A Service of

Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics

Torres, Francisco

Article — Published Version How efficient is joint decision-making in the EU? Environmental policies and the co-decision procedure

Intereconomics

Suggested Citation: Torres, Francisco (2003) : How efficient is joint decision-making in the EU? Environmental policies and the co-decision procedure, Intereconomics, ISSN 0020-5346, Springer, Heidelberg, Vol. 38, Iss. 6, pp. 312-322

This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/41730

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use:

Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes.

Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE

Francisco Torres* How Effi cient is Joint Decision-Making in the EU? Environmental Policies and the Co-Decision Procedure

This paper looks at how the joint decision-making mode of governance enhances policy effectiveness in the fi eld of European environmental policy. This is mainly due to the as yet neglected phenomenon of the interaction between representative institutions at different levels in the European Union that characterises joint decision-making.

his paper looks at how the joint decision-making with respect to internalising monetary externalities Tmode of governance enhances policy effective- (exchange rate instability) at the European level.3 ness in the fi eld of European environmental policy. However, contrary to what happened in the case This is mainly due to the as yet neglected phenom- of EMU, these constraints seem quite far from being enon of the interaction between representative insti- transposed into clear goals involving a well-defi ned tutions at different levels in the European Union that common strategy with an objective and timetable, characterises joint decision-making. like the one provided by the fulfi lment of the Maas- While it could be argued at fi rst sight that, with tricht criteria as a pre-condition for EMU accession. EMU achieved,1 there was no other clear and pow- By themselves, however, such constraints may erful challenge left that could trigger a sustained nevertheless constitute a set of principles for the change in political attitudes and policy stances conduct of national policies that is increasingly be- (increasing the effectiveness and democratic qual- coming the subject of both inter-governmental and ity of governance in the EU), new challenges have (European) public opinion discussions about the surfaced that, by being raised to political objectives, future of Europe and the reform of its policies.4 This may fulfi l that function. New environmental constraints2 are perceived in 1 For a parallel analysis of a supranational regulation mode of govern- ance, namely Economic and Monetary Union, see F. To r r e s : EMU civil society at large, much more than in the case of and EU Governance, in: F. To r r e s , A. Ve r dun, C. Zilioli, H. Zim- EMU, as a set of pre-conditions for sustained devel- mermann (eds.): Governing EMU, Florence forthcoming, EUI. opment and quality of life. Therefore, the political 2 The Amsterdam Treaty has laid down in two articles of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC) that environmental consensus (and popular support within civil society protection requirements must be integrated into the defi nition and in general and among NGOs in particular) is much implementation of EU policies with a view to promoting sustainable stronger with respect to internalising environmental development (Article 6) and that environment policy at the Community level shall aim at a high level of protection taking into account the di- externalities (pollution) at the European level than versity of situations with references to the precautionary principle and preventive action and the polluter-pays principle (Article 174 (2)). 3 According to recent polls (Eurobarometer 56, Fig. 4.3), for 87 per * Professor and Head of Research of IEE, Catholic University, Lisbon, cent of the European Union’s population protecting the environment and Visiting Associate Professor at the University of Aveiro; Senior as well as food quality (very much linked to the broad category of Economist at the Bank of . Broader versions of this paper environmental and quality of life issues that are used as an example have been presented at the ECPR meetings in Bordeaux at the Johns in the paper) should be a priority for EU action. As far as EMU is Hopkins University, SAIS, in Bologna, at the IEE of Universidade concerned, even immediately before the launching of bills and Católica and the IEEI-Gulbenkian Foundation conference in Lisbon coins (November 2001), the successful implementation of the single and at the Max-Planck Institute in Cologne. The author is indebted European currency was only a priority for EU action for 67 per cent of to seminar participants for comments and discussions, particularly EU citizens. On the other hand, only 9 per cent thought the environ- to Annette Bongardt, Erik Jones, Jonathon Moses, Suzanne Schüt- ment should not be a priority for the EU as compared to 26 per cent in temeyer and Amy Verdun. the case of EMU.

312 Intereconomics, November/December 2003 EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE paper discusses how EU joint decision-making may common rules that are accepted by a majority of help transform such constraints into common objec- member states and, more importantly, by a majority tives, enhancing policy effectiveness in the fi eld of of the European population. Furthermore, although environmental policy. through a multitude of different channels such as the European Convention, the IGCs, treaty changes and First the process of internalising environmental referenda or the European co-decision process, new externalities at the EU level is discussed. The issues common rules are increasingly the subject of multi- are then addressed of how the stage of economic level political negotiation, allowing for increased par- development and some features of cohesion policy ticipation of many different actors. may hinder the capacity to reach new enduring con- sensual reforms in the EU and how the building-up With a view to improving the rather unsatisfactory of bottom-up pressures may have a counteracting implementation record of environmental policies, the effect. The question of the qualitative change in the 5th Environmental Action Programme (1993-2000), process of continuously evolving governance in the “Towards Sustainability”, has also increased the em- EU is then dealt with, the role of the EP in bridging phasis on shared responsibilities at different levels the gap between national and European representa- of government. This emphasis raises precisely the tion discussed, and the co-decision procedure and importance of the interaction between institutions, the interaction between different representative in- namely between representative institutions, and of stitutions examined. enlarged participation and increased transparency in these multi-level forms of governance. The Making of New Common Rules The (SEA), the Treaty of With the forthcoming enlargement of the EU and Maastricht and the introduced the prospect of a closer political union for a limited environmental policy into the Treaty on European number of countries within the Union (reinforced co- Union (TEU) and the Treaty Establishing the Euro- operation), it might again be politically decisive for pean Community (TEC). They did so more in terms of some member countries with less popular support operating principles than in terms of objectives.5 In for EU action on the environmental side always to fact, Article 175 of the TEC is particularly relevant for be in the core of and not to be specifying three legislative methods: the coopera- perceived as laggards by their counterparts and by tion procedures; unanimity in the ; their constituencies. and the co-decision procedure for general action In this respect, some new EU instruments might programmes. Most legal instruments take the form exert an important infl uence and even (democratic) of European directives. There are also other types of conditionality (through the availability of structural instrument such as information campaigns and the and cohesion funds, especially for old and new European Environment Agency established in 1994. cohesion countries) on the need for reform and on Many of these instruments are also designed to give national policies. Those new instruments comprise effect to Environmental Action Programmes (EAP), the Nature 2000 network, the Environmental Action adopted since 1973. Programmes and many ensuing European direc- In this context, the currently developing institu- tives that fall under the co-decision procedure, new tions (in the broad sense of the term6) in the EU agencies (as, for instance, food quality), and the new – such as EMU (which will potentially increase policy strategy for sustainable development (SSD), adopt- transparency in Euroland) and the new European co- ed in June 2001 by the European Council in Gothen- 7 decision procedure – do play a role in shaping new burg. The latter added the environmental dimension to the Lisbon strategy and to the Broad Economic 4 These preoccupations are clearly present in opinion polls (for in- Policy Guidelines (BEPG),8 which are at the centre of stance on food quality and the environment), national policy changes (the creation in – under the previous government – in economic policy coordination. and in Britain of ministries of food quality and consumer protection instead of the traditional production-oriented ministries of agriculture) 7 and several political speeches on the need for European policies’ : Commission Communication 9175/01: A (CAP) reform. Of course, the European Convention was the most sig- Sustainable Europe for a Better World: A European Union Strategy for nifi cant forum in that regard. Sustainable Development, 2001. 8 5 N. Nugent: The Government and Politics of the European Union, These Guidelines are now also discussed before approval at a new 4th ed., London 1999, MacMillan Press. level: joint meetings between national MPs and MEPs. The fi rst of these meetings took place in Brussels on 23 February 1999. The Lis- 6 The rules of the game. See D. N orth: Institutions, Institutional bon Summit of March 2000, stressing the need for a regular political Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge 1990, Cambridge discussion of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines at the Council University Press. Spring Meetings, reinforced that cooperation.

Intereconomics, November/December 2003 313 EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE

What is new about the environmental dimension is Drawing on the experience of EMU, Italy and the fact that, because of the pace of both globalisa- likewise experienced a much stronger con- tion and the European integration processes, global sensus on the need to meet the convergence criteria challenges such as the need to act upon the dete- than Portugal that, given the fl exibility of its econo- rioration of the environment, which command much my but also its less developed social welfare system, more popular support than the need to internalise was able to meet the Maastricht criteria with less other types of externalities, transform into EU policy effort. Portugal experienced a much stronger inter- constraints. This transformation takes place through nal criticism during the period of convergence and a continuous political negotiation process carried it is coping at present with much greater diffi culties out at multiple levels of government, in which the in complying with the stability pact, mainly due to might refl ect the views of citi- structural (systemic) weaknesses in both its health zens, national parliaments and NGOs. Through such sector and the public administration. a process, in turn, EU policy constraints may also be In the case of environmental policies, the problem raised to national political objectives (as happened is that transposing European directives does not directly, without any intermediate step, in the case automatically mean enforcement, as clearly illus- of EMU) in spite of a sceptical attitude on the part of trated by many examples. In the case of Southern national policy-makers, forcing important changes in EU countries for instance there are still many serious attitudes.9 problems that can certainly be ascribed to systemic Environmental Awareness and the Level defi ciencies of political and administrative institu- of Economic Development tions. In Italy and Spain there is also vertical frag- mentation (between state and regional governments) In the case of environmental policies, the situa- although horizontal fragmentation (among different tion is somewhat more complex than in the case ministries at the central level) has been reduced in of EMU, as it is much more diffi cult to monitor their most countries by strengthening the respective envi- implementation. As in the case of EMU, there are ronmental ministries with signifi cantly more compe- some EU member countries, such as Italy, where tencies than before. there seemed until recently (at least in the North) to be a stronger consensus about the need for higher Like in the case of EMU, the level of economic environmental standards than in countries such as development seems to affect some EU Members’ Portugal and Spain where that consensus may still attitudes towards environmental policies at least as be weaker. In fact, environmental awareness tends far as some Southern EU members are concerned. to be lower in less developed economies.10 Never- It translates into the following reasoning: we should theless, Italy’s performance both in terms of trans- fi rst grow to levels closer to our Northern partners posing EU directives and in the light of infringements before we can afford to have higher (monetary or and convictions before the European Court of Jus- environmental) standards that might hamper “real” tice was no better than Portugal’s and Spain’s.11 convergence. Recall that, in the mid 1990s, the EMU debate

9 This process might be somehow symmetrical for “Southern” and centred on the issue of real versus nominal con- “Northern” Member States as far as EMU and the environment are vergence. It was claimed that monetary integration concerned. It takes place through different channels, however, in (nominal convergence) with more advanced econo- “Southern” and “Northern” Member States, namely the co-decision procedure in the case of the former and the smooth functioning of the mies (Germany) would signifi cantly slow down the single currency in the case of the latter. catching-up process (real convergence).12 Since 10 See G. P ridham, M. Cini: Enforcing Environmental Standards in 1998 only few politicians, policy-makers and com- the European Union: Is There a Southern Problem, in: M. F a u r e , J. Vervaele, A. Waele (eds.): Environmental Standards in the EU in mentators have not come to recognise the advan- an Interdisciplinary Framework, Antwerp 1994, Maklu. tages of EMU for sustained growth. Yet, many still 11 For data on EU members’ performance in transposing EU directives argue that higher environmental standards (quality and on infringements and convictions before the European Court of convergence), although a desirable aim in the long Justice see T. B örzel: Why There is no Southern Problem. On Envi- ronmental Leaders and Laggards in the European Union, in: Journal run, may hamper faster economic growth and hence of European Public Policy, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2000, pp. 141-162. See also real convergence. the annual reports of the ECJ and the annual reports of the European Commission on Monitoring the Application of Community Law. On the basis of actions taken due to the failure to fulfi l obligations and judge- ments with which the state has not yet complied, countries where one 12 For various examples see E. J ones, J. Frieden, F. Torres (eds.): would expect a stronger consensus about the need for higher environ- Joining Europe’s Monetary Club: The Challenges for Smaller Member mental standards also perform rather badly. States, New York and London 1998, Martin’s Press and MacMillan.

314 Intereconomics, November/December 2003 EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE

Along similar lines, it is still often argued by Spain and sometimes Italy with respect to the ap- politicians and policy-makers in the catching-up proval of some important directives. In addition, the countries that European environmental policies, like perceived negative impact of the adoption of higher solid monetary institutions and sound fi scal practic- environmental standards on short-run competitive- es, cannot be reconciled and are in confl ict with, no- ness – a short-term consideration as opposed to tably, the need to preserve and create employment13 restructuring and innovation in the wake of more and the need to foster economic growth. demanding environmental standards that constitute a de facto industrial policy – may also be responsible Furthermore, according to Michael Carley and for that reasoning. Ian Christie,14 there is a complex tension between centralisation and decentralisation over environ- Let me take two examples with different fates. mental policies. In fact, some EU member states are The auto-oil programme – a series of EU direc- concerned that decision-making on environmental tives (Directives 70/220/EC and 93/12/EC) under policy and impact assessment is over-centralised in co-decision in the EU to reduce some forms of gas Brussels while for other EU member states and/or emissions and increase fuel quality standards – was many EU citizens and non-governmental organisa- a relative success. That was probably due to the tions that very centralisation has not come a moment fact that it fell under the co-decision procedure. In too soon, since environmental protection receives no spite of vested interests (oil companies), that more more than lip service from national governments.15 than just lobbying before and during the co-decision That apparent over-centralisation, it is argued below, procedure almost appeared to negotiate instead of may also refl ect both democratic infl uences (namely some governments, the European Parliament man- decisions from the European Parliament) and “pres- aged to overcome those interests and the resistance sures from below” (citizens, NGOs and even national of some national governments. parliaments). Due to rising public concern about global warm- Wrong EU Incentives and Wrong National ing, the European Commission had in 1990 already

Perceptions on Real Convergence proposed a combined tax on energy and CO2 emis- sions to be levied by national governments. In the That sceptical reasoning that higher environ- light of the strong opposition of industry and the mental standards and/or increased EU action on lack of enthusiasm of fi nance ministers, supposedly environmental matters may impede the process also because of the technical diffi culties it entailed, of catching-up with the most developed EU coun- the proposal was never adopted, not even in its soft tries has received further support in the cohesion form (Commission amendment of 1995) that made countries because of the need felt to take the most its adoption voluntary. One of the political issues at (and fast) advantage of the existence of Community stake was the exemption of catching-up countries.16 Framework Support (CFS) programmes (basically The initial fi erce opposition from the governments of structural and cohesion funds). By limiting national the UK and of the four cohesion countries, , public defi cits (and thus expenditures), the Stability Ireland, Portugal and Spain, fi nished the proposal and Growth Pact in fact limits the amount of com- off. More recently, in 1999, Spain and Ireland re- munity funds that can be used nationally due to jected in the Ecofi n a compromise put forward by the principle of additionality of EU and national re- the German presidency of the European Council that sources. For the same reason, higher environmental would have allowed Spain to set low rates or grant standards, in conjunction with mandatory in-depth exemptions. environmental impact assessment (EIA), would reduce the number of projects approved for EU co- These two examples seem relevant because, fi nancing. again like in the case of EMU, the policies proposed involved reforms and change in attitudes concerning That logic has been quite pervasive in many of issues very much present in the daily life (and dis- the policy positions assumed by Greece, Portugal, cussions) of many European citizens.17 The argument is that the relative level of economic development of

13 See G. P ridham, M. Cini, op. cit. 14 See M. C arley, I. Christie: Managing Sustainable Development, 16 Again, the stage of economic development argument was put for- 2nd edition, London and Sterling, VA, 2000, Earthscan Publications. ward. 15 Carley and Christie take up that issue on a global scale on questions 17 Both at the European level and at the heart of national politics. Take such as ozone depletion and global warming. the case of the Ökosteuer in Germany.

Intereconomics, November/December 2003 315 EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE a country is important to push policies through. In Note that, as in the case of bottom-up pressures, some ways and through the mechanisms described pressures from below push for more democratic in this section, the level of economic development participation. Unlike top-down pressures, however, affects the capacity of a (national) political system pressures from above, in the case of the shaping and in the end of a polity (or a polity in the making) of environmental policies in the EU, allow for the such as the European Union to internalise some ex- infl uences of representative (parliamentarian) insti- ternalities. tutions. These infl uences – basically the decisions of the European Parliament, in some cases taken in Nevertheless, considerations referring to the level conjunction with national parliaments or at least with of economic development and wrong incentives of some national parliamentarians – are increasingly EU cohesion programmes as well as false percep- powerful and obviously push for more democracy. tions on prosperity convergence with the rest of Eu- rope have, unlike in the case of EMU, prevailed and In any case, such a move towards a proactive at- impeded any leap forward with respect to other EU titude has a more direct impact on policy formulation policy reforms. than on policy implementation. This is quite signifi - cant, fi rstly, in terms of democratic decision-making The Build-up of Pressures from Below and, secondly, for traditional “laggards” that do not In some EU countries, namely in the so-called have clearly structured environmental policy frame- cohesion countries, although the change in attitudes works (again, very much like in the case of monetary and practices in the political and administrative reform). systems may still be rather weak, there are visible Conditionality and Issues signs of greater environmental awareness and better strategic planning behind public decisions, namely The pull and push model can be much more effec- regarding the national approach to the latest Com- tive in practice if there are some mechanisms of con- munity Framework Support programme (Agenda ditionality (namely of fi nancial resources) involved in 2000). This in turn has contributed to an increased the processes of building up both pressures from effectiveness (outcomes) of environmental policies. above and pressures from below (bottom-up con- ditionality). Moreover, this change in attitudes and practices in the political and administrative systems, although The need for fi scal consolidation has already led still feeble, is also slowly starting to respond to the to a more careful – not necessarily better in environ- democratic defi cit in environmental management mental terms – planning of the use of structural and procedures and increasingly facing important bot- cohesion funds. Moreover, conditionality has always tom-up pressures.18 Such a process also improves been a feature of the Cohesion Fund, with the need transparency and participation. It is noteworthy that to respect the convergence plan (before EMU) and one of the rare cases of infringement proceedings the Stability and Growth Pact (since the beginning of before the European Court of Justice happens to EMU’s third phase). be the confl ict between the promotion of investment Recently, eco-conditionality started to play a and the protection of the environment. role, too. In March 2000, the European Commission The Pull and Push Model threatened to withhold regional aid from countries that did not respect (read implement) the Nature According to Tanja Börzel’s Pull and Push model, 2000, a European ecological network, selecting environmental policies stand a good chance of be- and appointing Special Protection Areas (SPAs, ing effectively implemented when the authorities are under the Birds Directive 79/409/EC) and Special “sandwiched” between domestic non-governmental Areas of Conservation (SACs, under the Habitats actors, NGOs and, one could add, national parlia- Directive 92/43/EC). That move was backed by the ments, and the EU.19 The perception of this pressure European Parliament and has generated pressure from “below” and “above” may also prompt the au- from “below”, including national parliaments and thorities and also politicians in general to shift from some political parties or some (“greener”) factions a reactive to a proactive stance. The aforementioned of those parties. political change refl ects the pressure from “below” and from “above”. Although the Commission had only stated that it would hold back funds from countries that failed to 18 Namely complaints from NGOs, groups of citizens and even national parliamentarians to the European Commission. 19 See T. Börzel, op cit. 316 Intereconomics, November/December 2003 EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE provide satisfactory information on how they were The Qualitative Change in the Nature of implementing that specifi c legislation, softening its Governance in the EU stance by adding even that the principle of propor- The process of European integration is a good 20 tionality would be respected, the principle of eco- example of how different challenges posed by an conditionality was brought up and entered European evolving (“ever closer”) political cooperation may and national discussions. Note, however, that in this contribute to achieving a model of sustainable devel- case the principle of conditionality was not set to opment that is compatible with the other objectives work automatically as in the case of the cohesion enshrined in the treaties.23 The concept of sustain- fund and the convergence and stability and growth ability implies that development is bound by some programmes and that, of course, the subsidiarity limits that, if surpassed, may cause its reversal. One principle may also contribute to avoiding any au- can also argue that a development process may be tomatism, preventing conditionality from working at reversed if based upon non-democratic (and/or un- 21 all in practice. accountable) institutions. In fact, that link between conditionality and sub- Evolving political cooperation has been increas- sidiarity and indeed both concepts have not been ingly subject to a multi-level political negotiation used coherently (let alone rigorously) in the political process in the EU. That process comprises, among arena. And yet they are always present in political others, co-decision and all ensuing EU directives discussions about European common policies in- and legislation in general, the discussion and ap- volving fi nancial resources. proval of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (an It would be important to further develop the link increasingly important tool of soft policy coordina- between conditionality, subsidiarity and account- tion in EMU, supporting a more deliberative way of ability in order to allow for the development of some governance), the new open method of coordination forms of bottom-up conditionality. It is clear, how- (OMC), the new European Council Spring meetings, ever, that, once more, the interaction of representa- all sorts of European and national recommendations tive (parliamentarian) institutions is already playing and parliament resolutions, the adoption of summit an important role in establishing the basis for some agendas and conclusions and of European strate- form of bottom-up conditionality, while respecting gies and white papers and, quite importantly, the the principle of subsidiarity and enhancing the dem- domestic and European debate that takes place. ocratic accountability of different agencies in charge More recently (since the Amsterdam Treaty), even of specifi c programmes. intergovernmental conferences (IGCs), convened to These developments would have been impossible revise the treaties, are increasingly characterised by at the inter-governmental level alone. The interac- multi-level political negotiations. In fact, these inter- tion of different representative (parliamentarian) governmental conferences include representatives institutions at different levels of the permanent proc- of the European Parliament that is regularly briefed ess of political negotiation in the EU, both among by the negotiators and can give its views on the themselves and with other institutions (the European issues under discussion. Moreover, the European Council, the EU Council of Ministers, the European Parliament’s views on the IGCs are increasingly im- Commission, etc.) and actors in civil society, is al- portant in shaping European public opinion on these lowing for the building-up of more appropriate (and matters and therefore the inter-governmental nego- legitimate) incentives for the correct implementation tiation process. 22 of common policies. 22 Interestingly, the desired role of the EU in people’s daily lives in fi ve years in Greece and Portugal scores higher than the EU average while it is highest in Italy and more or less average in Spain (Euroba- 20 This principle provides wrong incentives: countries may shy away rometer 56, Fig. 3.10b). Portugal, Italy and Greece are also the three from any ambitions in terms of nature protection. This was already EU countries where people are not satisfi ed with national democracy the case of conditionality of the Cohesion fund on the convergence (Eurobarometer 56, Fig. 2.3). Italy, Greece and Spain, but not Portugal, programmes (where there was an incentive not to be too ambitious also score above the average (at the top of the scale) regarding both in terms of fi scal consolidation) but it is no longer the case with the the average level of support for EU decision-making (for 26 policy Stability and Growth Pact. areas) and the number of policy areas where EU decision-making is more popular than national decision-making (Eurobarometer 56, 4.1). 21 Already at the 1985 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), the Single Portugal, Italy and Greece are also the countries where people tend to European Act while giving the EU (at that time EC) a wide scope for trust the EU more than the UN and national governments; in all other environmental action (Article 130r.1) invoked for the fi rst time in the EU countries the UN, or the national government in the case of Lux- EC Treaty (Article 130r.4) the principle of subsidiarity. It was cancelled embourg, come fi rst (Eurobarometer 57, 4). when the general subsidiarity clause was included in the TEU. See D. Dinan: Ever-Closer Union: An Introduction to the European Union, 23 The objective of sustainable development was enshrined in the 2nd Ed., London 1999, Palgrave. Treaty on European Union, Article 2, by the Amsterdam Treaty.

Intereconomics, November/December 2003 317 EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE

National parliaments, too, participate in that proc- Despite the fact that Europe (yet) has neither a ess. Not least, they retain the ultimate power of rati- constitution nor a government and that it suffers the fying the treaties. Moreover, they also participate in impact of globalisation on national political systems the process through regular hearings with national (that are unable to deal with new global problems (and other) IGC negotiators, through bilateral and without sharing sovereignty), it may be argued that multilateral meetings with the European Parliament’s such conditions may also be leading to an improve- Constitutional Committee and through internal and ment in the democratic quality of EU governance. open discussions (increasingly with representatives In fact, the European Union has been experienc- of civil society) and resolutions. The European Con- ing a permanent re-drafting of its treaties, necessary vention was the maximum exponent of the (multi- to accommodate important institutional changes level) involvement/participation of many parties in (such as the Internal Market, EMU, Schengen and such a process. It is through such a process that the communitarisation of other matters of justice those EU policy constraints transform into European and internal affairs) that involve an explicit transfer of and national political objectives. national sovereignty to the Union level. At the time of Such a multi-level political negotiation process in each constitutional change the question of democ- the EU allows for a continuous discussion of proc- racy is discussed both Europe-wide and at the level esses and outcomes. That permanent discussion in of each Member State, in some cases in conjunction turn permits increased transparency of and partici- with a referendum and, especially in traditionally pation in the entire process of European integration. more centralised states, it is also focused on that Moreover, the multi-level political negotiation proc- very transfer of sovereignty.24 ess has also repeatedly allowed for the creation of a A multi-level political negotiation process may national and European consensus for reform at the render policy-making more effi cient by allowing for a EU level. continuous confrontation of positions at various lev- Furthermore, the European Union is currently in a els of government, making it possible and easier to process of transition towards a wider political union converge to an acceptable (for all and at the various in Europe together with an increasingly important levels of government) common position. role of representative institutions. In such a situation, It follows that national parliaments, the European European institution-building, with more effi cient and Parliament and European citizens in general may transparent bodies and even transnational political all have become more aware of the need for more parties may be a way of reinforcing the democratic democratic control of new European institutions but quality of the European integration process (and its also of the need for regaining democratic control reach), namely the link between participation and over national governments and institutions that have “responsible representation” of the voters and the become more unaccountable through the process of guarantee that the existing social structures remain globalisation. open and accessible to pressures from below. Therefore, despite the non-existence of a Euro- In most EU countries European integration chal- pean constitution to date and of a European gov- lenges such as Economic and Monetary Union have ernment, EU governance seems not to be hindering worked not only as mechanisms for economic sta- European democracy but rather extending it, bring- bilisation but also, and perhaps more importantly, ing in some new important features, such as new as prerequisites for structural reform and long-term forms of participation, through the interaction of dif- development. ferent institutions and citizens in a multi-level politi- The responses to European integration challenges cal negotiation process. provide good examples of evolving governance National and European Representation in the EU because they go together with the more The process of globalisation made the tension clearly perceived need for democratic control of its between increasing complexity and the growing new institutions. In addition, they also allow for an felt need for democracy in modern societies more increased participation of representative institutions and civil society in the discussions that take place 24 That transfer of sovereignty alone does not involve its external before the approval of treaty changes and their ratifi - affairs aspect because other sources of power (such as the United Nations, NATO or simply the United States) superior to that of the EU cation about the goals of the envisaged reforms, i.e. and its territory exist and both European citizens and member states on the envisaged type of model of society. recognise that. Recent world events illustrate this point well.

318 Intereconomics, November/December 2003 EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE acute. In fact, with globalisation, concentrated deci- of the solution as a way of improving effi ciency (and sion-making and larger organisational structures are therefore output legitimisation) but also part of the well beyond the reach of the democratic infl uence problem in terms of transparency and accountability of national social and political systems. Moreover, as well as participation and deliberative processes many of the various problems that modern societies (input legitimisation). Given that in the EU responsi- face cannot be dealt with successfully by national bility is much more diffuse than in national systems, political systems – monetary and fi nancial instability it becomes even more diffi cult to bring the various and global warming, just to mention two problems institutions that formulate policies and/or take deci- related to EMU and environmental policy. sions at different levels into account. On the other hand, governments of different The question then is how to address the identi- countries, by getting together, can only partly deal fi ed democratic defi cit in terms of democratic ac- with that type of transnational problem and incurring countability and transparency (and participatory and additional costs. This is because at the intergov- deliberative processes one might add) in the EU. In ernmental level the process of reaching decisions this paper the European Parliament was chosen to is obviously more complicated: there are thus (very illustrate the point that it is the European institu- concrete) additional costs in terms of effi ciency tion that comes closest to fulfi lling the functions of (concerning all the diffi culties in reaching agreement responsible representation and of principal for other among governments, then to get the approval of EU supranational bodies. their respective parliaments etc.) and citizens may In fact, the European Parliament is the representa- feel even more acutely the need for more democ- tive institution at the EU level, directly chosen by racy, given the lack of transparency and/or the insuf- the people. Thus, one can argue that not only in the fi cient participation in that type of decision.25 In fact, case of EU supranational bodies’ decisions but also it can be argued that the inter-governmental level in the case of qualifi ed majority voting (QMV) where alone, while necessary for carrying on the European national governments may be outvoted in the Coun- integration process both in terms of processes and cil, and therefore cannot be held accountable to na- outcomes, is neither an effi cient nor a transparent tional parliaments, the European Parliament can be or participatory way of governance in the European seen as an alternative (to a certain extent, and under Union. a particular perspective, complementary to national In the European Union, where regional, national, parliaments) for democratic accountability.26 inter-governmental and federal structures overlap, By its very nature,27 the EP is also relatively open the tension between increasing complexity and the and accessible to pressures from below (and to growing felt need for democracy in modern societies lobbying, one might add), allowing for instance for is thus even more evident than at the national level. citizens’ petitions and questioning; it also somehow In the EU there is an on-going evolution in terms facilitates the development of other emerging social of sharing sovereignty that should raise effi ciency. structures, such as European parties or party fami- Stable forms of political cooperation among the EU lies, independent of the national states, the Com- Member States are hence (quite an important) part mission and the European Council. Moreover, the European Parliament, again as a 25 For some authors, majority voting, although increasing the effective- representative institution, has a unique role in an ness of decisions in the EU at the intergovernmental level, infringes the sovereign right of the Member States to ultimately decide what overlapping political structure such as the European is and what is not acceptable to their national constituencies. See B. Union: it interacts more and more with the various Kohler-Koch: The Evolution and Transformation of European Gov- 28 ernance, in: B. K ohler-Koch, R. Eising (eds.): The Transformation national parliaments, bridging the gap between of Governance in the EU, London and N.Y. 1999, Routledge. Note that this presupposes, however, that the state still had de facto sovereignty 27 Different MEPs and staff tend to listen to and receive all kind of dif- in the fi rst place. By pooling sovereignty in the EU some Member ferent experts and organised and non-organised interests as a way of States might at least infl uence some decisions that they could not negotiating and advancing their own proposals and reports. They are affect before. also quite open (to citizens, the media, researchers, etc.) regarding their political and policy options. 26 According to opinion polls (see Eurobarometer, 56 and 57), in the EU the European Parliament is the institution, among the main EU 28 The European Parliament holds regular meetings with members institutions and agencies, which people tend to trust most on aver- of the relevant national parliamentary committees on a wide range age; exceptions are Germany, , , , , the of issues: EMU and hearings of the ECB’s President, the BEPG, the and where the Court of Justice and/or the IGCs, EU enlargement, etc., not to mention the COSAC – Conference ECB tend to score higher. The EP is also the best known EU institution of European Affairs Committees of the EU (and applicant countries) (Eurobarometer 56, fi g. 7.10) and it is perceived as playing the most National Parliaments and the European Parliament – and the Euro- important role in the life of the EU (Eurobarometer 56, fi g. 3.6). pean Convention.

Intereconomics, November/December 2003 319 EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE national and European representation; it is recognis- European Parliament is also evolving. It has been ably more open and accessible than any other Eu- assigned new roles in the Treaty Establishing the ropean institution to pressures from below, allowing by the Maastricht and Am- for an increased participation of European citizens in sterdam treaties and this fact is certainly perceived the Community’s life; and it provides more transpar- by European public opinion or the different Member ency to the process of decision-making in the EU, States’ public opinions, as shown by the polls re- thus allowing for some accountability of other Euro- ferred to above.31 That fact was certainly perceived pean institutions, such as the European Commission by all national parliaments that ratifi ed those trea- and the .29 ties. In the case of environmental policies, the Euro- The Co-decision Procedure and pean Parliament may have a leading role in adopt- Institutional Interaction ing new common policies that internalise at the Since the ratifi cation of the Amsterdam Treaty it European level some important external effects such became even more interesting for national parlia- as pollution regardless of differentiated national ments to propose resolutions (namely at the initiative resistances. At the same time, those pressures of their European Affairs Committees) with respect from above (new EU directives, for example) may to the position of their respective governments in also refl ect pressures from below (for instance en- the Council for a number of directives, entering in vironmental groups of activists, non-governmental this way the process of shaping different EU poli- organisations and European citizens in general that cies. This is possible because the Amsterdam Treaty may include especially motivated individual national has further extended the scope of the co-decision politicians and parliamentarians with special po- procedure, namely with respect to environmental litical clout) because of the European Parliament’s policies (Article 175 of the Treaty Establishing the participation in the process of policy-making, for European Community).32 instance through the co-decision process, and de- gree of openness and accessibility, and the views of The co-decision procedure was extended to most national parliaments. of what was covered before by the so-called coop- eration procedure and indeed to most areas of leg- The European Parliament may then well increase islation, unless otherwise specifi ed as exempted or the effi ciency of governance at the European level falling under one of the other procedures.33 by smoothing out various resistances to the accept- ance of some common policies. But it increases ef- In fact, the co-decision procedure developed and fi ciency as a consequence of more transparency and extended the cooperation procedure created by participation and not at the cost of driving political the Single European Act to speed up the process decision-making further away from citizens. of decision-making with a view to the completion and well-functioning of the Single European Market This role for the European Parliament has been (SEM), allowing for the European Parliament to step somehow neglected in the literature. Most authors in (out of legitimacy considerations and also under dealing with the legitimacy problem, the democratic considerable pressure from the EP) in the case of defi cit and the effectiveness problem of the Euro- qualifi ed majority voting in the Council (for effi ciency pean Union, hold that it would have to opt to be reasons). either a federal political union, with one government and one parliament, or a confederation of sovereign In order not to increase effi ciency at the expense states, without majority voting. Some authors argue of democracy (in the case that a national government that the European Parliament has “an inferior repre- was outvoted in the Council by QMV), the European sentative quality”.30 It is possible to argue, however, that the repre- 31 Regarding knowledge about the EP, how it is perceived to play the most important role in EU life and how it is the institution which on av- sentative (of the European population) quality of the erage people tend to trust most in the EU (Eurobarometer, 56). 32 Article 95 of the TEC has also been changed by the Amsterdam 29 F. To r r e s , op. cit. Treaty, allowing for exceptional measures based on environmental considerations that may not be in accordance with Internal Market 30 B. Kohler-Koch, op. cit., p. 17. This “inferior representative qual- rules. The European Commission has then a six-month time limit to ity” of the European Parliament is in general attributed on the basis of review such measures. the “inferior quality” of European elections (disputed not on European but on domestic political grounds and with very low turnouts and dif- 33 See H. Wallace: The Institutional Setting. Five Variations on a ferent national voting rules and party lists) and of the lack of clear po- Theme, in: H. Wallace, W. Wallace (eds.): Policy-Making in the litical and ideological cleavages (MEPs remain rather technocratic). European Union, 4th Ed., Oxford 2000, Oxford University Press. 320 Intereconomics, November/December 2003 EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE

Parliament was granted in the cooperation proce- has been decisive in that respect. In the already dure (SEA) the power to propose amendments on mentioned auto-oil programme for instance, the legislation, albeit concerning a very limited number conciliation procedure triggered by the co-decision of Community areas. In the case of qualifi ed majority procedure led to more rigorous regulations than had voting there would thus be a kind of complementary originally been agreed by the EU Council.38 accountability to national parliaments and to the Eu- The co-decision procedure has also undoubtedly ropean Parliament. increased the possibility of a wider participation in The Treaty of Maastricht created the co-decision the European legislative process, namely by provid- procedure (Article 189b), giving the EP veto power ing a new channel of participation for the national over a legislative proposal.34 This power was then parliaments.39 extended from 15 articles to 37 Until recently, some EU countries, in particular the Amsterdam Treaty articles (see Article 251 of the cohesion countries but not only, tended to ask for consolidated Treaty establishing the European Com- derogations with respect to European environmental munity). In fact, with the exception of EMU, external directives that had an immediate economic impact. trade issues, fi scal harmonisation, the Common Ag- This was due to the level of economic development, ricultural Policy (CAP) and Justice and Home Affairs wrong national perceptions and EU incentives, as (JHA), most European legislation is subject to the pointed out in the previous section. new co-decision procedure. In the case of the auto-oil programme, the Euro- With this new version of the co-decision proce- pean Affairs Comittee of the Portuguese Parliament dure, one can argue that the European Parliament adopted a resolution project considering that the has substantially increased its legislative powers.35 derogation that was expected (already during the Moreover, co-decision has certainly enhanced dem- co-decision procedure) to be granted by the EU (and ocratic accountability in the sense that the European also accepted by the European Parliament, whose Commission, a non-elected body, had to share its already mentioned more stringent and “greener” exclusive rights concerning draft legislation (a less approach to the programme was favoured by the contentious issue, even before the ratifi cation of the Portuguese parliamentary committee during the co- Amsterdam Treaty36) with the European Parliament. decision procedure) to Southern countries, namely As a matter of fact, the European Parliament has Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal, “could have had had a strong infl uence on the adoption of environ- potentially very negative consequences for Portugal, mental legislation at the European level.37 Its role is namely with respect to the negotiation of Agenda particularly relevant in the fi eld of environmental pol- icy because it has managed to force the approval of more stringent rules than the ones initially proposed 36 L. Martin, op. cit. by the European Commission and the ones desired 37 For an account of its increased importance, namely through the increasingly powerful and aggressively-led European Parliamentary by the European Council and/or the European Union Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protec- Council of Ministers. The co-decision procedure tion, see A. S bragia: Environmental Policy. Economic Constraints and External Pressures, in: H. Wallace, W. Wallace (eds.): Policy- Making in the European Union, 4th Ed., Oxford 2000, Oxford Univer- sity Press, pp. 293-316. For Henry Farrell and Adrienne Héritier, the 34 Note also that the protocol to the Amsterdam Treaty requires the European Parliament has been successful in advancing its interests European Council, the European Commission and the European Par- over time, increasing its role in the European legislative process, pre- liament to use co-decision as expeditiously as possible. cisely through the strategic use of the relationship between formal and 35 Before the extension of its scope that issue was somewhat conten- informal institutions. Cf. H. F a r r ell, A. Héritier: Formal and Infor- tious, although the record of legislative amendments made by the mal Institutions under Codecision: Continuous Constitutional Building European Parliament and accepted by the European Commission in Europe, Max Planck Project Group – Common Goods: Law, Politics and the Council of Ministers suggested otherwise. On the increase and Economics, Bonn 2002, MPI. I stress here, in this regard, the of power of the European Parliament with co-decision prior to its revi- interaction between the European Parliament and national parlia sion by the Amsterdam Treaty, for a cautious approach (pointing to ments. the need for further research) see for instance L. M artin: Economic 38 A. Young, H. Wallace: Regulatory Politics in the Enlarging Eu- and Political Integration: Institutional Challenge and Response, in: B. ropean Union: Weighing Civic and Producer Interests, Manchester Eichengreen, J. Frieden (eds.): Forging an Integrated Europe, 2000, Manchester University Press. Michigan 1998, University of Michigan Press, pp. 129-157. For a nega- tive answer, see G. Tsebelis: The Power of the European Parliament 39 The Amsterdam Treaty included a protocol on the role of national as a Conditional Agenda Setter, in: American Political Science Review, parliaments, giving the COSAC (Conférence des Organes Spécial- Vol. 88, 1994, pp. 128-42; G. Tsebelis: Will Maastricht Reduce the isées aux Affaires Communautaires), the bi-annual meetings of the “Democratic Defi cit”?, paper presented at the American Political Sci- Conference of European Affairs Committees of the EU (and applicant ence Association annual meeting, Chicago 1995; and G. G a r r ett: countries) National Parliaments and the European Parliament, the From the Luxembourg Compromise to Codecision: Decision Making right to send comments on EU legislative proposals to the European in the European Union, Stanford University 1995, manuscript. Commission, the European Council and the European Parliament.

Intereconomics, November/December 2003 321 EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE

2000”. This meant playing the “European card”: cies. The European directives on birds and habitats the need not to be perceived as a laggard in the collide in many instances with the accommodation European integration process, especially during an of private interests; the Commission and the ECJ important negotiation of fi nancial resources. (pressures from “above”) may then be allies of public interest (pressures from “below” or bottom-up pres- The auto-oil resolution project (with no votes sures). against in the European Affairs Committee of the Portuguese Parliament) had an important role in A new attitude with respect to the importance of obliging the domestic oil sector to comply with the internalising environmental externalities has then a abolition of leaded gasoline six months ahead of much better chance of thriving if different national schedule instead of making use of a derogation actors (parliamentarians, politicians in general, of two to three years. Following that decision the NGOs and citizens movements) succeed in obtain- Portuguese Government later adopted a more open ing a fi rm backing from the European institutions. attitude in the European Council in 2000 (again dur- As already stated above, a clearer conditionality of ing its presidency of the EU) which made possible structural funds concerning the compliance with a considerable shortening of the derogation for the environmental policies would also be of great help in adoption of the outstanding part of the auto-oil pro- ensuring a wider participation of the affected popu- gramme in Portugal.40 lation in recipient countries. That is only possible with an enhanced role of representative (parliamen- The example is interesting because it indicates tarian) institutions in the process of policy-making in that the interacton between EU national parliaments the European Union. and the European Parliament may make it possible to overcome both specifi c interests and strong Conclusion lobbying or the more accommodating (sometimes The joint decision-making mode of governance short-sighted) positions of the Council and/or of has contributed to enhanced EU policy effective- the Commission.41 It may also suggest that it is pos- ness especially in regard to European environmental sible to overcome sometimes unjustifi ed fears of legislation. The European Parliament, as a co-legis- national governments of appearing to be too radical lator with veto power in the co-decision procedure, (“fundamentalist”) and/or of being accused of not has been a crucial organisational actor. It has, to adequately defending the “national” interest (that start with, obliged the European Commission, a non- is, in the case of the auto-oil programme, of not well elected body, to share with it its rights concerning defending the “national” oil sectors). draft legislation. In addition, its interactions – “infor- Thanks to the co-decision procedure and to its mal institutions” – with other actors, such as national discussion in national parliaments, discussions and parliaments, the Council of Ministers and the Euro- deliberations of the European Parliament as well as pean Commission, have been particularly relevant in European environmental directives are now followed the building-up of more appropriate and legitimate up and in some cases strengthened before being incentives for the correct implementation of com- torpedoed by some derogation and/or by special mon policies, internalising many environmental ex- conditions.42 What happened in Portugal with the ternalities. Such interactions have also allowed for a auto-oil programme may happen in any other EU more active role of EU national parliaments in the EU Member State with European directives such as legislative process, increasing their leverage vis-à- the defence of special protected areas and/or spe- vis their respective governments as far as European legislation is concerned. They may help in the future to develop a democratic form of conditionality for 40 It appears, however, that the Portuguese national oil sector delayed as much as possible the full implementation of the directive as far as the more effi cient use of EU and national resources diesel was concerned. in fostering the wider EU goals of sustainable growth 41 Noury and Roland found out that in votes held under the co-decision and, indeed, cohesion. procedure, where the EP is most powerful, MEPs participate more and are more party-cohesive. A. N oury, G. Roland: More Power to the European Parliament?, in: Economic Policy, Vol. 17, No. 35, October 2002. These fi ndings reinforce the idea, already expressed above with respect to EMU and to the Stability and Growth Pact, that the 42 Examples of this co-operation have been discussed at COSAC European Parliament cannot be so directly infl uenced by the electoral meetings. The auto-oil resolution project of the Portuguese parliament or other short-term concerns of one or two governments in the EU. was also stressed by the President of the Belgian Parliament as ex- This in turn reinforces the importance of the European Parliament as emplary at a Speakers’ conference in Vienna in 1998 and discussed, a representative institution for the democratic quality of the European as an example of an enhanced role for national parliaments, at the governance and integration processes and their outcomes. COSAC in Vienna. 322 Intereconomics, November/December 2003