Ladbury, S et al 2016 Jihadi Groups and State-Building: The Case of stability in Nigeria. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 5(1): 16, pp. 1–19, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.427

RESEARCH ARTICLE Jihadi Groups and State-Building: The Case of Boko Haram in Nigeria Sarah Ladbury, Hamsatu Allamin, Chitra Nagarajan, Paul Francis and Ukoha Ukiwo

The following article considers the extent to which the Nigerian jihadi group, Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal- (JAS), also known as Boko Haram, is transforming its model of governance from domination by violence and force to governance through civil administration and public support. Drawing on over four years of research and programming in north-east Nigeria, the authors consider three aspects of such a transformation: the development of institutions, the propaga- tion of an ideology and programmes to win over the hearts and minds of the wider population, and the role assigned to women and girls. The article finds that JAS has established little in the way of a civilian administration in the areas that have come under its control. Likewise, the movement has apparently made no concerted effort to project a vision of a future society or concrete benefits of the envisaged cali- phate that would generate a level of public support. Moreover, the brutal treatment of women and girls belies any attempt by the movement to promote a positive vision of the role of women, even as wives and mothers. In this, JAS is seen to differ from a number of other jihadi movements that have relatively sophisticated approaches to generating popular support and recruiting members. The article goes on to suggest a number of reasons for JAS’s failure to move towards a polity that is more consensual and less dependent on violence, as well as its implications for those who would seek to restrain the expansion and ideological reach of jihadist groups. It concludes by offering suggestions of how the government can seize the opportunity presented by this lack of a state-building strategy, in order to show the people of north-east Nigeria that it can offer a better alternative.

Introduction warfare, including suicide attacks, are the Jihadist groups with the goal of building means through which territory is captured states based on the caliphate model typi- and local populations brought under con- cally prepare themselves for statehood while trol. The sheer prospect of success in realis- still fighting to control territory. Military ing a caliphate has also proved an effective assault, combined with tactics of asymmetric tool for recruiting fighters (Petraeus 2016). However, establishing and maintaining a state requires more than military force and NSRP, NG the vision of a caliphate. Since the majority Corresponding author: Ukoha Ukiwo of the civilian population may not have been ([email protected]) radicalised into a jihadi worldview, ensuring Art. 16, page 2 of 19 Ladbury et al: Jihadi Groups and State-Building their active participation, or at least compli- jihadi movement: Jama’atu Ahlis ance – if it is not to be achieved solely by Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS), force – will depend upon their perception of also known as Boko Haram, which benefits. The prospect of Shari’a law, and the operates in north-east Nigeria and hope that it will deliver effective justice and the neighbouring countries of the a more principled form of governance than Lake Chad basin.1 Where a compara- has hitherto been experienced, is one poten- tive perspective lends insight, the tial attraction of a jihadist regime. In addi- analysis also refers to state-building tion, citizens will aspire to what is demanded programmes of other jihadi move- of states everywhere: peace, security, justice, ments. While the article is largely employment, education for their children, concerned with JAS, the questions and so on. it addresses are pertinent to other Without support from a significant portion groups with ambitions to build states of the civilian population, any new state risks on the pattern of caliphates. The find- losing its population to mass out-migration, ings are therefore relevant to national or risks expending valuable military assets on and international actors that aim to policing possible migrants. To move beyond prevent territorial expansion of such control by force and create the conditions for groups and diminish their ideological a consensual and sustainable governance, a influence over civilian populations. jihadi movement requires civic as well as military policies and institutions – eventu- After providing a brief background, the arti- ally a parallel administration should emerge cle considers the extent to which JAS has which administers territory and addresses been concerned with building the founda- the very grievances that have discredited tions of a non-military state, a question sel- and undermined the previous regime. Jihadi dom addressed in existing literature. The movements also need a narrative that con- analysis focuses on the civilian population vincingly projects the legitimacy of their rule rather than on combatants. The discus- to would-be citizens, as well as an ideologi- sion considers three facets of non-military cal framework that justifies the moral rules state-building. of the new society. Da’wah (proselytising) Firstly, the article looks at the degree to campaigns typically perform this function; which JAS has established a civilian adminis- through da’wah instruction, civilians are tration to provide governance and services in taught to interpret religious texts as defined controlled areas. Research conducted by the by the jihadi group. authors finds that institutions established to date do not amount to nascent state-build- This article considers the extent and ing. They seem aimed at population control conditions under which jihadi groups and instilling fear rather than governance or are able to transform their mode of administration. governance, from ruling by force and Next, it considers whether JAS is interact- violence to ruling with the support ing with the civilian population in a way of a substantial proportion of the that promotes recruitment of fighters and citizen population. This article draws engenders the loyalty, or at least consent, of upon over four years of research civilians. Whereas jihadi movements in other and programmatic interventions in areas of the world have developed sophisti- north-east Nigeria carried out by the cated propaganda campaigns and extensive Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation social services in order to win hearts and Programme (NSRP), as well as wider minds, JAS provides few concrete benefits literature, to focus on one major to populations under its control. Rather, the Ladbury et al: Jihadi Groups and State-Building Art. 16, page 3 of 19 focus of its violence is primarily directed at free of corruption. His message resonated non-combatants, alienating most civilians. with a local populace disillusioned with Finally, the article focuses on JAS’s treat- earlier attempts to introduce Shari’a (Kyari ment of women and girls. Reformist rulers 2014). Between 1999 and 2001 the govern- in Muslim majority countries, whether secu- ments of twelve northern states of Nigeria lar or religious, have typically used rules on had introduced Shari’a law, ostensibly to women’s comportment and dress to reflect address corruption, inequality and injus- and underline the moral rules of their new tice (Ostien 2007; Casey 2008; Umar 2015). society (Kandiyoti 2005). Other jihadi pro- However, these efforts had fallen short of jects laud women as supporters of jihad local expectations. through their roles as wives and mothers, In contrast to the Nigerian government, and hold out the promise of their active Yusuf was seen as an advocate of the ‘true’ participation in building a society based on and proper implementation of Shari’a. Yusuf Shari’a. Despite some early pronouncements also garnered support from prominent mem- of this kind, which initially drew women to bers of the political and social elite who were the sect, there is currently no concerted strat- keen to tap his growing following for elec- egy to reach women and girls. Abduction, toral ends. However, his relationship with imprisonment, rape, and forced marriage both the political class and the security forces have instead become the sect’s hallmark. deteriorated. In 2009, 800 of Yusuf’s follow- The article goes on to analyse the rea- ers died following violent confrontations sons behind the group’s failure to develop with Nigerian security forces (Zenn 2013; a clear state-building strategy. Unlike other Mellgard 2015). Yusuf himself was arrested jihadi groups, JAS has controlled territory in July 2009 and killed whilst in police cus- for a limited time and, at present, seems tody (Walker 2016a). more focused on military gain than govern- Following Yusuf’s death, JAS supporters ance. Furthermore, in contrast to its char- went into hiding until the movement’s re- ismatic founder, the current JAS leadership emergence in 2010 when Abubakar Shekau, appears to lack the vision, skills, experience Yusuf’s deputy, became the group’s leader. and indeed the interest in governing a state. Under Shekau’s leadership, the movement The article concludes with a consideration re-grouped in Maiduguri, the capital of of the implications of these findings for the Borno State, and launched revenge attacks Nigerian government and the international on police and security forces (Zenn 2014; community. Karlsson 2016; Kyari 2015). The first reported abductions of women and girls took place in Background to JAS 2013, when the families of officials and secu- Formed in 2002, JAS is an Islamist militant rity agents were targeted in retaliation for group based in Borno State, north-eastern detaining the wives and children of JAS lead- Nigeria (Monguno and Umara 2014). In its ers (Pearson and Zenn 2014). Subsequently, early years, JAS protested against corrup- JAS began attacking civilians, both Christian tion and un-Islamic rule, and was therefore and Muslim, and targeting public spaces, similar to other Islamist groups in its con- such as markets and schools. frontation of secular state power (Onuoha In mid-2013, JAS was driven out of 2015; Agbiboa 2013; Yusef and Ramey 2007; Maiduguri, largely through the efforts of Tseleq and Ramey 2012). Its founder and youth combatants of the ‘Civilian Joint leader, Mohammed Yusuf, attracted a local Task Force’ (CJTF). JAS fighters regrouped following through his fiery sermons, which in remote rural areas to continue attack- denounced Nigeria’s patrimonial governance ing neighbouring towns and villages. system and promoted his vision of a society Simultaneously, Nigerian security forces Art. 16, page 4 of 19 Ladbury et al: Jihadi Groups and State-Building and CJTF members were accused of serious it can govern populations, win additional human rights violations, including deaths recruits, publicise its successes, and finance in custody, extrajudicial executions, tor- future expansion. Given that JAS reportedly ture, recruitment of children, sexual exploi- operates as a franchise, with individual cells tation, abuse, and harassment (Amnesty having a considerable degree of autonomy International 2015b, 2015c, 2015d, 2015e; (Amnesty International 2015a; Pantucci and UN Office of the Special Representative Jesperson 2015; Pantucci 2014), it might be of the Secretary General for Children and expected that institutions are also needed Armed Conflict 2015; Watchlist 2014). to maintain internal cohesion, coordination, In addition to expanding JAS’s targets and and discipline. attacks, Shekau has also cultivated relations Other established jihadi groups have used with jihadi groups in other countries (Zenn a range of institutions to govern the areas 2013, 2015). In March 2015, JAS pledged they control and, at the same time, signal allegiance to the Islamic State (IS) and was their religious ideology. Among most move- renamed the ‘Islamic State in West Africa ments, proselytisation (da’wah) is generally Province’ (ISWAP) (Zenn 2014b). the first ‘service’ provided to a new territory. This is typically followed by the establish- State-building: Institutions ment of Shari’a courts and local and religious It is not entirely clear whether Shekau’s police (hisbah). In Syria and Iraq, IS has gone primary aim is to establish and maintain far beyond justice and policing and now a caliphate as a territorial entity across provides a full range of services in strategic parts of northern Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and towns, including education, infrastructure, Cameroon, as argued by some authors sewerage and sanitation, water, electricity, (Kaplan 2015; Dele-Adedeji 2014), or whether transport, and labour, among other services his ultimate aim is to be accepted as part of a (Caris and Reynolds 2014). Human rela- global caliphate project. His statements after tions structures are also in place: a Public the JAS capture of Gwoza, Borno State in Relations/Tribal Affairs office handles citi- August 2014 imply that he sees his victories zens’ demands in major towns, and humani- in Nigeria as a first step towards the global tarian aid is delivered to vulnerable Muslim rule of Islamic law: populations via the IS Muslim Services divi- sion. Relations with non-Muslim populations ‘Thanks be to Allah, who gave victory are also regulated, primarily through the to our brethren in Gwoza and made it Islamic dhimmi tax, payment of which allows part of the Islamic caliphate… We did them to remain in the caliphate (ibid). not do it on our own. Allah used us IS has developed a sophisticated system of to captured Gwoza; Allah is going to governance as a result of its longtime control use Islam to rule Gwoza, Nigeria, and of strategic towns and its ability to call upon the whole world… Allah commands us a large number of local and foreign profes- to rule Gwoza by Islamic law. In fact, sionals. This is also the case for the he commands us to rule the rest of in Afghanistan, al-Shabaab in Somalia, and the world, not only Nigeria, and now a range of other jihadi groups which have we have started’ (cited in Grossman controlled territory over extended periods 2014).2 (Gardner and El-Bushra 2015). Has JAS begun to develop a similar insti- Whether the movement’s intentions are tutional infrastructure? In the early years of regional, international, or both, like any JAS, it appeared that administrative institu- jihadi movement, JAS needs administrative as tions had begun to emerge. Some writers well as religious institutions through which maintain that Mohammed Yusuf had been in Ladbury et al: Jihadi Groups and State-Building Art. 16, page 5 of 19 the process of setting up a parallel political reason, and a ban on intermediaries between organisation in order to ‘replace the actual producer and consumer. The regulations state’. Andrew Walker notes that Yusuf had a are standardised and memorised by JAS fol- cabinet, a Supreme Council (Shura), special- lowers, especially those in senior positions. ised departments (Lagina), and various Amirs ‘Justice’ comprises punishments handed out posted to Local Government Areas (LGA) for breaking the rules, the severity of which (Walker 2012). Yusuf reportedly organised his depends on the adjudicator. Examples given followers into distinct roles, such as soldiers, by witnesses include: 30 lashes to a woman recruiters, errand boys and organisers, who for selling children’s clothes to neighbours; would help bring a crowd together when- flogging or execution for anyone trying to ever he went on da’wah missions (Onuoha escape the town; and stoning to death for 2014; Allamin, personal communication). alleged adultery (Amnesty International Yusuf also had nascent social policies: report- interviews 2015a; interviews by Allamin). edly he ensured that food was distributed to Religious indoctrination is an important refugees and arranged affordable marriages part of the occupation. In the town of Damask for his followers. Other authors note that by in Bama LGA, for example, all school age girls 2008, Yusuf had put in place a rudimentary and boys were reportedly placed in a large welfare system where members could work compound where they received systematic land acquired by the group, or take microfi- and intensive religious instruction. Initially, nance loans to begin small businesses (Osita- parents were pleased that their children were Njoku and Chikere 2015; Walker 2016a). being taught the Quran, but in December Micha’el Tanchum holds that this ‘alterna- 2015, 300 children disappeared from the tive society’ eventually formed a ‘miniature compound. Furthermore, though interviews state within the state’, though it is debatable with children who had received religious whether the administration developed at instruction demonstrated a continuity in the that particular time justifies this label (2012). subject matter taught by previous Quranic When Shekau emerged as leader in 2010, teachers, there was one important difference: there was no indication that he would JAS’s instruction included injunctions to use expand Yusuf’s nascent administration. violence against anyone opposing the teach- Indeed, rather than organising members or ings that they received, including their own civilians, the group embarked on targeted parents (personal communication, Allamin). killings. The fairly limited evidence available about Today, individuals living in JAS-controlled communities under JAS control suggests that areas describe JAS ‘governance’ in terms of the systems and structures imposed by the a set of rules, a police system and ‘justice’ insurgents have gone little beyond the ele- (largely a mechanism for dispensing pun- ments described above: the appointment of ishment). Residents report that an Amir is Amirs, the imposition of supposedly Islamic immediately appointed when a community social mores (including often severe pun- is taken by JAS; he and his men are then ishments for transgressions), and religious responsible for governing. As part of the pro- preaching and proselytisation (da’wah). cess, a set of rules is communicated to the Reportedly, taxes on vehicles have also been population in leaflets, both in Kanuri and imposed. There is mention of provision of Hausa, and through town criers. Typically, credit to young men, who are then required the rules include the prohibition of smok- to join the group (Mercy Corps 2016), but no ing and drugs, an injunction that men must evidence of wider policies or programmes let their beards grow, that women should in support of livelihoods. Indeed, restric- cover their faces in public and not move out- tions on movement in JAS-controlled areas side the household unless for a permitted and the effect of destruction and insecurity Art. 16, page 6 of 19 Ladbury et al: Jihadi Groups and State-Building in the local economy mean that livelihood present considerable scope for winning opportunities of all kinds are severely con- over local populations with the prospect of strained, and that in some areas, food is in improvement. Success in any of these areas short supply (Amnesty International 2015a; can build or cement local civilian support for International Organisation of Migration the jihadi project. 2016). Neither Shekau nor the JAS Shura Other jihadi movements exemplify the appear to have appointed individuals with various ways in which local support or com- sectoral responsibilities, such as for the econ- pliance can be generated. One well-known omy, water, agriculture, trade, or education. example is the support given in Somalia The institutions established by JAS appear to by al-Shabaab to minority clans (Axiom be aimed at maintaining control and instill- Consultancy 2014; Landinfo 2011; UNHCR ing fear, rather than governance and admin- 2010) and its provision of services in areas istration in any wider sense. not served by the Somali national govern- Most analysts have concluded that JAS ment (Mwangi 2012). In Syria and Iraq, IS has institutions do not amount to an attempt at provided fuel subsidies to gain the adherence nascent state-building. For example, Pérouse of important tribes and used cash bribes to de Montclos notes that there has never been buy off tribal leaders. By monopolising the a JAS proclamation that sets out a political use of force and eliminating internecine programme indicating how it will govern conflicts, the group also provides residents according to Shari’a (2015) and Pérouse de of occupied cities with security (Fromson Montclos (2014b). In support of this posi- and Simon 2015). On the propaganda side, tion, Virginia Comolli notes that, despite the IS’ message of ‘inclusion’ has induced some relentless advance of JAS under Shekau, ‘… Sunni women and girls, as well as men, to there is no evidence indicating that any form leave their homes and travel to Syria, a testa- of administration or governance is being ment to the sophisticated use of population implemented in this ‘Islamic state’ (2015: profiling and social media (Brown 2014), and 161). to the powerful impact of ‘ummah conscious- In summary, the JAS movement appears ness’ messaging, a technique also used by al- to lack the administrative structures to gov- Shabaab (Meleagrou-Hitches et al 2012). In ern effectively beyond its current focus on Afghanistan, the Taliban provided a justice control and compliance. Although the JAS system that was speedier than the govern- commitment to implement ‘real Shari’a’ had ment system and untainted by corruption. mass popular support during the early years Although many recoiled from the frequency of the movement, it has not yet put in place of executions entailed in Taliban ‘justice’, it the systems and structures for a political sys- nonetheless won them support from sec- tem based on Shari’a, nor shown any indica- tions of the population (Hirst 2009; Ladbury, tion that it intends to do so in the future. CPAU and Smith 2010). In Yemen, the jihadi group Ansar al-Sharia has provided electric- State-building: A hearts and minds ity, water, and education to communities campaign under its jurisdiction (Petouris 2014). Jihadi movements across the globe have In the case of JAS, a distinction can be made used increasingly sophisticated and tailored between the approach adopted by Yusuf and propaganda, combined with programmes that of successive leaders. Up until the death that demonstrate the benefits of member- of Yusuf in 2009, and for some two years ship, to recruit fighters and gain civilian sup- afterwards, JAS violence was predominantly port. Prior conditions of poor governance, aimed at security forces rather than civilians. rampant corruption, failures of justice and For this reason, most residents of Yobe and security, and lack of economic opportunity Borno states did not fear that the group was Ladbury et al: Jihadi Groups and State-Building Art. 16, page 7 of 19 going to harm them, and many were initially us or die’ (Walker 2016b). As Thurston notes: sympathetic to it (personal communica- ‘Unlike other movements in the region... tion, Allamin). In fact, many residents were Boko Haram’s leaders have consistently more afraid of the excesses of the security used extremely narrow criteria to define forces than of the insurgents. As Pérouse de who counts as a Muslim. Boko Haram foot Montclos notes ‘While Boko Haram was, at soldiers are, whether for ideological, mate- least at inception, committed to not harming rial, or personal reasons, willing to slaugh- those who had not antagonised them and ter those whom the leaders have designated alerting people in areas where they intended unbelievers’ (2016). Among those killed to fight, the security agencies were known were thousands of men and women, as well for their brutality in retaliation against the as children (UN Children and Armed Conflict population for the actions of their oppo- 2015; Amnesty International 2015–16). As nents, especially where the agencies had all civilians, including women and children, incurred fatalities’ (2014a). became potential targets, the support and However, JAS’s policy of not harming civil- sympathy that the group had garnered inev- ians changed in mid-2011, when the group itably began to drain away. Nevertheless, began targeting a wider population. Those some residual sympathies remained as the attacked included religious scholars who group continued to present itself as the ‘vic- preached against their ideology and tradi- tim’ and rationalised its actions as responses tional leaders who had reported them to to losses it had suffered. authorities or confiscated their property Another development that very likely whilst they were in hiding. Violence contin- influenced the changing tactics of JAS was ued to be driven by a quest for vengeance, but the emergence of the aforementioned CJTF now the targets included anyone who was in 2013 in Maiduguri, in which thousands perceived to have harmed JAS members or of young people were affected by the collat- interests. The notion of al-Qisas (vengeance) eral damage of both the insurgency and the also featured prominently in the recruitment counter-insurgency activities of the Nigerian strategy of JAS, especially among women, government’s security agencies. These young girls and young men who had lost relatives men and women carried out searches of (Usman et al 2015); by joining JAS they were members of the general public, and went promised the chance to avenge the deaths of from house to house to identify persons family members. suspected of being JAS members; they then The concept of takfir – the denouncing handed them over to the government Joint of others as infidel because they reject the Task Force (JTF). The formation of the CJTF Quran and Sunnah – also came to play an radically altered the course of the insurgency increasing part in JAS ideology, and was used by dislodging JAS insurgents from the cit- to rationalize an ever-widening perimeter of ies to Krenowa in Marte LGA, then to the violence (Mellgard 2015). The insurgents Sambisa Forest and border areas (Allamin used takfir to justify the killing of anyone 2016). Although CJTF methods were often who did not accept the JAS leader’s inter- brutal, the broader civilian population began pretation of the Quran and Sunnah. While to hope that JAS could be routed (IRIN 2013). at the outset takfir was used to justify the Some support for the insurgents remained, assassination of Christians and Muslim reli- particularly from close relatives of JAS fight- gious leaders who supported the govern- ers, those whose family members had been ment, it soon came to mean any person, killed or had property destroyed by the secu- whether Christian or Muslim, who did not rity forces, or those receiving regular pay- join or accept JAS as a movement (Mellgard ments or loans from the group (Mercy Corps 2015). The philosophy became one of ‘join 2016; personal communication, Allamin). Art. 16, page 8 of 19 Ladbury et al: Jihadi Groups and State-Building

However, the increasingly extreme ideol- there are many within its own ranks who are ogy and brutality of JAS subsequently alien- there under duress. The scale and nature of ated most civilians. While many Nigerian JAS abductions differentiates it from other Muslims may aspire for Shari’a to be the law jihadi groups with caliphate-building ambi- of the land, they do not hold with a takfir tions. Although the majority of abductees are ideology, the targeting of Christians, or the women and girls, many men and boys have abduction or rape of women, girls, and boys. also been kidnapped (Zenn 2014a). Indeed, Nor do they support harsh punishments, the paths members take to join JAS defy neat which is not what most adherents see as the categories of ‘voluntary’ and ‘forced’, with essence of Shari’a. As Pérouse de Monclos many falling between these two extremes. notes, many people want Shari’a, but along- Many have been coerced, pressured, moti- side democracy and freedom of religion vated by circumstances, or simply joined JAS (2014b). Only a very small minority, and far because this seemed the ‘least bad’ of avail- fewer than in some other African countries, able options (Monguno and Umara 2015; support harsh Shari’a punishments, such as Mercy Corps 2016). the stoning of women who commit adultery or the amputation of the hands of thieves. State-building: Treatment of women Although JAS pays its combat and non- and girls combat members well, it provides few con- Reformist leaders in Muslim majority coun- crete benefits to the broader population tries, both religious and secular, have fre- (Walker 2016a; Mercy Corps 2016). According quently used laws controlling women’s to Amnesty International and Allamin’s inter- comportment and dress to represent and views with residents in Borno and Yobe states, advance the moral rules of the new society the economic situation of those in captured that they aim to establish. This phenomenon territory is dire. Since men have been killed has been documented of reformist state or abducted, and given that women cannot leaders across the Middle East and South Asia travel, many households become dependent (Kandiyoti 1991; Najmabadi 1991). Jihadi on children to collect or find food (Amnesty movements have generally emerged in patri- International 2015a). JAS makes no consist- archal societies, in which gender roles are ent attempt to engage with the needs of local already rigidly differentiated. With their core people, even through propaganda. There aim of establishing a state based on a ‘puri- is certainly no equivalent to the sophisti- fied’ form of Islam, jihadi movements use cated ‘welcoming’ tactics of IS in Syria. While the imposition of strict controls on women’s Shekau frequently quotes the Qur’an in his dress, movement, and behaviour to commu- pronouncements, religious texts are selected nicate the greater purity of the new Muslim to justify his previous actions or intentions; state. there seems to be no attempt to appeal to In jihadi state-building projects, women local people’s grievances or to promise an thus function as symbols of wider social inclusive ummah experience. Moreover, half and political purity (Bloom 2016). At a more the population – women and girls – are dis- functional level, all jihadi groups expect cussed in ways people find derogatory, disre- women to undertake the daily tasks required spectful and unreflective of their reading and to maintain an army of fighting men (such as understanding of the Qur’an. providing sex, cooking, cleaning, caring for In summary, there is no evidence of the children). Some women, often widows or par- movement’s promotion of a hearts and minds ticularly vulnerable women, may be selected campaign to win the voluntary and sustained for operational roles – hiding and transport- support of ordinary people. Not only does ing weapons, gleaning intelligence, or help- the group alienate the civilian population, ing with recruitment (Ladbury 2015). Since Ladbury et al: Jihadi Groups and State-Building Art. 16, page 9 of 19

2002, jihadi groups have also used women the “caliphate’s” jihad than fighting and that, as front-line combatants and are increasingly for women, there is a specific state building using women and girls as suicide bombers. role’ (Rafik and Malik 2015). However, despite the ‘elevation’ of women In contrast, the JAS strategy neither lauds to the ranks of combatants, no jihadi move- women as the mothers and wives of fight- ment has ever appointed a female leader or ers, nor recruits them for a positive role in permitted women to participate in discus- a new Islamic society. Mohammed Yusuf sions on matters of policy, strategy, or theol- did make pronouncements on women; for ogy (Ladbury 2015). example, he promised to address the unac- Given the subordinate role consistently ceptable behaviour of men who abdicated assigned to women in all jihadi groups, their responsibilities by marrying and then including JAS, how are these movements divorcing their wives. He also encouraged his able to attract the support and participation spokespeople to talk to the women’s section of women and girls under conditions of little of the mosque and to answer their queries, or no agency and heightened seclusion? and instructed men to take their wives for Jihadi movements have commonly used Quranic education and bring them to public two strategies to attract women. The first, seen gatherings where he was speaking (Usman et in caliphate-aspiring movements across the al 2015). This emphasis on women’s Quranic Middle East and Africa, is to project a positive education contrasted with prevailing social and central role for them in the struggle for norms at the time. Indeed, the opportunity the realisation of the new caliphate. Women’s for religious education seems to have been role as mothers and wives is consistently one of the attractions of JAS to women. One lauded in sermons, publications, videos and young woman interviewed said, ‘I didn’t have social media. The message is that ‘our’ women many expectations. I just wanted to learn contribute to jihad, not through physical com- more of the Quran and my religion’ (Mercy bat (although, as noted, this may sometimes Corps 2016). be the case), but by supporting their jihadi Since his assumption of leadership in 2010, husbands and bringing up the next genera- Shekau has never made a positive statement tion of fighters. Women whose sons have been regarding the potential contributions of killed are particularly lauded as the mothers women and girls to jihad or to the new cali- of ‘martyrs’. Ladbury argues that this message phate. There is no evidence that social or gives women an elevated sense of their own other media have been used to encourage importance – as opposed to their counter- women and girls to join the movement or parts in many secular states (2015). persuade them of the benefits of an inclu- The second way in which women and sive, welcoming ummah. On the contrary, the girls are drawn into the jihadi enterprise is abduction, imprisonment, forced marriage, through the promise of participation in the and rape of women and girls, both Christian building of a society based on Shari’a – a and Muslim, have now become hallmark cus- new venture in which the contribution of toms of JAS, while the use of girls as suicide women is both valued and necessary. The use bombers has continued to increased (BBC of social media by IS to target Sunni Muslim News 2016). Recent figures indicate that of women from diverse countries to come to the 151 suicide attacks JAS members carried Syria shows how such a prospect of inclusion out in 2015, one in five were by children, 75 can attract even well-off women and girls in per cent of whom were girls (UNICEF 2016). western countries. ‘The participation prom- The use of women and girls as camp fol- ise incentivises women to join Islamic State lowers and suicide bombers is not unique to even though their role is strictly non-mili- JAS, though what distinguishes them is that tary. It conveys a sense that there is more to the rhetoric of the ‘purity’ of ‘our women’ Art. 16, page 10 of 19 Ladbury et al: Jihadi Groups and State-Building and the duty, entrusted to men, to guar- also believed she had been brainwashed.3 For antee women’s welfare and protection are the majority of women and girls, however, entirely absent. Indeed, given that JAS fight- there is nothing in the JAS message to induce ers raped women and girls as they attacked their voluntary cooperation or support. and occupied their villages (International In summary, there is little evidence of any Alert 2016), the high incidence of abductions intention on the part of JAS to win the hearts and forced marriages/remarriages (Amnesty and minds of women by offering them a clear, International 2015), and the degrees of positive, and socially-sanctioned role in the coerced recruitment (Mercy Corps 2016), realisation of a new society. JAS cannot hope the lines between ‘our women’ and all other to win the support of women or communi- women and girls are blurred. Bloom argues ties in general through abductions, forced that JAS aims to set itself apart both from marriage, and rape. The notion of Shari’a other terrorist organisations that benefit bringing about a ‘purer’ and better society from willing female participation and from is belied by JAS’s treatment of women, men, other Islamist movements in north-east and children. Rather, the group has instru- Nigeria (2006). As she states: ‘Other Salafi mentalised women as weapons of the insur- groups have advocated for women’s educa- gency. As with young men, it has preyed on tion and have coexisted with the Nigerian the vulnerabilities of women and young girls secular state – by emphasising its differences to attract them into its fold. This approach with such movements, Boko Haram portrays has largely consisted of the propagation of itself as the vanguard of “true Islam”’ (Bloom the ideology of retaliation – for the deaths 2016). of husbands, sons and brothers, and the While their brutal and retrogressive treat- offer of marriage – to respond to the needs ment of women and girls may be an effec- of women for economic security and social tive marker of uniqueness, it is clearly not security (Human Rights Watch 2013). an approach that encourages the voluntary engagement of women and girls in JAS’s Why has JAS failed to develop a cause (Human Rights Watch 2014). Some strategy for governing? women do become converts and supporters, There are several possible reasons for why but evidence indicates that they are a minor- movement has not elaborated a wider civic ity. Within JAS camps and controlled areas, strategy. One is the limited time that they young women appeared to have gained have controlled territory. It has been only status by carrying out the roles they were seven years since the killing of their former assigned: by undertaking tasks (for example leader in police custody, the event that trig- recruitment of other girls and women, burn- gered the escalation of violence. It is even ing down homes) or by becoming teachers more recently, since 2013, that JAS-associated and preachers to other women (Mercy Corps groups began to take control of a significant 2016). As Walker notes, like child soldiers else- geographical area (part of which has been where in Africa (Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the subsequently regained by the state). The Lord’s Resistance Army in the Central African expansion was contingent upon other fac- Republic and Uganda), some women come tors: their continuing access to arms, some to accept their new lives so thoroughly that of which may have come from Nigerian their old ones are completely erased (2016a). military sources, a ready flow of voluntary For example, one teenage girl, who had been and conscripted combatants, support from abducted, forcibly married to a commander other jihadi movements, and the operational and then rescued by soldiers of the Nigerian weakness of the Nigerian military. Compared army, said she longed for her husband and to other jihadi groups, JAS has had a rela- wished she was still with him, although she tively short amount of time to mature into Ladbury et al: Jihadi Groups and State-Building Art. 16, page 11 of 19 an organisation with a civic state-building , but have expended few resources agenda and, as part of this, to evolve a strat- on governance in coastal Latakia (Caris and egy regarding women. Reynolds 2014). When JAS was chased out It is notable that other jihadi groups that of Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State in have developed functioning governance 2013, it was forced to operate out of camps systems and social policies (including those in the vast Sambisa Forest area and to make directly aimed at women) have done so after attacks on surrounding towns and villages. a long maturation phase. The Taliban in It could be argued that expending energy Afghanistan, for example, had its roots in the and resources on state-building in such a Islamic resistance against the Soviet Union vast area with a sparse population would not between 1979 and 1989, followed by seven have contributed to the military strategy, and years of civil war. When the Taliban took may not have been practically effective. Kabul in 1996 and established the Islamic Why has there been so little energy Emirate of Afghanistan, it was after 17 years expended on a campaign to win over civil- of armed combat – a period that also allowed ians in areas of JAS control? One possibil- for the development of parallel state institu- ity is that the current JAS leadership lacks tions in areas they controlled (Dorronsoro the vision, skills, and experience to develop 2009; Giustozzi et al 2012; Semple 2015; from a military movement to a civic one and Guistozzi 2015). Similarly, al-Shabaab is implement practical plans for state-building. a veteran of the Somali conflict with far Yusuf was a charismatic and persuasive ora- more experience of implementing its own tor. Although it engaged in violence, the form of governance than other groups, JAS of his era also allowed for dialogue and including the Somali Federal Government engagement with the government. However, (International Crisis Group 2014; UNHRC the moderates within the group, being easier 2010). Furthermore, although Islamic State’s to identify and locate, were killed by security Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced the forma- forces in 2009 or eliminated by the group tion of a caliphate stretching from Aleppo itself in the years afterwards (International in Syria to Diyala in Iraq only in June 2013 Crisis Group 2014). Thus there is widespread (Glenn 2016), the movement could draw perception in the region that the original JAS on its earlier state-building attempts as the was hijacked by political and military inter- from 2006–8 (Fromson est groups that perpetrated violence mainly and Simon 2015). The JAS movement, in for material and political gain (interviews by contrast, is still in an early military phase, Allamin). The current JAS strategy seems to with its leadership focused on military gains, be wholly focused on violence: to continue rather than on implementing institutions to take territory through a terror campaign and winning over the population, whether in the north-east; to encourage like-minded women or men. groups to carry out attacks in other parts of That JAS has not maintained continuous Nigeria; and to link with Islamist militant control over a strategically important urban groups across state borders, particularly in centre may also account for a lack of empha- the Chad-basin area of neighbouring north- sis on state-building. Other authors note that ern Cameroon, southern Chad and the Niger jihadi groups tend to expend energy on gov- Republic (Mark 2015; Nigeria Stability and ernance only in cities and towns that are stra- Reconciliation Programme 2014–15).4 tegically important for the continuation of Despite talk of forming an Islamic cali- their military campaigns. Thus, IS has rolled phate, the pronouncements of Abubakar out its full governance programme – involv- Shekau have done little to indicate how such ing a range of administrative and religious a caliphate would be put in place, where its institutions – in the strategically important borders would be, how Shari’a law would Art. 16, page 12 of 19 Ladbury et al: Jihadi Groups and State-Building be interpreted, or what improvements citi- Conclusions zens of the new state could expect in their Jihadi movements worldwide typically try to lives. In contrast, the Taliban, al-Shabaab, do several things at once: expand the terri- and IS have developed state-building skills tory under their control through military over a long period. When they have lacked conquest, implement their interpretation of necessary skills or, in the case of IS, lacked Shari’a law, earn global recognition amongst the sheer number of professionals needed to fellow jihadis for ideological purity, and run a functioning state, they have publicly instill fear internationally through use of ter- advertised for foreign professionals to join ror tactics and violence. However, as several them (Agron 2015). In contrast, there is little authors have pointed out, these aims can- evidence of JAS either having access to such not necessarily be pursued together and are skills, or making efforts to acquire them. often contradictory (Lia 2015; Fromson and The allegiance that JAS has pledged to IS Simon 2015). Thus jihadi movements often could certainly change this situation. IS has face a ‘governance dilemma’, which arises a wide range of well-educated profession- because it is difficult to combine the admin- als with the skills to support JAS to combine istration of territory and compromise nec- its military strategy with a state-building essary to gain popular support with global programme, as well as an effective outreach recognition as an ideologically pure jihadi strategy using social media (Gates and Podder group that, if necessary, will enforce its writ 2015). As already noted, there is evidence that through limitless violence. Movements with IS is helping JAS with their media strategy substantial resources such as IS may not have (BBC Monitoring Africa 2015). If this proves to to make a choice about which option to pur- be the beginning of partnership, JAS’s capac- sue; those with fewer resources such as JAS ity may develop to the point where it is able may need to prioritise. to plan and implement a state-building pro- This article has sought to analyse some gramme. If so, we might expect that, along- of the governance dilemmas faced by the side, or replacing, the violence meted out to JAS movement in northern Nigeria, and to women and men classified as ‘enemies’, there understand why it appears to have neglected would be a parallel ‘hearts and minds’ cam- the state-building route taken by other jihadi paign aimed at potential supporters. However, movements. While these movements are cre- there is little evidence of this occurring at the ating administrative and governance institu- time of writing. tions, providing services and other benefits We must also ask whether carving out and to civilians, and implementing proactive governing a physical state in West Africa has strategies to ensure women are encouraged ever been a priority aim for the JAS leader- to feel ownership of the jihadi project, the ship. The early focus was on the rigorous and JAS approach has alienated civilians. Indeed, universal imposition of Shari’a in the existing its tactics have been characterised by attacks state. More recently the apparent disinclina- on communities, most notably in the wide- tion and unpreparedness to administer a cali- spread abductions of women and girls, at phate is perhaps because the acquisition of levels not seen by other jihadi groups (BBC territory came largely from the movement’s News 2014; Zenn and Pearson 2014). reaction to its expulsion from urban areas Much of this can be attributed to the rather than as a proactive strategy. In short, comparatively short length of time JAS has the primary reason for the lack of a state- been in direct conflict with the state and building plan and a strategy to win civic sup- controlled territory. Other jihadi groups may port may be that contributing to global jihad simply have had longer to plan and imple- has always been a more important goal than ment a strategy of civilian engagement, and establishing and building a physical state. had the expertise within their ranks to put Ladbury et al: Jihadi Groups and State-Building Art. 16, page 13 of 19 a state-building strategy into effect. The the Nigerian state offers a convincing alter- explanation may also be one of priorities. native, both to their previous experiences If the JAS leadership has always seen the and to what is offered by the JAS movement. movement primarily as contributing to the Further action is also necessary to address realisation of Allah’s rule globally, this would people’s material needs and the underlying account for the sheer brutality of the group issues of corruption, inequality, and wom- and the scant attention given to winning en’s disenfranchisement that have driven over civilians or to establishing relationships JAS support and recruitment. A purely mili- with political elites. taristic approach will not address the deeper In the medium term, it appears that the causes of disorder, as these are rooted in gov- JAS leadership is content to promote itself ernance and developmental deficits. Instead, as a ‘brand’ that is able to attract a range of a more holistic range of interventions is militant groups to act on its behalf, knowing needed. This would include combining mil- that individual terror acts over a wide area itary-centric tactics that abide by human will command national and international rights, humanitarian law, and the rules of attention. engagement, with efforts that focus on win- ning the hearts and minds of the population. Recommendations Effective media campaigns to counteract fun- A major limitation of the current study is the damentalist ideology and communicate real lack of in-depth information on the structure government commitment to change need of JAS since the death of Yusuf, and how it to be matched by action. This action should has governed in the stronghold around the prioritise putting in place real security for Sambisa Forest. With sustained military pres- the peoples of the north-east, building insti- sure on JAS, continued liberation of captured tutions that work – including educational populations, and reported fissures in the ones for a generation of children who have JAS leadership, opportunities will open for missed out on schooling – and addressing future research that provides insights into grievances. The latter includes taking strong these issues and sheds further light on the measures to prevent and sanction institu- JAS state-building project. tionalised corruption, and ensuring inclu- However, it is already clear from the evi- sive economic growth and regeneration that dence available that JAS’s continued reliance addresses widespread inequalities between on violence, and the lack of a clear state- individuals, groups, and regions. Allegations building plan, presents an opportunity that of human rights abuses must be investigated the Nigerian government and others would and perpetrators brought to justice. Action is be wise to exploit. At present, the populace also required to address the widespread mar- is unsure as to where it can place its trust ginalisation of women, girls, young men, and and loyalty. Despite their revulsion at JAS boys. Policies and programmes need to be brutality, many people in the north-east are designed and implemented with the differ- also profoundly disenchanted with the gov- ent experiences and needs of women, girls, ernment. Indeed, research by CIVIC (2015) men and boys in mind, in order to tackle found that, although civilians feel JAS has gender-based violence and encourage the perpetrated the majority of harm against meaningful participation of all in rebuilding them and their families, the myopic military their communities and states. focus of the Nigerian government and their There are indications that the Nigerian allies on defeating JAS has resulted in very government increasingly recognises this serious human rights abuses and collateral need for a comprehensive response, but civilian harm. The priority for the govern- pressure is needed to ensure that action fol- ment and its allies is therefore to show that lows. At the time of writing, the government Art. 16, page 14 of 19 Ladbury et al: Jihadi Groups and State-Building is developing a plan for the north-east to Notes rebuild infrastructure, strengthen institu- 1 Although the term ‘Boko Haram’ is more tions, and address the chronic under-devel- widely used outside north-east Nigeria, opment that has characterised the region the authors will use the term Jama’atu even before the insurgency. In concert with Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS) the World Bank, the European Union, and throughout this article in conformity United Nations Development Programme, with principles of conflict sensitivity. the Nigerian government has developed ‘Boko Haram’ is not the name the group a post conflict peace-building assessment uses to describe itself, but rather a label that documents the needs for comprehen- assigned to it by the media, usage of sive development (World Bank et al 2016). which has become widespread. The term However, it is not clear when these pro- is deeply resented by the group itself. posed programmes would actually be imple- Further, the authors believe that the term mented. There are growing concerns about ‘Boko Haram’, which is often translated delays in the inauguration of the Presidential as ‘western education is sinful’ perpetu- Committee on North East Initiatives (PCNI) ates a particular stereotype of the group and protracted discussions on the enactment that understates the complexity of its ori- of the legal framework for the planned North gin and aims. East Development Commission (NEDC). The 2 Different translations exist for the report. fiscal contraction facing the Nigerian state See full text of declaration in http://www. also poses challenges for full-scale imple- premiumtimesng.com/news/167248- mentation of the plan. boko-haram-leader-shekau-claims-cap- These circumstances indicate that an incre- tured-gwosa-now-islamic-caliphate.html. mental approach on the part of the govern- 3 See several news reports: http://www. ment may be most effective. However, as aljazeera.com/news/2016/02/rescued- Nigeria and its partners move forward, it will nigerian-girl-longs-boko-haram-hus- be important to coordinate around human band-160205073808809.html, http:// security in a way that is respectful of human in..com/article/nigeria-women- rights, integrates a gendered perspective, girls-idINKCN0VE0FH, http://www.bbc. includes the provision of development services co.uk/news/world-africa-36041860. and infrastructure, and implements measures 4 In its regular Conflict Briefing Notes, to demobilise and reintegrate former insur- the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation gents in ways that are sensitive to community Programme, a DFID funded programme, concerns. 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How to cite this article: Ladbury, S, Allamin, H, Nagarajan, C, Francis, P and Ukiwo, U 2016 Jihadi Groups and State-Building: The Case of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 5(1): 16, pp. 1–19, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.427

Submitted: 03 August 2016 Accepted: 17 August 2016 Published: 30 November 2016

Copyright: © 2016 The Author(s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC-BY 4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. See http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.

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