NO. 17 APRIL 2018 Introduction

China’s Global Connectivity Politics On Confidently Dealing with Chinese Initiatives Paul J. Kohlenberg and Nadine Godehardt

European attitudes towards China and its Belt and Road Initiative are changing. While the People’s Republic under Xi Jinping is the only country in the world pur- suing a global vision, distrust of China’s expanding influence is growing. As a con- sequence, the European debate about China is becoming increasingly emotional with interpretations fluctuating between alarmism and reassurance. Ideas about the ‘essence of China’ and expectations that the country should fit into the liberal order according to Western standards, however, threaten to limit Europe’s scope of action in dealing with the People’s Republic. In order to develop strategies for a confident German and European policy, China’s current global political approach should be considered systematically. Based on the features of China’s ‘connectivity politics’ (Konnektivitätspolitik), Germany and the EU could formulate policy options that go far beyond the realm of infrastructure.

Under President Xi Jinping, China has estab- resources an actor gains, the more potential lished a distinct and global form of connec- power he acquires to directly or indirectly tivity politics. This includes investment in influence other actors. So (initially), no dis- infrastructure and international lending, tinction is made between forums and chan- broadening cooperation with and influenc- nels of connectivity. Instead, the motto ing institutions in research, finance and ‘a lot helps a lot’ applies here. As a result, policy-making, acquiring international Beijing also uses its relations with Western media houses and disseminating technical states and institutions of the liberal order and regulatory standards. Thus, connectivity to expand its connectivity resources. politics is driven by China’s strategic under- However, this is not compatible with standing that power and connectivity are the rather static idea that China can be inte- closely interlinked (see SWP Comment 13/ grated into an existing liberal international 2018). From Beijing’s point of view, political order without it changing. China’s eco- room for manoeuvre stems less from a new, nomic rise and steadily expanding global authoritarian “sharp power”, as is currently range is changing the liberal system itself. being discussed in the US, but rather from Irrespective of the West’s hopes for domes- the consistent enforcement of proactive tic liberalization in the People’s Republic, ‘connectivity power’. The more connectivity the participation of an authoritarian state

with China’s clout and size clearly has an and therefore destabilizing the global econo- impact on the existing international order. my. As a result, China uses every political Although liberal standards and principles opportunity to actively define what open- continue to apply, at the same time, exist- ness means. China is also pursuing this ing rules are being questioned, other per- strategy beyond the Belt and Road Initiative spectives presented, existing institutions (BRI) and attempting to involve more and criticized or new ones created. Whether it more countries using the key phrases ‘open- concerns criteria for granting development ness’ and ‘expanding the circle of friends’ loans or regulating the cyberspace of the among groups such as the Shanghai Co- future: China’s proactive connectivity operation Organization (SCO) and BRICS. politics are transforming the universe of what is possible and legitimate. Multidimensionality (duowei lianjie) In the countless documents on the BRI, connectivity is usually broken down into Features of China’s specific thematic areas. However, inter- Connectivity Politics actions between the dimensions of different technological layers and geographic spaces, Proactivity (zhudongxing) such as economic corridors, supply chains, The Chinese approach to connectivity poli- transit regions and cities, underwater cables, tics is often tied to the notion of ‘strategic mobile networks and satellites, are far more docking’. It refers to how and in what way important. Individual Chinese projects, connections are established. Only by being often criticized as unprofitable by foreign proactive is it possible to pre-set the agenda commentators, follow a different logic from of newly created connections and determine China’s perspective, depending on which the points of contact with other actors geographic and technical dimensions are and states. As a result, asymmetries can be jointly relevant. It is a matter of construct- strengthened in favour of the proactive actor ing new ecosystems that, once intercon- in a connective relationship. Demands for nected, establish new geographic and politi- new connections to be reciprocal are largely cal spaces. For example, China is focussing beside the point because the proactive side, much of its attention on port cities along in our case China, has, from the beginning, the new Silk Road routes. This is not only defined the fundamentals of the connection a question of consolidating logistics routes, in its favour. According to US economist but also about creating the conditions to Jennifer M. Harris, ever-closer ties between push forward new technical standards, such US and Chinese companies in the obligato- as data transmission, over the long term. ry form of joint ventures are threatening to ‘Standards’ does not necessarily mean that suppress internal US calls for more formal they are Chinese patents. It could also mean reciprocity. It has also been noted that that Chinese companies gain a dominant Western companies active in China tend to market position in distributing new technol- temper their criticism of legal and political ogies, such as 5G mobile communications. developments in the country. Consequent- As a consequence, this interplay of the ly, widespread Western hopes that more different dimensions within China’s con- connections and partnerships inevitably nectivity politics can also create new geo- generate more reciprocity due to increasing graphic regions. They may not be easily interconnectedness, have been dashed. depicted on maps (as in the case of ‘smart Proactivity is a key aspect of connectivity cities’), but grow more closely together as politics because it can be asserted in politi- transnational networks. This applies, for cal rhetoric that one’s own foreign policy is example, to flagship projects pursued by committed to the idea of ‘openness’. As soon China in its Belt and Road Initiative, such as the other party rejects China’s offers, Bei- as in Duisburg or Gwadar (Pakistan). These jing can portray these actors as isolationist projects are supposed to lay the tracks for

SWP Comment 17 April 2018

2 new technical developments. Against this the liberal value system. This suggests that backdrop, global investment and company China intends to limit the territorial reach acquisitions are intended to ensure that of the liberal system in the long term. practices and standards shaped by China According to Beijing’s interpretation, parts can find future clients and be implemented of Latin America or Eastern Europe should globally. no longer be located in the global West.

Discourse power (huayuquan) Internationalizing implicit (Party) The (Chinese) term ‘discourse power’ is rules (qian guize) currently dominating a large number of China has preferred a more informal tem- political science publications in China, plate for establishing connections in its more than other notions of power, such as initiatives. These include numerous match- “soft” or “sharp power”. Discourse power making trade fairs between Chinese busi- has both a practical and an ideational- nesses and local companies to establish strategic component. Its practical side is initial contact in new partner countries. If intended to result in better communication the contact is formalized or institutional- channels and platforms. For Xi Jinping, the ized, foreign actors in China are confronted further development of technical innova- not only with (state) law, but also with the tions in the cyber sector has particular rules, standards and institutions of the priority here. At the same time, China’s Communist Party. However, Party cells in foreign investment in media houses, think- Chinese companies and Sino-foreign joint tank partnerships and research projects is ventures can come to the fore after a de- not only intended to influence news con- layed period of time. Only then does it tent and debates. It also wants to determine become clear that, for example, they in- rules and procedures for political discus- fluence corporate and human resource deci- sions that are advantageous to Beijing in sions. This is a profound change because the long term. In addition, organizations the Party’s prerogatives, such as data pro- of the existing liberal world order play an tection and access to information, take important role, for example the United precedence over existing contracts and Nations. Representatives of Beijing are agreements. In terms of its general ap- deliberately trying to place Chinese policy proach to connectivity, this means the legal formulations in UN bodies. nature of links with China may change over In an ideational-strategic sense, discourse time. Beijing has announced it will set up power is, therefore, also based on proactive, its own international arbitration tribunals ideational connectivity. For example, Beijing for disputes over investments related to the carefully considers which concepts and Belt and Road Initiative. This makes such ideas of the Western liberal world order can implicit shifts in the legal logic more likely be linked to China’s own ‘discourse system’. in the long term because China has enough More neutral terms such as ‘openness’ and leverage over many actors to force them to ‘inclusiveness’ or China’s efforts against accept particular dispute resolution forums. ‘deglobalization’ do not only act as mere hinges between different political value systems. Unlike with more predefined Conclusion terms such as ‘democracy’, ‘reciprocity’ or ‘human rights’, China sees an opportunity Beijing’s authoritarian leadership cannot here to influence the use of these newer decide alone with whom, through what and terms in the West as well. how its connectivity-centred approach to For strategic planners in Beijing, ex- global politics is to be implemented. There- changes with countries in Latin America or fore, the above description of the features Eastern Europe are particularly promising of China’s approach is not intended as an as they are seen as less firmly anchored in

SWP Comment 17 April 2018

3 appeal to European actors to copy Beijing’s European Union Fields of Action strategies. European Code of Conduct on openness, To take advantage of their options for reciprocity and transparency in dealing action (see table), German and European with foreign direct investment. policymakers and experts should take into account four guiding principles. First, they Rethinking connectivity as a complex set should avoid making premature judge- of issues: recognizing cross-connections ments and adopting overly static views of between cyberspace, mobility, communica- tion, the power grid and others as regulatory Chinese politics. Second, it is better to focus spaces and shaping them politically. on the strengths of democracy, in particular © Stiftung Wissenschaft its culture and spirit of intense, disputa- Using China’s national isolationism to und Politik, 2018 tious, public debate, its transparency and legitimize more robust measures. For All rights reserved perseverance. Third, it is essential that the example: ensure free communication (i.e. public sphere and democratic discourse are without censorship) on Chinese communi- This Comment reflects cation apps if their users are in the EU. given a similar status as critical infrastruc- the author’s views. ture. Although Chinese positions are also to Options for Action The online version of be included here, allowing Chinese-driven this publication contains censorship to take hold in Germany and the with respect to China functioning links to other EU should be avoided. Fourth, it is appro- Provide targeted support to Chinese initiatives based on liberal standards. For SWP texts and other relevant priate to establish individuals’ data protec- sources. example: the operating mode of the Asian tion as a basis of liberal foreign policy. For Infrastructure Investment Bank, China’s SWP Comments are subject example, the EU’s General Data Protection peacekeeping efforts. to internal peer review, fact- Regulation could be applied to the activities checking and copy-editing. of Chinese technology groups such as Concentrated and sustained analysis of For further information on Baidu, Alibaba or Tencent (BAT). In dealing Chinese terms and concepts. For example: our quality control pro- Chinese interpretation of ‘deglobalization’, with Chinese initiatives, German and Euro- cedures, please visit the SWP reinterpretation of terms such as ‘openness’. website: https://www.swp- pean politics do not, therefore, have to berlin.org/en/about-swp/ become ‘Chinese’ but they must, above all, quality-management-for- become more confident. swp-publications/

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Translation by Martin Haynes

(English version of SWP-Aktuell 18/2018)

Paul Joscha Kohlenberg is an Associate in the DFG project “Which region?” of the Asia Division at SWP. Dr. Nadine Godehardt is Deputy Head of the Asia Division at SWP. Funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG, German Research Foundation) – Projectnumber 282959679

SWP Comment 17 April 2018

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