The Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Nepal and Sri Lanka: Navigating Post Conflict Identities in Civilian Life

The Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Nepal and Sri Lanka: Navigating post conflict identities in civilian life.

Kate Macfarlane June 2021

Department of International Relations Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs ANU College of Asia & the Pacific Canberra, ACT Australia

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of The Australian National University

Declaration

I declare that all work contained in this thesis is my own original work prepared and submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Kate Macfarlane 10 June 2021

Acknowledgements

Since 2009, I was based at ANU in a professional capacity as a newly graduated university student, long before I commenced my own PhD. These years were formative for me as I was fortunate enough to work for Emeritus Professor John Braithwaite on his ambitious project, Peacebuilding Compared at RegNet. John sent me all around the world conducting fieldwork and opened my eyes to the importance of conducting research motivated by social justice concerns. Aside from his obvious brilliant intellect, John is humble, passionate and visionary. I could not have started my own research journey without this experience, and to him I am very grateful for his humour and mentorship that continues until today.

My PhD commenced in 2015 and became a much bigger journey of learning intellectually, but also about life. I started this journey with my husband Mamoun, who encouraged me to apply and was with me every step of the way. Throughout that time, we became a family of five with our three daughters, Ayah, Sara, and Hannah. The PhD journey is defined by very challenging and confronting moments through the ups and downs of life and research, but most importantly the stories that my participants shared motivated me to keep going and finish this project.

The project would not be possible without the support of my supervisors. Firstly, I wish to thank Dr Cecilia Jacob my principal supervisor, who has patiently and methodically worked to provide feedback on numerous drafts and ideas. You went above and beyond to support and advise me in completing this research, and pushed me to complete a thesis to the best of my abilities. I am very grateful for your supervision, patience and time. Most of all, I am very grateful for your empathy and care in helping me to navigate the tricky world of motherhood and PhD.

I also wish to thank my other wonderful panel members, Emeritus Professor John Braithwaite and Professor Sharon Bessell. I cannot thank you both enough for your mentorship and guidance. John, thank you for teaching me the skills of

fieldwork, and for encouraging me not to shy away from analysing and showcasing the ‘big picture perspective’ on the important stories collected through the fieldwork. Thankyou Sharon for your thoughtful and sharp advice, and engagement with my research.

Professor Bina D’Costa started as my principal supervisor and encouraged me to pursue a difficult, but important research topic. I am inspired by your advocacy research agenda and commitment to social and political justice issues in South Asia. I am grateful for your commitment to the project, your advice, time, comments, and both stimulating and challenging conversations.

I also acknowledge Emeritus Professor Tamara Jacka, who was a panel member while I was based at the Department of Political and Social Change. I thank her for her time, advice and support.

I acknowledge the support of my two departments at ANU, firstly the Department of Political and Social Change, and now the Department of International Relations where I completed the thesis. I also acknowledge the financial assistance given to me by the ANU through an Australian Government Research Training Program Scholarship, and fieldwork funding provided by my departments. I am also thankful for the Australian Government Endeavour Fellowship, which provided additional funding to conduct extensive fieldwork in Sri Lanka.

During my fieldwork in Nepal and Sri Lanka there were many people that supported and trusted me along the way to make this research possible. In Nepal, I am grateful to Lenin Bista, who heads the Peace Envisioners organisation and is a former child soldier himself. I thank him for his time, contacts and friendship. I admire your passion, drive and commitment in seeking a better life for yourself and other former child soldiers. I am grateful to Dr Kamalesh Adhikari and his family for helping me with contacts and accommodation during our stay in Nepal. I also thank my interpreter Palistha Ranjitkar for her time and dedication.

iii

In Sri Lanka, I am grateful to the International Center for Ethnic Studies (ICES) where I was hosted for the four months while based in Colombo. I thank the director Dr Mario Gomez and all the other staff for providing me with resources and contacts necessary to conduct the fieldwork. I would also like to thank my interpreter Mike, who worked with me tirelessly and under stressful conditions to capture many important interviews.

In both countries, I would like to thank the NGO workers, human rights activists, researchers and analysts that provided important insights along the way.

After completing my fieldwork, I was fortunate to be selected as the ANU’s Yale Fox Fellowship representative (2018-2019). I immensely enjoyed my time at Yale University where I had time to draft the thesis, and was surrounded by the diverse and rich intellectual life of the university. I am grateful to Professor Ben Cashore for his leadership of the program, and the time he spent mentoring and advising me. I also thank Ms Julia Muravnik and other staff for the successful administration of the fellowship. Most of all I am grateful to have met other fellow Foxes from all around the world for their friendship and collegiality. I also wish to thank Anna Garner Bushy, who took wonderful care of my daughter Ayah during this time.

There are many friends and colleagues that supported me along the way. I am most grateful to Ana Alonso, whose friendship, intellect, laughter and support sustained me through this long journey. I also thank many others for their friendship and support along the way: Zohra Akhter, Professor Valerie Braithwaite, Professor Kate Henne, Dr Seung-Hun Hong and Eunjeong Park, Dr Haroro Ingram, Towheed Islam, Dr Ibolya Losoncz, Teresa Jopson, Romina Paskotic, Halua Noor, Giridharan Ramasubramanian, Assoc/Professor Gavin Smith, Dr Erick Viramontes, and Dr Rebecca Williamson.

Finally, I wish to acknowledge the love and support of my family in Australia and Jordan. I thank my parents, Mandy and Stuart, for their love and support, and their commitment to my education from a young age. I also thank my parents-in law, Amou Atef and Amto Ne’meh for their love and support despite the

geographical barriers. Only a month before the thesis submission, I lost my beloved Grandmother, Suzanne Carew-Reid, who passed away just one day shy of her 90th birthday on the 24 December 2020. I know she will be very proud of me. Of course, the person I want to thank the most is my husband, Mamoun Alazab. He has never wavered in his love and support, and has given me the courage and strength to meet both the challenges of the PhD and in life. I could not have done this without you by my side. My fieldwork trip became a family affair with both you and Ayah present. You became my project manager, liaison officer and kept me going through some challenging and confronting times experienced during fieldwork. You have always supported my endeavours and push me to be the best version of myself. You are an amazing husband and father to our two girls, and I am forever grateful that we are in this life together.

To my daughters Ayah, Sara (and now) Hannah, I wake up every day so grateful to be your mum. You have taught me to be patient, and the joy of being a mum. I love you and I hope that when you are all older you will be proud of my achievement.

Finally, I dedicate this thesis to all the former child soldiers, who generously and courageously shared their stories with me. I thank you for your trust. I hope my research contributes to your efforts in achieving justice and peace.

Abstract

Reintegration remains an on-going process for former child soldiers as they undergo multiple transitions from their child to adult civilian lives. It is crucial to understand how children experience the child soldier identity in relation to complex social and political situations that are present in post conflict settings. The child soldier identity is under theorised and often poorly understood. They have a fluid and complex identity experience by moving between different categories- child, adult, combatant, victim, perpetrator- depending upon the local, national context. This thesis provides an analysis of reintegration in the context of national post conflict politics by examining the longer-term reintegration experiences of former girl and boy child soldiers in post conflict, who were recruited to two former armed groups, the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN-M), and the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE), Sri Lanka. This thesis illustrates the complexities of reintegration as experienced by former child soldiers by focusing on their agency and lived experience. The thesis employs a theoretical approach that draws on the sociological approach to children in International Relations, and a methodology that used case studies based on interviews with former child soldiers conducted through fieldwork.

The significance of the empirical analysis shows that the child soldier’s reintegration experience is more than the individual transition from a military to civilian identity. Through the reintegration process, the child soldier identity takes on a political meaning in post conflict settings where national led efforts to address issues of peace, justice, and human rights are politicised and often contentious. A three level analysis approach is applied to the two case studies: i) individual experiences of the child soldier identity, ii) family and community relationships, and iii) state-level political analysis.

The Nepalese case finds that former child soldiers occupy and negotiate multiple identities and subjectivities across an international and local divide, some of which are of their own making and others that have been produced within the post conflict political environment of Nepal. In Nepal, the child soldier identity imposed upon

them by the UN during the formal rehabilitation program disempowered them by creating social distinctions between them, their former Maoist senior comrades, and their families and communities. However, in Nepal’s politicised transitional justice context former child soldiers have created an alternative justice narrative through the work of the Peace Envisioners organisation. The organisation is building international linkages by utilising the international child soldier identity as a strategy to pressure the national government and former CPN-M senior leadership to address social justice and legal concerns.

In Sri Lanka, the child soldier identity was used by the state to build political legitimacy through state led child soldier rehabilitation efforts. The state’s protection of former child soldiers is contingent upon them performing a national identity based on loyalty and commitment to the state. Sri Lanka’s militarised setting continues to generate fear and insecurity in the lives of former child soldiers, their families and communities ultimately limiting their reintegration outcomes. This is demonstrated by an analysis of the militarised, masculine state and the continued subjugation of the Tamil population, including through a gendered lens.

This thesis generates new insights into the connection between child soldier reintegration outcomes and the national political setting regarding the legacy of conflict, peace, and justice. The legacy of conflict intersects with their reintegration experiences to determine their life outcomes, their ability to rebuild relationships and social status within the family and community more broadly, and their position as citizens in relation to state. The thesis contributes a richer understanding of child soldiers’ post conflict lives to support future policy and advocacy initiatives that empower youth in conflict-affected contexts.

vii

Table of Contents

Declaration ...... i Acknowledgements...... ii Abstract ...... vi Table of Contents ...... viii Chapter 1: Introduction ...... 1 1. 1 Research questions ...... 3 1. 2 Who is the child soldier? ...... 4 1. 3 Reintegration: Overview and conceptual discussion ...... 9 1. 4 Introduction to case studies: Nepal and Sri Lanka ...... 12 1. 5 Theoretical approach and rationale ...... 13 1. 6 Methodological approach ...... 16 1.6.1 Fieldwork matters ...... 19 1.6.2 Data limitations ...... 20 1.6.3 Logistical issues ...... 22 1.6.4 Document Analysis ...... 23 1. 7 Ethical considerations ...... 24 1. 8 Thesis roadmap ...... 25 1. 9 Conclusion ...... 28 Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework ...... 30 2.1 Defining child and childhood ...... 30 2.2 The rights of the child ...... 35 2.3 Sociological approach to childhood ...... 41 2.4 Children and International Relations scholarship ...... 43 2.5 Children and agency ...... 47 2.5.1 Everyday agency ...... 48 2.5.2 Political agency ...... 50 2.6 State protection and power ...... 52 2.7 Nation and identity ...... 56 2.8 Conclusion ...... 59 Chapter 3: Defining the Child Soldier ...... 60 3.1 Background context and profile ...... 60 3.2 Politics of childhood ...... 63

viii

3.3 Global North South relations ...... 67 3.4 Victimhood and perpetrator ...... 70 3.5 Girl and boy child soldiers ...... 77 3.6 Conclusion ...... 82 Chapter 4: Reintegration: Conceptual Discussion and Analysis ...... 83 4.1 Introduction to DDR...... 83 4.2 Critiques of DDR ...... 85 4.3 Reintegration conceptual overview ...... 90 4.4 Child soldier reintegration literature ...... 96 4.5 Social reintegration ...... 98 4.5.1 Social stigma...... 102 4.5.2 Gendered reintegration experiences ...... 104 4.6 Conclusion ...... 107 Chapter 5: Nepal: Political Context, Conflict and Peace ...... 108 5.1 State unification and political developments, 1768-1996 ...... 109 5.1.1 Panchayat period, 1960-1990 ...... 112 5.1.2 Parliamentary democracy and the Maoists, 1990-1996 ...... 112 5.2 Conflict ...... 113 5.2.1 Female combatants ...... 114 5.2.2 Child soldiers in conflict ...... 116 5.3. Post conflict Nepal ...... 121 5.3.1 Peace process ...... 121 5.3.2 Transitional justice ...... 124 5.3.3 Political developments ...... 126 5.4 Conclusion ...... 128 Chapter 6: ‘Winners’’ Exclusion in Nepal ...... 129 6.1 Demobilisation and social division ...... 130 6.2 Reflections on DDR and disqualification ...... 135 6.3 Social dynamics of return: family, community and generational ordering ..... 138 6.3.1 Marriage ...... 140 6.3.2. Employment ...... 142 6.6.3 Gendered experiences of return...... 142 6.4 Empowered agency through political contestation and justice ...... 145 6.4.1 Construction of a victimhood narrative ...... 146 6.4.2 Strategies for protest ...... 149 6.5 Conclusion ...... 151

Chapter 7: Sri Lanka: Politics, Conflict and Militarisation ...... 152 7.1 Political developments, 1948-1983 ...... 153 7.1.2 Post colonial state formation ...... 153 7.1.3 Decline in democracy ...... 154 7.1.4 Military growth and expansion ...... 155 7.1.5 Ethnic riots and Tamil nationalism ...... 156 7.2 Conflict in Sri Lanka ...... 157 7.3 Child soldiers in conflict ...... 160 7.4 Post conflict context ...... 164 7.4.1 Politics, peace and reconciliation ...... 166 7.4.2 LLRC commission: faltering justice ...... 168 7.4.3 State control and militarisation ...... 172 7.5 Conclusion ...... 174 Chapter 8: ‘Losers’’ Exclusion Sri Lanka ...... 175 8.1 Children and adult rehabilitation ...... 175 8.2 The paternal state ...... 178 8.2.1 Construction of victimhood ...... 179 8.2.2 Child soldiers and state protection ...... 183 8.3 The militarised, masculine state ...... 186 8.3.1 Tamil victims and perpetrators ...... 187 8.3.2 Adult rehabilitation and state power ...... 189 8.4 Girls, women and the militarised state ...... 192 8.5 Conclusion ...... 197 Chapter 9: Conclusion ...... 199 9.1 Social reintegration ...... 202 9.2 Agency and victimhood ...... 203 9.3 Deconstructing the child soldier identity ...... 207 9.4 Child soldiers, reintegration and peace ...... 209 9.5 Final reflections ...... 210 References ...... 215 Appendix 1: Participant Information Sheet ...... 266 Appendix 2: Missing former LTTE members ...... 269

Chapter 1: Introduction

Upon my return family acceptance was not easy. When my mother sees me, she scolds me time and time again. It is not the same now. I went with big dreams but returned with nothing. It is difficult for me to assimilate into society. I feel abandoned like a stray dog. (former girl child soldier, Nepal, 22.11.17)

The Sri Lankan authorities still watch me closely. They will come every month, sometimes every two weeks to visit me. The authorities are concerned that the LTTE might have plans for reunification and they are trying to stop this. (former girl child soldier, Sri Lanka, 25.4.18)

The reintegration of child soldiers to civilian life is fraught with difficulty. Child soldiers navigate a complicated path in their transition to a civilian identity, and in re-establishing key relationships with their family and community1. This thesis provides an analysis of child soldiers’ reintegration experience in the context of national post conflict politics by drawing on the long-term reintegration experiences of former girl and boy child soldiers, who were recruited to the two former armed groups2, the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE), Sri Lanka, and the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN-M), Nepal. The two vignettes above provide insight into the difficulties of reintegration, but both former girl child soldiers express very different concerns about their experience. There is still much to learn about the post conflict lives of former child soldiers and the different social, cultural and political challenges that shape their reintegration experience. This research will provide insight and analysis of those challenges within the South Asian context.

The child soldier is an international construct that reflects the concerns of the international humanitarian and human rights community to uphold child

1 A community is defined as: ‘a group of people with diverse characteristics who are linked by social ties, common perspectives and engage in joint action in geographic locations or settings’ (MacQueen et al 2001, 1929) 2 I follow The Paris Principles’ (UNICEF 2007) terminology of armed force and armed group (state and non-state respectively) throughout this thesis. 1

protection norms and children’s rights in conflict and post conflict contexts. These norms reflect a predominately Western internationalised model of childhood that position children as innocent victims, and in need of adult protection (UN 2021; Boyden 2015, 169-173; Berents 2016). However, the international child soldier construct provides a narrow and limited analytical framework to study children’s lives, their social experiences, and their reintegration outcomes as former child soldiers. Children experience the child soldier identity in multiple and fluid ways by moving between different identities: as a child, adult, combatant, victim, perpetrator, militarised identity, and civilian identity, depending upon the local and national context.

Existing international reintegration practice focuses on the individual child soldier and their ability to reintegrate; however, an analysis of reintegration outcomes needs to account for a greater depth of social and political dynamics experienced by former child soldiers. The child soldier identity takes on a political meaning through post conflict settings. The child soldier identity either given to former child soldiers through international and/or national-based programs (such as reintegration programs), or adopted by individual children themselves, is politicised by on-going national projects focused on peace, justice, human rights, and democracy, which remain contested in Nepal and Sri Lanka between the ruling government and the broader population. The child soldier identity can be politicised by the state authorities to build political legitimacy; it can be shaped by ideas of victimhood and who is considered a victim within national led transitional justice mechanisms and narratives; or child soldiers themselves can understand and utilise the child soldier identity as way to leverage for their human rights and social justice concerns. The political context of post conflict settings creates the context from which former child soldiers generate meaning about their own identities, which influences their place in relation to family and community, and their relationship to state as citizens.

This research, therefore, identifies post conflict settings as a political space. National efforts to address peace, justice, security, governance, democracy and accountability are contested and viewed differently by different groups in society, such as victims, communities and politicians, across both formal institutional

settings and local social practices (see Selim 2017, 2018; Jacob 2013; Nickson & Braithwaite 2014; Braithwaite et al 2012; Kent 2011). These conversations are produced through social, cultural and political values, structures and institutions. Political, therefore, encapsulates a process of contestation, resistance and sometimes consensus amongst different groups within society, which occur at a local and national level regarding key efforts to build peace. This is because formal institutional mechanisms and programs do not always facilitate local experience of peace, justice, reconciliation, and empowerment (Millar 2014, 1-4). The political nature of peace shapes former child soldiers’ reintegration outcomes by structuring their post conflict identity, possibilities for agency, political participation, and their ability to re-build their adult lives. The everyday lives of former child soldiers, including their ability to achieve a quality of life in relation to security, protection, and justice issues, are some of the key reintegration concerns identified by them, as documented in this research.

1. 1 Research questions

This research addresses child soldiers’ reintegration experiences by addressing how they experience the child soldier identity in a local, post conflict setting. To address this, the question central to the thesis is: How is a child’s reintegration experience shaped by the child soldier identity in a post conflict setting? While this question focuses on the child soldier identity as experienced in relation to different social and political dimensions of reintegration, it is important to analyse how international ideas of child soldiering through narratives and programs (like Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)) are filtered through to a local, socio-political context. Two sub-questions will address this: To what extent does the international child soldier identity structure children’s reintegration experience in Nepal and Sri Lanka? And how do child soldiers understand or relate to this identity? Finally, to address gendered dimensions of reintegration a third question asks: How do boy and girls experience reintegration differently?

1. 2 Who is the child soldier?

Internationally, a child soldier is defined according to The Paris Principles: Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups (UNICEF 2007). A child soldier, also referred to as a ‘child associated with an armed force or armed group’ (CAAFAG)3 refers to any person, who is: Below 18 years of age who is or who has been recruited or used by an armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to children, boys and girls, used as fighters, cooks, porters, messengers, spies or for sexual purposes. It does not only refer to a child who is taking or has taken a direct part in hostilities.4

The international child soldier definition is deliberately broad to capture multiple experiences of child soldiering as documented by different human rights organisations and NGOs. Currently, there are 30,000 verified child soldiers recruited in 17 countries (Child Soldiers International 2019). Between 2012-2017, Child Soldiers International observed an upward trend in the number of child soldiers recruited5 (Child Soldiers International 2019). Child soldiers continue to be recruited by both armed forces and armed groups all with diverse goals, but armed groups are documented to recruit higher numbers of child soldiers (United Nations 2018).6 Such groups include rebel forces, revolutionaries, insurgents, terrorist groups, paramilitaries, and local defence organisations (Child Soldiers International 2018a), which all have a variety of goals, such as those demanding democratic societies, resisting oppression, criminal violence, or inflicting terrorist violence upon society (Rosen 2015, 137).

International humanitarian and human rights advocacy actors define child soldiering as a contemporary phenomenon, which is distinct from children’s

3 For this research I use the ‘child soldier’. 4 Child soldiering is listed as a worst form of labour ILO 8.7. International humanitarian law prohibits child soldier recruitments below the age of 15 enshrined in Article 77 of Additional Protocol I, and in Article 4 of Additional Protocol II are also considered to prohibit accepting voluntary enlistment (P I, Art. 77 (2); P II, Art. 4(3)(c)).Article 38(3) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child also prohibits the recruitment of children in hostilities (ICRC 2012) 5 Statistics used by Child soldiers International are based on analysis of the UN Secretary- General’s Children and Armed Conflict Annual Reports from 2013 to 2018 (UN 2018). 6 For example, in 2017 the United Nations estimated that 56 non-state armed groups and seven state armed forces were recruiting and using children in 2017 (United Nations 2018). 4

historical participation in war (Denov 2010) 7. Nowadays, children’s participation in war is considered a result of adult criminality, and children are considered victims (Rosen 2005). International humanitarian and human rights advocacy and research on child soldiers began in earnest at the end of the Cold War era, reflecting growing international concerns around the changing nature of war, the impact on civilians, and the role of the international community in protecting children (Machel 1996). Kaldor theorised that in the post Cold War era, intrastate warfare is representative of ‘New Wars’, defined among many developments in warfare practice, the blurring of civilian and combatant lines (Kaldor 2012). Graça Machel’s seminal report (1996) ‘The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children’, emphasised children’s distinct vulnerability within the changing context of violence characterised by the ‘New Wars’, including systematic violence in the form of genocide, ethnic cleansing, systematic rape and other human rights violations against children (Machel 1996, 4). The report outlined issues, including child soldiering, refugees and internally displaced children, sexual exploitation and gender-based violence, and psychosocial impact of violence on children. Contemporary understandings of child soldiering, therefore, emerged within an international advocacy setting in which various humanitarian, human rights and child activists were concerned by the deliberate targeting of children.

In response to Machel’s (1996) report, in 1999 the Children and Armed Conflict (CaAC) thematic agenda was created, after resolution UNSCR 1261 was passed. The CaAC agenda identifies six grave violations against children in armed conflict settings: killing and maiming of children; recruitment or use of children as soldiers; sexual violence against children; abduction of children; attacks against schools or hospitals; and denial of humanitarian access for children (United Nations 2013). The CaAC represents a collection of UN led mechanisms, designed to account for and report on children’s situation in armed conflict. This included the appointment of a Special Representative of Children in Armed Conflict, who is both an advocate and advisor on these issues to the UN through the collection of information about children, and reports annually to the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council. Also, a ‘name and shame’

7 An historical example is the American drummer boys from the civil war. 5

mechanism was implemented by the UN Security Council, which enables the Secretary General to publicly list armed forces, and/or armed groups that recruit child soldiers, contrary to international law.

The emergence of the CaAC agenda and the prioritisation of child protection in conflict settings resulted in a more uniform international advocacy agenda to address child soldiering. In June 1998 seven international NGOs – Amnesty International, Defence for Children International, Human Rights Watch, International Federation Terre des Hommes, International Save the Children Alliance, Jesuit Refugee Service, and the Quaker United Nations Office, Geneva, joined forces in launching the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. UNICEF developed a more uniform approach in terms of programming and policy to target child soldiering, and NGOs started to expand their work in understanding the nature of recruitment and effects of being a child soldier. An expansive scholarly and policy research agenda also emerged to focus on different concerns related to child soldiering. This included documenting the conditions and factors driving the child soldier phenomenon, recruitment patterns, and experiences of reintegration from a range of theoretical positions including psychological, socio-cultural, legal, civil war theory, and policy perspectives (for example see Gates & Reich 2010; Wels 2006a; Brett & Specht 2004; Cohn & Goodwin-Gill 1994).

The study of child soldiers is not without controversy and limitations. In the last twenty years, academics, policy makers and development practitioners have researched the causes of child soldiering, and advocated to end child soldier recruitment. International child soldier advocacy efforts powerfully inform and frame international understandings of the child soldiering issue amongst policy makers, researchers and even governments. However, particularly through the 1990s and 2000s, some international advocacy organisations and NGOs promoted dramatic images and testimonies of the child soldier as a strategy for gaining public support and funding. These images and testimonies reinforced problematic stereotypes, including the African origins of child soldiering and children’s victimhood (see UNICEF 2020a; World Vision 2021; Amnesty International 2012; The Guardian 2014; BBC 2021). For example, child soldier

documentation featured violent recruitment experiences (forcible abduction, including sexual violence towards girls), violent initiation ceremonies in which children were tasked with killing members of their own communities, and children being drugged to carry out terrible acts of violence (for an overview see Drumbl 2012b; Denov 2012; Brocklehurst & Peters 2017). There currently exists a diversity of international advocacy groups, NGOs and child activists that all have different goals and programs to help child soldiers, however, these stereotypes remain powerful and are often reinforced through popular media accounts of child soldiering. This was evident in the two recent campaigns: Kony2012 and #bringbackourgirls campaigns8, which received considerable international attention. The intentions of the campaigns were worthy in addressing social and justice concerns, but they problematically simplified children’s lives and perpetuated the global North’s superiority in saving children of the global South- a dynamic, which is commonly seen in child specific humanitarian work (Berents 2016; Tabak 2020; Wells 2009). Scholars critical of the child soldiering advocacy agenda do not negate children’s experience of violence, however, they argue that the experience of being a child soldier is far more complicated in terms of identity and agency (Rosen 2019; Beier 2011; Denov 2010; Blattman & Annan 2009; Shepler 2005). For this reason, Drumbl and Barrett state that there is still much to learn about when child soldiers become involved, and why and how (Drumbl & Barrett 2019, 2).

This research contributes to this endeavour by critically thinking about how a child soldier experiences the identity of a ‘child soldier’ through reintegration. I argue that the child soldier identity experience is political, and is shaped in diverse ways by international norms, national programs and framings, and the child soldiers’ own experience of this identity. While the international understanding of the child soldier powerfully shapes advocacy efforts, the thesis provides a more nuanced analysis of the way that children experience this identity as a product of an international and local interaction, as located in post

8 The Kony2012 campaign by Invisible Children aimed to have the fugitive, indicted war criminal Joseph Kony brought to trial at the International Criminal Court. Joseph Kony was the leader of the LRA and responsible for recruiting child soldiers. The #bringbackourgirls campaign was a social media campaign started by Nigerians and was adopted internationally in response to the kidnapping of 276 school girls by the terrorist group Boko Haram. 7

conflict settings. To do this, the research is positioned within the critical child soldiering scholarship. Broadly speaking, this scholarship is united by an approach that positions the child as subject rather than as a passive object of research, that is aware of the conceptual limitations relating to the child soldier in international advocacy contexts and the politics of childhood that frames this work, applies a critical lens in researching children’s agency, and focuses on using research methods and approaches that draw on the narratives and real life experiences of children (see for example Drumbl & Barrett 2019; Drumbl 2012a; Beier 2011; Denov 2010).

My research builds on insights from the critical child soldiering scholarship by exploring the complexities and tensions that exist between the international child soldier construct, and the real life experiences of children as child soldiers. For example, the age based definition of the child soldier and the sharp distinction between a child and adult is inadequate in capturing individual social experiences of conflict and reintegration, as documented in this research. Child soldiers often have a much more fluid and complex identity by moving between different categories, such as child, adult, combatant, victim, perpetrator, depending upon the international and national context. Many individuals interviewed were recruited as child soldiers but were adult combatants by the end of the conflict. Also, individual child soldiers relate to the child soldier identity in different ways. Sometimes it is an identity imposed upon them by international or national stakeholders, or children deliberately use the identity to obtain resources and support. Other times childhood experiences of violence, militarisation and displacement can hold more meaning for an individual child than their experience as a child soldier, which may only comprise a small amount of time.

Secondly, critical scholarship notes the omission of girl child soldiers from research and policy work, despite their significant presence worldwide in armed forces and armed groups (Tonheim 2014; Drumbl 2012a; Denov 2010; Park 2006; McKay & Mazurana 2004). This research contributes to this endeavour by focusing on the girl child soldier, but not to the exclusion of boy child soldiers, whose insights were important in this research. My research, therefore, focuses on reintegration as a gendered experience by analysing the role of gendered

social norms and structures in shaping boy and girls’ reintegration experience in different ways. In Nepal and Sri Lanka, girl child soldiers (and women) faced greater criticism and experience of social stigma from family and community members because they transgressed expected gendered roles. Within the LTTE and the CPN-M, girls often experienced a suspension of common gendered social norms, which for some created distinct changes in their lives in terms of their personal identity. Some girls and women took on leadership roles, including as commanders (De Mel 1998; Manchanda 2004). However, often these distinct changes to their identity and roles were lost on return to civilian life as girls faced pressure to conform to their existing, pre-conflict roles. But, while girls are more disadvantaged by gendered social norms and structures in post conflict settings, gender also plays out in the lives of boy child soldiers in complicated ways, which relates to the inability of men to fulfil their social status. In Nepal, this is because of the social and economic disadvantages they contend with as former child soldiers, and in Sri Lanka the specific targeting of men for torture and detention by government authorities has emasculated Tamil men. These issues will be explored further from Chapters 5-8.

1. 3 Reintegration: Overview and conceptual discussion

Reintegration is typically the third or final phase of a DDR program, and is usually implemented in the early post conflict period, following the cessation of conflict and implementation of a peace agreement. Reintegration is defined as an individual’s transition from a military identity to a civilian based identity. The individual resumes a normal civilian life that is supported by family and community networks, and can pursue employment opportunities (UN IDDRS 2019). Child specific reintegration standards are articulated in The Paris Principles (UNICEF 2007), which is the key international guidelines on child soldier reintegration. These standards largely reflect the United Nations Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (UN IDDRS) (UN 2019; 2006) definition, but with a greater emphasis on a child’s education, and family reunification. Reintegration is defined as:

The process through which children transition into civil society and enter meaningful roles and identities as civilians who are accepted by their families and communities in a context of local and national reconciliation (UNICEF 2007, 7).

Scholarship on child soldier reintegration identify many factors, including family support, education and employment opportunities, as key to supporting their transition to a civilian life and life (Denov 2010; Kohrt et al 2010; Wessells 2009; Boothby et al 2006). Boy and girl child soldiers experience this process in different ways because gendered social cultural norms and structures reinforce greater disadvantages for girls in terms of employment and education opportunities (Denov et al 2016; MacKay & Mazurana 2004). To date, existing research on child soldier reintegration is broadly divided between three areas. Firstly, scholarship that focuses on individual experiences, with an emphasis on psychological recovery that is divided between a deficit medical trauma camp, and resilience perspectives that emphasises children’s agency and capacity to overcome experiences of trauma (Denov & Akesson 2017; Barber 2013; Wessells 2009; Boothby et al 2006; Boyden & Mann 2005). Secondly, there are practice-based perspectives that assess programmatic experiences of reintegration in the context of formalised programs like Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)9, and the strengths or weaknesses of these programs (Haer 2017; Pauletto & Patel 2010). Thirdly, reintegration scholarship that focuses on different pathways and experiences of reintegration, including issues of social reintegration, transitional justice, and traditional practice, in facilitating reintegration, such as rituals or other cultural practices (Akello 2019; Barrett 2019; Honwana 2011; Denov 2010).

There is still much to learn about children’s experiences of reintegration, which remains marginal in the DDR and the broader reintegration specific literature (for exceptions see Wessells 2019; Gates & Reich 2011; Honwana 2011; Özerdem, & Podder 2011; Denov 2010). Children face distinct challenges in their transition

9 DDR is defined in three phases: disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration. Disarmament is the process of obtaining weapons to be stored safely by authorities; demobilisation refers to a process of disbanding an armed unit; and reintegration is the process of acquiring civilian status. 10

to adulthood. Many children transition into adulthood without the necessary support and resources from society or government. Reintegration experiences for child soldiers vary in different ways and at an individual level are shaped by culture, social norms and values within family and community as structured by different social identities, including childhood, gender, ethnicity, caste and religion.

More broadly, the study of reintegration is limited by a focus on the merits and weaknesses of DDR, rather than on reintegration per se (for critical overview see Munive 2013; Berdal & Ucko 2009; Muggah 2005). DDR research and discussion has a strong policy angle that focuses on improving DDR practice through practical, management based initiatives (Muggah 2005). For example, reintegration programs have a short-term focus, and success is measured by quantitative results, such as the number of combatants trained for employment (Torjesen 2013). Existing academic scholarship, therefore, identifies a need to broaden research on DDR and reintegration specifically beyond a project, ‘outcome’ focus towards a research focus that accounts for the social, economic and political complexities that ex-combatants (and child soldiers) face (Subedi 2014; Torjesen 2013). For example, some scholars argue that reintegration is a social process, and there is an analytical need to broaden ideas of reintegration outcomes beyond simple, numerical measurements to account for social process of an ex-combatant returning to family and community (Bowd & Özerdem 2013). The transition from a military to civilian identity rests upon a child soldier’s ability to commit to their new civilian life, and they need to be accepted by family and community. Social relations are, therefore, key to this process (Tonheim 2014; Özerdem 2012; Denov 2010). Indeed, the ability of some child soldiers to rebuild relationships with their families and communities in Nepal and Sri Lanka remains a difficult task.

This research, therefore, approaches the study of reintegration in two ways. Firstly, former child soldiers all experience a different reintegration trajectory. While some child soldiers are reintegrated through a formal program like DDR, other child soldiers are excluded (such as girl child soldiers), and others choose to self-demobilise and return their communities. It is important to capture these

different experiences, and to understand the social, economic and political challenges that each child soldiers confronts through formal reintegration programs and beyond. The importance of a longer-term reintegration perspective is important for this study to understand transitions from childhood to adulthood, and from a militarised identity to a civilian one. Secondly, this research focuses on broadening reintegration analysis to account for a greater depth of social and political experiences. In other words, the broader national political context shapes a child soldier’s reintegration experience, and their overall quality of life. The social and political context structures the ability of children to rebuild their civilian lives. In this way, the research provides both a bottom up, individual, and a top down analysis of reintegration.

1. 4 Introduction to case studies: Nepal and Sri Lanka

Two case studies from South Asia, Nepal and Sri Lanka, were chosen to provide a comparative perspective on child soldiers’ reintegration experiences. In Nepal, it was estimated that between 3,500-4,500 child soldiers were recruited by the CPN-M (HRW 2007). In Sri Lanka, in 2008 there were 6,259 cases of child recruitment by the LTTE documented. Out of this total there were 3,784 boys, 2,475 girls, and 2,047 released children (girls and boys)10 (OHCHR 2008). These figures are only an indication of the actual number of child soldiers as the number of child soldiers recruited over the duration of both conflicts is likely to be higher.11 Existing child soldiering research focuses on African case studies like the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Mozambique. A study on Nepal and Sri Lanka is, therefore, important in addressing this geographical research gap. Nepal and Sri Lanka provide important insight into the South Asian context of child soldiering and reintegration as shaped by the local, social context. In Nepal and Sri Lanka, former child soldier’s reintegration experiences are shaped in important ways by childhood, gender, caste, culture, ethnicity, and religion.

10 ‘Released children’ refers to those children released by an armed group or armed force. 11 For example, in Sri Lanka only 594 child soldiers were rehabilitated through formal programs, run by the Sri Lankan state. There are many other child soldiers that are not accounted for. 12

Secondly, Nepal and Sri Lanka experienced extended civil wars, but both countries have very different political landscapes and experiences of building peace. The socio-political context that child soldiers return to is important in understanding their experiences of reintegration, and includes a nation’s historical developments, political developments, and social and cultural practices. This research includes theorisation at the state level to account for the historical and sociological context of state rule, including political power and access to resources, and identity, which includes local (community) experiences of state power. This analysis also includes a Feminist theorisation of state (Parashar et al 2018; Young 2003; Peterson 1992) relating to gendered acts of power and authority used to subvert the Tamil population, as discussed in Chapter 9. Nepal has followed a path of democratisation, but has not substantially addressed the political, social and economic marginalisation experienced by caste and ethnic groups. In Sri Lanka, while democracy exists, authoritarian practices limit the extent of democracy, and militarised practices are used by the state to control the Tamil population. In both countries, formal peace processes and justice mechanisms are highly politicised and limited in delivering outcomes because of the national political context. The political context of both countries structures child soldiers’ reintegration experience in important ways. Further details of the conflict and post conflict scenarios in both countries are outlined thoroughly in Chapters 5 & 7.

1. 5 Theoretical approach and rationale

This thesis addresses important theoretical and empirical gaps in the study of child soldiers. Unlike some other categories of war-affected children, such as children born of war time rape (Jacob 2018; Seto 2015; Carpenter 2007), child soldiers are already present as an international advocacy issue, but the complexity of their lives related to identity and lived experience needs further exploration and research. The thesis employs a theoretical approach that utilises children in International Relations (CIR) scholarship, and engages with the lives of child soldiers through an ‘everyday’ lens. CIR scholarship and the concomitant focus on ‘childhood’ provides the broad framework for this thesis. This is

supplemented by Feminist IR scholarship as discussed below. CIR scholarship is informed by sociological studies of childhood that theorises ‘childhood’ as a social construct, which positions the child as a significant actor. Childhood is an important identity that intersects with other social identities like gender, class, ethnicity, and socio-economic status to determine a child’s position in society, and their access to resources and opportunities (James & Prout 2015 3-5; Jenks 1996, 57). CIR scholarship utilises a sociological theoretical grounding to analyse the social, political and economic norms, practices and structures that marginalised groups differently in research and practice in international politics (Huynh et al 2015). CIR scholarship argues for the value of studying children in international politics as a potential site of knowledge, and their ability to shape their own surroundings, including political, social and cultural processes (D’Costa 2016; Jacob 2015; Watson 2006). This is an important methodological insight as typically children have been studied as passive and objects of research (James & Prout 2015, 4). The diversity of child soldiering experiences becomes apparent through thinking about childhood critically: a child’s experience of being a child soldier can conform to international understandings, but they can actively challenge these understandings through their own narratives and experiences of recruitment, and post conflict experience. Secondly, children’s identities can be used as a political tool by different actors to support various political agendas in post conflict environments, such as building state legitimacy.

This research demonstrates in important ways that childhood is experienced in conflict and post conflict settings in diverse ways, as shaped by processes of militarisation, conflict and political violence. I focus on the role of social identities in shaping child soldiers’ reintegration experiences, which is dynamic and intersectional. An intersectional theoretical framework (Crenshaw 1989)12 is used to analyse multiple identities and social subjectivities as located within structures of power and oppression. One criticism of the intersectional theoretical framework advanced by Crenshaw, however, is that identity is fixed and is a possessive attribute of groups or identities (Anthias 2008; Anthias and Yuval-

12 The intersectional theoretical framework was developed to understand Black American women’s experience of racial and social inequalities alongside gender. See Crenshaw (1989) 14

Davis 2005, 62–63). Instead, scholars argue for that identity is located within a broader context of ‘social locations and processes’ (Anthias 2008, 5). In other words, identities are shaped by social practices, structures and outcomes that are not fixed, but can shift and change overtime, or be accepted or rejected by the subject itself (Anthias 2008; Giri 2021). This research draws upon recent developments in the intersectional approach to capture the different ways that former child soldiers experience identity through different spaces and time frames in relation to different social and political structures and institutions.

Secondly, this work draws upon Feminist IR scholarship to analyse the gendered experience of child soldiering in conflict and reintegration. Feminist IR scholarship challenges the idea that women are simply victims of conflict in need of protection by providing a rich and nuanced understanding of women’s diverse role in violence, and the complicated interplay between person and political motivations for participation in armed conflict or acts of political violence (Giri 2021; Henshaw 2017; Parashar 2014, Allison 2009; Moser & Clark 2001). Gender analysis is at the forefront of this work, which pays attention to the way that gender acts as a socially constructed organisational category that is based upon a hierarchy of (dominant) masculine values and norms over feminine ones. As a structural power relation, gender relies upon distinctions between categories of people to determines access to resources and opportunities within society. As Cohn (2013) explains, gender shapes the lives of men and women differently in terms of their individual experience and their ability to exercise agency in conflict and post conflict settings. While men and women may experience many of the same phenomenon (sexual assault, injury, torture, displacement), ultimately as ‘men’ and ‘women’ they embody and symbolise different meanings to their communities, authorities, families and opponents and, are therefore, often targeted in different ways with different social impacts (Cohn 2013, 22). This research draws on these insights to explore the gender dimensions of reintegration for former girl and boy child soldiers.

Thirdly, this research draws on an expanded idea of agency through an ‘everyday’ lens to analyse the daily actions taken by former child soldiers to negotiate and rebuild their adult lives in in post conflict settings. The everyday

emerged from the local turn in peacebuilding to illustrate that liberal peace is distant from the everyday needs and realities that shape people’s lives (see Richmond 2012; Mac Ginty 2014)13. This research does not focus on liberal peacebuilding interventions, but the everyday nonetheless promotes the importance of understanding a bottom up, contextualised understanding of how conflict and peace intersect people’s lives beyond formal peace agreements and milestones, and how in turn individuals cope with and negotiate conflict and post conflict settings through social practices. Mac Ginty describes the everyday as ‘the routinized practices used by individuals and collectives as they navigate their way through life’ (2014, 549). 14 This includes, as Björkdahl explains, ‘issues such as infrastructure, housing and schooling. to improve the conditions of everyday life’ (2013, 211). By adopting an everyday lens, this research recognises the resilience and resistance demonstrated by former child soldiers as an expression of agency through the social and political actions that they take to better their lives, and that of their families and communities. These actions often take place within difficult circumstances as they contend with structural inequalities, social injustice, poverty and marginalisation.

1. 6 Methodological approach

This thesis employs a qualitative approach to methodology that used case studies based on interviews with former child soldiers and ex-combatants, conducted through fieldwork in Nepal and Sri Lanka. I documented these interviews in note form and recorded the interview if I had permission to do so. Fieldwork was carried out in Sri Lanka and Nepal, over a six month period from 2017-2018. I approached the interviews by focusing on former a child soldier’s childhood experience through different phases: pre-conflict, conflict and post

13 Ideas of the everyday typically are influenced by Michel de Certeau theorisation of the everyday. This draws attention to the way that people resist socio cultural organisation (local/global governance) to re-appropriate space and challenge attempts by authority figures to organise and structure their lives (de Certeau 1984) 14 One important critique of the everyday advanced by Randazzo is that peacebuilding scholarship only highlights certain types of local agency, based upon a criterion of emancipation or resistance. She argues that this is a result of a normative agenda by scholars to substantially challenge the liberal peace project. She states, the critical scholarship selectively chooses: ‘appropriate forms of behaviour from unwanted “unbecoming” ones’ at the local scale (Randazzo 2016, 1361). 16

conflict settings. In this way, I could contextualise their reintegration experience within a broader continuum of life experiences and challenges. In the interviews, I asked participants to reflect on some of the challenges they faced in their reintegration experience. I was also interested in how the participant related to being a ‘child soldier’ and what sort of impact this has had on their identity and status. In both case studies, the conflicts ended some time ago. In Nepal, the conflict ended fourteen years ago and in Sri Lanka the conflict ended eleven years ago. For many former child soldiers, considerable time has passed since they returned to society. This provided an important research opportunity. Former child soldiers, who are now adults, could reflect and think more broadly about the implications of being a child soldier through the lens of their adult lives to discuss their child soldiering experiences within a broader perspective of life experiences and challenges.

Interviewees were found through the ‘snowballing method’ through my own networks established in country, including through NGOs, government and/or military contacts, local researchers, former child soldiers and/or ex combatants, or through my interpreters. I accessed participants through informal rather than formal networks and did not have to seek formal government approval, either at a local or national level, to conduct this research. However, I did not have the language skills to conduct the interviews in the local language (Tamil and Nepalese) so I relied upon an interpreter in each country, who were a ‘gatekeeper’ to communication between myself and the participant. To engage with the participant in the interview despite the language limitations, I spent time with the interpreter discussing the research aims and topic before commencing the interview. After the interview had finished, I also debriefed with the interpreter by jointly discussing and reviewing the interview together. These debriefs involved identifying better questions or ways or handling issues that arose during the interview, and clarifying other matters where needed. For example, in one interview with a former girl child soldier in Sri Lanka, the child soldier was apprehensive to speak. During the interview, I realised that my interpreter was trying to push her to speak. I told him that his strategy was unnecessary and it was up to her what she discussed with me. I made sure to re-iterate to him the importance of upholding the voluntary nature of the interviews in the debrief, and

that it was important not to place pressure on participants to speak if they did not wish to. I also adopted another engagement strategy during the interview whereby I directly addressed the questions to the participant to establish eye contact. I paid attention to their voice, and other visual cues to interpret and analyse the interview further. A triangle arrangement was adopted in the seating arrangement to ensure that I could engage as much as possible with the participant, rather than relying on my interpreter (Edwards 1998).

The interviews were semi-structured and primarily involved one-on-one interviews with former child soldiers and ex-combatants, and some group discussions to gather data and took place in homes of the interviewees, community halls, or meeting rooms. While I intended to set up one-on-one interviews, in Sri Lanka some of the interviews with former child soldiers took place in their family homes, and family members were present and participated. This was particularly the case for the younger former child soldiers, who were still living with their parents. Family members were there to support their (adult) children as some of the former child soldiers were apprehensive about the interview. While the ‘child soldier’ was the focus of the interview, often family members supplemented the interview with their own experiences by discussing their child’s reintegration process, and their fears and concerns about their child’s future. Sometimes the parent’s views contradicted the otherwise positive account given by the child soldier in relation to their treatment by state authorities, for example. The insights and reflections given by family members often gave a more nuanced understanding of the security situation and the realities that the former child soldier faced in re-building their adult lives. They were more willing than the former child soldier to articulate their thoughts on more ‘sensitive matters’, specifically the political sensitives that continue to exist between the Sri Lankan government and former LTTE members. Former child soldiers did not appear to defer to their parents, and were relatively free to speak. But it became evident that some of the former child soldiers were fearful of being critical of the Sri Lankan government. The presence of family members, therefore, provided additional layers of information that would not have been available had I only interviewed the former child soldier. See section 8.1.3 and 8.4 for further discussion and analysis of these matters.

1.6.1 Fieldwork matters

Firstly, I was based in Nepal for two months from November to December 2017, and interviews took place both in Kathmandu (the capital) and on the outskirts of the city. I interviewed 30 former child soldiers (18 girls and 12 boys). Their age range was 25-30. Most of them are not from Kathmandu, but they now live there. For this reason, I captured a broad range of experience as shaped by caste, ethnicity, gender and geography. These interviews were set up through Lenin Bista, who runs an organisation called Peace Envisioners (formerly known as the Discharged PLA organisation). The Peace Envisioners organisation currently represents 3,000 of the 4,008 former child soldiers, who were classified as Verified Minors and Late Recruits (VMLR) during the UN verification process after 2006.15 As ‘verified minors’ they accessed a separate reintegration program, and were not able to access the same amount of compensation in the form of voluntary retirement packages, or integration in to the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) like their adult counter-parts. Included in the thirty interviews were eight phone interviews conducted with former child soldiers (mainly girls) living in remote regions.

Peace Envisioners has a political agenda to challenge the Nepalese government for compensation and to achieve social justice. From a methodological perspective, the narratives presented in the interviews were at times political as all the former child soldiers interviewed are affiliated with Lenin and the Peace Envisioners organisation. I critically reflect upon this in terms of my research findings in the Nepal findings chapter (Chapter 6). In addition, I conducted interviews with international and national NGOs, government officials and activists (n=10). My interpreter was a female journalist, who lives in Kathmandu. She had no affiliation to the Peace Envisioners organisation.

In Sri Lanka, I was based in Colombo for four months and was hosted at the International Centre for Ethnic Studies (ICES) from February to May 2018. I then

15 Personal correspondence with Lenin Bista, 1.12.20 19

spent time in the Northern province16 of Sri Lanka in Jaffna, and undertook fieldwork with former child soldiers and combatants in the surrounding area through day trips. This research focuses on children, who live in the Northern province, which was the main epicentre of the conflict. 45 former child soldiers were interviewed in total, 21 were female, and 24 were male. The age range was 24-40 and the participants lived in the Northern Province. Like Nepal, these interviews were supplemented by interviews with international and national NGOs, government officials, and activists, primarily in Colombo (n=9).

In Sri Lanka, the interviews were set up in three ways: through my own informal networks, through my interpreter, or through a former child soldier that I met on the second day of interviews, who facilitated interviews with other former child soldiers and ex-combatants known to him. My interpreter was a local Tamil man, who lived in Jaffna with his wife and family. He previously worked for international organisations like UNICEF on child soldiering in Sri Lanka and, therefore, had extensive contacts in the region. I built a strong working relationship with my interpreter, who I relied upon for translation, but also in navigating the complicated security issues in the region to ensure that we protected ourselves and most importantly the participants. On the second day of the trip, I interviewed a former child soldier, who had recently been released from prison. He was setting up a local organisation to help other former child soldiers and ex-combatants meet some of the social and economic hardships they face. He arranged some of the interviews, including with former senior LTTE members. Without his help, I would not have gained access to some of the formerly highly ranked LTTE members.

1.6.2 Data limitations

In both countries, it is inevitable that some of the participants did not wish to share some information with me, or altered their stories for both personal, political, and/or security reasons. For women, there was greater concern about social stigmatisation, particularly if they were seeking marriage, were widowed,

16 Northern province is made up of five districts: Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mannar, Mullaitivu and Vavuniya. 20

or their husband was missing. While some women were open about these challenges, in other interviews they were more careful in constructing their narrative. For example, one former girl child soldier became pregnant to another fellow former boy child soldier while in the cantonment camps. Because they were not married at the time, she did not openly admit this to me because being pregnant before marriage is taboo in Nepalese culture. Even though she left the cantonment camp ten years ago (or more) and is now married to the same man, her pregnancy remains a private matter for her. It was only through a private discussion with my interpreter after the interview that I established the context of this event. Similarly, a former girl child soldier in Sri Lanka was very careful about detailing her involvement in the LTTE because her and her family were seeking marriage for her and needed to manage her public reputation.

In both case studies, Sri Lanka and Nepal’s post conflict political environment played out in different ways in participant’s narratives. In Sri Lanka, former child soldiers and ex-combatants, who are based in the northern and eastern part of the country, live with the substantial presence of government security forces in troop numbers and in military bases. Many of the participants reported being under surveillance to varying degrees. Many of the participants maintain a strong political commitment to the LTTE in supporting the establishment of an independent Tamil homeland. It is, therefore, possible that some of them distorted experiences of state oppression or highlighted the merits of the Tamil movement. It is unlikely, however, that they distorted or exaggerated state oppression and violence too much, as issues of detention, torture and surveillance are documented by other researchers, and in secondary documentary sources.

Similarly, in Nepal, former child soldiers represented by the Peace Envisioners organisation have a political agenda to challenge the state’s failure to provide substantial compensation, education and employment assistance. My research will document how former child soldiers actively engage with international narratives of child soldiering in terms of victimhood and criminality in their international and national advocacy efforts. In other words, they engage in language to ‘constitute themselves as political subjects’ (Kent 2011, 436). This

was apparent in their narratives, which shifted between acknowledgement of their previous support of the Maoists and their engagement with international child soldiering advocacy narratives and strategies. A tension in their narratives was obvious, which I reflect on in Chapter 6.

Given the social nature of narratives it is inevitable that stories evolve or change because of life phases, events, and surroundings, particularly given the time since both conflicts ended. What is significant for the participant now in terms of their reintegration challenges is most likely to be different if they were interviewed at another time in their life.

1.6.3 Logistical issues

In Nepal I only accessed participants, who were based in Kathmandu or on the outskirts of the city. Existing research demonstrates that people belonging to lower caste and other marginalised groups, including some ethnic groups experienced greater levels of violence during the conflict, and face even greater difficulties in rural areas because they cannot access resources and facilities because of the significant rural/urban divide that continues to exist (Bishwakarma 2018; Braithwaite 2015). Access to rural based participants could have provided different perspectives than the urban based participants I interviewed. For example, I anticipate that caste could have featured more prominently in these interviews in discussing reintegration. I was also told that women had suffered more greatly from conflict base sexual violence in the rural areas, and there were other former child soldiers with severe mental and physical injuries that resulted from the conflict. Interestingly, many of the former child soldiers I interviewed were from higher castes, or did not cite caste as an issue. I can only speculate that their modern city life enables them to overcome some of those pre-existing social prejudice because of higher education and employment levels, and the network of support developed through the Peace Envisioners organisation. Furthermore, some of the interviews with former child soldiers were conducted on the phone (total of 8). Being there ‘in-person’ with the participant would have enabled me to engage even more in the interviews, as well as observing their

surroundings, home life and visual cues. It is difficult to establish personal rapport and trust with somebody through a short telephone conversation. These participants might have spoken to me about different, and even sensitive topics had I been there ‘in-person’. But nonetheless, these interviews were still valuable and provided insight into the different challenges that women face in rural settings in terms of their work load and child care commitments.

In Sri Lanka access to participants was less of an issue because of the better quality roads and infrastructure. My interviews captured many individuals with diverse backgrounds, gender, and age etc. The main limitation I faced was security because of the militarised environment and the on-going surveillance of former LTTE members. I was not able to spend long interviewing the participants because we did not want to draw unnecessary attention to them.

1.6.4 Document Analysis

The fieldwork conducted for this research was supplemented through document analysis of key sources like international and national NGO reports on child soldiers, and local research on peace and conflict in Sri Lanka and Nepal, carried out by policy think tanks and activists. Often international organisations have a local office or commission local researchers to conduct research and analysis, which I drew upon in this research. Some of the international organisations included Child Soldiers International, International Center for Transitional Justice (Nepal and Sri Lanka), International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch, UNICEF and other UN organisations. Local organisations included Nepal Peacebuilding Initiative, International Centre for Ethnic Studies, and other local researchers, either based in a university in country, or who work independently. Some of the key topics identified and analysed through secondary document sources included: analysis of conflict and peace, transitional justice, reintegration for women and children, ethnic relations, and political analysis, to list a few examples. Such analysis is needed to situate the participants’ point of view within a broader context of political, cultural and social meanings and processes.

1. 7 Ethical considerations

The research itself was subjected to strict ethical clearance through The Australian National University Human Research Ethics Committee before research commenced (protocol 2017/460). The data was collected in a way to protect the anonymity and confidentially of participants by using codes, rather than names. All recordings were uploaded to a password protected computer that is in a locked office in Australia.

This research was motivated by the importance of documenting child soldiers’ reintegration experience to not only understand the challenges they continue to face and the resilience they demonstrate, but to provide theoretical and empirical insights that challenge the research agenda of the International Relations (IR) discipline. Given the sensitivities of conducting this research, I was guided by a Feminist perspective in designing the methodology and conducting the research. This included principles of self-reflexivity, social justice, and the potential for research to have a transformative effect (Ackerly et al 2006, 4-6). Feminist methodologies illustrate the importance of engaging with marginalised groups to study ‘up’ and ‘down’ simultaneously. Insights provided by marginalised subjects through field work, or other methods help to revise key concepts in IR theory related to states, protection, security, conflict and peace (Ackerly et al 2006, 4). Centring the marginalised subject provides theoretical insights that would otherwise be inaccessible (D’Costa 2006, 129).

Sri Lanka and Nepal as case studies were chosen strategically as both conflicts ended ten years ago or more. Former child soldiers are now adults and issues of consent were, therefore, easier to manage than researching with children. Before commencing the research, I was aware participation in the research could potentially cause further trauma to participants. I mitigated this risk in the following ways. Firstly, before I commenced fieldwork, I completed a course run by the NSW Service for the Treatment and Rehabilitation of Torture and Trauma Survivors (STARTTS) on ‘Core Concepts in Working with People from Refugee Backgrounds’. I also consulted with a psychologist, a former ANU academic in Criminology and Psychology, on the best strategy for approaching participants

and spoke about my intended questions. The most important strategy suggested to me was to identify child soldiers by working with mental health workers and psychologists that are helping them through their practice or support service. I pursued this strategy where possible, particularly in Sri Lanka. The second approach was to find former child soldiers who already speak quite openly about their stories through the media or their work (say for an NGO or other type of organisation). This strategy worked in Nepal through the Peace Envisioners organisation.

Most of the participants had time to process some of the extreme experiences of trauma. The focus of the interviews was not to ask participants to work through their trauma and grief (compared to clinical psychological interventions, for example). In many cases, family members were present in the interviews to support their children, and would sometimes contribute to the discussion. I explained up front the voluntary nature of their participation and that they could withdraw at any point. I also provided counselling services on the information sheet given to participants (see Appendix 1). I found that people wanted to share their stories as they felt marginalised and silenced by authorities. For many participants, therefore, participation was an opportunity to raise concerns about their ill treatment and the challenges that they continue to face in providing for their families.

1. 8 Thesis roadmap

In Chapter 2, I introduce the key concepts that provide the theoretical and conceptual framing of this this thesis. This includes childhood, child agency and children’s rights. I focus on childhood and International Relations (CIR) scholarship, which draws on sociological childhood studies that position the child as significant actor, and theorises childhood as a social identity. CIR scholarship provides a theoretical and methodological opening to demonstrate the different ways that children are significant in international politics. A critical theorisation of the state in relation to power and identity are also discussed. I argue that

reintegration experiences need to be analysed and understood through both a bottom up (individual) and top down perspective (state, political analysis).

In Chapter 3, I provide a critical overview of child soldier research and policy literature, identifying key themes that frame my research approach. This includes the politics of childhood, global North South relations, an analysis of agency in relation to a victim and perpetrator binary, and girl and boy child soldiers. This chapter argues that there is a need to further interrogate the politics framing the child soldier construct, and the way that individual children relate to, or understand, the child soldier identity. Currently, there exists a significant gap between the international idea of the child soldier, and the social, political, economic and legal and realities that shape a child’s experience of this identity in a local setting. The key themes identified in the chapter provide a framework in critically analysing child soldier experiences in Nepal and Sri Lanka.

Chapter 4 critically analyses reintegration. I provide a critical overview of DDR and argue that reintegration is insufficiently conceptualised in the context of DDR programming. Reintegration is a multi-faceted process that encompasses multiple transitions from a military to civilian context for the individual child soldier. Reintegration outcomes are intrinsically shaped by the war to peace transition that occurs in post conflict settings. In the second part of the chapter, I address specific aspects of reintegration that are particularly relevant to child solder reintegration, including the different ways that children experience the child soldier identity in relation to social settings, including social stigma and gendered experience of return.

Chapter 5 is the background chapter to Nepal. Nepal’s historical and contemporary political developments are defined by on-going social, economic and political marginalisation experienced by particular caste and ethnic groups, including the lowest caste Dalit, indigenous groups (janajati) and women. The Nepalese state continues to prioritise Nepalese national characteristics based on Hindu religion and culture. In the post conflict period, historical patterns of exclusion continue to exist along caste and ethnic lines. Marginalised groups make up most of the conflict victims, but they have not benefited extensively from

peace and democratic reform. Nepal’s peace process remains defined by on- going issues in delivering justice to victims because of the political context, which for many victims includes socio-economic justice. Nepal’s peace process provides an important context in understanding how former child soldiers’ position themselves in relation to national peace and justice initiatives, and their campaign to advocate for social justice.

In Chapter 6, I analyse child soldier reintegration experiences in Nepal. Nepal’s case study demonstrates the multiple ways that child soldiers engage with the child soldier identity across an international and local divide. The child soldier identity imposed upon them through DDR process was largely disempowering and created a social division between former child soldiers and their senior Maoist leaders, and their families and communities. Girl child soldiers in particular are subjected to social criticism by family and society for transgressing expected gendered norms, and face significant pressure to be married. In the final section, I analyse how former child soldiers in the Peace Envisioners organisations strategically used the child soldier identity to leverage international support in their efforts to attain social justice, particularly employment and other compensation. Peace Envisioners represents a powerful example of former child soldiers collectively working to challenge existing ideas of justice, and to refute national narratives on peace building.

Chapter 7 is the background chapter to Sri Lanka. The rise of the Sinhalese dominated state after Sri Lanka gained independence from the British in 194817 consolidated ethnic divisions between the Sinhalese political majority and Tamil community. Sri Lanka’s political developments are defined by the rise of authoritarian tendencies, and the growth of the military as an institution used to maintain control and order of the population. In the conflict period, I analyse the conflict experiences of child soldiers recruited to the LTTE to illustrate the complexities surrounding choice and agency for many children in the face of on- going violence and destruction of their communities. In the post conflict period,

17 Sri Lanka was retained in the British Commonwealth until 22 May 1972 when it was re-named the Republic of Sri Lanka. 27

the Sri Lankan government refuses to engage seriously in political dialogue with Tamil communities to address justice and reconciliation concerns. The militarisation of the former conflict zones where child soldiers are based has serious and on-going implications for their security and well-being.

In Chapter 8, I present the empirical findings for Sri Lanka. I argue that the actions of the Sri Lankan state towards former LTTE members is structured by two identities: a paternal, fatherly identity and a masculine, militarised identity. Both identities work in tandem to support the Sri Lankan state’s attempts to maintain legitimacy and control over Tamil communities. I argue that their rehabilitation of 594 former child soldiers was done for instrumental purposes, and, in return, former soldiers are expected to perform a particular identity as victimised child soldiers. In the masculine, militarised state I analyse the state’s on-going attempts to subjugate the Tamil population, particularly former LTTE members. I suggest that a child soldier’s reintegration process is only sustained within a broader environment of human rights, and political and social freedom. In the final section, I apply a gendered lens to understand the gendered social norms that structure girls and women’s reintegration experiences, and the multiple vulnerabilities that they face in relation to the militarised environment.

1. 9 Conclusion

The focus of this thesis is to explore children’s experience of the child soldier identity in relation to complex social and political situations that are present in post conflict settings. I do this by drawing on sociological approaches to children in International Relations, and a methodology that uses fieldwork and case studies. I will analyse reintegration in the context of national post conflict politics by examining the longer-term reintegration experiences of former girl and boy child soldiers, who were recruited to the two former armed groups: CPN-M (Nepal) and the LTTE (Sri Lanka). The political context of post conflict settings creates the context from which former child soldiers generate meaning around their own social identity, their place in relation to family and community, and as citizens in relation to state. This thesis illustrates the complexities of reintegration

as experienced by former child soldiers by focusing on their agency and lived experience.

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework

This chapter outlines key theoretical concepts used in the thesis used to incorporate the study of child soldiers in international politics in a meaningful way. Specifically, this chapter will address the definition of childhood, children’s rights, sociological approaches to childhood, and children in International Relations (CIR) scholarship. The chapter begins by defining the child and childhood to illustrate the socially constructed nature of these terms. Internationally there exists consensus about the child and expectations of childhood experiences, but locally these experiences often sit in tension to international norms, including in the context of children’s rights. I then briefly outline sociological theories of childhood including recent developments in the field centred on relational ontology.

In the second part of the chapter, I outline current approaches to CIR scholarship, which positions children as significant actors in international politics. While children are already present in the workings of the international system, the complexity of their lives related to identity and lived experiences needs further exploration. CIR scholarship, which is informed by sociological approaches to childhood, provides a theoretical and methodological opening to situate them as significant actors, to engage with their agency in different forms, and to understand their lives in a ‘bottom up’ and ‘top down’ sense in relation to key concepts such as conflict, peace, justice, and the state. Two approaches are identified: individual experiences of children in relation to family, community and state, and secondly, a top down analysis of state protection and security of children (sections 2.6 and 2.7). These two key themes help to structure my analysis of child soldiering reintegration experiences.

2.1 Defining child and childhood

According to The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989)(CRC), a child is defined as anybody under the age of 18, unless the laws of the country set the legal age for adulthood younger. While acknowledging the contested nature of

childhood as will be outlined below, this research regards childhood in the twentieth century as distinct to adulthood, and as a fluid and transitory state, which is culturally and historically variable (James & Prout 2015, 4; Gittins 2008, James & James 2004). Childhood is not just defined by age, but is socially constructed and informed by local values and expectations, including family and community expectations, which varies from culture to culture (Lee-Koo 2015,10; Brocklehurst 2006). A child belongs, therefore, to the collective group of ‘childhood’, but within this category exists a diverse range of children. Most importantly, childhood is defined in relation to other forms of social identity that intersect with childhood, like gender, race, ethnicity, and caste (James & Prout 2015). Ideas of childhood are also fluid and can change to reflect social values and priorities.

Despite the importance of social identity, age is still an important factor in defining who is a child, and in accounting for their mental and physical capacity related to age. In international practices age is used to distinguish childhood from adulthood in different legal and policy contexts. The age of the child is often broken down into life phases, which is often used interchangeably in international and customary law as well as international policy discussion), with terms like ‘infant’, ‘child’, ‘minor’, juvenile, youth to indicate different life phases, from younger to older children. These categories signify a couple of things: the age group and the capacity of the child in relation to social and legal matters, such as criminal responsibility (Brocklehurst 2006, 9).

Ideas of childhood can also be politicised in terms of who belongs to the category, and who does not. Political situations can ‘unmake childhood’ (Brocklehurst 2006). This is illustrated in Palestine. Although Israel legally recognise a child as 18 and under, until 2009 Palestinian children were trialled in an adult military court setting for alleged offences relating to violent crime, and public protests (UNICEF 2013a). While Israel subsequently adopted a military juvenile court, there remains concerns by activists that children as young as twelve will be imprisoned for violent crime offences, rather than prioritising rehabilitation (Defence for Children International Palestine 2016). Given the historical and political context of Israel’s domination of the Palestinian population,

childhood experiences are shaped by the Israeli state’s desire to subdue the Palestinians.

Despite the prevalence of childhood in international narratives and policy making, the concept of child and childhood are contested, largely because international ideas of childhood draw upon a Western and liberal model of childhood found in the ‘global North’ (Boyden 2015; Archard 1993). Western here refers to the economically and powerfully strong countries primarily located in western European and North America. This is illustrated by international policy and NGO based statements describing childhood. For example, UNICEF refers childhood as a ‘special, protected time, in which children must be allowed to grow, learn, play, develop and flourish with dignity’ (UNICEF 2021).

The problem with such a definition, as highlighted in the literature, is that this idea of childhood is regarded as the expected norm, which devalues other childhood experiences, particularly in the Global South (see Imoh 2016; Punch & Tisdall 2012). Linde (2014) also explains that the international community uses ideological power and authority to define childhood. She states: By articulating standards of childhood, the international community assumes the power to define childhood, which includes identifying areas of protection, setting the scope of protections, identifying violations of those protections, and establishing processes of adjudication when violations occur (2014, 564).

Indeed, the concept of childhood is a construct and principally emerged from the eighteenth century onwards in response to social, economic and political changes, primarily in western Europe (Jenks 1996; Hendrick 1990). Scholars often refer to the seminal work of Philippe Ariés, L’Enfant et la view familiale sous l’ancien regime (Childhood: A Social History of Family Life) (1960), as being a central reference point in defining modern childhood and childhood studies. Ariés argued that up to, and including the Middle Ages, children were not considered differently to adults. The social identity of ‘childhood’ only emerged in the eighteenth century. Children, he argued, had previously been treated like small adults and were not given special treatment as ‘children’ (Jenks 1996; Wells

2009, 5-6). Spurred on by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and other Romantic thinkers from the eighteenth century onwards, children were identified as a unique grouping with a distinctive, collective identity. Rousseau called for special attention to be given to the needs of children and the value of a child having a ‘childhood’. Education was also seen as key to their childhood. However, this childhood experience was largely restricted to families from more socio-economic privileged backgrounds, who could support a lifestyle for their children (Jenks 1996, 64-65). In this period, children changed into sentimental objects for their families and communities, as explained by Scheper-Hughes 1987: The instrumental value of children has largely been replaced by their expressive value. Children have become relatively worthless (economically) to their parents, but priceless in terms of their psychological worth (Scheper-Hughes 1987, 12).

From the 1800s onwards, children’s identification as a unique grouping with special needs was driven by changing social attitudes towards children in post- industrial Britain and Europe, more broadly. Firstly, Qvortrup refers to the ‘privatisation of childhood’ to describe the social emphasis on children’s place in the community as confined to the home or school (domestic sphere) (2005, 9). Secondly, the privatisation of childhood was reinforced by a series of social and legal measures that recognised, and put in place, welfare and rights mechanisms to protect children. This included social and welfare changes (particularly around child labour issues), the rise of Christianity, and emphasis on the nuclear family unit (Boyden 2015, Hendrick 1990). Wells (2009) explains that social concern to protect children resulted in the ‘child saver’ position, which is still evident in the contemporary politics of childhood protection. Typically, this approach depicts children as innocent and living in abusive and dangerous circumstances, and for the need to save them. Of particular concern to these advocates was prostitution and homelessness (Wells 2009, 29-30). However, the social and legal reforms that sought to protect children excluded them from public life by putting in place social exclusion practices based on age. James & James (2004) are more critical of such protection measures, noting that ‘children become largely confined to a state of dependency and to the social worlds of the school and the family (James and James 2004, 36).

Within the broader childhood studies literature, particularly sociological and anthropological work, scholars have critiqued the international application of childhood in policy and academic terms because it discounts and even devalues other experiences of childhood, particularly along a global North-South divide. These debates are particularly evident in relation to the CRC (Imoh et al 2019; Pupavac 2001). Indeed, it is only a minority of children that can experience childhood in this way. Liebel defines the global North-South divide as having a geopolitical meaning rather than being a geographical entity, which ‘accounts for the division and inequality between and within different regions of the world’ (Liebel 2020, 5). Through cross-cultural studies, scholars demonstrate that there are multiple experiences of childhood that are shaped by important social events and transitions, such as early marriage, work responsibilities or even as a child- headed household (Punch 2002; Woodhead 1999). Sometimes children shift into adult worlds because of financial and economic hardships, as families cannot always provide the type of childhood discussed in international policy contexts. Children can also value bringing money for their families (Woodhead 1999).

Post colonial childhood scholarship takes this perspective further by demonstrating that academic and policy knowledge generated on childhood is often compromised by particular values and understandings of childhood. Post colonial here refers to the study of global power structures of power that unequally structure people’s lives as a legacy of colonialism (Liebel 2020; Spivak 1988). For example, Imoh argues that in global media accounts and NGO work, and research on childhood in sub-Saharan Africa, there is a focus on a deficit model of childhood, which overshadows the ability of children to navigate difficulties situations in an everyday and routine sense (Imoh 2016, 456). He suggests there is a need to more fully engage with the pluralities of childhood that are evident in this region. Rabello de Castro also makes similar argument in relation to ‘Third World’ children that are often regarded as the most ‘socially harmed category’. He proposes that researchers need to be open to new forms of living and engage children through research that recognises their ability to make social and political change (Rabello de Castro 2020, 11-12). In some respects, the academic focus on the global North-South divide reinforces such a

divide. One way to move away from devaluing certain childhood experiences is to utilise the analytical framework of intersectionality (Crenshaw 1989; Watson 2020) to understand different experiences of childhood as structured by other social divisions (race, class, ethnicity, gender, and religion), and in providing a more nuanced lens that captures experiences of marginalisation through multiple, interactive identities. This approach frames my analysis of childhood in the South Asian context.

However, while it is necessary to acknowledge different childhoods worldwide and the power dynamics evident through research and knowledge acquisition particularly along a global North/South divide, the childhood model promoted in international policy terms is not necessarily foreign to children and their families, worldwide. Indeed, a lot of families do prioritise education, and want to provide a safe and protected environment for their children. Families can share universal goals in terms of the life outcomes they want for their children. Of course, there are important variations according to culture and socio-economic status, but it also important to acknowledge that many families want to provide a childhood to their children that resonates with international policy and human rights frameworks regarding education, safety and development outcomes and standards.

2.2 The rights of the child

In international discourses and advocacy, children’s rights underpin the international child soldier identity. Child soldiering is a violation of children’s rights to protection during conflict and also features in demobilisation and reintegration efforts. In Article 6 of the CRC, it states that ‘state parties will take all feasible measures to demobilise children’. Similarly, Article 39 calls on states to help the social reintegration of children. Actions taken by relevant parties should be based on the ‘best interests of the child’ (Article 3). In the next section, I address the question of children’s rights. Many of the key debates around childhood in relation to the global North-South divide, and the importance of acknowledging different childhood experiences, are also important debates that continue in the

context of children’s rights. I provide a brief overview of the CRC, including criticisms of it, and its strength and limitations in the context of political violence and post conflict settings. While the CRC remains an important tool in protecting children in conflict and post conflict settings by upholding human rights standards, in practice there are limitations in the conceptualisation of the CRC and applying it to different cultural and social contexts. This analysis of key issues in children’s rights provides important insight into the tensions and complexities of applying a children’s rights regime in post conflict settings. While in Sri Lanka and Nepal children’s rights in theory informed DDR programs, in practice the implementation was distorted by the political and social environment.

The CRC was ratified in 1989 by the UN general assembly and is currently ratified by 196 countries (UN 2021). It is the most important global document for the promotion of children’s human rights in ensuring the protection, survival and development. Children’s rights are defined by three components: children’s rights to provision, protection and participation (Franklin and Franklin, 1996). A defining feature of the CRC is the integration of four categories of rights: civil and political, economic, social and cultural rights. Most importantly, the CRC encompasses a range of entitlements including protecting children from harm and exploitation, but it also contains the participatory article that support the idea that children should have a say in matters that affect their life (Article 12). The CRC’s emphasis on children’s participatory rights represents an important departure from previous UN child declarations, namely the UN 1924 League of Nations declaration and the 1959 UN declarations, which emphasised the welfare rights of children. The CRC is an important international tool used by the international community to keep state’s accountable by upholding international standard of childhood (Wells 2009). Therefore, child rights advocates and proponents regard it as an important resource for the protection of children worldwide, regardless of culture, ethnicity, religion and other social identity. Rights cannot be taken away under any circumstance.

Despite the importance of the CRC in advancing children's human rights and the emphasis on children’s participation and self-determination, there are a number of key criticisms that exist. The first debate centres on the problems of promoting

an international model of childhood through the CRC that at times pathologises global South childhoods. Boyden explains that the international children’s rights regime assumes a model of childhood development that is universally applicable, and that is largely based upon a Western social risk management of childhood (Boyden 1990; 1994, 256). In effect, as Lewis explains: By setting this standard southern childhood is not only effectively erased from international view but the Western model of childhood becomes the standard by which to judge southern societies (Lewis 1998, 95).

However, Watson puts forward a different view and suggests that the CRC is a reference point and is not designed to mediate broader conversations around the different experiences of childhood that exist world-wide. The implicit assumption is that local contexts will deal with these differences through legislative and policy settings (Watson 2009).

Local cultural practices are an important site of tension in relation to the CRC. This is known as the cultural relativist debate. These concerns emerged at the very initial stages of drafting the CRC. As D’Costa explains: ‘the heated debates about what exactly culture is and how it shapes the concept of rights have been sharply divided along both disciplinary lines and global North-South relations’ (D’Costa 2016, 7). For example, some non-Western countries argue that the children’s rights regime is a Western construct, based upon a Western philosophical and legal liberal tradition (Harris-Short 2001). The tensions that emerge between cultural relativism and the international remain a tricky subject to resolve, particularly in cases where states problematically argue for cultural differences that cause harm and persecution to sections of their population. In some African countries, homosexuality remains criminalised despite the ratification of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In their defence, these countries have drawn on a cultural relativist debate stating that the human rights’ regime is a Western construct (Maastricht University 2019). There are cultural based practices that continue to disproportionally harm girls, such as child marriage and Female Genital Mutilation (FGM). WHO estimates that 3 million girls remain at risk annually from FGM practices (WHO 2020). Many countries that advance the cultural relativist debate do not necessarily engage in

harmful cultural practices, but culture can facilitate more extreme and problematic practices under a cultural relativist argument.

Furthermore, the idea of ‘culture’ is problematic. Within the national context, cultures are contested and are differentiated by economic and social divides, such as rural/urban, older/younger generations, and gender (White 1999, 142). Engle-Merry similarly cautions that a generic idea of culture is problematic, and states: ‘culture is contested and can be used as a mode to legitimise to power and authority culture’ (2009, 9). Human rights, as Engle-Merry suggests, often provide an important circuit breaker in making those changes. She argues that while negotiating the global-local divide is complex, it is useful to think of human rights as not necessarily displacing existing frameworks, but providing an additional resource to policy makers, activists and NGOs (2009, 4). While this research does not focus specifically on these debates, it is nonetheless important in highlighting the ways that norms are contested and adapted to a local context. Despite the international reach of the CRC, a nation’s socio-political context, including the policy and institutional arrangements, and social and cultural setting shape the state’s implementation of the CRC.

The CRC also articulates the idea of an individual child, which reflects the concept of individualism as opposed to collectivism. This can be at odds with many cultures where children’s identities are constituted collectively, rather than individually. Children may have a range of duties and obligations towards the family and community that can work against the notion that children are individual rights bearers. As Denov and Akesson summarise: Individualism is the idea that one’s life belongs to him or her alone and that he or she has an inalienable right to live it as he or she sees fit, to act on his or her own judgment…Collectivism is the idea that a child’s life belongs not to the individual child, but rather to the group or society of which he or she is a part (Denov & Akesson 2016, 341).

Canavera et al (2016) found that in South Sudan the application of children’s rights and protection programs carried out by humanitarian agencies created tensions with the community. According to local perceptions, humanitarian

agencies seemed to discount the importance of the community in providing caring systems to children. These programs were unable to bridge the cultural divide between an individual focus on the child, and the collectivist orientation of community.

Another important debate in children’s rights centres on legal and philosophical questions around children’s ability to act upon their rights. Scholars continue to question whether children should have rights, with some arguing that they lack capacity to realise those rights because children lack the ability to exercise agency and make rational decisions (Griffin 2002). This reflects a familiar argument in which the developmental status of children is emphasised in the context of human rights. Children are conceptualised as being dependent on the adults: the pre-political nature of childhood is, therefore, reinforced with adults as both the protector and active political subject (Beier 2017; Wyness 2016; Pupavac 2001). Freeman counters this by referring to cognitive psychological research demonstrates that children are fully competent at making decisions much earlier than was initially thought (Freeman 1992, 38). However, any doubt about the importance of children’s rights is also difficult to sustain given the breadth of children’s rights advocacy worldwide and near worldwide ratification of the CRC.

Relatedly, Wyness (2016) suggests that global discourses centred on children’s rights need to further acknowledge the different capacities and resources of children, socially, culturally and economically. For example, in relation to child soldering, he argues that the CRC does not account for the ‘expansive nature of children’s agency’, particularly in complex contexts of violence. This has important consequences for policy and program practice (Wyness 2016, 353). The child protectionist lens that dominantes international practice also has implications for DDR/rehabilitation practices. Such programs are typically implemented without consulting child soldiers about their needs and expectations. Wessells explains that practitioners implementing reintegration programs only achieve low levels of child participation rates, and rarely take the time to consult child soldiers about their needs in line with the provision on enabling children to have a say over matters that are important to them (Article

12) (Wessells 2019, 477). This was a concern articulated by former child soldiers in the context of Nepal, and will be discussed in Chapter 6.

More broadly in other legal settings, Article 12.1 - the right to express a view- is not accorded to all children, and the extent to which a child’s view is incorporated, depends upon their maturity and capacity. In theory, an older child’s view will be taken more seriously than a younger child. As Archard and Skivenes explain, ‘it is not easy to understand how one might 'weight' a child's views’ (Archard & Skivenes 2009,18). In the context of court rulings in the UK and Norway, Archard & Skivenes analyse the tension that arises between the application of Article 3 (best interests of the child) and Article 12. While neither have overarching priority, it is difficult to reconcile implementation of both. Archard and Skivenes state: The problem arises because the two commitments seem to pull in different directions: promotion of a child's welfare is essentially paternalist since it asks us to do what we, but not necessarily the child, think is best for the child; whereas, listening to the child's own views asks us to consider doing what the child, but not necessarily we, thinks is best for the child (Archard & Skivenes 2009, 2).

Finally, there is the question of the state, which is the primary actor in overseeing the implementation of children’s rights. The CRC and the UN study on Violence against Children (2006) emphasise the role of the State in fulfilling children’s protection rights at national, district and community level. Indeed, as Archard details, in liberal democratic societies, the state in theory has a public role in protecting children and can act neutrally in promoting the best interests of the child (1993, 154). But there are unresolved questions related to a state’s ability to implement children’s rights or to facilitate the social and legal environment needed to enact children’s rights. Boyden and Hart sum up this concern by asking: ‘what happens when the state does not fulfil its responsibilities?’ They explain that in international policy practice it is widely assumed that the state will generally have a beneficial role in the protection of children (2007, 241). However, politics, power, resources and history shape the actions of a state in relation to children’s rights. Some groups within society have a more beneficial

relationship with the state because of identity (caste or ethnicity for instance), and political and economic resources. This is particularly important when discussing marginalised groups, like refugees or Internally Displace Peoples (IDPs). Many states lack capacity to improve the political and social situation to make the realisation of rights possible. This situation is also compounded by a weak reporting system on children’s rights. While states are required to submit reports every two years, and full reports every five years on progress on the CRC, national reports are not necessarily a major concern for countries as there are no serious ramifications for not meeting CRC expectations (Grugel & Peruzzotti 2012).

In sum, the children’s rights regime as articulated through the CRC represent an important way forward in applying universal standards of protection, which are particularly important in conflict settings and in efforts to support a child’s rehabilitation process. However, there remain practical challenges in implementing children’s rights because of the protectionist approach that typically dominates the application of children’s rights, both in international and national terms. The implementation of Article 12 is an important example and although reintegration programs use a children’s rights framework, child soldiers are typically given a pre-selection of employment and education options without any consultation.

2.3 Sociological approach to childhood

In this next section, I provide a brief overview of sociological approaches to childhood, which provides an important theoretical and methodological approach used in critical International Relations studies. Sociological theories of childhood specifically represented by the ‘New Social Studies of Childhood (NSSC)’, emerged in response to the limitations of the developmental psychological model of ‘childhood’, which theorises childhood through cognitive and physical time bound phases. Within this paradigm, children are regarded as incomplete adults, lacking the capacity to make rational decisions because of their lack of cognitive development and life experiences (see Jenks 1996, 22-30). NSSC offered an alternative approach to studying children’s lives through the ‘interpretive frame’ of

childhood (James and Prout 2015, 3). In this paradigm, ‘childhood’, is a social construction that is historically and culturally variable, which acts as an important social identity marker like gender, class, ethnicity, religion, and is defined by, other social classes and power relations within a society (James and Prout 2015, 3-5; Jenks 1996, 57). In this paradigm, children should be regarded as social actors, and ontologically independent and autonomous (James & Prout 2015, 4).

More recent developments in the field, however, suggest that sociological studies of childhood over emphasise the autonomy of the child in its ability to think and act independently (Spyrou et al 2018; Oswell 2013), without accounting for the connections that exist between children and adults through social and generational relationships (Alanen 2014; Qvortrup 2008). Spyrou et al (2018) suggest that children should be thought of in a ‘relational sense’ rather than as an abject child. While still acknowledging the potential agency of children, more recent discussions emphasise the social and interactive relationships that define children’s lives and their experiences of childhood. Thus, they highlight the importance of applying a ‘relational ontology’ to engage in a critical discussion that moves childhood studies forward and uncovers existing biases and limitations in the field. Relational ontology is defined as a process to: ‘identify and examine those entangled relations, which materialize, surround and exceed children as entities and childhood as a phenomenon diversely across time and space’ (Spyrou et al 2020, 8). Agency is an important example of this. For example, Oswell (2013) argues that agency should be theorised as varied and relational, and that the capacity of a child to possess agency is informed by circumstances (Oswell 2013, 270-271).

Relational ontology is important in studying childhood experiences in conflict and post conflict settings. While this research focuses on the individual child soldier, a child soldier’s reintegration experience is shaped in relation to social, cultural and political circumstances. In their social experiences, the inter-generational dynamic importantly informs their own identity in relation to family and community expectations, particularly as illustrated in Nepal (Chapter 6, section 6.3). There is also a temporal aspect to children’s agency, where children exercise agency at various times and not others throughout their conflict and post conflict

experience. In this way, my findings also corroborate the importance of relationality and the importance of theorising agency in both variable and temporal dimensions.

2.4 Children and International Relations scholarship

Children and International Relations (CIR) scholarship provide the theoretical and methodological grounding for this thesis, situating children’s experiences as relevant to the study of International Relations, including peace, conflict and security analysis. Drawing on sociological insights regarding the socially constructed nature of childhood, children are regarded as subjects, who make meanings out of their world (Huynh et al 2015, 123-157). CIR scholarship draws widely upon critical theories in IR, particularly critical security studies and Feminist work to challenge state centric accounts of security and protection, and to critically engage with children’s lives. Broadly speaking, CIR scholarship advances two inter-related projects. Firstly, a theoretical and methodological project that addresses IR failure to theorise children as important actors in the workings of international politics; and secondly research that engages with children’s lives through empirical based research to understand how they are affected by, and respond to situations of violence, armed conflict and peace (Beier 2020; Beier 2015; D’Costa 2016). As Huynh et al (2015) explain, children should be: Recognised as actors who contribute in positive, less than positive, sometimes unique and enlightening ways to conflict, peace and security. Like everyone else, they should not be silenced or ignored (Huynh 2015 et al, 2).

Within dominant IR theories, particularly realism and liberalism, Burke et al (2016) observes that both theories ‘subscribe to a “caretaker” view of children’s rights—children are primarily and often solely victims of armed conflict, who require the protection and care of adult actors’ (Burke et al 2016, 74). The ‘child as victim’ commonly features in conflict and political violence narratives particularly alongside liberal peace discussions, and is used as a rationale for

adult centric protection interventions and policy decisions (Watson 2015; Berents 2016; Lee-Koo 2018). However, as Watson explains, the process of labelling children as victims can be ‘othering’ as victimhood is associated with powerlessness and the inability of an actor to claim agency (Watson 2015, 47- 49). Children are often perceived as the ‘ultimate victims’- as the most physically harmed from violence and the socio-economic effects of war. However, this subject position is problematic as it not only reduces them to objects of protection (Beier 2020; Lee-Koo 2018), but children themselves have a much more fluid identity experience, and exercise agency to survive. For child soldiers, victimhood is only one component of their recruitment and reintegration experiences. They move between different identity positions, such as victims, perpetrators, children, adults, militarised and civilian identities in complicated and fluid ways.

CIR scholarship, therefore, re-positions children as social and political actors as ‘new sites of knowledge’ (Watson 2006), who provide new insight into the workings of the international political system, including in conflict zones, international economy and peacebuilding. Children are present in the social field of armed conflict and international politics (Jacob 2015). In fact, scholars suggest that children have always been present, but that their presence and impact is not acknowledged (Brocklehurst 2006). As Jacob (2014) notes, the CIR project has a normative value of centring children’s experience of violence and conflict to enable different actors to better address their protection and security needs through relevant data and analysis.

CIR scholarship highlights three ways in which children impact global politics: children as symbolic actors, children as political actors in conflict and post conflict settings, and as sites of knowledge (McEvoy- Levy 2018; Jacob 2013, 32-33; Brocklehurst 2006; Watson 2006) The symbolism of children relates to the way that different actors use discursive and symbolic constructions of childhood in different settings. Children’s identities are characterised by their innocence and vulnerability, or they are regarded as wayward and degenerate. Governments and/or international actors often rely upon a homogenous idea of children’s identity to justify policy decisions, international intervention, or other political

decisions. In Brocklehurst’s analysis of state building, militarisation and nationalisation campaigns seen through the twentieth century in (former) Nazi Germany, South Africa and Britain, the ‘child’ became a political symbol that legitimised political and ideological campaigns. Children became political subjects of the state, and represented the promise of a new generation that would uphold and carry forward the vision central to these national campaigns. Children’s lives, therefore, were shaped in political terms as subjects of the state (Brocklehurst 2006). Lee-Koo’s analysis also demonstrates that children play a central role in ‘establishing the narrative landscape of conflict’ (Lee-Koo, 2013, 483). As she explains, the stories of children as innocent and in need of protection and rescue is familiar to Western audience and helps to contextualise political and military debates. Thus, child centric narratives functioned as a ‘powerful parallel narrative’ leading up to the conflict in Afghanistan. Different American political and military figures justified the conflict based on a need to save children from the brutal treatment of the Taliban (Lee-Koo, 2013, 483-484). In this way, children’s identities were used in a political manner to support a military and political agenda.

While constructions of childhood feature within different political, military and social narratives, similarly, imagery of suffering children is used by different actors to advance social and/or political agendas. A well known example is the suffering child in situations of poverty and starvation used in humanitarian campaigns, which Burman describes as a form of ‘disaster porn’ (Burman, 1994). Berents argues that imagery associated with the children killed and/or suffering from a gas attack on Khan Shaykhun, influenced the former President Donald Trump to intervene in Syria. This is indicative of the way that images of children are used to mobilise political actions and to justify contentious decisions. While children are presented in a neutral, a-political manner, she suggests that the images function to shape political events and decisions in important ways. Such images speak not only to the individual suffering of the child, but are used by different actors to critique the failings of a nation unable to protect their children (Berents 2020, 7). However, children’s “taken for granted status’ obscures the complex ways that international politics relies upon imagery of children to maintain international order (Berents 2020, 20).

As political actors, children impact the nature and conduct of conflict including strategy in the context of the ‘New Wars’. Children’s bodies are not only targeted as weapons and body shields, but they can play an active role in warfare itself as child soldiers (Singer 2005, 106-107; Wessells 2006a). For example, Singer’s research documented the use of children used as ‘human shields’ and ‘cannon fodder’ throughout the Iran-Iraq war, and in the conflicts that took place in Guatemala, DRC and Uganda. Finnström’s research on young combatants, including children and women, in the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda provides insight into the complicated interplay between spiritual and political meanings of the conflict articulated by youth. There was a fundamentally ‘modern’ aspect to the conflict as noted by Finnstrom: ‘children and women wear uniforms, carry guns and participate in the war, which makes them legitimate targets of military violence’ (Finnstrom 2006, 206.) But the social meanings that youth ascribed to the conflict shaped their participation, and interaction with other members of society.

As a site of knowledge production (Watson 2006) children’s experiences provide new insights into conflict and peace, and as it relates more broadly to the working of the international system. Indeed, this research demonstrates the importance of incorporating children’s voices, as interviews with child soldiers provides insight into on-going legacy of conflict in both a national and local sense, but also the contested and political nature of peace and justice in national settings.

In summary, CIR scholarship identifies and analyses the way that children’s identities are used by different political and social actors through narratives and images to justify interventions, policies and decisions. While protecting children is an important goal, protecting and upholding the rights of children takes place within a politicised space. This theme is relevant in the analysis of child protection practices and institutions in national, post conflict settings. Jacob identifies in her research on child protection practices in post conflict Cambodia and Myanmar, a ‘protection gap’ in child protection practices because of local politics and government rule. Child insecurity, she argues, is conceptualised by both national governments as a protection and development issue. Thus, the

child protection practices evident in both countries do not account for the post conflict ‘structural, political and conflict-related nature of children’s insecurity’ (Jacob 2014, 5). In the post conflict environments of Sri Lanka and Nepal, children’s identities were constructed and positioned by government and/or powerful actors to support political and social agendas. In Sri Lanka, the identities of Tamil children as victims of LTTE recruitment was used to consolidate Sinhalese state legitimacy and social order. In Nepal, CPN-M’s senior leaders leveraged their new found political power based on former child soldier’s ‘children’ status, as established through the verification process that separated ‘adults’ and ‘children’ at the end of the conflict. Thus, a generational social order was re-established. An analysis of protecting children in post conflict settings needs to account for the broader political dynamics associated with peacebuilding, transitional justice, and efforts by the state to regain control.

2.5 Children and agency

One of the most useful developments within CIR scholarship is recognition of children’s agency as exercised in various political and social settings, including conflict and post conflict environments, and their ability to impact the international system (Lee-Koo 2018a; Beier 2015). This builds on existing sociological work that regards children as social actors and the importance of engaging child- centric research approaches (James & Prout 2015). The above discussion on CIR scholarship illustrates the problem of a childhood narrative that focuses on children’s victimhood and innocence. Such narratives do not give a voice to the children in question, 18 and instead their experiences are ‘appropriated’ to meet a vision of childhood (Berents 2016). Theorising children’s agency is, therefore, important in providing a theoretical space for children as actors and pushing through disciplinary boundaries.

18 It is important to note, however, that being a victim that the victim status can lead to certain compensation or assistance and moral authority, that otherwise would not be available. As Dahl, thus, states: ‘victim status is not necessarily an abdication from agency, but can itself be a form of rewarding agency’ (Dahl 2009, 399).

Agency is itself a contested subject. However, the working definition of agency used in this thesis refers to the capacity of children to undertake intentional actions or behaviour. Children may not be able to make significant change in politically transformative sense, or in overcoming significant structural power, but they can make decisions that impact their lives, their families and communities (see Lee-Koo 2018, 56-58; Berents 2018). Agency is relational and the ability of children exercise agency is mediated by their social surroundings (Thompson et al, 2019). As Beier explains, children’s agency needs to be theorised to account for ‘children as complex social actors who, like all human subjects, are co- constituted with the social worlds of which they are part’ (Beier 2020, 13). Secondly, the ability of a child to exercise agency is contingent upon individual circumstances, including their capacities as defined by age, lived experiences, and resources (such as education). For example, the role of family is important in determining childhood experiences and the way children can exercise agency. As D’Costa observes, families can enable or constrain the lives of their children. Girls are often subjected to gendered discrimination in the home and their education may not be valued in the same way as boys (D’Costa 2016).

2.5.1 Everyday agency

This research is influenced by discussions of the ‘everyday’ that has emerged in peacebuilding scholarship. As Guillaume & Huysmans (2019) explain, the everyday expresses analytical interest in exploring social and political phenomena that would otherwise be considered insignificant. The everyday helps to overcome an analytical bias in studying power that focuses on elite or structural power (Guillaume & Huysman 2019, 279).

Ideas of the everyday typically are influenced by Michel de Certeau’s (1984) theorisation of the everyday. This draws attention to the way that people resist socio-cultural organisation (local/global governance) to re-appropriate space and challenge attempts by authority figures to organise and structure their lives (de Certeau 1984). The everyday perspective is important as while the actions of the individual might not amount to significant social and/or political transformation,

their actions are still significant as acts of survival and demonstrate resilience. Therefore, in the context of peace, the everyday refers to social practices adopted by individuals and communities to survive violence, insecurity and conflict in the face of institutional marginalisation and social exclusion. These actions can be about challenging existing structures of peace, or actions that individuals take to minimise risk and to survive (Mac Ginty 2014; Berents 2018; Roberts 2011). These actions are often about making small changes to improve the safety and quality of life for the children themselves and their families. For example, going to school, providing for family and communities, resisting state oppression and building social and political networks.

The question of survival in relation to children’s everyday agency is important, particularly in conflict zones. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, child soldiers often rely on ‘tactical agency’ to survive the immediate conflict situation. This form of agency does not amount to challenging or changing structures in a significant way, but nonetheless demonstrates children’s ability to navigate complicated and dangerous conflict situations (Honwana 2011). Research conducted in Timor-Leste by Braithwaite et al (2012) documents the Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente (FRETILIN) resistance movement to Indonesian rule in the lead up to the 1999 referendum on independence from Indonesia. The authors argue that it is important to understand children’s agency in terms of surviving conflict situations. Timorese children made a large contribution to genocide prevention, sometimes with adults, by leaving their parents behind, or by fleeing to the mountains on the day of the 1999 vote. Children’s survival was dependent on their ability to know where to run and hide when soldiers arrived so that they could prevent their recruitment to Indonesian armed forces or militia groups, and survive the violence (Braithwaite et al 2012). Similarly, Berents and McEvoy-Levy theorise children’s agency in survival situation as a as a potential site of political action. They state: For young people, every day life in many cases is a constant negotiation with, and sometimes transgression of expected norms; whether that is because they took up arms in conflict, or they are living with inadequate food and shelter…(Berents & McEvoy-Levy 2015, 117).

2.5.2 Political agency

The political agency of children is another important aspect of agency in this research. Political agency is commonly associated with the actions of an actor to influence, challenge or transform political actions and institutions, through social movements, political participation or changing political institutions. However, as noted by Häkli & Kallio more recent scholarship on children and political agency has expanded the concept of political action to refer to a: “variety of individual and collective, official and mundane, rational and affective, and human and non- human ways of acting, affecting and impacting politically” (Häkli & Kallio, 2014, 181). Häkli and Kallio, therefore, argue that political is defined and measured by what is important to the actor. The actor has ‘something at stake’ in a particular matter (Häkli & Kallio 2014, 183). In this research, the idea of political agency is important where many former child soldiers do not have access to political power, and/or are marginalised from key peace processes, but politics is central to their lives and the actions that they take. While former child soldiers are not always able to challenge or transform political institutions, they work and engage in a political space to develop counter-narratives of justice, and/or advance other political agendas to address social inequalities.

Another important discussion related to children and political agency relates to the actions that children can take either directly or in-directly to challenge their subject position. CIR scholarship has established that children are not taken seriously as subjects because of hegemonic childhood narratives that position them as innocent and without agency. Beier helpfully distinguishes between agency and subjecthood to illustrate this point. He defines agency is defined as the ‘capacity to act’, whereas subjecthood is the ‘mastery of one’s own agency or the idea that actions are the products of one’s (at least relatively) autonomous choices’ (Beier 2015, 240) The actions that children take in conflict zones, he argues is not taken seriously because children are not regarded as autonomous and capable subjects. This is well illustrated by international advocacy narratives children’s participation in violent acts. These narratives emphasise children’s victim status and their lack of choice and agency because it is easier and more palatable for audiences to understand, rather than engaging with a discussion on

children’s participation in violence through choice and belief in a cause. As Beier explains: The denial of subjecthood leaves little room for serious engagement with the possibility that some young people might choose participation in armed conflict as an autonomously reasoned survival strategy. Moreover, directing our gaze instead toward the presumed “real” subjects – those adults in the name of whose projects child soldiers fight – also leaves us potentially inattentive to the material conditions that could motivate a young person to see such a choice as an opportunity for improved circumstances (Beier 2015, 242)

The ability of children to challenge their subject position is helpfully illustrated by Lind’s study on migrant children in irregular situations19, who are seeking British citizenship. He argues that political agency is expressed by children in the way that they contest their given subject position as potentially ‘deportable’ and ‘non- British’. As Lind explains, children’s narratives and their ways of challenging the labels given to them by UK authorities to seek inclusion, ‘suggest their own understanding of who they are and where they belong’ (Lind 2017, 289). Lind’s research demonstrates that children find themselves in politicised positions where the politics of their identity shapes their lives and actions they take. The idea of political subjectivity is an important theme illustrated in this research. Children themselves are active in negotiating concepts of childhood and victimhood bestowed upon them through international programming, and national policies. For example, child soldiers sometimes make strategic choices to emphasise their victim status to support their social advocacy agenda, as is illustrated in the context of Nepal (Chapter 6), or in seeking funding or resources from NGOs (Shaw 2014; Shepler 2005).

Discussions on children and political agency are important, however, it is worth noting that CIR scholarship prioritises children’s political agency as a strategy for justifying their significance to the international system (Brocklehurst 2006; Watson 2020; Lee-Koo 2020). However, this perspective can overlook or

19 Irregular in the context means deportability. 51

perhaps devalue different forms of agency, and different categories of children, who do not take political actions. As Jacob notes, the scholarly focus on children’s political agency ‘give partial expression to the actual experiences of children affected by conflict, as in isolation this discussion results in the political appropriation of children’s agency in other contexts’ (Jacob 2013, 42). She cautions that this approach excludes certain categories of children, who do not exert political agency, and explains that many children do not engage in political action. Instead, she suggests a need to conceptualise children’s agency based upon their rights and protection (Jacob 2013, 42).

In sum, within the CIR scholarship, discussion of children’s agency is on-going. But importantly this literature highlights the varied forms of agency that children can exercise, including acts of survival and resilience, while recognising that children as a category represents a broad range of capacities and situations, both based on age and their social identity. Political agency is also important in this research as post conflict settings are political. Former child soldiers, therefore, live in a politicised space, socially and politically. Some of the former child soldiers are politically active and utilise their subject positions to challenge state practices and institutions through the development of counter-narratives and social resistance. Other former child soldiers continue to find ways to navigate around politics to survive in an everyday sense. My research also demonstrates is that agency has an important temporal dimension, as illustrated through the experiences of former child soldiers. Children’s ability to exercise agency can shift in form and nature, depending upon the context.

2.6 State protection and power

The state is an important variable in understanding children’s experiences of conflict and post conflict settings. As observed more broadly in the Critical IR scholarship, the state plays a central role in determining children’s experiences of security, protection and peace in post conflict settings (Booth 2007, Huynh et al 2015). In realist theory, state power is equated to the maintenance of sovereignty and territorial integrity (Waltz 1979). However, this theoretical viewpoint speaks

very little to the dynamic relationship that exists between citizens and state that results from historical and contemporary state formation processes. State institutions are embedded and conditioned by their political, social and cultural context (Dinnen & Allen 2018, 129), which shapes how the state interacts with its population in terms of resources, protection and security. In this section, I argue that state theorisation needs to account for the historical and sociological context of state rule, including political power and access to resources, and identity, which includes local (community) experiences of state power. This research contends that the context of how a country is governed in post conflict settings directly shapes the reintegration process of child soldiers in terms of accessing resources, identity, citizenship, and how peace and justice are achieved. The broader political and social context framing state rule provides an important ‘top- down’ perspective that structures former child soldiers’ reintegration experiences.

The state can be defined as a political form of organisation, which is an assemblage of ‘institutions, organizations, and interactions involved in the exercise of political leadership’, and is distinct to nation (Jessop 1990,16). In dominant IR theories, particularly realism and liberalism, the state remains the main unit of analysis. However, these IR theories apply a structural analysis of the state to explain patterns in world politics (Waltz 1979), rather than analysing the state itself. There is no consideration of whether states are good or bad (Lake 2008). Furthermore, there are certain characteristics of the state that remain powerful and ideal, particularly in International Relations. These are aligned with Max Weber’s conception of state (Anter 2014). This includes the state’s ability to monopolise physical violence, an autonomous bureaucratic apparatus, and a spatially and territorially coherent entity (Midgal & Schlichte 2005, 6) The everyday lives of people and how they both are affected by the working of state are not considered important, as dominant IR theories assume that the state will adequately protect children and women (Tickner 2018; Seto 2015). However, the idea of state protection is fundamentally flawed as people worldwide continue to face on-going insecurities, and it reflects a Eurocentric view of the relationship between state and citizens (Tickner 2018; Booth 2007).

A political sociological approach20 to state power is useful in highlighting the political relationship that exists between the state and the citizens. While in theory, states provide security and rights to their population; this does not always work in practice. As the two background chapters will demonstrate, the relationship that exists between children in relation to state authority is shaped by a broader political and social context, with implications for identity, experiences of citizenship, and experiences of state security and protection. A political sociological analysis pays attention to the overlap between social and political spheres of life, which is based upon an expansive view of the political, or the ‘politicised’ (Fraser 1990, 204). Accordingly, rather than political institutions governing in an abstract manner separate from society, political institutions are shaped by the social and cultural context (Clemens 2016; Nash 2010). Nash explains that the political is always framed ‘against social relations’ and are ‘concerned with challenging or resisting power as it is exercised by some over others (Nash 2010, 35). This process inevitably is a question of power, as politics can work to create negative or positive changes for particular grouping and not others.

The political analysis of the state relating to governance, power and authority is important in the context of Nepal and Sri Lanka where state institution and rule are shaped by social hierarchy and divisions that exists in society. As Hameiri explains: The significance of institutions resides not in their capacity per se, but in the sort of interests they promote or marginalise, and in the kinds of conflicts they give expression to, or structure out of politics. This means that state ‘capture’ by particular interests and coalitions, predatory or otherwise, is not an aberration, but something that is inherent to every state, or indeed every political structure (2010, 36; see also Jones 2010).

Political leaders, including local elites, often belong to a group that is more privileged over others, according to class, ethnicity, religion, gender, which

20 Political sociology has its roots in the philosophical traditions of Max Weber and Karl Marx. Post structuralist contributions include Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida.

enables greater access to political power, including resources. These perspectives are particularly important in the context of Sri Lanka and Nepal and in the broader South Asian context, where social divisions remain entrenched, to varying degrees, according to caste, gender, class, ethnic, and religious identity. In both countries, a select group of political elite benefit from social divisions in terms of access to power and to formal political representation structures. This analysis is particularly important in understanding post conflict environments. In Nepal and Sri Lanka, efforts by national politicians to formally address peace, justice, reconciliation, democratic and human rights concerns, are limited by their own political agenda, which has limited the how the population benefits from such initiatives.

Furthermore, state security and protection practices are shaped in important ways by questions of identity and politics with implications for children’s lives. As an example of this, Jacob profiles the Indian state’s failures to uphold relevant human rights and legal provisions in relation to children and other vulnerable groups affected by communal violence, which was carried out to target particular minority religious groups. She explains that communal violence in India provides a: Very clear case study of the political nature of state security and protection practice in relation to minority groups, be they based on religious, caste, tribal, gendered, age or other specific identities’ (Jacob 2016, 201).

She argues that social identity determines how minority groups can access protection from the Indian state, through different periods of unrest and violence experienced by these groups.

Similarly, this theme is highlighted in Berents’ research in the Cazucá settlement, in the South of Bogotá, Colombia. Like other urban poor settlements in Latin America, those living in the Cazucá settlement are more prone to state violence, because they are identified as a security risk and are targeted by state authorities more often than other communities. People’s lives are, therefore, shaped by insecurities resulting from their interactions with state authorities, and social and economic structural inequalities, including poverty and crime (Berents 2018). A

critical analysis of the state and its ability to protect its citizens is important in terms of my own research. In Sri Lanka, the militarised context and Sinhalese dominated rule of state, has created profound insecurities for many of the Tamil communities because authorities consider many former LTTE to be a potential security risk to the state. The examples given by Jacob (2016) and Berents (2018) are twoof many case studies that illustrate the insecurity (social, economic and political) that children experience in relation to the ‘state’.

2.7 Nation and identity

The power of the state related to governance and politics is not the only aspect of state rule that shapes child soldiers’ reintegration experiences in post conflict settings. State actors can use identity based on childhood and gender, to support a particular regime of power, create boundaries of belonging in a national context, and a broader sense of national identity. In this way, the state can use policies and practices that create cultural and political identities. This theme is addressed extensively in Feminist analysis on gender and nation building. Using D’Costa’s (2011) definition, nation building is defined as ‘an international organic process by which a society contests, considers, reaches consensus on and consolidates a national identity …’(D’Costa 2011, 8). In contrast state building is a process of building institutions after conflict and in international policy terms if typically thought of as a technical exercise (see Hameiri 2010 for critique). A Feminist analysis of the state considers the state and nation separately. As Tooze (1996) states: We live within a political structure that is itself based on the state and the assumed identity that nation equals state or perhaps more appropriately given sources of power, the state equals nation’ (Tooze 1996, xvii).

Feminist scholarship analysis of state illustrates the relationship that exist between state power and authority and gendered identities and symbolism based upon masculine and feminine norms and values(D’Costa 2011; De Alwis 1997; Yuval-Davis 1997). A number of key themes are addressed in the literature (see Parashar et al 2018), but one important theme related to this research is the idea

that nations are feminised and states are considered a masculine entity, thus the masculine state protects and the subordinate female, typically women and children (Pettman 1996). In the context of state protection, Young (2003) observes that the logic of these practice mirrors domestic arrangements of men as head of household and defender of his family (Young 2003; Peterson 1992, 50). Thus, the protection of women and children is based on their position as subordinates. Indeed, governments and policy makers continue to refer to notions of masculinity and femininity in contemporary narratives used to justify war. As Enloe observed in relation to the First Gulf War, ‘the U.S. intervention in the Gulf would be harder to justify if there were no feminized victim’ (1993, 166). As evidence of Enloe’s observation, in the US war in Afghanistan, Laura Bush, wife of then President George Bush, justified the US invasion on the basis of liberating Afghani women.

The masculine state and feminised nation is well illustrated in the context of wartime sexual violence perpetrated against women, and alsoincluding children and men. Symbolically the act of rape feminises the state, which is unable to protect their own women and thus disrupting the purity of its women (Alison 2007). The protection of women’s identity and sexuality is central to the state’s masculine image, thus re-claiming female purity is equally important in the context of wartime rape. This is evident in D’Costa’s research on the Birangona women in Bangladesh in the Bangladesh Liberation War (March – December 1971). Many of the women, who were raped by Pakistani soldiers, gave birth to children born of wartime rape. In response, the Bangladeshi government developed a national story, which positioned women as having sacrificed their bodies for the national cause of survival. However, D’Costa’s analysis highlights that the national narratives produced were on the basis of controlling women’s bodies in the interest of a national ideology and did not aid women as they navigated complex social situations regarding social stigma and family acceptance. The children born of wartime rape were subject to a nation-wide infanticide (D’Costa 2011, 110-143).

D’Costa’s research is important and her analysis can be extended to the place of children within the nation building and post conflict context in which state

authorities or stories about the war and national identity, often rest on particular idea of the child or deploying particular childhood subjects and not others. In other words, some childhood subjects are considered legitimate and helpful to the state’s interests, and others not so, such as children born of wartime rape. Child soldiers in Sri Lanka reintegrated by state authorities are an important example of being a legitimate and useful subject for authorities. National narratives positioned children as being ‘saved’ from the Tamil threat, thus legitimising the rule of Sinhalese. This will be explored further in Chapter 8. In contrast, children born of wartime rape is an example of a childhood subject that does not necessarily aid or help a nation moving forward in terms of developing a strong national identity.

Seto’s (2015) analysis of children born of war is another important example of the state’s engagement with childhood identity in asserting sovereign authority and legitimacy. Seto (2015) explains that children who are born of wartime rape do not fit into any existing understandings of childhood prescribed in accordance with children’s rights regime and legal frameworks. They represent a politically and socially charged category of identity because they resulted from forced impregnation and rape. This makes them more susceptible to marginalisation and victimisation by society and governments. Her analysis demonstrates that governments used children born of war as a collective victimhood category to construct a stable national identity, based on a strategy of including and excluding certain groups as a strategy for asserting sovereign power and authority. She states: Rather than condoned, the violence committed on the excluded is considered systematically necessary as it represents the primal factor in how the sovereign demonstrates its relationship with the population (Seto 2015, 183).

Seto’s analysis is important in highlighting the political nature of childhood related to national, state led efforts to build identity and cohesion, based on an idea of inclusion and exclusion to create boundaries of belonging.

In sum, this section briefly outlined the importance of gendered identity in analysing state identity, and the exercise of power and authority. Childhood (like womanhood) is not only a powerful concept in international terms, but is deployed by state actors to build legitimacy. Children become political subjects of the state, but not necessarily in a way that benefits children themselves.

2.8 Conclusion

This chapter has provided a critical overview of key concepts, theories and approaches within a broader framework CIR scholarship. The key themes identified as they relate to reintegration, are childhood, agency, and children’s rights. Childhood as experienced in conflict and post conflict settings is diverse and shaped by many factors, including social identity like gender, caste, ethnicity, and religion. There also exists an important gap between the theoretical and conceptual underpinning of these concepts, and the actual implementation and practice of these ideas through programs in different social and legal contexts. In the context of reintegration, formal reintegration programs can either support or disempower children in terms of agency and their human rights based on the application of a ‘protection’ framework. In relation to children’s agency more specifically, it is important to emphasise the varied ways that children exercise agency in ways that might not be recognised by mainstream IR theories, but nonetheless provide important insight into their ability to survive and adapt in conflict situations.

Finally, the chapter addressed the role of the state in structuring children’s experience of conflict and post conflict settings. Sociological insights into state rule enable a theorisation of the state that accounts for social division and hierarchy, which determines the state-society relationship in post conflict settings. This is important when considering state rule, including child protection and children’s dealing with the state. The last section also considered Feminist discussions on nation building that draws attention to the state’s use of ‘womanhood’ and ‘childhood’ identity to legitimise and bolster state authority, but that in turn politicises children’s lives.

Chapter 3: Defining the Child Soldier

In this chapter, I provide a critical analysis of key themes associated with the child soldier that is found in academic and policy scholarship more broadly. These four themes are the politics of childhood, North South relations, victimhood or perpetrator (of violence), and the girl and the boy child soldier. These themes remain relevant to the remainder of the thesis in structuring analysis of child soldier reintegration experiences in Nepal and Sri Lanka.

Research on child soldiers is extensive and approached from a variety of theoretical and methodological perspectives, including political science, law, social work, and anthropology (Drumbl & Barrett 2019; Drumbl 2012a; Denov 2010; Gates & Reich 2010; Wessells 2006a; Cohn & Goodwin-Gill 1994). This research identifies a need to further interrogate the politics framing the child soldier construct, and the way that individual children relate to, or understand, the child soldier identity. Currently, there exists a significant gap between the international idea of the child soldier, and the social, political, economic and legal and realities that shape a child’s experience of this identity in a local setting. The narratives of former child soldiers in Sri Lanka and Nepal used in this thesis demonstrate how they position themselves differently in relation to the child soldier identity.

The chapter proceeds by firstly providing a brief context to NGO and humanitarian research on the child soldier, and then addresses the four themes central to unpacking the child soldier construct: the politics of childhood, global North-South relations, victim and perpetrator, and the girl child versus the boy child.

3.1 Background context and profile

It is important to give a brief overview of international advocacy work on child soldiering as the advocacy context established the international child soldier identity. In June 1998 seven international NGOs – Amnesty International,

Defence for Children International, Human Rights Watch, International Federation Terre des Hommes, International Save the Children Alliance, Jesuit Refugee Service, and the Quaker United Nations Office, Geneva, joined forces and launched the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. UNICEF developed a more uniform approach in terms of programming and policy to target child soldiering, and NGOs started to expand their work in understanding the nature of recruitment and effects of being a child soldier. International NGO documentation of child soldiers became prolific, and provided crucial data and other information to track child soldiering patterns, including recruitment, demobilisation and reintegration. This research consists mostly of research reports profiling single country case studies of children, often with accompanying testimonies from the children themselves (see for example Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 2004 & 2008; Child Soldiers International 2018a). They also publish particular findings or ‘calls for action’ on governments or armed groups, which continue to use child soldiers despite commitment to the international prohibition of use of child soldiers.

International and national advocacy groups and NGOs carry out important work to document the ‘push’ factors driving child soldier recruitment, and to work with child soldiers and their communities to support the return of children (see War Child 2019; World Vision 2019). Existing NGO and academic research emphasise a particular understanding of child soldier recruitment drivers known as ‘push factors’. Conflict is an obvious driver leading to social and economic breakdown, such as poverty, insecurity and displacement (Lischer 2010; Brett & Specht 2004; World Vision 2019; Save the Children 2019). Other factors can be due to a lack of educational opportunities, family breakdown, politics and ideology of recruiting groups, and personal factors including loss of income, home life, and inability to access education. Families can also facilitate child soldier recruitment, by having children born into families participating in a conflict. While some scholars dispute the idea that most child soldiers are forcibly recruited (Drumbl 2012a), advocates continue to be critical of the idea that child soldiers can volunteer, suggesting that their agency and choice is limited by a number of factors to do with age, loss of education, poverty and family (Child Soldiers International 2016; War Child 2019). Furthermore, some groups

encourage children to join through various incentives, but may not be upfront about the realities of joining an armed group and the hardships that children may face (see Chapter 6). As children are especially vulnerable in conflict situations, particularly in the context of displacement, loss of family members, they can be coerced or manipulated into recruitment, or come to regret their decision to join, but have no pathway to leave the group.

The parameters of international advocacy work is largely confined to strengthening legal and human rights frameworks to support banning the recruitment of child soldiers. Reintegration remains less of a focus. Indeed, the challenge of supporting children through their reintegration process is also identified in a recent report produced by the Global Coalition for Reintegration of Child Soldiers (2020). One of the key issues identified in the report is the need to support children as a longer-term investment after the cessation of the formal reintegration program through follow up education and employment programs. This also includes the need to establish a longer-term model of funding that moves beyond the short term financial relief that humanitarian groups can provide by building a sustainable national funding model (Global Coalition for Reintegration of Child Soldiers 2020).

The Graça Machel (1996) report identified the need to ban recruitment of children for military purposes. Concurrently, a campaign led by Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (now known as Child Soldiers International) called the ‘straight 18 approach’ sought to prevent the recruitment and use of children under the age of 18 into armed forces or armed groups, and to ban criminal prosecution of children for war crimes. The enactment of The Optional Protocol to the CRC on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OPAC) in 2002 raised the minimum age for direct participation in hostilities from 15 to 18, as specified in the CRC and other legal instruments. To date 152 of the 177 states with armed forces worldwide have ratiﬁed OPAC, with a further two-thirds of those countries committing to ban all recruitment of children (Child Soldiers International 2018b). OPAC sets out that states must take ‘all feasible measures’ to stop recruitment of children to armed forces under the age of 15, but they can voluntarily and with their parents' support join at the age of 16 or 17. In effect, children between the

ages of fifteen and eighteen can be lawfully recruited to be soldiers under the same terms and conditions as adults.

Many Western countries like the US, UK, Canada and other populous countries like China and India allow recruitment of children into armed forces from 16 years old (Child Soldiers International 2018b). OPAC is more restrictively applied in child recruitment to non-state groups, stating that children ‘should not, under any circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons under the age of 18 years’. States can take ‘all feasible measures’ to criminalise such practices. A UNICEF report on the Optional Protocol states that it represents progress in providing legal protection to children. However, OPAC is a watered-down version of the original intentions of the straight 18 campaign. Influential states like the US and UK prevented the complete implementation of the straight 18 as they were and continue to recruit children to armed forces. Gates and Reich further suggest that there is little evidence that these measures are effective (Gates & Reich 2010).

3.2 Politics of childhood

International advocacy work to prevent the recruitment of child soldiers, and to support children in their return processes of demobilisation, reintegration and rehabilitation remains important. However, the advocacy context limits the way the child soldier identity is conceptualised as it provides a narrow framework for analysing the lived experiences of child soldiers, and the multiple ways that children experience the identity in a local, national setting. The international child soldier identity is shaped by contemporary constructions of childhood, which emerged in response to a predominately Western and liberal idea of childhood, as articulated through international policy and child specific human rights and protection frameworks (Honwana 2011; MacMillan 2009; Rosen 2005). Within these frameworks, childhood is regarded as a time of vulnerability and protection (Boyden 2015; Wells 2009). Thus, as Beier notes, the child soldier figure featured in international advocacy campaigns relies on a ‘stable’ notion of childhood, which results in:

Complex subject positions [that are] collapsed into juridical categories and the rhetorically necessary construction of victimhood insisted upon children’s separation from politics and the denial of their agency (Beier 2011, 6)

This is evident in relation to the international child soldier definition. The child soldier, as Rosen notes, ‘denotes a person too young to serve legitimately in the military’ on an age basis (18 and under) (Rosen 2019, 96). International constructions of the child soldier, therefore, depoliticise the child based on an assumption of their victimhood. While children are certainly victimised through their experience, a child’s victimhood status can obscure the complicated ways and actions taken by children to survive conflict situations. Furthermore, children’s victimhood status can constrain the actions of children. Former child soldiers can be expected to perform and enact this expected identity through policies and programs implemented by international and national stakeholders in order to receive resources and funding (Shaw 2014), or even to receive protection by authorities, as is discussed in the Sri Lankan context (Chapter 8).

Secondly, Rosen argues that the international definition and focus on ‘childhood’ discounts worldwide variations of childhood, which are particularly documented through anthropological and historical accounts of childhood, and children’s participation in war (Rosen 2007). He states that current understandings of child soldiering are a result of Western imagination that suffer from a ‘historical amnesia’ effectively erasing long history of recruitment of youngsters into the armies of the west (Rosen 2015, 31). For example, he cites historical examples of children such as the drummer boys in the American Civil War, children who participated in the Crusades (1096 to 1271), and other accounts of young boys being initiated into warrior hood in different societies, such as the Massai and Samburu tribes in Eastern Africa (Rosen 2007, 296; 2015). Rosen’s analysis is important in illustrating that the international child soldier advocacy movement narrowly focuses on one type of childhood experience, whereas in reality children have a far more complicated relationship to violence.

The critical literature on child soldiering also highlights other related issues. The child soldier construct was not created as an academic empirical category for research and analysis, but serves international agendas to implement legal and moral standards that hold nation states accountable for child soldier recruitment. Thus, Rosen notes that research has often been trumped by advocacy efforts to highlight the magnitude of the child soldiering problem (Rosen 2019, 171; Beier 2011). Indeed, this a trend that is not just unique to researching child soldiers, but can be seen more broadly in relation to other categories of vulnerable children such as street kids, child prostitutes, and child poverty . Aid agencies have commonly used pictures of malnourished or ‘at risk’ children to bolster fund raising efforts, which is an advocacy approach described by Wells as the ‘politics of pity’ (Wells 2009, 34). Scholarship on children in vulnerable situations commonly documents that the need to save children (as evident through the narratives of aid agencies and international organisations) obscures the need to research children on their own terms by focusing on their voices and experiences (see Montgomery 2007; 2001; Burman 1994).

The lives of child soldiers in conflict and post conflict settings are complicated and there is a need to uphold protection standards, but without objectifying them. Through the 1990s, the portrayal of child soldiering through popular images in media accounts and some NGO work utilised dramatic images of children holding guns, consolidated a one dimensional view of these children. There was less research that actually engaged with children’s voices and their agency (for exceptions see Honwana 2011; Wessells 2006a). Denov (2012) argues that the portrayal of the child soldier in media images and journalistic accounts is filtered through three simplified categories: the innocent, wayward and heroic child. These categories are constructed through a ‘framework of extremes’. However, she states: ‘in reality, the lives of these children fall within the grey, ambiguous and paradoxical zones of each’ (Denov 2012, 281).

This research finds that the actions and identities of child soldiers exist in a grey space between children and adult worlds, and this plays out in complicated ways in their own lives and in relation to family and communities. Honwana aptly describes that the child soldier breaks down clear-cut distinctions between child

and adult categories, and established boundaries between innocence and guilt, victim and perpetrator, civilian and soldier (Honwana 2005, 32). The complicated position that child soldiers occupy between child and adult worlds in the context of war is not necessarily well served by international narratives of who is the child soldier as seen in policy and humanitarian practice. As well, due to the strict, time bound age focus of the child soldier definition and typical focus on boys, certain categories of children can be missed in formal programs designed to help their rehabilitation. This includes girls, who were marginalised from formal reintegration processes. Arguably, this can include youths, some who are only one or two years over the age of 18, who may need more support and help in setting up their lives than adult counterparts, but occupy a grey area between child and adult worlds.

While this research agrees with the political problems of the international childhood construction in relation to the child soldier, a remedy to this is to focus research on children’s experiences of being a child soldier in local and national settings, through their conflict and reintegration experiences. Indeed, the way that children experience the ‘child soldier identity’ can play out in complicated ways in a local context. The child soldier identity acts as a site of political contestation between international and domestic norms and expectations, which plays out discursively and in practical terms shaping the lives of child soldiers. Authorities can manipulate ‘childhood’ in different ways to advance a particular political agenda to support the state (see Baird 2008). Or the way that child soldiers experience the ‘politics of childhood’ can also determine their relationship to authorities, NGOs, their protection, and their own individual identification of the ‘child soldier’ category.

This dynamic is illustrated in the context of nations dealing with terrorism in relation to child soldiers. The child soldier, therefore, can be a site of political contestation in which a nation asserts sovereign power, and thus overrides international commitments to protecting children as articulated through international human rights and humanitarian law frameworks. This can have severe consequences for the child, life outcomes and their rights to protection. Governments have ignored the status of a child as a child soldier to meet

national security objectives. A well-known example is Omar Khadr, a Canadian citizen, who, at the age of 15, was accused of killing an American soldier in Afghanistan. He was detained in Guantanamo Bay for ten years where he was allegedly tortured. US authorities dis-regarded his rights as a child and prosecuted him at a military commission on counter terrorism charges (Hoban 2019). Children are detained illegally for a variety of reasons, including as illegal migrants and orphans in the context of armed conflict and national security matters. The report estimates that there are at least 1.5 million children in this situation (HRW 2019a). In Iraq, a recent HRW report documents Iraqi and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) authorities detaining Islamic States of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) child subjects, who are often badly treated (such as torture) and face unfair trials with lengthy sentences (HRW 2019b). National governments continue to face terrorist threats in the form of foreign fighters returning from ISIS to the country and locals that become radicalised by ISIS’ agenda. Capone (2017) explains that children returning from groups like ISIS face far stricter punishment by Western national governments who deal with them as criminals. While none have been set to trial in their home state in the West, there are on-going reports of children being arrested and on-going concern about whether relevant juvenile justice standards will be upheld. Criminal responsibility in the UK for example is as low as 10 enabling authorities to arrest a record number of terror suspects under the age of 18. Capone’s analysis highlights the problematic treatment of child ‘terrorists’, which goes against international legal provisions that not only prevents the punishment of children for participating in hostilities, but also call upon states to prioritise social reintegration and rehabilitation, as enshrined in the CRC. This provides an important example of the politics that shape a nation’s response to the child. A nation’s response to a child soldier is contingent on many factors.

3.3 Global North South relations

A second but related concern identified in the literature is conceiving of child soldiering as an African phenomenon. Post colonial analysis argues that the objectified African child soldier reflects Western, racialised attitudes towards

Africa as an underdeveloped place (Imoh 2016; Mackenzie 2012; Smith 2006). In popular media accounts and some NGO work, child soldiers are typically portrayed as the African boy child soldier holding an AK 47, which effectively pathologises childhoods in the global south (Beier 2011; Pupavac 2001). Children are commonly portrayed with qualities with which children and societies ‘ought not to have’ (Podder 2011, 141). The plight of children, therefore, is a broader reflection of the problems in their society. As MacKenzie (2012) states: The young boy soldier symbolizes uncomplicated perceptions of “the Afri- can” subject. He embodies the constant possibility of chaos in Africa and the perceived need for outside intervention (MacKenzie 2012,1).

Similarly, Smith argues, in the post colonial context, discourses about Africa’s tragedy that are found and sustained in international relations and development and popular media representations, are built upon a ‘Western imagination’ of Africa’s core deficiencies, but are inaccurate in representing the diversity of individual experiences (Smith 2006, 2-3). Thus, child soldiers act as a discursive site in which the North constructs knowledge about the South and their need for help.

Research and advocacy focus on African child soldiers in the 1990s and early 2000s is perhaps explained by conflict trends at the time, with estimates of over 100,000 child soldiers alone in sub-Saharan Africa, including the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda, Sierra Leone and Liberia (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 2004 & 2008). For a time, Africa was the epicentre of child soldiering due to the number of conflicts occurring. Drumbl (2012a) explains that many of these conflicts were also ‘atrocity producing’ conflicts, and include the genocide in Rwanda, and ethnic cleansing campaign in DRC. Well-known international legal and advocacy child soldier campaigns have also focused on African legal and political cases. For example, this includes Thomas Lubanga, a rebel leader from the Democratic Republic of Congo, who was convicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) of the war crime of recruiting children under the age of 15 (New York Times 2012). The Kony 2012 campaign started by Invisible Children aimed to arrest Joseph Kony, a Ugandan militia leader, by the end of 2012 and have him indicted to face the International Criminal Court.

These examples were published through the Western media, and consolidated a popular understanding of the African child soldier (Drumbl 2012b). While child soldiers continue to be recruited in African countries such as Mali, Somalia and Sudan, according to more recent data from ChildSoldierIndex in 2016 (Child Soldiers Initiative 2016), child recruitment is more of a concern throughout South Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Myanmar), Iraq and Syria.

The global North-South dynamic, as Beier observes ‘sketches a moral hierarchy of childhood subject positions’ (Beier 2011, 4). As Lee-Koo reminds us it is important to be mindful that certain representations of militarised children are used to ‘construct moral and political knowledge about conflict’ (Lee-Koo 2011, 727). For example, she observes two important differences in the way that militarised children/youth are portrayed, both discursively and through imagery. In an Australian Defence Force (ADF) Gap Year Challenge that encouraged Australian high school leavers between the age of 16-18 to experience life in one of the military services, the opportunity for an underage child to participate in the program was presented in the brochure as an empowering experience that would support their future military and/or civilian endeavours. In contrast, the image of the African child soldier commonly seen in international advocacy campaigns portrays a different image of a child, who has lost the opportunity of having a childhood (Lee-Koo 2011, 726-727). As Lee-Koo states: ‘the matching of youth with militarism seems to celebrate the coming of age in the global North, while mourning the loss of innocence in the global South’ (Lee-Koo 2011, 727). The discursive framing of the African child soldier versus a western underage soldier, does indicates a double standard concerning youth agency and informed decision making. Another argument made by Beier (2011) is that children’s lives are militarised in many different ways, even in the global North. While children feel the magnitude and consequences of militarisation differently, a narrow academic and advocacy focus on the global South prevents nuanced analysis of children’s lives in the global North, as affected by militarisation, which continues to operate, but perhaps in unseen ways (Beier 2011, 4).

In academic and policy work, the global North-South division in discursive framing, image production and knowledge production related to child soldiering

remains an important issue, as noted more broadly in relation to international childhood (Chapter 2, section 3.3.) However, regarding child soldiering research more specifically, international advocacy work has largely stopped using problematic images of the African boy child, because many of the sub-Saharan conflict where child soldiers were found have ended. This was also balanced by reporting done by Child Soldiers International, which produced reports to highlight the issue of underage child recruitment to western military forces, such as the United Kingdom (UK) (Child Soldiers International 2018). While it is important to be mindful of power relations implicit in child soldier representation (through media, policy and academic scholarship), underage children recruited to an armed force in a peaceful, democratic country do not face the same difficulties compared with a child soldier located in a conflict zone, who must deal with violence, and a break down in social systems of protection and family. An underage child recruited to a armed force in the context of western, democratic countries has much more choice and typically receives remuneration and other support from the armed force, including medical and housing support that other child soldiers do not receive.

3.4 Victimhood and perpetrator

This section addresses common stereotypes of child soldiers as victims or perpetrators of violence. Children’s relationship to violence as theorised through a binary victim or perpetrator lens has dominated popular media accounts, some NGO reporting and academic scholarship, as noted within the critical scholarship on child soldiering (Drumbl 2012; Denov 2010; Rosen 2005). As either victims or perpetrators, children have been portrayed without agency, lacking the wherewithal to navigate difficult circumstances, and ability to make decisions such as forming allegiances to armed groups. As Coulter notes, international humanitarian narratives are gendered and position children as subjects that are ‘feminized or alternatively infantilized: women and children are victims, men are not’ (2009, 149). Indeed, a lot of children experienced extreme levels of violence in sub-Saharan African conflicts through abduction and violent initiation processes, sometimes involving the killing or maiming of community members

and/or families, and the perpetration of extreme violent acts in killing, maiming and raping others, often with the support of drugs to desensitize children (Blattman & Annan 2009; Coulter 2011). However, as Blattman & Annan caution, while some children experience socialisation into an extreme violent ideology and practice, not all child soldiers experience the same process (Blattman & Annan 2009).

Before moving on to child soldier specific discussion of victim versus perpetrator, it is important to define a victim. Most commonly, a victim is associated within a criminal justice context, and the study of victimhood emerged within criminological studies (McEvoy & McConnachie 2012). Within the context of criminal justice, being a victim corresponds to a category of rights and is juxtaposed with culpable and blame worthy perpetrator. Thus, a victim is meant to be innocent and blameless. Scholarship on victimhood, particularly as applied in the field of transitional justice, highlights important criticisms concerning the application of the victim label, and the political utility of it. Transitional justice processes are legitimated through their ‘victim-centredness’ and often use the category of victim to support broader political or social goals (McEvoy & McConnachie 2013, 490) In this context, victims are prioritised in order of importance and/or need according to a hierarchy established by key actors (such as NGOs, government) (Selim 2017). This is not an exhaustive overview of the victim category, however, it does briefly highlight some of the problems associated with assigning a victim label. Indeed, the idea of the victim child is central to international narratives and advocacy work on the child soldier.

Critical child soldiering scholarship has addressed the reality that some child soldiers participate in extreme acts of violence. The literature highlights that children have a complicated relationship to violence in relation to reasoning and choice. Denov’s research on children recruited to the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), Sierra Leone, illustrates the complex position of children as both victims and perpetrators of violence. While children were typically the victim of violence and abuse, they also in turn committed acts of violence, thus blurring the distinction between their victim and perpetrator position. Denov suggests that a

better way to theorise children’s relationship to violence is to apply a nonlinear relationship. She explains: Children’s experiences reveal that they continually drifted between committing acts of violence and simultaneously being victims of violence by others. The children’s plight was complex: as they perpetrated violence, they remained victims of coercion, terror, violence and deception (Denov 2010, 288).

Coulter is similarly critical of the victim versus perpetrator position arguing that it does not adequately deal with the experiences of children (and women) themselves, and their community experiences (2009, 149) Coulter’s research on girls and young women’s transition to fighters in the RUF, notes that there are many different motivations for perpetrating violence. Sometimes it is because they are resigned to it in order to survive, they are forced into it, or others want authority and prestige (Coulter 2011).

Within the literature, there are two perspectives that emerge. One set of literature emphasises the structural conditions explaining children’s agency, while another focus on individual considerations regarding children’s ability to act. Denov suggests that these perspectives, as applied in the scholarship, tend to be either or, and sit in tension with one another, rather than complementing (Denov 2012, 39-47) Work done by authors like Honwana (2011; 2005), Vigh (2006) and Utas (2005) focus on the individual action used by child soldiers to survive conflict settings, often demonstrating resourcefulness and resilience in the process. For example, Honwana (2005) argues that children have ‘tactical agency’, indicating their ability to navigate circumstances in the short term and to seize opportunities, even if those opportunities are limited. According to this framework, children do not act from a position of power or necessarily have the ability to make decisions with a long-term impact, but they are still able to assert agency even within a context of significant restrictions and violence (Honwana 2005). In a similar way, Utas (2005) uses a framework of ‘social navigation’ to illustrate how women and girls as Bush wives use different strategies to survive, including linking up with a powerful soldier (such as a commander) in order to be

protected. Women and girls were also typically trained to fight as soldiers (2005, 413-416).

More recently, the social context (or structural context) is emphasised in academic scholarship in analysing children’s ability to act. Vaha & Vastapuu (2018) argue that child soldiering scholarship needs to systematically incorporate the social context by focusing on empirical, contextual accounts of child soldiers’ lives to analyse their choices and ability to act. Denov’s research similarly echoes Vaha & Vastapuu’s call to account for social structures. She notes that international accounts frequently emphasise the structural reasons for child soldiering (poverty, state failure) without incorporating children’s agency. She argues that Gidden’s theory of structuration that theorises the interplay between structure and individual known as ‘duality of structure’ remains useful in analysing children’s agency (Denov 2010).

Social and political structures in post conflict settings shapes the lives of former child soldiers in important and diverse ways, and either create or limit possibilities for life quality, and social and political engagement. This is evident in the case studies for this research. In Sri Lanka, the militarised and patriarchal context inhibits the lives of Tamil child soldiers and the quality of life they can achieve. In the context of girls and women, they contend with insecurity relating to acts of sexual violence perpetrated by a range of actors such as military, police or unknown actors. But despite these difficulties, former child soldiers and their families continue to display resilience in meeting their day to day needs. In Nepal, a functioning democracy provides the space for former child soldier soldiers to challenge failings of the national transitional justice agenda to advocate for social justice. But former child soldiers still fight to overcome significant social stigma and marginalisation because of their identity as a child soldier.

While the child soldiering scholarship importantly focuses on agency typically in the context of violence and survival, much of this literature focuses on African case studies. In South Asia, particularly Nepal and Sri Lanka the type of armed movements carried out by the former CPN-M and the LTTE sought social,

economic, and political transformation in response to years of marginalisation and in some cases persecution by another dominant ethnic/caste group. This is another important factor when assessing the type of agency that former child soldiers were able to exercise, and as will be discussed further from Chapters 5 – 8, as many felt that they were part of an important cause that could make a change and help them to have a better life.

This is a theme that is explored in further detail within Feminist scholarship on female combatants and the significance of their actions in the context of political violence and conflict (Gentry et al 2018; Parashar 2014; Alison 2009; Moser & Clark 2001). Feminist research on ethno-nationalist struggles theorises a more complicated relationship between women, gender and conflict, that accounts for changing gender roles, and the aspirations and experiences of women (Parashar 2014; Alison 2009). This is seen in case studies like the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), the Women’s Protection Unit (YPG) in North Syria, and the LTTE in Sri Lanka. According to Moghadam (2004), ethno-nationalist21 struggles are a kind of revolutionary movement that enable women to challenge existing gender norms as structures: women become the symbols of liberations and modernisation and are actively encouraged to participate in the military. The potential for women to exercise political agency and be empowered through an armed movement by challenging existing gendered norms and structures is heavily debated within the literature, particularly in the South Asian context. In reference to the LTTE, some scholars suggested that women were merely used for instrumental purposes as ‘cogs in the wheel’ to serve a broader male dominated political project (Coomaraswamy 1996, 10) In contrast, Alison’s study found that women were motivated by nationalistic concerns, but sometimes they had different ideas about nationalistic goals compared to the movement’s official position. In other words, women made choices about what was important to them, and did not just blindly follow the LTTE leadership (Alison 2009). Rajasingham-Senanayake suggests that LTTE women experienced ‘ambivalent empowerment’ (2004, 162).

21 Nepal cannot be described as an ‘ethno-nationalist struggle’, but for analytical purposes the role that women played in ethno-nationalist struggles echoes with the revolutionary movement led by the CPN-M and the role of women. 74

The idea of empowerment is problematic in a context of militarised violence because of the devastating and destructive nature on war in terms of community based experiences of violence, but also the violence that female combatants can either experience or perpetrate against others. Secondly, the changes that women experience in terms of new freedoms and empowerment rarely translate in any transformative sense in post conflict settings. However, Feminist scholarship highlights an important connection between the type of movement and the experience that can result for that individual. Both the LTTE and the CPN-M had transformative goals and this is reflected in the interviews, specifically by ex-combatants on-going connection to, and support of, the past. This is demonstrated in the narratives given by older generations of female and male LTTE ex-combatants who experienced the LTTE at its military and its ideological strength and continue to express great support for the goals of the LTTE movement, despite the sacrifices they made for the cause. Similarly, in Nepal many of the former child soldiers came to believe in the CPN-M movement and supported the broader goals of transforming society. Their experience, therefore, cannot just defined by their utility to the movement. However, as Friedman cautions, it is also important to not just focus on political agency as a driver of female recruitment. She argues that female ex-combatants can have a range of personal and political reasons for joining an armed movement, and it is important to not understate those personal motivations, such as revenge, community obligation, family participation (Friedman 2018). While some child soldiers are victimised through their recruitment and participation, many join armed movements for a variety of different reasons related to political and/or personal motivations. It is important not to downplay the significance of their actions just because they are ‘children’ and to understand the complexities surrounding choice and participation.

In addressing another related point, transitional justice literature that discusses child soldiers in relation to on-going transitional justice processes and reconciliation, finds that the portrayal of children as victims evident through international law frameworks and some transitional justice processes (Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands) does not help child soldiers negotiate the social

realities of return. In cases where child soldiers have committed violent acts even against their own communities this creates obvious tensions within communities as child soldiers are not held accountable for their action in any formal legalistic sense (Akello 2019). Indeed, Drumbl argues that the international legal imagination, which defines children as the ‘faultless passive victim’, problematically influences international law and policy. Drumbl defines the legal imagination as the ‘normative, aspirational, and operational mix of international law, policy, and practices’ articulated by a wide variety of actors (Drumbl 2012, 9). Drumbl argues that the international community needs to ‘reimagine’ the child soldier to account for their agency, but also in helping societies and the processes of reconciliation in the context of transitional justice. While child soldiers should not be prosecuted, there needs to be some middle ground that enables them to meaningfully engage in justice processes that in turn enable communities to reconcile (Drumbl 2012, 102). Child soldiers still remain an important part of a post conflict society’s reconstructive and reconciliation journey and they need to be meaningfully engaged in these processes, both formally and informally. Kelsall similarly reflects on the simplistic notion of children’s victimhood, and highlight the importance of positionality relating to how child soldiers are viewed by different sections of the population. In testimonies given by a child soldier at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Kelsall states that: In the context of Civil Defence Forces (CDF) initiation, then, [the witness] is a small boy; in a meeting with the President, he is a ‘very small boy’; whereas in a context where the CDF has just stormed a rebel held town, he is ‘a CDF man’ (Kelsall 2009, 164).

Thus, Kelsall’s insights demonstrate the relational nature of the child solider in different social, political and legal settings.

Children also demonstrate a sense of justice in terms of what is right or wrong about their actions, as illustrated by Ishmael Beah’s story. As a former child soldier from Sierra Leone, he wrote an account of his time in the LRA in the Long Way Home: Memoirs of a boy soldier (2008). He explains that international rehabilitation officers told him that he had done nothing wrong, but he clearly

understood that he had done wrong in committing acts of violence, which created considerable mental confusion for him.

In sum, this section illustrates the complexities of theorising children’s relationship to violence and agency. The question of victim and perpetrator in relation to violence loses some of its salience in the context of this research, where the conflicts ended some time ago and most participants have moved on as best as they can with their lives, as has their families and communities. The important point to highlight is the grey areas that exist between victimhood and perpetrator, and the complex identities of former child soldiers. It is also important to note that children have a variety of political and personal reasons for joining an armed movement, and that the type of movement that child soldiers are recruited to, such as movements that focus on creating broader social and political changes, can bring about greater transformation in that particular time.

3.5 Girl and boy child soldiers

In this next section I provide a critical overview of girl child soldier scholarship. The child soldier is largely portrayed as a boy phenomenon in popular media accounts and scholarship on conflict and peace (see Drumbl 2012a; Denov 2010; Wessells 2007; Stavrou 2005; McKay & Mazurana 2004). Commonly in international discourses and advocacy, particularly in the 1990s, child soldiering was presented as a boy phenomenon, reflecting gendered understandings of ‘war’ as a masculine space (Moser & Clark 2001). For the most part, girl children are underrepresented and marginalised in child soldier specific programs (such as a DDR) and in academic scholarship on political conflict, despite their significant presence in armed conflict worldwide. According to Mazurana et al (2002), from 1990-2002, girls were members of fighting forces in 55 countries and participated in armed conflict in 38 countries. More recently, it is estimated that girls account for anywhere up to 40% of child soldiers worldwide (UN 2015a; Drumbl 2012a). Girls also take up a variety of roles, which includes more logistical and domestic support roles, soldiering, spying, and even participation in more extreme violent terrorist activities. Girls are predominantly found in armed

opposition groups such as paramilitaries and militias, but also in armed forces, including police and army auxiliary forces (Child Soldiers International 2016; MacKenzie 2012; Mazurana et al 2002,100).

Existing research, particularly driven by NGOs, illustrates that like boys, girls join armed groups for a variety of reasons and under different conditions. A report done by Keairns (2003) on girl soldiers from the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Colombia for the Quaker office outlined a variety of factors driving the girls’ recruitment including suffering domestic abuse at home, self-protection from enemy forces, and identification with the ideology of a movement. Similarly, in the study ‘Young Soldiers Why they Choose to Fight’, Brett and Specht (2004) found that girls were motivated to join armed groups for a variety of reasons that were often not too dissimilar to boys (Brett and Specht 2004).

Girls and boy, however, experience child soldiering in different ways. Child soldiering is a gendered experience based on the identity of being a man or woman. Thus, the gendered differences that boy and girl child soldiers experience through conflict and post conflict settings are embedded within social structures and power dynamics (Denov et al 2016, 565). As a structural power relation, gender relies upon distinctions between categories of people in which some characteristics are more valued than others. This is the same for other systems of power like class, race and caste. As Cohn (2013) notes, female and male based identities shapes and defines an individual’s access to resources, rights and responsibilities. While men and women may experience many of the same phenomenon (sexual assault, injury, torture, displacement), ultimately as ‘men’ and ‘women’ they embody and symbolise different meanings to their communities, authorities, families and opponents and, are therefore, often targeted in different ways with different social impacts (Cohn 2013, 22). Thus, following Cohn’s argument, girls and boys experience these differences too in post conflict settings through formal DDR programs and in their return home. These experiences are intersected by other social identity based on caste, ethnicity, class etc. However, gender and other social identities are not a static experience, but are contextual. Butler’s theorisation of gender as an internalised category that is performed and produced is useful. In this sense, through

performance of being a man or woman, gender becomes both as an outcome of and a rationale for various social arrangements, and as a means of legitimating one of the most fundamental divisions of society (Butler 2011).

Vaha & Vastapuu (2018) argue that girls are a particularly controversial figure in the study of armed conflict, as they inhabit two identities as both a girl child and as a female combatant. They state: ‘They challenge prevalent notions of women’s and children’s victimhood and innocence in wartime from two overlapping directions’ (Vaha & Vastapuu 2018, 224). Thus, girls are marginalised as a child because in international politics children are stereotyped as victims. Secondly, like female combatants, girls do not belong in conflict because it is considered a masculine space (Moser & Clark 2001). Critical Feminist IR work on female combatants does not identify the ‘girl child’ within this category, but nonetheless a focus on the theorisation of gender and conflict is useful. Feminist scholars explain that most research on conflict typically associates women (and girls) as the ‘victim’, which is based on assumption of their inherent peacefulness (Alison 2009, 1-3). In contrast, men are viewed as the perpetrator of violence, and the protector of women and children (Parashar 2014; MacKenzie 2012; Alison 2009; Sober & Gentry 2007; Coulter 2008, 55). Popular images of the soldier remain male, and, therefore, discussions of the relationship between women, violence, and armed conflict are limited. Importantly the literature on women, gender and violence creates a theoretical opening that links women as worthy subjects in political violence, rather than as passive objects as merely victims of war. It is important to note that women are not just worthy subjects as female combatants, but that their interactions on an individual and collective level with violence are complicated and can be defined by both personal and political reasons, simultaneously or at different times (Freidman 2018; Alison 2009).

Much of the earlier literature on the girl child soldier emphasised their victimhood status, as noted within critical scholarship on child soldiering (Denov et al 2016; McKay & Mazurana 2004). This included illustrating their gender specific vulnerabilities such as a greater exposure to sexual violence, slavery, abduction, forced marriage, greater exposure to HIV/Aids and other sexually related illness.

Indeed, women and girls recruited as ‘Bush Wives’ were often subjected to systematic sexual abuse and violence, but often these accounts problematically down played women and girl’s ability to survive (Coulter 2011, chapter 3). However, girl soldiers (like boys) are often crucial to the functioning and survival of the armed group, play multiple roles, and find ways of exercising agency (Mazurana et al 2002,100; Coulter 2008). For example, in one case study of girl soldiers in Sierra Leone, Parke (2006) found that girls fought, mined for diamonds, but were also required to provide sexual services to fellow male combatants at night (Park 2006, 315-337). Agency in this context equates to a question of survival. Girls are unable to challenge or transform their situation, but nonetheless these examples illustrate how agency is exercised in extreme situations. This builds on an already well-established argument that children should not be conceptualised as just ‘victims’.

The transition of women and girls to a post conflict phase is also challenging. Often experiences of change or agency gained during an armed movement are lost. Research on women in post conflict settings illustrates that they continue to face disadvantages and marginalisation, regardless of their personal gains or roles as combatants or civilians (MacKenzie 2012; Rajasingham-Senanyake 2004). Girl child soldiers and female combatants are generally subjected to more social criticism for transgressing expected gendered roles by participating in an armed group. This is a general trend found in research on girl child soldiers conducted worldwide (Denov 2010; Mazurana & McKay 2004;).

In post conflict situations, existing research highlights that women experience marginalisation at a top down level (such as through post conflict recovery reform, including peace building and government reform) and bottom up level (personal experiences of violence, discrimination) (MacKenzie 2012; Cockburn 2004). As Lee-Koo (2018b) explains from a top down level, in post conflict periods often state elites ignore opportunities to reform traditional state based agendas and practices that are patriarchal in design. Thus, she argues that a ‘gendered hierarchy of power’ is re-produced to limit the ability of women to pursue gender equality goals, particularly in political settings (Lee-Koo 2018b, 138-139). Women’s individual experiences are also highlighted in this research.

Cockburn (2004) describes, ‘a continuum of violence’ that women experience between conflict and post conflict violence, such as partner violence or other structural violence including poverty, and economic marginalisation (Cockburn 2004; Enloe 2000).

These insights are important in highlighting the way that gender shapes the experiences of men, women, girls and boys in conflict and post conflict settings. However, it is not just a question of ‘gender’. Wartime for some generates security, status power and material benefits that are not equally distributed in society. While women are typically excluded from peace building processes, there are also many examples where they have gone onto be successful politicians, lawyers and hold other high-ranking jobs, as is the case in Sri Lanka and Nepal. Also an individual’s post conflict experience is shaped by their pre- war status, acceptance by community and family, and broader politics of peace. While gender continues to be equated as a ‘women’s’ issue, gender also shapes the experiences of boys and men in different ways. Their experiences too is shaped by a matrix of social identity, including caste, ethnicity, class, and religion in their conflict and post conflict experience. For example, boys and men can also be subjected to sexual violence. But given current research focuses largely on girl and women’s experiences, their stories remain marginalised (Touquet 2018).

In Sierra Leone for example, while boys and men were also victims of rape, they were unwilling to report it for fear that they would be stigmatised as homosexuals (Aijazi et al 2019; Oosterveld 2019, 80). Oosterveld notes that at the Sierra Leone Special Court set up to prosecute war crimes, including the recruitment of children to hostilities, girls were typically called upon to testify about sexual violence and not boys. The court perpetuated gendered stereotypes about boy and girl experiences, despite evidence from human rights groups that boys and men had experienced sexual violence (Oosterveld 2019). While this research draws upon a gendered analysis, I have consciously incorporated boy (male) perspectives because their insights are also important. Furthermore, there is greater recognition now of girls presence as child soldiers, as seen in international advocacy work (World Vision 2020).

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter began by briefly overviewing the emergence of the child soldier figure within international advocacy work. I identified four key themes - the politics of childhood, global North South relations, victimhood versus perpetrator, and girl versus boy child soldier- to deconstruct the child soldier identity. In particular, the question of agency and gender is important in my analysis of child soldier reintegration experiences in Nepal and Sri Lanka. In some respects, the international advocacy movement has moved away from some of the problematic imagery related to Africa that was evident through various campaigns in the 1990s. Nonetheless, while child soldiers continue to be found in South Asia, African, and in ISIS recruitment throughout Syria and Iraq, there remain little advocacy attention or research efforts in the countries outside of Africa. This is most likely a result of access problems, but there also remains a strong association between Africa and child soldiering that continues to frame international advocacy, policy and program efforts in the children’s rights and protection space. This analysis highlights a need to theorise child soldier identities and experiences in a more meaningful way in terms of understanding former child soldiers’ experience of social and political dimensions as experienced through conflict and reintegration processes,

Chapter 4: Reintegration: Conceptual Discussion and Analysis

This chapter provides an analysis of reintegration, both within the context of DDR programming and beyond formal programming. Much of the DDR and specific reintegration literature comes from policy and practice based perspectives, which ultimately limits theoretical and conceptual understandings of reintegration. In this chapter, I began by briefly outlining DDR practice, and its limitations in relation to the concept and practice of reintegration. The second section analyses the reintegration concept and practice. There are two dimensions that are important in this research. Firstly, there is an important connection between reintegration outcomes and levels of peace, justice and reconciliation as experienced by former child soldiers, their families and communities. Reintegration programs problematically rest upon the idea of a post conflict society, but in reality a national commitment to rebuilding society and addressing peace and justice concerns is an on-going project that is often at odds with what the local population needs, or at least certain groups in society. Secondly, I argue that reintegration is not just a linear transition from a military to civilian identity, but consists of multiple social transitions related to an individual’s ability to adapt and grow in their new environment. In the remaining sections of the chapter, I consider the role of the child soldier identity in shaping return processes, social reintegration experiences and finally gendered experiences of return. These are key themes that play out in the empirical chapters on Nepal and Sri Lanka in analysing child soldiers’ reintegration experiences.

4.1 Introduction to DDR

This section begins with a brief overview of DDR practice, and some of the key debates identified in the scholarship since DDR programs typically form the first phase of reintegration for many of the former child soldiers interviewed. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) occurs in three phases.

According to UN Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (UN IDDRS) (2019; 2006), DDR is defined as: A process that contributes to security and stability in a post conflict recovery context by removing weapons from the hands of combatants, taking the combatants out of military structures and helping them to integrate socially and economically into society by finding civilian livelihoods (UN 2006, 6)

The UN has recently evolved DDR practice away from time sequenced, individualistic focused programs to focus on re-creating links between the receiving community and ex-combatants. This known as the ‘second generation DDR’ and involves programs that help de-radicalise ex-combatants through employment options, and programs that support community dialogue and reconciliation (UN 2021b). This program is currently in practice in dealing with former Al-Shabaab combatants in Somalia.

It is worth, however, covering some of the earlier discussions on DDR within academic and policy scholarship, since the conflicts in Sri Lanka and Nepal ended before recent developments in DDR practice occurred. Since the 1980s, approximately 60 DDR programs were implemented, and over half of these programs were implemented in the last decade (Colletta & Muggah 2009). Currently there are DDR programs occurring in Central African Republic (MINUSCA), the DRC (MONUSCO), Mali (MINUSMA), and South Sudan (UNMISS) (UN 2021). DDR programs have evolved from simple security outcomes (reforming security forces) to include equal attention to development concerns in order to sustain peace, which included capacity-building, local governance, and job creation (Cartagena 2009, 8). DDR programs remain a central component of international peace building efforts, and are used by international organisations, multilateral and bilateral organisations to meet both security and development objectives. The World Bank (WB), the United Nations (UN), and other UN agencies like United Nations Development Program (UNDP), are key organisations involved, as well as regional organisations, NGOs and national governments.

Child soldier specific DDR standards have evolved in this time too to meet children’s rights standards (UNICEF 2007), and primarily include the separation of children to adults during the DDR process. For example, the demobilisation of children should take place throughout the conflict, and in DDR settings, children should be separated from adults (UNICEF 2007; UN 2019; 2006). Typically, DDR programs consist of education and/or employment packages, family reunification and psychosocial programming. But this varies according to the national context and funding available. Secondly, DDR processes should be supported by broader child protection measures in building peace. This includes the deployment of child protection officers and development of national child protection policies in post conflict settings. While not all child soldiers experience DDR, many do. This is evident worldwide where child specific DDR programs have been implemented in countries like Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Colombia, Sri Lanka and Nepal, for example.

4.2 Critiques of DDR

Despite the prevalence of DDR as a tool in international peace building efforts, there are important critiques relating to the effectiveness of DDR programs in supporting an ex-combatant or child soldier’s reintegration processes, and in supporting the broader goal of enabling a country’s war to peace transition (Munive 2013; Muggah 2005). Firstly, reintegration is typically defined within the context of DDR practice by policy makers and NGOs. Reintegration is the third phase of DDR, and is commonly defined and measured as an economic based activity (job creation, cash packages). Thus, international stakeholders define reintegration outcomes in quantifiable, measurable outcomes, such as ex- combatants employed. In the DDR context, reintegration practices are restricted by formulaic implementation, with a focus on prescriptive and short-term outcomes (Berdal & Ucko 2009)

As Torjesen explains reintegration remains a ‘theory-less’ field (Torjensen 2013,1) as DDR studies have commonly emphasised reintegration as a measurable based outcome rather than a process. The transition from a military

identity to civilian identity is a process that encompasses social, economic, psychological and political dimensions. These are challenges that ex-combatants and former child soldiers continue to face in the longer-term. Scholars, therefore, argue that DDR practices limit what constitutes ‘success’ in a reintegration program, given the complex political, social and economic processes, which shapes the return experiences of ex-combatants (Torjensen 2013, 2; see also Bowd & Özerdem 2013, 444). The criticism of DDR and reintegration practices more specifically identified in the academic literature speaks to a practice versus academic divide, one in which the practice perspective has dominated. Berdal & Ucko (2009) explain that much of the NGO and UN literature generated on DDR focuses on ways of improving DDR practice through better planning and organisation (Berdal & Ucko 2009, 2).

Secondly, while DDR is often presented as a technical exercise, the implementation and practice of DDR, is shaped by the political context in which it occurs. Thus, the nature, scope and actual implementation of DDR is informed by political decisions, relating to peace negotiations, power play between different factions, and post conflict political arrangements, by national and/or state actors. DDR’s political character results from a purposeful redistribution of power in reinstating state control and legitimacy and power sharing arrangements (Colletta & Muggah 2009). Similarly, the Cartagena report (2009) describes it as an: ‘important political inflection point... its structure and degree of success may have deep and long lasting influences on the shape of local and national institutions’ (Cartagena 2009, 8). This criticism is not surprising in the context of international peace building interventions in which DDR programs are one component. International interventions and programs are an imperfect practice because when international standards and principles are implemented on the ground, they are often distorted by the social and political context. Existing research demonstrates that key international and national actors have their own agenda in vying for political power (Subedi 2013), or international actors can have their own ‘social logic’ in conducting interventions (Autesserre 2014). The importance of the political context in shaping DDR implementation is demonstrated by a number of different case studies.

In Munive’s (2013) analysis of South Sudan’s DDR process, she explains that the standard template of DDR was challenged by politics in the national context. This included divergent views between national power holders (principally the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)) and international actors regarding the goals of the DDR program. Secondly, international actors unintentionally reinforced existing political patronage networks, which were dominated by the SPLA. The SPLA shaped the DDR process to obtain entitlements and resources (Munive 2013, 596). Subedi similarly reflects this perspective based on DDR outcomes in Nepal. DDR programs targeting Maoist combatants were delayed for six years due to conflict amongst key political actors. The senior Maoist leadership became one of the key stakeholders once the conflict finished and deliberately delayed the commencement of DDR in order to negotiate key peace agreement outcomes (Subedi 2014). This is because the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) did not systematically outline DDR arrangements, which enabled different actors to negotiate DDR outcomes, based on their own agendas. Thus, many ex-combatants and child soldiers were left in limbo while these details were worked out (Subedi 2014). In my own research on Sri Lanka, DDR programs were implemented in a political manner by the Sri Lankan government to re-assert state authority and legitimacy by disciplining members of the LTTE population, sometimes through torture and detention (see Chapters 7 & 8; ICJ 2010).

The marginalisation and/or exclusion of female combatants and girl soldiers is identified as a major failing of DDR programming. Scholarship on female specific DDR experiences illustrates a pattern of exclusion from DDR programs, often because they are not considered soldiers by organisations or government actors implementing the program (MacKenzie 2012; Coulter 2011, 1-5). In Mozambique, Mazurana’s et al (2002) studied girl soldiers who were forcibly recruited to the Mozambican National Resistance group (RENAMO) as fighters, domestic and sex slaves, were left out of the DDR process because as ‘Bush Wives’ they were not considered soldiers. Once the DDR programs were implemented, many of them were given no choice but to accompany the men, who had originally captured them, back to their home villages (Mazurana et al 2002,116).

Jenning’s (2009) analysis of DDR in Liberia also illustrates the exclusion of women (and presumably girls). Female reintegration was given less attention by international and national actors, because men were stereotyped as greater threats to destabilising peace. The DDR program, therefore, focused on creating job pathways for men into the formal economy, whereas the majority of females were assumed to take on caring responsibilities and roles in the informal economy (like market stalls), with less security (Jennings 2009, 481). Jenning’s analysis illustrates how gendered cultural and social norms shaped the implementation of DDR to the detriment of women. Relatedly, in Nepal the job markets that boys and girl soldiers were direct to reflect existing gendered ideas related to employment opportunities. For example, girls were given opportunities to study tailoring, and boys were directed to being cooks or drivers (see Chapter 6). Existing social ideas about men and women’s work cannot be easily challenged through DDR, even if gender mainstreaming approaches are applied, as they were in Nepal. Thus, there exists a gap between policymaking and the social realities and structures that child soldiers negotiate through their reintegration process.

DDR practices have evolved to include gender mainstreaming practices. This was certainly evident in Sri Lanka and Nepal where boy and girl child soldiers participated in fairly even numbers. In Nepal, UNICEF implemented special measures to deal with pregnant or girl child soldiers who became mothers (UNICEF 2008). However, Mazurana et al (2017) question the current practice of DDR, which assumes that DDR remain the best method of supporting women and girls’ reintegration. Indeed, participating in a DDR program can result in further social stigma by identifying women and girls as combatants (see Wessells 2019, 485). They contend that women and girls should have access to a ‘portfolio of projects’, rather than predetermined resources and programs. In this way women and girls can make better choice about what they need to support them: Improving DDR outcomes for women and girls needs to start with a rethink of the individual trajectories that the target group need to undergo… a linear progression is out dated and should be made obsolete as a basis for planning (Mazurana et al 2017, 451).

This is an interesting perspective and reflects concerns raised by former child soldiers in some of the interviews conducted in this research. Former child soldiers questioned the predetermined programs they accessed, and felt that they had no say over the program choice or delivery (see Chapter 6). This concern is also reflected in Francis’ (2007) research where he argues that programs should employ different programs based on the different needs of children. Those that were used as cooks need different support and reintegration assistance, compared to a child who was on the front line, for example (Francis 2007). DDR practices would benefit its recipients more if there were more flexibility in the design and implementation of programs.

Similarly, child soldiers have experienced marginalisation from DDR processes on account their identity, despite the implementation of child soldier specific DDR standards. Firstly, there is problem of identifying a child soldier. Government or non-state armed groups are not always forthcoming with information, given the illegality of recruiting child soldiers in the first place, or children may not consider themselves child soldiers in the first place (McMullin 2011& 2013; Podder 2011; Hodgson 2012). There can be difficulties in identifying child soldiers, especially in cases where they have been in conflict for a long time, or in cases where children do not have access to proper birth records and/or citizenship papers (McMullin 2011). The age threshold of 18 used to identify children does not always work in practice, particularly in cases where village chiefs or former commanders are asked to draw up a list (Stovel 2010; Schepler 2005). Secondly, other scholarship critiques the failure of DDR programming to account for the socio- political and cultural context that child soldiers return to. Sometimes communities are hostile to the return of child soldiers, which can impact the psychosocial and mental health outcomes of children (Wessells 2019; Pauletto & Patel 2010). In other context, communities prefer to apply their own reintegration practice through rituals, such as in Mozambique where communities applied local customary healing rituals in bringing back children (Honwana 1997; see also Barrett (2019) for research based in Uganda). Nowadays, community sensitisation programs often accompany child soldier specific DDR program, but it takes time to achieve reconciliation in communities (Stovel 2010).

Despite limitations in DDR practice, the participation of former child soldiers in DDR programs can provide an important linking mechanism to informal processes of reintegration. If a child soldier is marginalised because of their gender or other social identity, they may miss out on accessing education and employment resources that can help them set up their new post war lives. While DDR practice provides a limited conceptual understanding of reintegration and there may be better approaches utilised in reintegrating children, it also can be an important variable in a child soldier’s reintegration trajectory. For many of the former child soldiers interviewed in this research, despite the limitations of DDR they also benefited from education, employment and other resources that many other war affected children did not access, over a one to two year period.

In sum, this section has provided a brief overview of DDR and some of the main critiques. DDR programs are typically limited by time and budget, thus providing only a limited context for understanding a child soldier’s reintegration experience. The importance of accounting for the political context was highlighted as the nature and scope of DDR are typically influenced by political decisions. The final section I analysed the problems of identifying particular groups for inclusion in DDR programs, including child soldiers (girls and boys) and women. In the next section, I further analyse reintegration as a concept and practice outside of DDR in order to set up a conceptual framework that accounts for the social and political complexities of return.

4.3 Reintegration conceptual overview

Reintegration occurs during the transition from a military identity to civilian one, and is based on the assumption that the individual can resume some semblance of a normal life (Kingma 2001). According to UN IDDRS (2006)22, child soldier specific reintegration involves:

22 The most recent UN IDDRS standards are still being updated so much of the documentation available on the website dates back to 2006. 90

Family reunification, mobilizing and enabling the child’s existing care system, medical screening and health care, schooling and/or vocational training, psychosocial support, and social and community based reintegration.

The UN DDR standards also emphasise the role of the State in facilitating social reintegration, according to Article 39 of the CRC. As well, it is important to note the definition of reintegration in accordance with The Paris Principles, the main technical document outlining child soldier reintegration. Reintegration is defined as The process through which children transition into civil society and enter meaningful roles and identities as civilians who are accepted by their families and communities in a context of local and national reconciliation (UNICEF 2007, 7).

Despite the existence of an international reintegration definition, reintegration remains a contested term amongst policy makers and scholars alike. This firstly relates to the problems of reintegration in the context of DDR, as discussed in section 4.2. Secondly, the success of reintegration is predicated on the national existence of a broader framework of peace, security and development having occurred in a national context. In theory, this includes the successful demilitarisation of society, democratic political reform, the implementation of rule of law, and reform of the security sector to replace militarised institutions (Nilsson 2005, 13). The idea of a ‘post conflict’ context is problematic, as is highlighted in broader peace and conflict analysis. In international policy terms, post conflict often denotes an absence of violence or acceptance that some local violence is normal (Autesserre 2010), rather than genuine, positive peace. Galtung’s theory of peace defines negative peace as the absence of violence, and positive peace as the absence of all violence to support social justice and equality (1969; 1990). Indeed, in the immediate post conflict environment, research demonstrates that rates of crime, such as homicide, can be higher (Braithwate & D’Costa 2018) and women can experience higher rates of domestic violence and sexual assault (Harris-Rimmer 2010, 128; Cockburn 2004, 43).

Post conflict environments are in between a war and peace state (McMullin 2013, 17-44; Mac Ginty 2006; Muggah 2005) and the legacy of conflict continues to be experienced by individuals at a community and national level because of on- going and/or incomplete peace and justice mechanisms and processes, associated with the limitations of international peace building intervention and/or national led measures to facilitate peace building that does not create meaningful change in relation to socio-economic justice, and addressing the root causes of conflict (Lederach 1997). The legacy of conflict can result in low levels of peace and reconciliation between different communities and individuals, and also between state and society. These factors impact an individual’s reintegration experience and such concerns were reflected in interviews with former child soldiers. While some were critical of their DDR experience, from a longer-term perspective they were most concerned by their social and economic outcomes, and their on-going political marginalisation from the state in terms of the level of protection and care they received.

Currently, the reintegration scholarship does not extensively explore the important connection between reintegration and an expansive peace concept. Peace scholarship frames peace and justice in more expansive, conceptual terms, which are related to meeting human needs, addressing structural injustices, but also rebuilding social cohesion in a bottom up sense, which Lederach defines as ‘societal infrastructure’ (Lederach 1997, xviv). Gawerc defines peace as a ‘structure of peace that is based on justice, equity, and cooperation (i.e., positive peace)’(2006, 439). Peace is an everyday experience that can be experienced in different ways by different people. Furthermore, the question of justice is also important as it can be a contentious issue within society. Countries can have peace without justice (Sriram 2010). Justice is typically defined as the formal understanding of achieving justice through retributive justice mechanisms, but individuals particularly from more marginalised groups or the less politically powerful, can have different ideas of justice or not have their needs met, particularly within formal transitional justice processes (Nickson & Braithwaite 2014; Braithwaite 2010). Lambourne’s (2009) research found that in Cambodia the inability of the local population to meet their basic day to day economic needs was a socio-economic justice issue, which

remained a significant impediment to achieving peace and reconciliation between the broader population and the more social and politically powerful groups. The people living in poorer conditions resented the more powerful and rich, who were living a better life, but being held unaccountable for alleged war crimes (2009). Thus, both socio-economic and political justice featured prominently in the narratives of those who participated in Lambourne’s research.

In Sri Lanka and Nepal although the respective conflicts ended some time ago, national political elites have politicised peace and justice mechanisms and processes (such as transitional justice) to either avoid accountability or to implement policies that benefit only certain sections of the population. National projects related to key concepts like peace and justice are often at odds with local understandings of the concepts and what they mean to the people in an everyday lived experience (Mac Ginty 2014; Björkdahl 2013). For example, in Nepal, many former child soldiers remained concern by socio-economic justice concerns related to poverty and lack of employment opportunities, and the state’s failure to support them either through transitional justice processes or through the distribution of resources. In Sri Lanka, former child soldiers remained concern by the lack of security (physical, economic, social) because of on-going militarisation, and their marginalisation by the Sinhala dominated national identity. These themes, as related to their reintegration experiences, will be explored further in Chapters 6 & 8.

The scholarship addresses this issue, but from a slightly different perspective in relation to the problematic idea that ex-combatants and former child soldiers can return back to a ‘normal existence’, as implied by the ‘re’ of reintegration. As McMullin explains: In many pre-conflict societies, ‘non-integration’ is the norm, due to political marginalization, poverty, and repressive social systems designed to keep certain segments of the population powerless (McMullin 2013, 17)

Ex-combatant and former child soldiers return back to societies where the disintegration of social, economic and political structures and institutions has occurred, and is most likely exacerbated by war (Hazen 2007). This is not just a

result of the conflict, but can relate to broader social, economic and political dynamics that existed even before the conflict commenced. While reintegration programs cannot expect to ameliorate the social and economic breakdown resulting from conflict, the short term and limited analytical focus of reintegration as applied in practice, particularly through DDR programs, fails to acknowledge this important issue. Reintegration outcomes for individuals need to be supported by a longer-term commitment by governments, international partners and local agencies to change existing social, economic and political inequalities, particularly for marginalised groups at an institutional and individual level.

Furthermore, reintegration programs are implemented on the basis that equipping ex-combatants with a particular skill set will support a return to a ‘normal existence’. Reintegration programs are designed to deliver training and resources to help a child soldier and/or ex-combatant return to civilian life, which typically takes the form of vocational training, cash, housing, land, education and psychosocial counselling. However, the training that individuals receive may not meet their needs, or account for the skills that they learnt as a combatant/child soldier (McMullin 2011; Chapter 6, section 6.2). Individuals may not be able to secure gainful employment based on their new skills acquired through training programs. High rates of employment, particularly youth unemployment are a common scenario in post conflict environments (ILO 2014; UN 2009). The reintegration process can be tricky for children, as many are close to adulthood by the time the conflict ends. They have missed out on education opportunities that other children may have received, which creates additional difficulties in transitioning to adulthood, as is discussed in Chapter 6. Indeed, McMullin observes that a common narrative evident in international DDR documents (such as the World Bank) indicate that reintegration training is used to ‘buy time’ until real peace kicks in (2013, 3). For example, an evaluation report published by the World Bank in reference to the Burundi DDR process states that: ‘DDR programs can be considered as means to buy time for peace to produce its beneficial effects’ (Unvin 2007). However, upon completion of reintegration programs, commonly international and/or government stakeholders may consider reintegration complete, and will not necessarily invest further in the training and resources needed to support former child soldiers and ex-combatants in their

civilian lives. It was evident through this research that many of the former child soldiers felt they needed on-going support and resources, in terms of education, support for business and other livelihood options, but they are not always prioritised in the NGO development sector because they have already received help or assistance through the reintegration program.

Given the limitations of defining reintegration in program settings, this research draws upon reintegration as encompassing multiple social transitions from a previous military based identity to a new civilian one (Theidon 2007; Denov & Maclure 2007), and the importance of understanding this transition within the socio-political context. As MacKenzie states, ‘reintegration in this sense is both an event and a process that begins with re-entry but continues long afterwards’ (MacKenzie 2012, 6). Certainly, for individuals experiencing reintegration, there is complex interplay between social, economic, psychological and political dimensions. For example, without a viable economic livelihood a former child soldier may not meet social expectations from family, nor restore their psychological well being because they feel unworthy (Wessells 2006b; Boothby 2006). Wessells explains that livelihood assistance for child soldiers in Sierra Leone in the form of micro-credit and business start-up funds generated important social outcomes for the child soldier status and identity, who were now able to help their families and communities financially (Wessells 2006b).

In sum, reintegration is a process whereby a child soldier or ex-combatant transitions from a military identity to a civilian identity. However, as this discussion demonstrates, reintegration is a multifaceted process that not only encompasses social, economic and political dimensions at an individual level, but is also shaped by a broader national context pertaining to post conflict, and the level and extent of peace experienced by former child soldiers. It is not just that post conflict countries are in a war to peace state, but there remain important structural and indirect forms of violence and injustices (Galtung 1969; 1990) as experienced through, economic, social, cultural and political domains, which can limit reintegration outcomes, particularly in the longer-term. Often these conditions exist before the conflict, but in both case studies there are new political, social and economic dimensions shaping structural inequalities. These

inequalities are often driven by a failure of political actors to engage in political dialogue with its constituents to address existing grievances and concerns within the population. In conceptualising reintegration as an on-going process that involves multiple transitions, it is worth noting that reintegration can take on different challenges and meanings. Former child soldiers can overcome certain challenges in their immediate reintegration experience, but may contend with new challenges in their adult lives, such as providing a financial security to look after the well being of their family.

4.4 Child soldier reintegration literature

In this section, I briefly highlight child specific reintegration literature that focuses on the social and political complexities that children contend with on their return, both in terms of their identity and their social positioning. The international child soldier identity as constructed through international humanitarian narratives and programs does not account for the different ways that children experience the child soldier identity in a local context. Insights from the literature, therefore, illustrate the different ways that children experience the child soldier identity in local settings.

On an individual level, a child soldier’s transition to a civilian identity is often a conflicting one. This is illustrated by Denov’s research on child soldiers demobilised from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone. Her research describes the ‘unmaking’ of the child soldier, which refers to the: ‘ways in which these young people leave the world of violence and their struggles to redefine themselves following demobilization’ (2010, 145). For the former RUF child soldiers, the process of unmaking was a conflicting experience; for some it involved the loss of power and protection, and for others it presented new freedom and opportunities. Often, their efforts to construct a civilian identity took place in communities that were not always receptive to the return of child soldiers (Denov 2010). Many former child soldiers also express regret due to their inability to take up social roles and employment opportunities that are typical to people of their own age (Denov & Marchand 2014; Wessells 2006b). This was illustrated in

Nepal, which will be discussed later. As my research will demonstrate, while many of the child soldiers appreciated the opportunity to return back home, their transition into a civilian identity has been a difficult process because they lack education and employment opportunities that would enable them to establish their adult lives in the way they wish. Beyond immediate identity changes, Denov theorises that children’s reintegration experiences are shaped by individual and structural factors, including identity construction, family and community, education, employment and gender based health and violence (2010, 146). There is an important process that occurs between the individual and structural settings (i.e. context), which facilitates or constrains the child soldier’s actions.

The problems of identity are also highlighted in Anderson’s study on RUF child soldiers’, from a different angle. She found that former child soldiers used ‘identity management strategies’ to meet community expectations. If they did not behave in a way that conformed to societal roles, they would face criticism for reverting to their ‘child soldier ways’. Thus, community acceptance of the child soldier was based on that child soldier concealing particular experiences associated with child soldiering (Anderson 2018,195) Her research demonstrates that former child soldiers are not really accepted for who they are, but have to perform a particular identity that disassociates them from their child soldering past.

The child soldier identity can also create problems for the child in relation to other groups of children, who may not receive the same level of help as a former child soldier through formal reintegration programs. Wessells (2019) observes that despite the positive motivations behind reintegration programs, many have intended and unintended consequences that breach the ‘do no harm’ humanitarian ideals behind such programmes. For example, in Sierra Leone and Liberia, child soldiers faced reverse discrimination and social backlash because humanitarian workers singled them out for support, whereas other vulnerable children did not receive the same support. Child soldiers were provided with livelihood assistance. This created jealousy within their local communities as it was only child soldiers that were provided with such resources. Furthermore, community animosity was compounded by a perception that child soldiers had

not been held accountable for their actions. The individualistic focus of reintegration programs ultimately created tensions for former child soldiers returning back to communal societies (2019, 474).

Indeed, there are important tensions that arise between international ideas of the child and children’s rights that guide reintegration programs, versus the local cultural context in which child soldiers are located. Reintegration programs can also problematically rely on ideas of international ideas of ‘childhood’. In Shaw’s study on the work of Child Protection Agencies (CPA) working with children, including child soldiers, in interim care centres in Sierra Leone education programs run by international and local stakeholders promoted a narrative of returning and restoring children’s ‘childhood’ status. She observes that one Reintegration Officer advised children that: ‘you are a child. OK, you want to be a big man. Go back to your community. Go to school. Work hard. And you will be a big man’ (Shaw 2014, 313). Shaw’s quote demonstrates that children’s acquisition of new skills in conflict settings are often not recognised by various stakeholders in post conflict settings. This can create frustration for the child.

The assumption that children can regain their ‘lost childhood’ is problematic as child soldiers have experiences outside of any ‘normal’ childhood as they have experienced adult war, but have also taken on responsibilities and learned new skills to survive in armed groups. Child soldiers also have to face ‘adult’ situations on their return to society. As other studies from Sierra Leone demonstrate, child soldiers often face significant rejection by family and community, particularly in cases where they committed violent acts against their own community members (Stovel 2010).

4.5 Social reintegration

At this point I revisit the idea of social reintegration, which I understand as the informal process of return and resumption of relationships within family and community. Social inclusion is an important outcome of this process (Friedman 2018; Tonheim 2014; Kingma 2001), but many former child soldiers continue to face barriers in achieving a state of inclusion in relation to their families and

communities. The social aspect of return was often a central issue identified by the former child soldiers in interviews conducted for this research. In the academic literature, social reintegration is identified as a way to theorise the more complex social processes of return in order to challenge the programmatic outcome focus of reintegration practice and studies (see Torjesen 2013; Özerdem 2012;). In addition to this, a social reintegration lens can capture girls and women’s experiences of return, which often falls outside the purview of formal reintegration program (see Friedman 2018). A female’s experience of reintegration is often defined in terms of gendered social role as a woman, and as a potential wife and mother. While men too are subjected to social pressure, in both Sri Lanka and Nepal the interviews suggested that reintegration was more difficult for girls in this regard because they face greater pressure to conform to pre-existing gendered roles (see Chapters 6 & 8)

Social reintegration is arguably the most difficult aspect of reintegration as it is an experience defined by social identity (childhood, gender, race, caste, ethnicity) and personal relationships that fall outside of the purview of policy of programs. For example, Kingma’s definition emphasises the importance of the ex- combatant and their family being accepted by the community (Kingma 2001, 407). Tonheim identifies a more individual focus in her definition, stating that it is about: ‘social acceptance and inclusion into the relationships and social networks of family and community’ (Tonheim 2014, 634). Either way, both definitions emphasise a repairing of social relations between community members and child soldiers. Family and community take a central place in determining child soldier reintegration experiences, as a source of social protection and in providing the social context that determines psychosocial outcomes (Betancourt et al 2010; Kohrt et al 2010). Wessells thus emphasises the importance of family tracing and reunification as being a central requisite of child soldier reintegration. This is also reflected in international standards like The Paris Principles (UNICEF 2007) and in the CRC, which states: “The child, for the full and harmonious development of his or her personality, should grow up in a family environment” (UN 1989, preamble). Just as a child’s experience of violence is mediated by the social context, in turn their recovery and rehabilitation is socially mediated through

systems support and the way that those around them respond and attach meaning to acts of violence (Wessells 2009; 2018; Boothby et al 2006).

Children’s return process is distinct to adults as many are in the process of acquiring adult status, through adult responsibilities and transitions such as marriage and work responsibilities. Thus, their position in relation to family and community is often quite different to adults in terms of the roles and expectations placed upon them by family and community. In other words, while they may have acquired adult experiences during conflict, they return home as children in terms of their social status. Honwana uses the idea of ‘waithood’ to describe youths who are unable to fully transition to adulthood, because of situations where social practices and institutions that previously supported this transition, have broken down owing to the failure of neo-liberal economic polices and the problems of jobs, poverty, and access to education (Honwana 2012). Those in ‘waithood’ often have to negotiate lives outside of normal family and economic structures with both potential negative or positive outcome. Many former child soldiers interviewed, particularly in the Nepal case, described a similar scenario of ‘waithood’ but in a post conflict setting. The social and political changes they experienced in the CPN-M movement created a dislocation between themselves and the post conflict society they returned to. The progressive social norms they adopted were not supported by mainstream society, and their failure to achieve education and employment outcomes created significant difficulties in setting up their adult lives.

The return of children back to society to family and community, however, is not always a straightforward process. While in theory families are often an important site of protection and support, families may be reluctant to receive returning child soldiers, particularly when there is a lot of community negativity and hostility towards child soldiers (Anderson 2018). Families are also a site where social, cultural and economic inequalities may be reproduced, through the support of practices like child marriage or denial of education opportunities. Research demonstrates the gendered nature of these problems, which disproportionately affects girls. Families may deny girls the same education opportunities as boys in the household, for example (D’Costa 2016; Plan 2014). As well, war can destroy

100

families and community structures and in turn may prove a risk to the child itself (Boothby et al 2006, 5). In Sri Lanka, some of the interviewees had lost many family members, which took away important support and resources particularly for those who now have significant war related disabilities (see Chapter 8). Ager (2006) also explains the possibility of ‘malign socialization’ in which families can socialise the child into stereotypes of prejudice (2006, 50). Loss of family or rejection can significantly impact the child soldier’s ability to rebuild their lives.

Community acceptance of the child soldier is an important determinant of child soldier return experiences, including psychosocial outcomes (Betancourt et al 2010; Kohrt et al 2010). Boersch-Supan describes reintegration as a two way process of an ex-combatant returning and the acceptance of the ex-combatant by community (Boersch-Supan 2008,1). Community reconciliation is an important issue that shapes a child soldier’s return process to community. A lack of reconciliation can impede the return of former child soldiers particularly in cases where child soldiers committed violence against their communities (Stavrou 2005; Veale & Stavrou 2003). Social reconciliation, defined here as the repairing of relations between community members and ex-combatants/child soldiers, is particularly important where crime or violence was committed against that particular community (Ginifer 2003, 42) Stovel (2008) expands upon the idea of reconciliation further, explaining that most peace building efforts focus on rational reconciliation, which focus on an agreement and do not require resolution of justice and fairness. The other form of reconciliation, sentient reconciliation, refers to trust and healing and emotional reconciliation of the past. This is a deeper and more engaged idea of reconciliation, but is harder to measure as it ‘is felt’ (Stovel 2008, 311). Reconciliation, however, is not just a community experience, but also relates to national led efforts to implement reconciliation measures. In Sri Lanka, the government implemented a Lessons Learned and Reconciliation Commission, which was criticised by civil society activists and the international community for not substantially dealing with reconciliation issues, particularly pertaining to the grievances that Tamil communities continue to express relating to the state’s failure to engage in genuine political dialogue and reconciliation.

101

Community relationships are not just defined, however, in terms of the level or extent of reconciliation. The community also serves as an important source of social connection in supporting the development and recovery of children, particularly in post conflict settings. More broadly, research on children and communities highlights the importance of ‘positive intergenerational relationships’, which enable children to feel safe and secure through positive engagements with adults in their communities (Bessell 2017, 269-270). Social capital is a useful concept in measuring the level of trust and social cohesion present in a community to support a child soldier’s reintegration process. Putnam (1993) defines social capital as the ‘features of social organizations, such as networks, norms and trust that facilitate action and cooperation for mutual benefit’ (Putnam 1993, 35). Leff explains that social capital enables connections to be forged across different identities (such as religious, ethnic, gender and other social identities), and to foster broader processes of peace and development through trust and reciprocity (Leff 2008, 12). Community focused reintegration programs are, therefore, an important mechanism in building social capital, by involving community organisations (Leff 2008, 35; Bowd & Özerdem 2013). In Sri Lanka, the question of social capital is important. There exists a significant level of distrust between former Tamil combatants, including child soldiers, in relation to the broader Tamil community. This is largely driven by fear, as association with former LTTE will mean that the individual’s actions will be scrutinised by government officials, specifically security and surveillance actors (see Chapter 8, section 8.1.2). The lack of social capital makes reintegration a difficult experience as former LTTE can feel isolated from the rest of the Tamil community.

4.5.1 Social stigma

Social stigma is an important example of the social consequences for many child soldiers on return to family and community, and can be a major barrier in rebuilding the positive social relationships needed for support and recovery. Social stigma refers to the disapproval of a person or group based on a characteristic that creates difference between other members of society. As Goffman explains, this characteristic is “deeply discrediting” and changes a

102

person ‘from a whole and usual person, to a tainted, discounted one’ (Goffman 1963, 3). Individual identity and self-worth is overshadowed because of a broader social narrative that criticises the actions, characteristics and value of that person in relation to society (Denov & Marchand 2014). Dijker & Koomen (2007) define stigmatisation as a social control mechanism, and theorise it as a psychological response to alleged deviance. Repair and tolerance are the other two responses to deviance, which is framed by the social and cultural context. Dijker & Koomen also emphasise other important features of stigma. The public nature of stigmatisation acts as a warning system to other members of society by alerting them to the problematic character of a particular individual. Secondly, in hierarchical based societies, stigma can be used: To maintain and legitimize their power, mainly by publicly associating those who threaten their power and values with a bad reputation and exposing them as ‘bad examples’ and objects of public punishment (Dijker & Koomen 2007, 7).

Stigma can vary over time and can change, and can vary in form and intensity. But stigma can be used to justify social exclusion, including discrimination from societal benefits like housing, education and health care (Mason et al 2001, 3-4.) As a concept, social stigma is important in exploring the complex social and psychological processes and consequences for former child soldiers as they attempt to repair relationships.

Commonly, both boy and girl child soldiers will experience some form of social stigma on return. Denov describes this as a process of a ‘secondary victimization’ (2010,185). A child soldier’s experience of social stigma, which typically occurs in community settings, is identified through multiple case studies, including Sierra Leone, Uganda, Colombia, Nepal, and Sri Lanka (Denov & Marchand 2014; MacKenzie 2012; Coulter 2011). Existing scholarship demonstrates that child soldiers will experience social stigma within families, community and amongst peers, to varying degrees. This typically relates to their (former) status as a child soldier. Betancourt’s et al (2010) study on RUF child soldiers in Sierra Leone demonstrated that 73% of child soldiers had experienced at least one incidence of stigma (2010, 22) Denov & Marchand (2014) explain the

103

child soldiers can be perceived as ‘immoral, untrustworthy and/or dangerous within society’ (Denov & Marchand 2014, 228). Betancourt’s et al (2010) findings suggest that there is an important relationship between stigma (manifesting in forms of discrimination) and a child soldier’s psychosocial outcomes in dealing with war related trauma and stress. Stigma may result in less acceptance and protection by family and community, and less access to education and employment. Tonheim notes that stigmatisation is used to socially exclude and punish those who go against norms; whereas social inclusion (integration) is used to reward those who act within expected norms and behaviour stipulated by society (Tonheim 2014, 636). Social exclusion, she explains, can take both overt and subtle forms. This could be in the form of name calling, or being told by their families not to go out with them. Indirect forms of social exclusion can be feelings of avoidance from neighbours and community members (Tonheim 2012, 288).

While the psychological consequences of stigma are important, there are important social and even physical impacts that stigma can have on the lives of former child soldiers. In Nepal, some of the child soldiers were in inter-caste marriages that were arranged before returning home at the end of the conflict. The CPN-M movement encouraged inter-caste marriage during the conflict, but it remains socially unacceptable in Nepalese mainstream society. Some of these child soldiers have moved away from their hometowns to start their lives anew. For other former CPN-M child soldiers interviewed for this research, they continue to fear the social stigma they would contend with if they were to return to their home village. Many have, therefore, made a new life for themselves in urban settings, like Kathmandu (the capital). Thus, child soldiers can face significant social dislocation in managing this social stigma. While it may lessen over time, the initial impact can have important and on-going consequences upon the lived experiences of child soldiers.

4.5.2 Gendered reintegration experiences

Scholarship on girl child soldiers' reintegration experiences also highlight social stigma among many issues that they negotiate on return to society. Girls are more harshly judged by families and communities for joining an armed group as

104

being a soldier contravenes acceptable female behaviour, as documented in the empirical literature (Tonheim 2014; Coulter 2011; Mazurana 2002). This is regardless of the circumstances surrounding their recruitment, such as forcible abduction. Indeed, in Tonheim’s (2014) study on girls’ return to communities in Eastern Congo, she describes the situation as a ‘superficial coexistence rather than a genuine social inclusion’ (Tonheim 2014, 642).

In more traditional patriarchal societies where girls are confined to the domestic sphere, the participation of girls in conflict often contravenes familial and social expectations about their role, particularly as potential wives and mothers (Kohrt 2016; Coulter 2011). Such criticism can centre on their sexuality and marriage prospects, based on the possibility that they lost their virginity outside of marriage. They can, therefore, be considered defiled, sexually loose, and as ‘damaged goods’ (Coulter 2011; Betancourt et al 2008). This can have a flow on effect in their lives, preventing marriage or other social obligations required to gain community acceptance (Burman & McKay 2007). This form of social stigma can be amplified, particularly in contexts where armed groups were well known for using girls (and women) as Bush Wives, particularly in the context of Africa. Tonheim found that girls recruited to armed groups in the Eastern Congo had a reputation for having had multiple sexual partners with different male soldiers (Tonheim 2012, 284).

In the South Asian context, marriage is also an important community marker of social acceptance and can be a way for former girl soldiers to manage social stigma. This was certainly reflected in the interviews conducted for this research in which many girls felt pressured to be married (see Chapter 6 & 8). Kohrt’s (2016) study of a gendered ritual in Nepal called the Swasthani ritual was used by community and family members to support the return home of girl child soldiers. This is a ritual performed by women in a month long fast to atone for one sins. The community placed pressure on girls to participate in this ritual for their future marriage prospects. As Kohrt explains in relation to one girl child soldier named ‘Maya’, the adult women advised her to participate to: Prevent negative consequences of their sin committed as Maoist soldiers such as travelling with men, interacting with other castes, and being

105

physically active during menstruation. If girl soldiers did not perform this ritual, they endangered their future husbands and sons, according to the elder women (Kohrt 2016, 369).

There are also particular categories of the girl child soldier that face even harsher criticism from society. Existing research on girl mothers from Sierra Leone, Uganda and Liberia illustrates that girl mothers had enormous difficulties returning back to communities with their children that they gave birth to during their time in an armed group (McKay et al 2011; Stavrou 2005; McKay & Mazurana 2004). Burman & McKay explain that the social difficulty of being a mother relates to cultural perceptions of their womanhood. Essentially, becoming a mother outside of the expected social context means that they have not experienced the normal cultural transitions and girlhood developmental processes required to become a mother (Burman & McKay 2007, 319). Girl mothers can experience extreme marginalisation and sometimes be forced to leave their communities to make a life elsewhere. As a single mother, former girl soldiers can be considered a burden to their families, who have to provide for both their daughter and child. Also, the child can experience social stigma as the ‘enemy child’. Tonheim (2014) explains that East Congolese families did not want to look after a child of Rwandan origins (from the Interwahame forces). Girls were either expected to give up their children, or return them to the fathers (Tonheim 2014, 638). This phenomenon is documented from other wars, including Bosnia and Herzegovina (Seto 2015) and in Bangladesh (D’Costa 2011).

The literature demonstrates that there is an important public/private divide evident in girl’s reintegration experiences in which girls (and women) are subjected to a gendered social re-ordering to conform to their pre-existing domestic, private roles. This is a theme highlighted in MacKenzie’s (2012) study on female ex-combatant experience of DDR in Sierra Leone. International and local actors developed programs of security reform to deal only with male soldiers because women (and girls) were not considered as legitimate combatants. External and national actors focused on repositioning women back into the demilitarised domestic space through a gendered social re-ordering to re-establish male dominance. MacKenzie explains that social re-ordering is

106

based upon conjugal relations. Conjugal relations are defined as the: the ‘laws and social norms that serve to regulate sexuality, (re)construct the family, and send messages about acceptable and legitimate social relationships’ (MacKenzie 2012, 4).

MacKenzie’s analysis of gendered social re ordering can be applied to many other contexts, including Nepal and Sri Lanka. Returning girls and women face significant social pressure in being married to fulfil community standards about their expected role as wives and potential mothers. Paradoxically in Sri Lanka, authorities have identified male ex-combatants as greater security risks, resulting for many in on-going detention and torture, which is often sexual in nature. This has destabilised the conjugal order as families do not have a male head or men are unable to have children as a result of their injuries (Chapter 8).

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter provided a critical overview and analysis of reintegration in the context of DDR and more broadly in relation to complex political and social environments. Reintegration is a multi-faceted process that encompasses multiple transitions from a military to civilian context for the individual child soldier, which consists of multiple social, economic and political challenges. I also emphasised the importance of understanding reintegration in relation to post conflict environments. Section 4.2 explored the different ways that a child soldier identity can impact an individual child through their social relations. The child soldier identity can actually create divisions between child soldiers and other members of society, particularly in relation to other groups of war affected children who may not receive the same level of help or resources as child soldiers. In the final section, I focused on gendered reintegration experiences. Social reintegration is a key concept identified to uncover girls and women’s experiences of reintegration, and to understand the dynamics of family and community in shaping reintegration outcomes.

107

Chapter 5: Nepal: Political Context, Conflict and Peace

In previous chapters, I argued that to broaden reintegration analysis it is necessary to analyse the socio-political context that child soldiers return to. An analysis of national politics framing state rule is crucial in understanding the contested nature of peace, justice and reconciliation in post conflict environments, which shapes a child soldiers’ reintegration experience in terms of post war identity, quality of life and relationship to the state as citizens.

This chapter is primarily concerned with identifying major political and social developments in Nepal, commencing with the unification of the country in the eighteenth century, under Prithvi Narayan Shah. Nepal’s political situation, conflict and post conflict periods are defined by on-going social, economic and political marginalisation and injustices, particularly for marginalised caste and ethnic groups, including the lowest caste Dalit, indigenous groups (janajati) and women. The Nepalese state continues to prioritise Nepalese national characteristics based on Hindu religion and culture, and is controlled by a small (typically male) social and political elite, called the Caste Hill Hindu Elite (CHHE). The political, social and cultural exclusion experienced by many groups provides an important context in understanding the drivers of the conflict that occurred (1996-2006), led by the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN-M)(Maoist). Indeed, many of the former child soldiers experienced the social, cultural and economic marginalisation that sustained the CPN-M movement. In the post conflict period, historical patterns of exclusion continue to exist along caste and ethnic lines. For the most marginalised groups, who make up the majority of conflict victims, they have not benefited extensively from peace and democratic reform in Nepal.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section (5.1) begins with a brief historical overview of important political and social developments that explain the dominance and continuation of the Nepalese Hindu state (1768- 1996). Section 2 (5.2) provides an overview of the conflict (1996-2006) led by the

108

CPN-M, which largely emerged in response to historical injustices as experienced by marginalised groups. The experiences of child soldiers are also profiled. In Section 3 (5.3), I examine national led efforts to formally address peace and justice. Nepal’s peace processes continue to be hampered by national politics, which limits the extent to which politicians engage in formal processes, like transitional justice. Nepal’s peace process remains defined by on-going issues in delivering justice to victims, which includes issues of socio-economic justice. The political context framing Nepal’s peace process provides important background in understanding how former child soldiers position themselves in relation to national peace and justice initiatives, and their campaign to advocate for social justice, as will be discussed in Chapter 6.

5.1 State unification and political developments, 1768-1996

Nepal is a landlocked, predominantly rural based agricultural country that is located between India and China. According to the 2011 census, the population size of Nepal is 26.5 million and is made up of 125 caste/ethnic groups with 123 languages. The country is divided into three geographical regions: (i) Himalayan range (ii) valleys and hills and (iii) the Terai belt which borders with India23. A large proportion of the population lives in the hills and mountains and relies on subsistence farming in the absence of other economic activities. 66% of the population are directly engaged in farming, which is mostly subsistent and integrated with livestock (Government of Nepal 2011). Nepal continues to be ranked as one of the poorest countries in the world, with rates of poverty particularly high in the mid and far west regions known as mountain/Terai belt. In 2010, 25.2% of the population live under the poverty line (ADB 2012).

In the eighteenth century Prithvi Narayan Shah unified Nepal from his small kingdom of Gorkha. Both the monarchy and Hinduism were central to Shah’s rule and the development of a centralised Nepalese state. Hinduism legitimised monarchical rule on the basis of divine right and Hindu belief of nobility from birth

23 The Terai region refers to the lowland region that stretches across southern Nepal between the Indian border and the foothills of the Himalayas 109

(Sharma 1997, 475). Despite the diversity of religions, ethnicities and languages, the Shah (and subsequent Rana and Panchas rulers) undertook a campaign to homogenise Nepal as a unified national state by conducting a campaign to spread Hindu culture to create a Nepalese identity. This was on the basis of one religion, Hinduism, Nepalese language (Khas-khura), and Hindu upper caste culture, which was imposed on the rest of the population (Lawoti 2015, 90). The Shah also consolidated his rule through the centralization of politics and administration. Both central and local elites were used to obtain revenue from the population and to maintain law and order (Hachhethu 2003), and elite families dominated important political positions of power (Lawoti 2015, 90). As Lawoti explains: The ruling group defined the rights and duties of citizens toward the state by conflating it with its own interests and adopting political institutions that concentrated power within the group (Lawoti 2007, 23).

This style of state rule continued during the Ranas and Panchas. Indeed, the power of the monarch was typically supported by male, Hindu elite rule Bahun Chhetri, or known as the caste Hill Hindu Elite (CHHE) (2011; Whelpton 2005)24.

The legacy of a centralised state rule continues to impact contemporary politics, including preventing marginalised groups from particular ethnic and caste groups, namely the lowest caste Dalits, indigenous people (janjati), Madhesi25 people, and women from accessing political power and resources. There exists a significant urban/rural divide where standards of living, including rates of poverty, and delivery of resources and government services are lacking in rural regions, and experiences of social discrimination based on caste, ethnicity and gender for non-CHHE groups. Nepal remains a deeply hierarchical society, which is maintained by discriminatory institutional and legal practices, and social and cultural practices.

24 Hindu elites are primarily drawn from the dominant castes of Brahmin, Chhetri, and Thakuri. 25 Madhesi people are ethnically Tharu and Maithali and inhabit the Terai, a southern part of Nepal 110

The introduction of the Muluki Ain in 1854 was another significant development in Nepal’s history and which continues to impact social and economic equality in contemporary Nepal. In 1846, Jung Bahadur Rana, a military court official took over government rule through a bloody coup, and established the Rana autocracy (1846-1951).26 The Ranas applied Hinduism more rigidly, which culminated in the introduction of the Muluki Ain (1854). The Muluki Ain (1854) was a legal framework that established a Hindu caste-based social order. In turn, this legal framework was used by Hindu caste elites to support their political power. The Bahun and Chhetri (Pahadis) were placed at the top, Tibeto- Burman27 tribes in the middle and untouchable caste (today’s Dalits) at the bottom (Tamang 2011, 298). The Muluki Ain’s law codified caste groups along a continuum of pollution and purity. Accordingly, each caste group was accorded differential privileges, resources and social obligations. The social order systematically regulated Nepalese society through inter-group relations around social interaction, including sexual and marital relations. The social order extended into all aspects of life, and impacted the legal system. Lower castes, like the Dalits, would be punished much more harshly than higher caste groups, even if they committed the same crime. Higher castes would tend to receive lesser punishment or no punishment at all (Bishwakarma 2018, Lawoti 2007), and marginalised groups did not have the same access to education and jobs (Lawoti 2007,18).

The Muluki Ain was disbanded in 1963, but the social and cultural practices associated with caste and ethnic division continue to drive social exclusion. There exist significant disparities for marginalised groups in terms of accessing political resources, society, education opportunities, and in the economy. Social divisions based on caste and ethnicity continue to shape an individual’s experience of discrimination, inequality and disparity, in relation to their social status, and access to social, political and cultural and educational sectors (Bishwakarma 2018; ADB 2012; Bennett 2008).

26 The Rana’s ruled as prime ministers through a hereditary system. While the Shah’s effectively remained on the throne, the Rana family effectively had political power. (Whelpton 2005, 1). 27 Included in this group are Gurung, Tamang, Limbu, Rai and Sherpa, now self-defined as indigenous people (janajati). For some of the debates surrounding the complex distinctions between caste and tribe see Gellner (1991) and Sharma (1978). 111

5.1.1 Panchayat period, 1960-1990

In 1950 the Rana regime was overthrown. King Tribhuwan experimented with parliamentary democracy and the Panchayat28 system was introduced as a guided and controlled form of democracy. The authoritarian Panchayat era was significant in establishing the modern roots of the Nepalese state. The constitution declared Nepal a Hindu kingdom, and Nepali as the official language. A uniform national culture was established through the education system and media, on the basis of ‘social harmony’. This goal was encapsulated in the Panchayat slogan of ek bhasha, ek bhesh, ek desh (one language, one style of dress, one country) The Panchayat regime not only ignored Nepal’s linguistic, cultural and ethnic diversity, but also framed it as a barrier to the modern development of the country (Lawoti 2007). Group exclusion and discrimination based on caste, gender and religion became entrenched (Lawoti 2007,9). As Thapa states the: Panchayat system crafted a sense of Nepali nationhood based on a set of features with which more than two-thirds of the population could not identify. Conformity was demanded by the state, and dissent was penalized severely (Thapa 2012, 40).

The Panchayat period, therefore, continued to reinforce the Nepali Hindu state and national based project.

5.1.2 Parliamentary democracy and the Maoists, 1990-1996

The Panchayat system was dismantled as a result of the first People’s Movement (Jana Andolan I). A coalition of political parties, including both the Nepali Congress and various communist parties demanded the restoration of multi-party democracy. This resulted in promulgation of a new constitution and multi-party democracy, and a more limited role for the monarchy as a constitutional monarchy. The disbanding of Panchayat rule was met with initial optimism and

28 In this system local elections were held at village and election level and representatives at district and most at national level were drawn from village panchayats.

112

the new constitution declared Nepal as a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, and democratic state with all citizens equal. However, the constitution continued to recognise Nepali as the official language, and Nepal as a Hindu kingdom. Thus, Nepal’s central features as a Hindu state were retained (von Einsiedel et al 2012). . Despite initial optimism and hopes for Nepal’s multi party democracy, there remained widespread discontent politically and socially. Political reform was not enough to create a more inclusive form of democratic governance for historically marginalised groups in terms of their rights, participation and formal political representation (Tamang 2011).29 A far left splinter group called the CPN-M presented the most radical critique and registered their concerns through a list of 40 point demands. These points focused broadly on addressing social, economic and political inequalities experienced by certain groups, including the Dalits, indigenous people, Madhesi people, and women. Some of the issues identified in the 40 points demands included land distribution and management, land inheritance for women, and more even distribution and access to economic resources (Thapa and Sijapati, 2005, 211). Among the many demands, the CPN- M sought to remove the monarchy and create a people’s republic committed to principles of equality on the basis of a new constitution (see Thapa and Sijapati, 2005, 211).

5.2 Conflict

The CPN-M movement, led by Prachanda (Pushpa Kamal Dahal), and Babu Ram Bhattarai, rejected the constitution promulgated in November 1990, because it provided an inadequate basis for inclusive democracy and representation of minority groups. The Maoists presented a list of 40 point demands to the National Congress with a deadline. Before the deadline expired on 13 February 1996 the People’s War official commenced with sporadic attacks by the Maoists against police landmarks in Rolpa, Rukum and Sindhuli. In 2001

29 Tamang (2011) explains that janjatis in particular protested that there was no need to have the term Hindu inserted into the constitution description arguing that the king was already safeguarded by other measures. The Madhesis also protested again discriminatory citizenship causes. 113

the King issued a state of emergency and declared the Maoists as terrorists, and the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) was put in charge. This period of the conflict saw an increase in battle related deaths, and the suppression of media freedom. Human rights organisations also noted an escalation in human rights abuses committed against so called ‘Maoist sympathisers’. This included indiscriminate executions by the Army against civilians, who were accused of being Maoist sympathisers, torture, and sexual based violence (Shakya 2011, 557). In 2003 and 2004, Nepal had the highest number of disappearances worldwide (HRW 2005). Despite this, by 2002 the Maoists had extended control from their home base in West Nepal to almost all districts by 2002, and had set up village committees to govern local areas.

The Maoists were able to sustain a successful armed struggle because of their ability to tap into the discontent expressed by marginalised and minority groups, who for centuries had been excluded from political, social and cultural spheres of life (Lawoti, 2012, 136; Shakya, 2011, 122; Thapa 2012, 51). Poverty and income inequality were important structural factors driving the insurgency (Thapa 2012; Sharma 2006; Pfaff-Czarnecka 2005). The conflict commenced in the western districts, which from the 1950s was a communist stronghold (Thapa 2002), and popular support of the Maoists was developed through cultural troupes and propaganda efforts. The Maoists successfully built an inclusive ideological platform that encompassed historical forms of exclusion, including political representation, rural landlessness, poverty and regional inequalities (Lecomte- Tilouine 2013; Thapa 2012, 51).

5.2.1 Female combatants

The presence of female combatants was described by the CPN-M as significant in challenging women’s experience of subordination in both the personal and political realm. The Maoist recruitment effort focused on women and girls located in rural areas, and from poor Tibeto-Burman and non- Aryan communities, e.g. Magars, Tamang, Kamis, and Gurungs, and other oppressed castes, such as Dalits and Tharus (Manchanda 2004). Traditional gender discriminatory practices were often more severe in rural areas, and many of these women were

114

marginalised from state governance and development projects, and experienced unequal development outcomes (Acharya 2006). Existing research notes that some of the women joined the movement to protect themselves from conflict related sexual violence perpetrated by the Army, which was particularly prevalent in the western regions of Nepal (Braithwaite 2015, 8). In my interviews, some former girl child soldiers were concerned by their inferior status as women ‘to be’. For example, one former girl child soldier explained to me that she was decided to join the Maoist based on her concern that in the future a marriage would result in her slave like existence to a husband. By joining the Maoists she could improve society and in turn her own social standing (former girl child soldier, CS 4, Nepal 22.11.17). However, former girl child soldiers expressed a variety of personal and political reasons for joining the Maoists that did not always centre on gender concerns. As one former girl child soldier explained, it was considered fashionable to join the Maoists (former girl child soldier, CS 4, 22.11.17, Nepal)

Officially, gender equality featured in the CPN-M political platform as point 19 in the 40 demands, which stated that ‘patriarchal exploitation and discrimination against women should be stopped. Daughters should be allowed access to paternal property’ (Thapa and Sijapati, 2005, 211). The CPN-M regarded the presence of female combatants as a way to support gender equality (Pettigrew & Schneiderman 2004). The CPN-M movement supported a range of campaigns to support social change for women, including banning alcohol. However, ultimately gender equality became a secondary concern to the broader movement, and was not always prioritised within the ranks. The former senior female Maoist Commander Pavati commented that women’s equal role was not always well received by men as fellow Maoist cadres. This was a project that they were continuing to work on (Yami 2007). During the peace process that commenced in 2006, the male delegation did not prioritise women’s participation, and thus the CPN-M contingent remained all male.

The CPN-M’s attempt to challenge unequal gender relations has not followed through into the post conflict era in a way that reflects the rhetoric and practice of the movement. Nepal has met important gender equality milestones, such as the 1/3 mandatory election of women to parliament, and the reform of key gender

115

discriminatory laws around citizenship, land inheritance, divorce and child marriage (see Subedi 2009). However, while some former senior female Maoists have gone onto hold senior public positions, the majority of female ex- combatants now contend with extreme social, economic and political disadvantages. This includes: social stigma in their communities, difficulties in supporting themselves economically, and divorce as a result of inter-caste marriage breakdowns (interview with NGO worker, Nepal, 1.12.17; Upreti & Shivakoti 2018). These issues are also reflected in the interviews with former girl child soldiers.

5.2.2 Child soldiers in conflict

The CPN-M armed movement relied upon the use of child soldiers to perform a variety of roles, including as fighters, intelligence workers, messengers, and in providing logistical support. The Maoists never publically admitted to using child soldiers, but they were integral to the armed movement (former boy child soldier, Nepal, 13.11.17; HRW 2007; Amnesty International 2005). The Army also used children as messengers (HRW 2007). Many former child soldiers interviewed grew up experiencing social, economic and political marginalisation, which compelled them to join the CPN-M movement, or their childhood was framed by the uncertainty of conflict. Some of the former child soldiers were working as farmers or labourers in rural areas without access to adequate education and support. One former boy child soldier stated: When I was first worked for someone, I followed a monotonous routine. I looked after livestock, and after the house. I was not treated well in that family. I felt like I was suffocating. The Maoists weren’t selling big ideas but the country was already in conflict. There was no peace in the country. I thought I would give up [my life] and go and fight for them. I didn’t understand the vision as I was a child, but it was easy to persuade me (former boy child soldier, CS6, 22.11.17, Nepal).

The child soldier explained to me that he did not completely comprehend the Maoist vision, but over time grew up in the movement, he understood the Maoist

116

goals, which he came to support. This was a common story presented through other interviews.

The theme of marginalisation was also reflected in an interview with a child rights NGO worker, who told me: Most of the kids, both girls and boys they were living marginalised lives. They knew what discrimination was...at that age..11,12,13, they were having hard times. They knew the structure of society and how they were marginalised they thought it was unfair. They wanted to change that situation…. [There was] purely the sense of having to do something for their society… (child rights NGO worker, 3.12.17, Nepal)

The experience of marginalisation reflected in these interviews is not surprising as childhood experiences are shaped in important ways by social identities including gender, caste, ethnicity, class, and religion. In Nepal, because of the socially hierarchical nature of society that is importantly defined by caste, social identity sets strict boundaries around opportunities for education and employment, marriage prospects, and ability to progress one’s social status beyond a particular caste grouping. Poverty is particularly high in rural areas and among the lower caste groups. Children do not have the same opportunities for education, and some take up work responsibilities at a much younger age (UNICEF 2010). The conflict also changed ideas of childhood, with some children taking on responsibilities as heads of households, performing tasks associated with child soldiering, or being Maoist informants, which changed the nature of their childhood experience (Pettigrew 2007).

From a child protection perspective, the methods used by Maoists to recruit children, who were too young to fight in a guerrilla war, ultimately makes it difficult to reconcile the recruitment of children, despite the difficult circumstances that many children dealt with in their pre-conflict lives. Indeed, many former child soldiers described the hardships they faced during the conflict, including the lack of food, being unable to contact their families and the physical hardships they faced (former girl child soldier, CS7, Nepal, 23.11.17). While not all child soldiers were forcibly recruited, many were and sometimes from schools (Shakya 2011;

117

HRW 2007). Others faced intimidation from either the Maoists or the Army, and so the safest option was to join the Maoists (former boy child soldier, CS2, Nepal, 22.11.17). The Maoists also used deceptive recruitment methods. For example, some of the child soldiers told me that upon their joining they were told they would just perform in these cultural troupes, but later they underwent military training and were sent to fight (former boy child soldier, CS 2, 22.11.17, Nepal). The idea of children having choice in joining the movement is highly problematic and limited in this context where the Maoists often used deceptive narratives and methods of indoctrination to recruit them. Children, therefore, could not make an informed choice, particularly in cases where they and their families faced intimidation by the Maoists or the RNA.

However, this does not mean that children did not exercise some form of agency during the conflict. For example, a former girl child soldier was a commander at the age of 16 of 50 others, both boys and girls. She told me: It didn’t matter that I appeared younger than I was…my unit respected me when I took charge…I had 50 people who I was responsible for. I felt I commanded well. During the time we went to war, I was in charge of that team.

While she was subsequently shot in her legs during a battle and continues to deal with the medical consequences without adequate medical care, this experience was still important for her in demonstrating resilience and strength (former girl child soldier, CS7, Nepal, 23.11.17). Furthermore, many of the child soldiers believed in the Maoist movement, and that they were contributing to a better future. One of the biggest difficulties they face in their post conflict lives is that they were part of a larger revolutionary movement that gave them a cause to fight for, and hope for a better future. But their post conflict lives are not guided by a broader revolutionary agenda, which makes it difficult to find purpose amongst all the other economic and social hardships they face (see Chapter 6). Zharkevich’s (2009) describes the place of Maoist youth during the conflict as a ‘new mode of being young in Nepal’ (2009, 68). Youth were able to build a new identity in revolutionary politics through challenging existing generational order. Many of these youths categorically rejected being defined as child soldiers and

118

spoke of their agency through their participation (2009, 69). Indeed, in both historical and contemporary times, youth have formed an important part of political activism and politics more broadly (Snellinger 2009), which was most recently demonstrated in the Jana Andaolan II. The political allegiance of child soldiers is partly explained by the indoctrination strategies employed by the Maoists (Pettigrew 2013) however, these children did not support the movement just because of blind allegiance, particularly given the difficult lives that some had before the armed movement commenced. On reflection, former child soldiers are critical of their recruitment to the CPN-M, but there remain important tensions between their conflict and post conflict narratives. Their criticism of Maoist child soldier recruitment is perhaps augmented by the hardships and social dislocation they face in their post conflict lives, rather than the actual act of recruitment and participation. This will be explored further in Chapter 6.

Child soldiers were one of many groups of children victimised by the conflict. Children suffered from violence, including a variety of human rights violations throughout the conflict, at the hands of the CPN-M and government forces. Both the CPN-M and Army were accused of committing human rights abuses against children, which included extra-judicial killings, being detained by police and military to be interrogated as potential Maoist informants, disruption of schooling, and experiences of sexual violence (Shakya 2011). An Amnesty International report (2005) also documents examples of children killed in ‘armed encounters’ with the Army due to their alleged support of the Maoists. One former girl child soldier explained that the Army treated child soldiers no differently to adult combatants, and if child soldiers were captured they faced the possibility of being tortured. She said: If the army captured a male they would be killed and tortured to death…when it came to a female their treatment of her was even more brutal. They raped them..they sold their uterus and organs, and when they came back from this they were disfigured, they lost a lot of things. They were brutally treated (former girl child soldier, CS 7, Nepal, 23.11.17)

While she did not experience this violence directly, she knew of friends that had been subjected to this type of violence.

119

Indeed, the use of gendered violence by the Army, particularly sexual violence against girls and women, both civilian and combatants, was documented by various human rights organisations, but is not an issue that is currently being addressed through transitional justice mechanisms (interview with child activist, 20.11.17, Nepal; former boy child soldier, Nepal, 13.11.17; Yadav 2019). Yadav explains that female combatants were subjected to physical and mental torture in prison and subjected to sexual violence by security forces. These allegations have never been investigated or brought forward as a transitional justice issue (Yadav 2019, 229). One human rights activist explained that because of the sexual violence during conflict there exist children born of wartime rape. While many of these children do not know the details of their conception, she is concerned about the social stigma that these children would contend with if this information became public (human rights activist, Nepal, 20.11.17).

The government missed important opportunities to demobilise child soldiers during the conflict. Interviews with human rights activists suggest that government officials lacked awareness or even a will to engage with child protection issues during the conflict (interview with child activist, 20.11.17, Nepal). For example, a children’s rights organisation described the difficulties of protecting children (including child soldiers) during the conflict from both Maoist and the Army during the conflict. Safe houses were set up where these children could stay, but the child workers frequently faced threats by both the army and Maoists, who wanted to access the children (interview with NGO worker, Nepal, 3.12.17).

In Nepal’s current transitional justice context, only a small group of children were identified as conflict victims, namely those children who belonged to deceased member of the armed force, and became eligible for scholarship and other support. Some former child soldiers did benefit from the DDR program run by UNICEF, but many missed out on resources. The transitional justice process has not engaged more broadly with issues relating to children and armed conflict.

120

5.3. Post conflict Nepal

5.3.1 Peace process

The conflict resulted in 13,000 people killed (OHCHR 2012). Other human rights organisations suggest a figure of 15,027 fatalities, with the state responsible for approximately two-thirds of this figure (INSEC 2010,13). The CPN-M and RNA were accused of committing atrocities against civilians, such as unlawful killings, enforced disappearance, torture, arbitrary arrest, and sexual violence. Internally displaced people were estimated to number between 100−200,000, and tens of thousands fled as refugees (OHCHR 2012).

In 2006, the Jana Andolan II, also known as the People’s Movement II occurred, in which 19 days of protest were carried out to remove King Gyanendra as direct ruler. This paved the way for the signing of the 2006 the Comprehensive Peace Accord30, which was signed between the CPN-M and Seven Party Alliance (SPA) formally ending the ten year civil war. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in November 2006 and contained a variety of different provisions, and presented an ambitious road map to Nepal’s peace process. Key elements of the agreement included the adoption of an interim constitution, the institution of an interim parliament, the holding of elections for a Constituent Assembly and state restructuring based on decentralisation and removing the unitary structure of the state. Other provisions related to investigating human rights violations and disappearances, establishing transitional justice mechanisms, and a plan for demobilising ex-combatants. Another important theme was a focus on social and economic justice (Pasipanodya 2008). The CPA states the need to build ‘a common development concept for socio- economic transformation and justice.’ This included policies for land reform and ending feudalism, restructuring of state to end discrimination along the line of caste, gender, ethnicity, and citizen rights for education, housing, and health care (Section 3, CPA).

30 CPA states that it aims to: ‘carry out an inclusive, democratic and progressive structuring of the state by eliminating the current centralized and unitary form of the state in order to address problems related to women, Dalit, indigenous ethnic (Adivasi Janajati) people, Madhesi, oppressed, neglected and minority communities and backward regions by ending discrimination based on class, caste, language, gender, culture, religion, and region.’ 121

Nepal’s peace process was nationally led and owned, but with significant support from international actors, including India. The international community was present as the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to promote human rights protection and provide advice to the government. In 2006, the United Nations Mission in Nepal was established in 2006 to help with implementing some of the provisions of the CPA. UNMIN, unlike other large scale UN peacekeeping missions, was described as a ‘light foot campaign’ and was given a narrow mandate to monitor the ceasefire code of conduct, monitoring arms and armed personnel and monitoring the Constituent Assembly elections and providing technical assistance to the Electoral Commission areas (Martin 2010; ICG 2007, 28-29). Some of the key success included deterring violence, building confidence between the different parties and promoting local ownership (Suhrke 2011, 44).

Nepal’s peace process was successful as a peaceful transition from conflict to politics occurred with the integration of the former rebels (CPN-M) into mainstream politics as the Unified Communist Party of Nepal U-CPN(M) party. Although the first round of elections was delayed one year, by 2008 the Constituent Assembly election commenced. 2008 was a significant year in meeting some of the objectives of the Maoist insurgency, including abolishing the Monarchy, holding elections and declaring Nepal as a federal democratic republic.

There are some important deficits, however, relating to representation and inclusion of particular individuals during the peace process, namely women and children like female ex-combatants and former child soldiers. There are other issues such as a failure to investigate human rights violations that occurred during the conflict, post conflict violence, the stalled transitional justice process and failure to reform politics to be genuinely more inclusive and representative of marginalised groups. Bogati & Britton (2016) explain that social inequalities based upon ethnicity, caste, and gender determine the degree to which different groups receive the benefits of peace and democracy. For many Nepalese, socio- economic justice is considered an important outcome of the peace processes,

122

but the quality of life for many has not improved (former girl child soldier CS 21, Nepal, 4.12.17; former boy and girl child soldier (husband and wife) CS22, Nepal, 4.12.17; Selim 2017; Pasipanodya 2008). Poverty continues to affect those in rural areas and from marginalised ethnic and caste groups (Bishwakarma 2018; ADB 2012). This is a theme reflected in the interviews with former CPN-M child soldiers (see Chapter 6).

Victims of the conflict are largely from socially and geographically marginalised communities. For example, Dalits and indigenous groups were disproportionately targeted in government violence, and the CPN-M recruitment efforts focused upon these groups (Braithwaite 2015). Girls particularly from the rural areas, lower caste, and/or indigenous groups were more vulnerable to rape (OHCHR 2012, 62). Such groups, however, lack the means to organise and the political power to be included in transitional justice processes. In comparison, Billingsley’s (2018) research demonstrates that although higher caste groups were targeted in the initial stages of the conflict by the CPN-M, higher castes individuals generally have more resources, including money and political power or connections to mitigate their situation (Billingsley 2018).

Post conflict violence has occurred through the proliferation of gang activity particularly in urban areas of Kathmandu Valley and in the Terai region. There are a variety of groups including criminal gangs, political affiliation (such as youth political groups), social and ethnic movements who have made use of the small arms still in circulation after the conflict. There are also reports that former child soldiers have formed armed groups, although the numbers have now since reduced (interview with policy think tank, Nepal 5.12.17). Protests do erupt from time to time that have turned violent. During the stalled 2015 constitutional process, Madhesis in the Terai region staged a protest because of their continued experience of discrimination that was not adequately addressed in constitutional reform efforts. HRW reports that sixteen people and nine police were killed. Most concerning was the level of force used against civilian by the police, including a number of eyewitnesses who saw a 14 year old boy dragged out from the bush and summarily executed on the street (HRW 2015).

123

5.3.2 Transitional justice

Nepal’s transitional justice process provides important context in understanding former child soldiers’ on-going experience of marginalisation, and their attempts to re-frame justice narratives. Transitional justice processes are politicised and only recognise particular victims groups.

In 2006, during the peace process, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s (TRC) purpose was established: ‘to probe into those involved in serious violation of human rights and crimes against humanity in [the] course of the armed conflict for creating an atmosphere for reconciliation in the society’ (Article 5.2.5). Both sides agreed to provide within 60 days details of those that had disappeared. Despite initial momentum in the transitional justice process, it was only in February 2015 that the two commissions, the TRC and a Commission of Inquiry into Enforced Disappearances (CIEDP) were established. There are many issues in carrying out the work of these commissions as they are understaffed, under-resourced and civil society groups and victims continue to question their impartiality (Selim 2017, 279-280).

The transitional justice process has been subjected to extensive political interference. NGOs and civil society groups express concern that successive governments have not committed to justice (Farasat & Hayner 2009). As Selim observes, while Nepali national politicians use the language of transitional justice by discussing key concepts like truth, reconciliation and forgiveness, they are not engaging with these terms in any substantial way. For example, during the drafting of the CPA, the political parties insisted that the term ‘justice’ be removed from the title “Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission”, to become the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Selim 2018). This enabled key political parties to deny any involvement in human rights violations that occurred during the conflict (Farasat & Hayner 2009,69).

Investigations into human rights violations were not prioritised in the transitional justice process with important implications for delivering justice to victims. The monitoring of human rights violations became important during the latter stages

124

of the conflict, but became less of a priority in relation to post conflict politics where other milestones like the integration of Maoist combatants, holding of elections and local government politics took precedence (see Jeffrey 2017). As Rawski and Sharma’s analysis demonstrate the state became hostile to human rights advocacy after the implementation of the CPA, particularly in holding perpetrators responsible for conflict related violations. There was not enough consideration given to the political situation of Nepal before setting up the commissions. They state: Linking human rights initiatives so intimately to the CPA and progress in the peace process reinforced the tendency to see events through the eyes of the political elite and their short-term interests. The international community and much of the national intelligentsia misjudged the political climate by viewing developments through a Kathmandu centred lens (Rawski & Sharma 2012,196)

Furthermore, a nine point deal drawn up in 2016 amongst the four key political parties directs authorities to provide amnesty to alleged perpetrators of abuse, thus shielding many current politicians and the military for being held accountable to past human rights violations and abuse. A more recent report notes that the government refuses to amend legislation, based upon a 2015 Supreme Court ruling, which struck down amnesties for perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity (HRW 2016). The participation of the former CPN-M leadership in Nepal’s political context makes it particularly difficult for former child soldiers to hold Maoists accountable for the unlawful recruitment of children during the conflict. The unlawfulness of child soldier recruitment is not considered a justice issue in Nepal’s context, which is very frustrating for a lot of the former child soldiers that continue to deal with the economic and social consequences of their previous affiliation to the Maoists.

At a local level, the label of victim is often politicised and contentious. Selim’s (2017) analysis shows that victims with the most political leverage are usually part of organisations that are supported by transitional justice brokers, like ICRC (2017, 281) and thus most vocal. Her analysis also shows that at a local, community level there are often divergent opinions regarding who should be

125

thought of as victim, or not. For example, in one interview a human rights organisation did not view Maoist ex-combatants as victims as they did not regard ex-combatants as innocent. . In contrast, another community member described ex-combatants as victims because they continue to suffer from marginalisation (2017, 284-286).

The transitional justice process has not delivered ‘bottom up’ outcomes for many of the conflict victims (Trial International 2019). The Interim Relief Program (IRP), distributed reparation payments in a problematic manner. IRP excluded victims of torture and sexual violence, but included payments for individuals whose properties suffered damaged (interview with child right’s worker, Nepal 11.12.17). Children who belonged to parents/guardians killed, forcibly disappeared, or seriously disabled during the conflict are eligible for education scholarships in the form of fix sums of money. However, the money provided by government is insufficient to cover all children (ICTJ 2012, 3). Furthermore, it is a politicised process that remains distant from the everyday lives of individuals, who do have the political power to access or influence the transitional justice process (Billingsley 2018, 86). Justice is only delivered to rich people (Selim 2017). Some scholars observe that victims’ ideas of justice have shifted away from human rights violations to focus more on socio-economic justice concerns in meeting the day to day needs of individuals (Selim 2017; Pasipanodya 2008).

An analysis of Nepal’s transitional justice processes highlight how particular ideas of justice, truth and victimhood are contested in post conflict settings. While internationally child soldiers are defined by their victimhood, the local political context dictates the degree to which children are considered victims and worthy of justice.

5.3.3 Political developments

Political developments in post conflict Nepal are worth briefly mentioning as political power continues to largely reflect historical patterns of political exclusivity. National led efforts to institute peace and justice processes are ultimately limited by elite power politics, restricting the extent of peace dividends

126

as experienced by the local population. The political elite continues to be dominated by the CHHE who constitute 31% of the population, but occupy all ten of the highest public offices (prime minister, president, chief justice, speaker and opposition leader of lower house, speaker and opposition leader of upper house, army chief, police chief, and armed police chief) (Lawoti 2019, 136). While Nepal successfully held peaceful democratic elections 31 it is yet to achieve democratic development that reflects political inclusivity and representation required to meet the CPA’s ambitious agenda of political transformation. Former Maoists joined a small ruling elite, and like other political parties benefit from a system of government that is characterised by patron-client dynamic, nepotism, and instability (Tamang & Malena 2011; Kumar 2008).

Most importantly, the state is weak in delivering services and resources outside of Kathmandu valley, which is compounded by political corruption and patronage based rule (Bhandari & Robins 2018). More women have gone on to be elected in formal politics. The 2015 constitution guarantees that 33 % of seats are allocated to women. As of 2020, women occupy 41.8% of all political positions across the country (Upreti et al 2020). While this is certainly an important achievement, women from the CHHE largely dominate senior government positions such as mayors and chairpersons. Minority groups typically do not hold such senior positions. A report by IDEA (2011) also explains that many of the women in senior leadership roles tend to rely on family connections and networks, which help them to gain these roles.

Nepalese politics has been unstable, which has made it difficult to carry through on important legal and policy changes. There are have been a series of different constitutions, including a constitutional crisis of 201232 due to the dispute about the federalist structure, and the failure of minority group representatives and politicians to come to agreement about the number, boundaries, or names of the new federal states (Adhikari and Gellner 2016) Scholars remained concerned

31 During recent elections there have been some small outbreaks of violence, but these episodes were contained. For example, in 2017 some politicians were attacked in during their campaign, but despite this the elections proceeded peacefully (New York Times 2017). 32 The constitutional crisis of 2012 refers to the time that the constituent assembly was dismissed in 2012 because of a failure to promulgate a new constitution. 127

about the extent of democracy arguing that on the surface Nepal has democracy as ‘procedural democracy’ consisting of elections, however, there has been a failure to build institutions and access to institutions that are inclusive for all (Lawoti 2019).

In sum, Nepal has made important democratic gains, but its transitional justice process and peace building agenda remained compromised by national politicians’ political agendas. The Nepalese state has successfully restructured citizen-state relationships, which are still largely defined by neo-patrimonial relationships (Tamang & Malena 2011). This is largely because of Nepal’s history as a feudal and monarchy based society. Many citizens continue to regard the state as hostile and are unwilling to question the authority of bureaucrats, and trust of public authority and institutions is low (Tamang & Malena 2011, 8).

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter provided an overview and analysis of the socio political context of Nepal. This chapter demonstrates that historical continuities and new patterns relating to state governance are important in understanding the post conflict context of Nepal, particularly in relation to social, economic and political marginalisation. The chapter analysed the child soldiers’ experience during the conflict to demonstrate the complexities of understanding their agency and victimhood, through different phases of the conflict. Despite the rhetoric promoted by CPN-M to overthrow existing political and social order during the conflict, these changes are not reflected in any extensive way in post conflict Nepal. For many former child soldiers, this created significant difficulties for them on their return as they grew up thinking that life could be different. Nepal’s politics, peace and justice context weaves through the reintegration experiences of former child soldiers, as will be discussed in Chapter 6, and frames their efforts to construct a new social justice narrative.

128

Chapter 6: ‘Winners’’ Exclusion in Nepal

In the previous chapter, I analysed the key political and social developments that characterise Nepal’s history, through to its post conflict period. National transitional justice efforts have not created space for accountability, nor addressed structural economic and social issues of inequality that are key issues identified by many Nepalese, particularly for marginalised groups and former child soldiers. Former child soldiers were on the ‘winning’ side given the successful peace agreement and the former CPN-M transition into politics as the newly found United Communist Party of Nepal (UPCN-M). However, their reintegration process is characterised by exclusion from the peace process because of political and caste divisions that emerged between the child soldiers and the senior Maoist leadership at the end of the conflict. The Nepalese case demonstrates that former child soldiers occupy and negotiate multiple identities and subjectivities across an international and local divide, some of which are of their own making and others that have been produced within the post conflict political environment of Nepal. This chapter demonstrates the child soldier identity is both a disempowering and empowering experience that is contingent on one’s position in society and access to support. During the UN verification process at the end of the conflict, children were verified as Verified Minors and Late Recruits (VMLRs). However, the child soldier label created social distinctions between them, their former Maoist comrades, and their families and communities. Consequently, former child soldiers experienced multiple layers of marginalisation, which is outlined in the first two sections of the chapter (6.1 & 6.2). In the third section, I demonstrate that former child soldiers have identified alternative channels to exercise agency by creating a social justice and welfare campaign through the Peace Envisioners organisation, by using the international child soldier identity to create international linkages of support. In doing so, former child soldiers have created an alternative justice narrative.

129

6.1 Demobilisation and social division

Before the peace process we were similar and there was no hierarchy. We were all equal. Even the leaders used to eat together. But now everybody can see that the leaders have become political leaders and we do not recognise them now...there is a vast gap between us and the leaders (former boy child soldier, 13.11.17, Nepal).

The quote above is a reflection on social relations within the Maoist movement during the conflict. The Maoist leaders and fellow comrades treated child soldiers equally, and children were expected to perform the same roles as others. The immediate period following the demobilisation of child soldiers was an important turning point in their lives. A division emerged between largely upper caste senior Maoist leaders and the largely lower caste ‘foot soldiers’, which included many child soldiers.33 Many former senior Maoist leaders went onto hold political positions of power or other positions of power in society. In national politics, the former Maoist leadership abandoned their revolutionary social, economic and political agenda for the sake of the new democratic political contest in the newly formed UPCN-M party. The abandonment of the agenda was devastating for many former child soldiers who found a voice and purpose in challenging their pre-existing marginalisation, and in giving them hope that they could contribute to a better future. A former girl child soldier told me: I contributed to transforming the country’s situation, but when I returned from the cantonment I returned empty handed. That was sad. I played a role in changing the structure of the ruling system of our country. I feel betrayed as I didn’t get to continue with the vision that prompted me to join the Maoists (former girl child soldier, CS26, 10.12.17, Nepal).

Child soldiers experienced social division based on identity at the end of the conflict. They returned to a society in which pre-existing social norms and

33 A number of child soldiers interviewed belonged to upper castes or did not cite caste as an issue, but they lack the political power and leverage to challenge their situation through formal political avenues. 130

practices had not changed substantially regarding practices like marriage, employment opportunities, social status and identity. In post conflict politics, marginalised groups have forged new pathways through political advocacy and formal political participation (Adhikari & Gellner 2016), but social divisions are still experienced in important ways through every day life. While child soldiers embraced certain social changes during the conflict centred on equality, they returned to a society that had not embraced these changes. This will be discussed further in section 6.2. In certain progressive ways, child soldiers exercised agency against their oppressed lives during the conflict, but after the war mainstream society and the Maoists curtailed their agency by excluding them from society and politics.

Three years after the conflict ended, child soldiers were eventually discharged by the former CPN-M in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1612(2005) MRM. On 16 December 2009 the UPCN-M signed an agreement with the United Nations to implement an Action Plan to discharge and rehabilitate adult Maoist army personnel As Hodgson notes, the Action Plan only refers to ‘ Maoist army personnel’, and does not mention that many of these personnel are potentially child soldiers, as the Maoists never publicly admitted to recruiting child soldiers (Hodgson 2012). The Action Plan, therefore, enabled the former senior Maoist leaders to distance themselves from their responsibilities to the child soldiers, rather than negotiating on behalf of the child soldiers to gain further concessions and support the child soldiers reintegration process by understanding what was important to the child soldiers themselves.. Once child soldiers were discharged from the Maoists, they were able to participate in a UN Interagency Rehabilitation Programme (UNIRP), which took place from June 2010 to August 2013. UNDP was the lead agency and was supported by the United Nation’s Children Fund (UNICEF), International Organisation for Migration (IOM), and the World Health Organisation (WHO). The program provided four sectoral rehabilitation options: vocational skills training, micro-enterprise development, education, and health-related training. Those verified as minor or late recruits had the option to access education or training package within twelve months of their discharge date.

131

The idea of division is a useful lens in understanding the multiple phases of reintegration, beginning with the immediate demobilisation and the reintegration program that commenced in 2010. During the conflict, the identity of being a child soldier or combatant was irrelevant as the Maoist leadership treated children and adults in the same way. However, during the UNRIP DDR process, the UN categorised child soldiers as Verified Minors and Late Recruits (VMLR)34 based on the age (under 18) they were recruited, or because they joined the Maoist as minors after the peace process in 2006. A total of 4008 child soldiers were verified under the UN verification process. On paper, international partners successfully ran the child soldier specific DDR process to meet international children’s rights and protection standards (UNICEF 2008). It was supported by a broader program of rehabilitation and reintegration of all children affected by armed conflict in 34 districts, run by the Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups (CAAFAG) working committee, and met important international protection and children’s rights standards, in line with The Paris Principles. However, the UN verification process distinguished child soldiers from adult combatants, but such distinctions had not existed before. The child soldier identity only became established through the DDR process and was imposed upon these children.

This was significant as children and adults were separated into their relevant DDR process, and received separate resources and compensation. Adult combatants could choose integration into the newly formed national army, rehabilitation through community education programs, or voluntary retirement with a cash option of NPR 500,000 (USD 5,000) to NPR800, 000 (USD 8,000) per person, depending upon their rank and profile in the Maoist Army (Bogati 2014, 6). Compensation for adult combatants was significantly higher than the compensation child soldiers could obtain. Hodgson suggests that adult combatants were eligible for a cash option that was seven times higher than the compensation amount available to child soldiers (Hodgson 2012).35 Indeed,

34 To be considered a VMLR children had to be born after 25 May 1988 and or recruited after the ceasefire agreement on 25 May 2006. 35 Nonetheless, child soldiers still received far more resources and compensation that other categories of war affected children (interview with NGO worker, Nepal, 15.11.17) 132

some of the former child soldiers told me that they were sent home with only enough money to pay for their bus fares home. One former boy child soldier told me: ‘We were given a small amount of 10,000 rupees for bus fares and food’ (former boy child soldier, CS2, Nepal 23.11.17). Others were hoping for much better jobs, like integration into the army or a government job (former girl child soldier, CS15, Nepal 26.11.17). The DDR process was significantly delayed by UPCN-M political interference (Subedi 2013). Many child soldiers were adults by the time they were officially released from cantonment, which made the distinction between children and adult combatants irrelevant. Out of the 4008 VMLRs verified in 2007, there were only 533 remaining ‘children’ by the time they were discharged (Hodgson 2012). Many did not understand why they were being separated to adults in the first place. The child soldier identity, therefore, was a disempowering experience for the child soldiers in this context as many felt that it took away recognition of their contribution. While existing international reintegration guidelines outline the need to separate children from adults from a protection, welfare concern, in the Nepalese case the child/adult distinction did not meet the needs of children. It is worth noting, however, that qualified combatants, who elected for cash settlements have not necessarily invested their money wisely. According to Bogati’s (2014) research, many of the combatants spent the money frivolously or did not invest wisely. Cash settlements were not followed up with any further training, which has impacted their ability to create new economic opportunities. Others still used the money for health related care to deal with injuries (Bogati, 2014, 8; see also Robinson et al 2016).

Before the formal DDR program commenced, the former senior Maoist leadership capitalised on child soldiers’ vulnerabilities in various ways as they continued to be an important resource for the Maoist leaders. Some child soldiers were encouraged by Maoist leadership not to participate in education or vocational training on offer through the UN led program. In other cases, child soldiers were encouraged to join the Youth Communist League (YCL)36. The child soldiers interviewed had very different understandings about what they could potentially receive as compensation, future job opportunities and even

36 YCL is a youth wing of the communist party found worldwide. 133

integration into the army, compared to the stated outcomes of the DDR program. For example, one boy child soldier explained that despite being disqualified: A Maoists commander said that even though they were not eligible he promised that they would get equal privileges and funds to be compensated for what they had endured, but this never happened (former boy child soldier, CS2, 22.11.17, Nepal).

Similarly, a girl child soldier stated that: We were given assurances [by the Maoists] and now life is getting more and more difficult. I am very angry they didn’t care about us...We transformed the country as children, but our lives are not transformed (former girl child soldier, CS22, 4.12.17, Nepal).

On reflection, the former child soldiers realised they were a political tool for the Maoists in supporting their post conflict political agenda through continued political activism, particularly at the time of the peace negotiations (former girl child soldier, CS7, Nepal 22.11.17). However, soon child soldiers became a liability for the leaders elected as politicians. This included the former CPN-M leader Prachanda, who was appointed as Nepal’s prime minister in 2008-2009 and again in 2016-2017. Former Maoist leaders wanted to maintain their distance from child soldiers to abscond responsibility for recruiting and using them in the first place.

The political power and prestige that senior leaders achieved in the post conflict period cushioned them from dealing with the harsh social realities experienced by child soldiers, who are often politically powerless to change their lives. One girl child soldier stated: After I came out of the camp these differences began to emerge not amongst us, but amongst the Maoists [leadership]. One leader I knew fired a girl from her job because of her caste. This was the same person who used to preach about equality and solidarity amongst castes. They [the Maoist leadership] are hypocrites and have done a lot of bad things (former girl child soldier, CS16, Nepal, 26.11.17).

134

This quote demonstrates how caste once again became an issue for former child soldiers.

6.2 Reflections on DDR and disqualification

Former child soldier’s current social status is shaped in important ways by their previous child soldier identity. During the UN verification process children and adults were separated into two different reintegration and rehabilitation streams. However, within Nepalese society, child soldiers became known as disqualified (ayogya) because they did not receive the same amount of compensation or options for integration into the Royal Nepalese Army, like their adult counterparts. Ayogya in Nepalese refers to an incompetent and unworthy individual, and has an emasculating quality. As one former boy child soldier explained to me: The media didn’t make it clear that we were ineligible [disqualified] because of our age. So [the media] left an impression and impact upon the general public that [child soldiers are] disqualified in each and every sector of [life]...they are not eligible to have a job. Young people like me could not study at schools, they could not utilise their skills for jobs (former boy child soldier, CS2, Nepal, 22.11.17)

The disqualification label remains an important issue for former child soldiers as it continues to impact their lives socially, culturally, and economically. Former child soldiers cite difficulties in re-establishing their civilian lives, particularly in terms of seeking gainful employment. One former girl child soldier told me that was unable to seek a government position because she had been disqualified (former girl child soldier, CS15, 26.11.17, Nepal).

Another former girl child soldier told me that it is the government’s responsibility to change their identity in order to improve their situation. I want child soldiers to be acknowledged by society rather than being marked by society. It is necessary for government to establish our identity. I want a new identity for myself and I want the government to facilitate that process (former girl child soldier, CS26 10.12.17)

135

The term disqualified continues to be deeply upsetting for many child soldiers as it compounds the stigma they faced on returning to communities, and their own feelings of self-worth. Indeed, one of the key objectives of the Peace Envisioners is to replace disqualified with another term (see Box 1). One former boy child soldier told me that he knew of 13 friends that had committed suicide over the shame and social stigma of being disqualified (former boy child soldier CS1, Nepal, 22.11.17). Other child soldiers have managed the label of being disqualified by not disclosing their status to their community, or even in some cases by lying to their family that they received compensation (former boy child soldier CS1, Nepal, 22.11.17). The consequences of being labelled disqualified reflects what Wessells (2019) describes as the ‘unintended’ consequences of formal reintegration programs that can result from different social cultural environments. As Wessells' (2019) research demonstrates, being labelled a child soldier does not always help the return process for individual children and can create additional social and economic difficulties that did not exist in the first place. While former child soldiers were given more compensation and resources that other groups of war affected children in Nepal for the most part (interview with international NGO worker, Nepal, 15.11.17), child soldiers contend with longer-term consequences in seeking employment in part because their former status as child soldiers.

Secondly, but relatedly, former child soldiers expressed concerns about the DDR program and the lack of consultation in establishing what child soldiers wanted from the program. One important concern expressed by child soldiers related to their employment training options, which were oriented towards low skilled job market. Often the training they received was only short term on a two to three months basis. As one former boy child soldier told me: We were trained in weapons and ammunition and to prepare for war. What they [UNICEF] offered was cooking, cleaning those low level things from there. Our interests and training didn’t match up. What many of the former child soldiers expected was high level work...Cooking is not their interest. That is why training was unsuccessful (former boy child soldier, 13.11.17, Nepal)

136

Their inability to seek a more worthy job reflects poorly on their social status, particularly for the former boy child soldiers, who are now young men and are expected to fulfil the role of being a man and showing leadership as head of household. In this way, gendered norms that typically favour the dominance of men in society actually work against them, as they are unable to meet the social expectations of being a man.

Furthermore, very few of the former child soldiers were able to pursue higher- level education, which is so valued in Nepalese society. Education is a means to overcome structural inequalities and to attain access to a better job market than previous generations. Education is more than just attaining literacy and numeracy skills, but represents the potential for families to better themselves and future generations (Valentin 2011). During the conflict, the Maoists actively discouraged young recruits from pursuing education. But having an education in contemporary society is a necessity for the job market. One former boy child soldier reflected on this difficulty: Once they were out everybody needed a certificate to get a job otherwise they have to be a driver. During their time in the Maoists, they [ the child soldiers] were told that we can change the country, the mind-set was at that high level. But once they left [the CPN-M} it was totally disastrous. Suddenly overnight they became a driver, labourer…it was very difficult for them (former boy child soldier, 13.11.17, Nepal).

The outcomes that former child soldiers wanted from the DDR program could probably not be achieved in a short term setting, and would require longer term funding and support. However, UNDP and other international partners could have made more effort to consult with former child soldiers about what they wanted and what was important to them to give them some sense of ownership, as is also reflected in the CRC provision (Article 12) that supports children in having a say over matters that are important to them.

Former child soldiers also felt that the training they received during DDR reinforced gendered employment options. Girl soldiers were given options like

137

tailoring, whereas boys were directed towards being cooks or drivers. While the DDR program mainstreamed gender in terms of accounting for girl’s specific needs, regarding medical issues, girl mothers, and pregnancy, it did not amount to challenging the labour market based upon gendered stereotypes of ‘men’ and ‘women’s’ work. A lot of the former girl child soldiers did take on leadership roles and new opportunities that they would never normally have access to. This was a failing of the program in not accounting for those changes that some girls, and indeed boys experienced during the conflict in terms of the skills they attained.

6.3 Social dynamics of return: family, community and generational ordering

Former child soldiers’ childhood was disrupted by conflict, which prevented them from achieving socially recognised milestones in progression towards their adulthood. In this next section, I argue that former child soldiers were subjected to a generational re-ordering in relation to their families where the achievements and skills that the child soldiers gained during the conflict were not recognised as worthy or important in their new adult lives.37 Normally, family members occupy a central role in negotiating important social milestones for children such as marriage, education, and employment (Kohrt & Maharjan 2009, 127-129). However, the conflict fundamentally changed the relationship dynamic between children and their families due to the separation caused by conflict. As a result, former child soldiers are not taken seriously as adults by their families and society because they did not fulfil the usual outcomes of childhood, particularly in relation to education, employment, and social expectations. Indeed, the social changes embraced by the child soldiers during the conflict are now at odds with the broader communitypractice. Although they are now adults, they continue to deal with the legacy of their previous affiliation. While some former child soldiers were accepted by their families with minimal fuss, many others continue to face criticism for a variety of reasons, such as being a former Maoist, the

37 Qvortup (1987; 2011) argues that the concept of generation capture the structural relationship that exists between childhood and adulthood. Generational relationships indicate the structural, interactive nature between childhood and adulthood. Childhood is measured in relation to adulthood. 138

disqualification status, not achieving education and employment outcomes, marriage arrangements, and not fulfilling gendered roles.

The former CPN-M movement is now criticised by society more broadly for not achieving the changes they set out to achieve (former boy child soldier, CS9, Nepal, 23.11.17). Bowd and Özerdem (2013) observe in their own research that social reintegration success is often contingent on belonging to the victorious side. Although the conflict came to end peacefully in Nepal, some former child soldiers explained that there was community resentment towards the CPN-M because the ten year conflict did not achieve the revolutionary aims of the movement. One former boy child soldier said: ‘after the conflict resolved there was an image about the Maoists were really bad and that the people who joined were losers…We were not really respected [by society) (former boy child soldier, CS 9, 23.11.17, Nepal). One former boy child soldier explained that for him and other child soldiers the family criticism they face is because they came home without substantial compensation to make their lives better and their families because of the disqualified status (former boy child soldier, CS11, Nepal, 23.11.17). Former child soldiers often receive the brunt of those criticisms, unlike former senior Maoist leaders who are cushioned by political power, prestige, and upper caste status.

The social criticism that former child soldiers contend with has important social and even physical consequences in their lives. A number of the former child soldiers interviewed moved away from their home villages to Kathmandu, or elsewhere as a strategy to overcome social stigma and shame that they experienced on return to family and community, or simply to build a new life elsewhere. Of course, not all have been able to do that and continue to deal with family and community criticism as a daily experience. A former girl child soldier, who had trained to be a beautician explained that she wanted to stay far away from her village. She told me: It was the fear of society that made me stay away from my family home and networks. I thought that society would come up with many questions that I could not answer. I was worried about potential questioning… so I

139

thought it was easier to stay away (former girl child soldier, CS 28, Nepal, 10.12.17).

Another former boy child soldier described how his family and community continue to direct ‘hatred’ towards him because he joined the CPN-M. As his brother was a member of the national army, his family’s hatred of the former CPN-M is probably explained by this affiliation (former boy child soldier, CS 9, 23.11.17, Nepal). Another former boy child soldier told me: My family and society express very negative views towards me…They keep taunting me by telling me that my friends have already done a lot in life, but that I have nowhere to go and have achieved nothing. I still feel very bad about that (former boy child soldier, CS10, 23.11.17, Nepal).

This boy child soldier attempted to continue his education during his rehabilitation, but was unable to do so because of family and business commitments. His father was a high school teacher and valued education. The father considers his son’s failure to achieve education milestones as deeply disappointing. In addition, the former child soldier had set up a business in his home village, but he lacks the capital needed to expand and progress the business in the way he desires.

6.3.1 Marriage

Marriage is also an important theme that was highlighted during the interviews. A number of the former child soldiers were married in inter-caste marriage during, or in the immediate aftermath of the conflict. However, it is difficult for former child soldiers to gain social acceptance of their marriage, as it is not a practice accepted by Nepalese society. Hindu values and norms continue to strongly influence marriage patterns, including within different ethnic groups. As well, marriage remains a significant milestone for both boys and girls, and is usually negotiated between families, typically as an arranged marriage. As noted by Allendorf (2013): ‘marriage is a bond between families and a promise of continuity in patriarchal family lines’ (Allendorf 2013).

140

One former boy child soldier told me that he faced significant social stigma and criticism from his family and community because he was disqualified and he married a woman from a different caste. He is from the mid-west of Nepal on the border of China and India, which is a socially conservative area. He told me: ‘I could not bear all of these grudges [directed towards me]. So I migrated down to a place called Konsenpur. I settled there and have a small tea shop’ (former boy child soldier, CS11, Nepal, 23.11.17 ). He noted though that his wife’s family fully accepted their marriage, but he continued to have a difficult relationship with his own family (former boy child soldier, CS11, Nepal, 23.11.17 ).

Another former girl child soldier, who remains married to a man from a lower caste, explained that her mother refused to eat the food she cooked as her mother considered her hands to be ‘dirty’.38 While her mother has come to terms with the marriage, this was a particularly difficult situation that the girl soldier faced in her immediate reintegration experience, which caused her much emotional angst (former girl child soldier, CS 19, 3.12.17, Nepal). Another girl child soldier told me that she knows of other women who married outside of caste system and committed suicide because they could not deal with the family and community criticism and shame they experienced. She explained: When we were in the camp there was a different discipline and we were equal…everything was good. But later when we reintegrated to society there was a lot of questions about caste system, so we could not assimilate. That was the first reason why some women committed suicide. The second reason [is that during the conflict] men and women were equal…but later men started to dominate after they returned back to society. This social shift caused women to commit suicide even though they had children (former girl child soldier, CS20, 3.12.17, Nepal).

Some of the former girl child soldiers reflected on the benefits of gender equality during their time as Maoists and the difficulties of returning to a life of male dominance (former girl child soldier CS24, 10.12.17 Nepal).

38 In this interview, it was explained that if a higher caste individual marries a lower caste individual, the higher caste individual is considered to belong to the lower caste (former girl child soldier, CS 19, 3.12.17, Nepal). 141

6.3.2. Employment

Another key theme identified in the interviews is employment. Former child soldiers contend with both structural economic issues, and their own ability to secure work. While in global standings Nepal’s poverty rate has decreased, there remains high youth unemployment. ILO (2014) figures suggest youth employment (15–29 years) is 19.2 %. A high youth population (15–29 year-olds represent 27.8 % of the total population) and a poor labour market (ILO 2014, 2) exacerbate this situation. Out of the 30 former child soldiers interviewed, the majority are engaged in low level, irregular work, such as manual labour, cooking, driving and tailoring. Life is hard as they cannot obtain secure work and the social benefits that flow on from that, including social respect but also medical insurance and savings.

A number of the former boy child soldiers, or husbands of former girl child soldiers work overseas in Malaysia or the Gulf region to seek further work opportunities, but such opportunities are not available to girls who are banned by the Nepalese Government from travelling overseas to Gulf countries. A husband and wife (both former child soldiers) interviewed, provided insight into these difficulties. While her husband found work in Malaysia he returned to Nepal because of kidney disease. They now have to pay for his medical treatment and he is unable to work properly. The wife tries to support the family and does some manual labour to make ends meet, but they described living in poverty. They have two children to support, and the 2015 earthquake destroyed their house (former girl and boy child soldier, CS 22, 4.12.17, Nepal). This example shows the multiple experiences of disadvantage that child soldiers face.

6.6.3 Gendered experiences of return

In Nepal, the reintegration experience of former girl child soldiers is a gendered experience in important ways. Despite the significant political gains that have been made in post conflict Nepal regarding women’s political representation and the selection of women to other key legal and leadership roles, many former girl 142

child soldiers (and female ex-combatants) remain disadvantaged by norms and social institutions that support the patriarchal Nepalese society (Upreti & Shivakoti 2018). This issue was reflected in many interviews with former boy and girl child soldiers, who commented that reintegration was more challenging for girls because of the gendered social norms and inequalities they faced (former girl child soldier, CS 16, Nepal, 26.11.17). An important example of these challenges centres on the difficulties that girls face in fulfilling their social identities as women, wives and potential mothers through milestones like marriage. In Nepalese society, women are judged more harshly than men for the marriage choice. Thus, the social consequences are often more extreme in terms of the rejection they may from their communities (Upreti & Shivakoti 2018)

One issue identified by some former girl child soldiers relates to the question of female and male interaction outside of marriage during the conflict. Virginity is very much valued in Nepalese culture and can dictate marriage prospects. Some girls reflected that joining the Maoists created an image and reputation that they were socially impure. Members of the community were concerned that they had slept in the same room as boys and questioned whether they were still virgins. One former girl child soldier explained: For every Nepalese girl, if a girl goes out or if she does anything that challenges her family role then she is not pure enough. That is the case. In this scenario this is where boys and girls are different (former girl child soldier CS16, Nepal, 26.11.2017).

In Nepal, marriage serves as the primary institution that maintains the subordinate position of girls to boys in Nepalese society. While norms are slowly changing, socially a ‘good’ girl is someone, who is restricted in their movement outside the familial house before marriage, submissive, and does not interact with males outside of the family. This reflects Hindu norms, typically related to Brahmanical cultural ideals of the ‘‘good woman’’ (Skinner & Holland 1998; Bennett 1983). Indeed other girl child soldiers described feeling pressure to be married as a way of protecting them from judgement and criticism within society. One girl child soldier stated:

143

Many people…felt that I wasn't viable for marriage. People also said that I could never get married…I really didn’t want to marry for at least five years [after returning home]. But the question of marriage kept bothering me...My mother also cried because she worried that her daughters would be spinsters. Despite not having intentions to marry I married a man. I was afraid (CS 7 girl child soldier, Nepal, 22.11.17).

Many of the former girl child soldiers interviewed regarded marriage as an important part of their social transition to womanhood. However, the pressure of marriage resulted in rushed decisions to marry. Some of the girl regretted their marriage, or had already divorced their husband.

As one former girl child soldier explained: When I returned back to my family it was not a big deal, but within society there were rumours that the girls who joined the Maoists had eaten and slept together [with the men]. They are degenerate. I stayed with my family for one month, but I could not stand what society said and the way I was stigmatised (former girl child soldier, CS 16 Nepal, 26.11.17)

The girl felt her only recourse was to be married. But unfortunately after being married to her husband for one year he left her to work overseas. After five years, he remains overseas and they have no contact despite having one child together. At one point she felt so desperate and overwhelmed by her situation when her husband left her she attempted suicide. For women married to men who work abroad, they are typically left at home with very little support to help with their work and child duties. This is also demonstrated in situations where girls after their marriage have commenced a rural life. They contend with the ‘double burden’ of looking after the children and working on the land (former girl child soldier, CS21, 4.12.17. Nepal). They are the primary carers of their children and are expected to generate income, but they also do not have the same freedom of movement that men do to find new job opportunities.

144

6.4 Empowered agency through political contestation and justice

The previous sections in this chapter outlined the child soldier identity as a disempowering experience because of the multiple level of marginalisation that former boy and girl child soldiers negotiate in their adult lives. However, the child soldier identity has also become an empowering identity in relation to the work of the Peace Envisioners organisation (formerly Discharged People’s Liberation Army (PLA)), which was set up in 2016 by Lenin Bista, a former boy child soldier, with support from others, to represent former child soldiers disqualified through the UN verification process. Currently the organisation is in contact with 3000 of the 4008 former child soldiers. The broad aims of the organisation are to remove the term ‘disqualified’, seek justice, compensation and welfare support from the Nepalese government and former Maoist senior leadership (see Box 1). The Peace Envisioners organisation is significant for a number of reasons, but primarily it allows former child soldiers to develop a justice narrative that is based upon the international child soldier identity of children’s victimhood. In the final section I analyse the positioning of former child soldiers in relation to Nepal’s politicised justice context. International understandings of the child soldier represent a powerful discursive tool used by this group of child soldiers to leverage their case with international stakeholders.

Box 1: Key demands, Peace Envisioners memorandum • The government to abandon the term ‘disqualified’ without delay and honour the discharged ex-PLA as republican fighters for their role in the struggle for change. • The authorities to treat the 4,008 discharged PLA as other PLA members and address their demands in a sustainable way • The government and concerned parties to take responsibility for the abuse of rights of the child around chid recruitment • To ensure child rights, justice must be based on domestic and international principles, and state and rebel parties must be held accountable • Since ex-child soldiers have been deprived of the fundamental human right to education, the government of Nepal to address youth combatants’ practical concerns based on a social and economic package based on principles of social justice

145

• The Government to release unconditionally all discharged PLA who have been detained • The Government to provide medical treatment, psychosocial counselling and special support schemes to the injured, mentally ill and traumatised, and disabled members of the discharged PLA.

6.4.1 Construction of a victimhood narrative

Peace Envisioners works with the international understanding of child soldiering as an exploitative experience defined by the victimisation of the child, who were in an adult war. The child soldier identity, understood in these terms, represents a powerful discursive tool for the organisation in building international linkages. In Chapter 5, I addressed child soldiers in conflict (section 5.2.1) to illustrate the grey area that exists between victimhood and agency, as illustrated by the narratives of former child soldiers. For many, the CPN-M movement gave them a bigger cause and purpose in working for a better future. In reality, many of these child soldiers interviewed believed and supported the Maoist cause at some point during their conflict experience. Some of the former child soldiers even reflected that they enjoyed their experiences as a child soldier in making friends and living through a unique time. One former boy child soldier told me ‘I saw the bullets, they [the Maoists] were marching… I was fascinated as a little child because boys generally love this stuff (former boy child soldier, CS 14, Nepal 25.11.17). Another girl child soldier described having fun in the Maoists, stating that: ‘it was fun we had a lot of friends, played volleyball and football. It was a good time’ (former girl child soldier, CS22, 4.12.17, Nepal). Yet many child soldiers experienced extreme hardships both during and after the conflict. These tensions are evident in the narratives given by former child soldiers that demonstrate the grey area that exists between agency and victimhood, and their past and present lives.

On reflection, many of the former child soldiers expressed regret that they had wasted their formative years and that they did not understand the significance of joining the CPN-M as a young child. One former boy child soldier told me:

146

When I first joined the Maoists I didn’t understand what I was getting into, I now feel manipulated now I know the truth. I was better to study…I had many other productive things to do. But I involved myself in fighting and revolution… I was little [when recruited] but the ones that led us were not (former boy child soldier, CS 1, 22.11.17 Nepal).

I was a child and was manipulated [by the Maoists]. I didn’t know what I was doing or [could I predict] the impact on my future (former boy child soldier, CS 6, 22.11.17, Nepal)

These types of statements were common through most of the interviews and reflect the realities of what child soldiers contend with in their every day lives. The social dislocation that many of these former child soldiers experience now is greater because they lived through a time when there were high hopes for changing the social, economic and political inequalities that characterised Nepal. They now confront serious issues of social and economic marginalisation because they missed out on a particular childhood experience. However, Peace Envisioners has a political agenda to hold the Nepalese government and former Maoist senior leadership to account. The former child soldiers interviewed have a close connection to the organisations’ founder Lenin Bista, as this was how interviews were set up. The narratives given by former child soldiers, therefore, have a political agenda in line with the work of Peace Envisioners. Commonly, child soldiers’ narratives highlighted key themes such as the unlawfulness of recruitment, a wasted childhood and innocence, and the responsibility of government to provide appropriate compensation and support. This is not to say that these stories were untruthful, but there is a clear and defining shift or divide in the narratives given by former child soldiers now, compared to their reflections on their time in the Maoists. This reflects both the influence of, and their engagement with, international childhood politics.

Furthermore, international child soldier narratives and program assume a victimhood status for former child soldiers, but in Nepal’s context child soldiers are not considered victims within formal transitional justice processes, nor as victims in the social settings amongst families and communities, regardless of the

147

violence they may have experienced. Former child soldiers, like many other groups in society, including ex-combatants, victims of torture and sexual violence, are not included in formal transitional justice processes or other reparation schemes. Former child soldiers attempted to raise the issue of their unlawful recruitment as transitional justice issue, but this was dismissed (former boy child soldier, Nepal, 13.11.17).

The politicisation of victimhood in Nepal’s post conflict landscape, therefore, provides an important background in understanding the work of Peace Envisioners as they attempt to create linkages with the victimhood status. A connection with the victimhood status enables the organisation to create an alternative agenda for justice not captured by the formal justice context. This justice agenda seeks socio-economic relief and accountability for child recruitment. They identify the former senior Maoists and current Nepalese government as primarily responsible in addressing socio-economic marginalisation, and other justice issues important to the former child soldiers. One child soldier explained: Does it say in the Nepalese constitution that you can take a child? There has been no justice or punishment for those responsible [for child recruitment]. Both the state and Maoist need to be [held] accountable. The Maoist took children as soldiers and the state failed to give skills to those children. They said they are soldiers not children. When I was taken to the Maoists I was just a 12 years old child (former boy child soldier, Nepal, 13.11.17).

This quote powerfully highlights the connection that Peace Envisioners makes with international contemporary understandings of child soldiering and the illegality of child recruitment.

Commonly, former child soldiers at the end of their interview also reflected that children had no place in war. One example is summarised by the statement of a former boy child soldier: ‘Children are very much manipulated and should be used for other productive ways other than fight and waging wars’ (former boy child soldier, CS14, Nepal, 25.11.17). While this statement is certainly important,

148

it also indicates an engagement of former child soldiers with the politics of childhood as discussed in relation to the international advocacy and policy context. Such narratives discount the complexity of their involvement that was evident in relation to their agency and conflict experience.

6.4.2 Strategies for protest

Peace Envisioners has adopted different advocacy strategies since the time they were first established. Their advocacy approach reflects an influence of internationalisation. In the early days, the organisation focused on public protests against the former Maoist leadership and the Government. In one particular incident akin to bandh39 style protest, they took over a Maoist political headquarter for two days. 144 of the former child soldiers were arrested for protesting (Gulf Times 2016). Public protests and social movements are part of the political landscape in Nepal. Many former child soldiers were politically engaged in the CPN-M movement. In both historical and contemporary times, youth are at the forefront of the political revolutionary activity (Hirslund 2018). Indeed, at the end of the conflict, some former child soldiers continued their political involvement in the CPN-M movement through the YCL. For some former child soldiers, however, this type of political activity has resulted in imprisonment. Two former boy child soldiers alleged they were framed and/or imprisoned for their protest activities (former boy child soldier Nepal, 13.11.17; former boy child soldier CS14, Nepal 25.11.17). They expressed concern that there are discharged PLA, who remain in prison for similar reasons.

Peace Envisioners, however, has shifted away from traditional political protests to create linkages between their experiences as a child soldier and international ideas of justice and accountability. Orjuela (2018) conceptualises transitional justice global mechanisms and norms as a ‘set of opportunity structures’ that are ‘political, legal and discursive’ in the context of diaspora mobilisation (2018, 1358). While this context is slightly different, it is obvious that the strength of

39 Bandh style protests are characterised by street protests in which low levels of violence can occur. They are a common occurrence. Often cities are shut down because of such protests 149

Peace Envisioners is their ability to link into international narratives of child soldiering centred on legal, political and social issues associated with child soldiering. Most recently, a report was sent to various committees within the UN system, including the Secretary General of Children and Armed Conflict and the committee on children’s rights, which outlined the violations they experienced as children recruited to the Maoists, and the failure to obtain substantial rehabilitation and compensation. The report requests UN support and recognition of their cause, including placing pressure on the Government of Nepal to include in transitional justice processes the rehabilitation and reparation of child soldiers, and to guarantee the protection of children’s rights (Peace Envisioners and Trial International 2019, 23).

Peace Envisioners continues to strategically use child soldier to leverage support from international actors, including international governments and NGOs. At the time of this research, they were working closely with German Embassy for example to develop a unified advocacy strategy. The German Embassy sponsored a workshop that brought together 20 former child soldiers to Kathmandu to discuss different strategies and approaches for creating new international linkages of support. Lenin Bista has also promoted the idea of putting Prachanda on trial for war crimes during his visit to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Netherlands. While the work of Peace Envisioners is on-going it illustrates a novel engagement with the child soldier identity. In the process, former child soldiers have re-gained agency through international support in crafting an advocacy identity that helps them to overcome their local experience of marginalisation. By transcending local dynamics they have created a new purpose and agenda like in the past when they were child soldiers and driven by the Maoist revolutionary agenda.

Finally, the Peace Envisioners organisation has provided a way for former child soldiers to network with each other and provide support. Lenin and some of his friends have conducted their own research throughout Nepal to document the stories of former child soldiers and the difficulties that they face. In doing so, they continue to highlight the plight of many former child soldier, and to build a network of trust and support despite their geographical separation. It was obvious

150

in many of the interviews that former child soldiers isolated because of geographical location had a close relationship with Lenin Bista and the main organisers of Peace Envisioners. Many of the former child soldiers indicated their appreciation of their connection with Lenin in light of the hardships they face.

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated the multiple ways that former child soldiers experienced the child soldier identity, as it plays out in their lives in both an international and local sense. On the one hand, the local child soldier identity had negative implications for former child soldiers, who were victimised through their reintegration experiences. In the first section, I analysed the immediate post conflict reintegration experience through a lens of division to illustrate how former child soldiers took on the identity of the being a ‘child soldier’ that distinguished them to adult combatants and their former senior Maoist leaders. The social return process also proved difficult as demonstrated through a generational and gendered analysis. While the first part of the chapter detailed a difficult homecoming for many, the work of Peace Envisioners demonstrates the ability of former child soldiers to exercise agency by promoting a narrative that links into international understandings of the child soldier. Former child soldiers utilise Nepal’s politicised justice context to create an advocacy profile that emphasises their victimhood and the loss of their childhood resulting from their recruitment and child soldiering experience. As a result, child soldiers have created an advocacy identity that transcends the local, social dynamics they content with in their everyday life.

151

Chapter 7: Sri Lanka: Politics, Conflict and Militarisation

This chapter will identify major political and social developments in Sri Lanka from the time of independence from the British in 1948. These developments are primarily defined by the growth of Sinhalese dominated state rule. Ethnic divisions between the Sinhalese and minority groups, namely the Tamils and Muslims, hardened because of political, social and economic marginalisation experienced by these groups at the hands of the state. This became an important driver of the conflict that occurred between the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Elam (LTTE).

This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section (1948-1983) I outline the growth of the Sinhalese state project, alongside other key political developments. This includes the decline in democracy and rise of authoritarianism, the growth of state militarised practices, and the Tamil community’s experience of ethnic violence and growing nationalism. I then move onto the conflict period (1983-2009) and the rise of the LTTE. This section discusses the conflict experiences of child soldiers to illustrate the complexities surrounding choice and agency for many children in the face of on-going violence and destruction of their communities. In the third section, I analyse political developments in the post conflict period. The failure of the Sri Lankan state to take seriously its duties in creating substantial peace and justice continues to impact the lives of former child soldiers and ex-combatants in substantial ways. The state effectively acts outside of politics and rule of law to continue to control Tamil communities through both structural and direct acts of violence. Former child soldiers contend with political and social dynamics defined by heightened state security, a militarised environment and subjugation of their community. This will be explored in Chapter 8.

152

7.1 Political developments, 1948-1983

Sri Lanka is an island in the Indian Ocean located at the south of India. It is thought that the first Sinhalese arrived around the sixth century, probably from North India. According to 2011/2012 national census, Sri Lanka’s population as grouped by ethnicity/religion is Sinhalese, 74.9%; Sri Lankan Tamil, 11.2%; Tamil of Indian descent, 4.2%; Sri Lankan Moor, 9.2%; Malay, 0.2%; Burgher, 0.2%; and others, 0.1%, and a total population of 20,271,464 (Government of Sri Lanka 2012). The three main ethnic groups -Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims- are typically associated with religion: Sinhalese (Buddhist), Tamils40 (mainly Hindus), and Muslims. Tamil communities are mainly located in the North and Eastern areas of Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka ranks highly in the human development ranking at 71 out of 189 countries and territories. But there remain pockets of poverty, which are mainly located in former conflict zones where child soldiers are predominately located (UNICEF 2020b).

7.1.2 Post colonial state formation

On 4 February 1948, Sri Lanka gained independence from the British and the Sinhalese political elite immediately took over state power and governance. Scholars trace the origins of the conflict to this time when ethnic identities hardened and tensions began to grow between the Sinhalese and the Tamils (Spencer 1990; Wickranasinghe, 2006). The Sinhalese political elite positioned themselves to rule with little consideration of power sharing arrangement with other minority groups, and Sri Lanka became a mono-ethnic state in a poly- ethnic society (Coomaraswamy 2003). Minority groups’ rights and citizenship status was insufficiently protected by the new governance arrangements. The Sinhalese dominant government began by implementing a series of repressive and ethnically discriminatory state building policies against the Tamil people, which included restricting their university and civil service admission, and recognition of their own language (D’Costa 2013; Biswas 2006).

40 Indian Tamils lost their citizenship right in 1948. 153

The 1956 elections were significant in consolidating ethnic differences and in establishing a politically powerful Sinhala identity. Sinhalese politicians constructed a national identity narrative as ‘‘sons of the soil’’, who were exploited by colonial rule (DeVotta 2007). Sinhalese politicians from the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLPF) developed a platform called ‘Sinhala only!’. After the SLPF victory led by President S.W.R.D Bandaranaike, the national language was changed to Sinhalese. This was the Language Act (1956). While President Bandaranaike amended the Act in 1958, relations between Sinhala and Tamil communities were severely damaged. The actions of the Sinhalese politicians politicised ethnic identities and marginalised Tamils (and Muslims), but also prompted Tamil groups to think of a separate nationhood based upon a distinct ethnic identity. Tamil groups started to resist state rule, and carried out protests (Bose 1999, 94).

7.1.3 Decline in democracy

1970 marked a new era in Sri Lanka’s political developments. This included an authoritarian turn in politics, the growth and consolidation of national military strength, and Tamil community’s experience of state sanctioned violence. The rise of authoritarian practices in politics resulted from institutional decay and elite corruption that commenced upon Sri Lanka’s independence. Constitutional amendments became a tool for successive ruling parties to support partisan advantages. The 1978 constitution gave President J.R Jayewardene almost near dictatorial powers by expanding executive power. President Jayewardene and then Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa (1988–93), used executive power against the separatists and anyone—Sinhalese or Tamil—who challenged the United National Party (UNP) government’s authority (DeVotta 2014, 148-149). Both the 1972 and 1978 constitutions were a political reaction to Tamil calls for federal structure to support their nationalist aspirations. In response, the government entrenched the idea of a Sinhalese unitary state and the special place of Buddhism through constitutional change41 (Coomaraswamy 2003, 152).

41 The Government was put under pressure to do this by groups of Buddhist monks, rural sub elites, teachers, and the Sinahala speaking intelligentsia (DeVotta 2007) 154

Secondly, the state increasingly turned to legislation and public security provisions to enforce public order, which took on a new meaning in the context of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) uprising. The Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA)(1978) was used to suppress the second JVP uprising in 1978 (discussed in section 7.1.4). The PTA Act aimed to deter militant activities and under emergency powers, authorities could arbitrarily arrest and detain suspected insurgents or terrorists. President Jayewardene made the 1978 Act permanent in 1982. The enactment of the PTA gave significant power to the state in circumventing an individual’s fundamental rights in a democratic and rule of law context. As Manoharan (2006, 27) notes, the measures were draconian and included: prolonged detention (Section 7, 9), trial without preliminary inquiry (Section 15), admissibility of confession as evidence (Section 16), immunity of law enforcement personnel from prosecution (Section 26), and the precedence of the PTA over all other written laws (Section 28) (Manoharan 2006, 27). The PTA and other public security provisions continue to be used, which enables the state to avoid due process in the context of arbitrarily detaining former LTTE for extended periods, and not upholding their human rights. Human rights activists and ex-combatants interviewed cited the role of the PTA in facilitating their ill treatment (interview with human rights worker, Sri Lanka, 17.4.18). At the end of the conflict many former LTTE members were detained without charge. Others remain missing and families cannot hold the Sri Lankan government accountable (former male ex-combatant, SL3, 24.4.18 Sri Lanka; ICJ 2010).

7.1.4 Military growth and expansion

Sri Lanka’s democracy was weakened by the growth of authoritarian rule, which provided an opening for the growth of state militarised practices and institutionalised violence (De Mel 2007). The military evolved to become a key institution used by the government to maintain state control over minority groups that overtly challenged the government to protect the internal territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. The military focused on creating an ethnically Sinhalese dominant force through recruitment policies (Rajasingham-Senanayake 2001, 3-4). The military played a key role in suppressing dissident activity, which was first

155

demonstrated by the state’s response to the two Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) (People’s Liberation Front) uprisings (1971 & 1978), and the subsequent growth of Tamil militancy in the 1970s and early 1980s. The JVP uprising consisted of communist Sinhalese university students and urban youth in the South, who sought to challenge the ruling government through insurrection and socialist revolution. It is estimated that 30-60,000 Sinahala youth died during the uprisings and over 30 politicians were killed (Asia Foundation 2017). The military’s culture of violence and impunity was fostered during the time to suppress the JVP, with state support (Harrison & Sooka 2019). This included the cultivation of intelligence units that used interrogation and torture methods against Sinhala youth. Such techniques would be applied in the futures by security forces against LTTE members. In addition, state sponsored death squads were operating in the south, with tacit support from politicians (Harrison & Sooka 2019).

The role of the military in suppressing the JVP uprising reflected the growing militarisation of the state, and a lack of separation between the military and executive power. The state supported the military and security forces more broadly to use violent methods to implement order, even in the context of dealing with children and/or youth. While the CRC was not ratified by the Sri Lankan state at the time of the JVP uprisings, the military’s culture of violence fostered at the time created a dangerous dynamic that became evident both during and after the conflict in dealings with LTTE members. Indeed, as will be discussed in Chapter 8, there are many former child soldiers who remain unaccounted for at the end of the conflict, and other children that were killed by the Sri Lankan security forces, particularly in the final phases of the conflict.

7.1.5 Ethnic riots and Tamil nationalism

Tamil communities experienced significant violence during ethnic riots from the 1950s onwards, with alleged state involvement (Braithwaite & D’Costa 2018, 369). Ethnic riots took place in 1956, 1958, 1977, 1979, and 1981. However, the 1983 anti-Tamil pogrom known as the ‘Black July’ riots, which commenced on 23 July. This was a significant turning point in spurring Tamil militancy and youth

156

radicalisation, which led to the commencement of civil war against the government. The Black July riots started in response to allegations that Tamil militants killed thirteen soldiers. In response, violent Sinhalese mobs attacked and killed Tamils, their home and businesses. This resulted in the deaths of around 3,000 Tamils, and another 175,000 Tamils were further displaced (Tambia 1986). There is strong evidence that prominent Sinhalese government ministers and senior officials from the Jayewardene government were involved in managing gangs and assisting with logistics (Weiss 2011). Many Tamils left the country and began contributing funds to a growing separatist movement. The riots demonstrated the state’s failure to provide protection to all members of the population. The then government never attempted to hold Sinhalese politicians accountable for their alleged involvement in orchestrating the violence.

Tamil communities’ experiences of violence was cultivated by a growing nationalism that demanded the establishment of their own independent ‘Tamil’ homeland. This was known as the Thimpu principles. While there were initial attempts to negotiate with the Sri Lankan government regarding territorial autonomy, the Sri Lankan authorities regarded Tamil separatism as a rule of law issue, and would only compromise on decentralised government administration units (Uyangoda 2007,14). This was not enough of a compromise for the Tamil groups. Ultimately, the combination of post colonial state political developments, institutionalisation of state led violence, and a growing Tamil militant nationalism were important drivers of the conflict that commenced in 1983.

7.2 Conflict in Sri Lanka

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) formed on 5 May 1976 under the leadership of Velupillai Prabhakaran. The LTTE united numerous militant factions that were already operating prior to the conflict, but not in a formal organisational sense. In 1986, the LTTE eliminated all other rival Tamil parties to become the main party representing the Tamil cause. The Tamil cause was based on seeking an independent homeland for Tamils in the north and east, called Tamil Eelam. The intensity of violence ebbed and flowed throughout the almost 30 year war.

157

The LTTE became a formidable force. They became infamous for their recruitment of child soldiers (HRW 2007b), and they pioneered suicide bombing methods.

Significantly, female combatants were recruited to the LTTE to fight alongside men. Female combatants (girls and women) completed suicide missions, which included a 17 year old girl who is thought to have killed the then Indian prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi in 1991. Adel Ann, the Australian wife of the senior LTTE cadre Anton Balansingham and leader of the women’s wing, declared that women’s participation would free Tamil women from their traditional, conservative roles in society, and suggested that women had embraced the life of a Tamil tiger. She stated that Tamil women: Have literally flourished under such conditions and created for themselves, not only a new women’s military structure, but also a legend of fighting capability and bravery (Ann 1993).

Ann’s statement, however, obscured a more complicated reality related to achieving female emancipation and empowerment in the context of militarised violence. There is no doubt that the participation of women (and girls) was revolutionary, and challenged their traditional gendered roles by participating in the LTTE movement alongside men (de Soyza, 2012). Women and girls also had a variety of personal and political reasons for supporting the movement (Gowrinathan 2010). However, the political and social transformation experienced by women and girls was a temporary experience tied to the existence of the LTTE. In the post conflict era, female ex-combatants contend with social stigma, which is often related to pre-existing gendered norms centred on their inability to maintain their social status as women and mothers. They also deal with substantial disabilities with little medical or social support (Krishnan 2012), and some have resorted to prostitution to survive. In the interviews, some of the male ex-combatants were trying to find ways to support some of the particularly marginalised women, who were female ex-combatants, but the men themselves continue to struggle with resources and their own hardships.

158

Scholars also question the degree to which the LTTE movement really sought to transform gender relations. Female sexuality featured in the LLTE’s portrayal of women and the desire of families and communities to protect female sexuality became heighted during the conflict. The LTTE leadership presented women as equal to men in their capacity to fight, but they were also described as armed virgins. Coomaraswamy describes this as a ‘purely LTTE innovation having no precedence in Tamil literature or culture’ (Coomaraswamy 1996, 9). The female sexuality narrative indicated the importance of appealing to the Tamil population by emphasising their ability to uphold their traditional roles as women. The LTTE did not want to compromise gender roles and expectations too much.

Women and girls’ vulnerability to conflict related sexual violence also shaped efforts by families to protect their young girls, with some families marrying their young teenage girls to ensure protection against sexual vulnerability for fear that their daughters would be attacked by the Sri Lankan military (De Alwis & Hyndman 2002). During the conflict, there were reports of women and girls being targeted by security forces for sexual harassment or rape. Indeed, there is evidence of Sri Lankan military forces raping LTTE women, including girls at the end of the conflict (Channel 4 2011; De Alwis 2014). One male ex-combatant interviewed witnessed the treatment of a female colleague when they were initially captured. He explained that Sri Lankan authorities took additional actions against her compared with the men: ‘they undressed her and raped her. They continuously sexually assaulted her until she was unconscious and died. I saw her being raped’ (male ex-combatant, SL 4, Sri Lanka, 24.4.18).

While conflict related sexual violence was a concern during the conflict, in post conflict Sri Lanka, women and girls continue to deal with the threat of sexual violence within the community, and from security forces present in the region (Davies & True 2017; De Alwis 2014). Female ex-combatants face distinct challenges, but the post conflict militarised environment continues to create gendered insecurities that also affects former girl soldiers, which will be explored further in Chapter 8.

159

More broadly, Tamil civilians suffered immensely during the conflict. They dealt with several major internal displacements, and some Tamil civilians experienced multiple displacements over a twenty-year period.42 In 2001 at its peak 800,001 people were displaced (UNHCR 2002). The 2004 Tsunami resulted in 516,150 Internally Displaced People (IDPs), and communities had to deal with displacement both resulting from the conflict and the tsunami (Government of Sri Lanka 2006). During displacements, Tamils civilians faced multiple insecurities, including finding safe accommodation. A UNHCR report on the conditions of IDPs housed in government welfare centres notes that Tamils dealt with difficult living conditions, which included issues of alcoholism, suicide, sexual and domestic violence, and prostitution (UNHCR 2002). While it is hard to know how many children were displaced, many accompanied their parents. Some of the former child soldiers interviewed for this research reflected on the difficulties they experienced as a result of displacement. One former girl child soldier told me that children often suffered from sickness and fever, and it was hard to obtain food, clean drinking water, and medical attention. Schooling was disrupted too (former girl child soldier, SL 2, Sri Lanka 24.4.18). The conflict clearly affected the lives of many children in diverse ways, who grew up experiencing an unsafe and insecure childhood.

7.3 Child soldiers in conflict

Boy and girl child soldiers were recruited throughout the conflict, mainly by the LTTE, but also to other armed groups including the Tamil Peoples Liberation Tigers (Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal –TMVP), also known as the ‘Karuna faction’, which broke away from the LTTE in 200443 (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 2004 & 2010; HRW 2004 & 2007b; Hogg 2006). However, LTTE recruitment of child soldiers was most significant in number, and commenced

42 Displacement also affected the Muslim community located in the Northern province. In 1990, the LTTE expelled 75,000 Muslims from their homes (D’Costa 2013) 43 In 2002-2003 during the ceasefire, there was an ad hoc rehabilitation program for child soldiers who left the Karuna faction, led by UNICEF in the east. But with the resumption of the conflict soon after, many of those child soldiers either missed out on formal rehabilitation assistance and demobilized to communities by themselves, or were recruited back to the Northern province where fighting was now concentrated (interview with NGO worker, Sri Lanka, 19.4.18). 160

around 1984 when orphans were recruited and became part of a special unit called ‘baby brigade’. Later, child soldiers were integrated more broadly into the LTTE forces (Gunaratna 1998). Throughout the conflict, the international community and Sri Lankan government condemned the LTTE for forcibly recruiting child soldiers. Forcible recruitment occurred through the militarisation of schools, pressurising families to give one child to the cause, and through abduction (Hogg 2006). At times, Tamil families sent their children abroad to protect them44. International scrutiny of the LTTE curtailed forcible recruitment practices for periods of time, but forcible recruitment patterns would again intensify once international scrutiny was less (Hogg 2006,12). Once recruited children learnt to handle weapons, landmines and bombs, and military tactics.

While the Sri Lankan government and international community focused on the LTTE as the source of child soldier recruitment during the conflict, a report by the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (2010) notes that child soldier recruitment to various armed groups including to the Karuna faction, and other armed groups was not properly addressed by the Sri Lankan government during the conflict. The government did not implement child protection measures, and at time government security forces were also complicit in contributing to the problem (Coalition to Stop the use of Child Soldiers 2010, 1). The Sri Lankan government also failed to acknowledge their responsibilities relating to the actions that they took during the conflict to fight the LTTE, particularly in the final phases, and the devastating impact that this had on children’s lives and their families.

The issue of child soldiers in the Sri Lankan context is complicated, particularly given the extent of violence that Tamil communities dealt with throughout the conflict. Tamil civilians were commonly caught up in cross fire between the LTTE and government forces, and were targeted by government security forces, particularly if they were known for supporting the LTTE cause. Amongst the adult ex-combatants, who were typically recruited at a young age- often as ‘child soldiers’- they stayed fighting with the LTTE for many years. They continue to

44 Confidential personal correspondence, 1.3.20 161

express support of the movement, even though they were recruited as young children. While they do not support a resumption of conflict, they wish for an independent Tamil homeland and for that reason continue to support the goals of the former LTTE (female ex-combatant, SL 34, 27.4.18; male ex-combatant, SL21, Sri Lanka 25.4.18, Sri Lanka). Adult ex-combatants described growing up witnessing violence and the destruction of their communities. This was an important driver of their decision to join. One male ex-combatant who was 18 years old when he joined, told me: In 1989, my Aunt was brutally raped, and people around me were being killed by Tamil militias attached to the Sri Lankan army…there were body parts cut up and thrown in the canal. At that time I decided to join the LTTE to fight. My Aunty was raped because our family supported the LTTE (male ex-combatant, SL21, Sri Lanka 25.4.18).

Another female ex-combatant told me that she tried to join the LTTE as a child, but she was rejected for being too young. She waited until she was a young adult and then joined. On reflecting upon her childhood, she recalled her support for the LTTE not only because they could look after her, but because neighbours reported her family to authorities for their alleged support of the LTTE. She and her mother were interrogated numerous times by authorities, and her brother was tortured (female ex-combatant, SL9, Sri Lanka, 25.4.18). This strengthened her family’s support of the LTTE and fear of the Sri Lankan military.

A former senior commander of the LTTE, who worked closely with Prabhakaran, indicated that for a long time the policy of the LTTE was not to recruit child soldiers. Children were to be looked after in orphanages and receive education. However, he explained that there were times when groups within the LTTE deviated away from their policies regarding child recruitment. On a number of occasions, he wrote letters to the senior leadership expressing concern that such policies were not being followed properly (male ex-combatant, SL20, Sri Lanka 26.4.18). Indeed, many of the adult ex-combatants were turned away as children from joining the LTTE. While it is difficult to justify child recruitment, the LTTE at certain points during the conflict provided a source of protection for children, in

162

terms of food, housing, education and physical protection. The controversy of child soldier recruitment becomes more complicated in this context.

The narratives of older ex-combatants who supported the LTTE movement, however, contrast with the stories of younger child soldiers recruited in the final stages of the conflict when the LTTE engaged heavily in forcible recruitment. Many of the younger child soldiers described terrifying examples of being abducted or threatened to join by the LTTE, and being forced to fight on the front line, without adequate training. One former girl child soldier recruited in the last year of the conflict told me: ‘at midnight they [LTTE] took me from my home. They threatened to shoot my parents. I was 15 at the time I was taken’. She went onto explain that she only received 15 days of training and then was deployed to the frontline. However, she managed to escape (former girl child soldier, SL1 24.4.18, Sri Lanka).

The question of agency and choice is complicated in a context where children deal with violence, particularly violence that targets their communities and destroys their childhood. Sri Lanka illustrates this well. At least for some of the adult ex-combatants who joined as child soldiers, joining the LTTE was a question of survival. They experienced the LTTE when it was at its strength and at a time when the LTTE worked with the people, rather than against. Thus, the LTTE gave them a sense of purpose and control over a terribly violent conflict situation. However, younger child soldiers’ experiences of forcible recruitment and the fear they and their families experienced, presents a very different perspective on the LTTE recruitment practices, and the impact that this had upon their lives. Some of these younger child soldiers also detailed examples of being brutally punished by the LTTE, if they attempted to run away (former girl child soldier, Sri Lanka, 18.4.18; see also Hogg 2006, 17). The comparison of adult ex-combatants with younger child soldiers recruited in the later phases of the conflict, illustrates well the complexities of people’s conflict experiences that often transgress and challenge particular labelling, like the ‘child soldier’, and the need to pay attention to the narratives of those who actually experienced the event. It also demonstrates the importance of accounting for an armed group’s ideological goals and conduct. Ultimately, the LTTE were seeking a better life through their

163

own independent homeland, and this cause was important for many Tamils as well.

7.4 Post conflict context

The end result of the almost 30 year conflict was devastating. It is estimated that around 84,000 people lost their lives, while hundreds of thousands were being forcibly displaced (Uppsala Conflict Data Program n.d.; ICG 2010). President Mahinda Rajapaska (SPLF, 2005-2015) declared a ‘victor’s peace’, and he described the defeat of the Tamils as a defeat of the terrorist issue. The final phase of the war known as the ‘Final Offensive’, became one of the worst episodes of violence experienced by many Tamil civilians caught up in the crossfire in terms of injury, death and displacement. President Rajapaska justified a final offensive on humanitarian grounds to capitalise on international support for the Sri Lankan government to defeat LTTE ‘terrorists’ (Braithwaite & D’Costa 2018, 381). However, human rights activists, civil society group, and international observers voiced concern about the real intentions of the Sri Lankan government (see Weiss 2011) During the final phase of the conflict, an estimated 300,000 Tamil civilians were forced to a narrow coastal strip of Puttumatalan in the north-eastern Mullaitivu district. They were caught up in cross fire between the LTTE and Sri Lankan government forces. It is estimated that 40, 000 civilians alone died in the last phase of the conflict due to shelling and direct fire (OHCHR 2015, 219).

The United Nations conducted three main investigations into war crimes and crimes against humanity. These investigations identified both the Sri Lankan government forces (military and police), and the LTTE as responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the final stages of the war (OHCHR 2015; Petrie 2012; Darusman et al 2011). The findings referred to the time when Tamil civilians were driven to the narrow coastal strip in Mullaitivu district where Sri Lankan security forces denied Tamil civilians adequate medication, food and shelter, and hospitals were shelled. Sri Lankan security forces cut off access to international humanitarian actors, thus preventing any independent monitoring of

164

the situation as it unfolded. However, most significantly the Darusman (2011) report states that the military strategy of the government was ‘calculated to bring about the destruction of a significant part of the Tamil population’ (Darusman et al 2011, 7). Secondly, the investigations found that the LTTE used civilians as human shields by detaining women and children, and they were found to have shot at civilians (OHCHR 2015, 128–9). Significantly, the Report of the Secretary-General’s Internal Review Panel on United Nations Action in Sri Lanka (2012)(also known as the Petrie report) found that the UN systematically failed in its efforts to protect civilians in the final phase of the conflict as a result of institutional deficiencies and a failure to uphold human rights standards. This included UN staff that failed to report Government violations. It was reported that some senior staff suppressed field staff observations on human rights violations committed by the Sri Lankan government (Petrie 2012, 4).

In the post conflict period, the state continues to assert power and authority over Tamil communities located in the Northern and Eastern province through militarisation and control. Former child soldiers’ quality of life and their reintegration outcomes remain severely compromised by low levels of peace and reconciliation within Tamil communities, and between the state and its Tamil constituents. The GoSL’s unilateral victory over the LTTE enabled President Rajapaska (SLPF party) to determine how the country would move forward, providing him with an opportunity to consolidate state power and control in a way never done before. President Rajapaska remained as Sri Lanka’s president until 2015. There was hope that his successor, President Maithripala Sirsenia (SLPF)(2015- 2019), would engage more seriously with peace building and reconciliation. However, he was removed from power as President and replaced by Mahinda Rajapaska’s brother Gotabaya, with Mahinda (formerly President Rajapaska) selected as prime minister. As of 2020, Gotabaya remains President of Sri Lanka.

165

7.4.1 Politics, peace and reconciliation

President Rajapaska left an indelible mark on the trajectory of peace and politics in Sri Lanka. This began with the rejection of the liberal peace approach that was advocated by western governments involved in peace negotiations between the GoSL and the LTTE between 2002-2006. Critical scholarship on liberal peace building extensively criticises the ability of such projects to achieve substantial peace. The application of the liberal peace building model in external interventions is based on a flawed logic that peace can be achieved through a technocratic exercise of state building, democracy and a market based economy (Richmond 2014; Tadjbakhsh 2011; Lemay‐Hébert 2011). However, in Sri Lanka’s context, the lack of international oversight meant that the Sri Lankan government could work independently of international community pressure to address peace and justice concerns, militarisation, and human rights violations.

The Rajapaska government shunned any attempt at national led reconciliation efforts and rejected the idea that Tamils had legitimate grievances that lead to war in the first place (Höglund & Orjuela 2011). Instead, he produced a national story and identity to assert state authority and control over the Tamil population by consolidating a Sinhala Buddhist nationalist ideology, which was based upon total territorial control (Seoighe 2016a, 2). This historical dynamic existed before the conflict, but Rajapaska used Sinhala Buddhist nationalist ideology as a front to target any ‘traitors’ that seek to undermine the nation, including western countries (DeVotta 2007, 135; Rampton 2011). Sinhalese culture and mythology featured in public narratives and imagery that portrayed the defeat of the LTTE terrorists. For example, there were references to ancient battles between Sinhala and Tamil kingdoms,45 and billboards that portrayed Rajapaska with other Sinhala kings. Victory against the Tamils was celebrated with mass parades, flag ceremonies and celebrations for those who fought for the government. Seigohe observes that mass rituals used by the Rajapaska government was a: Process controlled by the sovereign in order to consolidate power through ideological coherence. Mass ritual discourse is a means of drawing those

45 Mahavamsa’s account of the battle is between the Sinhala King Dutugemunu (who reigned from 161 B.C. to 137 B.C.) and the ‘invading Tamil’ Prince Elara from India’s Chola Kingdom. See Seioghe (2016a, 6). 166

boundaries and defining the ‘inside’. In Sri Lanka, this is a militaristic Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism (Seoighe 2016a, 9). Throughout the Northern province, the government erected military monuments to commemorate and honour the military defeat of the LTTE that were seen throughout this research.

At the same time, President Rajapaska engaged superficially in reconciliatory language that outlined the importance of overcoming ethnic divisions existing in the country. He stated that: We have removed the word minorities from our vocabulary. […]. No longer are the Tamils, Muslims, Burghers, Malays and any others minorities. There are only two people in this country. One is the people that love this country. The other comprises the small groups that have no love for the land of their birth (cited in Höglund & Orjuela 2011, 24).

President Rajapaska’s statement is problematic for many reasons. It represents an attempt by the government to absolve itself from the responsibilities of its wrong doings, particularly as Tamil experience of state rule was an important driver of conflict in the first place.

The UN Peacebuilding Context Assessment (2016) report specifically notes that to achieve sustainable peace, the Sri Lankan government needs to focus on political resolution achieved through government reform, noting that the: Origins and dynamics of Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict are fundamentally related to the way in which people of all ethnicities in Sri Lanka have experienced government. It derives from the way in which state power has been constituted, accessed, exercised, and held accountable (De Mel & Venugopal 2016, 7).

Tamils remain marginalised from key state institutions, and have little ability to influence policy and resource distribution through legitimate political means (ICG, 2012). The main Tamil political party, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) simply has no influence or power to change Sri Lankan politics to benefit Tamil communities. As Goodhand explains, the TNA is limited by its position in

167

negotiating government demands and restrictions, and at the same time attempting to meet the needs and interests of Tamils, the diaspora community and international community (Goodhand 2012, 67).

While authoritarian practices were evident particularly from 1970 onwards, President Rajapaska’s prioritised the strengthening of state centric rule, and homogenised the political community after the military victory over the LTTE. Lewis et al (2018) describe these authoritarian government practices as a mode of conflict management that indicates a state of ‘illiberal peace’. During his reign, President Rajapaska expanded executive power, dominance of family members in executive and legislative positions, and weakening the judiciary. In 2014, an estimated 130 of the president’s relatives enjoyed government postings, and the president and his brothers controlled nearly 70% of the country’s budget (Stone 2014, 149). The state continues to act outside of a normal rule of law framework in dealing with some former LTTE members.

7.4.2 LLRC commission: faltering justice

The international community put pressure on Rajapaska and his government to investigate war crimes and allegations of human rights violations during the war (Seioghe 2016b, 359). In 2010, Rajapaska set up the Lessons Learned Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) to meet international demands. However, the Commission rather than investigating state accountability and war crimes was mandated to explain the failure of the 2002 ceasefire and to provide recommendations to ensure that the country did not experience the same episode of violence again (LLRC report 2011, 6). ‘The Report of the Secretary- General's Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka’ was critical of the LLRC for avoiding issues of war crimes and accountability, and for other reasons related to the conduct of the Commission (Darusman et al 2011). Some of the issues highlighted by the UN panel, human rights organisations and civil society activists, included the impartiality of LLRC members who had recently been senior state officials, and the short time allocated (15 minutes) to testimonies for Tamil and Muslim people in war areas. In contrast, the time limit given to Sinhalese politicians, army officials and government personnel was unrestricted

168

(Thiranagama 2013). The LLRC was considered farcical by many analysts and Tamils themselves, and was described as a ‘state performance’ (Seoighe 2016b; Thiranagama 2013, 94).

According to the official aims of the LLRC, the Commission was designed to promote reconciliation between different ethnic community groups. Reconciliation can be simply defined as the rebuilding of peaceful relations between individuals, families, communities and adversaries, such that values of peace are once again valued (Bar-Tal 2009). Ledearch also refers to this as the importance of rebuilding ‘societal infrastructure’ (Lederach 1997, xviv). However, the tensions and divisions that exist between Sri Lanka’s three dominant ethnic groups were not just a result of the conflict, but have historical precedence and, at times have been fuelled by state action or inaction, as detailed in section 7.1.5 (Rajasingham-Senanayake 1999). Even now, ethnic tensions between the Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims continue to flare up from time to time. While doing this research in 2018, some Muslim youth were accused of attacking a Sinhalese truck driver at a petrol station. This led to a flare up in ethnic tensions in which Muslims’ homes and businesses were attacked outside of Colombo, and Colombo itself was placed under curfew for a number of days. Ethnic tensions are importantly driven by Sri Lanka’s political and economic developments that have prioritised the Sinhalese ethnic group to the detriment of the Tamil and Muslim communities. In other words, the failure of the state to build a political community and identity that is inclusive is an important driver of ethnic tension and cannot be overlooked. The Peacebuilding Context Assessment also confirms this analysis too.

The LLRC’s focus on ethnic divisions as the source of on-going tension deflected other important issues affecting the lives of Tamils because of their unequal status as citizens. These issues include on-going political marginalisation, land ownership, militarisation, and human rights violations. These issues were highlighted in testimonies given by Tamils. As Thiranagama states: Testimonies rarely touched on ethnic reconciliation between communities as necessary for their current lives and conditions; instead, the northern Tamils who came to the LLRC were using it as a stage from which they

169

could communicate with the state. Reconciliation, these requests made clear, is about a negotiation between the state and its people (Thiranagama 2013, 101).

This was a theme that was also reflected in interviews with former child soldiers and ex-combatants. Their concerns related to reconciliation focused on their relationship to state and the importance of the state in upholding their human rights as equal citizens, rather than the tensions between different ethnic groups. For example, one former male ex-combatant told me: If we had real peace we could sit with top officials - Sinhalese and Tamil- to segregate their rights and our rights..what is your obligation and what is our obligation. You can give us our lands..we can segregate our lands and live peacefully… (male ex-combatant, SL20, 26.4.18, Sri Lanka)

Human rights organisations and activist continues to document on-going violence experienced by the Tamil population, particularly ex-combatants or alleged Tamil supporters, in the form of torture, arbitrary detention, sexual violence and random attacks (Touquet 2018; Sooka 2014; HRW 2013).

Despite the limitations of the LLRC, some of the findings were actually important and insightful. The Commission recognised that the Tamils had legitimate grievances that shaped the civil war, and provided recommendations to address on-going concerns around access and ownership of land, identification of dead and disappeared, fairer resettlement terms for those displaced, and implementing non-discriminatory language in legislation. However, any wrongdoings by the Sri Lankan army in the final phase of the war were downplayed. The Commission suggested it was too hard to prove either way if the army was responsible for the shelling of hospitals (LLRC report 2011). The Commission’s inadequate response to violations of international humanitarian and human rights law does prevent more substantial engagement with national reconciliation efforts.

It is unlikely that the Sri Lankan government or security forces will ever be held to account for any war crimes through international criminal justice mechanisms or through a national transitional justice process. Sinhalese politicians continue to

170

control state governance and the military, and continue to deny the state’s responsibility for war crimes. In fact, former President Rajapaska and his brother the current President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, have promoted high-ranking military officials to senior public roles, who have been accused of war crimes (HRW 2020). Most recently, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa pardoned a high-ranking general, Sgt. Sunil Ratnayake, who was convicted in 2015 of a massacre that killed eight Tamil civilians, including a child, (HRW 2020). World-wide international courts, like the International Criminal Court (ICC), and national led transitional justice mechanisms convict high ranking officials in limited numbers This is demonstrated by the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) low conviction rate (Donovan 2012). Indeed, formal justice processes do not necessarily generate feelings of justice and closure for many victims (Braithwaite et al 2010; Nickson & Braithwaite 2014). As Nickson and Braithwaite explain, while some of the senior leaders are prosecuted, there are many ‘neglected victims’, whose stories are not heard and who may have a different idea of what justice is for them (Nickson & Braithwaite 2014, 12).

There are other questions of justice that are yet to be addressed. One important example is sexual and gender based violence that occurred during the conflict and after. Davies & True (2017) explain that in the final stages of the conflict and the immediate post conflict period, displaced people including civilians and combatants (male and female) were subjected to sexual violence by the Sri Lankan security forces. They note that the Sri Lankan government response to wartime rape and sexual violence has: ‘fallen far short of international legal standards on transitional justice, due process and investigation’ (Davies & True 2017, 1321). Socio-economic justice is another concern for many of the Tamil communities. Many of the former child soldiers and ex-combatants interviewed for this research live on the poverty line, and face a dearth of decent employment opportunities (for example, former boy and girl child soldier (husband and wife), SL28, Sri Lanka), 27.4.18). The on-going militarisation of the region suppresses job opportunities, as many Tamils are forced to engage in labour and manual work, which is poorly paid and unpredictable. Tamils do not have the option to travel elsewhere to seek further job opportunities.

171

7.4.3 State control and militarisation

The on-going militarisation of the Northern and Eastern provinces is another aspect of state rule that defines the post conflict lives of Tamil communities, including former child soldiers, which restricts their ability to lead a peaceful existence. The militarised context prevents proper peace and reconciliation occurring by reinforcing divisions between Sinhalese and the Tamils. Militarised rule creates distrust and fear not only between Tamils and government authorities and security forces, but also within Tamil communities through surveillance and other control methods. In other words, the Sinhalese and Tamil ethnic divide continues to frame Sri Lankan government policy, and militarised rule has created new divisions within the Tamil communities, which prevents them from rebuilding social cohesion and trust.

Soon after victory in 2009, President Rajapaska implemented an economic development program called the ‘Northern Spring’, which was led by the military. The project aimed to rebuild major infrastructure, roads, utilities, and buildings. The military also built Buddhist sites to ‘Sinhalise’ the landscape to re-assert symbolic and spatial control, while destroying significant Tamil monuments and cemeteries (De Alwis & Hyndman 2002). The Northern Spring program was considered a front for the assertion of military control to support the process of ‘re-colonising’ the Northern and Eastern provinces (ICG 2018; Fernando 2013; ICG 2010). Militarisation can be defined as the process to establish social, economic and political structures, policies, values and behaviours to support the military (Lutz 2007), and where the military institution takes precedence over political processes. Militarisation takes many forms, and in Sri Lanka this is characterised by a number of developments. Firstly, there exists a military led government administration that control key government roles. Military run state corporations dominate, such as the Civil Service Development Company (CSD), which is the largest employer of former LTTE combatants. Secondly, military bases and personnel maintain a heavy presence in the region. While it is difficult to obtain exact figures, from 2009 onwards, ICG documented that two-thirds of troops were stationed in the Northern Province (ICG 2014). The military are responsible for significant land grabs, and despite official promises to give land

172

back to Tamil owners and communities, this has largely not happened. In 2018, HRW reported that 40,000 people remained displaced primarily from Jaffna because they are unable to access their lands (HRW 2018). As well, alongside police and intelligence, including the Ceylon Investigation Department (CID) the military play a key role in the surveillance and control of former LTTE members.

These issues were also reflected upon in interviews with former child soldiers and ex-combatants. The presence of the military continues to restrict their ability to support themselves, particularly through employment opportunities. Many families live on the poverty line and struggle to have regular meals or pay for the medical care that they require. They are only able to work in casual, low skilled jobs like farming, manual labour, and stone breaking. Although President Rajapaska implemented an extensive economic development package at the end of the war, Tamils are generally limited to accessing low skilled jobs. A former boy child soldier told me that there are a many construction projects occurring in the area, but workers from Colombo are brought up to work on these projects instead of Tamils. He thinks this is a deliberate strategy used by Sinhalese companies to prevent working opportunities for Tamils (former boy child soldier, SL 28, Sri Lanka 27.4.18). The ongoing surveillance of former combatants also makes it difficult for them to run businesses or to do work. One male ex-combatant told me that he had attempted to run a small business, but people were afraid to work with him because they too might be questioned about their working association with him (male ex-combatant, SL 24, 26.4.18, Sri Lanka). Another male combatant interviewed was a fisherman, but the ongoing presence of the Sri Lankan navy restricts access to fishing.

The militarisation of the former conflict zones provides insights into the state’s definition of national security, which is still defined by a legacy of conflict and concern around future Tamil insurrection against the state. A national security state emerges when a state distorts a security threat that: ‘normal(izes) a condition of constant threat and transform(s) the emergency response into a disposition of the state and of everyday life’ (Agrama 2012, 232). Other characteristics of this state, according to Mullin (2015) include: expansive sovereignty, the centralization of power in the hands of the executive; and

173

increased use of surveillance. In essence, the national security state operates outside of a framework of normal politics and accountability expected in democratic governance and in the relationship between state and citizens. This typically includes the criminalisation of one section of the population. For example, succession attempts against the state is criminalised in Sri Lanka, The Sri Lankan government’s use of the PTA to counter separatist insurgencies allows arrests for unspecified ‘unlawful activities’ and for those arrested to be detained up to 18 months or longer without charge (HRW 2018b).

7.5 Conclusion

This chapter outlined the socio-political developments that resulted in Sinhalese dominance of state rule and governance. In the years leading up the conflict, authoritarian political practice, militarised state practices and the rise of Tamil ethnic nationalism were important drivers framing the conflict. President Rajapaska’s rule throughout the later stages of the conflict and into the post conflict era was supported by the strengthening of a Sinhala Buddhist nationalist ideology that consolidated territorial control of the former conflict zones through militarisation. This control plays out in the lives of former child soldiers and ex- combatants, some of who continue to contend with surveillance by Sri Lankan authorities and on-going insecurities, including the threat of detention. The failure of the Sri Lankan government to engage seriously in addressing peace and justice initiatives at a national level has prevented or limited community based efforts to achieve reconciliation. Former child soldiers and their communities contend with fear, insecurity and low levels of reconciliation within the community and the nation writ large, which limits their quality of life and reintegration outcomes. This provides important context in analysing the reintegration experiences of former child soldiers, as will be discussed in Chapter 8.

174

Chapter 8: ‘Losers’’ Exclusion Sri Lanka

In Chapter 7, I analysed Sri Lanka’s political and national developments that limit the state’s ability to seriously engage with peace justice and reconciliation issues. In the post conflict context, a fractured relationship between the Sinhalese ruling majority and Tamil communities continues to be reinforced by the actions of the Sri Lankan state. Tamil communities continue to experience low levels of peace. In this chapter, I argue that the Sri Lankan state used the child soldier identity to support a broader Sinhalese political project of state rule, and children became political subjects of the state. At the end of the conflict Sri Lankan government authorities used the rehabilitation of 594 former child soldiers as an opportunity to bolster state legitimacy and authority by drawing upon a protection narrative centred on the state’s obligation to protect Tamil children. However, child soldier rehabilitation efforts were used as a decoy to hide the militarised, violent actions of the state towards other former members of the LTTE. This is demonstrated in the first two sections of the chapter: 8.1 The paternal state; and 8.2 The militarised and masculine state. In the third section, I provide a gendered analysis of former girl child soldiers’ reintegration experience. Girls’ experience of shame and stigma through social reintegration is dependent upon many factors, family acceptance, current role in society, and marriage status. I demonstrate that many former girl child soldiers are in fact protected from some of the social, cultural economic disadvantages that other female ex-combatants contend with, particularly in relation to the community and in their dealings with the militarised state apparatus.

8.1 Children and adult rehabilitation

At the end of the conflict in 2009, child soldiers and adult combatants were rehabilitated in separate government run programs, located in the Northern province. An inter-governmental group, headed by the Ministry of Defence, ran

175

the rehabilitation programs46. Officially there were 11, 600 adult combatants and 594 child soldiers rehabilitated (364 boys; 230 girls) (Government of Sri Lanka 2011). A senior military representative appointed as the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation (CGR) lead the management of the programs. Children accessed a mix of education, vocational training and psychosocial support. These programs were generally one year in duration (Government of Sri Lanka 2009). The overarching aim of the program was family reunification. Children were separated during the course of their rehabilitation from their families, but were able to maintain regular contact with their families through phone calls and visits by their families, every one to three months (former girl child soldier, SL1, Sri Lanka, 24.4.18).

The generational divide that emerged between ‘children’ and ‘adults’ took on a different meaning through the demobilisation and rehabilitation process, compared to the Nepalese case. While in Nepal being an adult combatant entitled individuals to greater compensation and recognition, this was not the case for adult combatants in Sri Lanka, many of whom were regarded as security threats by state authorities. The senior LTTE leadership were not able to negotiate any political concessions because of their military defeat, and Sri Lankan government failed to implement a peace process that involved negotiation with their former enemy. Many of the senior LTTE commanders were captured, then either killed or detained, sometimes in unknown locations (see male ex-combatants SL3 24.4.18; SL7(iv) 25.4.18, Sri Lanka; ICJ 2010). Some adult combatants secured training opportunities through the rehabilitation programs; however, other adult ex-combatants were subjected to interrogation and torture. One human rights activist outlined his concern stating that: Basically it was a bona fide interrogation and indoctrination centre with some meditation. The problem with the adult rehabilitation centres was that even if you were only involved with the LTTE for one week (like digging trenches) or doing simple admin work, you were taken into detention for one to two years of your life. I think that some [of the

46 Some international organisations played a very small part in delivery of key programs, like the International Labour Organization (ILO) that helped to delivery employment training programs to adult ex- combatants. 176

men/women] captured didn’t even have anything to do with the LTTE. Some of them were able to pay their way out (Interview with human rights worker, Sri Lanka, 17.4.18).

According to the ‘National Action Plan of the National Framework Proposal for Reintegration of Ex-combatants into Civilian Life in Sri Lanka’ (NAP) (Government of Sri Lanka 2009), a restorative justice approach was applied to the ex-combatant community through their rehabilitation. Adult ex-combatants were eligible for reintegration programs once they were found ‘not guilty’ following legal proceedings (Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights, 2009, 10). The NAP does not specify the crime that would prevent an ex- combatant from entering the reintegration program, but it is likely to be terrorist related. The Sri Lankan government refused to give international agencies information or access to monitor the well-being of LTTE combatants at the end of the conflict. Given the historical context of state rule, the draconian measures of the PTA, and other state dealings with militant and/or terrorist activity, there are important questions around how former LTTE were treated by state authorities through this process. Most concerning are reports that many ex-combatants continue to be detained in unknown locations, without having gone through a proper judicial process leading to their criminal conviction and on-going imprisonment. Many of these imprisoned LTTE members are ‘missing’ and only the government knows of their whereabouts (see Appendix 2)47. A male ex- combatant, who was only recently released from prison after ten years, told me he was forced to sign a confession under torture, which led to his conviction. Furthermore, he told me: Former LTTE member stay in jail for five to ten years for no reason [without proper conviction]. People have come to investigate and question authorities, but I think the government keeps these former LTTE members or associates detained so that they can waste their time in jail (male ex- combatant, SL3, 24.4.18, Sri Lanka).

47 A male ex-combatant provided this list of political prisoners to me from his own time as a political prisoner. He compiled this list because he personally knows the prisoners, otherwise there would be no independent way to gather these names. The Jaffna Missing Person Association has also been provided with a copy of this list. 177

In contrast, children classified as a child soldier by authorities were entitled to a certain level of protection and support from authorities. One former girl child soldier told me that when she was first demobilised as a child soldier: I was asked a series of questions about why I joined the LTTE. I told the authorities that I was forced to join...I was treated well… [During the rehabilitation process] I felt well protected… Once every three months my parents come to see me. Every day I could speak to my parents for five minutes. That was the program’s strength (former girl child soldier, SL 1, Sri Lanka 24.4.18).

The child soldier identity given to children by authorities represented an important turning point in their conflict to post conflict transition in terms of the security and protection they were eligible to receive as children of the state. In this way, state authorities sent a clear message to the Tamil communities about their position in relation to the state, as either those who needed protection (children) or those who were considered as security risks (adults). The state’s protection of children was, therefore, political. Childhood became an important tool used by the state to support a broader agenda of re-setting the status quo in terms of sovereign power and authority. As the next sections will show, the individual’s relationship to the state has important and on-going implications in terms of their quality of life and security they experience.

8.2 The paternal state

The Sri Lankan government described the rehabilitation of 594 child soldiers as a success. However, in this next section I argue that authorities strategically used Tamil children’s victim status as a guise to re-assert state authority over the broader Tamil population. In doing so, the state instrumentalised child soldiers to attain its state-security objectives. Drawing on critical feminist theorisation of the state and the gendered logic of protection (Young 2003; Peterson 1992, 50), I argue that the masculine identity of the Sri Lankan state in a fatherly, ‘protector’ role of children was used to re-assert state authority.

178

This is evidenced by official state narratives towards child soldiers, which were presented in a benevolent and paternal manner. In this way, the state presented itself as a fatherly figure in protecting children and in returning them to their childhood. On the Sri Lankan government website, the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation refers to former child soldiers as ‘our children’ (Sri Lankan Government 2011). Indeed, another senior military official involved in the rehabilitation process spoke of the close relationship that he formed with many of the former child soldiers. Children were very sad to leave [the rehabilitation program] when I gave the children back to their families I gave them my personal telephone number. The children often call me [for a chat] (interview with senior military official, Sri Lanka 17.4.18).

8.2.1 Construction of victimhood

Former child soldiers’ status as victims featured prominently in narratives used by authorities to describe and justify state responsibility for the protection and rehabilitation of former child soldiers. According to an interview with a senior military official involved in the rehabilitation process, Sri Lankan authorities made a careful choice about the terms used to describe child soldiers in the program. This military official interviewed decided to re-name child soldiers as ‘beneficiaries’ to recognise that they had done nothing wrong, and to help child soldiers avoid social stigma on return to communities (interview with senior military official, Sri Lanka 17.4.18). It was evident that the child soldiers interviewed were aware of the political importance of their status as victims, as reflected in the type of stories they told me. In several interviews with rehabilitated child soldiers, they described a similar story regarding their forcible abduction, ill treatment by the LTTE, and their efforts to escape. For example, one former girl child soldier told me: I was taken for three days to a camp with my sister, I was 16 years old and my sister was 19 years old. On the same day I was taken, another 50- 70 child soldiers were also forcibly recruited. Many got trapped and were taken by the LTTE under these circumstances. My sister and I made a narrow escape (former girl child soldier, SL 2, 24.4.18).

179

Another former boy child soldier told me: I was forcibly taken from home in 2008, during my studies. I was there [with the LTTE] for one month. During that month, I was injured and put into the medics camp. That time I escaped home. The LTTE frequently came and looked for me at my home, but I hid. I was 17 years old (former boy child soldier, SL 4, Sri Lanka 24.4.18)

In the final two years of the conflict the LTTE engaged in forcible recruitment practices. These statements are not surprising. However, their stories were characterised in the same way: they downplayed their association with the LTTE, including the time they were involved, and emphasised that they were only present in the LTTE for a month or less and made at least one attempt to escape. There was concern and fear evident in the way that former child soldiers framed their stories evidenced by the way they spoke Their families that were present in the interviews often gave the greatest insight into the fear that they and their children felt by making comments during or after the interview to indicate their concern for the on-going safety of their child (see former boy child soldier SL4, 24.4.18, Sri Lanka, section 8.1.3). This suggests that former child soldiers constructed stories to maintain their victim status and to possibly please authorities. As there was no international oversight during the rehabilitation process, it is quite possible that children were told to give a particular story by authorities to the community, or outsiders. Their stories were completely different to the stories of other former child soldiers and adult ex-combatants, many who talked about joining in the final phases because of their duty and belief in the LTTE cause, or who at least felt more positive about their time in the LTTE and were critical of their rehabilitation experiences (former girl child soldier, SL 6, Sri Lanka, 25.5.18)

State authorities emphasised the identity of children as victims through narratives and public relations efforts and their role of the state in saving them, to obscure the more complicated realities that children face because of conflict legacy, including militarisation and Sinhalese political rule. The same senior military official stated that: ‘children were brought back into their life as children…they

180

had lost their childhood, and the most important thing was to give them back their childhood and return them to their families’ (Interview with senior military official, Sri Lanka 17.4.18). According to the official government website, the success of the rehabilitation program was family reunification: Reintegrated and handed over to their parents, relatives or orphanage under the court orders they are now happily living with their families, relatives and kith and kin in their own habitants’ (Government of Sri Lanka 2011)

Throughout the country the government organised public return ceremonies where children were handed back to their families. This provided an important public relations opportunity for the Sri Lankan government to demonstrate that children were being looked after by the state, and to profile the military as a benevolent force working for the people. As outlined in Chapter 4, the idea of returning children back to childhood through a reintegration process is a common narrative used by different stakeholders. Such narratives can be problematic as children’s skills and expertise gained during the conflict are not recognised, including the adult responsibilities they took on. In Sri Lanka’s context, the idea of returning children to their childhood is problematic for different reasons because of the state’s role in the continual subjugation of the Tamil community, sometimes through violent means. Furthermore, UN investigations prove that the military (and other security forces) committed war crimes during the conflict, including instances where they could not uphold relevant children’s rights and protection standards (see Chapter 7).

Even if a Tamil child was not a child soldier during the conflict, their childhood was consistently defined by experiences of conflict, displacement, loss of family and trauma (Somasundaram 2007; Chapter 7). At the end of the conflict, some former child soldiers returned to families, who happily accepted them. But other former child soldiers interviewed lost significant numbers of family members, and continued to experience instability and trauma in their lives as a result (former boy and girl child soldier (husband and wife), SL28, Sri Lanka), 27.4.18). For many child soldiers losing large numbers of family members has ongoing implications for their resources, support and their psychological health.

181

Somasundaram’s research on community mental health outcomes highlights a breakdown in traditional social structures and ways of life, and lower social cohesion resulting from distrust and fear amongst community members (Somasundaram 2007; see as well Somasundaram & Sivayokan 2013). Family violence against children, including child abuse and neglect is also experienced at a greater rate (UNICEF 2013b; Catani et al 2008). Conflict and the on-going militarised context has resulted in fundamental societal transformation, which restricts the degree to which children can receive protection and support from their family and traditional social structures.

This was an important issue mentioned in the interviews. Former LTTE members in general, whether as a child or adult combatant, experience exclusion and marginalisation from the broader community because of their disability, and the security risk they pose to the rest of the Tamil community. Civilian affiliation with former LTTE members is seen by authorities as tacit support of the LTTE movement. In this context, child soldiers are marginalised not because they are ‘child soldiers’ per se. Many former LTTE members have lost limbs and are wearing a prosthetic leg, which usually physically identifies them as former LTTE members. One former girl child soldier explained that because of her prosthetic leg the broader community assumes she is disabled and cannot work properly. She said: Society makes fun of me as I am a disabled person who [they think] is not willing to do anything. But I have the capacity to achieve and have done so in previous years, they don’t know about this. But I’m cornered by society [because she is disabled]. I came by bus and no one offered a seat to me. This is the situation (former girl child soldier, SL 6, 25.4.18, Sri Lanka).

The interviewee was looking for more training to help her move forward and find a better career path in computer science, but was unable to secure the type of training she needed.

182

Secondly, ongoing surveillance by authorities, particularly the Ceylon Investigation Department (CID)48 has created significant divisions within the community. Reconciliation within Tamil communities is not necessarily hampered by poor relations between Tamils themselves, but rather by the divisions that authorities create in their interactions with Tamil society. Tamils can effectively spy on other community members and provide this information to authorities on a paid basis. Community members avoid former LTTE members to keep a low profile from authorities. A female ex-combatant explained that authorities would check up on her by questioning her neighbours about her activities and movements. This created a lot of fear and distrust between her and her neighbours. She told me: After 2017, the Ceylon Investigation Department (CID) investigated me three times by interviewing my neighbours to find out about their relationship to me. But the authorities never directly confronted me. Instead, they came and investigated parallel houses (female ex- combatant, SL9, Sri Lanka, 25.4.18).

The female ex-combatant lives by herself with her daughter, as her husband is still missing. While her extended family lives close by, the distrust that exists between herself and her neighbours makes life difficult and uncomfortable. This is a situation that many other former LTTE members described in interviews.

8.2.2 Child soldiers and state protection

The protection of former child soldiers is conditioned on their performance as loyal citizens of the state, thus creating a structurally dependent relationship between the ‘protector’ and the ‘protected’ (Stiehm 2018). Former child soldiers are expected to perform their role as new citizens of the country by being loyal to Sinhalese rule. One former girl child soldier told me during her rehabilitation experience she was told by a Sri Lankan rehabilitation officer to focus on her studies. When she asked why, he told her: ‘you are a child and have ambition. You are a citizen of this country. Don’t deviate your mind to other things’ (former

183

girl child soldier, SL 1, 24.4.18, Sri Lanka). However, child soldiers, retain a precarious position as citizens, despite the narrative put forward by authorities.

Former child soldiers and their families continue to experience on-going insecurity resulting from militarisation. A number of families sat in on interviews with former child soldiers, who often spoke of their fear for their child’s safety and future. Their concerns often contradicted the child soldier’s positive account of rehabilitation. One former girl child soldier illustrated this tension, stating that: My ambition…is to serve the nation, and to help others. But my parents are concerned about a change in government leadership. What about our safety? Right now we have a informal friendship with a lieutenant, but once he is transferred, my parents have concerns that no one else will look after us (former girl child soldier, SL1 Sri Lanka, 24.4.18).

Her quote highlights the uncertainty resulting from the political situation. The family felt that they could only maintain their protection by having a connection with somebody from the military. After this interview finished, the family asked about how they could send their daughter away as they were fearful of her safety. This was despite the former child soldier’s commitment to serving the nation, as she stated in her interview.

A military official specifically told me that former child soldiers were not under any surveillance (interview with senior military official, Sri Lanka 17.4.18), however, this was contradicted in interviews by some of the former child soldiers. One former boy child soldier explained that authorities continue to visit him to obtain information on his career progress and to check that he has not fled the country. The number of visits has reduced from once a month to once every three months. He told me regarding the visits: ‘in the early days I was scared, but now I’m familiarised with the process’ (former boy child soldier, Jaffna, SL4, Sri Lanka 24.4.18). Although he felt more comfortable with these visits and he assured me that authorities had not mistreated him in anyway, his parents still felt uncomfortable about the surveillance they were subjected to. His mother explained that:

184

I’m a little bit scared of authorities…sometimes we [as parents] tell lies to protect our child. Sometimes I wonder why the authorities always come and ask the parents… it makes me uncomfortable (former boy child soldier interview, Jaffna, SL4, 24.4.18, Sri Lanka)

There remains an uneasy relationship between authorities and child soldiers and their families. Former child soldiers and their families experience a lot of uncertainty and fear about the future. Their lives are dependent upon the position that future governments will take towards controlling the Tamil population.

Another former girl child soldier who went through the rehabilitation process explained to me: The intelligence and army authorities still watch me very closely. They will come every month, sometimes every two weeks to see me. That is the main reason they come and watch me very frequently is the military have some idea that the LTTE plans to reunify. They are trying to stop this happening…Any reunification would be a huge issue for the government. This is why the army and intelligence watches former LTTE cadres closely (former girl child soldier, SL6, Sri Lanka 25.4.18)

This former child soldier had lost her leg, and was still waiting on medical treatment to be fitted properly for a prosthetic leg. Given her physical inability it seemed unreasonable that she would be subjected to continual surveillance in the manner she described.

One former girl child soldier, however, did present a very positive picture of her relationship with authorities through rehabilitation. At one point, she was given an opportunity to meet then President of Sri Lanka with 15 other former child soldiers at a roundtable discussion organised by the military academy. She told the president that the government needs to generate jobs by building factories. She also said to him ‘don’t allow for children like us to get into trouble… we need to have an education’ (former girl child soldier, Sri Lanka, 27.2.18). The same girl child soldier reflected that the reasons Tamils find it hard to reintegrate and have a voice in post conflict Sri Lanka is because they do not know how to speak

185

Sinhalese. She learnt Sinhalese and enjoyed teaching Sinhalese to other young Tamil children. The former girl child soldier indicated that she has strong connections with the Sinhalese authorities. She works for the Civil Service Development (CSD), one of the largest state military enterprises employing former LTTE members, and spoke very highly of the company. For example, she mentioned that when she was married they provided her with wedding gifts, and a loan to buy land. However, I later found out that the Sri Lankan informant that set up this interview and was present while I interviewed this child soldier has a close relationship through family connections to a senior member of the military. Given this context, and the girl’s association with the military run CSD, it would be unlikely that she would say anything particularly critical of the Sri Lankan state. Other former child soldiers indicated through their interviews that they have a more difficult and precarious relationship with state authorities.

Ultimately, the rehabilitation of this small group of child soldiers was done for instrumental reasons in upholding national and international obligations. There is a performative element to the state’s protection of the 594 child soldiers rehabilitated. Any serious concern for their well-being would address the ongoing insecurity and surveillance that some former child soldiers are subjected to, and the broader ex-combatant community, as will be detailed in the next section of the chapter.

8.3 The militarised, masculine state

The other face of the Sri Lankan state is characterised by a masculine, militarised identity to attain sovereign power and control, both symbolically and physically. This is evidenced in the numerous monuments constructed to celebrate victory in the Northern province. Many of these monuments celebrate the Sri Lankan male soldier (Hyndman & De Alwis 2004). Existing feminist research highlights the gendered nature of war and militarisation, which is supported by a close association with masculine roles and norms that devalue feminine roles and norms through hierarchy (Cohn 2013; Enloe 2000). In this section, I argue that state-led acts of violence perpetrated against Tamil

186

communities, in particular male LTTE ex-combatants, are symptomatic of the state’s efforts to maintain control by subjugating and feminising the male ex- LTTE Tamil population. Human rights violations take the form of torture, detention, and enforced disappearances and are systematic in nature. It is important to highlight these experiences as the Sri Lankan state problematically relied upon a victim or perpetrator dichotomy in determining who constituted a security risk to the state. While in theory children were classified as victims, this did not always work in practice, as this next section will demonstrate.

8.3.1 Tamil victims and perpetrators

At the end of the conflict, the Sri Lankan state dealt with LTTE members by using a simplistic dichotomy of victim or perpetrator in assessing who constituted a security risk. In theory children were identified as victims and adult combatants as perpetrators. However, one important caveat emerged during the interviews. Some female ex-combatants mentioned that they surrendered as civilians because Sri Lankan authorities did not judge their participation as significant, nor consider that many women (and girls) fought. For women who surrendered as a civilian this allowed them to demobilise to their communities and avoid potential detention and interrogation, unlike some of their male counterparts (female ex- combatant, SL 14, Sri Lanka, 26.4.18).

The government’s reliance upon the victim or perpetrator dichotomy, however, is problematic upon further scrutiny particularly in relation to child soldiers that were not accounted for in the final phases of the conflict and the rehabilitation process. A former Sri Lankan child protection NGO worker estimates that there were around 6,000 child soldiers at the end of the conflict, with many missing. He explained that there were problems identifying child soldiers due to issues with paperwork. Other children were not returned to their families, and some fled the country (interview with child protection NGO worker 15.5.18, Sri Lanka). A Coalition to Stop Child Soldiers report (2010) published during the time of surrender and rehabilitation also notes that: ‘hundreds of others, including children formerly associated with the LTTE and other armed groups who were

187

recruited as children but are now over 18, are unaccounted for’ (Coalition to Stop Child Soldiers report 2010, 1).

It is highly problematic and concerning that there are many child soldiers unaccounted for, particularly in relation to evidence of war crimes committed by the GoSL in the final phases of the conflict. There are many instances where the state could not have upheld relevant child protection and human rights in line with international humanitarian legal provisions and the UNCRC49. The UN investigation (2011) identified that the Final Offensive aimed to bring about significant destruction of the Tamil population (Darusman et al 2011, 7). One male ex-combatant reflected on this and stated that without intervention by a catholic priest at the time of the LTTE defeat and surrender to the military he does not think he would be alive. In this interview, the male ex-combatant explained that the surrender period took place over a few days at the Mullataivu site. Catholic priests were present to negotiate the surrender terms with the military, including the removal of the sick and wounded from the scene as a priority. He told me that: The military had a hidden agenda to finish everything on the spot. Luckily, I was able to surrender. I was tortured heavily. My fellow colleagues also surrendered to the army in the dark. The military shone a torch, and one by one they brought people to a cleared area. They [the military] then asked former LTTE cadres to let the army know who was LTTE and who wasn’t by pointing to them …many of those people were shot dead, they never came back again (male ex-combatant, SL7(iv), Sri Lanka, 25.4.18)

A report on Sri Lanka’s mass detention of LTTE explains that some children were left in detention and not separated from adults. There was no independent monitoring to ensure that children were systematically separated and, therefore, no way to verify whether appropriate actions were taken to remove children from detention (ICJ 2010). Furthermore, some of the youths I interviewed were taken

49 Specific IHL provisions include the general protection given to children in international or non- international armed conflict regardless of whether they participated in the hostilities, according to the Geneva Convention 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977 (API and APII); and the UNCRC Optional Protocol. 188

into detention, and were only one or two years over the age of 18. One former male youth told me during his rehabilitation program he was investigated by authorities for three months, then he was taken with some of his friends to a forest where they were made to do farming as part of their de-radicalisation process. He told me that he felt like a slave (male ex-combatant, SL13, Sri Lanka 26.4.18). This situation is particularly concerning in Sri Lanka’s context where former LTTE, and alleged supporters remain imprisoned in unknown locations, and in some cases subjected to torture. They have little legal recourse or other resources to challenge their imprisonment (male ex-combatants, SL3, 24.4.18; SL7 (iv), 25.4.18; SL 20 26.4.18, Sri Lanka; ICJ 2010). Some female ex- combatant’s husbands remain missing. The woman and family are still waiting on confirmation of the husband’s whereabouts, and whether he is still alive. The rehabilitation of 594 child soldiers becomes inconsequential in light of the state’s treatment of Tamil communities, the number of civilians killed in the final phases of the conflict, and the number of child soldiers that are unaccounted for.

8.3.2 Adult rehabilitation and state power

For adult ex-combatants, there were even few opportunities for protection during the surrender period and rehabilitation process. At the end of the conflict, approximately 12,000 LTTE combatants were taken to rehabilitation centres (ICJ 2010). While some accessed a one-year rehabilitation programs consisting of vocational training, others were subjected to long periods of detention and ill treatment, including torture and extrajudicial execution (HRW 2013; Sooka 2014; Touquet 2018). In 2011 the Sri Lankan government ended the state of emergency in place since 1971, but introduced new provisions in the Prevention of Terrorism Act that enabled for extended detention of LTTE without charge or trial (Amnesty International 2012).

The maltreatment of adult combatants, or those who missed out on child soldier based rehabilitation programs, reflects a particular character and approach of the Sri Lankan state to weaken the Tamil population by feminising them. One particular egregious example of state led violence against Tamils is

189

systematic torture in detention settings. Acts of systematic torture are not only politically motivated acts, but involve key security sector institutions. A 2015 report by Freedom from Torture found that there is a network of torture facilities by the Sri Lankan military, police and intelligence services (Freedom from Torture 2015). Sooka (2014) explains that: These widespread and systematic violations by the Sri Lankan security forces… occur in a manner that indicates a coordinated, systematic plan approved by the highest levels of government. Members of the Sri Lankan security forces are secure in the knowledge that no action will be taken against them (Sooka 2014, 6).

Female ex-combatants were also detained and tortured like men. However, human rights organisations continue to document systematic torture that typically involves sexual violence against men and boys (Sooka 2014; Freedom from Torture 2015; HRW 2013). The targeting of men and boys in often very sexual terms not only dehumanises those subjected to this treatment, but also feminises them and undermines their ability to perform their social roles as men, fathers, and economic providers. Some men interviewed were unable to conceive children because of injuries, or medication given to them during their detention period (male ex-combatant SL6 (ii), Sri Lanka, 25.4.18). The mental and physical effects upon men also have implications in terms of their ability to uphold their role as ‘men’ in the community and within the family. Another older male ex- combatant, who joined in the last phases of the war suffered from nerve damage resulting from torture, which prevented him from working.. He explained that his wife was traumatised by their experiences with authorities, and their youngest daughter had a serious shelling accident to her brain and needed medical treatment that they could not afford. His elderly parents in law were trying their best to earn money for the family (male ex-combatant SL22, Sri Lanka, 26.4.18). The end result of these actions by the state continues to drive fear into the community, but also demonstrate the power of the state and its ability to give or take life.

One male ex-combatant, who was held in prison for ten years without charge, explained his experience with torture.

190

At various times, different people did different acts of torture on me, like hitting, undressing, putting stones in my bottom, chilli paste in eyes…These are the various acts of torture I faced in the last ten years. I went through nearly 300 instances of torture, and I’m surprised I’m still alive. I also have vision problems now. Once they finished torturing me I went to jail where the torture was 70% less. They still mentally tortured us, like undressing and humiliating us...Most of the former LTTE members have serious disease because of no food, and backbone problems because of heavy hitting. They can’t bend over properly. They have kidney stones because they only drank salty water [during imprisonment]. Some have nerve problems. They still use petrol bags. All of this was going on up until I was released [in 2018] (male ex-combatant, SL3, Sri Lanka 24.4.18)

Existing research on torture highlights that it is a method not just used to obtain information, but is an exercise of power that is politically driven. In Hernawan’s (2015) research on torture used by Indonesian authorities against West Papuans, torture is used as a tool of state coercion and dominance to express sovereign power. This is based upon a coercive governance, which he defines as: ‘state coercion in which the state resorts to force to build a society and to construct a structure of political domination that extends into all parts of the country’ (Hernawan 2015, 198; Foucault 1991). Sri Lanka represents a very different geographical context and the acts of torture that have occurred have taken place hidden away from public view, which contrasts to West Papua where torture takes place in the open as a ‘spectacle’. However, Hernawan’s analysis is helpful in analysing Sri Lanka’s context. Those that managed to leave detention and survive acts of torture are often physically and mentally scarred. The physical embodiment of their experiences thus acts as a reminder to the community of the Sri Lankan state’s power and authority over the Tamil population.

The state’s maltreatment of male ex-combatants is problematic for many reasons. Another reason is that a child soldier’s reintegration process is only sustained within a broader environment of human rights, and political and social

191

freedom. The quality of life experienced by child soldiers is intimately linked to the survival and growth of the broader Tamil community. The state’s ongoing efforts to subjugate sections of the Tamil population ultimately undermine their obligations to promote peace and security (see CRC preamble, for example). Most concerning is the whereabouts of many other child soldiers or children affected by the conflict who were not captured in formal rehabilitation programs or other protection programs.

8.4 Girls, women and the militarised state

In this next section, I focus on girl child soldiers’ ‘informal’ reintegration beyond rehabilitation, to analyse the role of gendered social norms in shaping their return process. Within feminist scholarship, reintegration of girls and women to civilian life is considered more difficult because reintegration is a gendered experience (Denov et al 2016; MacKenzie 2012). Broadly speaking, the two main issues that women and girls face relate to the social consequences of transgressing traditional gendered norms, which often manifests in stigma and marginalisation. Secondly, the personal gains they made during the conflict are often lost on return given the social pressure to conform to social practices, particularly regarding marriage (Kohrt 2016; Tonheim 2014; Burman & McKay 2007). To some degree this is reflected in the interviews. In the Sri Lankan context, gendered reintegration experiences are mediated by religion and local cultural practices, as Tamils are predominantly Hindu.

A child protection activist described former girl child soldiers as having: ‘stepped outside of the circle, they were the bad ones. The community are ashamed of them’ (child protection government representative, Sri Lanka, 8.3.17). Avoiding shame is central to the subject position of girls in Tamil culture. According to De Alwis, gendered expectations of girls and boys’ behaviour centres on the concept lajja-baya. A boy is trained to be responsive to fear (baya) and girls are responsive to shame (lajja)(De Alwis 1997). However, reintegration experiences for former girl child soldiers is complicated and depends upon their identity and personal standing in relation to family and community. While many negotiate on- going social stigma, the extent of this is dependent upon many factors, including

192

their age, family acceptance, current role in society and marriage status, and ability to meet family and community expectations.

In the post conflict era, girls and women’s marriage eligibility remain important in supporting their social status, and highlights De Alwis’ analysis of the girl child’s subject position of shame. The ongoing militarisation of the Northern and Eastern provinces continues to create insecurities for women and girls, including the growth of female prostitution, and there are reports of women and girls being raped or sexually abused by military personnel or other officials in random attacks (Davies & True 2017; De Alwis 2014; Ground views 2013; Tambiah 2004; University Teachers for Human Rights 2001). The most recent UN Secretary General’s report on conflict-related sexual violence in relation to Tamil women states that: ‘those displaced from conflict lead highly circumscribed lives in militarised zones, such as in northern Sri Lanka, due to an ever-present threat of sexual assault’ (OHCHR 2016). For LTTE women and girls, the Tamil community continues to express concern that women and girls transgressed moral codes around premarital virginity by interacting with male LTTE members, outside of marriage. Indeed, sociocultural expectations about marriage played out in some of the interviews with former girl child soldiers. One former girl child soldier said that: People don’t have a clear picture in their minds. They think that boys and girls were mixed in detention camps. People have questioned me about whether I lost my virginity before marriage. That’s why marriage is a problem for female cadres as they cannot marry freely. I don’t have much experience because I met my husband early on. And there are no issues with my family-in law’ (former girl child soldier, SL26, Sri Lanka, 27.4.18).

In contrast, being widowed or an unmarried woman is considered by the community as bad luck, and can result in the marginalisation of a woman from public life. An ICG (2011) report explains that Tamil culture continues to value the sumangali – a married woman whose husband is still alive – above all other women.

193

For unmarried girl child soldiers, it was evident in the interviews that a future marriage was important to them and their families. Marriage conforms to social and familial expectations helping the former child soldier to ‘fit in’, but being a former child soldier could potentially impact a girl’s marriage prospects, as was highlighted in one interview. I will tell people if asked, but I don’t want to make an issue of it…I don’t want to make a public announcement. But being a former child soldier could be an issue [for future marriage prospects], so I want to keep that quiet (former girl child soldier SL 2, Sri Lanka, 24.4.18).

This former girl child soldier, therefore, used an ‘identity management’ strategy (Anderson 2018) to protect her and her family from future difficulties in finding a husband because of her former identity as a child soldier. The girl’s mother said that she needs to organise a dowry and marriage for both of her daughters. It was, therefore, important to maintain a good reputation in the community (former girl child soldier interview, SL2, Sri Lanka, 24.4.18).

Marriage, particularly in poorer rural areas, can result in traditional practices of the woman being confined to the domestic sphere. Recent research on the place of Sri Lankan women highlights that women still remain subordinate to men in decision making in family settings, and employment standings (Herath 2015). Caste and ethnicity are important determinants of women’s standings. An NGO worker suggested that in the post conflict era the issue of caste and ethnicity feature more prominently in negotiating marriage arrangements (interview with NGO worker, Sri Lanka, 20.3.18). Women from poorer, rural areas have less ability to challenge traditional patriarchal social relations and can experience more restrictions around education and employment opportunities (Jeyasankar & Ganhewa 2018). However, on the other hand marriage remains important for girl child soldiers (and women) to protect them from social stigma. While marriage can result in less freedom and opportunities for women, in this specific context it also provides an important pathway in gaining social acceptance within the Tamil community more broadly.

194

There are other important issues that former girl child soldiers face in their lives. Many have significant caring responsibilities for children and/or husbands, particularly in cases where their husbands are severely disabled. One girl child soldier interviewed was the sole carer of her husband (former boy child soldier), who was paraplegic. Their families were killed during the conflict. They explained it was difficult to earn money as she needed to look after her husband and also because she only had one leg, which limited her physical capacity to do farm work and manual labour. Husband: It is very difficult for my wife to go out and work because of my disability. If I go to the toilet, she isn’t there to clean up the mess. That’s why the outside people [community] don’t want to talk to me because of my disability. If she goes for daily wages on a regular basis, she has to return early to look after me. Wife: There is no one to look after him, I’m always thinking about my husband…(former boy and girl child soldier (husband and wife), SL28 Sri Lanka), 27.4.18).

Like this couple, many other families contend with disabilities, illnesses, and incapacity to work. Disabilities are not just the result of the conflict, but some of the men interviewed had been extensively tortured. One young man, who was married to a former girl child soldier, was petrol bagged50 during his time in detention and lost vision in one eye, and was lucky to have retained 50% vision in his other eye. He relies upon his brother in-law to bring home money for everyday life (male ex-combatant, SL 8, Sri Lanka, 25.4.18). In a situation where there are no public health services like nurses or other support services to help with the needs of disabled family members, Tamil communities face extraordinary challenges in surviving on a daily basis.

It is worth noting that there are other categories of women, who face even more extreme hardships and navigate a far more complicated life than some of the former girl child soldiers interviewed in this research. Some former girl child soldiers were not able to return to families, or some may have become ‘female ex-combatants’ by the time the conflict ended. The category of female ex-

50 Petrol bagging is a torture method where a sack that contains petrol is placed over the head of an individual to induce asphyxiation. 195

combatant typically includes women who are unmarried, widowed, who have husbands missing, or who have left their husband because of domestic violence. Some of the key issues they face include dealing with substantial disabilities (Krishnan 2012) with very little social and medical support. They also experience more social stigma, and some have resorted to prostitution to survive (interview with NGO worker, Sri Lanka 20.3.18; see also Tambiah 2005). Women, who are female heads of households (FHH) is an important example. A FHH is defined as a woman who is the main income earner and decision maker of the household. In 2013, the Sri Lankan government estimated a total of 1.1 million FHH out of 5.2 million families in Sri Lanka (Government of Sri Lanka 2013), with the highest number residing in the former conflict zones (Jeyasankar 2015, 1). These women face social discrimination because of their marriage status, but they also fulfil the social and economic role of a man in their dealings with militarised state apparatus. Thus, they experience a double victimisation in both the public and private sphere (Singh 2017, 231). One widowed female ex-combatant reflected: Because I lost my husband, all of society will neglect me. That’s my main issue. The second thing is when I go to any meetings with officials they never take my opinion seriously. If I share my knowledge or experience they will make fun of me (female ex-combatant SL 33, Sri Lanka, 27.4.18).

In this research, female ex-combatants frequently reflected on the difficulties of dealing with government authorities as a woman . Tamils are required to deal extensively with government authorities and seek permission in order to process administrative tasks related to their lives. This includes accessing NGO support, housing, income generation, business permits, travel approval, and disability support. Another unmarried female ex-combatant explained to me that authorities would deliberately draw out application processes needlessly to access government resources and services. This particular female ex-combatant needed a disabled toilet installed as she had lost her leg during a shelling attack. She explained the difficulty of her dealings with officials: If I push too much for these things, the government will threaten me by coming to my home. I can’t push too much; I can only talk quietly. Can you

196

please give it to me? This sort of talk they expect (female ex-combatant, SL29, Sri Lanka, 27.4.18).

This female ex-combatant lived by herself with her mother as the rest of their family had been killed in a shelling attack. She had only one leg and was limited in movement. During her time in the LTTE she was trained as a nurse, but was unable to utilise her skills now and had faced discrimination on account of her disability in previous jobs. Of course, men would perhaps face the same difficulties with government authorities, but as a woman alone and without any protection her treatment by authorities would be intimidating. She also spoke about her concern with safety and that as a woman she did not have the same freedom of movement she had before.

In sum, this section first began by outlining the gendered experiences of return to demonstrate that women and girls navigate a far trickier social and cultural landscape in meeting community expectations as women compared to men. However, their experiences of shame are complicated and are not solely shaped by their previous identity as a girl child soldier or female combatant. As I showed, the ability of the woman (as a former girl child soldier or ex-combatant) to manage shame depends largely on their family protection, age, and marriage potential. These experiences were variable for all the women I interviewed. As well, on going militarisation creates additional insecurities for particularly groupings of women, such as women who are FHH, who are unmarried, or who live without family support.

8.5 Conclusion

This chapter argued that there are two faces to the Sri Lankan state based upon the paternal, protector identity, and the militarised, masculine identity. Both identities worked in tandem to support the Sri Lankan state’s efforts to build and consolidate authority and power in the post conflict era. The state’s protection regime of children served a political and ideological purpose, rather than truly focusing on the well being of former child soldiers. As a result, former child

197

soldiers continue to negotiate a complicated relationship with the state, resulting in their on-going fear and insecurity. An analysis of the militarised, masculine state was used to highlight the problematic usage of victim or perpetrator by state authorities in assessing security risks. While children in theory were assigned the victim status, in practice this did not always work. In the final section, I applied a gendered lens to analyse the social reintegration experiences of former girl child soldiers. Social norms centred on their role as women and potential wives are important features of their reintegration experience. However, it is important to keep in mind that female experiences of vulnerability often transcend categories of ‘girl’ or ‘women’ and are dependent upon a variety of factors including caste, ethnicity, social and economic status, and family protection, as was demonstrated in the final section.

198

Chapter 9: Conclusion

This thesis argued that there exists an important connection between a child soldier’s reintegration outcome and the national political context regarding the legacy of conflict. For a former child soldier, reintegration is more than just the transition from a military identity to civilian one. The transition to a civilian identity is a multifaceted and complicated process related to a child’s experience of the child soldier identity in a post conflict environment. My analysis of the child soldier identity positioned this experience within a dynamic international/local process of interaction, rather than being a binary, ‘either or’ experience. The child soldier identity either given to former child soldiers through international and national-based programs (such as reintegration programs), or adopted by individual children themselves, takes on a political meaning in relation to on- going national projects focused on peace, justice, human rights, and democracy, which remain contested in Nepal and Sri Lanka between the ruling government and the local population. The broader political environment structures the possibilities for children’s agency, their political participation, and ability to rebuild their adult lives. Importantly, the child soldier identity provides insight into the on-going legacy of conflict, as demonstrated by the stories and narratives of former child soldiers, who participated in this research.

The political context of post conflict settings creates the context from which former child soldiers generate meaning around their own social identity, their place in relation to family and community, and as citizens in relation to state. In Sri Lanka rehabilitating authorities used the child soldier identity to build and strengthen state legitimacy and control. In Nepal, the child soldier identity was imposed upon children during the DDR process, which disempowered children as political agents through their separation from the rest of the adult combatants, and the peace process itself. The child soldier identity is also a dynamic concept. While it is often imposed upon children, former child soldiers can be strategic and use their identity to create their owns paths of political agency. This is demonstrated in Nepal where former child soldiers continue to build a social

199

justice and welfare campaign by creating links with international partners by utilising the international child soldier identity to support their victimhood status.

In the two case studies the empirical findings and analysis was structured by a three level approach: i) individual experiences of the child soldier identity, ii) family and community relationships, and iii) state-level political analysis. In this way, I paid attention to the way that reintegration experiences are structured in a ‘bottom up’ and ‘top down’ sense. In Nepal, the empirical findings demonstrated that the child soldier identity imposed on former child soldiers by international stakeholders had negative implications for former child soldiers, who were victimised through their reintegration experience. This is primarily because they were disqualified and received far less monetary compensation than adult ex- combatants. While being a Maoist child soldier enabled them to exercise limited agency by challengingexisting marginalisation, this experience of agency was diminished by multiple factors relating to identity and the social reintegration process. In analysing their post conflict return process, I applied a lens of division to analyse the social and political consequences that define child soldier marginalisation from society and from their former senior Maoist leaders through politics and peace building. They returned to a society that had largely not embraced the social reform project espoused by the CPN-M movement, which lead to further social dislocation of former child soldiers. In analysing their family and community return, I argued that the conflict fundamentally changed the generational dynamic between child and family. Normally a family would oversee important milestones that define a childhood to adulthood transition, such as marriage, employment, but this practice could not continue during the conflict. This has on-going implications for former child soldiers in rebuilding key relationships with their families and communities. Finally, I looked at the Peace Envisioners organisation. The work of former child soldiers to address social welfare and justice concerns demonstrates their ability to exercise political agency by promoting a narrative that links into international understanding of the child soldier as a victim. Former child soldiers have utilised Nepal’s political justice context to create a profile that centres on powerful concepts like victimhood and childhood to create international linkages, which demonstrates their awareness of the political utility of such concepts.

200

In Sri Lanka, state authorities used the child soldier identity to build state legitimacy and power. Children rehabilitated by authorities, therefore, became important political subjects of the state, which was described in official narratives as ‘children of the nation’. The Sri Lankan state presented itself in paternal, fatherly terms. Thus, I argued that the rehabilitation programs were instrumental in purpose to meet state-security objectives. While former child soldiers benefit from greater protection from authorities than others former LTTE members, this is conditioned on their performance as a loyal citizen to state. The state’s protection regime of children served a political, ideological purpose, rather than truly focusing on the well being of former child soldiers. As a result, former child soldiers continue to negotiate a complicated relationship with the state, resulting in their on-going fear and insecurity. The second face of the Sri Lankan state is characterised by a militarised, masculine state. Both state based identities work in tandem to support the Sri Lanka’s states efforts to build and consolidate authority and power in the post conflict era. The militarised masculine state primarily asserts control and power by targeting some male ex-combatants for torture and detention, which is sometimes sexual in nature. In this way, the state is able to feminise Tamil men and assert its masculine identity. I argued that the state problematically used a victim or perpetrator label in determining which members of the LTTE were a security risk. While children in theory were assigned the victim status, in practice this did not always work. There is clear evidence from UN investigations and other human rights groups that the Final Offensive carried out by the Sri Lankan government aimed to bring about the destruction of the Tamils, which included children.

Furthermore, there are many other former child soldiers who remained unaccounted for. These issues are important and undermine the official narrative presented by authorities regarding the successful rehabilitation of former child soldiers. Finally, I applied a gendered lens to the militarised setting and the specific insecurities that girls and women contend with. The preservation of a female’s virginity status continues to shape marriage practices. The issue of marriage was frequently discussed in interviews and provides an important pathway in gaining social acceptance for former girl child soldiers. However, I

201

argued that some of the younger girl child soldiers were able to protect themselves from some of the social and economic issues that other categories of women contend with.

9.1 Social reintegration

Social reintegration was a central theme highlighted in interviews with former child soldiers, particularly in relation to their efforts to rebuild connections and relationships with their families and communities. Indeed, the contribution of this research was to highlight a South Asian perspective on child soldiering return experiences in relation to intersecting social identities of caste, ethnicity, religion, gender and childhood. Social identities are important in analysing a child soldier’s informal, social return process as it is these identities that former child soldiers negotiate in relation to family and community in order to meet expectations and fulfil their social status. Social status was a key theme particularly highlighted in the Nepal research. The conflict fundamentally changed the generational dynamic between children and their family due to their separation caused by the conflict. The social changes that some of the child soldiers embraced during the conflict were at odds with their family and community’s values and beliefs. In Sri Lanka, children were still expected to conform to existing social norms, but the insecurity and fear that former child soldiers and their families experience resulting from on-going militarisation in the former conflict zones is more of a defining issue in their lives.

Social reintegration was also used as an analytical tool to highlight girls’ reintegration experience as shaped by gendered social norms and structures. In both Nepal and Sri Lanka, former girl child soldiers were generally subjected to greater social criticism for being part of an armed group and continue to deal with community perceptions that they transgressed appropriate boundaries regarding sexuality. For many former girl child soldiers, marriage prospects remain an on- going concern. Marriage continues to provide an important pathway to social acceptance and protection. However, it is important to note that there are different categories of girls and women who suffer more from social criticism, state marginalisation, and poverty. In Sri Lanka, women who are FHH or

202

unmarried women are afforded far less protection because they do not have a family unit to protect them, compared to some of the younger former girl child soldiers. There is an assumption that child soldiers suffer more in conflict and post conflict settings in scholarship and policy analysis (Machel 1996). However, my research demonstrated that child soldiers, who have a successful return to families have an opportunity to re-build their lives in private, and can use different identity management strategies to avoid some of the social criticism that other categories of women may confront. These are important issues particularly in international policy terms in describing the vulnerabilities of women and girls, such as the Women Peace and Security Agenda 1325(2000)(WPS). Of course, there are situations where girls are more vulnerable, such as child marriage for instance. But it is important to critically assess how the category of ‘women’ and ‘girls’ are applied in policy making, as it is context specific and it can change.

It is also important to note that while reintegration is a gendered experience that tends to disadvantage girls, gendered norms and roles plays out in complicated ways for boy child soldiers too. This could be in relation to the social status of boy child soldiers, who cannot always meet social expectations of being a man because of their poor employment and education prospects. In Sri Lanka, the masculine identity of the state relies upon the feminisation of former LTTE male ex-combatants to assert authority and power. The targeting of some men for torture, which can be sexual in nature, and the nature of injuries suffered by some men during torture and/or detention makes it difficult for them to fulfil their role as male heads of households in terms of employment, physical ability, and ability to conceive children.

9.2 Agency and victimhood

Children’s agency and victimhood are central themes identified in the child soldiering literature and in the broader CIR scholarship. In the specific context of child soldiering, the idea of children as victims is problematic for many reasons. While it serves to support the international advocacy agenda, from an analytical perspective it provides a limited framework for understanding the ways that

203

former child soldiers experience their identity socially and politically as a former child soldier. This identity experience is multifaceted and complicated. The idea that child soldiers as victims does not necessarily help or aid child soldiers upon their return to society as they are not necessarily viewed in this way by their families or even within formal transitional justice mechanisms. In Nepal, the Maoists peacefully transitioned to politics, but they were criticised within society for causing a decade-long war in which they achieved very little change in accordance with the stated aims of the movement (Chapter 6, sections 6.1-6.2). The social reputation of many former child soldiers suffered as a result. Furthermore, some families are critical of their children for not returning with compensation and their inability to meet certain family standards related to employment outcomes and social status.

Secondly, the idea of a victim in post conflict contexts is political and is typically related to transitional justice mechanisms and narratives that establish who is a victim and who is not. In Nepal, being a child does not guarantee the application of victim status, as is demonstrated by former child soldiers, who are not officially recognised as victims through the transitional justice process despite their efforts to formally petition the transitional justice body. Official recognition of a victim is often tied to support and backing of an international organisation and victim advocacy movements (Selim 2017). As Selim’s (2017) research demonstrates within society there exist different opinions about who should be considered a victim or not. While some members of society consider former Maoist combatants as victims because of the marginalisation they contend with, others do not. The former child soldiers in this research certainly presented themselves as victims, but this is not a view that is necessarily supported by their families or other community members.

In Sri Lanka, the government played an active role in determining and defining which sections of the population should be considered victims. For example, at the end of the conflict, then President Rajapaska made it clear that the Sinhalese civilian population were the primary victims of the LTTE terrorist activity, by stating that: ‘the Tamils as special victims of the LTTE and the Sinhalese as the ‘‘real’’ victims of the LTTE’ (Schubert, 2013, 11). This was also evident in the

204

LLRC’s terms of reference, which focused on addressing the government’s role in better protecting its population, rather than addressing issues of war crimes and accountability. Former child soldiers rehabilitated by the state represent a special group of victims in that their status as victims is politically expedient to legitimise Sinhalese state authority.

Children’s agency is complicated, and the form of agency exercised by child soldiers through both their conflict and reintegration experiences vary. Recent discussions in CIR scholarship illustrate some of the different forms of agency evident in relation to children’s actions in terms of survival, resilience, political agency or everyday actions to survive. In the context of child soldiering research, the scholarship predominately focuses on children’s ability to survive their immediate surroundings, as ‘tactical agents’ (Honwana 2005; 2011). While their actions do not necessarily equate to transforming their existing settings, it importantly highlights children’s ability to survive, to be adaptive and resilient, and to cope with very difficult circumstances. This was demonstrated in the interviews done for this research where some children described their efforts to escape the armed group, or even the battles they survived. However, within the child soldiering literature there is a strong focus on children’s agency in relation to immediate experiences of violence in conflict settings, rather than their experiences post conflict from a longer-term perspective (for exception see Denov 2010).

My research deliberately addressed child soldiers’ reintegration experiences by analysing both conflict and post conflict experiences. The exercise of agency is shaped in a temporal sense in relation to particular events and moments of time. Some of the factors identified included the aims and conduct of the armed movement, the ability of child soldiers to negotiate family and community expectations centred on their social roles and expectations, and the political actions taken by children in post conflict setting. It is also worth mentioning that both the LTTE and CPN-M sought to challenge social, political and economic marginalisation and this fundamentally shaped children’s experiences of conflict. For some former child soldiers, the ideological goals of the respective armed

205

movement supported child soldiers in aiming for a larger goal that transcended the daily fighting and the hardships they faced.

In Nepal, many of the child soldiers came to support the ideological goals of the Maoists in transforming Nepal, socially, economically and politically. They exercised political agency as their participation was defined in these terms, rather than in simple instrumental terms of being recruited to the Maoists to bolster troop numbers. For this reason, reintegration has been so hard as their lives are no longer shaped by a bigger cause and purpose, which defined their childhood/youth. In their post conflict lives, they now contend with many hardships related to their poor employment prospects, responsibilities of looking after their own families, and social marginalisation. Their social dislocation to mainstream society exacerbates these hardships.

In Sri Lanka, a generational divide is evident in narratives given by the older generation of ex-combatants, who were typically recruited as child soldiers, and younger child soldiers recruited in the final phases of the conflict. The older generation of ex-combatants not only joined the LTTE because of survival, but also because they supported the LTTE, which provided a source of protection from the violence and destruction of their communities. While the LTTE did not have such revolutionary goals like the CPN-M in transforming society, the LTTE nonetheless provided a way forward for many Tamils to have a better life through the creation of an independent homeland. The older generation of LTTE members experienced the LTTE when it was at its height in terms of strength and cohesion as a movement. This is evident in their interviews where many detailed their on-going support and the belief in the former LTTE. For the younger child soldiers recruited in the final stages of the conflict, the LTTE were desperate for recruits and likely knew that they could not be victorious against the government in the final phases of the conflict.

This research also demonstrates that child soldiers are dynamic and agentive actors who display resilience in the face of social, economic and political injustices, and can actively use the child soldier identity to challenge existing peace and justice narratives. This is particularly demonstrated in Nepal where

206

former child soldiers continue to engage with international stakeholders by using the international child soldier identity to gain support in developing a campaign for social justice. I suggested that there is a definitive shift in their narratives, which is in part driven by the political agenda of Peace Envisioners.

9.3 Deconstructing the child soldier identity

The contribution of this thesis is to identify and capture the multiple and fluid experiences of being a child soldier as documented throughout this thesis. I argued that the international child soldier identity problematically homogenises a child’s experience of child soldiering by focusing on children’s victimhood and their lack of agency. This is because the international child soldier identity is shaped by contemporary constructions of childhood that are politicised by the protection ethic evident in international narratives and policies (Lee-Koo 2018a). In contrast, the child soldier identity as experienced in a local, national setting is varied and complex, and is relational and informed by social context, including relationships with family and community members, previous affiliation to a particular armed group, and the state’s position towards children. In Nepal, the child soldier identity is viewed in negative terms by society because former child soldiers are affiliated with the former CPN-M movement, and their disqualification status. In Sri Lanka, former LTTE members in general, whether as a child or adult combatant, experience exclusion and marginalisation from the broader Tamil community because of their disability, and the security risk they pose to the rest of the Tamil community, rather than because they are a ‘child soldier’ per se.

Another problem related to the child soldier identity is that it only captures one aspect of a child’s conflict and post conflict experience. In Sri Lanka, many former child soldiers grew up experiencing militarisation, displacement and the destruction of their community. Childhood experiences were more significantly shaped by these experiences, rather than their specific child soldiering experience, which only encompassed a small amount of time. Furthermore, while the ‘child soldier’ was the focus of the data collection, I found it hard at times to distinguish who was a child soldier or an adult combatant. Former child soldiers do not necessarily identify themselves as one, or in other cases children were

207

recruited as child soldiers but became adult combatants by the end of the conflict. I found that children who identified themselves as a ‘child soldier’ often did so because they were labelled a child soldier through formal reintegration programs, or because they wanted to make a political statement regarding their victimhood status. In contrast, a child, who self-demobilised, was less likely to identify as a child soldier. Other times, interviewees were labelled child soldiers for instrumental and political reasons, as demonstrated in Sri Lanka. These tensions are not extensively reflected upon in the critical scholarship on child soldiering, despite its merits in supporting this research. I deliberately captured different individual experiences through fieldwork, regardless of whether an individual identified as a child soldier. Going forward, child soldiering scholarship needs to engage more fully with these complexities in conducting empirical research. Indeed, as Macmillan argues, the child soldier is a multi-layered construct, rather than a singular problem. He states, there are: ‘complex layers of inequality and exploitation and different forms of responsibility and accountability that are implicated in the participation of children in warfare throughout time and space’ (MacMillan 2019, 514).

Despite these limitations, the child soldier category is still useful, particularly as an international advocacy tool in upholding child protection and children’s rights standards in conflict and post conflict settings. From a research perspective, the ‘child soldier’ identity provides an opening into the complex lives of children as they negotiate conflict and peace settings. When researching child soldiering, researchers need to be more mindful that the child soldier as discussed in international terms is a social construct, just like the term ‘ex-combatant’ (see McMullin’s discussion, 2013, 21-23). Therefore, there are limitations in capturing children’s varied experiences, related to agency, and their negotiation of social and political situations. Furthermore, there are important distinctions to be made between a child soldier and adult combatant, not just in relation to questions of international law/human rights, but in relation to their social status as children or adults on return. An analysis of childhood and other intersecting identities is important in understanding child soldiers’ reintegration experience.

208

9.4 Child soldiers, reintegration and peace

This research established an important connection between reintegration and the politics of post conflict settings, related to key political and social developments defining state rule and state-society relations. Existing research on reintegration demonstrates that ex-combatants and former child soldiers return back to a society that is still undergoing a war to peace transition. Reintegration programs problematically rely upon the idea that ex-combatants can return to a normal existence, but it takes time to re-build social cohesion, and institutions needed for a functioning, stable society. This research, through a political analysis of Nepal and Sri Lanka’s post conflict setting, demonstrates that in a national setting, efforts to build peace, address justice and reconciliation are often incomplete, contentious projects as there continues to exist significant divisions between national and local experiences of these concepts. This analysis highlights the legacy of conflict as an on-going issue that continues to impact state and society relations, and the reintegration outcomes of former child soldiers. As Millar (2014) explains, international stakeholders tend to assume that formal institutional mechanisms and programs will facilitate a particular local experience of justice, reconciliation, and empowerment. However, individuals have varying experiences in response to those institutions, processes and practices, which can be quite different to the original intentions of institutions. This analysis also applies in national led efforts to implement similar projects.

An analysis of national contexts needs to account for the nature of state rule and governance, relating to both historical state formation and the on-going dominance of particular social groups that hold positions of political power. In Nepal, this is based on caste and ethnicity, and in Sri Lanka the Sinhalese ethnic group continue to politically dominate the Tamils and Muslims. Given the dominance of particular groupings within society in holding political power, efforts to build peace and address justice and reconciliation through national projects can be hampered by individuals, who wish to avoid accountability or who do not want to engage in a genuine conflict resolution dialogue with their constituents. This limits the extent to which the local population benefits from such projects,

209

and/or individuals can have different ideas of what is important regarding justice, peace. The on-going division between national efforts and local expectations impacts everyday experiences in terms of belonging, citizenship, and social- economic security. Reintegration conceptualised in this way, accounts not only for an individual identity transition from a military to civilian identity, but also accounts for the way that post conflict settings continue to structure reintegration outcomes. Thus, this research finds that reintegration outcomes are shaped by the quality and level of peace experienced by former child soldiers, their families and communities as an everyday lived experience (Mac Ginty 2014; Roberts 2011).

The national and local divide is evident in both cases. In Nepal, the transitional justice process continues to avoid thornier issues of investigating human rights violations, such as sexual violence, and the idea of the victim in the transitional justice context is politicised. Many of the former child soldiers have on-going concerns related to achieving socio-economic justice and their on-going marginalisation from politics and formal peace building efforts. They continue to experience both social and political marginalisation, which makes their reintegration process difficult. In Sri Lanka, the state has failed to engage seriously in dialogue with Tamils at the end of the conflict in an effort to control Tamil population. While President Mahinda Rajapaska superficially engaged with ideas of reconciliation between different ethnic groups, he failed to establish political reconciliation and dialogue between the Sinhalese dominated state and its Tamil population. Sri Lanka’s Tamil population lived under militarised rule creating fear and insecurity in the day to day lives of former child soldiers, their families and communities.

9.5 Final reflections

The stories presented through the thesis paint a negative picture about child soldier reintegration experiences. Indeed, in the post conflict era, former child soldiers continue to navigate social and political exclusions on multiple levels, including in national politics, their family relationships, and in meeting social

210

expectations. The challenge of transitioning to an adult, civilian life after experiencing conflict is a great challenge that these former child soldiers continue to confront. However, it is worth noting that many child soldiers fared better than some other groups of war affected children through their rehabilitation process. Child soldiers who were rehabilitated did receive resources that other children did not such as access to education and vocational training, and even small amounts of compensation in some cases. Some other categories of war children are captured in NGO work and other program delivery services, but such programs are often delivered in the context of delivering resources or services to the family unit or broader community, or they do not comprehensively target multiple facets of children’s lives. At least this was an observation made during fieldwork in both countries. For example, in Sri Lanka, Oxfam runs a program targeting FHH livelihood options, which in turn would help their children through income generation. War Child in Sri Lanka also deliver psychosocial programs targeting children by building family and community support structures (War Child 2021). A child soldier formally rehabilitated accesses a more individual focused rehabilitation program that consists of multiple components: education, vocational, psychosocial and family reunification services. Some of the NGOs and other officials, who looked after child soldiers during the rehabilitation/reintegration process continue to maintain some contact to follow up on their well being. Even in Sri Lanka where the militarised context continues to create deep-seated fear and insecurity for former child soldiers, the child soldiers rehabilitated by authorities accessed greater employment options and protection from the state. The ability of former child soldiers to access some level of protection from the state means a lot in a context where many others are violently dealt with by the state.

While it is important theoretically and empirically to focus on the child soldier, there are still other important groups of war affected children to research, and even other situations of violence like mass atrocity and genocide that are currently not accounted for in the CAAC agenda. The CAAC agenda conceptualisation of children affected by political violence is limited. In the context of mass atrocity Jacob argues that there is a need to develop ‘child- centric protection architecture for periods of mass atrocities comparable to the

211

CAAC agenda’ (Jacob 2018, 91). The disproportionate research and policy focus on the child soldier over other groups of children means that other children miss out on supporting and funding, particularly in the NGO sector (Carpenter 2007) Furthermore, children’s lives and their social experiences of conflict and post conflict settings are usually more complex than can be encapsulated by the label of ‘child soldier’. A child could experience multiple vectors of vulnerability, not just related to their child soldier status, but perhaps as refugee, IDP, or as a girl child soldier who has been trafficked. Some of the former girl child soldiers experience greater hardships now compared to their previous lives as child soldiers. In Nepal, some of the former girl soldiers live in rural areas with their children, and their husband is abroad working. They have little in the way of support and life is hard. This is not to say that child soldiers should not be studied, but there is a need to think more broadly about the difficulties that children face by acknowledging the limitations of the child soldier category.

Child soldiering remains an issue worldwide. There are 30,000 verified cases of child soldier recruitment in 17 countries, with analysis indicating an upward trend in child soldier recruitment between 2012-2017 (Child Soldiers International 2019). In 2016, child soldiers were recruited in countries like Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Myanmar, Sudan, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Mali and Colombia (Child Soldiers International 2016) in both armed forces and armed groups. As an international policy issue, child soldiering is complicated. It remains difficult to verify exact numbers because of access issues and the political instability that continues to exist where child soldiers are located. In some respects, child soldiering has evolved since identified as an international issue. Africa can no longer be considered as the epicentre of child soldiering, and there is greater international acknowledgement that girl child soldiers are significantly present in armed forces and armed groups. Furthermore, international advocacy efforts have changed. Child Soldiers International ceased operations in 2019. There is no other large, reputable organisation to fill its shoes. UNICEF continues important work on child soldiering and child violations in conflict more broadly, but the organisation does not just focus on child soldiering. Child soldiering recruitment patterns remain complicated, particularly in the context of organisations like ISIS where young children are born into

212

families that are fighting, or are brought from other countries to Syria and surrounding areas. It remains to be seen how Western and European countries will deal with ISIS children and wives, some who remain stuck in refugee camps (ABC 2019). Australia, like other Western and European countries, is reluctant to deal with ISIS family members because of the terrorist issue. In the meantime, young children are languishing in refugee camps without adequate medical help, housing or food. Again, this demonstrates how children’s bodies are sites of political contestation, as child soldiers or as other categories of children.

The findings from Sri Lanka and Nepal suggest some important policy initiatives that could be applied to future reintegration contexts. In Nepal, international stakeholders that managed the child specific DDR program, failed to account for the cultural context. The term disqualified (agoya) in Nepalese implies very negative characteristics about this particular grouping. The child/adult distinction used by international stakeholders to separate child soldiers from adult combatants was almost irrelevant by the time children were formally rehabilitated because of delays in implementing the program as many of the child soldiers were adults by that time. The Sri Lankan context is even more complicated as the government and military ran the rehabilitation programs with very little international involvement that was strictly managed by the government in terms of access to former child soldiers and ex-combatants. However, official narratives that emphasise the apparent success of the rehabilitation programs for children and adults is clearly problematic given the on-going reports of human rights violations, disappearances and militarisation of the region.

There also remains questions about the practicalities of implementing children’s rights in the context of reintegration, and achieving a balance between protection and allowing children to have a say over matters concerning them. For instance, Sri Lankan and Nepalese child soldiers were not consulted about what they wanted as outcomes of the DDR programs, specifically employment. They were directed to a set of employment options. In Nepal, the employment options followed traditional gendered ideas of men and women’s work. International and/or national stakeholders need to direct greater efforts and resources in consulting with children about what would benefit them the most through their

213

rehabilitation program. Mazurana’s et al (2017) suggestion of a ‘portfolio of projects’ is viable and would give children more flexibility in the programs that suit them best. Children, where appropriate, should be given the opportunity to discuss these options with their families as families can provide important guidance and support.

Furthermore, given the short-term nature of reintegration programs, governments and NGOs need to follow up with former child soldiers systematically over a longer term to understand the continual challenges they face in their adult lives. The reintegration process does not just stop once DDR programs are complete and programs and policies need to be continually revised in consultation with former child soldiers to address their needs. This could be done with follow up education and training programs. In Nepal, many child soldiers commented that the education and training they received was inadequate, given that they had missed out on substantial education opportunities. In Sri Lanka, despite the government’s economic development initiatives implemented at the end of the conflict, on-going militarisation that has resulted in land grabs, restricted economic growth, and surveillance impedes the ability of Tamils to find decent employment opportunities.

The legacy of conflict continues to live with the participants. This was embodied with the physical injuries they suffer, and the trauma and grief they live with every day. This research is driven by the importance of hearing child soldiers’ stories and creating a platform to illustrate their resilience, and their skills and ability to overcome innumerable challenges in their lives. Reintegration is an on-going process, because the experiences of child soldiering and war never leave an individual. Ultimately, reintegration outcomes are not only intrinsically linked to a peaceful environment, but a quality of life that gives former child soldiers meaning and hope in their efforts to rebuild their adult civilian lives.

214

References

ABC. (2019, Sep). Married to the Islamic State. ABC Four Corners. Retrieved 12 Dec 2020 from URL: https://www.abc.net.au/4corners/married-to-islamic- state/11560850

Acharya, M. (2006, Oct). Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women. Achieving Millennium Development Goals: Challenges for Nepal. Nepal Rastra Bank, 48-71. Retrieved 12 Dec 2020 from URL: https://www.nrb.org.np/contents/uploads/2020/11/Special_Publications- Achieving-Millennium-Development-Goals-Challenges-for-Nepal.pdf

Ackerly, B., Stern, M., & True, J. (Eds.). (2006). Feminist methodologies for international relations. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Adhikari, K. & Gellner, D. (2016). New Identity Politics and the 2012 Collapse of Nepal's Constituent Assembly: When the dominant becomes ‘other’. Modern Asian Studies, 50(6), 2009-2040.

Ager, A. (2006). What is family? The nature and functions of families in times of conflict. In N. Boothby, A. Strang, & M. Wessells (Eds.) A World Turned Upside Down: Social Ecological Approaches to Children in War Zones (pp.39-63). CT, USA: Kumarian Press Book.

Agrama, H. (2012). Questioning secularism: Islam, sovereignty, and the rule of law in modern Egypt. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Aijazi, O., Amony, E., & Baines E. (2019). We Were Controlled, We Were Not Allowed to Express Our Sexuality, Our Intimacy Was Suppressed: Sexual Violence Experienced by Boys. In M. Drumbl & J. Barrett (Eds) Research Handbook on Child Soldiers (pp. 95–109). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.

215

Akello, G. (2019). Child agency and resistance to discourses within the Paris Principles in rehabilitation and reintegration processes of former child soldiers in northern Uganda. In M. Drumbl & J. Barrett (Eds) Research Handbook on Child Soldiers (pp. 436–451). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Alanen, L. (2014). Theorizing Childhood. Childhood, 21(1), 3–6.

Alison, M. (2007). Wartime sexual violence: women's human rights and questions of masculinity. Review of International Studies, 33(1), 75-90.

Alison, M. (2009). Women and Political Violence: Female combatants in ethno- national conflict, London, UK; NY, USA: Routledge.

Allen, M. & Dinnen, S. (2018) Reflections on Hybridity as an Analytical Lens on State Formation: The Case of Solomon Islands. In J. Wallis, L. Kent, M. Forsyth, S. Dinnen, & S. Bose (Eds.), Hybridity on the ground in peacebuilding and development: Critical Conversations. (1st ed, pp.129-155), Canberra, Aus: ANU Press.

Allendorf, K., & Ghimire, D. (2013). Determinants of marital quality in an arranged marriage society. Social science research, 42(1), 59-70.

Amnesty International. (2005). Nepal: Children caught in the conflict, AI Index: ASA 31/054/2005.

Amnesty International. (2012). Ending the use of child soldiers: one step forward. Retrieved 7 June 2021 from URL: https://www.amnestyusa.org/ending-the-use- of-child-soldiers-one-step-forward/

Anderson, R. (2018). Compromise Without Virtue: Male Child Soldier Reintegration in Sierra Leone. In J. Brewer (Eds.) The Sociology of Compromise after Conflict (pp. 179-206). London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

216

Ann, A. (1993). Women Fighters of Liberation Tigers. Retrieved 1 October 2020 from URL: https://tamilnation.org/books/eelam/adeleann

Anter, A. (2014). Max Weber’s Theory of the Modern State: Origins, structure and Significance. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan

Anthias, F. (2008). Thinking through the lens of translocational positionality: An intersectionality frame for understanding identity and belonging. Translocations:

Migration and Social Change, 4(1), 5–20.

Anthias, F., & Yuval-Davis, N. (2005). Racialized boundaries: Race, nation, gender, colour and class and the anti-racist struggle. Routledge.

Archard, D. (1993). Children: Rights and childhood. NY, USA: Routledge.

Archard, D. & Skivenes, M. (2009). Balancing a child's best interests and a child's views. International Journal of Children's Rights, 17(1), 1-21.

Ariés, P. (1960). L’Enfant et la View Familiale sous L’ancien Regime (Childhood: A Social History of Family Life) Paris, France: Librairie Plon.

Asia Foundation. (2017). The State of Conflict and Violence in Asia: Sri Lanka Asia Foundation. Retrieved1 Apr 2020 from URL: https://asiafoundation.org/wp- content/uploads/2017/10/SriLanka-StateofConflictandViolence.pdf

Asian Development Bank (ADB). (2007). Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2007. Mandaluyong, Philippines: Asian Development Bank.

Asian Development Bank (ADB). (2010). Overview of Gender Equality and Social Inclusion in Nepal. Mandaluyong, Philippines: Asian Development Bank.

217

Asian Development Bank (ADB). (2012). Country Partnership Strategy: Nepal, 2013-2017: Poverty Analysis (summary), Retrieved 3 March 2020 from URL: https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked-documents/cps-nep-2013-2017-pa- summary.pdf

Autesserre, S. (2010). The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding (Cambridge Studies in International Relations). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Autesserre, S. (2014). Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Barber, B. (2013). Annual research review: The experience of youth with political conflict–challenging notions of resilience and encouraging research refinement. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 54(4), 461-473.

Barrett, J. (2019). Navigating the mystical: child soldiers and reintegration rituals in northern Uganda. In M. Drumbl & J. Barrett (Eds) Research Handbook on Child Soldiers (pp. 409–435). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Bar-Tal D. (2009). Reconciliation as a Foundation of Culture of Peace. In: J. de Rivera (Eds) Handbook on Building Cultures of Peace (pp. 363-377). NY, USA: Springer.

BBC. (2021). Children of Conflict: child soldiers. Retrieved 7 June 2021 from URL: https://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/people/features/childrensrights/childrenofconf lict/soldier.shtml

Beah, I. (2008). A Long Way Home: Memoirs of a boy soldier. NSW, Australia: HarperCollins Publishers.

Beier, J (Eds.). (2011). The militarization of childhood: thinking beyond the global south (1st ed.). NY, USA: Palgrave MacMillan.

218

Beier, J. (2015). Shifting the Burden: Childhoods, Resilience, Subjecthood, Critical Studies on Security, 3(3), 237-252.

Beier, J. (2020). Introduction: Making Sense of Childhood in International Relations. In J. Beier (Ed.). Discovering childhood in international relations (1st ed., pp. 1-20). London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bennett, L. (1983) Dangerous Wives and Sacred Sisters: Social and Symbolic Roles of High-Caste Women in Nepal, New York, USA: Columbia University Press.

Bennett, L. (2008). Policy Reform and Culture Change: Contesting Gender, Caste, and Ethnic Exclusion in Nepal. In A. Dani & A. Haan (Eds) Inclusive States: Social Policy And Structural Inequalities. Washington DC, USA: The World Bank.

Betancourt, T. S., Brennan, R. T., Rubin-Smith, J., Fitzmaurice, G. M., & Gilman, S. E. (2010). Sierra Leone's former child soldiers: a longitudinal study of risk, protective factors, and mental health. Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 49(6), 606-615.

Berdal, M. & Ucko, D. (Eds.). (2009). Reintegrating Armed Groups After Conflict, Politics, Violence and Transition. (1st ed.). London, UK: Routledge.

Berents, H. (2015). Children, violence, and social exclusion: Negotiation of everyday insecurity in a Colombian barrio. Critical Studies on Security, 3(1), 90–

104.

Berents, H. (2016). Hashtagging girlhood: #IAmMalala, #BringBackOurGirls and gendering representations of global politics. International Feminist Journal of

Politics, 18(4), 513–527.

219

Berents, H. (2018). Young People and Everyday Peace: Exclusion, Insecurity and Peacebuilding in Colombia. London, UK: Routledge.

Berents, H. & McEvoy-Levy, S. (2015). Theorising youth and everyday peace (building). Peacebuilding, 3(2), 115-125.

Betancourt, T., Agnew-Blais, J., Gilman, S., Williams, D. & Ellis, B. (2010). Past horrors, present struggles: The role of stigma in the association between war experiences and psychosocial adjustment among former child soldiers in Sierra Leone. Social Science & Medicine, 70(1), 17-26.

Bessell, S. (2017). The Role of Intergenerational Relationships in Children’s Experiences of Community. Children & Society, 31(4), 263-275.

Bhandari, R. & Robins, S. (2018). Nepal. In H. Giessmann, & R. MacGinty (Eds) The Elgar Companion to Post-Conflict Transition (pp. 70–88), Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Billingsley, K. (2018). Intersectionality as Locality: Children and Transitional Justice in Nepal. International Journal of Transitional Justice, 12(1), 64-87.

Bishwakarma, M. (2018). Political Transformations in Nepal: Dalit Inequality and Social Justice. London, UK: Routledge.

Biswas, B. (2006). The challenges of conflict management: A case study of Sri Lanka. Civil Wars, 8(1), 46-65.

Björkdahl, A. (2013). Urban peacebuilding. Peacebuilding, 1(2), 207-221.

Blattman, C. & Annan, J. (2009). Child combatants in northern Uganda: reintegration myths and realities. In R. Muggah (Ed.) Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War (1st , ed., pp. 103- 125). NY, USA: Routledge.

220

Boersch-Supan, J. (2008). What the Communities Say: Ex-Combatant Integration and Reconciliation in Sierra Leone. NY, USA: Oxford University Press.

Bogati, S. (2014). Assessing Inclusivity in the Post-War Army Integration Process in Nepal. Inclusive Political Settlements Paper 11, Berlin: Berghof Foundation.

Bogati, S. & Britton, B. (2016, Oct 18). The case for community-led peacebuilding in Nepal. Retrieved 5 May 2019 from URL: https://www.peaceinsight.org/blog/2016/10/case-community-led-peacebuilding- nepal/

Booth, K. (2007). Theory of World Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Boothby, N., Strang, A., & Wessells, M. (Eds.). (2006). A World Turned Upside Down: Social Ecological Approaches to Children in War Zones (1st ed.). CT, USA: Kumarian Press.

Bowd, R., & Özerdem, A. (2013). How to assess social reintegration of ex- combatants. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 7(4), 453-475.

Boyden, J. (2015). Childhood and the policy makers: a comparative perspective on the globalization of childhood. In A. James & A. Prout (Eds) Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood: Contemporary Issues in the Sociological Study of Childhood (1st ed., pp. 167-201 ), London, UK: Routledge.

Boyden, J., & Mann, G. (2005). Children’s risk, resilience, and coping in extreme situations. In M. Ungar (Eds) Handbook for Working with Children and Youth: Pathways to Resilience across Cultures and Contexts (1st, pp. 3-26). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.

221

Braithwaite, J., Charlesworth, H., & Soares, A. (2012). Networked governance of freedom and tyranny: peace in Timor-Leste. Canberra, Australia: ANU Press.

Braithwaite, J. (2015). Gender, Class, Resilient Power: Nepal Lessons in Transformation. RegNet Research Papers, No. 92. ANU: Canberra.

Braithwaite, J., & D’Costa, B. (2018). Cascades of violence: War, crime and peace building across South Asia. Canberra, Australia: ANU Press.

Braithwaite, J., Dinnen, S., Allen, M., Braithwaite, V., & Charlesworth, H. (2010). Pillars and shadows: Statebuilding as peacebuilding in Solomon Islands. Canberra, Australia: ANU Press.

Brett, R., & Specht, I. (2004). Young soldiers: Why They Choose to Fight. London, UK: International Labour Organization.

Brocklehurst H. (2006). Who's afraid of children? Children, conflict and international relations. Aldershot, England, UK: Ashgate.

Brocklehurst, H. (2015). The State of Play: Securities of Childhood–insecurities of Children. Critical Studies on Security. 3(1), 29–46.

Brocklehurst, H. & Peters, K. (2017) Constructing and deconstructing child soldier narratives. In Skelton, T. Harker, C. & Hörschelmann, K. (Eds), Conflict, Violence and Peace, Springer. Burke, A., Lee-Koo, K., & McDonald, M. (2014). An Ethics of Global Security. Journal of Global Security Studies, 1(1), 64–79.

Burman, E. (1994). Innocents abroad: Western fantasies of childhood and the iconography of emergencies. Disasters, 18(3), 238-253.

Burman, E., & McKay, S. (2007). Marginalization of girl mothers during reintegration from armed groups in Sierra Leone. International Nursing Review, 54(4), 316-323.

222

Butler, J. (2011). Gender trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. London, UK: Routledge.

Canavera, M., Lanning, K., Polin, K., & Stark, L. (2016). And then they left: challenges to child protection systems strengthening in South Sudan. Children & Society, 30(5), 356-368.

Capone, F. (2017). ‘Worse’ than Child Soldiers? A Critical Analysis of Foreign Children in the Ranks of ISIL. International Criminal Law Review, 17(1), 161-185.

Carpenter, R. (Eds.). (2007). Born of war: Protecting children of sexual violence survivors in conflict zones. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press Book.

Cartagena (2009). The Cartagena Contribution to Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. Washington DC, USA: The World Bank.

Catani, C., Schauer, E., & Neuner, F. (2008). Beyond individual war trauma: domestic violence against children in Afghanistan and Sri Lanka. Journal of Marital and Family Therapy, 34(2), 165-176.

Channel 4. (2011). Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields. Retrieved4 Feb 2017 from URL: http://www.channel4.com/programmes/sri-lankas-killing-fields.

Child Soldiers Initiative. (2016). Reports of Child Soldiers used in Hostilities. Retrieved 16 Dec 2020 from URL: http://childsoldiersworldindex.org/hostilities.

Child Soldiers International (2016). A Law Unto Themselves? Confronting the Recruitment of Children by Armed Groups. Child Soldiers International: London, UK.

Child Soldiers International. (2018a, Jun). Child Soldiers International Annual Report 2017-18. Child Soldiers International. Retrieved27 Sep 2020 from URL:

223

https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/CSI_annual_report_2018.pd f

Child Soldiers International. (2018b, Apr). Why 18 Matters: a rights based analysis of child recruitment. Child Soldiers International: London, UK.

Child Soldiers International. (2019, Feb). Child soldier levels doubled since 2012 and girls’ exploitation is rising. Retrieved27 Sep 2020 from URL: https://reliefweb.int/report/world/child-soldier-levels-doubled-2012-and-girls- exploitation-rising

Clemens, E. (2016). What is Political Sociology?. MA, USA: John Wiley & Sons.

Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. (2004, Nov). Child Soldiers: Global Report 2004. Child Soldiers Coalition. London: United Kingdom. Retrieved21 Aug 2019 from URL: https://reliefweb.int/report/world/child-soldiers-global-report-2004

Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. (2008, May). Child Soldiers Global Report 2008. Child Soldiers Coalition. London: United Kingdom. Retrieved21 Aug 2019 from URL: https://www.hrw.org/legacy/pub/2008/children/Child_Soldiers_Global_Report_Su mmary.pdf

Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. (2010, Apr). Sri Lanka: Report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict. Child Soldiers Coalition. London: United Kingdom. Retrieved21 Aug 2019 from URL: https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4c3d8a982.pdf

Cockburn, C. (2004). The Continuum of Violence: A Gender Perspective on War and Peace. In W. Giles & J. Hyndman (Eds.) Sites of Violence: Gender and Conflict Zones (1st ed., pp. 24-44), CA, USA: University of California Press.

224

Cohn, C. (2013). Women and Wars: Toward a Conceptual Framework. In C. Cohn (Ed.,) Women and Wars: Contested Histories, Uncertain Futures. (1st ed., pp.,1-35) NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons

Cohn, I., & Goodwin-Gill, G. S. (1994). Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflict. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Colletta, N. & Muggah, R. (2009). Context matters: interim stabilisation and second generation approaches to security promotion. Conflict, Security & Development, 9(4), 425-453.

Coomaraswamy, R. (1996). Tiger Women and the Question of Women's Emancipation. Pravada 4(9), 8-10.

Coomaraswamy, R. (2003). The Politics of Institutional Design. An Overview of the Case of Sri Lanka. In S. Bastian, & R. Luckham (Eds.) Can Democracy Be Designed? The Politics of Institutional Choice in Conflict-Torn Societies (1st ed., pp. 145–169). London, UK: Zed Books.

Coulter, C. (2008). Female fighters in the Sierra Leone war: challenging the assumptions? Feminist review, 88(1), 54-73.

Coulter, C. (2011). Bush wives and girl soldiers: women's lives through war and peace in Sierra Leone. NY, USA: Cornell University Press.

Crenshaw, K. (1989). Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics. University of Chicago Legal Forum. 1989(1), 139- 167.

Dahl, G. (2009). Sociology and beyond: Agency, victimisation and the ethics of writing. Asian Journal of Social Science. 37(3), 391-407.

225

Darusman, M., Ratner, S. & Sooka, Y. (2011). Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka. Security Council Report, NY: United Nations, 31 March 2011.

Davies, S. E., & True, J. (2017). When there is no justice: gendered violence and harm in post-conflict Sri Lanka. The International Journal of Human Rights, 21(9), 1320-1336.

D’Costa, B. (2006). Marginalized identity: new frontiers of research for IR? In B., Ackerly, M., Stern & J., True. (Eds.). Feminist methodologies for international relations. (1st ed., pp129-152) Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

D'Costa, B. (2011). Nationbuilding, Gender and War Crimes in South Asia. London, UK: Routledge.

D'Costa, B. (2013) Sri Lanka: The End of War and the Continuation of Struggle. In Ed Aspinall, R. Jeffrey & A. Regan (Eds.) Diminishing Conflicts in Asia and the Pacific: Why some subside and others don't (1st ed., pp. 101-114). NY, USA: Routledge.

D'Costa, B. (2016). Introduction: ‘Turtles Can Fly’: Vicarious Terror and the Child in South Asia. In B. D'Costa (Ed.) Children and Violence: Politics of Conflict in South Asia (1st ed., pp.1-42), Cambridge University Press.

De Alwis, M. (1997). The Production and Embodiment of Respectability: Gendered Demeanours in Colonial Ceylon. Sri Lanka: collective identities revisited, 1, 105-143. Ethul Kotte: Marga Institute Press.

De Alwis, M. (2014). Gender & Governance in Northern Sri Lanka. Centre for Women’s Development Studies: Delhi, India.

226

De Alwis, M., & Hyndman, J. (2002). Capacity-building in conflict zones: A feminist analysis of humanitarian assistance in Sri Lanka. International Centre for Ethnic Studies. Colombo: Sri Lanka.

De Castro, L. R. (2020). Why global? Children and Childhood from a Decolonial Perspective. Childhood, 27(1), 48-62.

De Mel, N. (1998). Agent or Victim? The Sri Lankan Woman Militant in the Interregnum. In M. Roberts (Ed.) Sri Lanka. Collective Identities Revisited (1st ed., vol. 2, pp.199-220) Colombo, Sri Lanka: Marga Institute.

De Mel, N. (2007). Militarizing Sri Lanka: Popular Culture, Memory and Narrative in the Armed Conflict. SAGE Publications India

De Mel, N., & Venugopal, R. (2016). Peacebuilding Context Assessment: Sri Lanka 2016. United Nations Sri Lanka, Colombo, Sri Lanka.

Defense for Children International Palestine. (2016, Aug) New Israeli law allows children as young as 12 to be jailed. Defense for Children International Palestine. Retrieved12 Dec 2020 from URL: https://www.dci- palestine.org/new_israeli_law_allows_children_as_young_as_12_to_be_jailed

Denov, M. (2010). Child soldiers: Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United Front. NY, USA: Cambridge University press.

Denov, M. (2012). Child soldiers and Iconography: Portrayals and (Mis) Representations. Children & Society, 26(4), 280-292.

Denov, M., & Akesson, B. (2016). Children and Political Violence: At the Intersection of Rights and Realities. Children & Society, 30(5), 337-344.

Denov, M., & Akesson, B. (Eds.). (2017). Children affected by armed conflict: Theory, method, and practice. NY, USA: Columbia University Press.

227

Denov, M., & Maclure, R. (2007). Turnings and epiphanies: Militarization, life histories, and the making and unmaking of two child soldiers in Sierra Leone. Journal of Youth Studies, 10(2), 243-261.

Denov, M., & Marchand, I. (2014). One Cannot Take Away the Stain: Rejection and Stigma Among” Former Child Soldiers in Colombia. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 20(3), 227–240.

Denov, M., Ricard-Guay, A. & Green, A. (2016). Girl Soldiers and the Complexities of Demobilization and Reintegration. In S. Sharoni, J. Welland, L. Steiner & J. Pederson. (Eds.),Handbook on Gender and War: International Handbooks on Gender (1st ed., 550–571) London, UK: Edward Elgar

DeVotta, N. (2007). Sinhalese Buddhist National Ideology: Implications for politics and conflict resolution in Sri Lanka’. Policy Studies 40, Washington, D.C., USA: East-West Center

DeVotta, N. (2014). Parties, political decay, and democratic regression in Sri Lanka. Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 52(1), 139-165.

Dijker, A. & Koomen, W. (2007). Stigmatization, tolerance and repair: An integrative psychological analysis of responses to deviance. NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.

Donais, T. (2009). Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Processes. Peace & change, 34(1), 3-26.

Donovan, D. (2012, Mar). International Criminal Court: Successes and Failures. International Policy Digest. Retrieved20 Jan 2021 from URL: https://intpolicydigest.org/2012/03/23/international-criminal-court-successes-and- failures/#:~:text=Due%20to%20the%20lack%20of,on%20the%20chief%2- 0prosecutor's%20shoulders

228

Drumbl, M. & Barrett, J. (2019). Introduction to the Research Handbook on Child Soldiers. In M. Drumbl & J. Barrett (Eds) Research Handbook on Child Soldiers (pp. 1–26). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Drumbl, M. (2012a). Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Drumbl, M. (2012b). Child Soldiers and Clicktivism: Justice, Myths, and Prevention. Journal of Human Rights Practice, 4(3), 481 - 485.

Edwards, R. (1998). A critical examination of the use of interpreters in the qualitative research process. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 24(1), 197–208.

Engle-Merry, S. (2009). Human rights and gender violence: Translating international law into local justice. Chicago, USA: University of Chicago Press.

Enloe, C. (1993). The Morning After: Sexual politics at the end of the Cold War. California, USA: Univ of California Press.

Enloe, C. (2000). Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives. CA, USA: University of California Press.

Enloe, C. (2014). Bananas, beaches and bases: Making feminist sense of international politics. CA: USA: University of California Press.

Farasat, W. & Hayner, P. (2009). Negotiating peace in Nepal: Implications for justice. The Initiative for Peacebuilding (IfP) Mediation Cluster, International Centre for Transitional Justice. Retrieved5 Nov 2020 from URL: https://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-IFP-Nepal-Negotiating-Peace-2009- English.pdf

229

Fernando, J. (2013). ‘War by Other Means’. Expansion of Siṃhala Buddhism into the Tamil Region in “Post-war” Īlam. In P. Schalk (Ed.), Buddhism among Tamils in Tamilakam and Īlam, Part 3: Extension and Conclusions. (1st ed., pp. 175–239) Sweden: Uppsala University,

Finnström, S. (2006). Wars of the past and war in the present: The Lord’s

Resistance Movement/Army in Uganda. Africa, 200–220.

Foucault, M. (1991). Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison. London, UK: Penguin Books.

Francis, D. (2007). Paper protection mechanisms: child soldiers and the international protection of children in Africa's conflict zones. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 45(2), 207-231.

Franklin, A., & Franklin, B. (1996). Growing pains: The developing children’s rights movement in the UK. In J. Pilcher, J. Pilcher & S. Wagg (Eds.) Thatcher's Children? Politics, Childhood And Society In The 1980s And 1990s (1st ed., pp. 94-113). London, UK: Routledge.

Fraser, N. (1990). Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy. Social text, (25/26), 56-80.

Freedom from Torture. (2015). Tainted Peace - Torture in Sri Lanka since May 2009. London, UK: Freedom from Torture. Retrieved28 Mar 2020 from URL: https://www.refworld.org/docid/55cdacab4.html

Freeman, M. D. (1992). Taking Children's Rights more Seriously. International Journal of Law, policy and the Family, 6(1), 52-71.

Friedman, R. (2018). Remnants of a Checkered Past: Female LTTE and Social Reintegration in Post-war Sri Lanka. International Studies Quarterly, 62(3), 632- 642.

230

Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, peace, and peace research. Journal of peace research, 6(3), 167-191.

Galtung, J. (1990). Cultural violence. Journal of peace research, 27(3), 291-305.

Gates, S., & Reich, S. (Eds.). (2010). Child soldiers in the age of fractured states. PA, USA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Gawerc, M. I. (2006). Peacebuilding: Theoretical and concrete perspectives. Peace & Change, 31(4), 435-478.

Gellner, D. (1991). Hinduism, tribalism and the position of women: the problem of Newar identity. Man. 26(1), 105-125.

Gentry, E., Shepherd, L., & Sjoberg, L. (Eds.). (2018). Routledge handbook of gender and security. NY, USA: Routledge.

Giri, K. (2021). Do All Women Combatants Experience War and Peace

Uniformly? Intersectionality and Women Combatants. Global Studies Quarterly,

1(2), ksab004. https://doi.org/10.1093/isagsq/ksab004

Goffman, E. (1963). Stigma: Notes on the Management of a Spoiled Identity. NY, USA: Simon and Shuster.

Goodhand, J. (2012). Sri Lanka in 2011: Consolidation and militarization of the post-war regime. Asian Survey, 52(1), 130-137.

Gowrinathan, N. (2010). Why Do Women Rebel? Understanding State Repression and Female Participation in Sri Lanka.

231

Government of Nepal. (2011. Dec). Nepal: National Population and Housing Census 2011. Central Bureau of Statistics - National Planning Commission Secretariat, Government of Nepal. Retrieved15 Jun 2020 from URL: https://nada.cbs.gov.np/index.php/catalog/54

Government of Sri Lanka. (2006). Post Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction: Progress, Challenges, and Way Forward, Colombo Sri Lanka: Ministry of Finance and Planning, Government of Sri Lanka

Government of Sri Lanka. (2009, Jul). National Action Plan of the National Framework Proposal for Reintegration of Ex-combatants into Civilian Life in Sri Lanka. Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights. Retrieved15 Aug 2020 from URL: https://www.ilo.org/employment/Whatwedo/Publications/WCMS_116478/lang-- en/index.htm

Government of Sri Lanka. (2011). Bureau of Commissioner General Rehabilitation. State Ministry Of Prison Reforms And Prisoners Rehabilitation. Retrieved20 Jun 2020 from URL: https://bcgr.gov.lk/child-intro.php

Government of Sri Lanka. (2013, Dec). Household income and expenditure survey 2012/2013: Preliminary report. Department of Census and Statistics Ministry of Finance and Planning, Samples Survey Division Department of Census and Statistics, Colombo (2015). Retrieved23 November 2015 from URL: http://www.statistics.gov.lk/IncomeAndExpenditure/StaticalInformation/Household IncomeandExpenditureSurvey2016PreliminaryReport

Griffin, J. (2002). Do Children Have Rights?. In D. Archard and C. Macleod (Eds) The Moral and Political Status of Children (1st ed., pp. 19-30), Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Groundviews. (2013). Women and children in the North: sexual harassment, grievances and challenges. Groundviews: Journalism for Citizens. Retrieved29

232

Apr 2015 from URL: https://groundviews.org/2013/10/31/women-and-children-in- the-north-sexual-harassment-grievances-and-challenges/

Grugel, J., & Peruzzotti, E. (2012). The Domestic Politics of International Human Rights Law: Implementing the Convention on the Rights of the Child in Ecuador, Chile, and Argentina. Human Rights Quarterly. 34(1), 178-198.

Gulf Times (2016, Nov). Nepal arrests 144 ex-child soldiers following protests. Gulf Times. Retrieved23 Nov 2019 from URL: https://m.gulf- times.com/story/520431/Nepal-arrests-144-ex-child-soldiers-following-protests

Gunaratna, R. (1998). LTTE Child Combatants. Jane’s Intelligence Review, 7/98.

Hachhethu, K. (2003, Apr). The Question of Inclusion and Exclusion in Nepal Interface Between State and Ethnicity. Agenda of Transformation: Inclusion in Nepali Democracy' organised by the Social Science Baha, Kathmandu, 24-26 April 2003, at Birendra International Convention Centre, Kathmandu. Retrieved 6, Sep 2020 from URL: https://www.peaceinsight.org/blog/2016/10/case- community-led-peacebuilding-nepal/

Haer, R. (2017). The study of child soldiering: issues and consequences for DDR implementation. Third World Quarterly, 38(2), 450-466.

Häkli, J., & Kallio, K. P. (2014). Subject, action and polis: Theorizing political agency. Progress in Human Geography, 38(2), 181–200.

Hameiri, S. (2010). Regulating Statehood State Building and the Transformation of the Global Order. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan

Harrison, F. & Sooka, Y. (2019). Why has Sri Lanka’s Transitional Justice process failed to deliver? LSE Long Read. Retrieved 1 October 2020 from URL: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2019/02/06/long-read-why-has-sri-lankas- transitional-justice-process-failed-to-deliver/

233

Harris-Short, S. (2001). Listening to the Other-The Convention on the Rights of the Child. Melb. J. Int'l L., 2, 304.

Hazen, J. (2007, Mar). Social integration of ex-combatants after civil war. Paper presented at the UN expert group meeting on ‘Dialogue in the Social Integration Process: Building peaceful social relations - by, for and with people’, New York, November. Retrieved 5 Mar 2020 from URL: http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/sib/egm/paper/Jennifer%20Hazen.pdf.

Hendrick, H. (1990). Constructions and Reconstructions of British Childhood: An Interpretative Survey, 1800 to Present. In A. James & A. Prout (Eds). Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood: Contemporary Issues in the Sociological Study of Childhood, ((1st ed., pp. 29-53 ), London, UK: Routledge.

Henshaw, A. (2016). Why Women Rebel: Understanding Women’s Participation in Armed Rebel Groups. Routledge.

Herath, H. (2015). Place of Women in Sri Lankan Society: Measures for Their Empowerment for Development and Good Governance. Vidyodaya Journal of Management, 1(1), 1–14.

Hernawan, B. (2015). Torture as a Mode of Governance: Reflections on the Phenomenon of Torture in Papua, Indonesia. In M. Slama & J. Munro (Eds.) From ‘Stone-Age’ to ‘Real-Time’ Exploring Papuan Temporalities, Mobilities and Religiosities (1st ed., pp.195-220), Canberra, Australia: ANU Press.

Hirslund, D. V. (2018). Utopias of youth: politics of class in Maoist post- revolutionary mobilisation. Identities, 25(2), 140-157.

Hoban, I. (2019). Children, conflict, and the detention of ‘child soldiers’ in Canada and the United States: How framing contests shape policies. Journal of Human Rights, 18(5), 597-618.

234

Hodgson, S. (2012). Whose Action Plan? An analysis of the UN Security Council Resolution 1612 action plan and monitoring and reporting mechanism in Nepal. Journal of Human Rights Practice, 4(2), 164-186.

Hogg, C. L. (2006, July). The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and Child Recruitment. In Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Forum on armed groups and the involvement of children in armed conflict, Chateau de Bossey, Switzerland (pp. 4-7).

Höglund, K., & Orjuela, C. (2011). Winning the peace: conflict prevention after a victor's peace in Sri Lanka. Contemporary Social Science, 6(1), 19-37.

Honwana, A. M. (1997). Healing for Peace: Traditional Healers and Post-War Reconstruction in Southern Mozambique. Peace and Conflict, 3(3), 293-305.

Honwana, A. (2005). The pain of agency: The agency of pain. In A. Honwana, F. De Boeck (Eds.). Makers & Breakers: Children & Youth in Postcolonial Africa. (1st ed., pp 31-52)Oxford, UK: James Currey.

Honwana, A. (2011). Child soldiers in Africa. PA, USA: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Honwana, A. (2012). The time of youth: Work, social change, and politics in Africa. CT, USA: Kumarian Press Book.

Human Rights Watch (HRW). (2004). Living in fear: child soldiers and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. (Vol. 16, No. 13). Human Rights Watch. Retrieved 23 Nov 2019 from URL: https://www.hrw.org/report/2004/11/10/living-fear/child-soldiers- and-tamil-tigers-sri-lanka#

Human Rights Watch (HRW). (2005, Mar). Nepal: Security Forces 'Disappear' Hundreds of Civilians. Retrieved23 November 2019 from URL: https://www.hrw.org/report/2005/02/28/clear-culpability/disappearances-security- forces-nepal

235

Human Rights Watch (HRW). (2007, Feb). Children in the Ranks: The Maoists' Use of Child Soldiers in Nepal. (Vol. 19, No. 2). Retrieved23 November 2019 from URL: https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/nepal0207/

Human Rights Watch (HRW). (2013, Feb). We Will Teach You a Lesson: Sexual Violence Against Tamils by Sri Lankan Security Forces. Retrieved 16 Feb 2017 from URL: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/srilanka0213webwcover_0.pdf

Human Rights Watch (HRW). (2015, Oct). ‘Like we are Not Nepali’: Protest and Police Crackdown in the Terai Region of Nepal. Retrieved 28 November 2020 from URL: https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/10/16/we-are-not-nepali/protest-and- police-crackdown-terai-region-nepal

Human Rights Watch (HRW). (2016). Nepal: 9-Point Deal Undermines Transitional Justice. Human Rights Watched. Retrieved 3 October 2020 from URL: https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/13/nepal-9-point-deal-undermines- transitional-justice

Human Rights Watch. (2018a, Oct). Why Can’t We Go Home? Military Occupation of Land in Sri Lanka. Retrieved 25 Feb 2020 from URL: https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/10/09/why-cant-we-go-home/military- occupation-land-sri-lanka

Human Rights Watch (HRW). (2018b, Jan). Locked Up Without Evidence Abuses under Sri Lanka’s Prevention of Terrorism Act. Retrieved 30 Jan from URL: https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/01/29/locked-without-evidence/abuses- under-sri-lankas-prevention-terrorism-act

Human Rights Watch. (2019a, Oct). Global Efforts Needed to Free Detained Children. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved 18 Feb 2020 from URL:

236

https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/10/07/global-efforts-needed-free-detained- children

Human Rights Watch. (2019b, Mar). Iraq: ISIS Child Suspects Arbitrarily Arrested, Tortured. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved 25 May 2020 from URL: https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/03/06/iraq-isis-child-suspects-arbitrarily-arrested- tortured

Human Rights Watch. (2020, Mar). Sri Lanka: Justice Undone for Massacre Victims. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved20 Jan 2021 from URL: https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/27/sri-lanka-justice-undone-massacre-victims

Huynh, K., D'Costa, B., & Lee-Koo, K. (Eds.). (2015). Children and Global Conflict. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Hyndman, J., & De Alwis, M. (2004). Bodies, shrines, and roads: Violence,(im)mobility and displacement in Sri Lanka. Gender, Place & Culture: A Journal of Feminist Geography. 11(4), 535-557.

IDEA. (2011). Women Members of the Constituent Assembly: A Study on Contribution of Women in Constitution Making in Nepal. Kathmandu, Nepal: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.

Imoh, A. (2016). From the singular to the plural: Exploring diversities in contemporary childhoods in sub-Saharan Africa. Childhood, 23(3), 455-468.

Imoh, A., Bourdillon, M., & Meichsner, S. (Eds.). (2019). Global Childhoods beyond the North-South Divide. Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan

International Commission of Jurists (ICJ). (2010, Sep). Beyond Lawful Constraints: Sri Lanka’s Mass Detention of LTTE Suspects. ICJ Briefing Note. Retrieved Jun 25, 2020 from URL: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/28738E40D73D48AB49257 7AF000B5BD6-Full_Report.pdf

237

INSEC. (2010). Annual report. Kathmandu, Nepal: INSEC

International Crisis Group (ICG, Jan). 2010 Sri Lanka: A Bitter Peace. Retrieved 10 October 2020 from URL: https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/sri- lanka/sri-lanka-bitter-peace

International Crisis Group (ICG). (2011, Dec) Sri Lanka: Women’s Insecurity in the North And East. Asia Report No 217. Retrieved May 25, 2020 from URL: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full%20Report_428.pdf

International Crisis Group (ICG). (2014, Mar). The Forever War?: Military Control in Sri Lanka’s North. Asia Report. Retrieved May 25, 2020 from URL: https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/forever-war-military-control- sri-lanka-s-north

International Crisis Group (ICG). (2018). The Forever War?: Military Control in Sri Lanka’s North. Retrieved 25 Jun 2020 from URL: https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/forever-war-military-control- sri-lanka-s-north

International Commission of Jurists (ICJ). (2010, Sep) Beyond Lawful Constraints: Sri Lanka’s Mass Detention of LTTE suspects, ICJ Briefing note. Geneva, Switzerland: ICJ

International Labour Organization (ILO). (2014, May). Labour Market Transitions of Young Women and Men in Nepal. Geneva, Switzerland: ILO

Jacob, C. (2013). Child security in Asia: The impact of armed conflict in Cambodia and Myanmar. London, UK: Routledge.

Jacob, C. (2015). Children and Armed Conflict and the Field of Security Studies. Critical Studies on Security, 3(1), 14-28.

238

Jacob, C. (2016). Children Affected by Political Violence in India. In B. D'Costa (Ed.) Children and Violence: Politics of Conflict in South Asia (1st ed., pp.200- 219), Cambridge University Press.

Jacob, C. (2018). R2P and the Prevention of Mass Atrocities: A Child-Centric Approach. Global Responsibility to Protect, 10(1-2), 75-96.

James, A. L., & James, A. (2004). Constructing Childhood: Theory, Policy and Social Practice. NY, USA: Palgrave Macmillan.

James, A., & Prout, A. (2015). Introduction. In A. James & A. Prout (Eds.). Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood: Contemporary issues in the sociological study of childhood. London, UK: Routledge.

Jeffery, R. (2017). Nepal's comprehensive peace agreement: human rights compliance and impunity a decade on. International Affairs, 93(2), 343-364.

Jenks, C. (1996). Childhood. London, UK: Psychology Press.

Jennings, K. M. (2009). The political economy of DDR in Liberia: A gendered critique. Conflict, Security & Development, 9(4), 475-494.

Jessop, B. (1990). State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in Its Place. NY, USA: Cambridge: Polity Press.

Jeyasankar, V. & Ganhewa, S. (2018). Making Ends Meet: Women’s Livelihoods in Post-War Sri Lanka. International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Colombo, Sri Lanka.

Jeyasankar, V. (2015). A study on the status of female heads of households and their access to economic, social and cultural rights. Colombo, Sri Lanka: FOKUS Women Report. Retrieved17 Dec 2016, from URL https://d3jkvgmi357tqm.cloudfront.net/1516009327/escr-in-ampara.pdf

239

Jones, L. (2010). (Post-) colonial state-building and state failure in East Timor: bringing social conflict back in. Conflict, Security & Development, 10(4), 547-575.

Kaldor, K. (2012). New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Keairns, Y. (2003). The Voices of Girl Child Soldiers. NY: USA: Quaker United Nations Office.

Kelsall, T. (2009). Culture under cross-examination: international justice and the special court for Sierra Leone. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press.

Kent, L. (2011). Local memory practices in East Timor: Disrupting transitional justice narratives. International Journal of Transitional Justice, 5(3), 434–455.

Kingma, K. (2001). Demobilizing and reintegrating former combatants., In L. Reychler & T. Paffenholz (Eds.) Peacebuilding: A Field Guide (1st ed., pp. 405- 415), London, UK: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Kohrt, B. (2016). The role of traditional rituals for reintegration and psychosocial well being of child soldiers in Nepal. in D. Hinton & A. Hinton (Eds.) Genocide and Mass Violence: Memory, Symptom and Recovery. NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.

Kohrt, B. A., & Maharjan, S. M. (2009). When a child is no longer a child: Nepali ethnopsychology of child development and violence. Studies in Nepali History and Society, 14(1), 107-142.

Kohrt, B., Jordans, M., Tol, W., Perera, E., Karki, R., Koirala, S., & Upadhaya, N. (2010). Social Ecology of Child Soldiers: Child, Family, and Community

240

Determinants of Mental Health, Psychosocial Well-being, and Reintegration in Nepal. Transcultural psychiatry, 47(5), 727-753.

Krishnan, S. (2012). The Transition to Civilian Life of Teenage Girls and Young Women Ex-Combatants: A Case Study from Batticaloa. International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Colombo, Sri Lanka.

Kumar, D. (2008). Obstacles to Local leadership & Democracy in Nepal. In D. Gellner & K. Hachhethu (Eds.) Local Democracy in South Asia: Microprocesses of Democratization in Nepal and its Neighbours (1st ed., pp. 25-44), NY, USA: Sage Publications.

Lake, D. (2008). The State and International Relations. In C. Reus-Smit & D. Snidal (Eds.). The Oxford handbook of international relations. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Lambourne, W. (2009). Transitional justice and peacebuilding after mass violence. International journal of transitional justice, 3(1), 28-48.

Lawoti, M. (2007). Contentious Politics in Democratizing Nepal. Contentious politics and democratization in Nepal, 17-47.

Lawoti, M. (2012). Ethnic politics and the building of an inclusive state. Nepal in transition: From people’s war to fragile peace, 129-152.

Lawoti, M. (2015). Competing Nationhood and Constitutional Instability: Representation, Regime, and Resistance in Nepal. In M. Tushnet & M. Khosla (Eds.), Unstable Constitutionalism Law and Politics in South Asia (1st ed., pp. 86-123), NY, USA: Cambridge University press.

Lawoti, M. (2019). Nepal in 2018: The Communist Majority and the Emergence and Decline of Hope within a Year. Asian Survey, 59(1), 133-139.

Lecomte-Tilouine, M. (2013). Introduction. In M. Lecomte-Tilouine (Ed.),

241

Revolution in Nepal: An Anthropological and Historical Approach to the People's War. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press

Lederach, J. (1997). Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies. Washington DC, USA: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Lee-Koo, K. (2011). Horror and Hope:(re) presenting militarised children in global North–South relations. Third World Quarterly, 32(4), 725-742.

Lee-Koo, K. (2013). Not suitable for children: The politicisation of conflict-affected children in post-2001 Afghanistan. Australian Journal of International Affairs,

67(4), 475–490. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2013.803031

Lee-Koo, K. (2015). Children and Armed Conflict, Mapping the Terrain. In K. Huynh, B. D’Costa & K. Lee-Koo (Eds.) Children and Global Conflict (1st ed., pp. 9-34) Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Lee-Koo, K. (2018a). The Intolerable Impact of Armed Conflict on Children: The United Nations Security Council and the Protection of Children in Armed Conflict. Global responsibility to protect, 10 (1-2), 57-74.

Lee-Koo, K. (2018b). The Gendered State and the Emergence of a Postconflict, Postdisaster, Semiautonomous State: Aceh, Indonesia. In S. Parashar, J. Tickner & J. True (Eds) Revisiting Gendered States: Feminist Imaginings of the State in International Relations (1st ed., pp. 138-154). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press

Lee-Koo, K. (2020). Decolonizing Childhood in International Relations. In J. Beier (Ed.). Discovering childhood in international relations (1st ed., pp. 21-40). London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

242

Leff, J. (2008). The nexus between social capital and reintegration of ex- combatants: A case for Sierra Leone. African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 8(1), 9-38.

LLRC, Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC). 2011. Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation. Retrieved 15 Sept from URL: http://www.presidentsoffice.gov.lk/index.php?option=com_ content&view=article&id=54:llrc-report&catid=53&Itemid=290

Liebel, M. (2020) Decolonizing Childhoods: From Exclusion to Dignity, Bristol; Chicago, IL: Policy Press.

Lemay-Hébert, N. (2011). Empty Shell Approach: The Setup Process of International Administrations in Timor- Leste and Kosovo, Its Consequences and Lessons. International Studies Perspectives, 12(2), 190-211.

Lewis, D., Heathershaw, J., & Megoran, N. (2018). Illiberal peace? Authoritarian modes of conflict management. Cooperation and conflict, 53(4), 486-506.

Lind, J. (2017). The duality of children’s political agency in deportability. Politics,

37(3), 288–301.

Linde, R. (2014). The globalization of childhood: the international diffusion of norms and law against the child death penalty. European journal of international relations, 20(2), 544-568.

Lischer, S. (2010). War, Displacement and the recruitment of child soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In S. Gates & R. Child (Eds.) Child Soldiers in the Age of Fractured States (1st ed., pp. 143-159), PA, USA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Lutz, C. (2002). Making War at Home in the United States: Militarization and the Current Crisis. American Anthropologist, 104(3), 723-735.

243

Maastricht University (2019). Universalism vs. Relativism: Human Rights for Homosexuals in Africa, retrieved 14 Oct 2020 from URL: https://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/blog/2019/03/universalism-vs-relativism- human-rights-homosexuals-africa

Mac Ginty, R. (2014). Everyday Peace: Bottom-up and Local Agency in Conflict- Affected Cocieties. Security Dialogue, 45(6), 548-564.

MacGinty, R. (2011). International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Machel, G. (1996). Impact of Armed Conflict on Children. New York: United Nations.

MacKenzie, M. H. (2012). Female Soldiers in Sierra Leone: Sex, security and post-conflict development. NY, USA: NYU Press.

Macmillan, L. (2009). The child soldier in north-south relations. International Political Sociology, 3(1), 36-52.

MacQueen, K., McLellan, E., Metzger, D., et. Al. (2001). What is community? An evidence-based definition for participatory public health. American journal of public health, 91(12), 1929-1938.

Manchanda, R. (2004). Maoist insurgency in Nepal: Radicalizing gendered narratives. Cultural Dynamics, 16(2-3), 237-258.

Manoharan, N. (2006). Counterterrorism Legislation in Sri Lanka: Evaluating Efficacy. Honolulu, USA: East-West Center.

Martin, I. (2010). All Peace Operations Are Political: A Case for Designer Missions and the Next UN Reform. In R. Gowan (Ed.) Review of Political Missions 2010 (1st ed., pp. 8–14). NY, USA: Center on International Cooperation.

244

Mason, T., Carlisle, C., & Watkins, C. (Eds.). (2001). Stigma and Social Exclusion in Healthcare. London, UK: Psychology Press.

Mazurana, D. (2002). Girls in Fighting Forces and Groups: Their Recruitment, Participation, Demobilization and Reintegration. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 8 (2), 97–123.

Mazurana, D., McKay, S. A., Carlson, K. C., & Kasper, J. C. (2002). Girls in fighting forces and groups: Their recruitment, participation, demobilization, and reintegration. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 8(2), 97-123.

McKay, S. & Mazurana, D. (2004). Where Are the Girls? Girls in Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone, and Mozambique: Their Lives During and After War. Montreal, Canada: International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development.

McEvoy, K., & McConnachie, K. (2012). Victimology in transitional justice: Victimhood, innocence and hierarchy. European Journal of Criminology, 9(5), 527-538.

McEvoy, K., & McConnachie, K. (2013). Victims and Transitional Justice: Voice, Agency and Blame. Social & Legal Studies, 22(4), 489-513.

McEvoy-Levy, .S. (2018). Peace and Resistance in Youth Cultures: Reading the politics of peacebuilding from Harry Potter to the hunger games. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan

McKay, S., Veale, A., Worthen, M. & Wessells, M. G. (2011). Building meaningful participation in reintegration among war-affected young mothers in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Northern Uganda. Intervention, 9(2), 108-124.

245

McMillan, N. (2019). Beyond ‘the child soldier’: from a recognition of complexity to an ethics of engagement. In M. Drumbl & J. Barrett (Eds.) Research Handbook on Child Soldiers (pp. 513–518). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.

McMullin, J. (2013). Ex-combatants and the Post-conflict State: Challenges of Reintegration. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Mullin, C. (2015). Tunisia’s Revolution and the Domestic–International Nexus. In L. Sadiki (Ed.). (2014). Routledge handbook of the Arab Spring: Rethinking Democratization. (pp. 89-104) New York, USA: Routledge.

Merry, S. (2009). Human rights and gender violence: Translating international law into local justice. IL, USA: University of Chicago Press

Midgal, J. & Schlichte, K. (2005). Rethinking the State. In K Schlichte (Ed.). The Dynamics of States: The Formation and Crises of State Domination (1st ed., pp. 1-40) London; New York: Routledge.

Millar, G. (2014). Introduction. In An Ethnographic Approach to Peacebuilding: Understanding Local Experiences: Understanding Local Experiences in Transitional States. NY, USA: Routledge.

Moghadam, V. (1994). Introduction and Overview. In V. Moghadam (Ed.) Gender and National Identity (1st ed., pp. 1–17) New York, USA: Zed Books.

Montgomery, H. (2001). Modern Babylon? Prostituting Children in Thailand. NY, USA: Berghahn Books.

Montgomery, H. (2007). Working with child prostitutes in Thailand: Problems of practice and interpretation. Childhood, 14(4), 415-430.

Moser, C. & Clark, F. (2001). Victims, perpetrators or actors? Gender, armed conflict and political violence. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan

246

Muggah, R. (2005). No Magic Bullet: A Critical Perspective on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Weapons Reduction in Post-conflict Contexts. The Round Table, 94:379, 239-252.

Munive, J. (2013). Context Matters: The Conventional DDR Template is Challenged in South Sudan. International Peacekeeping, 20(5), 585-599.

Nash, K. (2010). Contemporary Political Sociology Globalization, Politics, and Power. London, UK: Blackwell Publishers

New York Times. (2012, Dec). Congolese Warlord Convicted, in First for International Court. The New York Times. Retrieved2 Dec 2019 from URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/15/world/africa/congo-thomas-lubanga- convicted-war-crimes-child-soldiers.html

Nickson, R., & Braithwaite, J. (2014). Deeper, broader, longer transitional justice. European Journal of Criminology, 11(4), 445-463.

Nilsson, A. (2005). Reintegrating Ex-Combatants in Post-Conflict. Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency.

Oosterveld, V. (2019). The construction of gender in child soldiering in the Special Court for Sierra Leone. In M. Drumbl & J. Barrett (Eds) Research Handbook on Child Soldiers (pp. 74–94). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). (2008, June). Initial Report of Sri Lanka under the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Children the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). (2012, Oct). Nepal Conflict Report 2012: An analysis of conflict-related violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law between

247

February 1996 and 21 November 2006. Geneva. Retrieved20 Jan 2021 from URL: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/NP/OHCHR_Nepal_Conflict_Report 2012.pdf

Office of the United Nations Human Rights Council (OHCHR). (2015, Sep). OHCHR Investigation on Sri Lanka. A/HRC/30/ CRP. Geneva: UN. Retrieved2 Oct 2020 from URL: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/OISL.aspx

Orjuela, C. (2018). Mobilising diasporas for justice. Opportunity structures and the presencing of a violent past. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 44(8), 1357-1373.

Oswell, D. (2013). The Agency of Children: From family to global human rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Özerdem, A. (2012). A re-conceptualisation of ex-combatant reintegration: social reintegration approach. Conflict, Security & Development, 12(1), 51-73.

Özerdem, A. & Podder, S. (Eds.). (2011). Child Soldiers: From Recruitment to Reintegration. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan

Parashar, S. (2014). Women and Militant Wars: The politics of injury. NY, USA: Routledge

Parashar, S., Tickner, J. & True, J. (Eds.). (2018). Revisiting Gendered States Feminist Imaginings of the State in International Relations. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Park, A. S. (2006). ‘Other inhumane acts’: Forced marriage, girl soldiers and the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Social & Legal Studies, 15(3), 315-337.

248

Pasipanodya, T. (2008). A Deeper Kustice: Economic and Social justice as Transitional Justice in Nepal. The International journal of transitional justice, 2(3), 378-397.

Pauletto, E., & Patel, P. (2010). Challenging child soldier DDR processes and policies in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development, 16, 35-57.

Peace Envsioners and Trial International (2019, Jun). A Quest for Justice: The Status of Children Involved in Nepal’s armed conflict.

Peterson, V. (1992). Security and the Sovereign State: What Is at Stake in Taking Feminism Seriously?. In V. Spike Peterson (Ed)., Gendered States: Feminist (Re)visions of International Relations Theory. (1st ed., 31-64) Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Petrie, C. (2012). Report of the Secretary-General’s Internal Review Panel on United Nations Action in Sri Lanka. New York: United Nations.

Pettigrew, J. (2007). Learning to Be Silent: Change, Childhood and Mental Health in the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal. In H. Ishii, D. Gellner & K. Nawa (Eds.) Nepalis Inside and Outside Nepal: Social Dynamics in Northern South Asia (Vol. 1). Delhi, India: Manohar press.

Pettigrew, J. (2013). Maoists at the Hearth: Everyday life in Nepal's civil war. PA, USA: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Pettigrew, J., & Shneiderman, S. (2004). Women and the Maobadi: Ideology and Agency in Nepal's Maoist Movement. Himal Southasian, 7(1), 19-29.

Podder, S. (2011). Neither Child Nor Solider: Contested Terrains in Identity, Victimcy and Survival. In A.Özerdem, S. Podder (Eds.) Child Soldiers: From Recruitment to Reintegration (1st ed., pp. 141-156). London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

249

Pettman, J. (1996). Worlding Women: A Feminist International Politics. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

Plan International. (2014). Because I am a Girl. The State of the World’s Girls 2014: Pathways to Power. Plan International.

Punch, S. (2002). Youth Transitions and Interdependent Adult–child Relations in Rural Bolivia. Journal of Rural Studies, 18 (2), 123–33.

Punch, S., & Tisdall, E. (2012). Exploring Children and Young People’s Relationships across Majority and Minority Worlds. Children’s Geographies 10(3), 241–48.

Pupavac, V. (2001). Misanthropy Without Borders: The International Children’s Rights Regime. Disasters, 25(2), 95-112.

Putnam, R. (1993). Making Democracy Work. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Qvortrup, J. (1987). The Sociology of Childhood. International Journal of Sociology, 17(3), 3–37.

Qvortrup J. (2005). Varieties of Childhood. In J. Qvortrup (Ed.). Studies in Modern Childhood: Society, Agency, Culture (1st ed., pp.1-20), London, UK: Palgrave MacMillan.

Qvortrup, J. (2011). Childhood as a Structural Form. In J. Qvortrup, J., Corsaro, and Honig, M. (Eds). The Palgrave Handbook of Childhood Studies (1st ed., pp.21-33), London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Rajasingham-Senanayake, D. (1999). Democracy and the problem of representation: The making of bi-polar ethnic identity in post/colonial Sri Lanka. Ethnic futures: The state and identity politics in Asia, 99-134.

250

Rajasingham-Senanayake, D. (2001). Dysfunctional democracy and the dirty war in Sri Lanka. Honolulu, USA: East-West Center.

Rajasingham-Senanayake, D. (2004). Between victim and agent: Women's ambivalent empowerment. In F. Essed (Ed.) Displacement. Refugees and the transformation of societies: Agency, policies, ethics and politics (1st ed., vol.13, pp. 151-166). NY, USA: Berghahn Books.

Rampton, D. (2011). ‘Deeper hegemony’: the Politics of Sinhala Nationalist Authenticity and the Failures of Power-Sharing in Sri Lanka. Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 49(2), 245-273.

Rawski, F. & Sharma, M. (2012). A Comprehensive Peace? Lessons from Human Rights Monitoring in Nepal. In S. Einsiedel, D. Malone & S. Pradhan (Eds.) Nepal in Transition: From People's War to Fragile Peace (1st ed., pp.175‐ 200). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Reath, A. (2006). Agency and Autonomy in Kant's Moral Theory: Selected Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Richmond, O. (2014). Failed Statebuilding: intervention and the dynamics of peace formation. CT, USA: Yale University Press.

Rimmer, S. (2010). Gender and transitional justice: The women of East Timor. NY, USA: Routledge.

Roberts, D. (2011). Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, Liberal Irrelevance and the Locus of Legitimacy. International Peacekeeping, 18(4), 410-424.

Simon Robins, Ram Kumar Bhandari & Ex-Pla Research Group (2016), Poverty, stigma and alienation: Reintegration challenges of ex-Maoist combatants in Nepal. A participatory action research project with ex-PLA fighters in Nepal , Berghof Foundation 251

Rosen, D. (2005). Armies of the Young: Child Soldiers in War and Terrorism. NJ, USA: Rutgers University Press.

Rosen, D. (2007). Child soldiers, international humanitarian law, and the globalization of childhood. American anthropologist, 109(2), 296-306.

Rosen, D. (2015). Child Soldiers in the Western Imagination: From Patriots to Victims. NJ, USA: Rutgers University Press.

Rosen, D. (2019). Child soldiers in historical and comparative perspective: creating a space for data-driven analysis. In M. Drumbl & J. Barrett (Eds.) Research Handbook on Child Soldiers (1st ed., pp. 151–174). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Schubert, A. (2013). Victorious Victims: An Analysis of Sri Lanka’s Post-war Reconciliation Discourse. Colombo: International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Colombo, Sri Lanka.

Schepher-Hughes, N. (1987) Child survival: Anthropological perspectives on the treatment and maltreatment of children, Boston, USA: Dordrecht.

Selim, Y. (2017). Examining victims and perpetrators in post-conflict Nepal. International Review of Victimology, 23(3), 275-301.

Selim, Y. (2018). Contestation and resistance: the politics of and around transitional justice in Nepal. Conflict, Security & Development, 18(1), 39-60.

Seoighe, R. (2016a). Nationalistic authorship and resistance in Northeastern Sri Lanka. Society and Culture in South Asia, 2(1), 1-30.

Seoighe, R. (2016b) Discourses of Victimization in Sri Lanka’s Civil War: Collective Memory. Legitimacy and Agency Social & Legal Studies. 25(3), 355– 380.

252

Seto, D. (2015). Children born of wartime sexual violence and the limits of existence. Peacebuilding, 3(2), 171-185.

Sjoberg, L., & Gentry, C. E. (2007). Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Women's Violence in Global Politics. London and New York: Zed Books.

Sooka, Y. (2014, Mar). An Unfinished War: Torture and Sexual Violence in Sri Lanka 2009 – 2014, The Bar Human Rights Committee of England and Wales and the International Truth & Justice Project, Sri Lanka.

Shakya, A. (2011). Experiences of children in armed conflict in Nepal. Children and Youth Services Review, 33(4), 557-563.

Sharma, Priyag Raj. 1997. "Nation Building, Multi‐Ethnicity, and the Hindu State." In D. Gellner, J. Pfaff‐Czarnecka & J. Whelpton (Eds.,) Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Hindu Kingdom: The Politics of Culture in Contemporary Nepal (1st ed., pp 471‐494) London, UK: Routledge.

Shaw, R. (2014). The TRC, the NGO and the child: young people and post‐ conflict futures in Sierra Leone. Social Anthropology, 22(3), 306-325.

Shepler, S. (2005). The Rites of the Child: Global Discourses of Youth and Reintegrating Child Soldiers in Sierra Leone. Journal of Human Rights, 4(2), 197- 211

Singer, P. (2005) Children at War. NY, USA: Pantheon Books.

Singh, S. (2017). Re-thinking the ‘Normative’ in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325: Perspectives from Sri Lanka. Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 4(2), 219-238.

253

Smith, M. (2006). Discourses on Development: Beyond the ‘African Tragedy’. In M. Smith (Ed.) Beyond the 'African Tragedy': Discourses on Development and the Global Economy (1st ed., pp.2-24). London, UK: Routledge

Snellinger, A. (2009). Yuba, Hamro Pusta Youth, Our Generation: Youth and Generational Politics in Nepali Political Culture. Studies in Nepali History and Society. 14(1), 39-66.

Somasundaram, D. (2007). Collective Trauma in Northern Sri Lanka: A Qualitative Psychosocial-Ecological study. International journal of mental health systems, 1(1), 1-27

Somasundaram, D., & Sivayokan, S. (2013). Rebuilding community resilience in a post-war context: developing insight and recommendations-a qualitative study in Northern Sri Lanka. International journal of mental health systems, 7(1), 1-25.

Sooka, Y. (2014). An Unfinished War: Torture and Sexual Violence in Sri Lanka 2009-2014. The Bar Human Rights Committee of England and Wales (BHRC) and The International Truth & Justice Project, Sri Lanka.

Soyza, N. (2012). Tamil Tigress: My Story as a Child Soldier in Sri Lanka's Bloody Civil War. London, UK: Allen & Unwin.

Spencer, J. (Ed.). (1990). Sri Lanka: History and the Roots of Conflict. London, UK: Routledge.

Spivak, G. (1988). Can the subaltern speak?. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Spyrou, S., Rosen, & Daniel., T. (2018). Introduction: Reimagining Childhood Studies: Connectivities…Relationalities..Linkages. In. S., Spyrou, R., Rosen, & T. Daniel. (Eds.), Reimagining Childhood Studies, London, UK: Bloomsbury

Sriram C. (2010). Resolving Conflicts and Pursuing Accountability: Beyond Justice Versus Peace. In: O. Richmond (Ed.) Palgrave Advances in

254

Peacebuilding. Palgrave Advances (1st, ed., pp. 279-293). London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Stavrou, V. (2005). Breaking the Silence: Girls Forcible involved in the Armed Struggle in Angola. CIDA and Christian Children’s Fund, Ottawa, Canada.

Stiehm, J. (1994). The Protected, the Protector, the Defender. Living with Contradictions (1st ed.). London, UK: Routledge

Stone., J. (2014). Shifting tides in South Asia: Sri Lanka’s postwar descent. Journal of Democracy, 25(2), 146-157

Stovel, L. (2008). There's no bad bush to throw away a bad child: tradition- inspired reintegration in post-war Sierra Leone. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 46(2), 305-324.

Stovel, L. (2010). Long Road Home: Building Reconciliation and Trust in Post- war Sierra Leone. Mortsel: Intersentia.

Subedi, D. (2013). Dealing with Ex-Combatants in a Negotiated Peace Process: Impacts of Transitional Politics on the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme in Nepal. Journal of Asian and African Studies. 49(6) 672–689.

Subedi, D. (2014). Discontents and Resistance of ‘Unverified’ Ex-combatants and Challenges to their Rehabilitation in Nepal. Agrarian South: Journal of Political Economy, 3(2), 203-237.

Subedi, N. (2009). Elimination of Gender Discriminatory Legal Provisions by the Supreme Court of Nepal with reference to women's right to property. Tribhuvan University Journal, 26(1), 37-54.

255

Suhrke, A. (2011). Virtues of a Narrow Mission: The UN Peace Operation in Nepal. Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, 17(1), 37-55.

Tabak, J. (2020). The Child and the World: Child-soldiers and the Claim for Progress. University of Georgia Press.

Tadjbakhsh, S. (2011). Introduction: Liberal Peace in Dispute. In S. Tadjbakhsh (Ed.) Rethinking the Liberal Peace: External Models and Local Alternatives (1st ed., pp. 1-16). NY, USA: Routledge. Tamang, S. (2011). Exclusionary Processes and Constitution Building in Nepal. International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 18(3), 293-308.

Tamang, S., & Malena, C. (2011). The Political Economy of Social Accountability in Nepal. Washington DC, USA: World Bank.

Tambiah, S. J. (1986). Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fracticide and the Dismantling of Democracy. IL, USA: University of Chicago Press.

Tambiah, Y. (2004). Sexuality and Women's Rights in Armed Conflict in Sri Lanka. Reproductive Health Matters, 12(23), 78-87.

Tambiah, Y. (2005). Turncoat bodies: Sexuality and Sex Work under Militarization in Sri Lanka. Gender & Society, 19(2), 243-261.

Thapa, D. (2002). The Maobadi of Nepal. in State of Nepal, 77-99.

Thapa, D. (2012). The Making of the Maoist Insurgency. In S. Einsiedel, D. Malone, S. Pradhan (Eds.) Nepal in Transition: From People's War to Fragile Peace (1st ed., pp.37‐57). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Thapa, D., & Sijapati, B. (2004). A kingdom under siege: Nepal's Maoist insurgency 1996 to 2004. London, UK: Zed books.

256

The Guardian. (2014, Jan). South Sudan: child soldiers released following deal with state and rebels Retrieved 7 June 2021 from URL: https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/jan/27/south-sudan-child- soldiers-released-deal-government-and-rebels

The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ). (2012). Retrieved 25 Jun 2020 from URL: https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Nepal-Reparations- 2012-English.pdf.

Theidon, K. (2007). Transitional Subjects: The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Colombia. International Journal of Transitional Justice, 1(1), 66–90.

Thiranagama, S. (2013). Claiming the state: Postwar Reconciliation in Sri Lanka. Humanity: an international journal of human rights, humanitarianism, and development, 4(1), 93-116.

Tickner, J. (2018) Rethinking the State in International Relations: A Personal Reflection. In S., Parashar, J., Tickner, & J., True, (Eds.). Revisiting Gendered States Feminist Imaginings of the State in International Relations. (1st ed, pp.19- 31) Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Thompson, A., Torres, R. M., Swanson, K., Blue, S. A., & Hernández, Ó. M. H. (2019). Re-conceptualising agency in migrant children from Central America and Mexico. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 45(2), 235–252.

Tooze, R. (1996). Prologue: states, nationalisms and identities – thinking in IR theory. In J. Krause & N. Renwick (Eds.) Identities in International Relations (1st, ed.). London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Tonheim, M. (2012). ‘Who will comfort me?’ Stigmatization of girls formerly associated with armed forces and groups in eastern Congo. International Journal of Human Rights, 16(2), 278-297

257

Tonheim, M. (2014). Genuine social inclusion or superficial co-existence? Former girl soldiers in eastern Congo returning home. International Journal of Human Rights, 18(6), 634-645.

Torjesen, S. (2013). Towards a theory of ex-combatant reintegration. Stability. International Journal of Security & Development, 2(3), 1-13.

Touquet, H. (2018). Unsilenced: Male Survivors Speak of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Sri Lanka. London: International Truth and Justice Project.

Trial International. (2019). Nepal: 13 Years On, No Justice for Conflict Victims. Retrieved 13 June 2020 from URL: https://trialinternational.org/latest-post/nepal- 13-years-on-no-justice-for-conflict-victims/

UNICEF. (2007, Feb). The Paris Principles: Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups. Retrieved 2 Aug 2019 from URL: https://www.unicef.org/mali/media/1561/file/ParisPrinciples.pdf

UNICEF (2008, May). UNICEF Programme for the Reintegration of Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups in Nepal, Evaluation Report. Retrieved 14 Mar 2020 from URL: https://www.unicef.org/evaldatabase/files/Nepal_2008-008_- _CAAFAG_Evaluation_report__2008.pdf.

UNICEF. (2010, Oct). Child Poverty and Disparities in Nepal: Towards escaping the cycle of poverty. Nepal Report 2010. UNICEF, New York. Retrieved 12 Dec 2020 from URL: https://www.unicef.org/socialpolicy/files/Nepal_Child_Poverty_Report.pdf

UNICEF. (2013a, Feb). Children in Israeli military detention: observations and recommendations. UNICEF, New York. Retrieved 12 Dec 2020 from URL: https://www.unicef.org/oPt/UNICEF_oPt_Children_in_Israeli_Military_Detention_ Observations_and_Recommendations_-_6_March_2013.pdf

258

UNICEF (2013b, Sep). Annual Report 2013 – Sri Lanka, Retrieved 3 Mar 2020 from URL: https://www.unicef.org/about/annualreport/files/Sri_Lanka_COAR_2013.pdf

UNICEF. (2020a, Jun). UNICEF is Working to Free Child Soldiers Around the World. Retrieved 7 June 2021 from URL: https://www.unicefusa.org/stories/unicef-working-free-child-soldiers-around- world/35474

UNICEF. (2020b, Feb). Investing in the Future: A Universal Benefit for Sri Lanka's Children. Retrieved 14 June 2020 from URL: https://www.unicef.org/srilanka/reports/investing-future-universal-benefit-sri- lankas-children

UNICEF. (2021, Jan). What is the Convention on the Rights of the Child?. Retrieved 12 Jan 2021 from URL: https://www.unicef.org/child-rights- convention/what-is-the-convention

United Nations (UN). (1989). The Convention on the Rights of the Child.

United Nations (UN). (2006, Aug). Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS), Children and DDR. Retrieved Jun 25, 2020 from URL: https://www.unddr.org/modules/IDDRS-5.30-Children-and-DDR.pdf

United Nations (UN). (2009, Oct). United Nations Policy for Post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation and Reintegration. Retrieved 2 Dec 2019 from URL: https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5227107a4.pdf

United Nations (UN). (2013, Nov). The Six Grave Violations Against Children During Armed Conflict: The Legal Foundation. Report of the UN Secretary- General for Children and Armed Conflict. NY: USA: United Nations. Retrieved2 Dec 2020 from URL: https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/publications/WorkingPaper- 1_SixGraveViolationsLegalFoundation.pdf

259

United Nations (UN). (2015a, Feb). 4 out of 10 child soldiers are girls. UN Office of the Secretary-Generals Envoy on Youth. Retrieved 20 Jan 2021 from URL: https://www.un.org/youthenvoy/2015/02/4-10-child-soldiers-girls/

United Nations (UN). (2019). Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS). Retrieved Jun 25, 2020 from URL: https://www.unddr.org/theiddrs/#:~:text=%E2%80%9CThe%20Integrated%20Dis armament%2C%20Demobilization%20and,%2C%20Demobilization%20and%20 Reintegration%20(DDR)

United Nations (UN). (2021, Jan). Convention on the Rights of the Child. UN Treaty Series, vol. 1577.New York, 20 Nov 1989. Retrieved 20 Jan 2021 from URL: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV- 11&chapter=4&lang=en

United Nations (UN). (2018, May). Children and Armed Conflict. Report of the UN Secretary-General. A/72/865–S/2018/465. NY: USA: United Nations. Retrieved 2 Dec 2020 from URL: https://undocs.org/s/2018/465

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). (2002, May). Programme for internally displaced persons in Sri Lanka: Report of a joint appraisal mission by the UK Department for International Development and UNHCR, Geneva, Switzerland. Retrieved 28 January 2012 from URL: https://targeting.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/UNHCR%20Sr i%20Lanks%20Report.pdf

University Teachers for Human Rights Jaffna (2001, Jul), Jaffna. The fatal conjunction: women, continuing violations and accountability. Bulletin No. 25. 11 July 2001. Retrieved 8 Apr 2020 from URL http://www.uthr.org/bulletins/bul25.htm

260

Uppsala Conflict Data Program. (n.d.) UCDP database (Uppsala, Uppsala University). Retrieved 1 October 2020 from URL: http:// www.ucdp.uu.se/database/.

Upreti, B, & Shivakoti, S. (2018). The Struggle of Female Ex-Combatants in Nepal. Peace Review, 30(1), 78-86.

Upreti, B. R., Upreti, D., & Ghale, Y. (2020). Nepali Women in Politics: Success and Challenges. Journal of International Women's Studies, 21(2), 76-93.

Utas, M. (2005). West-African Warscapes: Victimcy, Girlfriending, Soldiering: Tactic Agency in a Young Woman's Social Navigation of the Liberian War Zone. Anthropological Quarterly, 78(2), 403-430.

Uvin, P. (2007, Oct). Ex-combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left, how they fared. Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) Working Paper No.3. Washington DC, USA: The World Bank.

Uyangoda, J. (2007). Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: Changing Dynamics. Policy Studies 32, Washington, D.C., USA: East-West Center.

Vaha, M. & Vastapuu, L. (2018). ‘My heart was already cooked’: girl soldiers and situated moral agencies. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 31(2), 223- 238.

Valentin, K. (2011). Modernity, education and its alternatives: schooling among the urban poor in Kathmandu. Globalisation, Societies and Education, 9(1), 99- 113.

Veale, A., & Stavrou, A. (2003). Violence, reconciliation and identity: the reintegration of Lord's Resistance Army Child Abductees in Northern Uganda (pp. 1-59). Pretoria, South Africa: ISS, Institute of Security Studies.

261

Vigh, H. E. (2006). Navigating terrains of war: Youth and soldiering in Guinea- Bissau. NY, USA: Berghahn Books.

Waltz, K. (1979). Theory of International Politics. CA, USA: Addison-Wesley publishing

War child. (2019). Rethink Child Soldiers: A new approach to the reintegration of all children associated with armed forces and groups. Resource Centre. Retrieved May 24, 2021, from URL: https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/node/11866/pdf/war_child_uk_rethink _child_soldiers_report_final.pdf

Watson, A. (2006). Children and International Relations: A New Site of Knowledge?. Review of International Studies, 32, 237-250.

Watson, A. (2009). Children’s Human Rights and the Politics of Childhood. In P. Hayden (Ed.) The Ashgate research companion to ethics and international relations (1st ed., pp. 247-260). London, UK: Routledge.

Watson, A. (2015). Resilience is its own resistance: The place of children in post- conflict settlement. Critical Studies on Security, 3(1), 47-61.

Watson, A. (2020) Centralizing Childhood, Remaking the Discourse. In J. Beier (Ed.). Discovering childhood in international relations (1st ed., pp. Pages 243- 261). London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Weiss, G. (2011). The Cage: The Fight for Sri Lanka and the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers. Random House.

Wells, K. (2009). Childhood in a Global Perspective. Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2009.

262

Wessells, M. (2006a). Child Soldiers: From Violence to Protection. London, UK: Harvard University Press.

Wessells, M. (2006b). A living wage: The importance of livelihood in reintegrating former child soldiers. A world turned upside down: Social ecological approaches to children in war zones, 179-97.

Wessells, M. (2007). The Recruitment and Use of Girls in Armed Forces and Groups in Angola: Implications for Ethical Research and Reintegration. Ford Institute for Human Security Working Papers, Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh.

Wessells, M. (2009). Supporting the Mental Health and Psychosocial Well-Being of Former Child Soldiers. American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 48(6), 587-590.

Wessells, M. (2019). Do no harm: how reintegration programmes for former child soldiers can cause unintended harm. In M. Drumbl & J. Barrett (Eds) Research Handbook on Child Soldiers (pp. 471–492). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Whelpton, J. (2005). A history of Nepal. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

White, B. (1999). Defining the Intolerable: Child Work, Global Standards and Cultural Relativism. Childhood, 6(1), 133-144.

Wickranasinghe, N. (2006). Sri Lanka in the Modern Age: A History of Contested Identities. London, UK: C. Hurst & Co. Ltd

Woodhead, M. (1999). Combatting Child Labour Listen to What the Children Say. Childhood, 6(1), 27–49.

263

World Health Organization (WHO). (2020, Feb). Female Genital Mutilation. Retrieved 15 Dec 2020 from URL: https://www.who.int/news-room/fact- sheets/detail/female-genital-mutilation

World Vision. (2019.). No Choice: It takes a world to end the use of child soldiers. Resource Centre. Retrieved May 24, 2021 from URL: https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/node/12038/pdf/wv_itaw_no_choice_p olicy_report_2019_sp_online_2.pdf

World Vision. (2020). How we can best help girl child soldiers. Retrieved 12 Dec 2020 from URL: https://www.wvi.org/stories/world-vision-view/how-can-we-best- help-girl-child-soldiers

Wyness, M. (2016). Childhood, Human Rights and Adversity: The Case of Children and Military Conflict. Children & Society, 30(5), 345-355. Yami, H, (Comrade Parvati) (2007). People's War and Women's Liberation in Nepal. Kathmandu, Nepal: Janadhwani Publication

Yadav, P. (2019) Speaking from the Ground: Transitional Gender Justice in Nepal. In R. Shackel & L. Fiske (Eds.). Rethinking Transitional Gender Justice: Transformative Approaches in Post-Conflict Settings (1st ed., pp. 221-238). London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan

Young, I. (2003). The Logic of Masculinist Protection: Reflections on the Current Security State. Signs 29(1), 1-25.

Yuval-Davis, N. (1997). Gender and Nation. London, UK: Sage Publications.

Zharkevich, I. (2009). A new way of being young in Nepal: The idea of Maoist youth and dreams of a new man. Studies in Nepali History and Society, 14(1), 67-105.

264

265

Appendix 1: Participant Information Sheet

Participant Information Sheet

Researcher: Kate Macfarlane, PhD student, School of Politics and Social Change, College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University

Project Title: Girl Child Soldiers in Sri Lanka and Nepal

General Outline of the Project:

Description and Methodology:

The purpose of my research is to provide case studies of girl child soldiers in the former armed groups, Liberation Tamil Tigers of Elam and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists). As well, this research seeks to understand the reintegration experiences of former child soldiers into communities to suggest better approaches or possible lessons learned in protecting child soldiers, especially girls, in post-conflict zones through peacebuilding and international and local government initiatives.

Participants: I intend to interview former LTTE and Maoists combatants, including former child soldiers, academics, government and policy makers and members of international organisations who work broadly on children and armed conflict issues. The expected number of participants is 40-60.

Use of Data and Feedback: Data collected will be used to complete a PhD dissertation, but it may be used as well for peer-reviewed publications in academic journals or books.

Participant Involvement:

Voluntary Participation & Withdrawal: Participation in this project is voluntary and you may, without any penalty and without providing an explanation, decline to take part or withdraw from the research at any time until the work is prepared for publication. You can also refuse to answer a question or tell me that you don’t want to talk about any particular issue. If you choose to withdraw, your data will be destroyed and not used at all.

What does participation in the research entail? Participants will be asked a series of questions in an interview setting. With your permission a record of the interview will either be made and I will also take written notes.

Location and Duration: Typically, the interview will take place only once and will take place at a location that is both convenient and safe for you. The interview will be carried out in a location convenient to you, or over skype or phone. Interviews will only take about 45 minutes.

266

Risks: It is possible that participating in this research may cause you emotional distress by bringing up painful or traumatic memories, or in worse cases, by triggering Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) symptoms. Therefore, it is important to carefully consider whether you are in the position to speak with me. Professional support services are provided in the information sheet should you need to speak with someone.

If I would like to quote any of the interview in future publications, I will seek permission from you before this is included. Please note that I will not use your real name or location.

Benefits: Although it is unlikely that you will personally benefit from participating in this research, it is expected that this research will contribute to a broader understanding of child soldiering in South Asia and protecting child soldiers, especially girls, in post- conflict settings in the future.

Confidentiality:

I will protect your confidentiality to the best of my ability and as far as the law allows. Only myself, the primary researcher, and my supervisor will have access to records of interviews, both electronically and in written from. The records will be kept in a personal PC secured by a password only known by the primary researcher and in a locked office. For attribution in future publications, I will always use a pseudonym. If I would like to quote you directly, I will also seek permission from you before doing so.

Privacy Notice:

In collecting your personal information within this research, the ANU must comply with the Privacy Act 1988. The ANU Privacy Policy is available at https://policies.anu.edu.au/ppl/document/ANUP_010007 and it contains information about how a person can: • Access or seek correction to their personal information; • Complain about a breach of an Australian Privacy Principle by ANU, and how ANU will handle the complaint.

Data Storage:

The transcripts and recordings will be kept in a locked cabinet in the project office, which is also locked after hours and is secure. Digital files will be kept on a password protected computers accessed only by the researchers. The data will be kept for at least five years following publication. Once I graduate, I will make appropriate arrangements with my department to archive the data in a secure ANU data repository in a de-identified format, or I will retain the data in protected, encrypted digital device in a de-identified format, which will be locked in a filing cabinet, in a locked location.

267

Queries and Concerns:

For further requests for information or queries regarding the study, participants can contact the primary investigator at any time, [email protected] or + 61 2 61250923. Participants may also contact the main supervisor of this research: Professor Tamara Jacka, [email protected];

Contact Details if in Distress:

Australia Sydney: Service for Treatment and Rehabilitation of Torture and Trauma Survivors 152– 168 The Horsley Drive Carramar NSW 2163 Phone: (02) 9794 1900 Fax: (02) 9794 1910 Email:[email protected]

Canberra: Companion House 41 Templeton St, Cook, ACT Phone number: (02) 6251 4550 http://www.companionhouse.org.au/about-us/

Nepal: Centre for Victims of Trauma 71 Reyukai Marg, Bansbari KMC ward No. 3, P. O. Box - 5839 Kathmandu Nepal Phone: +977- 1- 4373900/ 4373902

Sri Lanka: Hope Foundation No. 60C, Kambikotuwa, Thalahena, Negombo, Sri Lanka. E-mail: [email protected] Phone: +94 (0)772 853190

Ethics Committee Clearance:

The ethical aspects of this research have been approved by the ANU Human Research Ethics Committee (Protocol 2017/460). If you have any concerns or complaints about how this research has been conducted, please contact:

Ethics Manager The ANU Human Research Ethics Committee The Australian National University Telephone: +61 2 6125 3427 Email: [email protected]

268

Appendix 2: Missing former LTTE members

269

270

271