The JapaneseSocietyJapanese Society forforSlavic Slavic and East European Studies
jZfp"nese Siai'ic and Eci.s't ELtrr)pean Sr"clieL' S'ol.27, 2006
Issues pertaining to Wallachian and Moldavian
vqyvoclas and their effect
on Russo-Ottoman relations (1774-1806)
Akitsu Mayuzunii
1. Introduction
This articlc aims to present an aspect of Russo-Ottoman relations with regard
to Wallachia and Moldavia in the period betwccn 1774 and 1806. through an
examination of issues surroundinLo. the vo.vvodas (princes) as diplomatic issues
bctwccn the two empires.
Bcginnin.o in the second ha"' o[' the eighteenth century. close and complicated
rc]ations were established betwccn Russia and the OtLoman Empire over
Wallachia and Moldavia, I.atcr, ethcr Eurepean poxs,ers became involved as
well. As a result by the beginning of the nineteenth century, these two
principalities occupicd an important place in Lhe pewer games of Europe and the Ottoman Empire, and issucs rcgarding the vo.y・vodos of these principalities became issues ofsignificant interest to the European powers, [Iherefore, I believe
that an analysis of this subject wil] help us to understand oJic aspcct of thc role
played by these principalilies in the proeess of the integration of Russia and the Ottoman Empire into the Western state systcm. Because the purpose of this
article is to cxamine this aspect of integration, I will not consider matters
pertaining to vo.yvodas in the eontext of domcstic affairs. Rather, I will discuss
this subject from the viewpoint ol' internationa] rclations.
After the Ottoman conquest, the historical cxperience of Wallachia and Moldavia, referrcd to as the Danubian Principalitics in Western documents and
important rets,]ons in prcsent-day Romania, difi'ered from thosc of other Balkan
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,iLkitsu NtL" uzunii
territories. Owing to their geographical and geopolitical position. these two principalities did not fa]1 under the direct rule of the Porte but were under its
control as autonomous vassal staLcs, mainLaining theirpartial independence in
cxchangc for various obligations to the Porte, such as an annual tribute and the
supply ol' provisiQns to Istanbul, Although Michael the Brave (Mihai Viteazul,
1558-1601) united Wallachia, Moldavia and Transylvania under a single rule
fora short period of time in the end oi' the sixteenth century, in general, the
Danubian Principalities were mostly undcr thc control of thc Portc during the
sixteenth and seventeenth eenturi ¢ s. Thus, attcmpts madc by thc Polcs and
Austrians to interfere in the aff'airs of these two principalities seldom met with success.
However, the 1[ireaty ofKarlewitz (1 699) marked thc dcclinc of thc Ottoman's
dominancc ovcr Europe, and concurrently, Russia emerged as a power in the
north. In the eighteenth cenLury, as a rcsu]t of this changc in thc political dynamics with rcgard to intcrnational relations, the European powers began to exercise
their influence over Wallachia and Moldavia earlicr than in thc othcr tcrritorics
in the Balkan Peninsula. Among thc European countries, Russia was one of the
first to exert its influence over these principalitics. Thc cxistcncc of a sccrct alliance between Peter the Great and the Moldavian voyi,oda Dimitrie Cantemir
(1693, 171O-11) at the time of thc Prut Campaign (171O- l711) bears tcstiniony
to this influence. Following thc war, thc Danubian Principalities became the - busis Ibr a powcr gaine mainly among three empires Habsburg, Russia and - Ottoman and a balance of power was achieved for more than fi t'ty years.
However, the Russo-Ottoman War (1768-1774) and the Treaty of Kyuchuk Kainardja (1774) rcsulted iii the unsettling of this balance. As a result. the
Danubian Principalities became one of the regions most disputcd by Russia and
the Ottoman Empirc, v,,itnessing involvement from Habsburg at times and later
from athcr European powers. It appears that. to da{e, littlc attcntion has been paid to this sub.ject, al though
severa) scholars have mentioned this topic bricfiy in their wc)rk. The Moldavian
(Bessarabian) schelar Grosul did so in his monograph on Russian policy
conccrning the Danubian Principaliticsi and Stanford Shaw in his study on thc
Ottoman Empire during the reign ofSclim III.i' However, these studies only
make superficial reference to the issues pcrtaining to vo.vvodcts and do not focus on them in the context of international rclations,
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Issues pertaining te "ii]lachian and Mo]davian N・e>,veclas
relations not Moreover, Russe-Ottoman in .eeneral during this period have
been the subject of man>, studics. whilc thcrc havc bccn an abundance Qf studies
on Russo-Balkan relations, Fi'om a Russian perspectiye, in addition to the abeye-
mentioned work by Grosul. seye]'ul mc)nographs l'ocus not only on Russia's
Balkan policy but also on Russo-Ottoman relations in general.-' From an Ottoman perspcctivc, thc only reliable stud>, thus i'ar is Uzungartiili's general history of the Ottoman Empire published by Ttirk Tarih Kurumu (Turkish Historical Society),4
Further, specific topics coneerning relations between the Ottoman Empire
and the Danubian Principalitics during thc cightcenth century - the so-called - Phanariot period have been discussed in artic}es by Romanian scholars. For example, Hatl-t "'erCtS (Imperial edicts)' addrcssed to Wallachia and Moldavia by the Portc, aftcr cach Russo-Ottoman XN'ar. provided a lega] background to
the relations between the Porte and the principalities, and severa] articles have
anaLvzed these cdicts.`' In particular. the Imperial edicts of 1802, which are one
of the main focuses in this articlc, are known to have altcred rclations bctwccn
the Ot,toman Empirc and the Danubian Principalities. With regard to these edicts.
Mihall Guboglu, a Romanian orientalist, edited the original text maintained in
the National Archives of Romania and translated it intc) Russian with a bricf
cxplanation regarding its background.7 A personal research, cenducted in the
National Archives in Bueharest. revealed manv . minute diffcrenccs betwecn
Guboglu's edition and the original text that he had based his translation upon.S
In addition, frc)rn the Russian pcrspectiyc, G. N, Seliakh provides an eutline of
the edicts based on Russian diplomatic documents."
Through such a review of the historiography, the lack of studies rcgarding
not only Russo-Ottoman relations but a]so the relations bct"icen the Ottoman
Empire and other Europcan powcrs in the eighteenth century beeomes evidenL
It would appear that the aft'airs which teok placc in the Balkans in {he second
`Eastern halfof the eightccnth ccntury have been exaniined only as a part of the Question,' and not in the context of Ottoman-European relations,i[' In other
words, the rolc of the Porte as a political actor in international politics has been
neglected, because researchers have depended solcly on Western material, It
must be emphasizcd that the Eastern Question is but one of several approachcs to Etn understanding of affairs in the Balkans, and does not provide us with a
detailed or comprehensive understanding. In Ottoman studies, from anothcr
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Akitsu NduvL]zuriii
perspcctivc. thc study of diplomatic history or international relations prior to
the eighteenth century, is one of the weakest fields of study.ii Based on these
observations, we should use both Western and Turkish material to pursuc the
study of Ottoman diplomacy as well as the relations between the Porte and the
European powers. Further, based on the results of the considerable number of studies on the Eastern Question, an attempt shoLild be made to comprehensively
reconsider the subject ot' the Balkans in the context ot' internationu] relations
"'herein the Ottoman Empire is one ol' the most important actors,
For the purposes oi' this study. wiLh regard to primary sources, issues related
to the vo)'L)odas and the international status of the Danubian Principatities have
been examined using both Russian and Ottoman sourccs. As a main sourcc
frem the Russian side, reference was made to a co]lection of diplomatic and
consulaLr reports published in Romania and the former Soviet Union.R From the Ottoman side. ' several chronicles written bvi Ottornan official chroniclers
tvak`a ndivt"s'ii were referred to. Apart from these, this study also madc usc of
published collections oftrcatics, transliterated or translated Ottoman documents
and several archiva] docunients.i4
2. The emergence of vayvodas as a politieal issue
in Russo-Ottoman relations
2.1 [[he status of Wallachian and Moldavian mprotlas prior to the Russ{"0ttoman War of 1768-1774
Wd]lachia and Moldavia, which were both integrated into the Ottoman Empire
as vassal states by the beginning of the sixteenth ecntury, had, in thcory, rcscrvcd
the right to elect their own vo.vvodtts,iS even though the rights of these two
principalitics wcre largely curtailed by {he Sublime Porte. In principle, the vo.yt,odas were elected by the boyars (nobles. boier in Romanian and ho.yclr in `vsul Turkish) from among a limitcd numbcr of upper-class boyars known as
doJ'nnesc; and the results of these elections were confirmed by Lhe Ottemun
authorities. However, despite the existence of this ru]c. bcginning around the
second half of the sixteenth century, the Portc dircctly chose the voyvodas de JLicto. At timcs thc Porte would intervene in thc clcctien. and if the elected cundidate cxhibited an anti-Ottoman attitudc. the election resulrs would be
rejcctcd.ih Nevertheless, the principle that vo.yvodas should be elected from
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Issues pertaining to ""ul[achian and ts4oldaviun ve>'vedus
among local boyars was maintaincd until thc beginning of thc ejghteenth century.
In the sixteenth and scvcntccnth ccnturics. Poland nei...ohboring Moldavia to the
south made frequent attempts to bring the vo.yvodas, and especia]ly the
Moldavittn vo.y・vodas, under its infl uence, and at times the Habsburg Empire
and Ukrainian Kazaks became involved.ii How'ever, during this period, Westein
Europe was predeminantly influenced by the Ottomttn Empire. Hence, issues
pcrtaining to thc })o.vvodas "・'crc specific (mly to Polish-Ottoman rclations and
did not involve many other European countries or atTect Ottoinan-European
rc]ations.
It is -iidely accepLed by scho]ars that the Treaty ef Karlowitz (1699) was a
rnajor turning point in OUoman hislory, particuiarly from a perspective of
Ottoman-European power relations. As a result of this treaty, the international
environinent surrounding thc Danubian Principalitics changed considerably. The
cession of Transylvania to Ausn'iu, by thc Porte, rcsulted in their bordering the
Habsburg Empire. and concurrently. in northern Europe, Russia emergecl as a
rival of the Ottoman Empire, In purticular, Russia attempted to advance into the
Balkans, appcaling to thc principalitics as a protcctor of the Orthodox Church
'yoke' and a libcrator firom the of the Ottonian rule. In response, the Moldavian
vo.yvodti Dimitrie Cantemir and the Wallachian vo}ivoda Constantin BrAncoveanu
(as Wallachian vo.},voda 1688- 1714) both rcqucstcd Russia's protection, and
Cantemir actively collaborated "Jith Russia in thc Russ()-Ott()man War (171()- 1711),
Although the Russians were defeated. the Porte was ferced to take new
measures to preyent the principulities 1'rom gttining indcpcndcncc i'rom thc
Ottoman suzerainty. Suhsequently, the Porte abolished the indirect appointment
of vo),vodas and introduced a direct appointment system to strcngthcn its rulc
over Wallachia and Mo]davia, The new]y nominated voyvodas wcre appointed
by the Porte from among sevei'al influential faniilies called Phanariots.[S since
rl'urkish"F'ener') their base was in thc Phanctr (in clistrict in Istanbul. These
i,oyvodas werc appointed in Istanbul and sent to Bucharest or Iasi like othcr
Ottoman vc71ts of whom were Orthodox Christians of Grcck-origin, engaged in commerce, shipping and flnance. They were needed by the Porte in the seventeenth century due to their financial power and their knowledge of both Europc and Eurepean languages. From the sccond half of thc seventeenth century onward, the 5 NII-Electronic Library Service The JapaneseSocietyJapanese Society forforSlavic Slavic and East European Studies ,nLkiLsu N'Ias,u/umi Phanariots were appointed as ei'l-icial translators ot' the imperial court (Dtvan-t hiima.1;t"tn ierctimanlart) and played an important role particularly in the dip]omatic ficld. From 171 ] to 1821, thc vo.vvodcts were appointed to the Danubian Principalities tl'om the Phctnat'iots; howevcr, they wcrc actually only chosen t'rom among less than ten deminunt families. This was becausc, in principle, as a career pattern, the chief translator of the irnperial court was nominated to bccomc a L,oJ,vodaiL' and was thus obligated to pay cnormous amounts of money and give gifts to the Sultan, his family and high officials. Therefore, only people with a strong po]itical and economic background could acquire the post. Morcov'er, although thc official tcrm of a vo.x:voda was three years, they were sometimes replaced earlier becausc of intensc competitjon among the Phanariot familics and thc Ottoman high officials' motivation to increase their profits. Thus, in the eighteenth century, thc policy adoptcd with regard te the appointment ef voyvodcts was inconsistent and ]acked long-term perspective, and the appointed vo.vvodas collected their investment in thc principalities with alacrity, Conscqucntly, this exhausted thc land and caused dissatisfaction amoT]g the boyars and peasantry,2" leading to discontentment among thc local boyars with regard to the Greeks who had accompanied the vo.yvoda from Istanbul and occupied high ranks in the adrninistration. The local boyars then turned to foreign countries, particularly Russia. in an attempt to regain the priyileges they had lost, making foreign intervention ala that much easier. Moreover, contrary to the Porte's expectations. the Phanariol vo.yvodas were not always loyal and sonie of them approached France, Habsburg and Russia. Thus, the Ottoman's intention to strengthen its rule over the Danubian Principalities, through the direct appointment of vo.vvodas, did not ulways succced. 2.2 The Treaty of Kyuchuk Kainardja and the status ot` Wallachia and Moldavia Many scholars agree that the Treaty of Kyuchuk Kainardja (1774) changed the balance of power that had existed between the Ottoman Empirc and the European powers. For thc Danubian Principalities, the treaty was also significant because according to the stipulations ot' the treaty, the internal at)lairs of these principalitics and Ottoman-Moldo-Wallachian suzcrain-subject relations emerged as international issucs {br the i'ir$t time since the Treaty of Karlowitz. Thcrcforc, thc Treaty of Kyuchuk Kainardjtt is an apt starting point for this 6 NII-Electronic Library Service The JapaneseSocietyJapanese Society forforSlavic Slavic and East European Studies Issucs pcrtaining to Vv'allachian and MoLdaviatn'olr・vodas art,icle's anal.vsis, and a more detailed cxamination of the process "'hcrcby the treaty was reached and of its inipact are required. The Russo-Ottoman Vv'ar in [768 was rnorc widcspread than the prcvious wars between thc two cmpires. Not only did it cover the Russo-Ottoinan frontiers in Europe but also spreud over Caucasus and )vdorca (Grecce) and they becarne battlefields as well. The militarily predominant Russian army advanced into the Danubian Principalitics and occupied Lhe capital of Moldavia, IaEi, in the autumn of 1769 and then udvanced into Wullachia and seized its capital Bucharest. Thus. the Ottoman del'eat in thc principa[ities was evident. Russia, ernphasizing its positien as the p]-otector of the Orthodox Church, made an appeal to thc pcoplc of Wallachia and Moldavia to cooperate.2i In response to this appeal, anti-Ottoman uprising.s occurred in various places and the local beyars and the clergy scnt a dcleg.ation to St. Petersburg to petition for the Empress' protcction uguinst Ottoman rule.ii Additionally. GrigQre Alexandru Ghica, the Wallachian voyvoda (in rvloldavia 1764-67, in Wallachia 1768-69), also cooperated with Russia b>, intcntionally delaying the supply of provisiens to the Ottoman troops. As a rcsult of this behavior, Ghica was rcmoved from his post and fled to Russia,"i When Russian supcriorit>i over the ()ttoman Empire and the Danubian Principalities' expectationts' "iith reE,ard to Russia became clear, other European countrics bccarnc invo]ved in the war as "'cll. Thc Habsburg Empire and Prussia, in particultLr, toQk an active part and undcr pressure resulting froin the involvement of these two countries, Russia dccided to enter into pcace ncs.etiations ",ith lhe Porte in 1770, Ne.ootiations were undcrtakcn, fjrgt in Giurgiu, then in Focsani and Bucharest. Howevcr, Lhe two parties were unable to reach an as,reement, and the war ra.oed on. As a rcsult of Pugachev's revolt, which had sprcad along the Vblgu and prescntcd a scrious threat to the Russian government, Russia was required to end the war in haste, and in June 1774, in K},uchuk Kainardja, a small village near Silistra. ncgotiations were reopened. Approximately two weeks later, on July 1O, 1774. a peaee agreeme]nt cemprising twenty-eight articlcs and two separttte articles was siLtned by both plcnipotentiaries.i4 ln thc last conforcncc, hcld in Bucharest. the Russian delegation hud presented thc Ottoman rcprcsentatives with a draft of a peace treaty {hat included stipulations regardin.e. the Danubian Principalitics.)" This timc, thc Ottoman NII-Electronic Library Service The JapaneseSocietyJapanese Society forforSlavic Slavic and East European Studies Akltsu ivlavuzunii representativcs accepted the treaty with some modifications. Articlc 16 of the treaty addresscd the status of Wallachia and Moldavia, Therein the Porte assured the freedom of Christianity in thc principalities, a tax exemption for two years, the right ofthe Russian diplomatic representative in Istanbul to vc)iec his opinions concerning the affairs of the Danubian Principalities, and so on. Altheugh Article 16 did not address thc subject of vo.yvodas, in the draft presented at the negotiations in Bucharest, Russia had demanded that the Porte reappoint the fbrmer vo.vvoda Grigorc Ghica, who was in Russia at the time, as `lifelong `with a voyvoda' to Moldavia a solemn plcdgc that the Porte would neither rcplace him fer any reason nor insult and menace him in any way,'26 Russia had protected Ghica with the intcntion of using, him as a puppet in the future, and it is evident from this clause that it aimed to extend its influence into Moldavia through this pro-Russian v,o.yvoclti. It can be implied then that Moldavia had turned into a puppct statc in thc hands of Russia, Subsequentl}-his clause would play a maj ()r role in Russia's advance into the Balkans. However, in the negotiations held at Kyuchuk Kainardja, Russia had conceded some points and their stipulation concerning thc appointment of Grigorc Ghica "'as excludcd. Nevertheless, the Porte was forced to agree to his appointment as a Moldavian vo.yvoda, and after thc conclusion of this trcaty, Ghica was `lifelong ofTicially nominated as a vo.i,・voda.'?-7 With regard to economy and I'inance, the treaty did not bring many improvements to the Danubjan Principalities. However, the significance of this treaty lies in the fact that e]ause 10 in Article 16, which stipulatcs Russia's voice concerning the affairs of thc principalities, paved thc way for Russia to officially involvc itself in issues pertaining to Wallachia and Moldavia. In othcr words, following this treaty, affairs oi' the principalitics that had previously bccn the internal a['fairs of the Ottornan Empire became international in scope. SQmc havc conjccturcd that owing to this treaty, Russia obLained the right to protect Orthodox Christian subjccts in the Ottoman Empire. This is not true, Article 7 of the treaty states that the Orthodox Christian subjects in the Ottoman Empirc must be protected by the Porte, and not by Russia,2E Thus, the Danubian Principalitics wcrc an cxccplion. The Russian voice in the affairs of Wallachia and Moldavia was not as strong as the right of protection. But this did rcpresent thc bcginning ofRussia's deepening invelvement in the atlairs concerning, i'irgt, the principalities and, later, the entire Balkan rcgion, aided by the rig.ht to open 8 NII-Electronic Library Service The JapaneseSocietyJapanese Society forforSlavic Slavic and East European Studies lssucs pertainl-g u, XX'allaehian and N・loldaNian vo>,vodus consulates anywhere in the territory of thc Ottoman Empire (Article 1 1). Moreover. although L. t.here "'as no clause about voyvodas. in Article I6, Russia succeeded in placing its puppet at un important vantagc point in one of the OttQman vassal states, and eNcntually this would provide Russia with Ihc opportunity to penetrate the Dunubian Principalities as well, With the granting ofnew rights to Russia in the treaty of 1774, thc balance of power among Russia. Western Europc and the Ottoman Empirc, which had brous,ht stability to the east.ern part of the European contincnt for more than fifty years, shifted. Consequently, the Habsbur.g Empirc and other European pewers bcgan to take precautions aL-uainst Russiats further advanccmcnt into the Balkan regien and hence were obligated to take an intercst in issues pertaining to that rcgion, Thus, we can conc]ude that Articlc 16 of the Treaty of Kyuchuk Kainardja carried immcnsc iiT)portance. not onl>, for the Danubian Principalitics and the Ba]kans, but also for thc balance ot' power and the intcrnatiQnal order: '1'reaty 2.3 Issues regarding vqyvodas after the of Kyuchuk Kainardja As mentioned above, the pro-Russian Grigorc Alexandru Ghica was appointed as a lifelong Moldavian vo.y・voda, Follo",ing Ghica's appointmcnt, Alexandru Ipsilanti, who was appointcd to Wallachia after the h'eaty, also pctitioned Russia `lifelong' for status,]" which action suggests thut Russia had become the other patron of the Danubian Principalities. Concurrently, in the Ottoman Empire, thcrc was an among the Phanariots sincc the chance increasing L. dissatisfaction L of their being appointed to the post of i'o.vT'oda had bccn reduced. As a result, thcrc soon appeared a movement to eliminate Ghica i'rom his post. Thc Ottoman govcrnmcnt was also dissatisfied with Ghica and the Russian prcscncc in Moldavia, One of the rcasons for their dissatisfactien was that the imperial family and high oft'icials were. consequcntly. no longer able to earn large sums of m()ney and receive gil'ts with each nomination af a tiew vo.vvodti.][' On learning that the Moldavian vo.yvodtt and boyars intended to place their state under Russian pretection. in an act ef protcst against the Ottoman cession of Bukovina to the Habsbur,a. Empire,"i thc Portc dccided to eliminate Ghica. In order to achieve this, thc Porte scnt an agcnt, kapicibast KarahisCu'T-7ade Ahmed. to latii who, in October 1777, succeeded in Ghica's assassination./'2 With thc climination of thc lifelong pro-Russian vo.vvoda, Russia's intended advance into the Danubian Pri ncipalities collapsed. 9 NII-Electronic Library Service The JapaneseSocietyJapanese Society forforSlavic Slavic and East European Studies AkiLsu N,laN,uzuJlli In 178I, Russia allied itself with the Habsburg Empirc, and by the end of 17g2, both made representatiens to thc Porte with regard to thc fo11owing three issucsi (1) the navigation of trading vcsse]s in the Black Sca, (2) Crimea and (3) the Danubian Principalities.3" With regard to the first issue, the Porte signed a commercial treaty with Russia in June I783.'"` With regard to Crimea, Catherine Il declared the annexation of thc Crimean Khanate by Russia and the Porte approved it in 1784.]S Finally, with regard to the Danubian Principalities, thc Porte was obliged to accept the demands put forward by Russia and the Habsburg Ernpire, owing to diplematic prcssure, and an agrccmcnt was signed as a form of convention (sened) in the beginning of 1784,36 In conncction with the principali(.ies, the most important point ol' this convcntion appears to have heen that the tributes and other taxcs scnt to the Porte were fixed in erdcr to prevent `..,unless exccssive exploitation, With regard to the vo.yvoda, it was statcd that a proved violation occurs, the vo.woda is not to be replaced.,..']' The inclusion of a passage on the vo)'vodas was thc tVirst instance of a rcgulation concerning vo.yvodas in an oflicial diplomatic agreemcnt bctween Russia and the Ottornan Empire, As a rcsult of this convention, the possibility that a vo.vvoda might stay - in the post for a longcr pcriod of time an outcome that Russia had coveted - was renewed. Even after the convention had bcen agreed upon and despite this stipulation, vo.yvodas were ot'ten replaced. It was evident that Russia had hoped to kecp pro-Russian vo),vodas in their posts for a long pcriod but apparently this stipulation had been ineffective. In gencral, L,o.vvodas could gain profit lcgal]y as well as illegally; thercforc. any form of violation was casily identified by both empires. Evcn if a voJ,voda complied with the regulations, sometimes other Phanariots, aiming to succeed to thc post, threatened him and forced him to resign. The Wallachian vo",i,oda Alexandru Ipsilanti's resignation in 17823" and Mihail Su?u's subsequent resi.onation in 17863" are examples of this. In fact, the Ottoman Empire appeared to rcgard the 1784 convention lightly. For example, in 1785, thc Portc appointed Alcxandru Mavrocordat II (Firaris, 1785-86). Thc new vo.yvoda was known to be a Russephile because, like Grigore Ghica, he had fied te Russia during the Rusgo-Otteman War.4" Nevertheless, he was appointed as a vo.yvodct. This fact clearly indicates that the Porte believed that they could remove hiin wiLh litLle diflficulty. As expected, he was replaccd by Nicolae Mavrogheni (1786-90) the very next year. TO NII-Electronic Library Service The JapaneseSocietyJapanese Society forforSlavic Slavic and East European Studies Issucs pcrraining to NNSallachian ancl N'lu[dayiun x,eyvodas Thus, Russia's arnbition to kcep pro-Russian vo.vvodas in their posts forlonger periods was not achieved through the convcntion of 1784. The yeur 1787 witnessed another Russo-Ottoman VIJar. Russian troops easily occupied Moldavia, and in kecping with an alliance between Russia and Austriu, Austrian troops advancecl into Wallachia. Despite this Russian and Austrian predominance, their complete victory over the Ottoman Empire was not accepted by other European poxN'ers. In 1789. Sweden dcclarcd war ab,ainst Russia, and Grcat Britain. Prussia and thc Nctherlands formed an alliance. Moreover, the French Rcvolution had an cxtrcmcly largc impact on Europe; consequently, the Habsburg Empire promptly signed a peace treaty with the Portc in Svishtov, and Russia, tbHowing in Habsburg's footstcps, called for an armistice. Prior to negotiations, Russia made clcar to thc Porte that the Danubian Principalities would be returned, a]beit with several conditions attached.4i In their negotiations, Russia focused on issues pertaining to Russian-occupicd Moldavia and an a.creement was reached with regard to several conditions such as a two-year tax exemption and the fi'ec inovement of Moldavian subjects within their country. Thc Trcat>f ef ]alji, sis,ncd in Jnnuary 1792, served to reconfirm the validity of past agreements regarding thc Danubian Principaliries but there was an absence of stipulations concerning the vo.},vodos.42 Howcvcr, it would appcar that thc Ottoman's attitude towai'd issues pertaining te the voyvodas changed during the Russo-Ottoman War ( 1787- 1792). Following the armistice in 1790, there arosc thc nccd to nominate a new Moldavian vo,vvoda. In the .orand vizieria] summary (telhfs), prcscntcd by the official deputy ofthe Grand Vizier (saddiret kavmakamO to thc Sultan on thc nomination of a neiNr 'who iJo.}.)vodci, the Ottoman o(Ticials placed significant cmphasis (m among the candidates is the most loyal to the Portc and who can cxc]udc Russian infiuence `who from Moldavia' instead of will pay the most,'43 t;urthcr, thc law (kclnn"tnnc7n!e) issucd to Moldavia after thc trcaty stipulatcd that among the translators in the Imperial Council (dtvan-t hi'iincl.yiln tei'ctimctnlart) a ve]'y loyal one to the Porte would be norriinated as vo.yi't)da.4` Based on this stipulation, who Alexandru Moruzi (inWitllachia1792-96, 1799-180 1, inMoldavia 1792), was said to have rc]ations with France. was nominated as thc Moldavian vovvodti, v Owing to the French revolution and the existcnce of an anti-Russian alliance, the Otteman Empire was able to avoid a lar."..e-scale territorial loss despite its military inl'eriority, Hewever, this war, undoubtedl},. had a great impact on the TI NII-Electronic Library Service The JapaneseSocietyJapanese Society forforSlavic Slavic and East European Studies AkiLsu Mayuzumj Porte, The Ottoman Empirc had been forced to recognize, clearly atid seriously i'or the first time, that their empire had grown cxtrcmely weak and thal it would be unable to recover ]ost territory by fOrce. This then led te a military reforrn `Nidim-i known as c'edld,' and thcy bcgan to feel threatened with regard to the security of the Danubian Principalities. This change in the Ottoman attitudc to"iards the nomination of voyvodas can bc rcgarded as evidence of their changing eonsciousncss with rcgard to the international situation as wcll. 3. Issues pertaining to vayvodas in the Imperial edicts of 1802 3.1 lntemal disorder in the Balkans and the involyement ot` France in the affairs of the Danubian Principalities Aftcr the French Revolution. Russia established the first diplomatic principlcs regarding the prevention of Franceis infiuence. Russia:s Balkan pelicy was not an cxception. In fact, in the first half of the 1790s. France actively bcgan to advance into the Balkans, and when the Porte ot'ficially recogniscd thc revo]utionary government, it gave I rancc pcrmission to establish its consulate in Bucharcst, hoping to diminish Russian influcncc oi,cr the Danubian Principalities.`S In this context, Russia began to carel'ully observc France's activities in the Danubian Principalities, particularly thc !elations between France and the families of thc voyvodas. Russia initia]ly be]ieved that Mihail SuLu, thc Moldavian vovvoda (1792-95), would be beneficial to them. However, when it becatne known that his son in Istanbul shared good relations with France, Russia began to doubt him. In 1795, when the French consulate opened in Bucharest. Russia feared that the French might have intluencc ovcr thc voyvo[iti's tamily, and the Russian Minister to the Ottoman Empire, V. P. Kochubey, complained ofMihail Su!u's illegal actions and demanded that the Porte remove him from his post, The chief translator at the Imperial council, Alexandru Callin)achi, was the stro-gest candidatc to bccome the ncxt voJ:voda, and he displayed a favorable attitude towards Russia in order to acquirc thc post with their help. Owing to pressure from Russia and other Phanttriots, Su!u resigned, This incidcnt illustrutcs Russia's anxiety with rcgurd to an incrcasc in Frcnch intlucnce over the Danubian Principalities. Frunce scnL agents to the arca south of thc Danubc and succeeded in ' establishing relations with local notablcs known as a`.yc2n.' During this pcriod, I2 NII-Electronic Library Service The JapaneseSocietyJapanese Society forforSlavic Slavic and East European Studies Issucs pcrtuining to VXJa]lachian and Mo]davian x,oyvodas the a`yans disrcgarded the central authority and fought one another to expand their own territory. Since thc po-er ofthc ccnlral authority was very weuk and it was unab]e to suppress tliese eonflicts, thc arca south of the Danube was in anarchy and was divided amons, several powerful a".v(lns. Of thcsc, Osman Pazvand-oglu ofVidin had a significant impact on Wallachia and Russo-Ottoman relations.46 Airning te widen his territory, Osman Pazvand-oglu battled with his rivals for many years, causins, a statc of disordcr and anarchy in Northern Bulgaria."7 In order to maintain his power, he retained a large number of private soldiers (kapt hatkt), The land beyond the Danube was a good sourcc of richcs, "'hich hc cxp[oitcd to supporl his soldiers. He ot'ten sent his troops north of thc Danubc to plundcr the area around Oltenia. and he repeatedly dcmandcd moncy and provisions for Vidin t'rom the Willachian, and at times even Moldavian vo.vvodas, threatening thcm with further attack it' Lhey ]'el'used.4" lk) suppress this disorder, the Porte dispatched troops tc) Viclin Eind besiegcd the fortress on three separate occasions, in l 795, 1798 and 1800. All of thesc cxpcditions cnded in failure, however, Moreover. on each occasion the Porte was compcllcd tu offcr Osman honorary offices such as kaptctba"'iik or i'e.n,bVik to placatc him. During these cxpcditions, thc Porte imposed a heavy burden on Wa]lachia and Moldavia, providing, the salary and supply of previsic}ns for thc Ottoman soldiers, offering their units to Vidin and so en. Thc Ottornan soldiers who entcred Wallaehia to attack Vidin were of diverse origin and not wcll organizcd, and as a rcsult, Lhey plundered towns and vallages on their way. Owing to these heayy burdens and miserable conditions, cspccially in Oltcniu. a strong voicc asking 1'or Russian interventien gradually cmcrtJed from among the Wallachian boyars around 1800."t' However, despite thcsc rcqucsts, Russia hesitatcd to intervene in thc affairs of thc Danubian Principalities because of internationa] relations at that tiine. France defeated the Iilabgburg troopK in Ital)', acquircd thc Ionian Islancls and the Albanian coast in accordance with {he Trcaty ofCampo Formio in 1797, and agitated the Greek insurrection. This caused a strain in French-Ottoman relations. Then. Francc's invasion ofE.gypl in the following year compelled the Porte to end all relations with France, who had bcen a potcntial aliy since the sixteenth century,50 This situation led thc Porte to forge an alliance with Great Britain and its strongest riv'al, Russia.Si This represented a drastic change in I1} NII-Electronic Library Service The JapaneseSocietyJapanese Society forforSlavic Slavic and East European Studies /S,kiLsuMuvuzumi Ottoman 1'oreign policy. As a result of this ailiancc, thc Portc, who had until then maintained neutrality among the European states,joined the anti-Napoleonic coalition. Given these circumstances, Russia needed to avoid strong intervention in thc ahnirs of the Danubian Principalities. In fact, in 1798, hefore establishing an alliance with the Porte, Russia had ofFered to send an auxiliary corps of six thousand soldiers to Vidin.5i Howcvcr, oncc an alliancc with thc Ottoman Empirc was forged, Russia did not repcat thcir oftbr and only rcqucstcd that thc Portc take proper measures to quell thc disorder in Wallachia. 3.2 The Imperial edicts addressed to WaElachia and IVIoldavia in 1802 In ISOO, whi]e the third siege of Vidin continued, Osman Pu7vand-oglu petitioned the Porte several times through the Wallachian vo.vvoda, but it v"'as Russia that played thc niost important role as a mcdiator. Osman scnt his agcnts with lelters to the Russian Vicc-Consu] in Bucharest and thc Russian Ministcr in Istanbul requesting that they forward his petition to the Porte. This is to say that Osman askcd Russia to put pressure on the Porte, and in order to compe[ Russia to pressure the Porte f'urther. Osman decided to send his soldiers to Wallachia again in 1802, sending thcm in groups this time.S3 From April 1 802 onward. there was severe turbulence in Wa}lachia, Since rlbpedelenli Ali Paija, whom thc Portc had appointcd as thc Govcrnor of Rumelia (Rumeli vLlttsi) and the Chief Commandant of the Rumelian front (Rumeti tar[{fi seraskeri),S4 did not abandon Yanya (Ieannina), his basc, Osrnan Pazvand-oglu dispatched Iarge numbers of troops to Wallachia. They seized Oltenia and advanced further. to Bucharest. As a result ef this sudden attack, there was widespread panic in BucharcKt, and tnan)f' boyars, foreign diplomats ancl cvcn the voyvoda himself flcd to Kronstadt CBratiov). Following this incidcnt, the boyars and ecclesiastics -'ho had escaped sent a petition to Alexander I, a copy rlbmara. of which was sent to Vtisi]y the Rusgian Minister in Istanbul, requesting Russian assistancc in thcir rcturn to Wallachia.)'S Based on this petition, [[bmara dispatchcd a diplomatic note to the Porte suggesting that action be taken to improve the disastrous situation in the Danubian Principalities. In the note, he introduced issues that pertained to the vo.vvodas and demanded that the Portc observe the regulations agreed to in the Russo-Ottomun Convcntion ef 1784. In `It addition, he wrote: is important and incvitable that the Sub]ime Porte und the I4 NII-Electronic Library Service The JapaneseSocietyJapanese Society forforSlavic Slavic and East European Studies [ssucs pcrtaining to "・'a[Iuchian and Moldavian voyvc}das - signatory ('Ibmara A, M,) enter into negotiations and arrive at an agreement to establish prepcr conditions concerning the term of both vo.yvodcis.iS6 Concurrcntly, in St. Petersbur.g, on receiving the petition from Kronstadt, the Russian governmcnl s¢ nt instructiens to [[bmara datcdJunc 28, 1 802, wherein Alexander I ordcred him to int'orm thc Portc that if thc damage caused by Pazvand-oglu reached IN{oldavia. Russia would dispatch its troops to the rlk)mara Danubian Principalities.ST' On receiving this order. delivered a second notc to thc Porte, wherein he rnade more concrete demands with regard to the principalities.5'X Asidc from thc cxemption of taxes, the official term of the vo.vvodas was the principal subject of the note. and [[bLnara proposed a tcrm of scven ycars or more. The instructions from St. Petersburg had not included thc `seven term of years.' Hence it is cvidcnt that this tcrm was introduced by [rbmara himself, based on his ownjudgment. However, this was net an idea that originated with [Ibmara, sincc the sex,en-year term was described in a request sent to him by the rcprescntativc rlbmara's Alextindru Su!u, in Istanbul.5`' Three days later, in response to note, `I'our the Porte proposed years' as the ofi'icial term t'er vo.yvodas, but Tbmara was not satisfied with this response. Therefore, on July 21, 1802. seeing that effective ineasures had not been taken even after his first demarche, Tomara delivered another diplomatic note to the Porte.`i" In the note hc, oncc again, insistcd that thc official terrn of Lhe vo.v・vodas be seven years. In the event of a dismissal prior to the completian of scven ycars, he suggested that the Porte inl'erni Russia, in advance, so ajoint decision could be made as to whether or not thc vovvodat・ had committcd an illegal action. With res,ard to thi,s issuc, he presented another note to the reistilkti.ttab, Mchmcd Rauf Efendi the sarnc day, wherein he demanded that the former Meldavian voyvoda, Constantin Ipsilanti, bc nominated as the new Wallachian voyvodo."i This demand was in accordancc with the petition that had been madc by the boyars in Kronstadt,"2 and Tbmara accepted this request because of {psilanti'g good rclations with Russia. C. Ipsiianti was not popular among thc Ottoman high offlcials and was only supported by iuist]ilkiitttlh and sadaret kethti'd(2si. At the timc oChis nomination as a Moldavian voyvoda in 1799, it is belicvcd that Ipsilanli paid Iess money to the high officials than his predecessors,C'4 These two diplomatic notes are a reflection of Russia's intentions regarding IS NII-Electronic Library Service The JapaneseSocietyJapanese Society forforSlavic Slavic and East European Studies Akitsu Mavuzunii issues pertaining to the vo.yvodas. In other "iords, Russia had expected that afterthe convention with thc Portc in ]784, thc frcqucnt changc of vo.yvodas - rcsulting in a heavy financial burden on thc peoplc of the Danubian Principalities - would cease, pro-Russian vo.yvedas would remain in their pQsts for longcr periods and anti-Russian t,o.vt,odas could be replaced more easily than beforc by pointing out their illegal actions. However, despite thgse expectations, thcre was no visib]e change in the situation even after the convention because of severe competition among the i'hanariots fbr the post of vo.x:vodo and economic dissatisfaction on the part of the Ottoman high efficials, In the l790s. when the French influence gradually reachecl the Danubian Principalities, Russia sought more certain and practical means of appeinting pro-Russian vo.yvodas, keeping them in their posts as long as possible and preventing the Porte from appointing and dismissing vo.vvodas at will. In order to achieve this goal, Russia fixed the official tcrm of voyvodas at seven years in the first notc and madc it ncccssary for the Porte to inform it in advance in the case of a vo.vvoda's early dismissal. In the second note, Russia insisted on the appointment of Constantin Ipsilanti, a pro-Russian, as the new Wallachian vo.vvoda. According to [Ibmara's notes, thc ncgotiations continued for a month. Bcforc the final agreement. the Porte accepted Russia's proposal to nominate Censtantin Ipsilanti, and on August 31, 1 802, hc was appointcd as thc Wal]achian voyvoda. Concurrently, Alcxandru Moruzi, thc formcr Wallachian vo.yvoda (1792-96, 1799- 1 801), was appointed as the Moldavian vo.yvoda. Prior to his appointment, Ipsilanti had repeatedly asked Tbmara to a]so neminate him as a voyvoda.fi5 Al. Moruzi was C, Ipsilanti's uncle and served as a Moldavian vo.vvoda during almost the sanie period when Ipsilanti was the Wallachian vo))voda (l799- 1 80 1). Since it was known that Al. Moruzi had cloge relations with France, Tomara hesitated to accept Ipsi]anti's request. However, when Al. Moruzi pledged his loyalty to Russia and Ipsilanti alsQ assured it, he finally consented.G6 Finally, in September 18e2, both sides reached an agreement and, in the second half of the month, two Imperial edicts U'erfnans) for Wallachia and Moldavia were issued. Russia insisted that the ¢ ontent of the agreement bc established as an act bctwccn two cmpires, but the Ottoman Empire claimed that it should be in the form of.fermc7n since issues pertuining to Wallachia and Moldavia were iLs o",n internal aiTairs, Ultimately, Russia compromised.67 With regard to the official term of the vo.yi,odas and the issuc of thcir dismissal. the 1・6 NII-Electronic Library Service The JapaneseSocietyJapanese Society forforSlavic Slavic and East European Studies Issues pcrtainiti.g to "a[lachian and Mo[davian veyvodas Perte accepted Russia's proposal a]most completely. A term of seven years was agreed upon, and the stipulation concemiing a v,o.yvodLi's dismissal was as fo]lowsi `ln case an Megal action appears during his (the vo.vvoda's -A.M.) reign, the Russian ambassador will be informed by thc Poi'tc, and after verification by both sides, if the suspicion ot' the aforementioned i'o),iJodtt is evident and certain, only then wil] his dismissal be approvcd.:"8 Incidentally, Russia's rival France had littlc influence during the negetiations, although they had acquired presti ,o,e in Constantinople before 1798. PieTTe RufTin, the French charg6 d'aft'aires to the Ottoman Empire,C'" who had been confined in thc Seven Towers (Yedikule) according to thc Ottoman custom, was rcleascd in l801, bu(, France was unable to regain its prior inilucnce in Istanbul until a new French ambassador arrived in Istanbul in thc cnd of 1802, Thus. by taking advantage of the disorder in the Balkans, thc change of internationa] relations around the Ottoman Empire and the absence of Frcnch influence in Istanbul, Russia- to a large extcnt- obtained the right to be allowed involvcmcnt with regard to vo.yvodas and other issucs concerning the Danubian Principalities. On the other hand. as a rcsulL of reluctantly tnade edicts, the Ottoman right to i'reely control the i,oyvodas was largely restrained, [(]heir censequent dissatisfactien wou]d eventually lead the Porte to turn towards France. 4. The vayvodas' dismissal in 1806 and its impact on Russo-Ottoman relations 4.1 The Ottoman Empire and its re]ations with Russia and France after 1802 At'ter the peace treaty of 1802, France digpatched General Brune to Istanbul as a plenipotentiary ambassador, and as a result, diplomatic relations bctwccn Lhe Ottoman Empire and France were completely normulized. The new ambassador attempted to re-cstablish French intluence over the Porte, as it had bccn befere the Egyptian expedition, and onc of his most important missions was to separate the Porte frotn Grcat Britain and Russia. He actively approached the Porte and sought cooperation from it, pointing eut that the British troops were inciting the afntt's (commanders or governors) of Egypt to rebel against the central authority. Meanwhilc. thc Brilish ambassador dcmanded neutrality from the Porte in thc British-French -'ar.7'`' I7 NII-Electronic Library Service The JapaneseSocietyJapanese Society forforSlavic Slavic and East European Studies ,ALkitsuMux'utuilli p Simultaneously, Franco-Russian relations deteriorated, and as aconsequence, the princip]e goal of Russian foreign policy was to maintain an alliancc with the Ottoman Empire and to prevent it from approaching France. Therefore, in accordance with this policy, the Russian government dcalt with the afifairs of thc Danubian Principalities with caution. in order not to give the Porte the impression that Russia was still intcrvcning in its affairs, For example, the Russian governmcnt prohibited the General Consul in Iatii and thc Vicc-Consul in Bucharest frotn making demarches to the vo.yvodas bascd on their own judgmcnt. Further, the Russian govcrnmcnt stated that if there was a need to make a demarche, thc Gcncral and Vice-Consuls were obliged to ask for prior permissiQn from the Forcign Minister in St, Petersburg or the Russian Ministcr in Istanbul.7i When Pazvand-oglu Osman Pa}ai7 once again demanded money and provisions from the Wallachian vo.yvodct early in 1 803,T'3 Constantin Ipsilanti and the Russian Vice-Consul in Bucharest requested that thc governmcnt of St Pctcrsburg send Russian troops to Wa]lachia. In response, the Foreign Minister "vZ)rontsov, A. R. clearly rc.jccted this possibility and made it evident that Russia would not take any measures oLhcr than deniarches, through the Minister. to the Ottoman Empirc. Vorontsov explained that the presence of Russian troops in the Danubian Principalities for thc inaintenance of publjc order would give France thc epportunity to dispatch its troops to Morca for thc samc rcason.74 Aftcr Russia seyered its diplomatic rclations with France in 1804, because 'Emperor." Napoleon had declared himself the diplomatic activities of the European ministers in Istanbul intcnsitied. France urgecl the Portc to acquicscc `Empcror: to the title ot' and Se]im III was ft'tvorablc towards this.75 However, the Porte suspended the making ot' any official answer because thcrc was still distrust regarding France among the OttQman high otlicials.ie Conscquently, at the end of 1804, Russia proposed to the Portc that they renew their delensive alliance of 1798, which was duc to expire at the cnd of 1805. Besides strengthening Russo-Ottoman relations, the principai aim of Russia's proposal was also to prevent France from approaching the Porte. Another motivc behind Russia's proposal was that it expected to reinforce the statienary troops that were based in thc Ionian Islands (Yt:di Ada Cumhuriyeti) through the enactment of a new treaty.77 Since the Porte hoped to maintain its alliancc with Great Britain, it acccpted Russia's proposa] and entered into negotiations, The Porte did, however, re fusc Lhe fo]lowing two stipulations in Russia's draft, First, givcn I8 NII-Electronic Library Service The JapaneseSocietyJapanese Society forforSlavic Slavic and East European Studies lssues pertainiTi.g le "'aNacliian and N4oldaviun voyvudas the possibility of a French attuck in the future, Russia would dispatch ten to fifteen thousand soldiers in thc Danubian Principalitics and Grcat Britain would send five thousand soldiers to Morea. This was on the condition that the Russians `ie `a.v・cl' and British would not inter('ere in intema] a('fairs, Second, v"'ith regard to ・non-Muslim (or Ottoman subjects') the Porte would improve the conditions of Christian subjects in Rumelia and xN'ould give them the same rights enjoyed by `har(2c" Muslim subjects. with thc cxccption of paying (lttnd tax),7S AIthough the second stipulation would be fulfi11ed in 1839. at the time, the Ottoman Empire rejected it. In Scptcmbcr 1805, after a long period ofnegotiations, both sides agrccd to a rcncwed treaty that was valid ft)r nine years,79 At the time that thcsc ncgotiations wcrc carricd out. the situation in Europe was not clear. Although France ",as comparatively dominant on the continent, Grcat Britain maintained its control over the Mediterranean, His triumph in the Battlc ofAusterlitz in December 1 805, ensured the dominance of Napoleon and Francc on the European Continent. To the regret of the Porte, news of the French victory arrivccl in Istanbul just one day after the mutual rati fication of the renewed Russo-Ottomttn Treaty. Soon al'tcr, a French envoy was sent to ofifjcially inform the Portc of France's triumph in Austcrlitz. In a confidential dia]ogue with the Ottoman high c)iTieials. the French envoy proposed that the Porte renounce all previous agrcements xk'ith Russiu rcgarding thc Danubian Principalities, inc]uding thc impcrial edicts of ] 802, and that France would secure and preserve Ottoman territorial integrity,S[' Although the Porte did not accept this proposa] and mai ntained a neutral stancc, its political attitudc towards France gradually became more fttyorttble. In the beginning of 1 806, thc Ottonian Empirc finally acknowledged Napoleon Bonaparte as Emperor of Francc, Thcn, by Apri1 1 806, (he Porte declined Russia's proposal that Russian fleets should be allowed to pass through the Bosporus StraitsSL cvcn Lhough this proposal had been tnadc in accordancc with a newly ratified treaty. It is evident that the immediate cause for the change in the Ottoman approach towards France was the resu]t ol' the French victory in Austcrlitz, However, Otteman's distrust of Russia, even though they were allies at thc time, shou]d a]so be taken into account when considcring this change of artitude. In addition to the Imperial edicts to the Danubian Principalities in l802, the Ottoman Empire was disturbcd by sevcra] Russian activitics such as thc prcsence of Russian troops on the Ionian Islands, thc annexation of Georgia in the I9 NII-Electronic Library Service The JapaneseSocietyJapanese Society forforSlavic Slavic and East European Studies Akitsu Mayuzumi Caucasus, the suspicion of incitement and support of the Serbian Revo]ution, and the large number of Russian troops based near the Russian-Moldavian border. As a result ef all these factors, the Porte would gradually sever its ties with Russia and preparcd for war against it, In the beginning of 1806, Su]tan Selim III who considcred the disorder in thc Balkans caused by the Serbs, Osman Pazvand-Qglu and other a".yclns to be the main rcason for foreign intervention, dccidcd to dispatch Nizc2m-t c'ediU askeri, a new Western-style military corps that he had founded, to the Ba]kans. While the official explanation for this decision was the suppression of the Serbian Revolution, in fact, the Sultan's intention was to introduce his reform progranis to thc Balkans"i and to prepEu'e fora futurc Russian attack.Si In responsc to this series of Ottoman actions based on a change in their attitude, Russia began to make its own prcparaLions for war whilc continuing its cfforts to rnaintain thc `I alliance with the Ottoman Empire, The Foreign Minister Budberg stated, think Russia needs to maintain its ibreis,n policy tewards the Ottoman Empire because a war betwecn Russia and thc Ottoman Empirc would only scrvc to fulfil Napoleon's purpose, Hence, regardless of his designs to break Russo- Ottoman relations, we must not be hasty in severing relations with Lhe Ottomun Empire.'S4 4.2 The change of vqyvodas in 1806 In July 1 806, the French government, determined to take decisive measures to break the Russo-Ottoman alliance, dispatched General Sebastiani to Istanbul as their new ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Issues related to the Danubian Principalities were an ideal means by which France could separate the Porte from Russia. As soon as the new ambassador arrived in Istanbu], he requested that thc Porte dismiss both the vo)?vodcts, stating that thcy both, under the influence of Russia, had supportcd thc Serbian uprising.g5 The Porte had also been inclined to rcplace these vo.y v-'odas whom they had unwillingly appointccl in 1802, undcr pressure of Russla, and eemplaints rcgarding thc long rule of the voyvodas had increased not only among the Ottoinan otficials but also among the Phanariots, The former Moldavian vop'oda, Alexandru Su!u, who was replaced by Moruzi in 1 802 provides one example. Aiming to rcgain his post, Suyu lobbied the high officials to scvcr all lies with Russia. Subsequently, by the end of 1805, Italinsky, thc Russian Minister in Istanbul, remonstratcd to the 20 NII-Electronic Library Service The JapaneseSocietyJapanese Society forforSlavic Slavic and East European Studies Issues pcrtaining to "'allachian und N{eldavian voyvodas Porte with regard to Sugu's activities."" Soon after, a deputy to Foreign Minister Adam Jerzy Czartoryski ordered Italinsky to make a demarche to the Porte and ensure that the vo.yv,odas would not be replaced before the completion of their seven-year terms.Hi The above suggests that in istanbul actions wcrc bcing taken to remove Ipsilanti and Moruzi from their posts. After considering this issue fbra week, on August 24, 1 806, the Porte decided to replace the Wallachian vo>,vodo, Constantin Ipsilanti with Alexandru Sulu, and the Moldavian vo.yvoda, Alexandru Meruzi with Scarlat Callimachi, the chief translator of the Imperial Council.SS These dismissals were executed without any advance notiilcation to Russia although such had bccn stipulated in thc a.grccmcnt of 1 802, This incidcnt does net imply, ho",cvcr, that thc Ottoman Empire had dccided to definitively cut ties with Russia and ally with the French. Even after the replacement of both the vo.yvodas, the Porte maintaincd its ncutrality and made attempts to avoid a conclusivc scverance froni Russia. It is evident that the peace treaty signcd bctwccn I rancc and Russia on July 20, 1806 in Paris afilected the Porte's decision. According to the lrcaty. thc independence and territorial integrity ofthe Ottoman Empirc were to be preserved, The Porte was informcd of the contents of this treaty through a letter from Napoleon addressed to Selim.S" The Porte did not anticipate that thc dismissal of the vo.y・vodos and violation of the diplomatic agreement would result in the severance oi' the Russo-Ottoman alliance because of this stipulation in the Peace of Paris ancl the military predominance of France, Nevcrtheless, contrary to the Pc)rteis anticipation, Russia took a firm stand against this incidcnt and regardcd these suddcn dismissals as a final change in Ottoman diplomatic poHcy. The Russian Minister in Istanbul Italinsky immediately protested against this decision tmd demanded that the departure of the newly appointed voyvodas for the pi'incipalitics be aborted."i In addition, based on instructions from St, Petersburg, he demanc[ed that the Porte restore Constantin Ipsilanti and Alexandru Moruzi to Iheir old posts and assure thcm thut they could scrvc thc rcmaindcr ef their seN'en-ycar tcrms. At the same time, he informed the Porte that ifhis dcmands werc not acccptcd, hc would lcaiic fbr Russia."i On the other hand Sebastiani, the French ambassadQr in Istanbul, requested that the Porte prohibit thc Russian i'leets ['rom passin.o through the Bosporus Straits: in oLher words, he requested that the Portc annul the Russo- Ottoman alliance.VL' As a result, thc Portc wus prescntcd with a ver>s difTicult 2I NII-Electronic Library Service The JapaneseSocietyJapanese Society forforSlavic Slavic and East European Studies Akirsu rL・IavuLunii choice from both sides, and thus. it attempted to delay the making of a decision. However, on October i3, Italinsky de]ivered an ultimatum to the Porte. With the help of mediaLion by thc British ambassador. the Poite attempted to appease the situation by restoring one of the two ve);vodas. But, Italinsky did not change his attitude, Some officials in the Porte regarded their relationship with Grcat Britain as the most important, and therefore, they were apprehensive about thc deterioration of British-Ottoman relations in the event the Russo-Ottoman alliance was renounced. Moreover. sonie ot't-icials appreciated that the Empire was not in the position to go to war against Russia, owing to a ]ack of preparation,"R Thking all these issues into account, on October 15,1806, the Porte finally decided to restore the dismissed vo.yvodas to their o]d posts."" Although Italinsky clispatched a courier with this news to St. Petersburg, the Russian s,ovcrnmcnt did not rcccivc it until November 5. 1806."" By this time, Alexander I had alreacly ordered the commander-in-chicfof the Russian army, bascd near the border of Mo]davia, to cross over into Moldavia on Octobcr 28, 1806."6 Consequently, although the Porte had cotnprotnised with Italinsky and restored the voyvodas, Russian troops invaded the Danubian Principalities and commcnccd the Russo-Ottoman ",ar, a war which would last until 18I2, - Even if the Porte had eliminated the pro-Russian t'oyt'odas, one of whom Al. Moruzi - was not, in fttct, so dcvoted to Russia, Russia would not have suffered any hcavy losses sincc thc activity of Russian consuls and merchants in the principalities would not hax'e been limited and thc advancc of other European powers would not have been accelerated. Nevertheless, since the regulations concerning the appointment and dismissal of voyvodas occupied an important place in Russia's Balkan policy in the Imperia] edicts of 1 802 and in the internatienal situtttion at that time, the replacement of the voyvodas in 1 806 was regarded by Russia as a definitive change in Ottoman foreign policy from a pro-Russian to a pro-French stance. In this way, issues pertaining to the voyvodas made a large impact on Russo-Ottoman relations and became the direct cause of thc Russo-Ottoman war, 5, Conclusion This article has examincd a series of issues related to the vovvodas ol' the Danubian Principalitics, in the context of RussQ-Ottoman relations. Previous Zl NII-Electronic Library Service The JapaneseSocietyJapanese Society forforSlavic Slavic and East European Studies lssucs pcrtaining io "'a]lachian und )v'loldav・jan voyvodas studies on thc Danubian Principulities and Russo-Ottoman rclations in the `Introduction,' eighteenth and ninctccnth ccnturies. which were mentioned in the revealed that Russia strengthened its influence over the Danubian Principalities in the second half of thc eighteenth centutlr'. However, these studies only ot'forcd a gcncral analysis of a variety of subjccts and did not analyse any onc subject - deeply. In contrast. this article has focuscd on one concrete subject namely - vo.v・vodas making use of both Russian and Ottornan documents. Questions pertaining to the Wallachian and Moldavian vo.v・vodas began with thc Treaty of Kyuchuk Kainarclja in l774. Through this treaty, Russia obtained thc voice and thc right to intervene in the aiifairs of thc principalities while also succeeding in the ol' a i,o.yvoda, who was a of thc Russian placeme]t Gri.oore Ghica, puppet government, in Moldavia. Although the Russian advance into the principalities was foilcd by thc assassination of this vo.vvoda, thereafter Russia aimed to place pro-Russian pcrsons as vo.v・vodcts and cxtcnd the ]ength of Lheir tcrms. Meanwhile, the Ottoman Empire madc attcinpts to hinder this Russian advance into the principalities by emasculating their diplomatic a.o,reement with Russia. With the French influence emerging in the Balkans in thc 1790s, Russia took advantage of the disorder in thc Balkans caused by the a`.vclns and by changes in international relations around the Ottoman Empire, and consequently, coinpelled the Porte to issue ncw regulatiens concerning the Danubian Principaiitics. The Imperial edicts Ulermans) ef 1802 were diplornatic agreements that actually stipulated thc scvcn-yeur terrn for L,o.vvodas and presentcd Russia with the opportunity to participate, in part'. in the nomination and disrnissal of vo.yvodas. On issuing these edicts, the Porte was forced to nominate two Phanariots, recQmmended by Russia, as voyvodas. These edicts, with which the Ouoman Empire was cliscontented. prcsented France with the idcal opportunity to break the Russo-Ottoman alliance after Frcnch-Ottoman diplomatic relations had been normalised at thc cnd of 1 802. When thc Frcnch s,aincd prcdominance on the continent, the Ottoman Empire graduall]r' ieaned toward the French, and in thc summer of 1 806, the Porte decided to violate the agreement of 1 802 by replacing the vo.vvodas, v,'ithout prior notitMication to thc Russian govcrnmcnt, Despite the Ottomun's expectation th ttt, owing to France's predominance, they could evade a war, this incidcnt was rcgarded by Russia as an obvious chang,e in the Ottomun's diplematic course, and consequently, it led both empires to war. In this ar{icle, two sisnificant points havc bccn made clcar. First. after the ・23 NII-Electronic Library Service The JapaneseSocietyJapanese Society forforSlavic Slavic and East European Studies Akitsu "vla},uzunii Treaty of Kyuchuk Kainardja, issues pertaining to Wallachian and Moldavian vo.yvodas, which wcrc an interna] affair of thc Ottoman Empire until I774, became a mattcr of international importance. Second, after 1 802, issucs rclated to voyvodos occupied an imporLant place among Russia, France and the Ottoman Empire as they had even a symbolic significance in the Ottoman diplomatic course. Thc first point supports the predominant opinion that the Treaty of Kyuchuk Kainardja rnarked thc turning point in relations among the Ottoman Empire, Russia and Wesrern Europc. The second pQint shows thut issues pertaining to thc vo.y・vodos that had becn an internal at:fiLir of the Ottoman Einpire until 1 774 would bccome, only thirty years later, some of the tnost impertant and disputed issucs among the Ottoman Ernpirc, Russia and Western Europe. Thus, the analysis of issues pertaining to Wallachian and Moldavian vo.yvodas in this article demonstrates concretely that aftcr the [Ilireuty of Kyuchuk Kainardja `wor]ds' these three wcrc in even closer contact with one anothcr with regard to issues rclatcd to the Danubian Principalit,ics and, as a result, Russia and thc Ottoman Empire wcre rapidly integrated into the Western statc system. Notes 1. 1'. C, rpocy.'i, a.viiai'tf'K'ue KHs,M'ec'tnesa e nc)mmiuft'e Ijtw('ifu i774-J806 ?e., Kmm{HeB, 1975.chereufter cited as O)o('.v.!) 2. S. J. Shaw. Bent,een Oid and Nevt',' 1'Jte Ottorvian Enipii'e untieJ' Suttafi Seiini JJi 1789-1807, Canibridge, 1971. 3. BeK EKaniepu"bl II.' R?t'c'un u ffa.iKaHbf, MocKBa, 1998: A.ielt'c'aiit)p J, HamJ.teo" tt Ea.7- KaHbr. PvlocKBa, 1997. 4. I, H. Uzun?arljili, Osnt"ftit tai'iiti, vol. 4, parL 2, pp. I74-188, Akdes Nimct Kura[, a TLLrkish - scholar i'amous 1'or his sLudy on Russo-Ottonian velations, has niain]y focused on the iiin¢ tecnth and twentieth centuries, pa)・ing little attcntlon to re]ations during the eis,hteenth ccntury. A, N. Kurat, 7'ribX'i.ve i't' Ru,y.va, Ankara. 1970, pp. 24-40. 'hatt-i 'hcJtt-J 5. In Ottoman pateogrtLphy, ,sg;'if or Iiiinicl.vttt"' means what the Su]tan writes c}n ']niperitLl paper, in person. theref'o]'e, ]nore c[]rrcctly spcuking, it niust be called orcler 'hatt-i Cflevnieln) LviLh Sultan"s sign of approva[," btit customarily it ig ca[ied jusL Ferij'. For further details, see NUibahat S. Ktitiikeglit, Osnianli Jleigeterinin Diii {DipJvtnatik), istanbul, 1998. 'Ro]ul 6. N・1, Nl. A]exandrescu-Dersca, hatiticrTfurilor de privilegii rn limitarea obliga;i]or cMatre Pourtg (1774-IS02)', Sntdii. Revist[V [k, istt)rie, 11-6(1 95S), pp. 101-119: Al. Vianu. 'Ap[iearca tratatului dc Ja KUciUk Kainar.gi cu privire la Moldova $i Tara Rumtncascti (177S-I783),' Studii. Revist`i de istorie, I3-S(1960). pp. 71-104, 14 NII-Electronic Library Service TheTheJapaneseSocietyforSlavicand Japanese Society for Slavic and East European Studies [ssues pertaining to N・Xia]lachian and NloldaNian toyvodas ""Bu 7, N{. ryfio]'./]y, .vKa・itL {18(}1 T'.) i{ cliHiJ.ceiiJd],tii peuKpLTiJf (1802 r'.), cBfi3aHHliie c '. TYPCUKe-PYCCKO-l] }, N{1,IHCKMNT LVVHf)il[eTIFIYMLI Bt)(・jJii)tillhtt, lfC711t)rtilUKtt J]C) ttCntOl)ult '[, HapoO"ct ft)t'o-Boc'nwvH(yt'f tf UeHrvipc"bHoit Eny)onbf. 2, NIocKBa, 1969. pp. 238-274, 'Decumente 8, Arhive]e nationa]e isLorice centrale {d]e Rornanian Nutional Archivcs). inv. turcclti,i nr. 1149. Gubog]u surniises LhuL Lhis lexL is u eopy froln a Iatcr pcriod, around 1811. 'P},ccKc)-vypeLtKoe 9. IL H. Ce./J"x, o'rtlo-eHL{c 1802 v. e ,'[yHtuvacKMx KHsiMeciBax', B"npcJc'bi "c'tnopt.ft{, 1961112, pp. 19S-202. 10. For example, J. A, R. Marriat, Tht. Ea.vici'n QetesiioH.' A Histoi'icai Stud.v in E'ui'opean Dipionrac'",, Oxfi)rd, 1917; )/1. S. AJidersen. Tha Ectst(,J'n Cluestion 1774-t923, X4aciriiLlan, 1966. 11. In 2004, the firs[ con]prchensiL,c stuci.y on OtLoniun diplomae.v Lvas published, A, Nuri Yurduses, ed., Ortcitnaii Dil)ieniac'.v. CoJll'eJttif)ntit oJ' CJnct)nt'enrionatl), PtL]grave pt4acniittan, 2004.12. Dv['i"nente pJ'iL,ind istoJ'ia Ron]tniei.' c'oiec.tia Et"lm'iii rit, Hui'inti:.aki (st'i'i[uu)utV), vol. 1, 'Rapoarte consulare ruse (1770-1796) din Arhix,a poiitica ex[ernli a Rusiei Moseova.' Bucuresti, 1962: vol, 4, i974(hereafte]' eited as Hurintfraki); BHeutHA" no.iunTim'a R,cc'uu XjX u Jsanya.la XX eek'ti, MncKBa. 196{}-[hcreut'ter L'iLed us BnP). 13. Ahtned VSsifefenc", Mc'htlsiii'i.ii.ts`lr i'(' Ht,kt7iA'iii-Ahhtli/ 2 vols., lstanbul, 1219h.(1g04- 05}, (hcreafter cited as l・'i)s'{f'i): AhTned X・'['is]1' et'endi. ,'tfehtlsin'iit-Astli' ve Hakt2ik'iil-ll'ibcli: '['hc haz. }L{(ictcba LlgUre], ,nNnkara. 1994 (citcd "s 1 t?.f4f2・ }. ['ormer covers the period frorn 1166h.(1762)-]18Sli.(1774) und The IatFer. Iruns[iLeruled in the inodern Turkish alphabct. cos,crs 1196h.cl782)-1201h.(17S7) "・']Lh the author's brlef earcer and seine inforniation rcgarding nianuseripts. Al]n]ed Cevdct Puva, TtlriS7-i Cevclet, terttb-i cedTd{nc", edition). ikinci tub'a{the second p]'inLii]g), 12 xcils., Der Sa'adet, 13U9h{1891-9ZHbereaftcr citcd as ',ilts]m '.!Lum Cevdet}: Ahmed erendi, ttlJ'iiii, 2 vols,, Istanbu], f,cL 14. Gabriel elTendi Noradoun.yhian, Ret'tit'it d'at'tes internaiionau.v cie i'Envpire Oncmian, 4 vols,, Paris, 1S97-1900: {[c Tcs[a. U{・['ifei/ ctes ti'aittis de ta PoJ'te 0ttonlane ai,ec' ies Pttissanc'(',s Eti'angc"J'es. vol, 9. PLLris, 1XY8/ G, E de Martcns ed., Rec'ueii (ie tJ'aitcis ci' Aliian('e, de Pai.v, tle TraL'(,, de A"erin'aiitti. de f'onunet'c'e, tle tintites, d'e'c'hange et['. er de J]hfsietti'"' atttJ'es ac'tes ,veJ'i'afit c> kt ('onfiui.s.saric (' cle.s t'elttti"ns c;ti'aiiigc"J'e.s [ies Piiissan('es et e'icrt,s de 1'Eftuu)e, 2nd cd,, S vols., Gotting, ue, 1S17-1S35: tVu'tlhedt.'/t ma('nu'f'a,yi. 5 vols,, l29Sh-t298h: V. Vcliman. Rvia.tiile roniclftc,-(Jrt,mtme i71i-IS21.' do('umente tuj'c'e"'ti, Bueurcsti. 1984, s 'L'tJ.vi'otia' 1S.In Ottonian sourccs, ",as uscd tnosl .veTicru]1}' as Li tertn designaLing the ruler el' 'hc7ss,' thc principa]ities. Thls ",erd of Slavic origin usua]ly niciins Lax cellector froni a tenure pesscssed blr' Sultans, lheir fa[nllics or hi."h di."nitaries in ()ttonian history. W'e can 'be.v' "teZgtni',' also oi'tcn find thc tern] in Otton]aJ] docLin]ents, Besidcs Lhese t-,o Lerms, thtlkim,' 'btln" and arc also Ltscd although thcy appear lcs.s oi'tcn. Sce Nq. Gubos,lu, I'ateogr[zfia Fi diptontatic'a turc'()-o.ynj(n"7, ,sttiditt .,s'i ctU)uni. Bucurclti, 195g, p, 84, In Europcun texts, 25 NII-Electronic Library Service TheTheJapaneseSocietyforSlavicand Japanese Society for Slavic and East European Studies .aLkitsu )vTavuzumi 'duke,''prinec,' 'hospodar' thc Lerms and the like are used. 'Po"'cr 16. For un example er' Ottotnan intervcntion, see V, PHnaite, Rclutionships in the Ottoman Empirc: Ttie SulttLns und L]ie Tribute-paying Princc$ ol' Wallachia and )vlo]daviu froin the Sixteenth to [he Ei s.ITteenLh CenLury,' bttei'ttatiwnai Jcnti'nai qf' Tt{J'kish Studies, 'L'aulononiie vol. 7(2001), pp. 33-34; pt'I. Maxirn, de la tsdoldavie e[ dc la Valachie dans lcs actcs officicts de ta E'orte au cours de la seconde moitid du XVIe siecte.' Revtte des Entdes Sud-E,yt Eui'(vtiennes, IS-2(1977), p. 2tl. 17. Fer cxumplc, in ]568 the Po]Lsh king Z)・gniunL II August dcmandcd thar lhe Porte should never appoinr lhe i'oyvodas o[' the Danubiun Prineipa]ities withoLit Poiish assent, and then a btleldaviain'o)'voda, BogLlun LiLpuljneanu {156g-72), a]so tried lo enter into mutrimony with a Nvornan t'roni a s:ta['Jira I'aTni]y and shc}wed allegiance ro the Polish king. Because er this, he was displaeed by the Porte. See I. H. Uzungareili, Osmantt tavihi, vol, 3, part 2, p. 166; rvl. A. b,4ehniet ed,, Dt)('tfntt'itie tttJ'('e"'ti fniL'inci istoJ'ia romfiniei, vol. 1. BucureEti, 1976, 93-94. Thc W'a[Iachian vo.-'vda pp. Radu Serban {1602-1O), the Moldavian L'o.vi'vda Gaspar Gra!iani (.1619-20) in the seventeent]] century, und ether vo.)'i'odt.ts ",ho fled lo Poland urtcr being disp[uccd by the Porte because of Lheir c]osc rclations, sometimes c]eLerioratcd Polish-Ottotnan relatinns. (i. H. Uzungartilh, q). t'in, pp. 173-175) ]S. For Phanariots, sec S)'niposiuJri L'e'peqt{e phancrriotu. 21-25 o('tfjnihJ'e I97(); ['i la nie'nioire de Cteohiiic Tsoi"'kas, Thcssuloniki, l974: A. Pippidi, 7)'aditia politit'rl hi:aittiml ftitcl)'ile j'omaf7e rn s('('oiele XLil=XL'lil, Bt]curesti. 1983. 19. Cevdet, vot. 6, p. 298. 20. We should Lakc neticc lhat scvcral v'o."'tJdas [ike Censtantin Nkwrocordat {in Wallachia t730, 1731-33, In5-41, ]744-48, 1756-5S. t761-63. in MoldavTa 1733-35, 1741-43, 1748- 49, 1769) or ,ALIexandru Ipsilanti (in Wallachia 1774-82, 1796-97, in Mo]dnvi:i 17g7-88> stayed ln their posL merc than Lhrcc ycat's and carried nut rei'orms. For thc rcforms of Constantin Pvlavrocordat. see F. ConsCanLiniLt, Ccmstantin Ma],jvcvi'dat, Bucureitj, 198S. 2l. R)['t'ttH t.i o['eofioc)tfnie.ihHa.g 6olu,ffa .vro.u)aG['ffeeo Htipo()a npoi'ti"" oc'.ifaHckoeo t{ia (l769- 1812), KL{tuHJieB, 1984, p. 2{}, 22. For [hc tcx[ of [his peti[ion, see ihid., pp, 23-31: Hurnn{:aki, vol. 1, pp. 87-89, 23.Cc'vdet, yol, 2, p, 78, 24. T]ic tcxL o[' Ehis trcaty was prepured in lhree languagcs, Russian, Italian and Ouonian- Turkish, The Russian detegalion signed on Russian and Italian texls, while tlie Ottoman representatiN,es signed on ILalian and Turkish Lexts. Thesc oris,ina] tcxts hayc yct to be 'Fhe discovered. Russian texl is in IIt).sHoe f'o6r)(tfftie .uaicojfo(i l)f)('('t"'"'Koit et.vtnepuu. series 1 c1649-1825). vol. 19, pp. 957-967. The ILalian [ext is in G. E de Mar!ens ed,, (u]. {'in, N,ot. 2, 'dtst. pp. 286-322. The OtLoniun-TLirkish texL is in Mti`tlhedt/t meetm'f vo]. 3, pp. 254-273 and in Cevdet, vol. 1. pp, 357-370. 25. The Lexl is in E. n. npyxLtHpiHa, KmLv.vK-K{iihtapf),)mitfif'iatil ."tfp 1774 eot)a Ci'et) Jiof)eo- nio6Ka tt 3ctK.iH)Lte"ucV, PvlecKBa. 1955, pp, 345-346. 26.In Vasif's chroniclc it is written that on Grigore Ghiea's death someone from his famil)' ,.6 NII-Electronic Library Service TheTheJapaneseSocietyforSlavicand Japanese Society for Slavic and East European Studies Issuc$ pcrtaining to W'allaehian and pt,Ioldavian voyvodas will succeed hirn in t]]c post of )'rJ,vivda. Such a clescripLion. ho",ever, does net exist iJi the Ru$sian drul'L, l・'tlslt' l, vo[. 2, p. 243. 27.A cop>, or the burtlt (impevia] diplonia) on ]iis appointmcnt dated SepLember 27, t774 (1lg8 reccb 21) Ls kcpL in Arhivelc nalionale istoricc centralc "he Romanian Na[ionat '[)oeutnente Archives), inv. istoricc,' pachet DLXXXI/64. `''Russian 28, For this question, sce Redcric H. Davison, Ski]1 and Turkish Imbecility": Thc Treary e(' KLtchuk Kuinard.P Reconsidcrcd,' StaL,i(' Ra'ieLt,. 3.5-3C1976), pp. 463-483. 29. Hurnui:・aki, vol. t, p. 97. 'ktlnt'tsuitline' 30.Thc inipcrial decrce issvcd in 1793 to both princlporlities set the anieunt of nioney xuhich u newly appointed L'fo :'cnitt should pay to sadi'-i ti']・ain, sadtlJ'et kethii(itlsi, J'eistilkiitteth and other high ot'l'icia[s <('clixe-i vo.v-'odalrk). According to this deeree. the aianounL exeeeded one lhird or the lributc {eiz.ve) ol' cueli prineiptLlily. Consldering the an]ouiiL paid to the Sultan and his t'anii]y, ww'¢ niay cstiniatc that upon appuintnienl, the i'o.vvotia ]]eeded to pay an arriounl ol' diioney cquivaleiit Lo inore than 1iatf ef the year[y tributc of that principulity. See, V. Vc[iTnan, Rela.tiile Jvrvit2iTo-c)toinane i71i-itY2J.' do('unJ{'nte 'O tui'('e"'ti, Bucureljti, 1984. pp. 599-6l4: N・1. A. Melunet. noua regulamentare a raporTtirilor -Kamt]mevne- Moldovei si T5rii RomSne$ti fa!ti dc Pourtii ta l792 CO carte de leg¢ in limba Lurci)', Stitdii, Ra'istc7 de istf,i'i[', 2・ O-4(1967), pp. 691-708. 31 . R)c't'ttA u oc'eothp()ciitre.・ibHas 6(v)b6a .Ldf). it)ae('Koeo stttl)-c)ct iv)omHnfe o('.vrtinit'KoerJ uc'a f1769- IX12j, KbT]-Ien, 19g4, p. 93. 'N'Iiir[urii 32.Cei'det, vol. 7-, p. 78: Tahsin C]enii[. din arhivele turcevti re['critoare lu slTrsitul tragic ui domnului N'lo]devei Grigore ,bLl. Ghica (1777),' ReL,isttr arhiveior, 19S4/3, pp, 289-29g, 33. For the content. see CeT'det. s,ol. 2・ , pp. 352-3S4. 34, For the lext, see iVu'tlhc・dill f]ic'('tni}'aNt, s,ol. 3, pp, 284-319: G. Noradounghian, Rect",ii d'at'ies intei'itaritJiiaii.r d(' l'EinpiJ'(' ()rf()mtin. vol. I, pp. 35 1-373. 35.Mte'(?Si{,d[lt ntectnt'f'ast, vol. 3. pp. 319-.120: G. Noradounghian, tv), t'it,, vol. 1. pp. 377- 378.36. '(isi. yol. Fer [he [ext,see ,・VLt'c?itedclr niec'tiifl 4. pp. 2-4; Arhive[e nationa[c istoriecccncru]c, 'Decumente inv, islerice,' paehct DLXXXL/92, Thc French trans[tLLion is iTi D. A. Srurdza Ei C, Colescv-Vartic cd., tvJ, ['it,, pp, 192-]95. '...tahkTk 37.Thc origina] tcx[ is olui]niulj bir 1(ihTnet x,Ltkt't' buldnakga beylcr azt o[unrnamak 3S. Cevdet, vol. 2, p. ]69. 39. Cei'dc,t, vo], 3, pp. 263-264, 40. Vcls{f2, pp, 21O, 38(.}-3g1. 41. Cevdet, vo]. S, 1], 1Sg, 'ttsi, 42. For Lhe text of this treuty see t'LIu'c7heUc?r tneL'nsil vol. 4. pp. 5-I3: CeT'det. N'ol, 5, pp. 330-339: D. A. Sturc]za sl C. Coteseu-Varlie ed.. wp. {'it,, pp, 219-225. 43. Cevdet, vo]. 5. pp. 327-330, 27 NII-Electronic Library Service TheTheJapaneseSocietyforSlavicand Japanese Society for Slavic and East European Studies Akitsu "v{avuzumi 44. V, Velirnan, c)p. ('it,, p. 604, 45, For the activitics of thc tlrst French consul in Bucharcsr, see Carnariuno-Cioran, 'L'activit6 d'Emi]e Cllaude GaLidin, prcmicr censul de France b Bucharest,' Rei'ue Rounraine d'histoi,'e, 9(1970). pp. 251-260. 'Osniun 46, For a surve), of his life a]id activity, scc R. Gradcva, Puzvantoglu of Vidin: Bctwccn Old and New.' in Frederick F. Ansconibc ed., TJve 0rtoman Batkans JZ50-/830, Princeton, 2006. pp. 11S-t61. 47.See B. M},TacPL["eBa, K)pf),Mc'a.7ta?t'Ko ripe."t,. CnO"fi, t977: Y. Ozkaya, Osnianh itnparatoJ'iu,gVrintht Dag"lt i,g}/anlai'i(1791-18eS), Ankara, 1983, 48.Hurmu-.aki, vol, 4, pp. 135-138, 262-26.1. 270-271. 49. ihid,, pp. 297-298, 315-317. 50. For French-Ottoman relations ef thls period, see E, Z. Karul, Fi'ansa-Mtsv' T'e Ostnanti jhfparatt)nlug"u (i7P7-1802・ ), isLanbu], 1938; i Soysal, Frtmsrz ihtiic7ii ve V'tiJ'k-Franst;・ Piptomasi miinasahettet'i f,17S9-!802), AnkartL, 1964 (rcprint,1999), '"sJ. 51. For the text vi' Lhis Russo-Otton]an lreatv vf' ]799, see, ,'Vti'd'thecf(tr met'nitl vol. 4. pp, 19-28; Gabric] cffdndi Noradounghian. f)p. ('it.. vol. 2. Paris, 1g97, pp. 24-27. 52. V. Ciebanu ed., EuJ'cv)e aJid th" Poi'teuVew 1)o('imte"rs on tha Eastern Quvstit"J, vol, 2 {Swedish Diptomatic Repor[s. 1798-1799), The Ccntrc for Romanian Studics, 2001, pp.106-107. 53. Fer dctails ot' the relations betwecn Osman Pazvand-oglu and Russia. see A. tsxlayuzumi, 'Pazvand-oglu Osman Pasha, Russia and The Danubian Principalities: froFn tlie end ol' thc 1Sth century te the begiTining of the 19th cenltiry." in Stticiii s.'i c'ert'ettlri de tur('oiogie c'omempoj'aJtt-eOma,giit pJ't?ft'st-uiui Mihai ,Wt't.vim. 2004, C1uj-Napoca, pp.109-1 [5. 54. Cei!det, vol. 7, p, 154, The Porte often used cooperativc a'.vt'tits to subdue the nlere rebellious enes. In thc case of OsTnan Pazi・arid-oglu, Lhe Portc supported his rival, Tirsinikli- eglu IsinaiL. but to no effec{, There['ore, at the beginning er 1S02 thc central governmenL asked Tepcdclcnli Ali Pasu to suppress Osman Pazvand-oglu by cenlerring tbc ']'he '1'omara 'If aboN,emcntioncd office. Russian Minister in IslanbuL, Vasily wrote, he is loyal to thc ccntraL govcrnmcnt. hc will put all a'J・Llns in order as bef'ore." BaP, vol. 1, p. 195. 55.ihid.,p.710. 56. ihicf., p. 239. S7. ihi[i,, pp. 232-233. 58. ihid., pp. 241-243. S9, HurmuJ・tvki, vo]. 4, pp. 393-394. 60. ihid., pp. 250-2S4. 61. BffP, vol. 1. pp. 254-25S. 62. iltirmuJ:aki, vol. 4, pp. 394-395, 63. Upon his nomination as MoldaN, lan i'(,.vi'oda iTi 1799, Lhe Emperor Pave] T orderecf To!nara ro give him his fu]] suppert. BnP, vol. 1, p. 5B. But he was dismissed in Ehe end oC lgOl, 2S NII-Electronic Library Service TheTheJapaneseSocietyforSlavicand Japanese Society for Slavic and East European Studies ]ssues pertaining to XN'al]achian an(] N'lol(iavjan voyvodas 64, ihid., p. 270. 6S. ibi,L, p, 302. 'The 66, Annand Gosu, Third ,ALiui-Nupe[eod]lc Coa]ition and the Sub]i[ne PorLe.' hite)'nationtit Jom'nat at'7'to'kish Sntdiev, 9,,'1-2t2003}, p, 219: V, Pvdischcvca and P, Zavitsanos, Pi'im'ipek' CcmstaJ]tiri }7)silanti 1760-JSi6, ChiEinau. 1999, pp. S9-62, However, Russia always lookcd on Moruzi with suspicion. 67, BnP. vol. 1, p, 701, However, Russia vicwcd thcsc edicls as an cMTiciul diplomaLic agreement. On Fcbruary 28, 1803 Russia sent u netc Lo thc Po]'te saying Lhat it approved the new sLipulutions cencerning the Danubian I'rineipalitics. This was actuaLt}, Russia's ratil'icaLi[.}n, 'llBa For the text ol' the,fbe'mtln adrcssed to NVal[aehia, sce D,a. 1'y6oi'Jiy, yKa/]a (1SOI F.) }t ']'ypcllKo-pyccKo-pyMblHcKLIM cBslmeHHhlii pecKpl・ITrr (l802 T'.'), cBsi'saJl]tble c o']']lol[Ec- ]n,iAxlM," Bo('nTcJ"}ible ttc'tnc)viiuK'u )io tf('rvitv)uu H"l)tyf)t)" I02o-Bo('titf)tiHot; ct UeHnti)a.lbHotl 'i. Eeponbl, 2, MocK6a. 1969, pp, 252-272: Ce},det. s,el, 7, pp, 352-361, Thcre are two copics in thc Remanian National Archis'es, Decumente turceiti, nr, 1 l49 and 2440, For its French translation, sec G. Noracjoun.y.hian, oi? cit.. vol. 2, 190[], pp, 55-67, For theJlertntln addressed to )vloldavia, sec Arhivclc na!ionule isLoricc ccnLrule, rL,Iicrof'ilni Turciu. rola 1, c. 19-22 Ccapied from Topkapi Sarayi MiL7csi Arsivi, E-3999!b. Romanian oricntatist pt,!ustafa A. Mehmet transluLed Lhehe t"・o cdictH into Romanlan. M. A. bv'Tehmet ed,, Dc)('umeiite ttirt'aEti i)rii'inct isto]'ia Romtlmt,i. vol. ][I(179T-1g12), Bucures[i, 19g6, pp.167-188, 'niUddet-i 68. The originul tcxt is: nicrkCLn]e igi]]de LOhnieLi zCthurunda cfuiib-i DevLet-i A[lyye'den Rusya elgisine ihhAr olunub bu vcchi[c Lur"fe>,nden ba'c]e'1-lahkik voys・'oda-i inanigilcyh ft nefs'il-e]nr niUueheni o]dug,u ztAhir v'e n]tlttehakik v]ur ise yalniz el halde a7,1i ctl'iz ola'. 69. FoT his lil'e, see H. Deheruin, Lct T・ic・ de Piei'i'(・ RtdJbi.' tJrienlaii,st et diplomat i74.7-1824, 2 vo[s., Paris, 1929-30. 70,Cc,i'det. vo[. 7. p, 260. 71,1'p"c.v.T, p. 166. 72,()sTnan had sent his agents and [etters to the Russian vicc-consu] ill Bucharest several tinies and requested Russia's inediation bet"'een t]ie 1]orre and hinisclf. I{c preniised lhal he would rernove a]1 his troops fron] "'allt]chia. enl} ii' hc wus pcrin itLeci b}, the Porte and 'vezir' ceuld have Lhc title or restored. Expec[in.g lha[ disorder in "'allachia would be settled, Russia put prcssure on the Poi'te aild as a resLi]t, in ,ALugust 1802, lhe I'orte pcmnirted 'v'eJ・ 'Pasa.' C)snian and retL]nicd the tittc el' tr' to hLni. ThLig 1ie becanie Osnii±n Ccvdcl, vol. 7, p. 161: ilurmuEaA'f, vol. 4, I). 415. 73. Cevdet, vot, 7, p. 256, His demand beganjusl at'Ier a Freneh agenL visirecl hini in Vidin in Lhe end of the previeus year, J do net hax'c un} deuu[nents with "'hich to contlrni this at present, but it is pnssib]e thaL thc French agcnL told hini el' French supporL aL Lhtn ti]ne, L p]an to study relations betw'cen predoniinanL it'.x'flns "nd ELLropcun coumLries in Lhe 1'uture. 74. BnP, vol, t, pp. 389-390. 75, It is wcll knosvn that Sclini xvas a Francophile as he had corresponded with thc French ly NII-Electronic Library Service TheTheJapaneseSocietyforSlavicand Japanese Society for Slavic and East European Studies AkitsuMavuzumL king Louis XVI when he was the crown p]'hice. See i. H. Uzungartiili. 'Sclim III'Un Veliaht Ikcn Fransa Krali Ltii XVL. ite Muhabereleri,' Bc,lleten, 2/5-6 (1938), pp. 191-246. 76. Cei'det, vo[. 8, p. 68. 77. As the resu]t ofjc]int eperuLiens b)' thc Rvssian and O[toinan flee[s againsL France in the Mediterraneun. in 180U thc Ionian IsLands bccaTne independent as a rcpublic under the suzeraint}, of the OtLoinun Enipirc. Evcn after indcpendence, tiu-'eve]; Ll]e Russian troops stayed thcrc bccausc of thcir gcopolitical importance in the Mcditerranean. Though Rttssia wantcd a reinforccment of troops and easier access there, the treaty o[' 1798 limitcd thc Russian fleets' navigations in thc Bosporus Slraits onLy Le wartime. Thcrefore Russia soughl an opportuniLy Lo modilLv this stipulaLion. C. Tukin, BvgW,a:lar mesetesL l999, pp. 138-139. For Russian activity in t]]e MediLerrunetLn, see A. M. CTaHi・ie."aBcKa", Rn'c'ti.,i u - l)]ei{u" e k'oHite Xl,'ili Hatia.ie XiX aeiJa.' }io.iiomfka ftJ['['ttti e MoHu,tec'lt'ot'i pec'nsE[uii(e V798-1807 ee., N{ocKBa, 1976: P.v('{'Ko-a)ie."tf?c'A'tte ontHc,tuu"J{Jt u npoCi.ic'.vbt cpeDti3e.v- ito.vropbA, J798-1807, MecKuu 1962. ,ALnd for the Ionian Repubtic 1'rom [he Otteman 'Artiiv pcrspcctive. see I, H. UzungarstL Vesikalarmu C]6rc Yedi Ada Cumhuriyeti.' BeVeten, lf3-4 {1937). pp. 627-639, 78.BnP, vo[. 2, p. 697. 79.For detuils rcgarding the baekgrouTid tb antl Lhe negotiHLion of this trcaty, see Armand 'Thc Gosu. Third Anti-Napoleonic Coa]itien tmd the Sublime PorLe.' intei'fuuionat Jotunat oj'7'uJ'k'i,s'h Studies, 911-2(2e03), pp. I99-237. Tl]is N'clutne was aLso pubtished us K. Karpat and R, Zens ed., OttonTan Bt)J'[iei'kind.' I,s's-",s', Perstmaiities and Pt)iitif'eti Changes, The UniversiLy oi' "'isconsin Press, N・Tadisen. 2003, For the text ef this treaty, see ,Wu'tlliedat 'a.yi. mec'nni vol. 4, pp. 35-49 (in Turkish): G. Noradounghian. tu). c'ii., vol. 2, pp. 70-77 {in Freneh); BilP, vo[. 2. pp. 582-594 (in Russian>. 80. CeT'det, vol. 8, p. 46. 81.Aceording to the secrct urLicle IV of the 180S Russo-Ottcnnan LreaEy, Lhe Russian flcet could pass throt]gh the Bosporus Straitg in peace ancl in wan The Porte, ho-,eve]', declined the Russian proposal, iTisisliTig on Lhe pessible uutbrcak ot' war with France and the neutrtt1 position el' Lhe OLLoTnun Ernpire. BI7P, vul, 3, p. 6g4; C, t'ukin, cu), cii,. pp, t44-14S. 82. Cevdet, vol. g, p. 61. "'hen thc Sultan's dceision becatne clear. atmost all a'vclns in the Ba]kans who had striven with each other cooperated in eppusing this p]um. As a rcsult, thc 'the iV'iztln}-f c'edict corps in Edirrie 1iuc] le go back to Istanbu]. This is callcd sccond Edirne 'a.s'r}.' incident (ik invi Edirne i'ak' 83,Fren] about 1805, the Otto[nan E]npire began repui]'ing Lhe ['ortresses along the Dnicstr and thc Danubc. BOP, vo]. 3, p. 79. 84.ihid., pp. 2S2-253. In insLrucLions i'rom the )vtinister nf Fereign Affairs Budbcrg te thc RussitLn )irfiniHter in lstu]ibu], ltalinsky, dated 3(} July, 85, ih id., p. 263. 86. ih id., p. 666. 87, ihid,, p. 179. 3o NII-Electronic Library Service TheTheJapaneseSocietyforSlavic Japanese Society for Slavic and East European Studies lssucs pcrtaid]ing Lo "Jullachiun an(1 Nleldavian s,oyvodtts g8, Cei'der, vo]. 8. p, 74. "Asmi ",i.ssm 89, A]nned E['endi. tcli'ihi, vot. 1, p, IS2. 90. BnP, vol, 3. 1). 285. AL thaL tinie he did nol deniand the resLeruLion o[' Lhc dis[nissed lpsi]anti and ts・lorui.i, because he Lhought Lhese ibn"er vo.x'vodcis niig.hL 1]ave been kil]cd. `Astni 91,ihicL, pp, 301-302: tilrihi. vo]. 1, p.182. 92.Bf7P, vol. ], p. 319. 93.Cei'det. vo[. 8. p, 76. 94. ihitL, pp. 75-76 : M. A, MehmeL. cv). cit., pp. 211-2t2. 95. BnP, vol, 3. p. 347, 96, ihirJ.. p. 360. ,ALIexander I had 1'ixcd ()cLohcr 13 as Lhe day of Ihc declsion, hut za,ithout ne"'s frotn Istanbu], [ie postponed his deeision tbr two weeks. 3I NII-Electronic LibraryMbrary Service