Document of The World Bank
FOROFFICIAL USE ONLY Public Disclosure Authorized
Report No. 6799
PROJECTCOMPLETION REPORT Public Disclosure Authorized MALI
MOPTI RICE II PROJECT (Credit 753-MLI)
May 29, 1987 Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized
Western Africa Regional Office Agriculture Division C
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. ABBREVIATIONS
BNDA National Agricultural Development Bank ED Executive Director of the Bank ERR Economic Rate of Return FAC Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation, French aid agency IDA International Development Association IER Institut d'Economie Rurale Mopti I First Mopti Rice Project (Cr. 277-MLI) OPAM Bureau of Agricultural Products of Mali ORM Operation Riz Mopti RMWA Regional Mission in West Africa, Abidjan SAR Staff Appraisal Report WARDA West Africa Rice Development Association
CURRENCY EQUIVALENT
Appraisal Year (1976) US$1 = MF 490 THEWORLD BANK Washington.D.C. 20433 U.S.A.
O0ratoe EviuUim
May 29, 1987
MEMORANDUMTO THE EXECUTIVEDIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Mali: Mopti II Rice Proiect (Credit 753-MLI)
Attached,for information,is a copy of the report entitled "ProjectCompletion Report: Mali Mopti II Rice Project (Credit753- MLI)" prepared by the West Africa Regional Office. Further evaluation of this project by the OperationsEvaluation Department has not been made.
Ram K. Chopra
for Yves Rovani
Attachment
This documenthas hrestrcted dbobution andmay be ue by tocipientsonly in Ih pfoman of their offcWl duties.Its contentsma not otherwisebe disclosedwithcmt Wotrid Bank authoftatbn. FOR OFmICIALUSE ONLY
MALI MOPTI II RICE PROJECT (Cr. 753-MLI) PROJECTCOMPLETION REPORT
TABLE OF COYTENiS Page Preface ...... *e, , , ,,,,,, i BasicData Sheet ...... ii Evaluation Summary ,....,..... iv
I. BACKGROUND* ...... * **s*. *** *** 1 A. General ...... ,. , ., , 1 B. The First Mopti Rice Project (Cr. 277-MLI) ..... 1
II. PROJECTFORMULATION ...... 3
A. Identification and Preparation ...... 3 B. Appraisal ...... , , 3 C. Negotiations, Board Presentation and Signing ... 4 D. Objectives and Description ...... 4 III. PROJECTIMPLEMENTATION ...... 5 A. Effectiveness and Start-up 5 B. Project Development 6 - CivilWorks ...... ****6*.. 6 - Land Distribution ...... 6 - Agricultural Production ...... 6 - Organization and Management ...... 7 C. Cost and Financing ...... *...... 7 D. Key Problems ...... , ...... 9 - The Droughts throughout the Implementation Period ...... ,., 9 - Farming Problems ,,...... 10 - Financial Problems *.*.**.*.*.*..**.*.***.., 11 E. Borrower's Performance ...... 12 F. Bank's Performance .....,,.4*,,,,,,.,,.... 12 IV. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ...... ,.. ... ,...... 13 V. CONC.,USIONS:LESSONS LEARNED ...... 16
Annexes 1. Projected and Attained Physical Objectives (Table) ., 19 2. Supporting Data for Economic Analysis ...... #to 21 I. Investments ...... ,,,,...... 21 II. IncrementalProduction .,...... , 23 III. Operating Costs ... **...... ,,, 25 IV. Costs and Benefits Streams ,...... 25 V. Rate of Return Calculation *..s...... 27
Mapz: TBRD 17521 Rl
This documenthas a restricteddistribution and may be used by recipientsonly in the performance of their officialduties. Its contentsmay not otherwisebe disclosedwithout World Bank authorization. MALI
MOPTI II RICE PROJECT. (Credit753-MLI)
PROJECTCOMPLETION REPORT
PREFACE
1. This is the ProjectCompletion Report (PCR) of the Mopti II Rice Projectin Mali, for which Credit 753-MLIin the amount of US$ 15.0 million was approvedon November 29, 1977. The original cr3dit closing date was November 30, 1983, the actual June 30, 1985. The last disbursementwas made on July 30, 1985 after which US$ 64,000 remainedundisbursed. The project was tht fifth creidt for agricultureand the second for rice productionin Mali. It was identifiedby the RegionalMission in Western Africa (RMWA)and prepar.d by the Institutd'Economie Rurale (IER) of the Ministryof Rural Developmentin Bamako. It was followedby the Mopti Area DevelopmentProject (Credit1597-MLI) which was approvedon May 21, 1985.
2. This PCR was preparedby the West Africa Region and is based in part on a Proect Implementation(Rapport d'Execution) Report preparedby the project implementingagency Opgration Riz Mopti (ORM) supervision reports, and the appraisal report (January 1983) for the Mopti Area DevelopmentProject. This PCR reviewselements that helped the development of the Mopti Region.
3. The PCR was not subjectedto audit by OED, and the draft report was sent to the Borrowerfor commenton March 23, 1987. No commentswere received. - ii -
MALI
MOPTI II RICE PROJECT (Cr. 753-14LI)
PROJECTCOMPLETION REPORT
Basic Data Sheet
Actual as Actualor % of Appraisal revised appraisal KEY PROJECTDATA estimate estimate estimate
Total Cost (US$ million)a/ 29.9 31.5 105 Total Cost (MF million)a7 14,646 12,208 83 Creditamount (US$ million) 15.0 Negotiations 10/3-6/77 Board approvaldate 11/29/77 Signingdate 12/08/77 Effectivenessdate 05/15/78 Completiondate of physicalcomponents 12/81 08/81 Proportioncompleted by above date 100 100 Area distributedto farmers (ha) 38,300 30,700 80 No. of directbeneficiaries (families) 13,000 12,600 97 Economicrate of return (%) 18 3 Financialperformance good poor Institutionalperformance good Borrower poor Bank poor
CUMULATIVEDISBURSEMENTS
FY79 FY80 FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85
Appraisalestimate (US$million) 1.2 4.4 8.7 12.7 14.5 15.0 Actual (US$ million) 2.9 7.2 11.0 14.2 14.4 14.5 14.7 Actualas % of estimate 242 164 126 112 100 97 98 Date of latestdisbursement 7/30/85 Closingdate 6/30/85 Undisbuzsedamount (US$) 64,000 Principalrepaid to date none
a/ The differencebetween project cost expressedin US$ and MF is due to the devaluatinnof the US$ with respectto the MF duringearly years of projectdevelopmenit. - iii -
MISSIONDATA Types Responsi- m.d. in Compo- ProjectProject of trend Problems Mission bility Date field sition perf.
Identification RMWA 11/74 n.a. n.a. - - Preparation IER 1975 n.a. n.a. - - Appraisal WAPAC 11/76 Supervision 1 WAPAC 11/78 10 a,b 1 - - 1 - Supervision 2 WAPAC 05/79 5 a 1 3 WAPAC 11/79 18 a,b,c 2 2 F,T Supervision 2 F,T Supervision 4 WAPAC 08/80 6 a 2 5 WAPAC 02/81 2 a 2 2 F,T Supervision 3 F,T Supervision 6 WAPAC 07/81 32 a,a 2 n.a. n.a. Supervision 7 WAPAC 11/81 6 c n.a. 8 WAPAC 02/82 40 a,c,d 2 1 F,T Supervision 2 F,T Supervision 9 WAPAC 09/82 42 a,b,b,b,c,c,e 2 1 F,T Supervision10 WAPAC 03/83 5 c 2 1 F,T Supervision11 WAPAC 03/84 5 c 2
Other ProjectData
Borrower:Government of Mali ExecutingAgency: Operation Riz Mopti Follow-onProjects: Mopti Area Dev. (Cr. 15'97-MLI),US$19.5m, approved5/21/85
a Irrigationengineer b = Economist c = Agronomist d = Financialanalyst e = Livestockspecialist
STAFFrWPUTS 1988 Total I, 1978 19D77 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1986
. . . . 47.0 Preappraisaf 16.3 3.9 27.1 .7 ...... 42.2 Appraisal . . 39.1 3.2 ...... 11.1 Negotiation . . . 11.1 . . . . 10.3 24.8 7.9 6.1 6.5 6.2 84.8 Supervision . . . 7.3 7.8 11.3 . . 1.2 Other . . 1.1 .4 24.8 . . 6.1 b.5 S.2 18B.2 Total 16.3 3.9 $7.2 22.2 7.3 11.3 10.4 24.8 7.9 - iv -
MALI
MOPTI II RICE PROJECT (Credit753-MLI)
PROJECTCOMPLETION REPORT
EVALUATIONSUMMARY
1. This was the secondrice production projectIDA financedin Mali. It was precededby four creditsfor agriculture)the first of which was for rice production. The projectwas identifiedby the Bank'sRegional Mission in West Africa (RMWA)in 1974 and preparedby the Institutd'Economie Rurale (IER) of the Ministryof Rural Development in Bamako. The appraisalfol- lowed in November1976 and the credit was approvedin November1977. The project'sobjective was to affect at full developmentabout 13,000families (90,000-100,000people) in an area with an incrementalpaddy productionof about 34,000 tons in an area of low economic activity.
The projectcentered on (a) constructionof four polders (together h,800 ha), (b) improvementof poldersdeveloped under the first rice project (Credit277-MLI), (c) deep ploughing of the newly developedpolders and of 14,285ha of polder,financed by Cr. 277-MLI,(d) constructionof stores, workshops,offices, houses, and training centers, (e) acquisitionof vehi- cles, machinery,equipment, and two ferries, (f) an appliedresearch and a credit program,and (g) technicalassistance.
3. The projectwas expectedto begin in mid 1978 and to be completed by November1983. However,the closing date had to be extendedto June 30, 1985. Final disbursementwas made in July 1985. Total projectcost increasedslightly, from US$29.9 million (appraisal) to US$31.5million, mainly becauseof more expensivecivil works which made up more than half of total projectcosts.
4. Projectdesign was largelybased on the experienceof the previous rice productionproject (Cr. 277-MLI). This previousproject had produced better than estimatedresults. With enough rainfallduring three project years of five, a higher rice price than estiuatedat appraisal,and a larger number of projectbeneficiaries than anticipated,its actualrate of return exceededestimates. The Mopti II project was to (a) expandthe areas flooded,(b) improveORM's managerialcapability, (c) _pgradethe efficiency of ORM's supportingservices, and (d) introducetraining.
5. While its civil works components progressedremarkably well, the projectdid not attain its productiontargets. Key problems--andtherewith inadequateflooding of polders--were the droughtsand the non-adherenceto the recommendedtechnical package (poor qualityseed, inadequateequipment, failureto weed, farmers'attitude). An oversizedand not always relevant agriculturalextension program caused results at farm level to stay below -v expectations.At appraisal the risk of abnormally dry years was under- estimated. Supervisionmissions did not pay sufficientattention to the technicalpackage and to the financialsituation, but gave disproportionate attentionto civil works.
6. Lessons learnedare of weight fov the follow-upproject (Cr. 1597- MLI) for which the followingagreements have been reached.
(a) Water components. Controlledflooding is to be revisedso that the flood probabilityincreases to 95%. Polderrice cultivationwould thereforedecrease from 36,200ha to 27,000ha leavingabout 9t00O ha to rainfed cultivation. Control of water levels will be improvedby constructionof additionaldikes and canals;
(b) AgriculturalCredit will be administered by BNDA with ORM assis- tance. Loan transactionsof farmers will be handledby BNDA only thus clearlyseparating them from water charges;
(c) Farmingpractices and ORM's ExtensionService. With more appropri- ate creditconditions, farmers will be better equippedto follow the recommendedfarming practices. Farmerswill buy threshersto do their own threshingrather than having it done by ORM. ORM's extensioncomponent can be reduced as the project'stechnical aspects are fairly simple and because farmers have had continuous tutoringfor fifteenyears.
(d) Marketingof paddy has been a loss for ORM, the only authorized buyer of the paddy producedby the project. ORM, under the follow- up project,will progressively liberalize paddy sales and have it on the free market systemby the fifth year. PROJECT COMPLETIONREPORT MALI MOPTI II RICE PROJECT -(Credit 753-NLI)
I. BACKGROUND
A. General
1.01 The Mopti II Rice Project (Cr. 753-MLI) followeda first Mopti Rice Project (Cr. 277-MLI)appraised in April 1971, and is followedby a third project, the Mopti Area DevelopmentProject, approved on May 21, 1985, and effectivesince November15, 1985. All three projectsare based on the same concept: the cultivation of rice within polders under controlled flooding to reduce the risks inherent to cultivationunder uncontrolledflood conditions,as traditionallypracticed in the flood plains of the Niger river basin. The Mopti II Rice Projectwas the sixth IDA operationin the Malian agriculturalsector.
1.02 This PCR is based on: (a) a "Rapport d'Execution"prepared by ORM, receivedin the Bank on April 4, 1985; (b) the series of supervision reports issued throughoutproject implementation;and (c) the findingsof an appraisalmission (January1983) for the Mopti Area Developmentproject. The three rice-basedoperations in the Mopti region, togetherwith the First LivestockProject (Cr. 538-MLI,of 1973),constitute in fact a series of interrelatedactions and reactions. Thus, rather than reviewing the performanceof Mopti II as an independentproject, the approachof this PCR is to focus on the key elementswhich, throughoutthe evo,lutionof the physical,agricultural and social conditions,have helped the Borrowerand the Bank in making some progress toward the understandingof the complex processof developmentof the Mopti region.
B. First Mopti Rice Project (Cr. 277-MLI)
1.03 The first Mopti Rice Projectwas implementedfrom 1972 to 1978. Main conponentswere: (a) the constructionof three new polders (about 13,000ha) along the Niger and the Bani rivers; (b) the rehabilitationof five existing polders (about 18,000 ha); (c) land preparation (deep ploughing)on about 10,300ha; (d) the constructionof ancillarybuildings (offices,workshops, storage, etc.) and acquisitionof vehicle and farming equipment; (e) an applied research program, includinga seed production farm; and (f) the provisionof technicalassistance to the OperationRiz Mopti (ORM), the project's executing agency. About 7,300 familieswere expected to benefit from the project. Project cost was estimated at appraisalat US$9.4million, of which foreignfinancing amounted to US$7.6 million:an IDA credit of US$6.9 million and a grant equivalentto US$0.7 million from France's Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation (PAC). A supplementaryIDA credit of US$2.6 millionwas approvedin 1975 to offset the effect of the dollar devaluationand to finance changes in project design and cost overruns. FAC also increasedits contributionby US$0.5 millionequivalent.
1.04 ORM preparedan ImplementationReport, dated June 1978, on the basis of which the Western Africa Regional Office prepared a PCR dated December1980. Further,on June 25, 1981, OED issueda ProjectPerformance Audit Memorandum (report No. 3523) which concluded that, despite of shortcomingsin certain areas, the controlled flood irrigation system - 2 -
offers benefits to a large number of farmers at low cost and does not requiredrastic changes of existingfarming systems.
1.05 The two first years of the implementationperiod (1972-1978)were very dry and, in terms of total output, the results were disappointing; conversely,rainfall in years 1974-76 was acceptableand results were encouraging. The table below summarizes the evolution of production parametersexpressed as percentageof appraisalestimates except for the ratio "harvestedarea/sown area" which refers to actualannual values.
Harvestedarea/ Sown area Harvestedarea Yield a/ Production sown area …------(M)…______------
1972/73 91.4 33 91 30 32 1973/74 65.4 53 100 53 73 1974/75 80.5 86 135 116 96 1975/76 80.3 79 112 88 88 1976/77 80.6 82 121 99 92
a/ per harvested area.
Yields per harvested area were good, exceeding consistently,after the second year, appraisalestimates, which called for an increase from 0.9 t/ha to 1.5 t/ha in five years. Regardingharvested area it seems that, aside from the two abnormallydry first years, there was a systematic deviationfrom harvestedto sown area of -20%, largerthan the -10% assumed at appraisal. In all likelihood,that deviationwas due to the fact that actual rainfallin those years was below the rainfallaccepted at appraisal as "normal"rainfall, which was defined as the rainfallthat would have a 90% probabilityof being equalledor exceeded.
1.06 Altogether,economic results were acceptable,mainly because a dramatic increase in the economic price of rice (more than 300% above appraisalestimate). Thus, in spite of project output being lower than expected,the actual rate of return was estimatedto be 17%, higher than the 14% estimated at appraisal. The number of project beneficiaries exceededappraisal estimates, reaching about 9,000 families. However,some unexpectedand undesirabledistortions were found regardingdistribution of project lands:about 25% of participantswere not primarilyfarmers (civil servants,traders, etc.) and 6% of participantswere attributed21% of the area. Although not supportedby a rigorous study, it became well known that holdings under these two categoriesexperienced severe shortagesof labor at harvesting,which probablyhad an adverse impact on the overall output. Therefore land reallocationbecame an importantcomponent under the Mopti Area DevelopmentProject (Cr. 1597-MLI). II. PROJECTFORMULATION
A. Identificationand Preparation
2.01 The Mopti II Rice Projectwas identifiedby the RegionalMission in Western Africa (RMWA) in November 1974 and prepared by the Institut d'EconomieRurale (IER) of the Ministry of Rural Developmentin Bamako. The projectwas conceivedas a follow-upand extensionof the then on-going Mopti Rice Project. Project preparationwas financed with funds from Cr. 277-MLI.
B. Appraisal
2.02 The projectwas appraisedin November 1976. There is no record of disagreementbetween Government and the Bank. Main issuesidentified by the appraisalmission were:
(a) Timing of project implementation.It was then commonlyaccepted that Mali had attained self-sufficiencyin rice productionand that the project might bring about a surplus. The mission recommendedto go ahead with the projectwithout delay, giving more importanceto the continuityelement between the first and secondprojects than to the potentialmarketing problems derived from a productionsurplus.
(b) Quality of Extensionarnd Farmers' Response. The mission found that performance of ORM's extension service was deficient; further, although new rice varieties had been well received, farmers had not adopted new farming techniques (mainly line-sowingand weeding)but rather,they kept their traditional practices. The missionrecommended that thosenew practiceswere made mandatory,that they should be carriedout by ORM at a fee (MF 1,000/ha) and farmers failing to apply "more efficient methods shouldbe divestedof their land-userights."
(c) FinancialEquilibrium of ORM. The mission flagged the weakness of ORM's financialposition, given that the resourcesto finance its operatingcosts were to be providedby the farmers,through the payment of a "developmentlevy", and by the Government, throughbudgetary allocations. The appraisalmission recommended that the financial situation of ORM be reviewed annually; further,the missionenvisaged that a substantialincrease in the "developmentlevy" (from MF 180 kg/ha to MF 300 kg/ha of paddy) might be necessaryto ensureORM's financialviability.
2.03 The Decision Meeting accepted the mission's recommendationson the above three issues. NO other issues were subject to discussion. However,one other issue was addressed:the inclusionin the project of a health compon.entfor the controlof schistosomiasis.Such a componentwas not includedin the project,because, it was concludedthat a decisionon that issue should await the resultsof a specializedstudy carriedout by - 4 -
the Office de Coordinationet de Cooperationpour la Lutte contre les Grandes Endemies. The meeting also agreed that, if further action on a possible health componentwere warranted,the appropriateDivision would participatein a post-appraisalmission. This did not happen.
C. Negotiations,Board Presentationand Signing
2.04 Negotiationswere held from October 3 to 6, 1977. The project remainedessentially as proposedby the appraisalmission. The only change worth notingwas the inclusion,at the requestof the Malian delegation,of a modest applied research program. There were no conditionsfor Board presentation. Most significantassurances given by the Malian Government were that: (a) farmers would have priority in land e.llocationover non- farmers;(b) price of paddy would be increasedto MF 50/kg (fromMF 45/kg) before the 1978/79 campaign; and (c) the development levy would be graduallyraised up to 240 kg/ha by 1982 (from 160 kg/ha).
2.05 The credit (No. 753-MLI)was approvedby the Board on November 29, 1977. ED's comments focused on the measures taken to cope with the most notorious difficultiesarisen in the previous project, namely the weaknessof the extensionservices and the allocationof project lands to non-farmers (civil servants, traders, etc.). The Credit Agreement was signedon December8, 1977.
D. Objectivesand Description
2.06 Taking into considerationthe lessons learnedfrom the preceding project,Mopti II objectiveswere to: (a) expandmoderately the floodable area; (b) improveORM's managerialcapability; (c) upgrade the efficiency of supportingservices rendered by ORM to farmers; and (d) widen the project scope by introducingalphabetization and trainingcomponents. At full development,the project was expected to reach 13,000 families (90,000-100,000people).
2.07 The projectconsists of:
- constructionof four polders (Sarg-Mala,Ouronema, Tiroguel and Torokoro)with a total area of 8,800 ha;
- improvementsto poldersdeveloped under Credit 277-MLI;
- deep ploughingof the new polders as well as of 14,285 ha in polders constructedunder Credit 227-MLIor being improvedwith financingprovided by the AfricanDevelopment Fund (ADF);
- constructionof storage facilitiesfor paddy, farm inputs and farm equipment, of workshops, offices and staff houses, and trainingcenters;
- acquisitionof farm machinery,civil works maintenanceequipment, vehicles,two ferries,workshop and officeequipment; establishmentof an adult literacy program for villages in the projectarea and an audio-visualprogram to be used by extension services;
- an appliedagricultural research program;
- agriculturalcredit for the purchase of fertilizer and farm implements;
- technicalassistance for project management,and ORM staff and operatingcosts during the projectperiod to the extentthat they are attributableto the expansionof the projectarea;
- provisionof supportto the EngineeringBureau of the Ministryof Rural Developmentincluding an extension to existing offices, acquisitionof equipment,travel scholarshipsand funds for the execution of studies for irrigation projects which may be includedin a future IDA-financedproject.
The projectwas expectedto begin in mid-1978 and to be completedin five years.
2.08 Projectcosts were estimatedat US$26.3million, net of taxes,to be financedas follows:IDA, US$15 million; FAC, US$2 million;ADF, US$6 million;users, US$2 million;and Government,US$1.3 million.
2.09 At full development,the projectwas expectedto increaseannual paddy productionby some 34,000 t (15,000t from new poldersand 19,000 t from improvedexisting ones). The economicrate of returnwas estimatedat 18%. Anticipatedrisks were those derivingfrom the variabilityinherent to the centralelements of the projectconcept: the timingand intensityof early local rains determiningthe sowing period and, subsequently,the timingand level reachedby the Niger's flood. It was estimatedthat a 20% drop in benefitswould still yield an ERR cf 12%.
III. PROJECTIMPLEMENTATION
A. Effectivenessand start-up
3.01 The only condition of credit effectiveness(other than the standard ones) was the fulfillmentof all conditionsprecedent to the initialdisbursements of the FAC grant. The creditbecame effectiveon May 15, 1978, before the funds of the previous credit were fully used. The project had a timely start. Contractsfor earth moving, deep ploughing, buildingsand equipment(which had been preparedduring execution of Mopti I) were awarded promptly. Acquisitionof vehicleswas also made on time. No procurement problems are reported. Regarding farming equipment, however, Bank required that purchases under Cr. 753-MLI were to be postponeduntil the equipmentprocured under the precedingcredit reached a reasonablerate of utilization. -6-
B. ProjectDevelopment
3.02 Civil Works. The project'sphysical targets were fully attained in a timely manner. Four new polders were built; works includeddikes (70 km), conveyancecanals with regulatinggates (25 km), and feeder roads (210 km). In addition,v polder initiatedunder Mopti I (Bougoula)was completedunder Mopti II and rehabilitationworks (dikes,150 km; roads, 35 km; and canals, 230 km) were carried out on nine existingpoldere. Deep ploughingwas carriedout on an area of 20,400 ha, practicallythe entire area foreseenat appraisal. Buildingsfor offices,warehouses and housing for project staff were executedaccording to appraisalestimates. Annex 1 gives the quantitiesof works actuallycarried out under the project and compares actual results with appraisal projectionsfor the area to be attributed to users and area requiring deep-ploughing.
3.03 Land Distribution.At completionin 1983, an area of 30,700 ha had been distributedto some 12,600users; the area was about 20% short of the 38,300 ha foreseenat appraisal,while the numberof beneficiarieswas very close to the initialtarget of 13,000. Consequently,at 2.3 ha, the averagefarm size was about 20% smallerthan anticipated.The distribution of the averagefarm size is fairlyhomogeneous throughout the projectarea, ranging from 1.6 ha in Sofara to 3.2 ha in Soufouroulaye.Given the low level of mechanization(para. 3.10 b) the average farm size was probably excessivefor the labor force of the averagefarm.
3.04 AgriculturalProduction. The project has failed to attain its productiontargets as shown below:
CultivatedArea Estimate Actual Yield Production Actual/Est. Smn HarvestedEst. Actual Est. ActualArea a/ Yield Prod. -- (_ha) - (6/95)- - -(t)y
1978/7918,500 17,800 13,400 1.6 1.2 28,80015,500 72 75 54 1979/8020,800 16,200 12,400 1.6 1.1 33,50013,400 60 69 40 1980/8126,400 15,200 12,300 1.7 1.1 43,70013,400 47 65 31 1981/8233,700 24,000 17,000 1.7 1.0 58,60017,800 50 59 30 1982/8337,400 24,400 2,500 1.8 0.7 66,400 1,800 7 39 3 a/ actualharvested area/estimate
The project's poor agriculturalperformance contrasts sharply with the remarkably good progress of its hardware components. Thus, for the campaign 1980/81,three years after effectiveness,the sixth supervision report (August 17, 1981) shows that civil works, deep ploughing and acquisitionof equipmentwere completed,which pusheddisbursements to 126% of appraisal estimates. Conversely,the harvested area was less than one-halfof appraisalprojections, yield was off more than one-thirdand thus, actual productionwas only 31% of the appraisalprojections. The reasons of this poor agriculturalperformance are analyzed in paragraph 3.10. - 7 -
3.05 The Applied research program, financed by FAC, was delayed because of disbursementprob'lems. Yet three resultswere attained:
'a) developmentof a relay cropping system for the polders consisting of maize/sorghum(grown and harvested during the rainfed season) intersown with rice (sown after the first rains and harvested after the recessionof floods);
(b) response to Tilemsi phosphateson the mostly phosphorus-deficient soils of the ORM polders;and
(c) identificationof two improved rice varieties.
3.06 The adult literacy program was 100% FAC financed, and despite disbursementproblems (see para 3.05), started satisfactorilybecause it was temporarilyrun on ORM funds. More than 100 villages were motivated. The program continues under the Mopti Area Development Project (Cr. 1597-MLI).
3.07 Organization and Management. During the execution of the project, ORM was directly responsiblefor the actual carryingout of most of the project activities,with the farmers having a limitedparticipation in the making of farmingplans and decisions. To dischargeits duties, ORM structure comprises five "divisions", each divided into two-to-four "sections",as indicatedbeiow:
Division Sections
Production Training,Extension, Applied Research,Literacy program Services Marketing,Farming equipment,Workshop Studies Statistics,Monitoring and Evaluation Administration Accounting,Personnel, Secretary Engineering Studies,Works
ORM is staffed with civil servants and personnel hired under fixed-term contracts. In the last three years of the project the number of civil servants was stable at 137, of which 54 were at professional level; fixed-termpersonnel, most of them supportingstaff, decreasedfrom 389 in 1982 to 367 in 1983 and further down to 347 in 1984.
C. Cost and Financing
3.08 AppraisalEstimates. At appraisal,project cost net of taxes and duties was estimated at US$26.3million, equivalent to MF12.9 billion at the then prevailing rate of US$1=MF490. Project cost and financing plan are summarizedbelow 1/:
1/ From SAR Annex 8, Table 1. -8 -
ID& FAC FAD Gov't Users Total (MF ) Million) %
Civilworks 3724 392 2695 - - 6811 13.9 52.9 &gineerirg 245 - - - - 245 0.5 1.9 Vehiclesand Equipment 980 98 - - - 1078 2.2 8.4 Operatingcost 343 245 - 343 - 931 1.9 7.2 TechicalAsst. 637 49 - - - 686 1.4 5.3 On-farminvest. 196 - - 196 980 1372 2.8 10.6
Sub-total 6125 784 2695 539 980 11,123 22.7 86.3
Supportto GR a/ 441 49 - - - 490 1.0 3.8
Unallocated 784 147 245 98 - 1274 2.6 9.9
Total 7350 980 2940 637 980 12,887
US$MiioLkn 15.0 2.0 6.0 1.3 2.0 26.3
% 57.0 7.6 22.8 5.0 7.6 100.0
al Supportto the Directorateof Rural Rgineering (Griie Rural)inclidrg: provent of building, office eqdpziwnt, training andstudies.
3.07 Actual Results. Actual projectcost has been estimatedby ORM at MR 12,636million 2/, i.e., practicallythe exact amount projected at appraisal. Accordingto ORM the financingof the projectwas as follows:
Source Amount (HF Million) (%)
IDA 6744 53.4 FAC 653 5.2 FAD 2807 22.2 Gov't 1404 11.1 Users 1028 8.1
12,636 100.0
It seems,however, that ORM has not accountedfor in its closingstatement the amount of MF 490 million equivalent earmarked for support of the
2/ Rapportd'Ex&cution, pages 29 and 37. - 9 -
Directorate of Rural Engineering (Genie Rural) of the Ministry of Agriculture. Aside from this omission,there are some inconsistenciesand informationgaps in the "Rapport d'Execution"which prevent a detailed comparisonbetween projected and actual costs. Thus, while actual cost by source of finance is MF 12,636million (page 29), as indicatedabove, the analytical breakdown gives a total of MF 12,208million (page 30). Further, the categoriesused in the "Rapportd'Exgcution" do not coincide with those used at appraisal neither in estimatingproject costs or in establishing disbursement categories. And finally, there are inconsistenciesin the "Rapportd'Execution" on the amount shown for civil works, which in Table 1 (page 12) is MF 7535 million (derivedfrom actual cost of civil work contracts) while in Section4.2 (page 30) is MF 7,950 million. With the above qualifications,actual project cost, by category,have been estimatedby ORM as follows:
Amount (MF million) (%)
Civil works 7950 65.1 Agriculturalresearch 110 0.9 Farmingequipment 744 6.1 Managementand extension 3404 27.9
12,208 100.0
3.08 From the above, it followsthat the civil works componentof the project was well defined and actual cost (MF 7,950million) was just 6% above appraisalestimates (MF 7,492 million,including contingencies). As for other components,project implementationdiverged substaatiallyfrom appraisalprojections and, once again, with due considerationto adverse climaticconditions, it looks like neither the Borrowernor the Bank had a firm grasp of the project.
D. Key Problems
3.09 The Droughts Throughout the ImplementationPeriod. The most significantcause of the project's poor results is, undoubtedly,the exceptionallylow floods of the Niger and Bani rivers which, in 1982, 83 and 84, have been well below the levelswhich, based on the period 1940 to 1983 (44 years), are expectedto be equalledor exceedednine out of ten years. Currently,we are witnessinghow the isohyetswhich determinethe Sahelian (100 mm-400 mm) and Sudanian (400mm-1,200 mm) zones have been displacedsouthward between 200 km and 400 km, if the data of the last 20 years (1965-1984)are used for the frequentialanalysis of the rainfall. Although nothing can be stated conclusively, the possibility of deteriorationof the rainfallpatterns in the Sahelianzone is a widespread concern among scientists. Further, if the period 1965-84 is used to analyze the frequentialdistribution of the rainfall, the flood area associatedwith the 90%- probabilityrainfall is substantiallysmaller than the flood area associatedwith the rainfall of the same frequency,but based on the data of the 1940-83period. Reciprocally,the probabilityof - 10 -
floodinga given area is lower if calculatedon the 1965-84data than if calculatedon data of the 1940-83period. The problem,however, is that we do not and can not know which sampleis more representativeof the next 5, 10, 20,...,years.
3.10 Faming Problems. Aside from the devastatingeffects of the drought,the project'sagricultural aspects seem to have deteriorated.At appraisal, four stages of agriculturalperformance were foreseen; they were:
Stage Key Features Yield (t/ha)
1 Traditionalrarieties; controlled flooding 1.1 2 Higher-yieldingvarieties; improved land preparation 1.4 3 Stage 2 plus line-sowing,weeding 1.9 4 Stage 3 plus fertilizers 2.5
Based on the above and consideringan acceptable rate of progress of farmingtechniques, average yield by year 4 was expectedto be 1,8 t/ha and at full development (year 7) 2 t/ha. Actual results have been most disappointing;in 1982-83,the project'sfourth year, averageyield over a harvested area of 2,520 ha was 730 kg/ha, with about 50% of the area stagnatingat 600 kg/ha.
Immediatecauses of this poor performanceseem to be:
(a) Poor quality seeds. Under the supervisionof the West Africa Rice DevelopmentAssociation (WARDA) the project has identified two improvedrice varieties;however, no provisionswere made to secure production of quality seed at farmers' level; thus, farmers have been using low quality seed infested with low yielding wild rice species. Furthermore,due to the lack of adequatefarming practices, wild rice has often re-invadedpaddy fields which had been previously freed from it by the deep ploughingoperation.
(b) Lack or inadequacyof farmingequipment. Farmerswere generally under-equippedand, therefore, farming practices have been inadequate.The main reasonis probablythe inappropriatenessof the agriculturalcredit schemewhich consistedof 0RM procuring directlythe farming equipmentand passing it on to the farmers with a down-paymentof 40-45% and the balancedue in one or two years, at 3% or 5% interestrate. These harsh conditionscaused the demand for credit to stagnate (and recoveryrate was low), with the result that about 60% of farmers lacked oxen or animal-drawn implements. In addition, ORM acquired 132 line-seederswhich never worked properly and the farmers, logically,were not interestedin buying that equipment,with the consequencethat the line-sowingpractice was never carriedout. Anothersimilar case was the acquisitionof 32 threshers (make: Colombini),which were inadaptedto the conditionsof the project - 11 -
and, despitethe modificationsintroduced by the manufacturer,of very limiteduse. A lot of 22 mid-size tractors (make: Fiat), with implements,was also procuredunder the project,mainly to carry out the deep- ploughing operation. The tractors have performedwell, but once the deep-ploughingwas completed,they remained under-utilized since only a few absentee farmers required the services of ORM equipzent to carry out farming operationsin their fields,while farmers are reluctantto pay for ORM services that they can carry out or from which they do not anticipate a clear benefit. A detailed list of farming equipmentis at the "Rapportd'Execution" (Table 3, page 17).
(c) Failure to weed. This operation requires a considerablelabor input. In the absence of good seeds, adequateland preparation and efficientsowing, farmers are not interestedin weeding.
(d) Lukewarm farmers' attitude toward improved farming techniques. When measured against the demand for land, farmers' attitude toward the project is very positive,with almost 13,000 farmers participatingin the projectand 30,000ha distributed.However, farmers'response toward accepting improved farming techniques is mixed, as anticipatedby the appraisalmission in view of the results of Mopti I. Farmers have largely accepted the use of "sativa" varieties seeds, although the quality was below standards; end-of-seasonploughing has been practiced to the extent of availabilityof oxen and implements,i.e. on about 30% of the area; and line-sowingand weedinghave been neglectedas discussed in (b) and (c) above. While sound statistical informationhas not been gathered,it seems that farmers have split their interestbetween the in-polderrice cultivationunder the supervisionof ORM and the off-polderprivate farming,where with less effort and without any financialcharges, they may obtainsimilar yields in grain crops dependingupon rainfalland, further, they grow some vegetablesfor self-consumptionand/or cash income.
3.11 Financial Problems. The combined effect of higher operating costs and lower operatingrevenues than anticipatedat appraisalresulted in an annual operatingdeficit for ORM of MP 270 million (averagefor 1977-78 t1iugh 1981-82),while appraisalprojections called for an annual operating surplus of MF 225 million (average for the same period). A summarizedcomparison between projected and actualannual results (for the above period)is presentedbelow:
Projected Actual Deviation -----(MF million)---- %
Operating revenue 700 300 - 57 Operating costs 475 570 + 20 Surplus (Deficit) 225 (270) - 220 - 12 -
The operating deficit has been financed through Government subsidies, deferred maintenanceand IDA financing,which was to cover 50% of the incremeaitaloperating cost.
E. Borrower'sPerformance
3.12 With due considerationto all adverse climatic conditions, Borrower's performance is open to question. Weakest areas have been agriculturalextension and organization-and-management.
(a) AgriculturalExtension. ORM has made a remarkableeffort in establishinga most detailed extensionprogram which includes: (i) the trainingof the extensionagents, (ii) the settingup of village producers'committees with detaileddescription of their functions, and (iii) the carrying out of specific extension activities. An added functionhas been the collectionof charges due by farmersto ORM, which has taken up to 40% of the agents' activities. While the program seems to have been carriedout in strict accordance with the guidelines regarding seminars, meetings, visits, setting-up of farmers' committees, demonstrationpractices, etc., results at farm level have been well below expectations. It seems that the dense and costly programof activitieswas largelyoversized given the limitations imposed by other factors: first, the climate; and second, the relativemodesty of the technicalinnovations.
(b) Organizationand Management. The administrativestructure of ORM and the number of staff throughoutthe projectwere essentially in accordancewith appraisalprojections (para 3.05); the issue, howeveris not the numbersper ce, but the centralconcept of the project, as establishedat appraisal,concerning the role and responsibilitiesof ORM. As recommendedin the SAR of the Mopti Area DevelopmentProject, the transferof threshingand marketing operationsto farmers,and credit operationsto the Agricultural DevelopmentBank (BNDA) will reduce the administrativeburden substantially,permitting a reductionin staff numbers.
F. Bank'sperformance
3.13 Bank's performancewent hand-in-handwith Borrower's. The risk of occurrence of abnormallydry years was underestimatedat appraisal, since the worst case analyzed was a 20% decrease in benefits. In retrospect,given the uncertaintiesinherent to the controlledflooding method, it seems prudent to allow for a more adverse situationthan those accepted as "worst case" at appraisal. In fact, as the recent climatic circumstanceshave brutallydemonstrated, a 90% probabilityof reachingor exceedinga certainflood level, derivedfrom the analysisof the historic records,does not precludethe occurrenceof discreteevents, no matterhow low the probability,such as two, three or more consecutiveyears of practicallynil floods. - 13 -
3.14 Aside from the adverse climatic conditions,the Bank failed to react to severalproblems which arose from what, in retrospect,seem to be design flaws: inadequate agronomic package (3.07) and over-optimistic financial projections(3.08). Judging by the specialtiesof the staff assignedto supervision,the Bank did not follow-upclosely enough the most sensitive areas (agricultureand financing) during project execution, particularlythe first half of the implementationperiod, as shown in the table below:
1st half 2nd half Total 11/78-7/81 11/81-3/84 11/78-3/84 ______(%)…______IrrigationEngineer 80 14 45 Economist 13 20 17 Agronomist 7 52 30 FinancialAnalyst 0 7 4 LivestockSpecialist 0 7 4
Total 100 100 100
3.15 The above data indicatethat the Bank alloweda disproportionate weight to the project'scivil works component,which entailedlittle or no risk given its relative simplicity. Conversely,it seems that major decisions related to agriculture (e.g. the acquisition of farming equipment,para 3.07 b) were approvedby the Bank withoutproper technical analysis. Further,despite the warningsof the appraisalmission about the weakness of the ORM's financialposition (2.02c), no measureswere taken during supervisionto correct the financialdeterioration of the project executingagency. However,as statedat the outset (1.02)the Borrowerand the Bank have agreed to undertake the necessary correctivemeasures to overcomethe difficultiesencountered in the past. These measures,which are outlinedin ChapterV, will be implementedthrough the follow-upMopti Area DevelopmentProject.
IV. ECONOMIcANALYSIS
4.01 At appraisal,the project'seconomic rate of returnwas estimated at 18%. This calculationwas based on the assumptionthat incremental productionfrom the projectwould be absorbedby domesticdemand including demand for the build-upof a rice reserve stock as a protectivemeasure againstfuture droughts. If part of incrementalproduction were to be - 14 -
exported,for a transitionalperiod of some 5 years, the rate of return would still be 16%. In calculatingthe ERR, the followingadjustments were made:
- the assistanceto the Rural Works Departmentwas excluded;
- the adult literacyprogram was excluded;
- the appliedagricultural research program was excluded;
- only 50% of technicalassistance was countedas incrementalcost since,without the project,two technicianswould have still been required;
- the farm-gateeconomic price of paddy was based on the import substitutionprice;
- the projectlife was consideredat 25 years.
A sensitivityanalysis was performedto measure the variationsof the ERR to deviationsfrom basic hypotheses. Resultsare summarizedbelow:
Assumptions ERR (%)
Base estimate 18 Costs + 20% 13 Benefits- 20% 12 2-yeardelay 13
4.02 In evaluatingthe projectfrom today'sperspective, a distinction must be made betweenthe poldersbuilt under Mopti I (the existingpolders) and the new poldersbuilt under Mopti II. For the existingpolders, the extremely adverse climatic conditions have determined that actual production "with project" has been below the pre-projectproduction. Therefore,the calculationof a rate of return for investmentsrelated to existingpolders would not be meaningful. We have thus limitedthe ex-post economicanalysis to the investmentsmade in the four new polders,where an incrementof production,albeit modest, has been obtainedwith respectto the pre-projectsituation.
4.03 In calculatingthe ex-posteconomic rate of return,the following criteriahave been considered:
(a) investments in infrastructureare actual costs of the contractsrelated to the new polders;
(b) investmentsin equipmenthave been pro-ratedto the ratio of area of new polders to total area; cost of equipment - 15 -
actually acquired but practically never used (seeding machinesand threshers)has been excluded;
(c) incrementalproduction has been measured as the difference betweenactual productionobtained in the new poldersuntil the season 1984/85 and the produetion resulting from applying the off-polder actual yield to the area of new polders; for the future, "'with"and "without"yields have been estimated at the levels assumed in the Mopti Area DevelopmentStaff AppraisalReport;
(d) operatingcosts for the entireOperation Riz Mopti have been analyzed in detail during appraisal of the Mopti Area Developmentproject; the estimatesfor Mopti II have been definedby applyingagain the new area-to-totalarea ratio to the values obtainedor projectedduring appraisalof the follow-upproject;
(e) replacementof equipment is expected to take place every five years;
(f) the economicprice of paddy has been estimatedat MP 150,000 per ton, which is the resulting import parity farm gate price based on Mopti reference market (riz Abidjan), as presented in the Mopti Area Development project Staff AppraisalReport;
(g) a standardconversion factor of 0.95 has been used to adjust local costs;
(h) GDP deflatorsused to adjust historiccosts to 1983 prices have been as follows:
Year _
1979 70.3 1980 76.7 1981 85.2 1982 92.7
(i) the project'seconomic life has been estimatedin 25 years. Supportingdetailed calculations are at Annex 2.
4.04 With the above assumptions,the project'sERR is estimatedto be about 3%. The main reason to explain the differencebetween the return estimated at appraisaland that calculatednow seems to be the drastic drought during the project'searly years, which has an extendednegative effectover the project'slife. - 16 -
V. CONCLUSIONS:LESSONS LEARNED
5.09 To improve project performance,it is clear that satisfactory answersmust be found to the four essentialproject issues:
(a) Water minagement. (b) Agriculturalcredit. (c) Farmingpractices and ORM's ExtensionService. (d) Marketing.
In the course of processingthe Mopti Area DevelopmentProject, Government and IDA have reachedconsensus on actions to be taken to addressthe above issues. A brief summaryof the agreementsreached is presentedbelow.
(a) Water management. Aside from the uncertaintiesinherent to the climatic factors, there is a wide consensus among project staff, consultants and Bank staff that the operationalguidelines for controlled flooding should be revisedto reduce the risk of losses that will occur in the areas not reached by the flood. This revision would essentiallyconsist of limiting cultivationto the area which would have a 95% probability3/ of having its water requirements satisfied by the flood. The operational criteriaadopted in the Mopti Area Developmentproject would reduce the in-polderrice area from 36,200ha to 27,000ha, by abandoning the higher fringes where flooding is more uncertain. As a consequence,the overall probabilityof fully meeting the project's water re,uirementswould be 91.5%,while with the operationalcriteria of the past the probabilitywas 84.6%. Further, control of water levels will be substantiallyimproved by the construction of additionaldikes, which will subdividecertain large polders into two or even three "sub-polders",and by the upgrading of certainsecondary canals.
(b) Agriculturalcredit. In the future, agriculturalcredit will be administeredby the NationalBank for Agricultural Development(BNDA), assisted by ORM staff in the appraisr.l of loan requests. Further,the financialresponsibility of the farmerswill be directlywith BNDA, insteadof ORM, thus separatingout water chargesfrom loan repayment. Terms and conditionswill be as follows:
3/ This is a general criterion;in certain polders, however, due to topographic constraints, lower probabilitiesare accepted, thus increasingthe risk of not meetingin full their water requirements. - 17 -
Loan Type Terms Down payment (years) (%)
Farmingequipment 4 10 Threshers 4 20 Blacksmith'sequipment 5 20 Storagewells 10 10 Livestock 5 20
Interestrates would be consistentwith those agreed with Governmentfor the Mali Sud II project, namely 10% for individualsand 9% to producer groupswhere these absorb significantrisks and administrativecosts.
(c) Faming practices and ORM's Extension Service. It is expected that, as a consequenceof the more appropriate credit conditions,farmers will be better equippedand thus more able to carry out adequatelythe recommendedfarming practices. Another essential innovation will be the threshing,which will be done at the villagesby the farmers themselves,with threshersacquired directly through credit, ir,steadof being done by ORM. Moreover, given the transferringof most of the farming activities to the farmers, it seems appropriateto call the attention of future supervision missions on the intensity of the interventionof ORM extension service into the farmers' business. As stated earlier (para.3.06 d), there are questionsabout the adequacy of the size of the extension component,especially taking into considerationthat the technicalaspects of the projectare fairlysimple and that, after 15 years of continuedtutoring, farmers' requirements can probablybe satisfiedwith a much lighterORM presence.
(d) Marketing. ORM has been the only authorizedbuyer of paddy producedin the project,acting on behalf of the Bureau of AgriculturalProducts of Mali (OPAM). However, since a large proportionof the productionwas self-consumed,this policyhas not been appreciablydetrimental to the farmers. It has been, however, detrimentalto ORM, which had to be staffedand equippedto carry out all the operationsrelated to the threshing-milling-marketingprocess. Further,since the price paid by OPAM to ORM was far below its administrativecosts, the process has b.en one of the sourcesof losses for ORM. In the follow-upproject, ORM will progressivelyreduce its role in this operation,so as to cease its participationby the fifth year. Farmers are now free to sell to whomeverthey wish. - If- -
THIS PAGE
i S BLANK MKCi rc RICE pr1JH
Projected an! Attained Physical (bjectives
Area aslmdto ausers Area requiring deep-pIioug Qtile (actual) FstimEte Actual Fstimate .4ctua1 DikesRod
ditatimI polders
M~pti Nord 5,800 5,740 2,000 2,000 27.2 thetmix 10.7 53.6 400 90 300 0 14.4 0.0 14.9 Karbaye 710 310 500 500 nDamaztkzir 9.1 0.0 10.3 1,040 1,040 880 880 4.8 )kD!ti Sx1 8.9 8.6 4,720 3,620 3,500 3,870 9.7 0.0 Sc~~zfcznuzIaye~4,900 33.9 8,80D 2,310 1,000 370 36.9 0.0 43.3 Sofars 730 330 0 0 'B.x (L Suzutm,-Syn 4.0 2.5 2.7 2,000 1,910 0 90 2.5 Die-Tewekou 12.4 21.1 6,370 1,790 2,500 2,500 42.0 Bcunzmlla 0.0 40.1 2,100 2,700 2,080 1,910 4.6 Sub-total 0.0 33.0 28,770 19,84 12,760 J12,12 155.2 34.5 261.5
NewPolders Rge 710 310 500 500 9.1 0.0 10.3~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Zdwlixiullrow1,040 1,040 890 880 4.8 8.9 8.6~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I- SBr6-*kla 3,120 2,600 3,12D 3,120 ojuram 25.9 10.2 84.3 4,100 3,390 3,620 3,650 27.4 6.1 67.3 Tfrojel 1,050 960 1,050 960 To,rdiu 8.0 3.7 23.6 530 1,760 530 510 4.6 Sub-total 5.0 2.9 8808,700 8,320 8,2740 65.9 250178.1 TOiMar 37,570 28.540 21,080 20,360 221.1 59.5 439.6 =hrl 90 =00300 ° 14.4 0.0 14. . -4~~~ H -
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I
z r m~~~~~~~~~~~~r Annex 2 Page 1 of 4 - 21 - MALI MOPTI II RICE PROJECT (Cr. 753-MLI)
PROJECTCOMPLETION REPORT SUPPORTINGDATA FOR THE ECONOMICANALYSIS
I. INVESTMENTS
New Polders
Area deep Infrastructure1 ploughing Hydraulic Buildings Total (ha) - --- (MF million)------
Sere-Mala 3,120 606.9 36.7 643.6 Ouronema 3,650 1,838.3 90.1 1,928.4 Tiroguel 960 1,851.3 73.4 1,924.7 Torokoro 510 200.5 31.4 231.9 Total 8,240 4,497.0 231.6 4,728.6
Equipment Cost (MF million)
O + M 250.6 Farming 403.9 Miscellaneous 66.8 721.3
Area attributedto users:2/ Four new polders 8,700 ha Total 28,540ha
Investmentin equipmentallocated to new polders: 8,700 X 721.3 = 220.1 28,540
Scheduleof Investments3/
Infrastructure Equipment Total % MF million % MF million on
1979/80 25 1,182.2 5 11.0 24.1 1,193.2 1980/81 30 1,418.6 60 132.1 31.3 1,550.7 1981/82 30 1,418.6 25 55.0 29.8 1,473.6 1982/83 15 709.2 10 22.0 14.8 731.2 Total 100 4,728.6 100 220.1 100.0 4,948.7
1/ Source:Tables 12 and 13. Rapportd'Exgcution. 2/ Source:Table page 17 rapportd'execution; investment prorated to area actuallyattributed to users (Tableof Draft PCR). 3/ Percentagesof disbursementsare roundedestimates based upon indirect date providedby rapportd'ex6cution and SPN reports. Annex 2 Page 2 of 4
II. INCREMENTALPRODUCTION
1. Area attributedto farmersin new polders:
Year Area (ha)
1979/80 0 1980/81 4,350 1981/82 8,700
2. Area attributedto farmersin existingpolders: 19.840 ha.
3. Ratio New area/Totalarea:
New Existing Total Ratio
1979/80 0 19,840 19,840 0.0 1980/81 4,350 19,840 24,190 0.2 1981/82 8,700 19,840 28,540 0.3
4. Estimateof Productionin new polders:
Total Productiona/ New PoldersProduction
Actual Estimate With b/ Withoutc/ -
…------(t) ------
1979/80 13,400 - - - 0 1980/81 13,400 - 2,680 1s300 1,380 1981/82 17,800 - 5,340 2,610 2,730 1982/83 1,800 - 540 0 540 1983/84 5,000 - 1,500 0 1,500 1984/85 300 - 90 0 90 1985/86onwards 26,100 7,960 2,610 5,350
a/ From table of PCR. b/ Obtainedby applyingNew Area/TotalArea ratio to actualproduction until 1984/85;from 1985/86onwards the expectedyield (0.915t/ha) is that assumedin the Mopti Area DevelopmentSAR. c/ Area X actualyield of 0.3 t/ha. Annex 2 Page 3 of 4 - 23-
III. OPERATINGCOSTS
Data obtainedfrom TableauNo. FGI, page 44, RapportPAUGAM:
1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 --- (MF million)------
Personnel 161.9 192.2 231.7 Travauxet fournitures 298.8 218.3 345.8 Transport 2.2 3.3 3.7 Fournituresbureaux 12.3 13.1 11.7 Total 475.3 426.9 592.9
New area/Totalarea 0.0 0.2 0.3
Imputableto new polders 0.0 85.4 177.9
IV. COSTS AND BENEFITSSTREAMS
Costs Increm. Gross value Net Invest. Opert'g Total Production of product'n Benefit --- (MF million)- --- (t) -----(MF million)------
1 1,193.2 0.0 1,193.2 0 0.0 -1,193.2 2 1,550.7 85.4 1,636.1 1,380 207.0 -1,173.0 3 1,473.6 177.9 1,651.5 2,730 409.5 -1,242.0 4 731.2 177.9 909.1 540 81.0 - 828.1 5 0.0 177.9 177.9 1,500 225.0 47.1 6 0.0 177.9 177.9 90 13.5 - 164.4 7-10 0.0 177.9 177.9 5,350 802.5 624.6 11 220.1 177.9 398.0 5,350 802.5 404.5 12-15 0.0 177.9 177.9 5,350 802.5 624.6 16 220.1 177.9 398.0 5,350 802.5 404.5 17-20 0.0 177.9 177.9 5,350 802.5 624.6 21 220.1 177.9 398.0 5,350 802.5 404.5 22-25 0.0 177.9 177.9 5,350 802.5 624.6 V. RATE OF RETURNCALCULATION (2.7%)
9m 19 3 im Om O 1,9s4 19Om 37 9 1" it" 99tm "a 9 9 2996 99 mt-n3u
lAt h ru Ftnive
ht Aroal hi 3 36 63 7 7 77 77 3W 3* "tedo "b 3* 33 3W 3W 37 37 31 M1 37 37 37 tij igi itt a2 In 112* 935 915 II fbim tue AN U3 U I two n5 7 no PM no 915 95 915 911 921 925 921 915 93 9 3 263 53 sSW 15W 37 7 7963 1W 79W M M nosM no no nu meS no nsn 796 9 796. 19W 19W 79 793 796 79W 79W UShufrojnct ut
km.lvivid beklt 9l 43m71 9*no 3790 3370 6130 31*m 373M 37433 67 37 3W 3730 37*o 374s 3731 JN3m 373 7 fitim to" J" * 5e asts * I o at# ate ats ate aSt ae asn ae ate sit am ato as. Ms 3acrot.et PAt* 1 oft Om 0 2W 233 S* 2W e 5W s5 53l 53 5W 533 SW 53 535 1 S3J 5J 531 5M p* price Uftcl 53 In1 3 15t 3 1353 Is to inU3 ISO 1 123 537 17 IS 2 is 135 351 bn_Md&tl hfits O uIii. 3 37 413 3n 2m5 24 P on 33 on 33 33 IIS 3n P 3 . on la bet 4I £ag vutrei3e 3332 2429 2439* Int e e* e * t * .9* 3* * pipmt u 13 I2 3 9 3 3 5 2 o It 132 is n * It 332 55 to.tl IM l5i 22 e I2 132 55 22 e 1474 n7 0 go 'O3 25 22 5 It 132 Ibwatt96cuts 55 22 * If 232 55 22 e P'e D 33 79 37 7t it N la 7t 37 7t 7 3 erati2u.3ai2et.act 3 44 34 104 234 7i lt 7 7 7t If t 144 IN4 I" 4 134I4 I"4 234 234 I34 I"4 tr~t I I I 124 24 IN4 134 13 I I I 2 I I I I I I .Eficvweplv 3 3 4 4 4 I I I I I I 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 totald e as t73 t7e 113 I' 4 4 4 4 total I3317 178 371 313 I1 3n II3 IN I13 I7 adjste by S 112 at 26 269 16t2 3 In 173 31 totalcest, to 3o to lU5 to to to to 69 3o 1H 339 I362 1643 9W af too 332 22 369 369 21 6t9 to 31 224 Of t6 to 33 224 I2 tH UP jdelatir 37.3 I6.7 15.2 9.7? t4 Totalcats is 1OM5prices I7 21231 t23 97 l9 lo6t 1 224 I3l9 69 3 32 224 I91 16 toI 331 224 391 to lit lecrmotu bUeith -3H7 -3923 -15319 4 56 -16 502 7 622 64 i2n S 2 579 612 34 623 352 o 6U2 64 a).\. potolwsmly. tlru.2, O"e Om,&we Ia, Tsrote. 5 wamattrtbtte to E rs. el 'apwt pWity wet f pricttt a- 14 rderfw. whrt fda dlimal i I9. 3 lows lsrI Atm Iewlgpt at kaudit whe d blidisg. post Oft, Apri 25. Of qlSputjt fIwOtlm SW omltt tte, #"oI SW *iKeeltum UN, rWtiate to wret attribttd W a" podts OD D f3 st.dm3 coopm"sin 9ctw of O.95. (M2.
O10 MAP SECTION \ v
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