CHAPTER THREE

BETWEEN HOPE AND FEAR: THE ARMED FORCES IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD

Introduction

The defence policy pursued by the Netherlands in the 1920s and 1930s is still considered by many to be one of the main reasons for the defeat in May 1940. After all, it is said, not only the poor level of training and the inadequate armament of the were the cause of the defeat, but also, and especially, the policy of neutral- ity. The political and leadership had not properly interpreted the signs of the times and therefore had failed to change course when there was still time. As a consequence, the country was unnecessarily poorly prepared when it began its trial of strength with the Third Reich. It is questionable, however, whether such reproaches do justice to the options that were open to the political and military leaders in the Nether- lands. A correct assessment of the defence policy therefore first requires an outline of its backgrounds and of the circumstances which faced the leaders in question. This will particularly concern the connections, or lack thereof, between three elements: the policy of neutrality, the military-stra- tegic policy and the availability of assets with which the armed forces were to perform their tasks.

The legacy of neutrality

The policy of neutrality, which was brought to an end by the German in- vasion in 1940, had a history which went back an entire century. The basis was laid in the 1840s, when, after the secession of , the Nether- lands resigned itself to its role as a smaller power. The general opinion was that the country’s security would be best served if the Netherlands involved itself as little as possible in the differences between and aspira- tions of the surrounding powers. In times of tension or outright conflict, 36 chapter three

Image from a staff exercise in the northern provinces, 15 June 1932. this policy of non-involvement took the form of neutrality. As long as the Netherlands was not attacked, it would not side with any of the warring parties and would take great care not to give offence to any power what- soever. ������������������������������������������������������������������Should����������������������������������������������������������������� the Netherlands be attacked nonetheless, then it would de- fend its sovereignty by force of arms, with the aggressor’s opponents auto- matically becoming allies. National defence was to have such a deterrent effect that foreign powers would think better of attacking. This was not the only basis for that deterrence, however. Political and military leaders assumed that the great European powers would not allow one another to conquer the Netherlands, as this would upset the balance of power. ThisTh is meant that the Netherlands could always count on assis-assis- tance from allies.����������������������������������������������������� ����������������������������������������������������Aggression against the Netherlands would almost cer- tainly plunge a foreign power into an armed conflict with the entire alli- ance. This prospect, it was assumed, would act as a significant deterrent.