A ssociate d P ress

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The United States and Post-Castro Cuba ...... 3

Mexico-Cuba Relations: Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, left, shakes hands with Fidel Rivero Prieto, president of Cuba’s state oil company A Two-Sided Triangle ...... 10 CUPET, as Cuba’s acting President Raul Castro looks on, after signing a cooperation agreement at the Revolution Palace in Havana, Tuesday, Jan. 15, 2008.

The Attitude of the European Union and Spain Toward Cuba . . . 15 UK Relations with Cuba Opting for Engagement in the Post-Fidel Era ...... 22

Canada-Cuba Relations: uba specialists around the world have spent much of the past decade, and an even Under the Shadow greater part of the period since July 2006, speculating on what the future holds of the Elephant ...... 27 Cfor Cuba after the departure of Fidel Castro from power. Will there be a stable succession or a dramatic change? Will a post–Fidel government strengthen respect for the Lessons for U .S . Policy ...... 35 rule of law and human rights, extend freedom of speech, and permit multi-party elections? Will it try to preserve Cuba’s achievements in education and health care, and if so, how? Will it change the role of the state in the economy? How will a new government handle the process of political and economic reforms? These questions and others have consumed the attention of analysts and policy makers.

Comparatively little attention has been paid, especially in the United States, to how other countries have chosen to relate to and engage with Cuba during this decisive period on the island and how those relations might evolve in the future. This publication hopes to fill that gap, looking at how countries in Europe and the Western Hemisphere relate to Cuba and suggesting some useful lessons for the international community. The Washington Office on Latin America has undertaken this publication because it believes that the international community can engage with Cuba in constructive and respectful ways that will over time contribute to greater respect for human rights and democratization on the island.

The United States is one of the very few countries that does not have formal diplomatic and commercial relations with Cuba. But among the countries that do, the level of engagement and interaction has varied widely. The articles herein trace the shifting levels of engagement that Mexico, the United Kingdom, Canada, Spain, and the European A WOLA Special Report Union have all had with Cuban government and society, where relations stand today, and where they might be headed. One article also looks at the U.S. approach and the April 2008 implications of the U.S. strategy of isolation. In 2007, many countries opted for a recognized that engagement allows greater relatively cautious approach to Cuba, cooperation on issues of common concern, maintaining relations but taking few such as security, terrorism, trade and initiatives and adopting a passive stance migration. based on the assumption that events on the island would dictate changes in the One striking element that emerges is the direction of their Cuba policy. Exploring extent to which the United States’ relations this theme, Joaquín Roy’s article traces the with Cuba continue to cast a long shadow internal debate over the European Union’s over other countries’ approaches. The ebbs “wait and see” tactics, while John Kirk and flows in third countries’ relationships and Peter McKenna describe the recent with Cuba are often influenced by the cooling in Canadian relations with the closeness of their relationship with the island. As events have unfolded in Cuba, United States. Still, it is remarkable how other governments have opted for increased unsuccessful U.S. pressure to isolate Cuba levels of engagement as the island moves has been among even some of Washington’s toward a post-Fidel Castro era. In this closest allies, as demonstrated by these cases. context, María Cristina Rosas explores the Mexican government’s changing approach, As these articles make clear, nations have Many governments while Margaret Blunden reviews British their own particular set of concerns and have also recognized relations with Cuba and appeals for a interests in relation to the island. Most more constructive approach toward its countries have economic and political that engagement allows government. interests that dispose them toward engaging greater cooperation with Cuba. Clearly, most governments also The British, Canadian, and Mexican have concerns about human rights and on issues of common perspectives have all concluded that political freedoms in Cuba. Most choose concern, such as engagement offers important benefits. As to pursue these concerns in the context of security, terrorism, trade Geoff Thale notes in the piece on U.S. engagement with Cuba; none have adopted policy, disengagement and isolation have the sanctions regime that the United States and migration. failed to undermine the Cuban government has pursued nor sought regime change. and have done little to improve the prospects for greater respect for human right on The articles follow the history of Canadian, the part of Cuban authorities. A better U.S., European Union (with a focus on alternative, he argues, would be to interact Spain and the United Kingdom), and with Cuba, as a deeper understanding of its Mexican relations with Cuba and the factors government, institutions and civil society that have influenced those relationships. will necessarily lead to a more positive They end with a set of recommendations outcome. Many governments have also based on lessons drawn from that history.

2 Opting for Engagement The United States and Post-Castro Cuba Geoff Thale,Washington Office on Latin America Geoff Thale is Program Director at the Washington Office on Latin America. He has spent more than 12 years working on issues related to Cuba with an emphasis on U.S. policy.

he United States has had a trade and the embargo would squeeze the country’s Ttravel embargo on Cuba since 1961. economy, thereby hastening Castro’s Originally conceived as one element of downfall. In the early years, exile groups a larger strategy to overthrow the Castro hoped that the economic disruption caused regime, in the context of the Cold War, the by the embargo would weaken the Castro embargo has remained in place for almost government’s ability to defend itself, fifty years. The historic foreign policy making an exile invasion more likely to rationale for the embargo has disappeared. succeed. After the failure of the Bay of …as the subsequent Today, its defenders are principally in Pigs invasion and the Cuban government’s transfer of power the hardline sectors of the Cuban exile eventual defeat of counter-revolutionary community. forces on the island, exiles contented proceeded smoothly themselves keeping the embargo in place, and without major For more than forty years, Fidel Castro’s harassing Cuba with occasional raids and opponents in the Cuban exile community waiting for the day when a hardline U.S. changes in the Cuban have hoped, prayed, and worked for the Administration might once again consider political regime. day when Castro would leave power. the invasion option. They had a brief They have pursued a variety of strategies moment of hope when Ronald Reagan to achieve their goal. Assuming that his was elected, and again after the collapse of departure would trigger major changes the Soviet Union when George Bush, Sr. in Cuba, they have hoped that illness refused to rule out invasion as an option. or assassination would remove him from But both Administrations had other foreign office. They danced in the streets of Miami policy priorities, and the invasion option when Castro suddenly announced that was not long on the table. he would cede power to his brother Raul while he recovered from surgery in the The Cuban economic crisis of the 1990s summer of 2006, and again in September spurred hardliners once again into thinking of 2007, when rumors spread in Miami that the Cuban economy might collapse, that he had passed away. Their optimism and might bring the government down proved unfounded on various levels, as the with it. In response, they sought to further subsequent transfer of power proceeded tighten the U.S. embargo on Cuba, lobbying smoothly and without major changes in the the Congress and Presidential candidates Cuban political regime. for new restrictions that they hoped would intensify the pressures on the struggling (As this publication goes to press, Raul Cuban economy. The Cuban Democracy Castro was recently elected Cuba’s Head Act, passed in 1992, forbade the foreign of State following the resignation of Fidel subsidiaries of U.S. companies to trade with Castro as Cuba’s leader on February 17, Cuba. Then, the Helms-Burton bill in 1996 2008.) sought to discourage foreign investment that might help revive the Cuban economy. Over the years, much of the hardliners’ It threatened foreign firms that did business effort has been focused on the U.S. in the United States with lawsuits if they embargo on Cuba, and the hope that invested in Cuba.

Washington Office on Latin America April 2008 3 These measures succeeded in hurting and who are very unlikely to ever negotiate the Cuban economy. They reduced the internal political and economic change Cuban government’s room to maneuver, for the sake of better relations with the and imposed additional hardships on the United States. already hard-pressed Cuban people. But they did not lead to collapse. Despite Given this view, hardline exile groups an economic crisis more severe than the sought to maintain the embargo not to Great Depression of the 1930s in the weaken or attack the current Castro United States, the Cuban government government but so that it could be used as maintained enough domestic legitimacy leverage for negotiations in the post-Fidel to prevent serious internal challenges, period. and began a slow process of economic re- structuring and recovery. A Presidential Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba was established by the Although they continued to pressure Bush Administration and charged with the Bush Administration to tighten the developing plans for assistance to a post- embargo even further – particularly to Fidel Cuba, based on this assumption. The restrict hard currency flows from the reports released by the Commission in The Presidential United States by limiting Cuban-American 2004 and 2006 are based on the premise Commission [the family visits – by 2006, most hardliners that, after Fidel, the Cuban people would had stopped believing that U.S. economic reject their entire social and political Commission for measures against Cuba would lead to framework, and welcome U.S. assistance Assistance to a Free the government’s collapse. The Cuban and advice. economy appeared to be recovering (in Cuba] reports, based fact, Cuban macro-economic growth rates The Presidential Commission reports, on these assumptions, have picked up substantially in the last based on these assumptions, provide no provide no useful several years), and while many Cubans useful framework for thinking about U.S. continued to be unhappy about their engagement with Cuba after Fidel The framework for thinking personal economic situation, there was events of the last year, in which a smooth about U.S. engagement little evidence of a significant or growing transfer of power took place in Cuba when with Cuba after Castro. internal opposition that could challenge Fidel Castro voluntarily ceded power to the Cuban government and provoke a his brother Raul while he coped with political crisis. emergency surgery and illness, illustrate how incorrect these assumptions are. As Strategists in the hardline exile a result, the United States government community came to believe that the remains an irrelevant actor during this next real opportunity for change in Cuba critical time in the history of Cuba. would come when Castro died. Having abandoned the notion that economic problems and internal unrest might lead What Will a Post-Fidel to Castro’s overthrow, they supposed that Government be Like? Castro’s death would create a political opportunity for change. They assumed Many discussions about Cuba begin that whatever post-Fidel government with the assumption that Fidel Castro’s emerged in Cuba, it would be interested departure will begin a process of rapid in improving relations with the United political change in the country. The States, and would be willing to negotiate examples of the Soviet Union and of political and economic changes in Cuba in the countries of Eastern Europe are return. This view presumes that a post- often cited, where transitions occured Fidel government will be substantially when governments collapsed, or when different than the current government, sharp divisions among the political elite for whom national sovereignty and provoked ruptures and led to regime independence are extremely important, change. Less traumatic transitions, such as

4 Opting for Engagement those in Spain after Franco, or Chile after dominant figure in each of these governing the referendum on Pinochet, are sometimes institutions. While the election of Raul cited as well. But Cuba is unlikely to follow as Cuba’s new President election occurred any of these models. without challenge, his hold on power will be significantly less concentrated that of Most serious observers, whether his older brother. He will depend on the sympathetic or hostile to the Castro support and the counsel of a number of key government, argue that, in the immediate figures and institutions, and will probably period after Fidel’s retirement, a relatively not be able to act without them. These stable succession will take place. Popular include the Minister of the Economy, the discontent will not boil over; internal Minister of Foreign Relations, the head differences among elites will not explode. of the National Assembly, and senior Continuity, not change, will be the members of the Central Committee of the hallmark of the new government. For Cuban Communist Party. Significantly, example, Mark Falcoff, a conservative when Fidel Castro announced the political analyst and scholar at the temporary transfer of power, he named the American Enterprise Institute has written, Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister “What follows Castro is not likely to be a of the Economy, and the Ministers of free-market democracy, but rather a blander Education and of Health, as individuals The post-Fidel and more bureaucratic version of the who would have key responsibilities, along government will need system they have now.” with Raul Castro. to take measures to Recent events seem to vindicate this point In addition, given the fact that Raul establish itself, both of view. President Fidel Castro had long Castro is only a few years younger than his ago named his brother, Raul Castro, as brother Fidel, his tenure in office will be domestically and his successor. When he announced in the significantly shorter. Other political leaders internationally, as the summer of 2006 that he was temporarily will perceive this, and Raul is unlikely to popular and legitimate ceding power while he recovered from accumulate the kind of decision-making surgery, he followed this plan, and power that Fidel had. He will be more government of Cuba. appointed Raul to stand in for him. Raul, dependent for support on other political an army general and the longtime Minister actors. In a post-Fidel government, of the Armed Forces, does not have the Raul Castro will lead, but in a political charisma or the popularity that Fidel does. environment where other actors have But he has become head of state. With become more powerful. Fidel’s resignation on February 17th 2008 and the subsequent election of Raul Castro The successor government led by Raul as Cuba’s new president, the transition is Castro will seek to both consolidate complete. Key centers of power in Cuban and demonstrate its popular support society – the military, the Communist Party and legitimacy. There will certainly be leadership, and senior state officials – have differences among the leadership. But accepted him as the country’s new leader. whatever those differences are, they will likely be managed privately; the public As Raul Castro leads the country, he does façade will be one of unity. so in new circumstances. Raul Castro will not rule as unilaterally as did his brother, Fidel. Fidel Castro was First Secretary Legitimacy and the of the Central Committee of the Cuban Succession in Cuba Communist Party, President of the Council of State elected by the National The current government will need to Assembly, and, by virtue of his position take measures to establish itself, both as President of the Council of State, head domestically and internationally, as the of the Council of Ministers that runs the popular and legitimate government of government bureaucracy. He was the Cuba. Displays of national unity and of

Washington Office on Latin America April 2008 5 popular support will be critical in the early once again some of the options for self- days, but other issues will surface. employment, while maintaining a vigorous campaign against corruption. The Cuban economy has improved since the very difficult years of the 1990s, when Such efforts by the Cuban government are the economy struggled to adjust to the end currently underway. A broad plan to reform of Soviet subsidies, and had to suddenly the agriculture industry has begun with a seek new markets for its exports. But series of dialogues with individuals ranging Cubans still continue to suffer through from government officials, to academic relatively difficult economic times. The researchers, unions and the farmers libreta, the coupon book for state subsidized themselves in order to best determine how food stuffs, only provides enough to cover to raise productivity, output, and living basic needs for two to three weeks out standards. This process represents an of the month. For the other one to two important change in the internal decision weeks, most Cubans have to purchase making process on economic issues facing food at non-subsidized prices, or in Cuba. The government may also consider hard currency. On a state salary, this is political measures that would boost its very difficult; Cubans who do not have legitimacy, including modest and carefully Most Cubans continue remittances from relatives abroad, or some controlled measures that would open space to accept and support form of earnings in hard currency, have a for some dissidents, and efforts to reach out hard time making ends meet. And while to and seek support from the churches in their government. But transportation and electricity supplies have Cuba. dissatisfaction is a factor improved from the most difficult times, many Cubans continue to suffer through In addition to pursuing measures that will in the background, and badly overcrowded public transportation, bolster its domestic legitimacy, a post- a post-Castro Cuban and occasional electrical outages. Fidel government may seek to quickly government will have to demonstrate its international acceptance, The result of these continuing economic urging visits by government leaders take that into account. difficulties is dissatisfaction. That ranging from Venezuelan President Hugo dissatisfaction has not boiled over, and is Chavez to Spanish President Jose Luis not likely to with Fidel’s departure. Most Zapatero, and from leaders in developing Cubans continue to accept and support nations not perceived as closely aligned to their government. But dissatisfaction is the United States. a factor in the background, and Raul’s government will have to take that into Independence and national sovereignty account. While it will have legitimacy in have been consistent themes in Cuba’s the eyes of the population, a government foreign relations since Fidel Castro came led by Raul Castro will not be able to count to power, and this is unlikely to change on the level of support that the charismatic under Raul Castro. Foreign governments Fidel enjoyed. The next government will who signal their acceptance of the political have to recognize the discontent, and will succession in Cuba will not be able to have to take some measures to respond to demand political or economic change it and maintain popular acceptance and in Cuba as a condition for recognition. support. Nonetheless, at a time when the Cuban government is re-examining aspects of The government will seek to re-enforce its internal policies, other countries with its popular legitimacy in several ways. relations with Cuba – from the centrist It may take short term steps that seek and center-left governments of Europe, to to spread the benefits of the macro- Chavez and the government of Iran – will economic growth of the last few years to be in a position to urge the new Cuban the “micro” level more aggressively, taking leadership to move in one direction or measures to increase salaries, or improve another. Countries like the United States, public services, perhaps even expanding with no contact with the Cuban leadership

6 Opting for Engagement and few contacts with Cuban society, will they may think of the Castro government, have no influence. are not eager to see exiles who left over forty years ago return to take over the As long as the United States continues to country. The Cuban government and the isolate the island, the new government will Cuban military would see any large scale certainly continue to capitalize on pro- attempt to return as a political challenge embargo rhetoric in the exile community and a national security threat. Conflict, or any other bold actions by the U.S. that in which U.S. citizens were arrested, or threaten Cuban sovereignty, in order to hurt, or killed, would be likely, and that unite Cubans in a nationalist rejection of would be very dangerous, as it would interference in Cuban affairs. threaten to bring both governments into confrontation.

Problems for In part because of this scenario, the U.S. U.S. Policy Makers Coast Guard has, for many years, had standing orders to prevent small boats Current U.S. policy sidelines the United from leaving South Florida and heading States as Cuba goes through a political toward Cuba in the period immediately succession and considers policy reforms. after Castro’s death or departure. This …as long as the United Beyond irrelevance, current policy also poses is a simple and common sense measure, States continues to several possible risks for U.S. policy makers. designed to prevent uncontrolled movement that could generate a crisis isolate the island, the Some Cuban-American hardliners at an already tense moment. Whether new government will have always believed that the Cuban the Bush Administration and subsequent population is waiting to throw off the yoke U.S. governments maintain this order, certainly continue of communist tyranny, and has always and assure that the Coast Guard fully and to capitalize on pro- imagined they would return to Cuba at the effectively implements it, is a major issue. It embargo rhetoric in the time of Fidel’s departure to help establish is an encouraging sign that the both federal a new government, or to support dissident and Florida state authorities made a serious exile community or any groups. The power transfer has taken place and effective effort to dissuade Cuban other bold actions by without any signs of internal unrest, or exiles and Cuban-Americans from trying the U.S. that threaten the emergence of a significant political to return to Cuba in the days after the opposition, and this has made the thought temporary transfer of power in 2006. Cuban sovereignty in of returning to Cuba seem less realistic. order to unite Cubans But it is still possible that groups in the If one risk has to do with Cuban- hardline exile community will try to return Americans heading toward Cuba after Fidel in a nationalist rejection to Cuba by boat or by air when Fidel Castro Castro’s death, another risk has to do with of interference in Cuban is finally gone. rafters leaving Cuba. If the succession in affairs. Cuba were to be less stable than expected, Others moved more by humanitarian an exodus of Cubans could take place concern than by politics, could try to with significant numbers of rafters heading return to Cuba to pick up relatives eager toward Florida. The hardline community to leave the island, at a time when they in Miami would likely contribute to this are less likely to be stopped by the Cuban exodus through its radio stations and military, which will be pre-occupied with other contacts in Cuba, encouraging the succession. people to take advantage of a relatively weak government and border patrol. This It is thus easy to imagine a relatively would present difficult political choices chaotic scenario in which Cuban- for the U.S. government. A significant Americans in boats or small planes, exodus would overwhelm U.S. resources attempt to return to Cuba at the time of and produce a huge political backlash in a definitive succession. This is a recipe for the United States (which is already in the disaster. Most Cuban citizens, whatever midst of a polarized immigration debate),

Washington Office on Latin America April 2008 7 while measures to prevent Cubans from that it does not seek to dictate the details of reaching U.S. soil would probably require Cuba’s economic and political life. It should military force and be politically costly in also recognize the real and significant the hardline Cuban-American community. advances that Cuba has made in education, health care, and social equality over the last Even if the United States prevents boats from forty years, advances that the Cuban people heading for Cuba, and can prevent a rafter are likely to want to preserve. crisis, under current policy it will still face a number of other issues in how it responds to U.S. discourse about Cuba has long Fidel’s departure from the scene. emphasized Cuba’s serious problems with democracy, respect for the rule of law, and The Helms-Burton Law, passed in 1996, human rights. The U.S. should not drop requires a set of changes in Cuba before the these concerns as it looks toward the post- United States can normalize relations or Fidel future, in particular continuing to extend economic assistance to Cuba. This call for a release of those dissidents arrested severely limits the scope of potential action in 2003 who remain in jail. But they can for the current and future administrations. only meaningfully be raised in the context The Bush Administration has made it clear of an extensive and ongoing dialogue with While the Cuban that it wants to see significant political Cuba, rather than being cast in stone as government may and economic change in Cuba as a pre- pre-conditions for a more constructive condition for improved relations. And, relationship. U.S. policy ought to broadly feel the need to take as noted earlier, hardline sectors envision engage with Cuba, and in that context, economic measures offering to ease the embargo in return for focus on encouraging a post-Fidel Cuba these changes in Cuba. to move toward greater political opening, designed to boost while respecting its sovereignty and popular support, This hardline position is unlikely to recognizing its achievements. economic conditions achieve results. Assuming that the successor government has come into office, Of course, any discussion about the will not be so dire that it and that a rafter and emigration crisis has U.S. role in promoting democracy and will be desperate for U.S. been avoided, no post-Castro government human rights around the world today has to recognize that the history of U.S. aid, or tourism, or trade is likely to abandon the nationalism and independence that have been the hallmark intervention in Latin America (much less to keep it afloat. of Cuban policy for nearly five decades the recent role in the Middle East) leaves in return for negotiations on U.S. terms. many people, both in the U.S. and in Latin While the Cuban government may feel the America, deeply suspicious about U.S. need to take economic measures designed motives when talking about democracy and to boost popular support, it will not be in human rights in other countries. such difficult economic circumstances that it will be desperate for U.S. aid, or tourism, Given those two caveats, how should or trade to keep it afloat. In fact, U.S. the United States act toward a post-Fidel demands for political and economic change Cuba, if what it hopes to do is encourage are likely to provide the government an movement toward greater political opportunity to rally public support in opening? nationalist opposition to U. S. interference. Thus the United States will be doomed to The most important point is that a policy continued irrelevance. of keeping the embargo in place, and waiting until Fidel dies or both Castro What should the U.S. do? brothers step down from power is short- sighted and ineffective. Cubans, from Fidel Any discussion about how the U.S. Castro on down, are already thinking about should act toward Cuba ought to begin by and preparing for the future. Sitting on recognizing historic Cuban sensitivity about the sidelines and waiting for the future to sovereignty. The U.S. should make it clear happen means having no meaningful role.

8 Opting for Engagement Efforts by the Bush Administration, academics, technicians, government through the Commission for Assistance to officials and others in Cuba who are young a Free Cuba, to lay out how the U.S. would and more open-minded. Any strategy that relate to a post-Fidel Cuba were all based wants to encourage political opening in on the assumption that a dramatic change Cuba ought to be interested in developing in Cuba’s governing structures would relations and maintaining contact with take place after Fidel leaves the scene. that younger set of Cubans. Such a strategy But events have shown that assumption need not be based on the idea that younger to be unrealistic, and so the work of the Cubans should be cultivated because the Commission has almost no value. United States can “infect” them with ideological beliefs, or can influence them A more sensible policy would start with the to fundamentally alter their government. recognition that a post-Fidel Cuba is likely, It should simply recognize that contact and at least initially, to look much like the Cuba communication between those individuals of today. Relations with a post-Fidel Cuba and sectors in Cuba and people in the will be shaped therefore by the relations we United States cannot but be constructive have today, and will develop in the near in the long term. future. Groundwork laid today through increased contacts between academics, The U.S. embargo against Cuba should Relations with a post- cultural sectors, and others, will open be ended. It was originally driven by Cold Fidel Cuba will be channels of contact and communication War fervor, and was never justified in terms that will be useful in the future. of any realistic appraisal of the human shaped therefore by the rights situation in Cuba itself. A policy relations we have today, The United States should recognize that of engagement with Cuba, in which the the Cuban-American community is going United States raises its human rights and and will develop in the to be a major force in shaping U.S. relations democracy concerns in the context of an near future. with Cuba now and in the future, and a ongoing diplomatic relationship, is the major force in relation to Cuba itself. In the right thing to do from both a moral and long run, the grievances that many Cuban- political standpoint. Americans feel will have to be addressed, as part of some process of reconciliation. (Such But in the context of discussions about a process will also have to recognize the the post-Fidel future, it is clear that the grievances that many Cubans harbor against United States should be taking measures the exile community.) The U.S. ought to now to increase contact between Cubans begin now to take measures that encourage on the island and the Cuban American contact between the Cuban American community, and increase contact between community and Cubans on the island, academic, religious and other sectors both because it will make future relations likely to be in touch with those who will easier, and because contact encourages actually shape Cuba’s future. The Coast and strengthens the moderate sectors of Guard should remain prepared to prevent a the community and tends to isolate the crisis in the even that Fidel’s death triggers hardliners. Family, business, cultural, and instability in the Florida Straits either in religious contact between Cuban Americans Miami or in Cuba. and Cubans can only reduce tension during a time of change. If we take these steps, we have a chance to encourage a succession in Cuba that Similarly, a sensible policy would recognize would avoid a crisis and might over time that the post-Fidel leadership is likely lead toward greater political opening on the to draw on the advice and expertise of island.

Washington Office on Latin America April 2008 9 Mexico-Cuba Relations: A Two-Sided Triangle María Cristina Rosas, Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) María Cristina Rosas is Professor and Researcher, School of Political and Social Sciences, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. Her most recent book is entitled China in the 21st Century: Toward a New Bipolarity? (Mexico, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México-Australian National University, 2007)

iplomatic relations between composed of Mexico, Cuba, and Spain. DMexico and Cuba have long been Subsequently, the triangle took a different characterized by “triangulation.” Mexican shape: Mexico, Cuba, and the United authorities and the Mexican people have States. In this way, in spite of the empathy long felt close to the Caribbean isle, and that naturally exists between the two Of course Mexico’s vice versa, based on mutual interests, yet peoples, the interference of more powerful foreign policy toward relations have always been conditioned nations has inevitably determined the by the interests of the global powers of course of the relationship. Cuba reflects its own the day. During colonial times, contact national interest, between the two territories was intense yet Of course Mexico’s foreign policy toward their relationship developed within the Cuba reflects its own national interest, and vice versa, but it framework of Spain’s rule over the region. and vice versa, but it is indisputable is indisputable that Once Mexico gained its independence, that the larger context that affects their the larger context Cuba became even more important, given relationship with each other are the links its position as a Spanish colony, and that each country has with the United that affects their therefore a possible launching point for States. In terms of Mexico, the United relationship with each attempts by the Spanish crown to retake States is its principal trading partner and other are the links that Mexican territory. As Spain declined in largest investor. Three quarters of Mexican importance in the New World and the exports are bound for the United States, each country has with United States took its place as a global a relationship institutionalized with the the United States. power, the triangular relationship morphed. enactment of the North American Free During this transition, revered Mexican Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, political leaders such as Antonio López de which has intensified the already heavy Santa Ana and Benito Juárez went into flow of goods, services, and investment exile, at different times, in Havana. José among the NAFTA countries. There is Martí, the father of Cuban independence, also a decidedly complex bilateral agenda spent part of his career as a politician, that includes prickly areas such as illegal writer, and journalist in Mexico. After immigration of Mexicans into the United the Spanish-American War, Cuba, with States, the drug war, the fight against its strategic location, saw itself converted organized crime, arms trafficking, border into a virtual protectorate of the United security, and, after the attacks of September States, a position that limited any Mexican 11, 2001, the war on terror. In addition, designs on its “third border.” The triangular Mexico’s geographical position, with its relationship came to be characterized by 3,000-kilometer border with the United the dynamics that prevail today. States, puts the country in the path of illegal immigration from South America, Mexico-Cuba relations have thus been Central America and Cuba as well as drug defined within a “strategic triangle.” or contraband smuggling networks that During the colonial period and through use Mexican territory by land, air, or sea to the 19th Century, the triangle was reach the United States.

10 Opting for Engagement The complexity of the relationship Above all, Mexico sought to ensure its own described above in itself explains the high internal stability during a time of political level of priority that the United States has turmoil and insurgency around the globe. in Mexico’s foreign policy. Mexico strives It also sought to avoid Cuban support for to exercise its leadership and autonomy guerrillas and activists inside Mexico who in its actions throughout the world, could threaten the country’s status quo. By always within the context of satisfying invoking nationalism and independence its national interests. The relationships from the United States in its foreign policy that it develops with other countries and toward Cuba, the Mexican government, international organisms are therefore under the Institutional Revolutionary designed to give the country the greatest Party (PRI) until 2000, also legitimized possible strategic benefit, including itself from within by taking advantage of creating conditions that permit Mexico to the long-standing empathy between the counterbalance the enormous influence of Mexican and Cuban people. the United States. In this way Mexico achieved several goals One must also keep in mind the through its relationship with Cuba during relationship between foreign and domestic the Cold War. It projected an image of policy. In many cases, actions taken in the political independence and leadership …actions taken in the international arena by Mexico are aimed in spite of its economic reliance on the international arena by at furthering national unity, and more United States; it used its relations with concretely, have allowed the political class Cuba as a counterweight to mitigate Mexico are aimed at in power to win legitimacy in the eyes of pressure from Washington; and it furthering national unity, social groups at home that may oppose occupied a role of privileged interlocutor its domestic political, economic, or social with Cuba on important topics such as and more concretely, programs. guerrilla movements. have allowed the political class in power Mexico-Cuba Relations Mexico-Cuba Relations to win legitimacy in the During the Cold War Post-Cold War eyes of social groups at During the Cold War, relations The international changes that brought the home that may oppose between Mexico and Cuba could be Cold War to a close, combined with a series its domestic political, termed “politically correct.” Trade of internal reforms in Mexico and Cuba, economic, or social maintained a low profile throughout. led to the substantial modification of the Academic, recreational, scientific, and bilateral links and the “strategic triangle.” programs. cultural exchanges carried on normally. For Cuba, the end of the Cold War meant When, after the triumph of the Cuban the end of Soviet- and Eastern European- Revolution, the Organization of American sponsored assistance, which meant that States resolved in 1962 that the Inter- the island had to reform its international American system was incompatible with a relationships, shifting its dependence to Marxist-Leninist government such as that nations in Western Europe, Latin America, which existed in Cuba. Mexico was one of and Canada, though none of these could six countries that abstained from the vote counterbalance the United States as the to suspend the island from participating Soviet Union had. Mexico, for its part, in the OAS. (The resolution won 14 to after facing external debt and the worst 1 to 6.) By abstaining from this vote, economic crisis of its history in the 1980s, Mexico demonstrated, on the one hand, found itself forced to implement sweeping its disagreement with the OAS’ strongly economic reforms that brought a reduction U.S.-influenced position, and on the other, in the role of the Mexican state in almost assured continued friendly relations with all of its functions. From that moment Havana, though without necessitating forth, and as never before in its history, deeper links with the island. internal decisions in Mexico would be

Washington Office on Latin America April 2008 11 strongly influenced by the course of global Vicente Fox, the first non-PRI head-of- events. In economic terms, its prosperity state, in 2000. would depend upon gaining better access to the markets of its principal trading The Fox administration (2000-2006) partners. At the same time, attracting sought to distinguish itself from previous foreign investment became a decisive issue. administrations. Fox’s victory gave him The United States would be crucial in tremendous political capital in the first achieving both those goals. years of his government, during which he developed a pragmatic policy of closer All these changes in Mexico contributed ties with Washington. Given the way in to a modification of the PRI power which he came to power, by defeating the base. In the 1980s, the PRI government PRI, Fox had no need to seek legitimacy demonstrated that it was incapable internally and so the value of political of maintaining the wellbeing of the dialogue with Cuba fell with respect to population, and in the 1990s, with the previous PRI administrations. signing of NAFTA, it entered into an alliance with the United States in a move There was an additional factor that that many sectors of Mexican society provoked a shift in Mexican-Cuban Fox had no need to seek considered a betrayal and a dizzying change relations in the Fox administration. legitimacy internally and in foreign policy. NAFTA went into Because the political transition that effect on January 1, 1994, accompanied brought Fox to power was the result of so the value of political by the outbreak of the Zapatista National a contested electoral process, the Fox dialogue with Cuba fell Liberation Army (EZLN) insurrection in government trumpeted democratic values, Chiapas and, later, the assassination of in which context criticism of the Cuban with respect to previous PRI presidential candidate Luis Donaldo regime became inevitable. PRI administrations. Colosio and that of PRI General Secretary José Francisco Ruíz Massieu. All those During the UN-sponsored International events demonstrated the attrition of Conference on Financing and the PRI-dominated political system and Development in Monterrey in March the impossibility of generating internal 2002, it became evident that the Mexican consensus within it, which in turn acted government had chosen to “bilateralize” as the impetus for a transition that ended its relations with Cuba, reducing their with Ernesto Zedillo taking power. The significance. Speaking by telephone to advent of the financial crisis in December Fidel Castro before the summit, Fox told 1995, which caused the gross domestic the Cuban leader that his presence would product to fall almost 7%, led to questions prove uncomfortable for U.S. President regarding Mexico’s economic model, even George W. Bush, given that both were as the financial rescue by the United States scheduled to participate in the meeting. demonstrated once again the enormous Fox told Castro to “eat and leave,” meaning dependence of Mexico on its neighbor. that he should participate only in the In this politically and economically official dinner and then leave immediately vulnerable position, Mexico changed its in order to avoid encountering President foreign policy, becoming more pragmatic Bush. A month later, Mexico voted in and less anti-establishment (in terms of favor of a resolution presented by Uruguay discourse) concerning the United States. at the U.N. Human Rights Commission This shift inevitably affected relations in Geneva to condemn the human rights with Cuba, since the strategic triangle situation in Cuba. In October that year, tended to become “bilateralized.” Mexico Mexico’s ambassador in Havana, Ricardo discussed the bilateral agenda directly Pascoe, resigned, expressing surprise at with Washington, without using its the drastic change of direction in the Fox relationships with third parties to obtain Administration’s relations with Cuba. concessions from Washington. This was From that point until the end of the particularly visible with the arrival of Fox administration, relations with Cuba

12 Opting for Engagement maintained a low profile. Not until the party. That being said, members of both arrival of Felipe Calderón to the presidency the PRI and PAN appear to recognize that in 2006 did bilateral ties begin to rebuild. unless they take decisive steps in favor of political dialogue with Cuba, Mexico’s interests could be harmed. Prospects for Mexico-Cuba Relations The Calderón Administration recently named Gabriel Jiménez Remus as Mexican As a post-Fidel transition begins to gestate Ambassador to Cuba. Known as a on the island, Mexico finds itself without conservative figure, Jiménez Remus was the ongoing political dialogue with Cuba Mexico’s ambassador to Spain during the necessary to be part of the discussion and Fox Administration and, in that position, therefore minimize any negative impacts he developed close ties with the Spanish on its own interests. The rupture of the royal family and top officials within the “strategic triangle” has not served Mexico’s Popular Party. Overall, in spite of his interests and, for that reason, policy conservatism, he is recognized as a capable planning has begun to focus on rebuilding negotiator, skilled in compromise and it. The Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs diplomacy, with high-level links to PAN recognizes the urgency of normalizing leadership, and, of course, to President As a post-Fidel transition relations with Cuba and has identified a Calderón. With this appointment, the begins to gestate on the series of priorities that should be dealt with Mexican government demonstrates its wish in the short term. to normalize relations with Cuba, though island, Mexico finds itself under different conditions than those without the ongoing Part of this strategy could involve during the PRI years. the creation of a high-level bilateral political dialogue with consultation mechanism, which would On a different note, given that one of the Cuba necessary to be permit political dialogue between officials points of conflict in relations between part of the discussion in both countries as well as offer solutions Mexico and Cuba is the vote in the new for any challenges. This mechanism is of United Nations Human Rights Council, and therefore minimize particular interest, because of the back- separating that topic from other elements any negative impacts on door channels of communication it might of the bilateral agenda has been proposed its own interests. facilitate. Though the Hugo Chávez in an effort to avoid “contaminating” the Administration has sought to become dialogue and cooperation on the remaining Cuba’s main political ally, Venezuela’s topics of common interest. In the same way, government lacks a constructive dialogue as a means of compensation for Mexico’s with the Bush Administration. In contrast, voting position in the council, the Calderón Calderón can guarantee more than just government has been considering lobbying dialogue with Washington; in fact, there in favor of Cuba before the UN General are reports that former president George H. Assembly regarding the U.S. embargo. W. Bush and U.S. ambassador to Mexico, Antonio Garza, have suggested that Mexico, in attempting to reassert itself as Mexico might serve as mediator for Cuba’s a regional power, may have interests in transition. In this sense, Washington exploring cooperation on energy issues and would seem to be in favor of recreating the regional development with Cuba. Mexico strategic triangle. might also be willing to lobby within the OAS for a dialogue that could lead to Cuba But this is not an easy task, above all rejoining the inter-American system, an internally, given that the political forces idea supported by OAS Secretary General that are likely to play leading roles in José Miguel Insulza. normalizing relations with Cuba are members of the PRI, creating the possilbity One of the most prickly subjects within the of a political power play vis-à-vis the bilateral relationship between Mexico and National Action Party (PAN), Calderón’s Cuba is the debt Havana has accumulated

Washington Office on Latin America April 2008 13 with the Mexican Foreign Trade Bank countries, the geographic proximity, and (BANCOMEXT), which amounts to $500 Mexico’s position as the closest neighbor to million. While trade ties are modest (Cuba the U.S. Many Cubans in Mexico maintain receives less than one percent of Mexican contact with Cuban family members who exports), this debt inhibits many trade and are residents in the United States. investment possibilities that Mexico would otherwise develop in Cuba. Moreover, In the face of this situation, it is imperative the debt impedes Mexico’s ability to take that Mexico and Cuba develop an advantage of the U.S. embargo against immigration agreement that takes into Cuba, given that when those economic account, among other concerns, the sanctions end, Mexico will face U.S. exchange of information about migratory competition in Cuba. If Mexico dedicated policies in the two countries, the definition itself to promoting its economic interests of policies for the reinsertion of nationals adequately before that transition, it would from each country, the criteria for combating find itself in a better position to compete. undocumented immigration, consular protections, and the rights of airline and Yet the most important subject for Mexico maritime crews that travel to Mexico. in its bilateral relations with Cuba has Conditions are in place to do with the security issues created by Conditions are in place for Mexico and for Mexico and Cuba Cuban migration to, and through, Mexico, Cuba to normalize bilateral relations and and with the possibility of increases in steer their relationship into less treacherous to normalize bilateral this migration in a post-Fidel period in waters. Cuba is Mexico’s third border, relations and steer their Cuba. Security and migration issues are a fact which bestows upon it special closely linked in Mexico. Since the 2001 relevancy for the bilateral agenda of that relationship into less terrorist attacks, the U.S. has sought to country. Mexico must take the initiative treacherous waters. reinforce its border controls, including the in this reconciliatory process, both to gain construction of a wall, and has exhorted the benefits that its foreign policy would the Mexican government to fortify its receive by taking a leadership role in the own border controls in regards to South region and to secure the support of Cuba American, Central American, and Cuban in those multilateral institutions where migrants who enter the country in transit Cuban diplomacy carries substantial weight to the United States. The addition of an that the Mexican government can use explosion of Cuban migrants would put in its favor. Other considerations justify Mexico in an impossible situation: a wall to closer ties with Havana, including the the north plus migrant flows from Central transition that is occurring on the island and South America, and the Cubans. and the impacts in terms of security that any transition could have on Mexico. Cuban migration to Mexico is not a new If the Calderón government does not phenomenon. Beginning in the early 1990s, develop an appropriate political dialogue, coinciding with the Special Period (period the consequences will be very unfavorable of economic crisis in Cuba) following the for the country. In contrast, a respectful collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and and cooperative relationship with the the end of Moscow’s assistance, Mexico Cubans will allow Mexico to be a proactive experienced a surge in Cuban immigration. protagonist in Cuba’s transition. It is This stems from the traditional empathy therefore in Mexico’s best interest to work that exists between the people of the two to reestablish the “strategic triangle.”

14 Opting for Engagement The Attitude of the European Union and Spain Toward Cuba1 Joaquín Roy, Miami University Joaquín Roy is Jean Monnet Professor of European Integration, Director of University of Miami European Union Center and Co-Director of the Miami-Florida European Union Center of Excellence. He has published more than 200 academic articles and reviews, and is the author, editor, or co-editor of 25 books. He has also published more than 1,300 columns and essays in newspapers and magazines. Among his awards is the Encomienda of the Order of Merit bestowed by King Juan Carlos of Spain.

he European Union’s approach toward the EU waited to see if any progress TCuba, and that of its individual was forthcoming, the EU took a series member states, has differed markedly from of initiatives aimed at finding a middle that of the United States. Brussels has not ground with Cuba while not abandoning While the EU overall restricted trade relations with Cuba for its human rights concerns. These many years. When Cuba opened itself to initiatives were controversial among EU has taken a cautious limited foreign investment in an effort to member governments: certain governments position vis-à-vis Cuba, cushion the impact of the collapse of the viewed them as positive; others saw the Spanish have moved Soviet Union and its subsidies, European them as insufficient. The new initiatives interests (especially Spanish companies) received an ambivalent response from the on their own track. looked to the island for opportunities. Cuban government. European tourism to Cuba has increased significantly. Still, while the EU has Today, tensions remain in the relation consistently opposed coercive sanctions between the EU and Cuba. Debate within on Cuba, it has criticized its government the EU culminated with a June 2007 on human rights and democracy issues and statement representing a compromise has declined to reach a full government- between member governments which re- to-government agreement on development affirmed the status quo. Cuba responded assistance and cooperation until Cuba negatively. In sum, a year and a half after makes progress on political and economic the July 31, 2006 announcement regarding reforms. Since the mid-1990s, Cuban- Castro’s health, not much has changed EU relations have gone through cycles of in the essence, details and spirit of the tension over these conditions. peculiar relationship between Europe and Cuba. Beginning in 2003, EU relations with Cuba entered a cycle in which European While the EU overall has taken a cautious actors would attempt to influence or position vis-à-vis Cuba, the Spanish persuade Havana to move toward political have moved on their own track. The and economic reforms. Cuban authorities politically risky trip taken by Spanish would respond to the pressure by freezing Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos the level of diplomatic contacts. In to Havana during Easter week of 2007 2005, after a prolonged period in which surprised European and U.S. observers as

1 Summarized version of a paper presented at the Latin American Studies Association (LASA) Congress in Montreal, Canada, September 5-9, 2007. This document is a follow-up to a report made in the aftermath of Fidel Castro’s illness and temporary withdrawal from power on August 1, 2006, “From stubbornness and mutual irrelevancy to stillness and vigil on Castro’s crisis: The current state of European Union-Spain-Cuba relations,” Occasional Paper, Jean Monnet Chair/European Union Center. Special August/September 2006. Reproduced by Real Instituto Elcano, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/documentos/253.asp. Available at website of Fundación Alternativas (Madrid): http://www.falternativas.org/base/download/bc80_28-08-06_vigil-EN-paper.pdf.

Washington Office on Latin America April 2008 15 a major turn in Spain’s policy several years the other hand, some states pursue a more after the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE)’s oppositional approach, with the Czech electoral victory in March of 2004. When Republic leading the ranking of EU member most observers expected the impasse caused states perceived as hard-liners on Cuba. by Castro’s illness to last longer and invite an extended period of inaction and caution The Cuban government reaffirmed its cool from an array of foreign actors, Spain approach, even after the suspension of the decided to act. The bold move taken by the EU temporary measures in 2005. Havana Spanish government has to be seen within continued to selectively place obstacles a wider context regarding the European on the access granted to certain foreign perception of the Cuban scene. representations to the high echelons of the regime. Meanwhile, the government-run media sporadically would attack, sometimes Cuba-EU Relations in a veiled manner, sometimes in an explicit way, certain European governments In 1996, after the planes of the exile and the EU as whole, accusing it of taking organization Brothers to the Rescue were part in the U.S. “conspiracy.” The EU shot down and Cuban authorities cracked Common Position in effect since 1996 has The European down on civil society, the EU, which had been systematically equated with the long- governments, historically been moving toward a full development standing U.S. embargo. cooperation agreement with the island, a counterweight to U.S. decided not to move forward. Instead, Havana has noted the willingness of certain hostility, have concluded EU governments adopted a united stand, countries to continue with the overall known as the Common Position, which approach of “constructive engagement.” that in the short term, stated that Brussels would not negotiate a But it has noted, too, a deepening of the Cuba does not need regular cooperation agreement until Cuba opposition approach taken by the Czech them as a balance to the adopted political and economic reforms. Republic. This has generated a verbally Since then, the Cuban government has aggressive response from the Cuban U.S. relationship. Raúl refused to meet the EU conditions which government and its media, blaming the Castro is well supported it perceives as an attempt to impose EU for allegedly caving in to pressure political changes on Cuba. Cuban-EU by the strategic alliance and mirroring the strategy of the United relations remained cool for the rest of States. with Venezuela and sees the decade, then warmed briefly as both no need to reach an sides displayed some flexibility. In 2003, The European governments, historically in response to the arrests of 75 dissidents a counterweight to U.S. hostility, have accommodation with and the execution of three Cubans who concluded that in the short term, Cuba the EU. had commandeered a passenger ferry, does not need them as a balance to the taking hostages in an attempt to reach the U.S. relationship. Raúl Castro is well United States, the EU adopted “temporary supported by the strategic alliance with measures” which limited EU-Cuban Venezuela and sees no need to reach an diplomatic contacts. The EU, in imposing accommodation with the EU. Although these restrictions, agreed to review them few expect a hardening in the public every year. In 2005, following Spanish confrontations between the EU and leadership, the measures were suspended Cuba, which were the norm before the (though not formally ended). suspension of the temporary measures in early 2005, the EU institutions have been Of course, within the overarching EU predicting that the stalemated relationship approach, individual countries each differ that is best described as “mutual in their relations with Cuba. Some states irrelevance” will continue. Both parties have pursed a policy of “constructive have come to the conclusion that they engagement.” A ranking of EU states cannot influence each other; so the logic exercising this policy shows Spain in first has been not to bother with more than the place, followed by Belgium and Italy. On status quo.

16 Opting for Engagement Moreover, the calm in Cuba that followed major changes should not be expected. the announcement of both Fidel’s illness Meanwhile, Fidel Castro continued to make in 2006, and his eventual retirement in indirect media appearances, reinforcing the 2008, has led EU observers to re-examine ambiguity about who was truly in charge the reality of European involvement and on the island. This ambiguity would be interests in Cuba. clarified only with his death or full return to power. Another factor had to do with the Europe’s influence over Cuba is thus limited pacts arranged by Cuba with other actors because Europe, like the United States, (Venezuela, among others), which indicate is not needed by the Cuban government. that Havana felt less need to win additional This perception was confirmed empirically support or favors. when Cuba bluntly declined the invitation to send a Cuban delegation to visit Brussels This European perception that it was to discuss a wide range of issues in June not the moment for policy change 2007. While some years ago this rejection toward Cuba coincides with that of might have been dictated by ideology international policy analysts elsewhere, and by the Cuban government’s need to including in the United States. In construct an “enemy” against whom to rally general, the international community the population, today there is a concrete has demonstrated a lack of fresh ideas ...the calm in Cuba economic factor added to the equation. in dealing with unforeseeable events in that followed the Venezuela and its leader Hugo Chávez, Cuba. As long as Washington does not for the moment, have filled the economic explore more innovative avenues toward announcement of vacuum, offering Cuba an alternative to Cuba, there is consequently little pressure both Fidel’s illness in dependency on European investment and on Europe to do so either, and so Europe financing. has maintained its cautious attitude 2006, and his eventual during this long period of “constructive retirement in 2008, has engagement.” EU Attitudes After led EU observers to re- Fidel Castro’s Illness European foreign ministries have thus examine the reality of opted to take into account the signals European involvement This situation, which existed before Castro emanating from Havana and to respond and interests in Cuba. fell ill, has continued. Eight months after to the apparent “normalcy” presented by the health crisis erupted, the EU (including the temporary transfer of power with a nod Spain) was still pursuing a cautious and an intention of waiting. At the same approach. The institutional machinery of time, because the EU’s precarious consensus the European Union and leading member position on Cuba had been developed states (leading because of their historical in the middle of 2006, shortly before the legacy and because of their influence in illness of Fidel Castro, the EU did not wish EU decision-making) reaffirmed a cautious to change its approach. This impasse lasted approach in their policy towards Cuba. into 2007. European discussions of innovative political and economic frameworks have been frozen In 2006, the EU in its annual review since Raúl Castro took over, with Europe of its Cuba position, agreed to draft a concluding that circumstances were not new strategy by 2007. But the promised propitious for a considerable shift in the drafting never took place. Concerned general policy. that a new strategy might re-affirm the 1996 Common Position that they sought Several factors contributed to this approach. to change, and seeking a more opportune One factor had to do with the lack of moment, Spain and other actors were substantial changes in the overall political energetically opposed to the development shape of the Cuban regime. Signals, of a new strategy document. They feared both subtle and explicit, emanated from that a re-affirmation of the Common the Cuban government implying that Position’s limits on full economic and

Washington Office on Latin America April 2008 17 diplomatic relations would make it Despite intensive discussions, the 2007 more difficult for the EU to maintain agreement failed to resolve important the flexibility needed to respond to disagreements among the EU member states unforeseeable circumstances. Also, Spain over policy toward Cuba. It was not possible and other governments felt that a new to reach an agreement on a re-evaluation EU strategy document might give the of the Common Position, or on formally Cuban regime new ammunition to argue ending the 2003 measures. The final that it was being harassed in the U.S. consensus then implied that the Common style. Position was still valid. In the event that Cuban authorities do not accept the invitation to meet, the Common Position The EU Adopts a will again be reviewed in June 2008. Formal Position All said, the consensus was a successful The pending business of the temporary initial agreement. The EU felt it would measures taken against Cuba in 2003, strengthen its future position by showing (provisionally lifted in 2005) and the unity and lose leverage if it showed continuing validity of the Common signs of in-fighting. A reopening of the …what originally Position approved in 1996, became the complex text meant the risk of destroying centerpieces of EU decisions made in the was simply a set of the agreement. The EU also managed middle of 2007. To the dissatisfaction of to place the ball back in Cuba’s court by conditions presented all parties involved, a new compromise extending the invitation to send Cuban to Cuba for enjoying a was reached which resulted only in representatives to Brussels. stalemate and continuing ambiguity. cooperation agreement The Cuban government’s reaction was similar to the deals There had been hopes for a permanent first a cool silence. It was then followed made with the rest of lifting of the 2003 measures. Spain and by a declaration laced with animosity other member states were pressuring and irritation. Castro published a furious the Latin American for their permanent suspension on the article in Granma. He described what countries, has been grounds that they were never really he called “sanctions” as “unenforceable implemented and had become an irritant “sold” by the Cuban and unsustainable.” He labeled the to the Cuban regime, while opposing Common Position a draft written by the exile community and members and sectors of the dissident U.S. State Department and called the the U.S. government as movement were advocating for the re- Czech government “U.S. peons.” The imposition of the measures. conclusions made by the EU Council were “sanctions,” a word that labeled as “calumnious” interference in the has been expanded The EU Council reached a compromise. “internal affairs of Cuba.” In sum, he said, It decided to continue the suspension of to cover the measures the EU was acting with a “persistent and the measures, without making any move humiliating subordination” to the United taken in 2003. toward their permanent dissolution. The States. It is then “up to the EU to make compromise reached was, essentially, a corrections in its policy towards Cuba.” way to avoid the topic of the measures altogether. The thorny topic of the Common Position suffered the same The Common Position treatment. The document that was drafted included the customary demands for It is worth noting that the meaning of the Cuban political and economic reform, Common Position of 1996 has been subtly and the liberation of political prisoners. changed and manipulated by a variety of In closing, the EU invited the Cuban actors. On one side, what originally was government to send a special delegation simply a set of conditions presented to to Brussels to discuss all matters of mutual Cuba for enjoying a cooperation agreement concern, including the conflict-ridden similar to the deals made with the rest of topic of human rights. the Latin American countries, has been

18 Opting for Engagement “sold” by the Cuban exile community and There were a range of reactions to and the U.S. government as “sanctions,” a attempts to explain the Spanish action. word that has been expanded to cover the As an immediate response, commentaries measures taken in 2003. On the other side, ranged from silence and prudence to the Cuban government has gladly accepted overt criticism and finger pointing at the term and its spirit. In the background the motivations involved. Dissidents, of the discussions over the decision to humiliated by Moratinos’ refusal to meet lift the measures in 2005, the Cuban with them, expressed disappointment at his government sent an unequivocal message decision and his offer, as an alternative, to indicating that there was no chance of an arrange a meeting with lower-level Spanish agreement unless the Common Position officials. Significantly, the frustration was lifted. over the visit of Moratinos and the lack of a scheduled meeting with the dissident As frequent declarations by Cuban officials community prompted some dissident groups including Fidel Castro have illustrated, to issue a “declaration of unity” (although the Common Position has been equated they denied the link between the visit and to U.S. policy. The Cuban government their decision). then skillfully applies the same treatment to both, interpreting them as examples Commentators close to the views of the …the current Spanish of economic and political imperialism, opposition Popular Party expressed critical government and other blaming them for the economic evaluations. Media analysts questioned the shortcomings of the Cuban system. future effectiveness of the move. Voices EU partners have been in the exile sectors argued that Spain’s opposed to a strategy It should be stressed, when dealing with motives were predominantly economic this comparative dimension, that the EU – Spain was tending to its investments, that is interpreted Common Position does not aim to bring seeking protection for current operations as the imposition of change to Cuba by coercive means. But and expecting devolution or compensation “sanctions.” They believe it continues to be portrayed that way for partnerships terminated in the past. in Cuba, based on nationalist feelings. the Common Position That has been the main reason why the When the Popular Party presented a has been ineffective in current Spanish government and other EU motion in Congress asking the Spanish offering incentives for partners have been opposed to a strategy government to demand the release of 134 that is interpreted as the imposition of political prisoners, Moratinos responded change in Cuba and has “sanctions.” They believe the Common that a strategy of dialogue would be the only stiffened nationalist Position has been ineffective in offering most effective. Elena Valenciano, the incentives for change in Cuba and has only ruling Socialist Party’s (PSOE) secretary resistance. stiffened nationalist resistance. for international relations, said the Spanish government had specifically communicated to Cuban authorities From Prudence to what Spain expected of them regarding Bold Action the prisoners, reminding critics that in the past, Spain carried little leverage and If the European Union, took a cautious hence had not obtained results. wait-and-see approach over the last year, Spain, acting on its own, did take a dramatic step. Foreign Minister Miguel Spain’s Motives Angel Moratinos visited Cuba, and the government made the decision to In response to the torrent of criticism, reestablish full communication with the keener analysts noted that simplistic Cuban government through the public explanations based solely on trade and signing of agreements in the fields of investment arguments were inaccurate. economics, investment, and political Cuban business operations are in fact dialogue including human rights. of relatively minor importance to the

Washington Office on Latin America April 2008 19 Spanish economy. The PSOE would the member states (especially those most have little domestic political incentive critical and skeptical toward Cuba) will to stress business ties with Cuba, since depend on how many imprisoned dissidents the Spanish business sectors that would will be liberated, which is out of Spain’s benefit from closer trade and investment control. In other words, Spain’s standing links with Cuba are strongly allied with may have been placed in a dependent the more conservative Popular Party. position. It will be up to the Cuban regime In spite of the public acrimony over the to respond and evaluate how important its Cuban issue, its actual impact in the relationship is with Spain before offering last election was insignificant. Voters any concessions. The Spanish government were motivated by unemployment, the took a direct dive into a Cuban swimming cost of living and housing, education, pool which was half empty. The Cuban immigration and ETA terrorism, not by government may or may not provide the Spain’s policy on Cuba. necessary water.

A more credible motivation for Spain’s But if there were risks to acting, the accommodation with Cuba might be the Spanish authorities concluded that there feeling that Spain was losing ground in were risks to inaction as well. The Spanish Spain decided to Cuba, where its presence had been felt may have concluded that a quick transition lead those who for half a millennium. Spain was left with was unlikely and that inaction would the unnerving prospect of subjecting its prolong the stalemate. considered that the policy to a never-ending annual review by best strategy was the EU, where the Czech Republic and other governments could influence policy to take advantage Conclusion while being cheered on by U.S.-supported of the Cuban groups in Europe. It was no wonder that The Brussels establishment has become increasingly irritated by the erratic system’s windows Madrid decided to set its own course. language used by Cuban authorities, of opportunity. The Spain decided to lead those who including that used by Castro himself “bilateral” approach considered that the best strategy was to in his writings. The offer to meet in take advantage of the Cuban system’s Brussels received a “provocative and prevailed over windows of opportunity. The “bilateral” unfriendly reply,” in the words of one the precarious approach prevailed over the precarious EU official, without the “respectful” tone “multilateralism of “multilateralism of the EU.” Spain so often demanded by the Cubans. EU concluded that cultural cooperation, representatives are not happy with what the EU.” development cooperation and political they perceive as a deliberate misreading dialogue with the Cuban government by Cuba of EU positions, with the Cubans would serve as the columns that maintain basing their opinions on statements by a communication with Cuban civil society. non-representative minority of EU member states. Brussels would hope that Cuban This attitude is not free from risks. declarations would take notice that the Some European analysts say Spain’s Common Position explicitly excludes strategy amounts to a willingness to coercive means, so as to be differentiated pay any price for maintaining an open from the U.S. attitude to which Cuba communication line with the Cuban frequently equates it. Still, no further government. Although the decision drastic policy changes are expected. may not be that important in terms of Spain’s standing in the EU, considering As the transition in Cuba further develops, the low priority enjoyed by Cuban the moment of truth will come, and issues in EU institutions, some loss of observers will see what kind of influence confidence in Spain might be the result the new Spanish approaches toward Cuba of its accommodation with Havana. may have. Meanwhile, the rest of the The final evaluation given by the rest of EU (with the possible exception of the

20 Opting for Engagement hardliners) will probably continue the political opening or makes a reckless move “wait and see” approach that has been by making further arrests. the trend until now. Neither Spain nor its EU opponents on the Cuban issue have For the time being, the EU continues to the capacity to drastically change the stand on the sidelines, and Spain will current official position or to re-impose the pursue a more forward looking policy of temporary measures, unless Cuba creates a engagement.

Washington Office on Latin America April 2008 21 UK Relations with Cuba in the Post-Fidel Era Margaret Blunden, International Institute for the Study of Cuba, London Metropolitan University Margaret Blunden is Director of the Policy Unit of the International Institute for the Study of Cuba at London Metropolitan University. She is an Emeritus Professor of the University of Westminster and a former Trustee of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. The International Institute for the Study of Cuba is an initiative by a team of UK-based academics, specialists and consultants, with the object of providing an in-depth and focused appraisal of the Cuban social experience as it approaches and undergoes another period of major change. The Institute was incorporated into London Metropolitan University on May 1, 2007.

British and European wo days after the revolution, on determinative of the government’s Cuba policies towards Cuba TJanuary 3, 1959, The Times of London policy. Since 1996, the Blair government’s published a letter from Graham Green, the support for the European Union’s so called have signally failed distinguished novelist and author of Our “Common Position”, linking policies to meet their stated Man in Havana. It began, “the welcome towards Cuba to human rights demands, success of Dr. Fidel Castro in overthrowing coinciding with the Blair government’s objectives, and a the dictatorship of Batista reminds us again exceptionally close relations with the radically new approach, of the extraordinary ignorance of Cuban United States, has brought Britain’s not based on heavy- affairs shown by the British government.” relations with Cuba to a low ebb. British The UK Government had, with American and European policies towards Cuba handed criticism and agreement, delivered 25 fighter aircraft have signally failed to meet their stated coercive political to General Batista in September 1958, objectives, and a radically new approach, convinced that Fidel Castro’s rebel army not based on heavy-handed criticism and conditionality, is needed. was facing defeat. Shortly after Castro had coercive political conditionality, is needed. taken power, his request for further aircraft was refused, principally to avoid offending the United States. UK Policy Through the Mid-90s A number of themes recur in British policies since the Cuban revolution: 1) The UK government, like that of other partial and incomplete understanding European nations, refused from the of Cuban politics and society; and 2) a start to join the U.S. trade embargo and calculated strategic approach, in which the maintained normal diplomatic relations view that Cuba is not worth a conflict with with the island. A compensation settlement the United States overrides commercial was agreed with the Shell Oil Company for interests and ideological considerations, or its property nationalized at the revolution. indeed matters of principle. Paradoxically, The British Government’s continuing the Labour government of former dissociation from the U.S. embargo helped Prime Minister Tony Blair attached less to offset the close relationship between importance to good relations with Cuba the UK and the U.S., particularly marked than did its immediate Conservative during the Thatcher government of 1979 predecessors. In contrast, in Spain, where to 1991. During the 1980s, trade and Cuba is a more prominent issue in foreign investment were not made conditional on policy debates, the right/left affiliation of progress in human rights, as they were later the party in power has been much more to become, and in 1986 Cuba constituted

22 Opting for Engagement the UK’s fifth largest market in Latin Position in 1996, which declared further America. If British policy toward Cuba improvements in political and economic through the 1980s was different than relations between the EU and Cuba to be that of the United States, Cuba was not a dependent on progress in human rights and priority issue for British leaders: As David political reforms. Brighty, British Ambassador from 1989 to 1991 has remarked, “it was clear to me In 1996, the U.S. hardened its policy that my masters in London saw Cuba as toward Cuba, reacting to the downing of peripheral and were really only interested two U.S.-registered private planes flown by in knowing when Fidel would step down.” Miami-based Cuban exiles over the Straits of Florida in February. In that same period, In the early 1990s, with the Cold Cuba halted the process of economic War over and Cuba embarking on a and political liberalization that had been number of market-oriented reforms, the underway in the early and mid-1990s. In Conservative Government of John Major Europe, the Common Position was an supported British commercial interests initiative proposed as a response to these and functional collaboration with events by the then-conservative Spanish Cuba, in areas such as counter-narcotics government, after American lobbying. The operations. The UK Government, in British and Spanish governments were the Good bilateral relations common with others, made it a crime only ones happy with the initial wording between the UK and to comply with the extraterritorial of the proposed Common Position, which provisions of the 1992 American Cuban many member states considered “too close Cuba were, however, Democracy Act (the Torricelli Law), to the U.S. thesis and demands.” to be complicated which prohibited foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies from trading with The agenda and priorities of the Labour from 1996 on, both or investing in Cuba, provisions Government of Tony Blair, which came by European Union which were widely seen as a violation to power in 1997, worked against good ambitions to develop of international laws and customary relations with Cuba despite the presence norms. In 1995, the Major Government, of a strong pro-Cuban lobby on the left a coordinated policy recognizing the commercial advantages wing of the Labour Party. Maintaining towards Cuba, and by of a closer dialogue, endorsed the a certain distance from one of the few American efforts at more foundation of the Cuba Initiative, a remaining communist countries helped to bilateral, non-government and non- underline the image of the Government vigorous enforcement of partisan political body which aims to as “New” rather than “Old” Labour. The the embargo. enhance the UK/Cuba relationship, Government’s vaunted new ethical foreign particularly in the business field. policy included giving greater prominence to human rights issues. Upholding the European Union’s Common Position UK Policy Since 1996 towards Cuba had the advantage of demonstrating New Labour’s credentials The Common Position both as defenders of human rights and as Good bilateral relations between the good Europeans on an issue that never had UK and Cuba were, however, to be the salience in Britain that it has in Spain. complicated from 1996 on, both by European Union ambitions to develop Initially, overt support for the EU Common a coordinated policy towards Cuba, and Position was not incompatible with by American efforts at more vigorous bilateral contacts – though these took enforcement of the embargo. The Major place at lower ministerial levels – and Government seemed less willing to resist with some support for British commercial American pressure when operating in interests. Philip McLean, UK Ambassador a multilateral, rather than a bilateral from 1994 to 1998, has remarked that framework. The government supported the Common Position proved no lasting the adoption of the EU Common impediment to the business of individual

Washington Office on Latin America April 2008 23 countries quietly building up practical EU position raised the possibility of a cooperation in chosen area. His successor, transatlantic trade war. David Ridgway, has described the Common Position as “a useful framework within Whereas the Major government had which member states were able to develop immediately protested to the Americans their own bilateral policies.” Official about the 1996 Helms-Burton (Cuban contacts with Cuba were confined to the Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act), junior ministerial level, as much because claiming that its extraterritorial provisions of issues related to UK-U.S. relations as would create a dangerous precedent in because of the Common Position itself. international law, the Blair government The close relations between the Blair seems to have played a leading role in Government and the Clinton and Bush securing a trade-off compromise. London Administrations meant that there was a red was the venue for the crucial meetings at line on Cuba which could not be crossed. which it was agreed that the European Below this line, junior ministers were free Union would not pursue its complaints to take low-level functional initiatives. A through the World Trade Organization, number of junior ministerial visits took but would negotiate a settlement of the place: in 1998 Baroness Symons, the then dispute directly with the U.S. government. The close relations parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, In the subsequent settlement, the Clinton between the Blair made the first visit to Cuba by a minister Administration agreed to suspend in the Foreign and Commonwealth implementation of the most egregious Government and Office since the revolution. Brian Wilson, aspects of Helms-Burton, while the EU the Clinton and Bush Minister of State between 1997 and 2003, agreed not pursue a WTO hearing that was able to normalize relations with Cuba would find the United States in violation Administrations meant in areas such as trade and energy, and of its trade obligations. This has been that there was a red collaboration developed between Cuba’s oil described by Michael Erisman as “a clear line on Cuba which and gas industries and their counterparts in victory for the Clinton Administration” Scotland. because it saved the Administration from could not be crossed. making hard choices between domestic Below this line, junior The UK and Helms-Burton political constituencies that wanted Helms- ministers were free Burton and its support for the WTO and Good relations with Cuba, were, however, WTO processes. This caused great offence to take low-level always vulnerable when broader British in Havana. functional initiatives. interests were involved. (This was particularly the case since the Blair The UK and the Cotonou government, like the American, was confidently expecting that the demise of Agreement Fidel Castro would be followed by popular After the UK became the single biggest demonstrations provoking a collapse of contributor to the American-led coalition the government and the installation of in Iraq in 2003, Blair was less willing than a new one, more favorable to American ever to allow anything to do with Cuba and British interests The 1996 Helms- to complicate relations with the United Burton legislation included provisions States. The Blair government played a affecting European investors in Cuba. In prominent role in the events of 2003 1998, coordinated European resistance to leading to President Castro’s decision to these extra-territorial provisions of the withdraw Cuba’s second application to Helms-Burton legislation, including the join the Cotonou Agreement, by which prospect of a formal appeal to the World the European Union provides its former Trade Organization, set off alarm bells colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the in London. Common EU resistance to Pacific (ACP), with trade preferences and Helms-Burton could threaten the Blair aid. In 2002, the EU and Cuba had begun government’s special relationship with negotiations that might lead to Cuba the Clinton Administration, and a tough becoming part of the Cotonou agreement.

24 Opting for Engagement Had Cuba’s application, which was made Western Hemisphere. While not incorrect, with the unanimous backing of the ACP this is too simplistic a characterization. The countries, been successful, EU aid to the Government did not trouble to make a island would probably have tripled. distinction, as some French ministers have But in the spring of 2003, Cuba arrested done, between political and social rights, and gave long jail sentences to some 75 or to acknowledge Cuba’s achievements dissidents and executed three would- in education and health. The unease of a be refugees who had commandeered number of British ministers – and indeed a passenger ferry at gunpoint in of prominent Conservatives – about the Havana harbor. In response, the Aznar logical justification for British policies Government in Spain, supported by the towards Cuba, rarely surfaces in public. Blair Government in the UK, persuaded their EU partners to postpone Cuba’s application indefinitely. New Governments in London and Havana When, the following year, the new Socialist government in Spain called The new government of Gordon Brown on the European Union to help Cuba in London, and that of Raul Castro, more negotiate entry into the Cotonou pragmatic than his brother, in Havana, The new government presents the opportunity for changing Agreement, the Blair Government was of Gordon Brown in among those countries opposing any policies, at both British and European change. The Government supported the levels, which have manifestly failed. London, and that of Raul Bush Administration’s policy of keeping The UK and the European Union have Castro, more pragmatic Cuba isolated; representations from the made themselves largely irrelevant while Cuba Initiative, the foundation that the Cuba, increasingly integrated into its own than his brother, in Major government had helped create eight region, has looked for partners elsewhere. Havana, presents years earlier, that increased cooperation A substantial body of parliamentary the opportunity for through business activity was more likely backbenchers and of business interests to bring about economic and political support a more positive approach. It should changing policies, reform, and pro-Cuba lobbying by Labour’s be possible, as former minister Brian Wilson at both British and left wing back-bench MPs at Westminster, points out, to develop a constructive European levels, which were ignored. foreign policy towards Cuba without calling into question the relationship with the have manifestly failed. The Cuban government, which has United States, even if there were to be no subsequently cut off political dialogue with change in policy from Washington. the EU and refused virtually all bilateral aid, has some justification in denouncing At the bilateral level, political dialogue EU policy as unfair in singling out Cuba between the UK and Cuba should be and conditioning relations on human rights re-opened. A necessary prerequisite, criteria that it does not employ elsewhere. at British as at European levels, is the Cuba is the only Latin American country adoption of more appropriate diplomatic not to enjoy a bilateral agreement with the language respectful of Cuba’s national EU. Cuba is indeed a one-party state, with sovereignty and balancing legitimate restricted civil and political liberties, which concerns about democracy and civil prioritizes unity and punishes its opponents rights with acknowledgement of Cuba’s severely. However, the 79 existing members many domestic achievements and its of the ACP group include some countries remarkable international contribution with dubious human rights records. In in health and education. Beneficial no other case was progress in this area opportunities, for both countries should be demanded as a prerequisite for membership. actively sought for bilateral cooperation, including business partnerships, scientific The Blair Government repeated the mantra cooperation in such areas as medicine, that Cuba is the only non-democracy in the biotechnology or alternative energy

Washington Office on Latin America April 2008 25 sources, and government-to-government objectives of the EU Amsterdam Treaty, collaboration in combating international to foster sustainable economic and social crime and terrorism. UK/Cuba cooperation development, to facilitate a smooth and in international development would gradual transition into the world economy, be particularly timely, at a moment and to fight against poverty, as well as when achievement of the Millennium developing and consolidating democracy Development Goals appears to be receding. and the rule of law, fundamental human rights and freedoms. Changes at the European level are overdue. The EU policy of “constructive The false analogy, much repeated by engagement” pursued since the adoption some Eastern European governments, of the EU Common Position in 1996, and frequently heard in the European has been neither constructive nor an Parliament, between the political system engagement and EU/Cuba relations are of Cuba and that of former Soviet now at a stalemate. The UK, together with satellites in Eastern Europe, needs to be France and Germany as leading decision rebutted. The Cuban government, with makers on the European Council, should all its shortcomings, enjoys a degree of be supporting Spain, the spearhead of nationalist legitimacy that the Eastern bloc Changes at the a European movement for improving governments never had; as the research of European level are relations with Latin America, including Elizabeth Dore among others suggests, its Cuba. The Council needs to instigate a political system incorporates substantial overdue. The EU fundamental re-thinking of the Common elements of consent, rather than coercion. policy of “constructive Position, without waiting for the change of The UK government should be urging that policy from Washington that may follow genuine engagement and partnership is engagement” pursued the next presidential elections. more likely to encourage greater political since the adoption and economic openness which the EU of the EU Common Real engagement with Cuba means rightly hopes to see in Cuba. dropping the heavy-handed political Position in 1996, conditionality of the Common Position The British government, with its has been neither and the critical and one-sided subsequent European partners, should make united annual reviews; it means forming a representations to the United States constructive nor an cooperation agreement with Cuba government to comply with annual United engagement and EU/ and re-opening negotiations for the Nations resolution calling for an end to Cuba relations are now country to join the Cotonou Agreement, the economic embargo of Cuba, adding its implicitly acknowledging that there is voice to the increasing weight of criticism at a stalemate. no consistent and principled justification of the embargo from within the United for its exclusion. Real engagement of States itself. The circumstances, in Europe, this kind would be more likely than the in the United States, and in Cuba itself, present standoff to achieve the balanced could be propitious for change.

26 Opting for Engagement Canada-Cuba Relations: Under the Shadow of the Elephant John M . Kirk, Dalhousie University Peter McKenna, University of Prince Edward Island John Kirk is Professor of Latin American Studies at Dalhousie University, and the author/ co-editor of several books on Cuba. The most recent is “A Contemporary Cuba Reader” (Rowman and Littlefield, 2007). He has been traveling to Cuba since 1976, and has worked for several NGOs and government departments as an analyst on Cuba. Peter McKenna is Associate Professor of Political Studies at the University of Prince Edward Island, and the author of two books on Canadian foreign policy trowards Latin America. Together with John Kirk he wrote “Canada-Cuba Relations: The Other Good Neighbor Policy” (University Press of Florida, 1997), an updated version of which is to be published in Cuba by the Editorial de Ciencias Sociales in 2008. The key-point to remember when here is an old oriental fable about Canadian security officials looked askance Tseveral blind men who were asked to at Cuba, following the orders of suspicious grappling with Canada- describe an elephant. One grasped the leg, Liberal and Conservative governments. Cuba ties is that despite and described the elephant as being round Prime Ministers such as Lester and sturdy, while another felt the trunk Pearson (Liberal) and Brian Mulroney moments of significant and said that it was long, thin and jerked a (Conservative) sought to downplay pressure, they have lot, and the third felt an ear and provided a the relationship in deference to U.S. stood the test of time. wholly different interpretation. Analyzing geopolitical interests, whereas others such Canadian-Cuban relations is somewhat as John Diefenbaker (Conservative) and similar, since providing a description of the especially Pierre Trudeau (Liberal) sought nature of bilateral ties in large part depends to foster closer ties, pursue commercial on what aspects are being talked about, and opportunities, and chart an independent who is doing the talking. course in foreign policy. In more recent years, the Liberal government of Jean This brief paper looks at the various Chrétien initially sought to distance itself “elephant parts” and then offers an overall from the Mulroney approach, but ended conjunctural analysis of bilateral ties, up being critical of Havana, swinging seeking to present an overview of their back and forth between periods of current direction. It concludes with some engagement and estrangement. predictions on the future of the distinctive Canada-Cuba relationship. The nature of relations between Canada and Cuba, then, is that they are “normal.” Yes, each side occasionally takes issue The Historical Overview with something that the other has done. But the essential point to bear in mind The key point to remember when grappling is that they engage with one another, with Canada-Cuba ties is that despite respecting each other’s sovereignty and moments of significant pressure, they distinctive circumstances, to discuss have stood the test of time. The Cold and express concerns as would happen War put enormous strains on the bilateral in any normal diplomatic relationship. relationship, particularly in the wake of That said, the relationship could, and the Missile Crisis of October 1962. Indeed, should, be a lot better. In the last years for over a quarter of a century afterwards, of the Chrétien government, and in the

Washington Office on Latin America April 2008 27 15 months of the Harper administration, of the United States on Canada: “Living Canada has lost the opportunity to next to you is in some ways like sleeping strengthen bilateral relations. with an elephant. No matter how friendly and even-tempered is the beast, if I can call Common to all of the Canadian it that, one is affected by every twitch and governments that have dealt with grunt.” In the case of Canada’s connections revolutionary Cuba, is the fact that there with Cuba, it is important to bear in mind has never been the slightest attempt to that the total annual bilateral trade is about terminate the relationship. While there the same amount as 12 hours of 1 day of have been several disagreements (usually goods crossing the U.S.-Canada border. over the human rights question), with the occasional diplomatic letter of protest handed over, nothing has ever been Recent Currents in serious enough to threaten the overall Canada-Cuba Relations relationship. “Constructive engagement,” and its occasional bureaucratic variant, In October 1993, the government of “principled pragmatism,” have been Jean Chrétien (Liberal) was elected, in the order of the day. In essence, Ottawa no small part because his predecessor, Ottawa decided long decided long ago that sitting down at the Brian Mulroney, had been reviled for his increasingly close ties with Washington. ago that sitting down table to discuss differences was far more sensible than breaking the relationship and Herein lies the paradox of Canadian-Cuba at the table to discuss isolating Cuba. relations, for while Ottawa officialdom is differences was far more often influenced by pressure from the south, This has at times been a challenge, in no the body politic of Canada looks askance sensible than breaking small part because of pressure emanating at excessively cozy ties with the United the relationship and from Washington. There are of course States. Mulroney found this out the hard isolating Cuba. enormous similarities between Canada and way. Chrétien was elected on a nationalist the United States, in terms of cultural, program, and lost few opportunities to security and linguistic ties, as well as condemn Mulroneýs close friendship with commercial and political connections. Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush, Understandably, this longstanding claiming that he did not care to “schmooze friendship between close neighbors – at Camp David.” particularly in light of the size of the United States and its geopolitical influence The potential of trade with Cuba was – has had a major influence on Canadian seen as being extremely promising during foreign policy. The two economies are the early years of the Special Period, or intricately intertwined, face similar border economic crisis in Cuba, that followed challenges, and historically have been on the implosion of the Soviet Union, and the same side in a number of international Canadian investment was soon flowing to wars and military missions. Cuba. Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy made two official trips to Cuba, and in This ideological, cultural, historical, 1998 the prime minister visited Cuba economic, political and geographic to meet with Fidel Castro. Sadly, the proximity has clearly influenced Ottawa relationship started to deteriorate, in in many ways. In particular, the economic no small part because of unrealistic dependency of Canada upon the United expectations that Chrétien had about States (some 83% of Canadian trade is Canadian influence on Cuba, a process with U.S. companies) is enormous, and typified by Chrétien’s blunt demand that has influenced Canadian foreign policy five prominent government opponents be disproportionately. Speaking to the released. Largely as a result of Ottawa’s National Press Club in Washington, D.C., approach to the Cuba file, the last decade in March 1969, Prime Minister Pierre has resulted in a bilateral relationship that Trudeau explained the significant impact has been muddling through with little

28 Opting for Engagement understanding of the bilateral dynamic or (including the Royal Bank of Canada and any clear direction. At times the policy the Bank of Nova Scotia) have closed appears almost frozen in time. accounts of Cuban companies and reduced ties with Canadian businesses that have Since taking power in February 2006, Prime connections with Cuba. This was done in Minister Stephen Harper (Conservative) response to U.S. pressure. So far Ottawa has pursued a foreign policy strongly has not protested officially or spoken up harmonized with that of Washington, most publicly to criticize this decision. clearly seen in the Middle East and the so-called “war on terror.” This has led to a In late 2007, in blatant disregard of downturn in the official relationship with Canadian blocking legislation, the Havana (which was already frosty under his government ignored the impact of the two Liberal predecessors). In May 2007, for purchase of the Canadian MasterCard example, Canada and Panama supported a franchise on Canadian credit unions watered-down statement issued by the U.S. by American banking restrictions. The delegation at the OAS on the admitted purchase by a U.S. firm imposes U.S. legal terrorist Luis Posada Carriles. This came restrictions on what is now a Canadian after Venezuela sought to condemn subsidiary of a U.S. corporation, and this Washington for failing to extradite Posada means that millions of Canadians with …the last decade has Carriles. The following month then- MasterCard drawn on a Credit Union resulted in a bilateral Foreign Minister Peter MacKay expressed account will not be able to use that credit disappointment at the U.N. Human Rights card in Cuba. relationship that has Council which had voted overwhelmingly been muddling through to downgrade concerns about the human with little understanding rights record of Cuba. In this vote, Canada The Future of Cuba was a minority of one, with all other voting of the bilateral dynamic members (46) voting against Ottawa. Since Fidel Castro ceded power to his or any clear direction. At Clearly this government’s approach to brother Raúl, not much of a dramatic Cuba, while showing deference to the Bush nature has happened in Cuba. In fact there times the policy appears administration, is doing itself few favors has been a seamless transfer of power, and almost frozen in time. internationally – particularly in Latin continuity and stability have been the order America and the Caribbean. of the day. The government has continued to function as before. There have been Finally, in July 2007 Prime Minister some new initiatives: some measures have Harper, on a state visit to Barbados, been taken to make it easier to obtain expressed “concerns about certain aspects consumer items; stern warnings have been of governance and human rights in Cuba.” issued by the revolutionary leadership Significantly his Barbadian counterpart about the need for the Cuban economy to Owen Arthur took him to task, explaining be more competitive and efficient and the that “civilized relationships” were based workforce more disciplined; and economic on “respect for people’s sovereignty and planners and academics have met to see non-interference and the right for people how changes can be introduced to offer to pursue alternative paths for their greater incentives to produce and acquire development.” To many Canadians this goods while maintaining the socialist was an ironic role reversal, with Harper system. In three speeches Raúl Castro has being lectured about the essence of the reached out to Washington, offering direct traditionally independent Canadian bilateral discussion, but sadly these have foreign policy, principles that he appears to been rebuffed, and the same tired rhetoric have forgotten. employed.

The current Canadian government has The minority of Cuban-Americans who also been taken to task for sins of omission. danced with joy in Calle Ocho in Miami as For example, several Canadian banks the news of Fidel Castro’s transfer of power

Washington Office on Latin America April 2008 29 and ill health were announced have been The successful visit to Havana of Deputy proven guilty of wishful thinking. Likewise Minister of Foreign Affairs Leonard those doomsayers who predicted rivers of Edwards in May 2007, while the prime blood in Havana also misread the reality of minister pursued a clearly different tack two Cuba today. The fact of the matter is that months later, would appear to illustrate this normalcy never disappeared from Cuba. confusion. Likewise, while Cuban minister “Business as usual” has been the dominant of tourism Manuel Marrero inaugurated note, and there is no sign of concern or the Canadian pavilion in November 2007 angst in the Cuban populace. Nor are there at the 25th International Havana Trade likely to be any major changes in the near Fair – at which Canada made sales totaling or mid-term future, with or without Fidel. $140 million – Canada voted against Cuba Stability will be the central watchword. at the U.N. General Assembly, in a vote on whether or not to eliminate a special Too often media commentators rush human rights rapporteur on Cuba. The to grasp in sound-bite fashion complex vote was 168 to eliminate the rapporteur realities, and Cuba is an excellent and 7 to maintain the position with example of this phenomenon. It is Canada joining the U.S. and traditional important to understand that most allies including Israel, Palau, the Marshall It is important to Cubans do not wish to make significant Islands, Australia and Micronesia). understand that most changes to their political system. While many understandably want better living There is some concern that, in exchange Cubans do not wish conditions (and housing, the cost of food for refusing to send Canadian troops to to make significant and transportation continue as major Iraq, and deciding not to join the ballistic problems on the island), the ideas of missile defense system sponsored by the changes to their Cuban-Americans returning to reclaim Bush administration, Ottawa might be political system. their property, run the economy, or take prepared to support Washington’s attempts control of the political system are definitely to isolate Cuba. not acceptable. Rául Castro appears to understand this with great clarity, and Should this ill-advised policy be pursued, whether he is a “caretaker” president before the government would be countered by two the Communist Party of Cuba chooses other significant parts of the “elephant”– another leader, or stays in power for a namely the business sector and, more number of years, it appears that a path of importantly, the Canadian population at controlled reform will result. It also appears large. The business sector is doing well that the vast majority of Cubans are happy in Cuba. Cuba is Canada’s largest export to go along with this prescription. This market in the Caribbean and Central means that there will not be significant America, and the third largest in Latin change in Cuba, a fact which Ottawa America, with annual bilateral trade of hopefully grasps. over a billion dollars. The largest single investor in Cuba is Canadian company Sherritt International, with principal The Future of the investments in oil and nickel mining and Canadian-Cuban refining, power generation and perhaps Relationship most promising of all, oil exploration beneath the Straits of Florida. Earnings Unfortunately, at present, official Canadian roughly doubled in 2006 for Sherritt, with policy towards Cuba appears to be drifting May 2007 quarterly profits up 150%, and on autopilot. (Others would say that the plans to invest a further $1.25 billion in the government has contradictory and confused coming years. aims, seeking on the one hand to appease Washington, while at the same preparing A third facet of the “elephant” (and often for changes in a post-Castro Cuba). There the most under-appreciated in government are many examples of this lack of direction. circles) is the impact of people-to-people

30 Opting for Engagement contact between Canadians and Cubans. Lessons to be Learned There are a handful of Canadian NGOs that have been working in Cuba the past from “Constructive decade and have been doing excellent Engagement” work. There are also about 20 Canadian universities and colleges with study It is clear that, for Cuba, the relationship abroad and exchange programs with with Canada has been successful and Cuban counterparts. At Dalhousie productive. After Washington broke University, for example, some 20 diplomatic ties with Havana in January students each semester spend 3-4 of 1961, it badly needed allies or at least months there. trading partners in the West. The aging machinery (mainly U.S.-manufactured) Far more important, though, is the needed spare parts and upgrading. An impact of tourism–with over 600,000 avenue for banking transactions (preferably Canadians (roughly one-quarter of all in U.S. dollars) was also required. And of tourists on the island) descending on course the strategic value in international Cuban beaches annually. During the circles of having good relations with tourist season there are direct flights from Washington’s neighbor (and largest trading some two dozen Canadian cities. This is partner) enhanced Cuba’s legitimacy. So while the Canadian This was particularly the case as the Cold more than a strict commercial exchange, prime minister since Canadians have been flocking to War heated up. Cuba needed a market Cuba since the emphasis on tourism was for its sugar following the reduction and might prefer to place revived about a dozen years ago. This then suspension of trade by the U.S. government policy is the equivalent in the U.S. context of government, and Canada was interested in some 6 million American tourists visiting purchasing cut-price sugar. towards Cuba more the island every year. in line with that of the For Canada there were also several United States, this is So, while the Canadian prime minister advantages in developing a working might prefer to place government policy relationship with revolutionary Cuba. For unlikely to happen, towards Cuba more in line with that governments of varying stripes it offered largely because of a of the United States, this is unlikely to the opportunity to distinguish their negative public reaction happen, largely because of a negative foreign policy from its U.S. counterpart. In public reaction to such a move. In particular, the Trudeau government gained to such a move. general, Canadians view the Bush significant symbolic capital for its political administration with great trepidation. independence, genuinely felt by the prime (In November 2006 a poll conducted by minister, who became the first NATO leading Canadian, British, Mexican and leader to travel to Cuba in 1976. Israeli newspapers revealed the extent of that concern: 62% of Canadians polled The present Canadian government viewed the world as more dangerous would do well to realize that the symbolic because of current U.S. policy, while importance of Cuba far exceeds its small George W. Bush was seen as a greater size of 11.2 million. In fact it is in Canada’s danger to world peace than Kim Jong-il of interests in Latin America to maintain a North Korea or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad good relationship with Cuba. From the of Iran.) As a result, pursuing closer ties 1970s, Cuba’s credibility began to rise in with Washington would be political folly the hemisphere, and its current leadership for Prime Minister Harper, especially of the 118-nation Non-Aligned Movement, given his minority status in the Canadian the widespread international support (seen Parliament. The growing displeasure in in the recent vote at the U.N. General Canada (particularly in Québec) with Assembly condemning the U.S. embargo government policy in Afghanistan will by 184 to 4), and the presence of 30,000 also be a factor in reining in the Harper Cuban medical staff in 72 countries all foreign policy agenda. speak volumes of Cuba’s international

Washington Office on Latin America April 2008 31 credibility. Clearly, in Latin America and over that direction. Too often we rush to the Caribbean, Cuba is highly regarded, as condemn the lack of “democracy” and Ottawa needs to appreciate more fully. “human rights” in Cuba without realizing that we are hardly paragons of virtue. (In Trade and investment opportunities have Canada, for example, the upper chamber been good for Canada. In all, some 85 or Senate is made up of appointed regional Canadian companies operate in Cuba, from representatives, none of whom is elected. large brewery companies such as Labatt The cost of winning an election in many to small companies selling various goods industrialized countries is also scandalously and services. Most prefer to “fly under the high, a process which of course questions radar” because of U.S. legislation. For its the basic concepts of democracy being part Cuba benefits greatly from Canadian based upon any talented citizen standing tourism, since the mid-1990s the mainstay for election. Media concentration also flies of the Cuban economy, as well as access in the face of an unbiased fifth estate). to high-tech products and training in Similarly, while we criticize the lack of management practices. civil and political human rights in Cuba, we fail to act diligently to resolve the The leadership shown on the Cuban horrible socio-economic conditions of the Clearly, in Latin America file in the early years of the Chrétien First Nations here, many of whom have and the Caribbean, government has proven beneficial to Cuba unemployment and suicide rates that are in terms of financial infrastructure. Senior many times the national average, and whose Cuba is highly regarded, advisers from the Bank of Canada and health profile bears little resemblance to as Ottawa needs to Revenue Canada (the IRS of Canada) that of mainstream Canadians. spent a great deal of time in Cuba, setting appreciate more fully. up a tax system, and explaining the This is not to say that one should accept the underpinnings of a modern, Western-styled clear limitations on human rights in Cuba. banking system there. Also useful was the Any victims of human rights, wherever substantial development assistance from they are, should be defended and abuses the Canadian International Development not tolerated. That said, it is important to Agency (CIDA) in providing financial bear in mind the context of Cuba. Most support designed to help Cuba prepare for First World governments often fail to a “soft landing” to capitalism. Carleton understand the priorities of underdeveloped University in Ottawa teamed up with the and developing societies, where the Faculty of Economics at the University importance of access to food, water, health of Havana on a multi-year CIDA-funded care, employment, housing, and education project to facilitate this process. The end trumps the concept of elections every four result of these various initiatives was a or five years or the possibility to write a far greater understanding for Havana of letter to the editor of a newspaper. In these the international capital market, and social, cultural and economic human rights, what it would need to do – including the Cuba does well, as a glance at WHO or concessions to be made – to survive in a UNICEF websites attests. post-Soviet world and globalized economy. Understanding the “big picture” is thus called for, something which is difficult to Recommendations grasp for many industrialized countries. This is particularly important if we are to First, discussions about human rights and understand the Cuban case, where 90 miles democratization in Cuba should be handled away is the world’s only superpower, and with some humility. It is important for which for almost 50 years has engaged in a a Canadian government, whatever the variety of tactics (including government- political stripe, to recognize that Cuba will supported terrorism) to bring about “regime follow its own development path, and that change” and which today both forbids its Canada has remarkably little influence citizens from traveling to the island and

32 Opting for Engagement maintains in place a Trading with the Cuba’s role within the region, particularly Enemy Act. In those circumstances the in view of the “Pink Tide” that has resulted decision of Cuba to limit political rights, from the election of eight socialist or while not defensible, is understandable. social democratic governments in the Again, it is important to walk in the other’s last two years. Cuba is the conscience of shoes and not to presume that there is only Latin America, and it behooves Ottawa’s one model – our model – that is correct. aspirations in the region (at the very least to show that it has indeed a foreign policy Second, while it is important to appreciate that is different from the unstinting neglect the idiosyncrasies of revolutionary Cuba, exhibited by the Bush White House) to this does not mean acceptance of them. have developed a solid working relationship What is important is confidence-building with Havana. in the relationship if we are to reduce the tensions felt in Havana around any Cuba clearly “punches above its weight,” external recommendation about reform. regionally and internationally. Its medical There are many ways that this process missions throughout the Americas have can develop, and the Canadian approach proven enormously successful. In the last of 1993-96 was instructive, since many three years alone, to take one example, useful initiatives were taken. (As a sign of Cuba has carried out eye surgery (at no Cuba is the conscience good faith, Cuba also offered to release to charge to the patient) on over 750,000 of Latin America, and Canada 21 political prisoners.) patients from the region. To put this in context, in April 2007 the United States it behooves Ottawa’s Third, it is important to maintain greater sent a 350-member task force to Panama aspirations in the interaction between representatives from and provided free consultations for 30,000 both countries – among government leaders people during a two-week period. President region…to have and ministers, business representatives, Bush also talked about winning the “hearts developed a solid intellectual, cultural and academic and minds” in the region by sending a working relationship delegates, and especially among people hospital ship to visit key ports. This is from various branches of civil society tokenism when compared to the significant with Havana. writ large. This process (largely symbolic) support throughout the region given by could lead to further, and more profound several thousand doctors and nurses from exchanges – ranging from bilateral trade Cuba, as well as the training of 20,000 commissions that met regularly to the visit medical students in Cuba at no charge. of Navy vessels, from trade missions to Cuba’s literacy program is also being used film series, from baseball games between widely in the region, and with great success. the Blue Jays and a Cuban national team, to cultural and religious exchanges. Finally, where Canada can be beneficial to Some of this is now happening, but it is Cuba, to itself, and indeed to the overall done sporadically and generally without region, is in reducing tensions between government initiative or focus. Washington and Havana. Canadian armed forces have never invaded any country Fourth, the Canadian government also in the region, the country is becoming needs to accept that Latin America and an important player in Latin America the Caribbean are becoming increasingly (particularly in the mining industry), important for Canada, for reasons of trade, immigration to Canada is increasing, it immigration, security, diplomacy, tourism has a decent reputation in the OAS, and and culture. To a certain extent the recent occasionally it has dared to speak out and visit by the prime minister to Colombia, express disagreement with Washington. Chile, Barbados and Haiti, and that of then In sum, the potential for establishing foreign minister Mackay to Mexico, reveal solid bona fides in Latin America and the that they are beginning to understand the Caribbean is there. It is now up to Ottawa region’s potential. What they also need to to take advantage of that fact and, more understand, however, is the importance of importantly, to use that political clout

Washington Office on Latin America April 2008 33 wisely. The appointment of a new foreign between Washington and Havana. This minister (Maxime Bernier), and the is a process which has appeared feasible promotion of Canadian Ambassador to on a half-dozen occasions, but has been Cuba Alexandra Bugailiskis to Assistant derailed by a variety of factors. With the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and passing of power to Raúl Castro more Executive Coordinator of the Americas than a year ago, it is time to revisit this Strategy, indicate the potential for a more needless bilateral disconnect. Should pragmatic policy towards Cuba – but only it desire (and of course should it have if the political will exists in Ottawa. So far, the support to do so of the two other it appears that the Harper administration players), Canada could play a useful is lacking a clear direction in its policy role in setting the scene for this process, towards Latin America, and in addition, although clearly it will be in post-Bush wants to cool down relations with Havana. times. The whole world would applaud Both developments are unfortunate. such a move, since the end of the first decade of the 21st millennium is a long, One of the greatest challenges facing the long way from the dark days of the Cold region is the normalization of relations War of the 1960s.

34 Opting for Engagement WOLA Staff

Lessons for U.S. Policy Joy Olson Executive Director he articles in this publication The United States will never make up for Geoff Thale Tdemonstrate that while the U.S. 50 years of lost time. Still, there are a few Director of Programs has succeeded in significantly affecting key lessons which can be learned from the Krystal Wubben other countries’ relations with Cuba, choices made by the countries profiled in Director of Operations and Finance those countries have never adopted the this report. The first is that the United Lori Piccolo outright isolationist policy pushed by States ought to do away with its failed Director of Development the United States. Despite U.S. pressure, policy of isolation. By normalizing our Canada, Mexico, and the European relations with Cuba, the United States can Roger Atwood Director of Communications Union (particularly the UK and Spain) regain some of the credibility it has lost in have opted to engage with Cuba for the international arena, including in Cuba. John Walsh Senior Associate for the a variety of economic, political, and The second is that reengaging with Cuba Andes and Drug Policy social reasons. The level of engagement would demonstrate U.S. interest in forming Gimena Sánchez-Garzoli varies from country to country, and as a new relationship with Latin America Senior Associate for leadership within each of these countries as a whole. And thirdly, reestablishing Colombia and Haiti has shifted over time. While there are a connections with Cuban government and Vicki Gass range of views on the level of engagement society would allow the United States Senior Associate for chosen by a country, the authors of this to reconnect with those people who Rights and Development publication believe that: are actively shaping Cuba’s future and Lainie Reisman influencing human rights on the island. Senior Associate for Gangs n The national political, social and economic interests of their country Adriana Beltrán In opting for a new relationship with are best served by engaging with Cuba Associate on Organized Cuba, the United States would benefit Crime and Police Reform n While engagement will not have an domestically in a variety of ways. It would Maureen Meyer impact overnight, it is much more gain the possibility of cooperating with Associate for Mexico likely than isolation to contribute Cuba on drug trafficking, immigration and Central America to the process of political and social concerns, and environmental problems Elsa Falkenburger change already underway in Cuba. in the Florida Straits, increased sales of Associate for Cuba and Gangs agricultural products to Cuba, tourism Joel Fyke These varying policies and relationships to and from Cuba, and access to Cuban Program Officer with Cuba have positioned countries advances in the medical and scientific fields. Rachel Robb other than the United States to play a far Program Assistant more significant role in Cuba’s future as it The vast amount of time and political Lilia López continues the process of gradual change capital used by the United States to try Program Assistant that began with Fidel Castro’s illness in to isolate Cuba have been squandered, Kristina Demain July of 2006. Cuba has formed strong resulting only in offending and frustrating Program Assistant commercial, cultural, and political ties our international partners and doing Luke Horner with countries as far away as China, while nothing to improve the human rights Development Associate its most natural partner just 90 miles situation in Cuba. By ending pressure on Coletta Youngers away has maintained a state of virtual other nations and normalizing relations Senior Fellow irrelevance for nearly half a century. with Cuba, the United States will serve its George Withers own national interests and position itself to Senior Fellow Years of engagement have provided at least engage in a dialogue about human Rachel Neild countries other than the United States rights and democracy in Cuba. Senior Fellow with close ties to Cuban civil society, Laurie Freeman academics, government and military While major changes in U.S. policy are Fellow officials, cultural contacts, religious unlikely during the Presidential campaigns organizations, and the commercial and of 2008, the U.S. government ought industrial sector, which will all play to, at a minimum, end its pressure on key roles in shaping Cuba’s future. The other governments to minimize their connections the United States has to engagement with Cuba. They also ought these sectors of Cuban society are weak to revise U.S. policy, and move toward and have been further debilitated by engagement with Cuba and its people, in the policies implemented by the Bush the hope of playing a constructive role in Administration since 2003. the country’s future.

Washington Office on Latin America April 2008 35 About WOLA The Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) is a nonprofit policy, research, and advocacy organization working to advance democracy, human rights, and social justice in Latin America and the Caribbean. Founded in 1974, WOLA plays a leading role in Washington policy debates about Latin America. WOLA facilitates dialogue between governmental and non-governmental actors, monitors the impact of policies and programs of governments and international organizations, and promotes alternatives through reporting, education, training, and advocacy.

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