Egypt in Transition The Third Republic

BY M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI

n January 25, 2011, the Egyptian people took to the streets and in 18 days were able to bring down the 30-year corrupt dictatorial regime of , using entirely Opeaceful means. That revolution set the Arab Republic of on a hopeful path to democracy. After Mubarak resigned, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) became the custodian of the transition. In June of 2012, in Egypt’s first free and fair election, Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohammed Morsi was elected President. Slightly more than 50 percent of registered voters actually voted, and those voters gave Morsi a majority of just less than 52 percent. Having won by this slim margin, Morsi was sworn in as President on June 30, 2012, and thus the Second Republic came to be.1 The Second Republic

Five months later, Morsi declared his decisions beyond judicial review, and thus his authority unchallengeable. In December, 2012, he pushed a pro-Islamist constitution through a popular referendum; it passed but with less than 30 percent of the popular vote. There was no constitu- tional way to recall, impeach, or remove Morsi. The path to democracy was taking a turn towards theocratic autocracy. The serving People’s Assembly (Majliss al-Sha‘ab) had been elected under a law later declared unconstitutional. Over 60 percent of the members of the new parliament were Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and Salafists. To many both in and outside of Egypt who view the values of secular democracy and as overlapping, such values were at risk of being compro- mised by an Egyptian theocracy ruled by the MB. The MB’s democratic rise to power, however, had to be respected. Regrettably, the Second Republic was short-lived. Insofar as there was no way for popular democracy to change the theocratic course of events, on June 30, 2013, the Egyptian people reacted in the only way possible, with their feet in the streets. In response to the general deterioration of the political and economic situations, youth groups launched the Tamarud (Rebel) movement, gathering 22 million signatures petitioning for

M. Cherif Bassiouni is Emeritus Distinguished Research Professor of Law at DePaul University and the President Emeritus of the International Human Rights Law Institute.

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Morsi’s resignation. They along with other custody, selecting a new temporary president opposition groups planned protests demand- who was immediately sworn in. The majority ing the president’s resignation, a revocation of of the Egyptian people supported what the the 2012 Constitution, and a temporary return military did. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry to the 1971 Constitution until a new constitu- responded on August 2, 2013, from Islamabad, tion could be drafted, and new parliamentary Pakistan, stating that the military had restored and presidential elections held. Thirteen mil- Egypt to the path of democracy. Relying on lion people took to the streets calling for formal legality, the MB disagreed vehemently, Morsi’s ouster. Had a constitution been in holding that this was a military coup without place, an impeachment process would have legitimacy.2 The MB initiated a wave of civil been possible. The controversial new 2012 resistance, but also engaged in violence and Constitution provided for such a process in its disruption of public order. A number of vio- Article 156, but this could only be pursued lent incidents occurred; no one knows exactly before the People’s Assembly, which had not how many persons were killed and injured. yet been elected. Consequently, there was no Both sides accuse each other of initiating the constitutional process in place through which violence, and there is no doubt that an impar- impeachment could have been pursued. tial and fair investigation is needed.3 Excessive Between July 2 and 3, 2013, the army force appears to have been used by the security intervened in support of the popular demand forces and the military. The human conse- that Morsi be deposed and took Morsi into quences were appalling. Gigi Ibrahim

Tahrir Square. November 27, 2012

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These protests and demonstrations have accessing their homes and from circulating had a crippling effect on the life of , freely in and out of their neighborhoods. and prevented the country from moving for- These two locations and other smaller ones ward. While such events led to some sympathy became small fortifications ready to face any for the MB and attracted support outside of efforts by the security forces to remove those Egypt, they galvanized more Egyptians to sup- on the inside. Both sides were locked in their port the military and security forces, adding to respective positions. The security forces warned the country’s already significant level of polar- that they would act to remove those who had ization and radicalization. Supporters of the occupied the streets and public areas because MB increased their fervor for martyrdom as they were impeding traffic and infringing upon more of their protestors confronted security the rights of the inhabitants of these areas, in forces, even establishing a brigade whose addition to disrupting the economy and order members donned t-shirts reading “martyr” in of the nation. . They prepared for a major showdown. These and other demonstrations, protests, This was in effect a big battle for martyrdom. and marches by the MB were held in the name The MB has always hoped to attract sympathy of democracy, calling for the return of ousted and support, both abroad and at home, and President Morsi and the restoration of the indeed acted with this goal in mind. The for- 2012 Constitution. There are valid claims on mer is very likely, while the effect on the latter both sides. The MB have a valid claim based is likely to be the opposite. on the legality of the processes that brought The month of August, 2013, was hot in about the election of Morsi and the adoption every sense of the word, as violence escalated of the 2012 Constitution by public referen- in Egypt. At dawn on August 14, Egyptian secu- dum. The opposition has a claim based on rity forces (police and army) acted to remove legitimacy that transcends legality, namely that the MB and their supporters from public loca- Morsi had appropriated all powers without tions they had occupied since July 2 following regard to judicial overview of his executive the ouster of then-President Morsi. Two pri- decisions; that he had mismanaged the affairs mary locations were in , one at the inter- of state; that there was no constitutional or section and public square known as al-Rabca other legal mechanism for his recall, removal, cAdawiyya, the other at al- Square. The or impeachment; and that the 2012 protestors were in other locations in Cairo as Constitution had been rammed through a well as other parts of Egypt, and engaged in popular referendum after having been pro- periodic public demonstrations. The two Cairo duced by a committee appointed by a legisla- locations were converted into inhabited make- ture established unconstitutionally and whose shift towns with field hospital tents and phar- elected officials had been dismissed. macies, as well as cooking, housing, and food A negotiated political solution was urged storage tents. Both of these camps had con- internally and externally. Internally, then-Tem- crete and stone barriers made of stone blocks porary Vice President Mohammad al-Baradei removed from the streets. They became forti- (who resigned on August 14, 2013) called on fied areas. Traffic was impeded and the inhab- the nephew of the late President itants of these areas were prevented from to convene a meeting of all political factions

PRISM 4, no. 4 FEATURES | 5 BASSIOUNI to discuss a solution to the crisis. The MB since July 2, 2013, there has been a crackdown refused and the effort was not pursued. The on the MB. Somewhere between 1,000 and Ministry of Transitional Justice, which had 8,000 MB supporters have been detained. In been established by decree of Temporary addition to Morsi, most of the Brotherhood’s President Adly Mansour and whose cabinet senior leaders have been imprisoned and their position was occupied by a distinguished, media outlets have been shut down. Criminal retired administrative Judge, Amin el-Mahdi, trials are being prepared for the former was basically “dead on arrival.” No initiative President and the leadership, and there is a was taken by the new Minister. definite feeling that things are returning to the All of this did not help Egypt progress nor repressive days of . address the country’s dire economic and social The Third Republic problems. The military maintain that they do not wish to retain political power and that For all practical purposes, Egypt’s Third General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi does not seek to Republic began on July 4, 2013. The birth of be a dictator. They say that they wish to see the Third Republic coincided with the anniver- Egypt on a path of stability, moving towards sary of the American Declaration of democracy in a way that fits Egyptian culture Independence. Let us hope that this historical and needs. But let there be no doubt about it: coincidence augurs well for Egypt’s future. In Mohamed Elsayed brahim

Pro-Morsi protesters in Damietta on July 5, 2013

6 | FEATURES PRISM 4, no. 4 EGYPT IN TRANSITION the meantime, tragic events immediately else that impacts the Arab and Muslim worlds. unfolded, resulting in an estimated 1,000 It is only the enormous reservoir of goodwill deaths and 4,000 injuries over the span of just that Arabs have for Americans that keeps Arab 72 hours. Exact numbers are difficult to ascer- and Muslim countries from giving up entirely tain. The Egyptian people have been trauma- on the U.S. as a reliable, friendly state. tised by this unprecedented experience of vio- Attacks on Christians lence. The government has not undertaken official investigations. Instead, there was a There has been a sharp rise in attacks on rejection by the cabinet at its August meeting Christians and Christian-owned property in of proposals for establishing fact-finding or Egypt since the events of August 14, 2013. In truth commissions. No efforts were made by apparent response to the dispersals on August the UN to establish an international commis- 14, supporters of the MB across Egypt, particu- sion. larly in Upper Egypt, engaged in acts of vio- Freedom and democracy are also among lence against churches and other Christian- the casualties. Whether the country will turn owned property. At least 42 churches into what some have described as a police nation-wide were burned or ransacked, and state, is at this point speculative. Both sides, other Christian-owned businesses or property the regime and the MB and its Islamist sup- were attacked.5 Egyptian authorities, particu- porters, are acting on the basis of two totally larly police forces, have consistently failed to opposing realities that inform their policies prevent these sectarian attacks and were not and actions. Egyptian society is strongly polar- present at their sites even after they were made ized and partially radicalized—each side feed- aware that they were taking place. According to ing upon their respective perceptions, using Human Rights Watch, sectarian violence in examples of violent and repressive actions as recent months has occurred in eight governor- evidence to support their suspicions. There is ates, and three Coptic Christians and one almost no political center remaining in Egypt, Muslim were killed as a result of attacks in at least none able to mediate between the two Dalga, Minya and Cairo. Egyptian authorities extremes. And there are no emerging moral lost control of the town of Dalga in southern leaders who have credibility with both sides. Minya to Islamists between July 3 (the day The country is on the verge of an eco- Morsi was ousted) and mid-September, during nomic abyss, and the present instability only which time the town saw the worst sectarian adds to the risks it is facing. The accumulation violence in Egypt in recent memory.6 The town of social and political problems will render has a population of about 120,000 of which stability more difficult to achieve. The regional 20,000 are Christians, and was overtaken by implications are yet to be felt, as are larger geo- radical Islamists who twice fought attempts by political consequences. Admittedly the U.S. is the army to regain control of the area. A in a difficult position. Notwithstanding its best 1650-year-old monastery and the two churches intentions, the Obama administration man- in the town were burned or looted, about 1000 ages to continue to be viewed by all parties Christians have fled, and those who remain in concerned as ambiguous and untrustworthy. the town generally have been staying indoors Maybe it is this perception more than anything for fear of harassment.7 Other residents of

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Minya have relayed to researchers that some- government to make the case for a crackdown one had been drawing black Xs on Christian- on supporters of the MB, which may in fact owned storefronts to distinguish them from give further momentum to militant activity in Muslim-owned businesses so they could be Upper Egypt and Sinai. easily identified and attacked.8 Following The attacks followed weeks of sectarian police practices of the Mubarak days, “recon- discourse by public speakers at the two major ciliation sessions” in the presence of local offi- sit-ins dispersed in August 2013, as well as cials, were held in August to pressure Coptic local groups and religious leaders in different Christians to withdraw complaints they had Egyptian governorates, suggesting that submitted against police stations in return for Christians were somehow at least partly their safety.9 Some in Dalga said that some responsible for Morsi’s removal from power, town residents even asked for money in and inciting attacks against them.12 exchange for protecting local Christians, in ref- Whatever the posture of the present erence to a tax that was imposed on Christians regime may be, politically, with respect to the centuries ago.10 These developments are in protection of non-Muslims, particularly the effect a breakdown of the rule of law, and a Copts, it is no different than the Mubarak clear failure by the state to fulfill one of its regime. most basic obligations, the protection of citi- Strikes Against Democracy zens from violence. When security forces brought heavy weapons to reclaim control of In the late hours on July 8 2013, Temporary the town, it was not to protect Christians, but President Mansour announced a new interim was rather to catch a fugitive Islamist, accord- Constitutional Declaration and a political ing to the Interior Ministry.11 timetable. In so doing, he assumed legislative powers. This new document outlines the time- line to re-establish a democratic system of gov- This violence significantly helps the current ernment while positing certain basic principles military-backed government to make the case about the nature of the state. In short, the for a crackdown on supporters of the MB, Third Republic intends these principles to be which may in fact give further momentum to drafted in a manner that will appeal to all con- militant activity in Upper Egypt and Sinai. cerned political sectors of society. The military, which made this transforma- tion possible, preserved its autonomy in Article The governorates of Minya and Asyut are 19, which grants military courts complete both Islamist strongholds; yet, they both have independence in their affairs. Article 21 con- relatively large Christian populations. This rise firms that the armed forces are the sole protec- in Islamist violent, sectarian activity against tor of the nation. Article 22 limits discussion Christians, in addition to a growing militant of the armed forces’ budget to a “National movement in the , shows the Defence Committee” likely to be dominated inability or unwillingness of the security forces by the military. But perhaps the most impor- to protect Christians. This violence signifi- tant provision is Article 23, which does not cantly helps the current military-backed define the President as head of the armed

8 | FEATURES PRISM 4, no. 4 EGYPT IN TRANSITION forces—a claim that ousted President Morsi or creed.” Article 6 states that no citizen may repeatedly made to confirm the executive’s be “arrested, searched, detained, or restricted power over the military. The military has not in movement or freedom” except in cases of only confirmed its autonomy in every respect, flagrante delicto or with an order from a judge it has also placed itself outside any constitu- or the state prosecutor. Article 8 protects the tional limit, which is a blow to democracy freedom of the press, deleting the 2012 with serious consequences for the rule of law, Constitution’s feared “Parliamentary Press particularly when it comes to the military Committee” that would have been given the courts exercising jurisdiction over civilians. In right to monitor the press and regulate which short, the military is no longer under civilian organizations could and could not publish. control; instead, it is the controller of civilian Article 10 grants full rights for peaceful meet- power. So much for democracy in the making. ings and demonstrations of all types. Private The new Constitutional Declaration gives meetings are also now allowed, and no mem- the Salafists confirmation of the Islamic nature ber of the security forces has the right to attend of the state. Article 1 states specifically that “[t] or listen in on the proceedings of private meet- he principles of Islamic Law and that includes ings. But all of these rights and freedoms are its sources, norms, and principles that are to “subject to law,” which means that current and be found in the recognized schools of law of future legislation regulating these freedoms the Sunna, are the primary source of legisla- and rights can restrict them. And that too is a tion.” This is an expansion from the 1971 violation of international human rights law Constitution (amended in 1980) that stated, and the ICCPR. “The principles of Islamic law are the primary Although this Constitutional Declaration source of legislation.” This new Article 1 adds was relatively well drafted, it is ambiguous in that the Supreme Constitutional Court can places and leaves many questions unanswered. only recognize Sunni jurisprudence, rejecting Most significantly, it suspends and yet at the any other Muslim jurisprudential school. This same time relies on the 2012 Constitution, was designed to assuage the Salafists. Article 7 while simultaneously relying on the 1971 states that freedom of religion is for the three Constitution—which the 2012 Constitution Abrahamic religions, ignoring the country’s supersedes. This is symptomatic of the con- other minority populations. Therefore the tinuing confusion in the use of constitutional Baha’i, Hindu, and Buddhist in Egypt will not instruments as a way of achieving the political be able to exercise their religious beliefs in goals of those in power. This was obvious in public places or as groups. This Article violates 2011, during the period in which the SCAF had the International Covenant on Civil and taken over all powers. The current Declaration Political Rights (hereinafter the ICCPR), to seeks to give something to everybody, yet which Egypt is a party. leaves all sides in doubt. The Islamists are still The Constitutional Declaration also apprehensive that the freedoms granted in the attempts to modestly address the concerns of Declaration could open the door to what they liberals by expanding general freedoms. Article perceive to be “blasphemy” or “attacks on 4 declares all citizens equal under the law Islam.” The liberals question contradictions in regardless of “origin, type, language, religion, rights and freedoms, and wonder how future

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laws will restrict them. Both camps have rea- plummeted to an estimated 25-35 percent of son to be wary of the continued preferred posi- its pre-revolution, pre-2011 levels. A substan- tion of the military that will operate as a state tial portion of the workforce joined the ranks within a state. of the unemployed, adding to the already 60 The Constitutional Declaration also sets percent unemployment rate among those forth what may prove to be an unrealistic time- under 30 who represent 50 percent of Egypt’s table for the country’s normalization. The 84 million people. Egypt’s foreign timetable is ambitious but it is also non-bind- reserves, valued at $39 billion in January 2011, ing. Even if it were binding, those who could declined to a mere $11 billion by March 2013, enforce it are those who created it. Any reason- of which $5 billion are believed to have been able assessment would conclude that this in bullion and $6 billion in treasury timetable is intended to show that democracy authorizations which cannot be used at the is in the making, that what happened was not international level. Egypt’s economic credit has a military coup, and more importantly, that all but disappeared, and all financial transac- the military is not interested in seizing power. tions, including government ones, have to be Nevertheless the Declaration is primarily a made on a cash basis. The loan for approxi- transparent way for the military to control the mately $4.5 billion Egypt had started to nego- future course of Egypt’s political life. tiate with the IMF in early 2011 (immediately following the January 25 Revolution) was never finalized because the Morsi Egypt’s economic credit has all but Administration could not agree to removing disappeared, and all financial transactions, government subsidies from electricity, gas, and including government ones, have to be made on food staples. In any event, that loan was only a cash basis. going to help Egypt in its 2013-2014 fiscal year. and Qatar deposited sub- stantial amounts with Egypt’s , but these were in the nature of foreign depos- The Transition its, which may have helped to give some com- The Morsi government abjectly failed to fort to investors but were not intended for address the economic needs of the country. For economic development projects. In fact, the all practical purposes, his government con- government had no economic development sisted of marginally competent cabinet offi- plan. Nevertheless, the government did use cers. But more importantly, there was no eco- some of these funds, thus exposing the trea- nomic policy. Not even the most elementary sury to a substantial debt in addition to any stop-gap measures to prevent the continued other debts that the treasury may discover as a free-fall of the economy were put in place. result of the collapse of previous investment Public safety continued to deteriorate as street projects, particularly in the tourism sector. The gangs and thieves became more brazen, and Egyptian Treasury will still be indebted to the country’s economic productivity spiralled Saudi Arabia and Qatar for sums estimated at downwards. Tourism, which has long been $8 billion dollars. These two countries could Egypt’s second largest source of income, forgive this debt, extend the loan in time, or

10 | FEATURES PRISM 4, no. 4 EGYPT IN TRANSITION use it as credit to acquire failed and failing eco- the Office of Guidance, including the Guide nomic projects from the public and private himself, proved ill-prepared to administer a sectors. But any such acquisitions would be country. made at bargain prices, thus further undermin- As the economy went from bad to worse, ing the Egyptian economy. one of the consequences was a significant The substantial revenue loss due to the acceleration in migration from rural to urban decrease in tourism and other economic fac- areas. Cairo saw an increase of more than two tors resulted in a substantial loss in the value million people in two years. The new-comers of the Egyptian , which went from 6 reside in shanty-towns built outside of existing EGP per dollar to 8 EGP in the relatively short shanty-towns. As the numbers increased, so period of six months in 2013. This reflected the did the demand for electricity and water, factors mentioned above and a high inflation which the city cannot supply. By the time the rate, which during the Morsi period of one June 30, 2013, protests began, the city of Cairo year was approximately 18 percent across the lacked electricity for an average of three hours board and higher in certain sectors, particu- per day, and several neighborhoods lacked larly the food sector which affects all water for up to four hours per day. Other cities Egyptians. This particularly impacted the 20 also suffered similar shortages. There were million Egyptians who before the Morsi gov- shortages of gasoline and bread, both of which ernment took office lived on an average of $2 are critical in the daily life of Egyptians. Public per day, or the equivalent of 10-12 EGP. With transportation broke down and rail transporta- the purchasing power of the pound dropping tion, which is essential particularly to link so significantly, these 20 million people who Upper Egypt to Cairo, became less and less were on the brink of poverty have been hurled reliable. Protestors and mobs stopped trains over the edge. and barricaded roads, while small gangs sim- All of these economic factors had a sig- ply hijacked cars and trucks on highways, even nificant political impact, resulting in a loss of in Cairo. The government was unable to confidence in the Morsi government and in the respond to any of these crises. MB. This was coupled with the obvious inept- In the end, the Egyptian people lost ness, not to say incompetence, of many cabinet patience with this situation and saw the pros- officers and government appointees, as well as pect of an Islamist form of government augur- a dysfunctional office of the president itself. ing more of what they were already struggling Issue after issue developed into crisis after cri- to endure. The June 30 popular action was sis, with the government unable to address any therefore not only driven by political beliefs, of them and the presidency unable to respond. but also by practical exigencies. After a year of what could politely be described A Delicate Situation for the U.S. as a government in disarray, it was obvious to the Egyptian people that Morsi was not a com- The Obama Administration reacted to petent president. In fact it was clear that he was these recent events with ambiguity, as it had a figurehead, and that most decisions were since January 2011, and for that matter, to the made by the MB’s Office of Guidance. entire region throughout the “.” Its Regrettably whoever was calling the shots at position, as reflected in public statements by

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President Obama and spokespersons for the Egyptian people and the military at this critical administration, has frequently come across as juncture. It is essential for the U.S. to maintain unfocused and unclear, sending inconsistent its contacts with the Egyptian military in order messages. On July 2, the U.S. warned the to retain its leverage and to influence both against a coup, threat- political and strategic outcomes. ening to suspend military aid while at the A security vacuum in the Sinai has already same time encouraging President Morsi to allowed Islamist militants to establish them- hold early elections (whether for the presi- selves in the north of the peninsula. From this dency or the People’s Assembly is unclear). But position they have launched attacks on soon thereafter the administration changed its Egyptian troops and police as well as on Israeli position. forces, forcing the current regime to embark on Mixed messages aside, it is clear that the the country’s largest military campaign since United States must continue to assist Egypt if the 1967 war. The strategic importance of the it wishes to maintain its influence. The admin- Sinai and its proximity to the make istration must not threaten to cut off military control of the area critical to U.S. interests. aid or any other form of economic assistance. Maintaining ties and providing aid and The last thing the U.S. needs is to offend the behind-the-scenes assistance may be the best

During the “Arab Spring” a man carries a card illustrating the vital role played by social networks in initiating the uprising.

12 | FEATURES PRISM 4, no. 4 EGYPT IN TRANSITION way to ensure that Egypt regains and retains for the Arab world, and avoid being pushed control over this crucial area. into decisions about the region by domestic If the Egyptian military becomes fed-up politics. The administration must fully realize with U.S. threats to cut off military assistance, that the lights along the banks of the Potomac Egypt could turn to Russia in the same way it do not illuminate the banks of the , or for did in 1956. Well aware of this historic prece- that matter the Tigris and Euphrates, the Litani, dent, Russian President Vladimir Putin already or the Yarmouk. made a declaration in Moscow to the effect Last but not least, it is important to note that Russia would be willing to provide Egypt that the saga of the Palestinian people is nei- with military assistance to prevent the situa- ther dead nor forgotten in the Arab world. tion from devolving into what he called a What happens in Egypt’s Sinai will be affected “civil war.” If Egypt shifted its military supply by what happens in Gaza, and what happens sourcing to Russia and the U.S. was cut out, in Gaza will be affected by what Egypt does in American influence in much of the region Sinai. Similarly, what happens in the West would vanish. The Arab world would be Bank will be affected by what Israel does there, divided once again, as it was after 1956, and what happens in Jordan will be affected between the monarchies and the republics. A by what happens in the West Bank. The Arab new revolutionary flame would be lit, and the world is much more interconnected than most U.S. would become the common enemy for people in Washington believe it to be. most Arab states. This is challenging for the U.S. adminis- Leaving aside the geopolitical conse- tration, which should take bold steps in the quences of such a situation, its most direct economic arena to assist Egypt—as well as effect would be to unify the revolutionary fer- Syria and Tunisia. It should also create initia- vor existing in the countries that have gone tives in Libya, which does not need economic through the “Arab Spring.” That in turn may assistance but could benefit from technical reinforce the position of Islamist movements. assistance on many levels. The U.S. could be It would also destabilize the monarchies and the champion of new constitutions and the could ignite sectarian war in some of the Gulf rule of law, advocating the values and princi- States, with the incitement of Iran. This would ples we most venerate. But the administration also constitute a threat to the security of Israel, has to live up to these values and principles; which would force the U.S. to take a more the President cannot only make speeches direct role in providing security for that coun- about them. Guantánamo and the wars in try. And more direct U.S. involvement in pro- Afghanistan and Iraq will continue to haunt viding military support and protection to the U.S., as does its unconditional support of Israel would in turn cause an escalation in Israel at the cost of even minimal justice for Arab antagonism towards the U.S. the Palestinian people. Our own double stan- All of this leads to the conclusion that the dards will always be a bar to our credibility U.S. should be very discrete in its pronounce- with the Arab peoples. But this too can change, ments, develop an integrated regional policy if the political will exists.

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Looking Ahead contradictory facts that need to be addressed in order to avoid more violence and a greater Every revolution raises questions of legitimacy schism within a society already sharply and legality. Some revolutions have legitimate divided. claims, grievances, and goals, but they seldom A political solution must be found, even address or achieve them through lawful pro- though the European Union, the U.S., and cesses. Had such a process existed, the legiti- many other countries have called upon the macy of these claims would have been Egyptian military to do whatever possible to addressed without demonstrations or violence. prevent violent incidents. But without follow- Revolutions are the last resort. up, it became clear that these were empty The Egyptian people have demonstrated exhortations. Egypt has become deeply that they want popular democracy and the rule divided, and the polarization that has devel- of law in their country. They should be sup- oped between the MB and the rest of Egyptian ported. Notwithstanding the above, excessive society is not likely to abate by itself. The divi- use of force by the military and security forces sions have spread beyond large urban centers cannot be justified. As many have asserted, into the countryside, where they have turned there must be an independent and impartial families and neighbors against one another. commission of inquiry to look into recent No internal political mechanism is likely to events, not only in Cairo but in other parts of work under the present circumstances. This is Egypt. There are too many conflicting and a dangerous sign for a society that needs to be Ahmed Abd El-Fatah Ahmed Abd

Tahrir Square. July 29, 2011. Friday of Unity.

14 | FEATURES PRISM 4, no. 4 EGYPT IN TRANSITION united in order to face and overcome a multi- through August 2013. But neither the United tude of contemporary challenges. If this polar- States nor the EU is pressing that point, and ization continues, social divisions will deepen without it, the military regime will not do it and political stability will be threatened, for fear of embarrassment. The military is thereby counteracting attempts at decisive extremely sensitive to any criticism and will leadership and preventing any party from not even allow any inquiry in any of its obtaining the broad-based support needed to actions, and the security forces simply do not address these issues. In particular, it is clear want the blame to fall on them, even though that the country’s economic crisis will worsen their tactical operations have demonstrated in the coming months, an issue that cannot be excessive use of force. Clearly, there can be no addressed or resolved in the midst of political progress towards reconciliation without estab- and social tumult. lishing the facts – the truth is always part of Throughout Egypt’s history, the one thing justice. If there is to be any reconciliation, any that has always held it together is the sense of national harmonization and coming together, “Egyptian-ness.” This includes the Muslim and it is crucial that an accurate record be estab- the Copt, the rural and the urban, the rich and lished of the participants to any particular act, the poor. Egypt has progressed when its people what occurred and why—particularly those have been united and regressed when its peo- ple have been divided. If no charismatic leader If there is to be any reconciliation, any has emerged to unify the people around the national harmonization and coming Egypt that every Egyptian carries in his or her together, it is crucial that an accurate record heart, then maybe the people will have the be established of the participants to any political maturity and common sense to come particular act, what occurred and why to that conclusion on their own. In the meantime, Egyptians must avoid sectarianism. The MB must cease claiming that there is a religious war between the righteous that resulted in multiple deaths and injuries. and the kuffar, meaning anybody who dis- An impartial and fair commission must deter- agrees with them or advocates secularism. The mine where responsibility lies, particularly Salafists must realize that they, like the MB and with respect to international criminal respon- other Islamists, are part of an Egypt that can sibility for what could be considered crimes claim adherence to Islamic values but must against humanity, torture, or violations of also establish a non-sectarian form of govern- internationally protected human rights. As it ment that guarantees the rights of all citizens, is now, conflicting accounts may be due to the Muslim and non-Muslim alike, irrespective of polarization mentioned above, as each politi- their faith, color, gender, and any other distinc- cal protagonist group offers a different narra- tion. tive based on sometimes radically different An international or national fact-finding interpretations of the same facts, and some- commission should be established to ascertain times based on different facts altogether.13 But and assess the events that led to the establish- these are essential truths that are foundational ment of the Third Republic in early July up for any process of national reconciliation.

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The discordant and fractured nature of reinstatement of the “state of emergency” laws Egypt today, and the factors stated above, will that were employed for decades by Mubarak have significant consequences for Egypt’s con- and only recently declared unconstitutional by tinued stability and sustainability. The Third Egypt’s highest court. The effect of these con- Republic is here to stay, in one form or frontations and their fall-out has left average another, and the military will have a strong Egyptians feeling drained, with an overwhelm- role in it for the foreseeable future. The mili- ing desire for stability, sustainability, and eco- tary may formally retreat from its current nomic growth. highly visible public role, but will maintain As history teaches, instability and eco- control over society by pulling the strings from nomic decline often lead to military dictator- behind the curtain, thereby maintaining its ship. Thus in a perverse sense the MB’s efforts own “state within a state.” This includes an are not only unlikely to lead the country already significant part of the national econ- towards democracy, but may instead produce omy, namely military industries and other its polar opposite. The declining economic interests in different economic sectors. situation that is evident today will have a con- Alternatively, the military may take over the tinuing impact on the country’s overall human executive branch and rule the country directly, development, which has already been at risk as Gamal Abdel Nasser did in 1954. for at least the past decade and more so since the revolution began in 2011.14 No matter what the future government of Egypt looks like, its The declining economic situation that is priority will necessarily entail stabilizing the evident today will have a continuing impact country’s government, economy, political par- on the country’s overall human development, ties, civil society, and general public. which has already been at risk for at least the Competency will—and indeed must—be a past decade and more so since the revolution prime prerequisite for those appointed to cab- began in 2011. inet and sub-cabinet positions. These new leaders must also possess integrity and clearly stand above the fray and the furore of contem- The continuing exponential increase in porary Egyptian politics. population and the fall in agricultural output Requiem for the Arab Spring and industrial productivity will have dire con- sequences that will take decades to reverse. The A new alliance has been forged between deepening effects of the economic crisis are Egypt’s Third Republic, the U.S., and the Saudi- experienced by most Egyptians, which explains led Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). From why they continue to support the military and the perspective of regional policy, this will pro- security forces, notwithstanding the casualties duce results substantially similar to those that among the MB, who have in turn reactivated existed under the Mubarak regime. Egypt’s their “secret organization” and returned to vio- Third Republic is unlikely to do anything that lent tactics. In fact, this violence has helped the will upset its relations with Israel or endanger current military-backed government to justify the peaceful relationship between the two, its crackdown on supporters of the MB and a which is indispensible to Egypt maintaining

16 | FEATURES PRISM 4, no. 4 EGYPT IN TRANSITION good relations with the United States. Egypt upheaval.16 By way of analogy, it is like a seis- will work much more closely with Saudi mic area with multiple volcanoes erupting at Arabia and through it with the United Arab different times and sometimes simultaneously. Emirates and other GCC countries, particularly All of that to say, in the most diplomatic of in the areas of economic cooperation and terms, that the situation in the Arab world, political support. Qatar, which was the princi- including Egypt, is fluid, unpredictable, and pal funder of the MB, has a new Emir who will potentially explosive. toe the Saudi line. It is already reported that Qatar has cut funding for the MB. All of that to say, in the most diplomatic of For all practical purposes, this is the end terms, that the situation in the Arab world, of the “Arab Spring,”15 but not of confronta- including Egypt, is fluid, unpredictable, and tions and violence in different parts of the potentially explosive. Arab world. In Syria, the casualty count now far exceeds 130,000 killed, an inestimable number of persons injured, and an estimated No End in Sight to Ambiguity nine million refugees and internally displaced persons. It appears more likely that the situa- The Obama administration finds itself in tion in Syria will play itself out over death and a dilemma. Many accuse the United States destruction only to ultimately result in a settle- of being disingenuous, playing both sides ment imposed by external forces. But when against the middle and one side against will that come, and after how many casualties, the other. Ambiguity is the worst possible and how much destruction of the country is policy in the Arab world, and particularly in unknown. Yemen continues to suffer from Egypt at this time. The type of constructive ongoing internal strife, but little attention is ambiguity that once was the hallmark of paid to it by the world. Iraq continues in its the Nixon administration, as carried out 17 own incessant ethnic violence with almost by Henry Kissinger, is no longer workable daily incidents. Since the Maliki regime has in the Arab world. Technology has made taken over with the support of Iran, an esti- information access and communication mated 10,000 people have been killed and as much easier and faster, and has left little many as 100,000 people injured. Libya contin- to the secretive recesses of diplomacy. So ues to be a chaotic scene where militias control much is known by so many and so fast that the country and operate as gangs. They have Machiavellian diplomacy is very difficult to virtually stopped oil production and export, carry out. kidnapped the Prime Minister from his resi- The Obama administration has to decide dence, seized public places at will – all of that how it can support the Egyptian military, at the because the United States and NATO never risk of alienating those who advocate democ- planned for the post-Qaddafi period. Where racy and human rights in the international else violence will erupt in the Arab world is community, and also achieve freedom and unpredictable, but many hotspots exist, such democracy. Ambiguity looks like dithering, as in Jordan, Morocco, and even Algeria. The indecisiveness, and lack of resolve. At this Arab world remains in a constant state of point, the United States is already losing

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support among Egyptians, even though it is Interior for the training of police officers alleged that Secretary Hagel and General responsible for riot control, and for the pros- Dempsey have consistently reassured their ecutors who ensure that guidelines on the use counterparts in the Egyptian military that U.S. of force are adequately observed and that the support and cooperation will continue, though rights of the accused are safeguarded. More subject to disruptions such as the postpone- importantly, the U.S. must insist on the reform ment of the delivery of F-16 aircraft and other of prisons and fund such an initiative. Prison military equipment and parts. But subject to conditions are appalling by international stan- diplomatically conveyed conditions, on dards, as recently revealed in a New York Times October 9, 2013, the U.S. stated it would be article.20 These are the hallmarks of a society cut a large part of the $1.3 billion military aid living according to the rule of law. All of these it sends to Egypt annually until the Egyptian are fairly low-cost programmes. In fact, cumu- government takes the necessary steps to restore latively they would not even amount to the democracy, in light of the continued crack- price of one F-16, but they would have a sig- down on Islamists.18 More particularly, it nificant impact in Egypt and thus would be a would suspend the delivery of large-scale mil- credit to the U.S.21 itary systems and withhold cash support. In Conclusion response to this, the Egyptian government has said this move was wrong and that Egypt Throughout this article, the reader will no “would not surrender to American pressure.”19 doubt see that there are interspersed conclu- U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, however, has sions within different sections. But, at the risk made clear that this cut in aid is not a with- of sounding like a self-appointed pundit, I can drawal from relations with Egypt, and has not conclude that Egypt is in the throes of a mili- made clear what the necessary steps are to tary dictatorship, which for some is benign, and certainly for the MB, is not so at all. The U.S. seems satisfied, though uncomfortable, Egypt is in the throes of a military dictatorship, with the situation. It is after all no different which for some is benign, and certainly for the than the way things were under Mubarak and MB, is not so at all. The U.S. seems satisfied, Sadat, though for the time being with much though uncomfortable, with the situation. more repression and violence concentrated in a relatively short period of time. The MB are not likely to give up, and they will continue restore democracy. either with peaceful demonstrations, violent The United States should reassure the ones, attacks on Christians in Upper Egypt, or Egyptian people that it will continue providing with acts of sabotage. The Regime is likely to assistance. This means that USAID staff that respond with the same level of harshness. The who been evacuated from Cairo should return media is likely to be more constrained and less and resume their activities. This is particularly free than in the Second Republic, under the true with respect to providing technical assis- MB. Even now the media is under greater tance to the Ministry of Justice for the training restrictions than it had been in the past two of judges, as well as to the Ministry of the decades of the Mubarak regime. In a

18 | FEATURES PRISM 4, no. 4 EGYPT IN TRANSITION confidentially leaked video of senior Egyptian Notwithstanding the above as well as the army officers published in the New York lack of democracy, the United States and the Times, it was clear and unequivocal that the EU will normalize relations with Egypt and military are concerned about the media and look the other way whenever it will suit them. have embarked on establishing a policy of “red The future for Egypt and for Egyptians lines.” But it is the economy that will sink does not look good objectively, but then for Egypt as it is sinking itself. No amount of some particular reason, some say supernatural, financial loans or deposits by Saudi Arabia or Egypt and Egyptians have always survived. As the Gulf States will be a cure for a rapidly the late President Sadat once told me during declining economy in the face of an exponen- an overnight visit at his hometown house at tially growing population, which even now Mit Abu el-Kom, “don’t worry about Egypt, it relies for 50 percent of its food supplies on has lived for 7,000 years and it will live for a foreign imports. No one in Egypt speaks of the long time to come.” PRISM existing economic crisis, and there are no plans to address it other than band-aid solu- tions designed to limit inflationary growth. The security situation in the Sinai is an ongo- ing threat that is likely to increase particularly NOTES as Hamas in Gaza will support it. Will the military option be to attack Gaza? Israel would 1 The First Republic was declared on 18 June surely find such an option in its interest, as it 1953 and ended with the resignation of Mubarak on would draw Egypt into a new quagmire as it 18 February 2011. The Second Republic lasted from tries to deal with almost 1.5 million inhabit- 30 June 2012 until 4 July 2013. 2 ants of Gaza. This will also be a test for the Bear in mind the distinction between legality and legitimacy, the former being a formal, legal and military that so far has had so much difficulty political process, and the latter reflecting the higher in the Sinai. values and principles usually reflected in a constitu- Egyptian society is deeply polarized with tion. 3 most of the population favouring the current M. Cherif Bassiouni and Daniel Rothenberg, The Chicago Principles on Post-Conflict Justice (DePaul military leadership and yearning for political University International Human Rights Law Institute, stability and economic development. But this 2008); See also M. Cherif Bassiouni, Post-Conflict is also an opportunity for the security forces to Justice (Transnational Publishers 2002); The Right to Restitution, Compensation, and Rehabilitation for and some elements of the military to eliminate Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and the MB once and for all, which explains the Fundamental Freedoms, 18 January 2000, UN Doc. E/ ongoing repression against them, and the CN.4/2000/62. 4 absence of any positive steps toward reconcili- “EU to suspend export licenses for weapons used by Egypt,” Egypt Independent, August 21, 2013. ation. This is not a good course of conduct, as http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/eu-suspend-export- the estimated three million MB activists and licenses-weapons-used-egypt. their supporters cannot simply be eliminated. 5 Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Mass Attacks on Wisdom would require reconciliation, but wis- Churches,” August 22, 2013, http://www.hrw.org/ news/2013/08/21/egypt-mass-attacks-churches. dom is not prevailing in Egypt at the moment. 6 Patrick Kingsley, “Egyptian authorities re-capture Islamist-held town,” The Guardian,

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September 16, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/ bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-09/u-s-suspends-cash-and- world/2013/sep/16/egyptian-police-recapture-islamist-town- equipment-assistance-to-egyptian-military.html. delga?CMP=twt_gu. 19 “Egypt condemns US decision to suspend 7 David D. Kirkpatrick, “In Islamist Bastions of military aid” BBC News, October 10, 2013, http://www. Egypt, the Army Treads Carefully, And Christians Do, bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24471148. Too,” The New York Times, September 17, 2013, http:// 20 David D. Kirkpatrick, “Westerners’ Smuggled www.nytimes.com/2013/09/17/world/middleeast/in-islamist- Letters Offer Glimpse of Egyptian Prisons” The New bastions-of-egypt-the-army-treads-carefully-and-christians-do- York Times, October 1, 2013, available at: http://www. too.html?hp&_r=0&gwh=64CD25F025948A4FE25872D91E2D nytimes.com/2013/10/01/world/middleeast/westerners-smug- 0CB1. gled-letters-offer-rare-glimpse-of-egyptian-prisons. 8 Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Mass Attacks on html?pagewanted=all. Churches,”. 21 For example, USAID assistance to the MoJ is 9 Amnesty International, “Egypt: Government only $7.5 million. must protect Christians from sectarian violence,” 22 David D. Kirkpatrick, “In Leaked Video, August 20, 2013, http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/ Egyptian Army Officers Debate How to Sway News egypt-government-must-protect-christians-sectarian-vio- Media” The New York Times, October 4, 2013, lence-2013-08-20. available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/04/world/ 10 David D. Kirkpatrick, “In Islamist Bastions of middleeast/in-leaked-video-egyptian-army-officers-debate-how- Egypt, the Army Treads Carefully, and Christians Do, to-sway-news-media.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. Too,”. 11 David D. Kirkpatrick , “In Islamist Bastions of Egypt, the Army Treads Carefully, and Christians Do, Photos Too,”. 12 Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Mass Attacks on Churches,”. Page 6 photo by Elayssed, Mohammed. 2013. 13 As Bahrain did with the Bahrain Independent Picture showing pro-Morsi protesters in Damietta on July Commission of Inquiry (BICI) in 2011. See Report of 5, 2013. From http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/ the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry File:Damietta_protests.jpg licensed under the Creative (2011), available at: http://www.bici.org.bh/BICIreportEN. Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported pdf. The BICI’s official website is available at:http:// license. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/ www.bici.org.bh. legalcode. Photo reproduced unaltered. 14 See Arab Human Development Report 2009: Challenges to Human Security in the Arab Countries, United Nations Development Programme (2009) available at http://www.arab-hdr.org/publications/other/ ahdrahdr2009e.pdf; Human Development Report, United Nations Development Programme (2013) available at http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/ corporate/HDR/2013GlobalHDR/English/HDR2013%20 Report%20English.pdf. 15 M. Cherif Bassiouni, “The “Arab Revolution” and Transitions in the Wake of the “Arab Spring””, UCLA Journal of International Law & Foreign Affairs 17, no. 133 (2012). 16 Eugene Fisher and M. Cherif Bassiouni, Storm Over the Arab World: A people in revolution (Chicago: Follett Publishing Company, 1972). 17 Henry, Kissinger. Years of Upheaval (New York: Little & Brown Co, 1982). 18 Nicole Gaouette and Caroline Alexander, “U.S. Cuts Military Aid to Egypt, Seeks Move to Democracy” Bloomberg, October 9, 2013, http://www.

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