorsed (or not) by the particular political party.

This research has demonstrated that the Michigan Model of electorate/voter behaviour is influential in referendum voting. The partisan influence has been especially marked in all referendums from 1967 to 1999 with a greater prevalence of Labor party identifiers supporting constitutional change. Similarly, there has been a clear leaning by Coalition identifiers to reject constitutional change, except when the Coalition is in power.

When considering the predictor variables according to the funnel of causality, the sociological variables are particularly helpful in predicting voter choice in constitutional referendums. However, as (Gow and Stenner 1992) have argued, the social elements of the model only tell part of the story. The Michigan Model (which includes social and psychological) provides a more complete picture of voter behaviour through party attachment, attitude to issues and orientation to candidates. In each referendum, party attachment has been evident. In each referendum, results suggest that voters do consider the issues as evidenced by the level of support or lack of support shown in voting and the variation in level of support at each referendum. Thirdly, voters‘ orientation to MPs (candidates) has been influential in providing voters with the necessary cues to cast their vote.

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10.3 Voter Choice in Referendums from 1967 to 1999

Any explanation of how voters decide rests on their belief of party behaviour. That is, parties (through the media) provide the main political guidance for voters (Budge and Fairlie 1983: 22). The application of this argument is inextricably correlated with the Michigan Model of voter choice. In a similar vein to Campbell et al, this research is concerned the exploring the influence of party identification (Campbell et al 1964: 68) on voter choice in referendums. The indicator for ‗party identification‘ has been based on the percentage of votes received from the previous general election. We can hypothesise that the higher the percentage of vote from the previous federal election, the higher the level of support for the proposed constitutional change through the referendum.

The point has been stressed in this research that one of the major differences between a referendum and a general election is the vote regarding constitutional change (the referendum) versus the vote for a candidate (general election). Budge and Fairlie argue that the joint effects of partisanship and issues should provide us with an adequate explanation for the outcome (Budge and Fairlie 1983: 57). Furthermore, their research has found that issue based voting and partisanship are good indicators for explaining vote outcome in past elections and predicting vote outcome in future elections (Budge and Fairlie 1983: 63). This analysis has enabled the application of these indicators to referendum voting.

In examining the referendum results from 1967 to 1999, there are many patterns which can be identified. By way of summary, over this 32 year period, there were 20 proposed constitutional changes. Of this 20, only four gained the required double majority in order to amend the constitution – one in 1967 and the other three in 1974. In other words, 80 precent of proposed constitutional changes were rejected by the Australian voting public.

When this acceptance or rejection of constitutional changes is broken down to the electorate level, the following results were found. In 1967 on the ‗nexus question‘, 32 (26 percent) electorates accepted the proposed change while 90 (74 percent) electorates rejected the proposed change. On the ‗Aboriginal question‘, all 122 electorates accepted the proposed change. In 1973, the proposed changes on ‗prices and incomes‘ saw the following results: on the prices question, 32 (26 percent) electorates accepted the proposed change, while 91 (74 percent) electorates rejected the proposed change. On the ‗incomes question‘, eight (6.5 percent) electorates accepted the proposed change while 115 (93.5 percent) electorates rejected the proposed change. In 1974, four proposed constitutional changes were put to the Australian electorates. Question number one, on ‗simultaneous elections‘, realised 44 (34.5

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percent) electorates supporting the proposed change. Question two, on ‗the mode of altering the Constitution‘, realised support from 42 electorates (33 percent). Question three, on ‗democratic elections‘, realised support from 39 electorates (31 percent). Question four did not fare any better and had 37 electorates (29 percent) supporting the change on ‗local government bodies‘ being codified into the Constitution.

Approximately three years later, in 1977 under a Coalition Government, a further referendum was held asking the electorate to consider a further four changes to the Constitution: – simultaneous elections, filling Senate casual vacancies, bringing the Australian Territories into the voting process in a referendum, and specifying a retirement age for judges. Support from the electorate was much higher than in previous referendums. On the question of ‗simultaneous elections‘, 102 from 124 electorates (82 percent) supported the change. The second question on filling of ‗senate casual vacancies‘, 118 of 124 electorates (95 percent) supported the change. The third question, on allowing the Australian Territories to be part of the referendum process saw support from 122 electorates (98 percent), and the fourth question, on the ‗retirement age of judges‘ realised support from all 124 electorates. Of the four questions, three received the required double majority. The first question failed, however we notice that a majority of voters and a majority of electorates supported the change.

The next referendum (under an ALP Government) was not held until 1984, when two questions were put to the Australian electorate. Question one, on ‗simultaneous elections‘, saw 75 from 148 electorates (51 percent) support this proposed change—much lower than for the same question in 1977. Question two, on the ‗interchange of powers‘ saw 49 electorates (33 percent) show support for this proposed change.

In 1988, under an ALP Government, a further four proposed constitutional changes were put to the Australian electorate. In summary, these were: the introduction of four year parliamentary terms, fair elections, recognising local government in the Constitution, and to enshrine rights and freedoms for all in the Constitution. Overall, this vote was one of the lowest votes received in support of the proposed constitutional changes. Four electorates (2.7 percent) supported the introduction of four year parliamentary terms. Eighteen electorates (12 percent) supported fair elections. Two electorates (1.5 percent) supported the recognition of local government in the Constitution, and just one electorate (1 percent) supported the ‗rights and freedoms‘ change.

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The latest constitutional referendum held in Australia in 1999 had two proposed constitutional changes. The first question asked voters to consider whether Australia should become a republic. The second question asked voters to consider whether there should be an alteration to the preamble of the Constitution. Question one, on the republic issue, saw support from 42 out of 148 electorates (28 percent), and question two saw 16 from 148 electorates (11 percent) support the amendment to the preamble.

Figure 10.1 Percent of ‘yes’ vote for referendum questions from 1967 to 1999

Electorate Yes

100.0

80.0

q1 yes 60.0 q2 yes

Percent q3 yes 40.0 q4 yes

20.0

0.0 1967 1973 1974 1977 1984 1988 1999 Referendum Year

Is there a pattern of acceptance or rejection of these proposed constitutional changes? The above graph illustrates the number and percentages of electorates that supported all of the proposed constitutional changes. The graph shows that six of the 20 proposed changes were accepted by majority voters in a majority of electorates, however, only four of the proposed changes received the required double majority. In answer to the question, the highest support for constitutional change occurs when the Coalition are in office.

A second aspect of the referendums from 1967 to 1999 is the level of acceptance of electorates to the proposed constitutional changes based on geographical location. Social factors, such as the geographical location of voters and, in this case, electorates, will influence the outcome of the results. Campbell et al argue that, despite the high mobility of voters, party identification will remain stable (1964: 88). Campbell‘s research also found that rural voters remained true to their long-standing traditions. An important caveat is that

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rural voters are susceptible to change. These voters have clear economic cleavages that lend weight to their voting behaviour (Campbell et al 1964: 221). The following graph (Figure 9.2 below) demonstrates that there is a recognisable trend between the four geographical locations in terms of support for constitutional change. This trend is that a majority of voters from metropolitan electorates are more likely to support constitutional change than voters in electorates from all other geographical areas. The reverse is also true, in that a majority of voters in provincial and rural areas are more likely to oppose constitutional change. Based on the data from this table, the results are statistically significant with 14 out of the 20 relationships having a positive or negative correlation with a p-value < 0.05.

Figure 10.2 Percentage of referendum ‘yes’ vote by Geographic Location from 1967 to 1999

Electorate Yes by Geographic Location

100.0 1967 q1 yes 1967 q2 yes 90.0 1967 q2 yes 1973 q1 yes 1973 q2 yes 80.0 1973 q2 yes 1974 q1 yes 70.0 1974 q2 yes 1974 q3 yes 1974 q4 yes 60.0 1974 q4 yes 1977 q1 yes 50.0 1977 q2 yes 1977 q3 yes

Percentage 1977 q4 yes 40.0 1977 q4 yes 1984 q1 yes 30.0 1984 q2 yes 1984 q2 yes 1988 q1 yes 20.0 1988 q2 yes 1988 q3 yes 10.0 1988 q4 yes 1988 q4 yes 1999 q1 yes 0.0 1999 q2 yes Inner Metro Outer Metro Provincial Rural Geographical Location

Overall, these aggregate data results support the centre-periphery hypothesis where voters from metropolitan electorates are more likely to support constitutional change than voters from provincial or rural electorates.

One of the tests conducted in the earlier chapters was to determine whether there was any geographical effect based on electorate mean values. The mean values did support the geographical effect with a gradual decrease in the mean value in both inner metropolitan to rural electorates, and larger to smaller populated states.

A variation in the geographical location proposition is the location of electorates from states. This research has hypothesised that voters in electorates from the larger populated states are more likely to support constitutional change than voters from electorates in states with

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smaller populations. The results, as seen in the graph below, support this hypothesis, with voters in New South Wales and Victorian electorates more likely to support constitutional change than voters in those electorates from the smaller populated states. These results are statistically significant with a p-value in many of the relationships being less than 0.05. We need to bear in mind that these results that show that a majority of electorates opposed to constitutional change, similarly, they show that a majority of voters in very few electorates actually supported proposed constitutional change.

Figure 10.3 Percentage of referendum ‘yes’ vote by State Location from 1967 to 1999

State by Percentage of YES vote

100.0 1967 q1 yes 1967 q2 yes 90.0 1967 q2 yes 1973 q1 yes 80.0 1973 q2 yes 1973 q2 yes 1974 q1 yes 70.0 1974 q2 yes 1974 q3 yes 60.0 1974 q4 yes 1974 q4 yes 50.0 1977 q1 yes

Percent 1977 q2 yes 1977 q3 yes 40.0 1977 q4 yes 1977 q4 yes 30.0 1984 q1 yes 1984 q2 yes 20.0 1984 q2 yes 1988 q1 yes

10.0 1988 q2 yes 1988 q3 yes 1988 q4 yes 0.0 1988 q4 yes NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS 1999 q1 yes State 1999 q2 yes

On the large populated state versus smaller populated states issue, the centre-periphery hypothesis is supported, based on those indicators that have been extrapolated from the Michigan Model at an aggregate level. We can affirm these results by claiming that socio- economic factors help to explain voter behaviour in constitutional referendums. However, as the Michigan Model highlights, psychological attachment to political parties is long-standing and stable in understanding voter behaviour.

The question which has been addressed is whether the partisan effect can be observed at the aggregate level. This research conducted analysis based on the two party preferred vote and the safeness of electorate seat, where ‗vote‘ from the previous federal general election were used as a proxy for the self-reported party identification variable. It was hypothesised that as a majority of voters in each electorate had voted for the current federal member at the previous general election, then voters would similarly support the position of their elected

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MP at the referendum. We should expect that results will show a trend where, if the government calling the referendum was a Labor Government and the incumbent member of an electorate at the time of a referendum was an ALP member, then a majority of voters in those electorates will similarly support the proposal. The hypothesis is supported. On a two party preferred basis, results showed that there was more support from voters in Labor held electorates than Coalition held electorates. Careful examination shows that there is a clear partisan effect. At the 1967 referendum under a Holt led Coalition government, support was higher among Coalition held electorates.

At the 1973 and 1974 referendums under the Whitlam Government, there is a similar effect with higher levels of support coming from voters in Labor held electorates. At the 1977 referendum, under a Fraser led Coalition government, support was higher from Coalition held electorates. The same was true for the referendums held in the 1980s. There was, however, a variation to this trend at the 1999 referendum under a Howard led Coalition government. Here we notice that there were higher levels of support for the proposed changes from Labor held electorates than there were from Coalition held electorates. One explanation for this (as has been previously argued) is that the 1999 referendum, on the issue of Australia becoming a republic, was only held due to Howard giving an election promise. This was not a proposed change supported by Howard and, therefore, did not gain the same level of support from the Prime Minister or the Coalition as in previous referendums initiated by the government of the day.

Further evidence and an extension of the two party preferred level of support is seen with a breakdown of each electorate into its ‗safeness‘. ‗Safeness of seat‘ is a term based on the margin each electorate is held by the current or elected MP as determined by the Australian Electoral Commission. In order to determine this effect, referendum results were broken into two groups. Group one is referendums from 1967 to 1977. Group two is referendums from 1984 to 1999. Between 1967 to 1977 (see Figure 10.4), referendums were initiated twice by the Coalition and twice by Labor. We notice that, in the first group, there are significantly higher levels of support for constitutional change from safe Labor held electorates. In terms of the distribution of results, a straight line at approximately 15 degrees could be drawn from one side of the graph to the other showing the downwards trend in electorate support for constitutional change from safe Labor held electorates to safe Coalition held electorates.

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Figure 10.4 Percentage of referendum ‘yes’ vote by safeness of seat from 1967 to 1977

Safeness of Seat by Percentage of Yes Vote from 1967 to 1977

100.0

80.0

1967 q1 yes 1967 q2 yes 1973 q1 yes 60.0 1973 q2 yes 1974 q1 yes 1974 q2 yes 1974 q3 yes Percent 1974 q4 yes 40.0 1977 q1 yes 1977 q2 yes 1977 q3 yes 1977 q4 yes

20.0

0.0 SL FSL ML MC FSC SC Safeness of Seat

The second group of referendums (1984 to 1999) as shown in Figure 10.5, demonstrates a similar trend with higher levels of support for constitutional change coming from the safe Labor held electorates. During this time period, all referendums held during the 1980s were done so under a Labor led Federal Government. The 1999 referendum was the only one initiated by a Coalition led Federal Government. This outcome leads one to conclude that the strength and direction of the partisan effect is especially evident among voters in safe Labor held electorates. Correlation values and associated p-values support this conclusion with significance levels regularly less than 0.05.

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Figure 10.5 Percentage of referendum ‘yes’ vote by safeness of seat from 1984 to 1999

Safeness of Seat by Percentage of YES vote

70.0

60.0

50.0 1984 q1 yes 1984 q2 yes 1984 q2 yes 40.0 1988 q1 yes 1988 q2 yes

1988 q3 yes Percent 30.0 1988 q4 yes 1988 q4 yes 1999 q1 yes 1999 q2 yes 20.0

10.0

0.0 SL FSL ML MC FSC SC Safeness of Seat

From these aggregate results, we are able to make the following conclusions. Firstly, there are higher levels of support from voters located in inner metropolitan electorates. Secondly, voters from electorates in larger populated states, such as New South Wales and Victoria, are more likely to support constitutional change than those from the smaller states. Thirdly, voters from Labor held electorates are more likely to support constitutional change than Coalition held electorates. This factor is stronger the safer the electorate is for Labor, whether the referendum is initiated by Labor or the Coalition.

The final part of this discussion addresses the results from the 1999 referendum for the aggregate level data and the 1999 ACRS. Utilising the ABS 1996 census data, the 1998 AEC election results and the 1999 AEC referendum results, research has allowed an analysis of Michigan Model variables of influence for referendum vote at both aggregate and individual levels.

The methodology considered seven variables as described by the Michigan Model of party identification, to determine the effect on referendum vote choice at the 1999 referendum. As expected, the models at both the aggregate and individual levels showed similarities. Firstly, party identification/partisanship was a telling factor in vote preference on the republic question, where Labor party voters were more supportive of this proposed change than other political party identifiers as shown by the standardised coefficients and the associated p- values. At the aggregate level, the causal relationship between Labor party identifiers and republic referendum vote, when taking all other variables into account, shows that ALP

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identifiers were (Beta = 0.265) 20 times more likely to vote for the proposed republic question than other party identifiers. At the individual level, results are similar (Beta = 0.239) with an associated p-value < 0.001.

The other significant indicators were education and employment type, where those voters that had a higher education were more likely to support the republic proposal. In contrast, voters from a blue-collar or manual labour background were more likely to oppose the republic. Both models (aggregate and individual level) show statistically significant results (Beta and T-tests with associated p-value < 0.001). Overall, both models are statistically significant, where the aggregate model explains approximately 79 percent of the referendum vote for the republic question, whereas the 1999 ACRS explains approximately 11 percent of the vote.

Model results for the preamble were statistically significant at an aggregate level only. At the aggregate level, the model explains approximately 76 percent of the vote for the preamble proposal. In the aggregate model on the preamble question, the one statistically significant variable was ALP party identification.

In summary, results from each referendum from 1967 to 1999 provide evidence that supports the Michigan Model of voter behaviour in constitutional referendums. It is, however, important to keep in mind that the Michigan Model encapsulates three factors in explaining voter choice: party attachment; attitude to issues; and orientation to candidates. Of these three factors, voting has clearly been influenced by all components. If voters only voted based on their established partisan preference, more referendums would pass. However, as voters consider the issues and the candidates (Prime Minister, Opposition Leader, Local Member of Parliament), for a majority of voters, the issues and the candidate take precedence over party identification or partisan alignments.

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CHAPTER ELEVEN

11.0 Conclusion and Implications

Richard Rose writes ―elections may decide who governs, but constitutions decide what the government is‖ (Rose 1983: 21). Rose‘s insight provides the over-arching principle of democratic voting—whether in a general election or a referendum—that the Constitution is the foundation of voting in a democratic system.

This research has examined whether the Michigan Model of voter behaviour in Australian general elections can be applied to referendum voting. The title, ‗Voter Behaviour and Constitutional Change in Australia since 1967‘, has provided the parameters for research and analysis. To determine whether the Michigan Model provides an explanation of voter behaviour in these referendums, the research has studied three sources of data. These have been the aggregate data sourced from the Australian Electoral Commission and the Australian Bureau of Statistics. Analysis was also made with survey data from the 1999 ACRS. This data allowed closer examination of the voting patterns that have influenced voters in referendum voting in Australia at the aggregate level.

In summarising the findings, there are several salient issues that help explain voter behaviour in referendums and how this behaviour is not dissimilar to voting in general elections. Firstly, the Australian electorate is not fearful of change. Secondly, as with general elections, referendums have political, social and economic implications. Thirdly, the well- being of the voter is an issue that political parties need to bear in mind—that is, the voter should not be treated as though they are incapable of making an informed decision. Fourthly, the constitution is a federal instrument and the structure dictates how power is shared between the Commonwealth and the States. Tampering with the structure, through indirect change to the Constitution, is not accepted by the voting public. Lastly, and most importantly for this research, is that partisan cues, based on party identification, are just as evident in referendum voting as they are in general election voting.

Previous research on the first issue, fear of change, has been anecdotal due to the difficultly in conceptualising this idea. On this issue, the discussion chapter raised a factor not previously considered: that is, elitist criticism (McAllister 2001: 258) of Australian voters‘ inability to have an adequate understanding of the issues being proposed in a referendum is unwarranted. This criticism argues that Australian voters are apathetic and incapable of

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understanding the political system and making an informed decision54. Galligan however, believes that this is a false assumption of the Australian voter in referendums. He argues,

Some have suggested that the ignorant and apathetic citizen, compelled to vote at a referendum, invariably says no. But the high level of turnout and low level of informal vote in referendums does not support such an hypothesis. Reluctant voters could stay away in droves and in effect challenge the legitimacy of the compulsory rule for referendums, or spoil their ballots in order to register indifference or antipathy. In fact, only small minorities take either of these alternatives (Galligan 1990: 501).

To illustrate the view that minimal change is not due to fear or apathy, the average Australian would not understand all the intricacies of the banking and finance industry, yet a majority of Australians use this service on a daily basis. Users of the banking and finance industry accept decisions made by those in authority (from the Reserve Bank Governor to the local branch manager), knowing that their decisions will have some form of impact on their lives. Similarly, voters may not understand all of the implications of the Australian Constitution; however the Constitution is the instrument that guides Australian law, system of government, and many other facets of the Australian way of life.

When one makes the comparison between changes in the political party in power, and the number of accepted constitutional changes from 1967 to 1999, we find that the rate of change is not dissimilar. To demonstrate this argument, the Coalition has held government for three block periods of time: – 1967 to 1969; 1975 to 1980; and 1996 to 1999 to 2007. The Australian Labor party has had two block periods of governance: – 1972 to 1975 and 1983 to 1996. What these results show is that there have been five changes in the political party in power over 32 years, coupled with 13 general elections (not including Senate elections).

Over this same time period, the Australian electorate has been asked to vote in seven referendums considering 20 proposed constitutional changes. Of these 20 proposed constitutional changes, four changes have been successful. The percentage of political party change in Australian general elections is 38 percent, whilst, over the same period, the rate of acceptance of constitutional change is 35 percent.

54 It is important to note that a report conducted by the ‗Civics Expert Group‘ researching citizenship education found that ―there is a high level of community ignorance about Australia‘s system of government and its origins‖ (Macintyre 1994)

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The conclusion that one can draw from this is that Australian voters are conservative when it comes to any form of political change (O'Keefe 1988: 18), and that, whether it be a political party or the Constitution, if circumstances do not dictate a need for change, then Australians are more likely to retain the status quo. Furthermore, one can confidently argue that Australian citizens do have an awareness55 of the political system and that when there is a need for change, the Australian electorate will cautiously accept change. Moreover, when change is not warranted in the minds of the voter, change will be rejected. This situation is aptly demonstrated by the fact that voters have rejected the proposed change to constitutionalise simultaneous elections between the Upper and Lower Houses on four separate occasions. The four proposals for simultaneous elections were turned down, not for fear of change, but rather to prevent the removal of Senate fixed terms (Sharman 1984: 21).

When voting in either a constitutional referendum or a general election, the second issue of social, political and economic considerations are equally important factors. Previous research has demonstrated that voters in general elections consider questions such as: ‗How is this going to affect my back-pocket‘ (Kinder and Kiewiet 1979: 496)? Research conducted by Blount highlighted the fact that voters‘ attitudes to fiscal issues at the micro- economic level are better predictors of vote outcome than attitudes to macro-economic issues (Blount 1999: 506, 513). Further research conducted by Blount concludes that economic considerations made by the Australian electorate when casting their votes are statistically significant. Research has demonstrated that unemployment (Blount 2002: 98), inflation and real income (Kinder and Kiewiet 1979: 496) are important socio-economic factors for voters, which are key components of the Michigan Model. Kramer (as cited by Kinder and Kiewiet) found that, when there were economic benefits to the community, the incumbent Members of Parliament benefited and, when there was economic decline, electoral chances favoured the opposition. Kramer concluded that ―voters draw upon their own personal economic circumstances in reaching political decisions‖ (Kinder and Kiewiet 1979: 496).

If there is a change in the political party in power, will their policies affect my way of life? The stability of Australian political culture is demonstrated by the fact that voters do not rotate political parties in government very often (McAllister 1992: 16). One can argue, therefore, that proposed constitutional change has the potential to destabilise Australia‘s

55 The Australian voting public has, for many years, had access to substantial information. Weber argues that in many political settings, ―voters have access to substantial information, typically gleaned from public opinion polls, concerning the expressed preferences and voting intentions of others. This information can affect … how voters cast their ballots (Weber 1993).

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political culture (balance of power), which could be a factor that voters consider when voting in referendums. If there is no perceived negative impact (at either individual or community level), it can be expected that voters will not oppose constitutional amendment. For example, the four accepted changes: – the Aboriginal question in 1967, and the three questions in 1977 (Senate casual vacancies; recognition of the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory in the Constitution; and a maximum retirement age of 70 for Federal Court judges) did not have any negatively perceived social, political or economic implications as they were issues that, broadly speaking, were based on the utilitarian principle of redress and/or the egalitarian principle of the commitment to equality.

On the other hand, all other questions that were not supported had either political or economic implications (or both). With some of the proposed changes (for example, the 1999 referendum on Australia becoming a republic), voters perceived that change would mean the removal of constitutional safe-guards (the introduction of an Australian Head of State that could be appointed by the Parliament and dismissed by the Prime Minister). In fact, it is argued that, where the proposed change involves the accretion of powers by the Commonwealth, voters have ―proved extremely suspicious‖ (Kirby 2000: 524). Other proposed changes would have had a direct impact on the hip-pocket nerve (the 1973 referendum questions where the Australian Government would have the power to control prices and legislate with respect to incomes), as well as indirect effects through the proposed recognition of local government bodies in the constitution (1974 and 1988). This change would have realised a de-facto shift in the division of powers between the Commonwealth and State Governments due to a reallocation in funding arrangements. Furthermore, there were the proposed changes that would have had the impact of granting the governing political party more power (simultaneous elections of the Senate and the House of Representatives in 1974, 1977 and 1984; the introduction of an interchange of powers that would enable the Commonwealth and States the ability to voluntarily refer powers to each other in 1984; parliamentary terms to four years maximum for members of both Houses of Parliament in 1988). These proposed changes, coupled with the knowledge that a majority of voters cast their votes for the same party in both houses would make it much easier for the government (regardless of what party was in power) to ensure that all policies and legislation were passed unhindered.

One of the central issues that dominates voters thinking in constitutional referendums is the realisation that many of the proposed changes meant that the electorate would have a reduced ability to have a say in government (Mendelsohn and Cutler 2000: 695). Although not addressed in this research, surveys have shown that voters desire a greater say in the

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matters of government. For example, in the 1998 AES and the 1999 ACRS, 33 and 30 percent (respectively) of respondents rated ‗giving people more say in government‘ as their most important concern, whilst a further 27 percent rated the same issue as their second highest concern.56 These results support Gollop‘s argument that ―distrust of government coupled with a desire by ordinary people to have more say in the way they are governed seems to inform virtually every current debate on politics in contemporary Australian society‖ (Gollop 2002: 1).

This thrust brings one back to the voters‘ ability to make an informed decision. Niemi and Weisberg (citing VO Key [1996]) argue that ―voters are not fools‖—they can vote on the basis of issues … (Niemi and Weisberg 1993a: 96). Similarly, voters are used to making decisions on a daily basis and voter decision-making cannot be much different—that is, voters acquire information for making choices (Lau and Redlawsk 2006: 21). Since both elections and constitutional referendums deal with issues, one must conclude that voters are able to make informed decisions. How that decision process is influenced, is what this research has been concerned with.

The central concern for this research has been whether the decision making process by the voter/electorate in constitutional referendums is based on partisanship as explained by the Michigan Model of voter behaviour. This research has examined the factors that contribute to the Michigan Model at both an aggregate and individual level.

Recall that the Michigan Model of voter behaviour argues that socio-economic variables, party identification, and attitude to issues and leaders all influence voter choice (Bone and Ranney 1971: 7). Within the Michigan Model, socio-economic factors, such as class, religion and ethnicity (Gow and Stenner 1992: 13), have been determined as influential determinants of voter choice. As highlighted in the literature review, Dalton‘s ‗funnel of causality‘ suitably illustrates the process from social maturation through to voter choice.

56 Respondents in the 1999 ACRS were asked to prioritise the aims of Australia from four choices: 1. Maintain order in the nation; 2. Give people more say in important government decisions; 3. Fight rising prices; 4. Protect freedom of speech. Rating these items from one to four for first and second priority, the first priority was to maintain order (39 percent); give people more say (29.8 percent); fight rising prices (17 percent); protect free speech (14 percent). The second priority was: maintain order (19.1 percent); give people more say (26.9 percent); fight rising prices (28.1 percent); protect free speech (25.9 percent) (Gow et al 2000b).

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Previous research has shown that party identification has a profound impact on voter choice in general elections and, ultimately, on the stability of Australian politics. Aitkin has argued that,

Electoral stability is connected to the stability of the larger political system. Australia‘s political parties do not challenge the legitimacy of the general constitution or socio-economic arrangements in society (Aitkin 1982: 6).

Aitkin‘s research found that ―there can be no doubt that partisanship, stable, predictable partisanship, is the basis of the party system‖ (Aitkin 1982: 353). As Aitken argues, party identification can be attributed to family and social background, values and class of the voter and, finallyf the issues that each political party espouses (Aitkin 1982: 353-354). Dalton similarly argues that citizens make judgements about which party best represents their interests, and that voters‘ attitudes towards issues are an essential element in understanding voter choice (Dalton 1996: 196). The Bone and Ranney, Aiken, Gow and Stenner, and Dalton analyses of voter behaviour may have been in connection with general elections, however, the logical extension for this research has been linked to voter behaviour in referendums. As McAllister rightly argues, ―in principle, referendums differ little from representative elections … and many referendums are often intensely partisan with politicians mobilising their supporters as they would in a regular election contest (McAllister 2001: 245)57.

This research has gathered available aggregate data from 1966 to 1999 in order to determine if the Michigan Model of voter behaviour can be supported in referendum voting. For the period from 1966 through to 1988, analysis was conducted using available results from the Australian Electoral Commission for each Australian electorate. For the 1998 election and the 1999 referendum, census results were available which allowed the testing of socio- economic variables with referendum results. The aggregate results were able to be compared with results from the 1999 ACRS, providing this research with a two-way analysis of the Michigan Model. A similar method was adopted by McAllister in 2000. 58 With a similar methodology, this approach allowed this research to examine the relationship between partisanship and referendum voting.

57 McAllister further argues that despite the similarities between the representative election and the referendum, when it comes to casting the actual vote, the ballot paper lacks the partisan cues (political party, politician‘s name) that voters are use to seeing. (McAllister 2001) 58 Ian McAllister presented a paper for the Republic Referendum Panel, Australasian Political Association meetings, held at the Australian National University, 3-6 October 2000.

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Aitkin argued that the Australian electorate follows particular patterns of voting within the three tiers of government. As much as there are federal and state differences, and voters cast their votes differently for state and federal elections, an overwhelming majority of Australians maintain a constant party preference whatever the nature of the election (Aitkin 1982: 45-46). McAllister adds further support by arguing that ―partisanship is stable over time, as it represents a long term influence on political behaviour‖ (McAllister 1992: 37). These eminent psephologists and the research that they have conducted, provide the background for adopting the Michigan Model for analysis of voting behaviour of referendums in Australia.

In order to assess the Michigan Model at the aggregate level, this research has undertaken analysis of five variables. The first variable, geographical location of the electorate provided data for analysis of one social component (urban-rural and centre-periphery divide). Where the electorate was located, in terms of the four categories was thought to be an important factor. The hypothesis proposed that metropolitan electorates were more likely to accept constitutional change than rural or provincial electorates. The hypothesis was supported, with greater support for accepting constitutional change coming from metropolitan electorates (combined inner and outer metropolitan). For example, in 1967, 39 percent of all electorates were classified as ‗inner metropolitan electorates‘, 19 percent were classified as ‗outer metropolitan electorates‘, 12 percent were classified as provincial electorates, and 30 percent were classified as rural electorates. Of all electorates that supported the nexus question, an overwhelming majority were from the inner and outer metropolitan electorates, whereas overwhelming rejection came from the provincial and rural electorates. In the referendums held in the 1970s, the difference was not as pronounced with the division for support of proposed changes coming from voters in inner and outer metropolitan, and provincial electorates. Voters in rural electorates were less likely to support proposed changes. Results from the 1977 referendum (recognising that three of the four proposals gained the required double majority) again showed that voters from inner and outer metropolitan electorates provided higher levels of support for the proposed changes than the provincial and rural electorates. Results from the referendums in the 1980s and 1999 further supported the hypothesis, with more support for proposed constitutional change coming from voters located in inner and outer metropolitan electorates. We can conclude, therefore, that historical divisions, such as geographical location, do influence referendum outcome.

The second hypothesis proposed that the larger populated states of Victoria and New South Wales were more likely to support constitutional change than the smaller states. This hypothesis was supported with results showing that greater levels of support for

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constitutional change came from the two larger states. These results were repeated in all referendum results, including the 1999 questions on the republic and preamble.

The third and fourth hypotheses proposed that partisanship does influence voters in constitutional referendums. The hypotheses stated that higher levels of support for constitutional change would come from stronger Australian Labor party held electorates. In all referendums, it was found that the safer the seat held by a Labor Member of Parliament, the higher the level of support from voters in these electorates. The opposite was also true; the safer a Coalition held seat, the less likely voters in those electorates supported constitutional change. In 1977, when three of the four proposed changes received the required double majority, Coalition held electorates were less likely to support the changes than voters from marginal held Coalition electorates.

The fifth hypothesis stated that partisanship extends to the state level and that a majority of voters align themselves with the political party that holds power with their respective state government. The assumption was that, if the political party in power at the Commonwealth and State level was the same, support for constitutional change would be higher than if political parties were different. In general, this hypothesis was not supported. Results showed that, for a majority of referendums, slightly higher support came from voters within electorates in those states that had an opposing political party in power to the Commonwealth.

The second part of the Michigan Model that this research examined was the socio-economic variables as found in chapters 8 and 9. To what extent did ethnicity, gender and employment, age, religion, income, and education impact on voter behaviour in the 1999 referendum at both aggregate and individual levels? Results from the multivariate analysis showed that certain variables were influential in voter decision at an electorate level. For example, education and employment were influential determinants of voter choice for both the republic and preamble questions. One of the limitations of the model using census data was the inability to include a variable measuring party identification.

At an individual level, using the 1999 ACRS on self-reported party identification, evidence clearly supports the partisanship principle as contained in the Michigan Model of voter behaviour. Results showed that there were higher levels of support for the republic from Labor party identifiers, voters from metropolitan electorates, and voters from the larger states of New South Wales and Victoria.

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When the model combined the party identification variable with the socio-economic variables, statistically significant results supporting the Michigan Model on the republic question were party identification, education, ‗none or other religion‘, occupation and income. Results were different on the preamble question with party identification of no statistical significance. Moderate support came from those with higher education and higher incomes. Negative support was observed from Australian born respondents.

Despite the cynicism held by voters about governments (as evidenced by broken promises, increases in politician salaries while the minimum wage is held fast, or various rorts [for example, travel or printing] by politicians), voters have a willingness to be involved in the democratic process when a referendum is held, as evidenced by the high voter turnout. Results have also shown that partisanship is present at the referendum ballot. The purpose of this research has been to determine whether party identification as theorised in the Michigan Model is influential in referendum voting in Australia. The 1967 to 1999 referendum results have shown that there is a partisan effect in all referendums. A caveat to this finding is that the partisan effect has not been as dominant in deciding the referendum results as it does in general elections. The conclusion one can draw from this research (based on available data), is that the Michigan Model of voter behaviour in general elections is supported and replicated in referendum voting.

As a result of this research, one can illustrate electorate and voter behaviour with a suitable diagram as follows:

Figure 11.1 Model of Referendum Voter Behaviour

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This model shows that the Michigan Model of voter behaviour does not govern referendum outcomes as the only explanatory behaviour. Rather, at the heart of voting in Australia (whether this is a general election or a referendum) is a stable democracy (McMillan 1991: 63), where all components (as shown in the diagram) are equally influential in both modes of voting.

At the top of the diagram, this research acknowledges the importance of party identification as a variable of influence in referendum voting. Voters have preferences and these preferences influence vote choice in both general elections and referendums (the outside semi-circular arrows). The theme, as raised earlier, with referendums and general elections is that voters are not opposed to constitutional change, nor are they opposed to changes in government. Rather, Australian voters are conservative and discriminating by nature (Bennett 2003: 26) and the fact that there is minimal change in the political party that governs Australia is mirrored by the minimal change that takes place in the Australian Constitution.

At the heart of the diagram is Australia‘s democracy, one of the most stable democratic systems in the world (Aitkin 1977; McMillan 1991: 63). The reason for this stability is due to the influence of all components, in which the strong party system of government and party identification are important. Australia has three tiers of government. Australians are similarly satisfied with the maximum three year terms that the elected political party can hold in office and, any attempts to alter the term have always failed at the federal level. This is not too high a price for the stability and the democracy that this country enjoys. Australia may not have much opportunity for deliberative democracy, however, the regularity of elections in all three tiers of government allows voters to accept that they do have the opportunity to re-elect the same government or elect a new government in a couple of years.

In conclusion, this research has found that the Michigan Model of voter behaviour is influential in Australian constitutional referendums. In concert with this finding is that Australia‘s stable democratic system is reflected by Australia‘s electoral behaviour. Australian voters are generally satisfied with the system of government and the Constitution the way it stands. Both have stood the test of time and have served all Australians well.

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Appendix 1 – State Election Dates

Election/Referendum Date Premier/Prime Minister Political Party

6 ‘no’VEMBER 1999 Referendum - Howard Coalition 18 September 1999 (VIC) Kennett, Jeffrey Gibb Liberal Party Victoria

27 March 1999 (NSW) Carr, Robert John Australian Labor Party New South Wales

29 August 1998 (TAS) Rundle, Anthony M Liberal Party Tasmania 13 June 1998 (QLD) Borbridge, Robert Edward National Party Queensland

21 February 1998 (ACT) Carnell, Anne Katherine (Kate) Liberal Party Australian Capital Territory

11 October 1997 (SA) Olsen, John Wayne Liberal Party South Australia

30 August 1997 (NT) Stone, Shane Leslie Northern Territory

14 December 1996 (WA) Court, Richard Fairfax Liberal Party Western Australia

30 March 1996 (VIC) Kennett, Jeffrey Gibb Liberal Party Victoria 24 February 1996 (TAS) Groom, Raymond John Liberal Party Tasmania

15 July 1995 (QLD) Goss, Wayne Keith Australian Labor Party Queensland

25 March 1995 (NSW) Fahey, John Joseph Liberal Party New South Wales Australian Labor Party Australian Capital 18 February 1995 (ACT) Follett, Rosemary Territory

4 June 1994 (NT) Perron, Marshall Bruce Country Liberal Party Northern Territory

11 December 1993 (SA) Arnold, Lynn Maurice Ferguson Australian Labor Party South Australia

6 February 1993 (WA) Lawrence, Carmen Mary Australian Labor Party Western Australia

3 October 1992 (VIC) Kirner, Joan Elizabeth Australian Labor Party Victoria

19 September 1992 (QLD) Goss, Wayne Keith Australian Labor Party Queensland Australian Labor Party Australian Capital 15 February 1992 (ACT) Follett, Rosemary Territory

2 February 1992 (TAS) Field, Michael Walter Australian Labor Party Tasmania 25 May 1991 (NSW) Greiner, Nicholas Frank Hugo Liberal Party New South Wales

27 October 1990 (NT) Perron, Marshall Bruce Country Liberal Party Northern Territory

2 December 1989 (QLD) Cooper, [Theo] Russell National Party Queensland

25 November 1989 (SA) Bannon, John Charles Australian Labor Party South Australia

13 May 1989 (TAS) Gray, Robin Trevor Liberal Party Tasmania 4 March 1989 (ACT) Australian Capital Territory

4 February 1989 (WA) Dowding, Peter McCallum Australian Labor Party Western Australia

1 October 1988 (VIC) Cain [jnr], John Australian Labor Party Victoria

3 SEPTEMBER 1988 Referendum - Hawke Australian Labor Party

19 March 1988 (NSW) Unsworth, Barrie John Australian Labor Party New South Wales

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7 March 1987 (NT) Hatton, Stephen Paul Country Liberal Party Northern Territory

1 November 1986 (QLD) Bjelke-Peterson, Johannes National Party Queensland 8 February 1986 (TAS) Gray, Robin Trevor Liberal Party Tasmania

8 February 1986 (WA) Burke, Brian Thomas Australian Labor Party Western Australia

7 December 1985 (SA) Bannon, John Charles Australian Labor Party South Australia

2 March 1985 (VIC) Cain [jnr], John Australian Labor Party Victoria

1 DECEMBER 1984 Referendum - Hawke Australian Labor Party

24 March 1984 (NSW) Wran, Neville Kenneth Australian Labor Party New South Wales

Everingham, Paul Anthony 3 December 1983 (NT) Country Liberal Party Northern Territory Edward 22 October 1983 (QLD) Bjelke-Peterson, Johannes National Party Queensland

19 February 1983 (WA) O'Connor, Raymond James Liberal Party Western Australia

6 November 1982 (SA) Tonkin, David Oliver Liberal Party South Australia

15 May 1982 (TAS) Holgate, Harold Norman Australian Labor Party Tasmania

Thompson, Lindsay Hamilton 3 April 1982 (VIC) Liberal Party Victoria Simpson

19 September 1981 (NSW) Wran, Neville Kenneth Australian Labor Party New South Wales 29 November 1980 (QLD) Bjelke-Peterson, Johannes National Party Queensland Everingham, Paul Anthony 7 June 1980 (NT) Country Liberal Party Northern Territory Edward 23 February 1980 (WA) Court, Charles Walter Michael Liberal Party Western Australia

15 September 1979 (SA) Corcoran, James Desmond Australian Labor Party South Australia

28 July 1979 (TAS) Lowe, Douglas Ackley Australian Labor Party Tasmania

5 May 1979 (VIC) Hamer, Rupert James Liberal Party Victoria

7 October 1978 (NSW) Wran, Neville Kenneth Australian Labor Party New South Wales

12 November 1977 (QLD) Bjelke-Peterson, Johannes National Party Queensland

17 September 1977 (SA) Dunstan, Donald Allan Australian Labor Party South Australia

13 August 1977 (NT) Letts, Godfrey Alan Country Liberal Party Northern Territory

21 MAY 1977 Referendum - Fraser Coalition

19 February 1977 (WA) Court, Charles Walter Michael Liberal Party Western Australia

11 December 1976 (TAS) Neilson, William Arthur Australian Labor Party Tasmania

1 May 1976 (NSW) Willis, Eric Archibald Liberal Party New South Wales

20 March 1976 (VIC) Hamer, Rupert James Liberal Party Victoria

12 July 1975 (SA) Dunstan, Donald Allan Australian Labor Party South Australia

7 December 1974 (QLD) Bjelke-Peterson, Johannes National Party Queensland 19 October 1974 (NT) Northern Territory - Referendum - Whitlam Australian Labor Party

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18 MAY 1974

30 March 1974 (WA) Tonkin, John Trezise Australian Labor Party Western Australia

8 DECEMBER 1973 Referendum - Whitlam Australian Labor Party Askin, Robin [also Robert] 17 November 1973 (NSW) Liberal Party New South Wales William 19 May 1973 (VIC) Hamer, Rupert James Liberal Party Victoria

10 March 1973 (SA) Dunstan, Donald Allan Australian Labor Party South Australia

27 May 1972 (QLD) Bjelke-Peterson, Johannes Country Party Queensland 22 April 1972 (TAS) Bethune, Walter Angus Liberal Party Tasmania

20 February 1971 (WA) Brand, David Liberal and Country League Western Australia

Askin, Robin [also Robert] 13 February 1971 (NSW) Liberal Party New South Wales William

30 May 1970 (SA) Hall, Raymond Steele Liberal and Country League South Australia

30 May 1970 (VIC) Bolte, Henry Edward Liberal Party Victoria 17 May 1969 (QLD) Bjelke-Peterson, Johannes Country Party Queensland

10 May 1969 (TAS) Reece, Eric Elliott Australian Labor Party Tasmania

23 March 1968 (WA) Brand, David Liberal and Country League Western Australia

2 March 1968 (SA) Dunstan, Donald Allan Australian Labor Party South Australia

Askin, Robin [also Robert] 24 February 1968 (NSW) Liberal Party New South Wales William

27 MAY 1967 Referendum - Holt Coalition

29 April 1967 (VIC) Bolte, Henry Edward Liberal and Country Party Victoria

Nicklin, George Francis (Frank) 28 May 1966 (QLD) Country Party Queensland Reuben Renshaw, John Brophy 1 May 1965 (NSW) Labor Party New South Wales Australian

6 March 1965 (SA) Playford [jnr], Thomas Liberal and Country League South Australia

20 February 1965 (WA) Brand, David Liberal and Country League Western Australia

27 June 1964 (VIC) Bolte, Henry Edward Liberal and Country Party Victoria

2 May 1964 (TAS) Reece, Eric Elliott Australian Labor Party Tasmania

Nicklin, George Francis (Frank) 1 June 1963 (QLD) Country Party Queensland Reuben

NB: Blue text indicates the state election immediately preceding the referendum vote date.

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Appendix 2 – Election Results

House of Representatives Election 1966

NSW Vic Qld SA WA Tas NT ACT Aust

2 308 1 702 6 193 Enrolled 900 492 585 465 433 097 197 666 17 395 48 127 775 864 881 Votes 2 282 ALP 862 631 548 743 354 674 222 828 168 257 96 246 6 734 22 721 834 2 291 LP(a) 862 407 622 708 253 663 296 923 160 894 78 684 . . 16 685 964 CP 226 355 130 468 165 358 . . 32 524 . . 7 221 . . 561 926 DLP 96 102 197 026 63 175 19 281 28 502 11 132 . . 2 193 417 411 Others 69 981 66 619 5 365 8 089 2 875 289 . . 2 396 155 614

2 117 1 565 5 709 Formal 842 235 547 121 393 052 186 351 13 955 43 995 476 564 749 Informal 69 340 60 779 15 595 16 220 16 518 2 849 500 777 182 578 2 186 1 626 5 892 Total 857 830 563 341 409 570 189 200 14 455 44 772 816 343 327

Per cent ALP 40.7 35.1 42.1 40.7 42.8 51.6 48.3 51.6 40.0 LP(a) 40.7 39.8 30.2 54.3 40.9 42.2 . . 37.9 40.1 CP 10.7 8.3 19.6 . . 8.3 . . 51.7 . . 9.8 DLP 4.5 12.6 7.5 3.5 7.3 6.0 . . 5.0 7.3 Others 3.3 4.3 0.6 1.5 0.7 0.2 . . 5.4 2.7

Formal 96.8 96.3 98.2 97.1 96.0 98.5 96.5 98.3 96.9 Informal 3.2 3.7 1.8 2.9 4.0 1.5 3.5 1.7 3.1 Total 94.7 95.5 95.3 96.2 94.6 95.7 83.1 93.0 95.1

Seats won ALP 17 8 6 3 3 3 . . 1 41 LP(a) 20 19 8 8 4 2 . . . . 61 CP 9 5 4 . . 2 . . 1 . . 21 Others . . 1 ...... 1

Total 46 33 18 11 9 5 1 1 124

(a) Includes LCL in South Australia.

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House of Representatives election 1972

NSW Vic Qld SA WA Tas NT ACT Aust

1 929 1 022 7 073 Enrolled 2 581 069 671 081 537 240 219 644 29 929 83 591 354 022 930 Votes 3 273 ALP 1 252 047 854 201 449 620 317 646 226 398 123 814 9 676 40 147 549 2 115 LP(a) 722 937 606 273 242 752 259 341 193 060 73 166 . . 17 556 085 CP 235 132 134 158 187 057 13 991 40 831 . . 11 657 . . 622 826 DLP 84 322 150 824 53 319 23 052 22 054 10 086 . . 2 758 346 415 AP 80 662 38 743 15 741 6 418 5 618 1 076 1 129 10 529 159 916 Others 36 492 22 331 4 412 6 918 3 008 1 915 2 170 6 013 83 259

1 806 6 601 Formal 2 411 592 952 901 627 366 490 969 210 057 24 632 77 003 530 050 Informal 46 750 43 456 19 440 16 845 13 328 3 393 1 176 1 806 146 194 1 849 6 747 Total 2 458 342 972 341 644 211 504 297 213 450 25 808 78 809 986 244

Per cent ALP 51.9 47.3 47.2 50.6 46.1 58.9 39.3 52.1 49.6 LP(a) 30.0 33.6 25.5 41.3 39.3 34.8 . . 22.8 32.0 CP 9.8 7.4 19.6 2.2 8.3 . . 47.3 . . 9.4 DLP 3.5 8.3 5.6 3.7 4.5 4.8 . . 3.6 5.2 AP 3.3 2.1 1.7 1.0 1.1 0.5 4.6 13.7 2.4 Others 1.5 1.2 0.5 1.1 0.6 0.9 8.8 7.8 1.3

Formal 98.1 97.7 98.0 97.4 97.4 98.4 95.4 97.7 97.8 Informal 1.9 2.3 2.0 2.6 2.6 1.6 4.6 2.3 2.2 Total 95.2 95.9 95.1 96.0 93.9 97.2 86.2 94.3 95.4

Seats won ALP 28 14 8 7 4 5 . . 1 67 LP(a) 10 14 6 5 3 ...... 38 CP 7 6 4 . . 2 . . 1 . . 20

Total 45 34 18 12 9 5 1 1 125

(a) Includes LCL in South Australia.

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House of Representatives election 1974

NSW Vic Qld SA WA Tas NT ACT Aust

2 161 1 154 7 897 Enrolled 2 834 558 750 308 612 016 246 596 36 480 101 455 474 762 649 Votes 3 644 ALP 1 400 255 970 236 476 710 341 563 261 107 128 787 13 397 52 055 110 2 582 LP(a) 887 202 738 236 330 365 256 904 233 240 103 701 . . 33 320 968 CP(b) 282 169 151 707 255 659 28 903 60 325 . . 14 514 3 300 796 577 AP 77 507 50 025 18 808 14 267 7 016 423 . . 4 130 172 176 DLP . . 104 974 ...... 104 974 LM ...... 57 817 ...... 57 817 Others 10 959 12 082 1 741 2 669 1 726 767 1 557 883 32 384

2 027 1 083 7 391 Formal 2 658 092 702 123 563 414 233 678 29 468 93 688 260 283 006 Informal 44 811 43 633 15 118 20 311 14 575 4 213 852 1 249 144 762 2 070 1 098 7 535 Total 2 702 903 722 434 577 989 237 891 30 320 94 937 893 401 768

Per cent ALP 52.7 47.9 44.0 48.6 46.3 55.1 45.5 55.6 49.3 LP(a) 33.4 36.4 30.5 36.6 41.4 44.4 . . 35.6 34.9 CP(b) 10.6 7.5 23.6 4.1 10.7 . . 49.3 3.5 10.8 AP 2.9 2.5 1.7 2.0 1.2 0.2 . . 4.4 2.3 DLP . . 5.2 ...... 1.4 LM ...... 8.2 ...... 0.8 Others 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.3 5.3 0.9 0.4

Formal 98.3 97.9 98.6 97.2 97.5 98.2 97.2 98.7 98.1 Informal 1.7 2.1 1.4 2.8 2.5 1.8 2.8 1.3 1.9 Total 95.4 95.8 95.1 96.3 94.4 96.5 83.1 93.6 95.4

Seats won ALP 25 16 6 7 5 5 . . 2 66 LP(a) 11 12 7 5 5 ...... 40 NP(b) 9 6 5 ...... 1 . . 21 Total 45 34 18 12 10 5 1 2 127

(a) Includes LCL in South Australia.

(b) Includes NP in Queensland and NA in Western Australia.

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House of Representatives election 1975

NSW Vic Qld SA WA Tas NT ACT Aust

Enrolled 2 961 698 2 234 858 1 206 231 789 004 658 419 255 402 40 885 115 916 8 262 413

Votes ALP 1 260 335 882 842 439 405 316 006 244 404 105 324 12 944 51 744 3 313 004 LP 1 100 672 887 685 370 041 365 353 326 679 131 002 . . 50 727 3 232 159 NCP(a) 326 124 186 667 303 107 4 070 30 727 3 248 . . . . 853 943 CLP ...... 15 976 . . 15 976 AP 10 931 21 473 . . 525 . . . . 701 . . 33 630 DLP . . 101 750 ...... 101 750 LM ...... 45 968 ...... 3 516 49 484 Others 74 058 17 280 21 041 9 246 7 240 2 550 . . 1 217 132 632

Formal 2 772 120 2 097 697 1 133 594 741 168 609 050 242 124 29 621 107 204 7 732 578 Informal 52 760 42 008 14 604 18 201 14 334 4 570 996 1 822 149 295 Total 2 824 880 2 139 705 1 148 198 759 369 623 384 246 694 30 617 109 026 7 881 873

Per cent ALP 45.5 42.1 38.8 42.6 40.1 43.5 43.7 48.3 42.8 LP 39.7 42.3 32.6 49.3 53.6 54.1 . . 47.3 41.8 NCP(a) 11.8 8.9 26.7 0.5 5.0 1.3 . . . . 11.0 CLP ...... 53.9 . . 0.2 AP 0.4 1.0 . . 0.1 . . . . 2.4 . . 0.4 DLP . . 4.9 ...... 1.3 LM ...... 6.2 ...... 3.3 0.6 Others 2.7 0.8 1.9 1.2 1.2 1.1 . . 1.1 1.7

Formal 98.1 98.0 98.7 97.6 97.7 98.1 96.7 98.3 98.1 Informal 1.9 2.0 1.3 2.4 2.3 1.9 3.3 1.7 1.9 Total 95.4 95.7 95.2 96.2 94.7 96.6 74.9 94.1 95.4

Seats won ALP 17 10 1 6 1 . . . . 1 36 LP 19 19 9 6 9 5 . . 1 68 NCP(a) 9 5 8 ...... 22 CLP ...... 1 . . 1 Total 45 34 18 12 10 5 1 2 127

(a) Includes CP in New South Wales, NP in Victoria, Queensland and Tasmania.

322

House of Representatives election 1977

NSW Vic Qld SA WA Tas NT ACT Aust

Enrolled 3 051 238 2 289 926 1 258 724 824 205 690 919 262 114 44 295 127 358 8 548 779

Votes ALP 1 201 560 791 083 443 221 322 883 205 793 103 877 14 811 57 823 3 141 051 LP 1 018 257 842 545 326 135 340 383 307 699 134 687 . . 48 190 3 017 896 NCP 320 051 120 032 305 275 6 065 25 559 ...... 776 982 CLP ...... 16 462 . . 16 462 DEM 239 808 250 943 77 169 85 578 70 590 8 255 2 478 8 544 743 365 DLP . . 113 271 ...... 113 271 Others 54 109 9 652 23 863 2 299 22 383 . . 987 534 113 827

Formal 2 833 785 2 127 526 1 175 663 757 208 632 024 246 819 34 738 115 091 7 922 854 Informal 65 660 62 381 18 212 26 461 21 560 6 579 1 244 2 811 204 908 Total 2 899 445 2 189 907 1 193 875 783 669 653 584 253 398 35 982 117 902 8 127 762

Per cent ALP 42.4 37.2 37.7 42.6 32.6 42.1 42.6 50.2 39.6 LP 35.9 39.6 27.7 45.0 48.7 54.6 . . 41.9 38.1 NCP 11.3 5.6 26.0 0.8 4.0 ...... 9.8 CLP ...... 47.4 . . 0.2 DEM 8.5 11.8 6.6 11.3 11.2 3.3 7.1 7.4 9.4 DLP . . 5.3 ...... 1.4 Others 1.9 0.5 2.0 0.3 3.5 . . 2.8 0.5 1.4

Formal 97.7 97.2 98.5 96.6 96.7 97.4 96.5 97.6 97.5 Informal 2.3 2.8 1.5 3.4 3.3 2.6 3.5 2.4 2.5 Total 95.0 95.6 94.8 95.1 94.6 96.7 81.2 92.6 95.1

Seats won ALP 17 10 3 6 1 . . . . 1 38 LP 18 20 9 5 9 5 . . 1 67 NCP 8 3 7 ...... 18 CLP ...... 1 . . 1 Total 43 33 19 11 10 5 1 2 124

323

House of Representatives election 1983

NSW Vic Qld SA WA Tas NT ACT Aust

Enrolled 3 247 827 2 495 392 1 472 462 880 455 798 973 282 230 57 320 137 405 9 372 064

Votes ALP 1 512 012 1 182 118 621 146 393 971 378 545 106 647 20 764 82 189 4 297 392 LP 951 810 869 542 328 530 342 821 304 677 145 393 . . 41 213 2 983 986 NP(a) 330 657 114 065 319 647 8 762 5 999 ...... 779 130 CLP ...... 20 479 . . 20 479 DEM 144 633 133 183 62 637 56 510 29 273 9 458 1 571 . . 437 265 DLP . . 17 318 ...... 17 318 Others 77 470 24 725 14 429 12 255 10 136 3 270 1 779 5 229 149 293

Formal 3 016 582 2 340 951 1 346 389 814 319 728 630 264 768 44 593 128 631 8 684 863 Informal 66 473 52 780 17 790 22 380 14 685 6 232 2 070 2 902 185 312 Total 3 083 055 2 393 731 1 364 179 836 699 743 315 271 000 46 663 131 533 8 870 175

Per cent ALP 50.1 50.5 46.1 48.4 52.0 40.3 46.6 63.9 49.5 LP 31.6 37.1 24.4 42.1 41.8 54.9 . . 32.0 34.4 NP(a) 11.0 4.9 23.7 1.1 0.8 ...... 9.0 CLP ...... 45.9 . . 0.2 DEM 4.8 5.7 4.7 6.9 4.0 3.6 3.5 . . 5.0 DLP . . 0.7 ...... 0.2 Others 2.6 1.1 1.1 1.5 1.4 1.2 4.0 4.1 1.7

Formal 97.8 97.8 98.7 97.3 98.0 97.7 95.6 97.8 97.9 Informal 2.2 2.2 1.3 2.7 2.0 2.3 4.4 2.2 2.1 Total 94.9 95.9 92.6 95.0 93.0 96.0 81.4 95.7 94.6

Seats won ALP 24 23 10 7 8 . . 1 2 75 LP 11 7 3 4 3 5 . . . . 33 NP 8 3 6 ...... 17 Total 43 33 19 11 11 5 1 2 125

(a) Includes NCP in Western Australia.

324

House of Representatives election 1984

NSW Vic Qld SA WA Tas NT ACT Aust

Enrolled 3 424 032 2 614 383 1 555 600 906 278 859 623 290 028 68 857 150 416 9 869 217

Votes ALP 1 458 856 1 117 874 605 804 367 915 359 810 113 094 25 140 71 637 4 120 130 LP 990 464 842 423 263 518 337 253 341 500 133 173 . . 43 225 2 951 556 NP 318 458 145 435 435 832 11 609 9 817 ...... 921 151 CLP ...... 27 335 . . 27 335 DEM 178 806 115 172 66 243 61 822 27 598 10 432 1 906 10 225 472 204 DLP . . 49 121 ...... 49 121 Others 76 518 14 508 3 635 6 311 7 949 3 747 1 581 9 206 123 455

Formal 3 023 102 2 284 533 1 375 032 784 910 746 674 260 446 55 962 134 293 8 664 952 Informal 198 648 202 740 67 586 74 719 59 799 16 864 2 909 7 204 630 469 Total 3 221 750 2 487 273 1 442 618 859 629 806 473 277 310 58 871 141 497 9 295 421

Per cent ALP 48.3 48.9 44.1 46.9 48.2 43.4 44.9 53.3 47.5 LP 32.8 36.9 19.2 43.0 45.7 51.1 . . 32.2 34.1 NP 10.5 6.4 31.7 1.5 1.3 ...... 10.6 CLP ...... 48.8 . . 0.3 DEM 5.9 5.0 4.8 7.9 3.7 4.0 3.4 7.6 5.4 DLP . . 2.2 ...... 0.6 Others 2.5 0.6 0.3 0.8 1.1 1.4 2.8 6.9 1.4

Formal 93.8 91.8 95.3 91.3 92.6 93.9 95.1 94.9 93.2 Informal 6.2 8.2 4.7 8.7 7.4 6.1 4.9 5.1 6.8 Total 94.1 95.0 92.7 94.9 93.8 95.6 85.5 94.1 94.2

Seats won ALP 29 25 9 8 9 . . . . 2 82 LP 12 11 7 5 4 5 . . . . 44 NP 10 3 8 ...... 21 CLP ...... 1 . . 1

Total 51 39 24 13 13 5 1 2 148

325

House of Representatives election 1987

NSW Vic Qld SA WA Tas NT ACT Aust

Enrolled 3 555 060 2 698 034 1 707 161 942 880 906 677 300 763 79 921 162 717 10 353 213

Votes ALP 1 438 985 1 139 337 683 640 367 045 377 493 118 077 28 195 79 791 4 232 563 LP 1 059 597 922 680 319 607 350 218 332 266 140 217 . . 44 806 3 169 391 NP 375 443 154 088 438 627 30 928 54 871 . . 10 273 . . 1 064 230 CLP ...... 21 668 . . 21 668 DEM 201 924 163 160 74 215 64 163 27 302 16 371 . . 10 124 557 259 DLP . . 3 334 ...... 3 334 Others 109 971 44 361 4 402 11 528 3 112 . . . . 13 267 186 641

Formal 3 185 920 2 426 960 1 520 491 823 882 795 044 274 665 60 136 147 988 9 235 086 Informal 152 696 134 415 53 622 60 536 55 776 14 297 3 684 5 328 480 354 Total 3 338 616 2 561 375 1 574 113 884 418 850 820 288 962 63 820 153 316 9 715 440

Per cent ALP 45.1 46.9 45.0 44.6 47.5 43.0 46.9 53.9 45.8 LP 33.3 38.0 21.0 42.5 41.8 51.1 . . 30.3 34.3 NP 11.8 6.3 28.8 3.8 6.9 . . 17.1 . . 11.5 CLP ...... 36.0 . . 0.2 DEM 6.3 6.7 4.9 7.8 3.4 6.0 . . 6.8 6.0 DLP . . 0.1 ...... Others 3.5 1.8 0.3 1.4 0.4 . . . . 9.0 2.0

Formal 95.4 94.8 96.6 93.2 93.4 95.1 94.2 96.5 95.1 Informal 4.6 5.2 3.4 6.8 6.6 4.9 5.8 3.5 4.9 Total 93.9 94.9 92.2 93.8 93.8 96.1 79.9 94.2 93.8

Seats won ALP 28 24 13 8 9 1 1 2 86 LP 13 12 5 5 4 4 . . . . 43 NP 10 3 6 ...... 19

Total 51 39 24 13 13 5 1 2 148

326

House of Representatives election 1998

NSW Vic Qld SA WA Tas NT ACT Aust

Enrolled 4 076 081 3 081 632 2 188 024 1 013 989 1 149 619 330 121 105 048 209 536 12 154 050

Votes ALP 1 489 021 1 261 289 719 743 319 267 377 545 150 384 38 469 98 588 4 454 306 LP 1 131 545 1 053 990 615 153 389 382 397 836 117 377 .. 59 424 3 764 707 NP 293 126 77 385 199 185 4 796 13 596 ...... 588 088 CLP ...... 36 014 .. 36 014 PHON 332 501 105 798 285 983 90 773 96 708 7 553 7 401 9 895 936 612 DEM 154 496 171 091 80 003 93 905 41 364 10 024 4 658 14 394 569 935 GRN 98 647 59 383 47 440 4 576 52 674 17 091 2 753 8 145 290 709 Others 211 808 113 745 45 868 23 292 63 052 5 048 1 642 4 237 468 692

Formal 3 711 144 2 842 681 1 993 375 925 991 1 042 775 307 477 90 937 194 683 11 109 063 Informal 154 859 103 524 68 659 44 074 45 509 9 819 3 951 5 743 436 138 Total 3 866 003 2 946 205 2 062 034 970 065 1 088 284 317 296 94 888 200 426 11 545 201

Per cent ALP 40.1 44.4 36.1 34.5 36.2 48.9 42.3 50.6 40.1 LP 30.5 37.1 30.9 42.1 38.2 38.2 .. 30.5 33.9 NP 7.9 2.7 10.0 0.5 1.3 ...... 5.3 CLP ...... 39.6 .. 0.3 PHON 9.0 3.7 14.3 9.8 9.3 2.5 8.1 5.1 8.4 DEM 4.2 6.0 4.0 10.1 4.0 3.3 5.1 7.4 5.1 GRN 2.7 2.1 2.4 0.5 5.1 5.6 3.0 4.2 2.6 Others 5.7 4.0 2.3 2.5 6.0 1.6 1.8 2.2 4.2

Formal 96.0 96.5 96.7 95.5 95.8 96.9 95.8 97.1 96.2 Informal 4.0 3.5 3.3 4.5 4.2 3.1 4.2 2.9 3.8 Total 94.8 95.6 94.2 95.7 94.7 96.1 90.3 95.7 95.0

Seats won ALP 22 19 8 3 7 5 1 2 67 LP 18 16 14 9 7 ...... 64 NP 9 2 5 ...... 16 Ind 1 ...... 1

Total 50 37 27 12 14 5 1 2 148

(a) Includes CLP in Northern Territory.

327

Appendix 3 – Australian Prime Ministers (1901 to 1999)

Name Party State Date Edmond Barton Prot (Protectionist NSW Jan 1901 to Sep 1903 Party) Alfred Deakin Prot VIC Sep 1903 to Apr 1904 Prot Jul 1905 to Nov 1908 Lib Jun 1909 to Apr 1910 John Watson ALP NSW Apr 1904 to Aug 1904 George Reid FT () VIC Aug 1904 to Jul 1905 Andrew Fisher ALP QLD Nov 1908 to Jun 1909 Apr 1910 to Jun 1913 Sep 1914 to Oct 1915 Joseph Cook Lib NSW Jun 1913 to Sep 1914 William Hughes ALP/Nat NSW Oct 1915 to Feb 1923 Nat VIC Feb 1923 to Oct 1929 James Scullin ALP VIC Oct 1929 to Jan 1932 Joseph Lyons UAP TAS Jan 1932 to Apr 1939 Earle Page CP NSW Apr 1939 to Apr 1939 Robert Menzies UAP VIC Apr 1939 to Aug 1941 Lib Dec 1949 to Jan 1966 Arthur Fadden CP QLD Aug 1941 to Oct 1941 John Curtin ALP VIC Oct 1941 to Jul 1945 Francis Ford ALP QLD Jul 1945 to Jul 1945 Ben Chifley ALP NSW Jul 1945 to Dec 1949 Harold Holt Lib NSW Jan 1966 to Dec 1967 John McEwan CP VIC Dec 1967 to Jan 1968 John Gorton Lib VIC Jan 1968 to Mar 1971 William McMahon Lib NSW Mar 1971 to Dec 1972 Gough Whitlam ALP NSW Dec 1972 to Nov 1975 Malcolm Fraser Lib VIC Nov 1975 to Mar 1983 Robert Hawke ALP VIC Mar 1983 to Dec 1991 Paul Keating ALP NSW Dec 1991 to Mar 1996 John Howard Lib NSW Mar 1996 to Dec 2007

New South Wales – represented 11 times Victoria – represented 10 times Queensland – represented three times Tasmania – represented once

328

Appendix 4 – Australian Opposition Leaders (1901 to 1999)

Name Party State Date George Reid FT (Free Trade Party) VIC May 1901 to Aug 1904 Jul 1905 to Nov 1908 Chris Watson ALP NSW Aug 1904 to Jul 1905 Joseph Cook Lib NSW Nov 1908 to May 1909 Jan 1913 to Jun 1913 Oct 1914 to Feb 1916 Alfred Deakin Lib VIC May 1909 to Jun 1909 Lib Jul 1910 to Jan 1913 Andrew Fisher ALP QLD Jun 1909 to Apr 1910 Jul 1913 to Sep 1914 Frank Tudor ALP VIC Nov 1916 to Jan 1922 Matthew Charlton ALP NSW Jan 1922 to Mar 1928 James Scullin ALP VIC Mar 1928 to Oct 1929 Jan 1932 to Oct 1935 John Latham Nat VIC Nov 1929 to May 1931 Joseph Lyons UAP TAS May 1931 to Jan 1932 John Curtin ALP VIC Oct 1935 to Oct 1941 Arthur Fadden CP QLD Oct 1941 to Sep 1943 Robert Menzies UAP/Lib VIC Sep 1943 to Dec 1949 Ben Chifley ALP NSW Dec 1949 to Jun 1951 Herbert Evatt ALP NSW Jun 1951 to Feb 1960 Arthur Calwell ALP VIC Mar 1960 to Feb 1967 Gough Whitlam ALP NSW Feb 1967 to Dec 1972 Nov 1975 to Dec 1977 Billy Snedden Lib VIC Dec 1972 to Mar 1975 Malcolm Fraser Lib VIC Mar 1975 to Nov 1975 Bill Hayden ALP QLD Dec 1977 to Feb 1983 Robert Hawke ALP VIC Feb 1983 to Mar 1983 Andrew Peacock Lib VIC Mar 1983 to Sep 1985 May 1989 to Apr 1990 John Howard Lib NSW Sep 1985 to May 1989 Jan 1995 to Mar 1996 John Hewson Lib NSW Apr 1990 to May 1994 Alexander Downer Lib SA May 1994 to Jan 1995

NSW – 8 Opposition Leaders; VIC – 12; QLD – 3; TAS – 1; SA – 1

329

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