THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN MIGRANTS IN SRI LANKA

DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF ila^ter of $t)ilos(apt)p IN POblTIGAb SGIENGE

BY VASUNDHARA SHARMA

Under the Supervision of Dr. Naheed Murtaza Khan

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE ALIGARM MUSLIM UNIVERSITY ALIGARH (INDIA) 1990 J^t,4l0'-M^

DS1809

"TT < i h;;^ Jvi ^ '^ . V. .i- *^ A. ^8 Or. Naheed Plurtaza Khan Reader „, CPublic : 26720 ncp.irliiii-nt of Politicil Scioncc phones : { . „ , fUni. : 266

6.12,1990

This is to certify that Wisa yasundhara

^harma has prepared her d.Phil dissertation on

"THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN HIGRANTS IN SRI UNKrt"

under my supervison. The work is original and,

in my opinion, suitable, for submission for the

evaluation.

Nah^ ttaza Khan parvisor I am highly grateful to Dr. A.P. Sharma for motivation-' to Drc Naheed Murtaza Khan for kind help and valuable guidance* to Dr. A.F. Usmani, Mr. M. Subrahmanyam, Dr. Akhtar Majeed and Dr. T.A. Nizami for encouragement; to all the staff members of Maulana Azad Library and Indian Council of World Affairs Library, Sapru House, New Delhi for providing all required material; and to all others, who helped me, directly or indi­ rectly in the preparation of this work. CONTENTS

Page

Ac know ledge Tie nts .•• ••• ^ii

Preface ...... v-vii

Map of Sri Lanka ...... vili

CHAPTER - I SRI LANKAiAN INTRODUCTION ... 1-18

(A) Physical Features .•• 3-4

(B) Historical Retrospect ... 4-11

(C) Demographic and Geographic Characteristics 11-18

CHAPTER - II THE POLITICAL PROBLEM-.CITIZENSHIP 19-39

CHAPTER - III THE ETHNIC PROBLEMS 40-64

(A) Problem of Language ••' 41-48

{ B) Problem of Higher Education & Employment 48-56

(C) Problem of Colonisation of Tamil Areas 57-59

(D) Others . . • 59-64

CHAPTER - IV SRI LANKAN ATTITUDE 65-91

(A) Governmental Attitude 66-80

(B) Tamil Response 80-89

(C) Sinhala Response •• 89-91

CHAPTER - V INDIAN ATTITUDE 92-109

CONCXUSION 110-112

BIBLIOGRAPHY 113-117 P R S F A C S

The South Asian societies are basically multi-ethnic societies. Therefore» it is natural that an ethnic community asserts its status as a nationality and may create social and political conflicts in the given system. Sri Lanka is no excep­ tion to it. The continued violence/ in which scores of lives are being lost every day* is edging convulsion. In this study, I have highlighted the problems of Tamil-speaking community, specially the Indian migrants, who migrated to Sri Lanka during last two centuries. They are victims of repressive policies of successive governments of Sri Lanka. Other Tamil speaking people, who migrated to Sri Lanka about 2000 years ago, are also suffering from the discrimination by the majority community, i.e. the VI

Sinhalese. Their victimization created a lot of problems. India is not unconcerned with their problems as they are of Indian origin. The people of India are also very synpathetic and senti­ mental towards them. This political and cultural ethos of India and the Indian people towards the intensity of problems led me to work on the problems of these migrants.

This dissertation is a library research based upon his­ torical analytical, speculative and apriori approach and formal, descriptive-taxonomic and normative-prescriptive method. In Chapter I, efforts have been made to introduce Sri Lanka in historical, geographical and demographical respects. Chapters II and III deal with the problems, the migrants are facing, as such . These are divided in two categories, the political and the ethnic. The main political problem was the question of grant of citizenship to Tamils of Indian origin in Sri Lanka. Now this problem has been resolved amicably by the two countries. But the ethnic problems linger on.

Chapters IV and V unfold the attitudes adopted by Sri Lanka and India on the problems of the Tamils in Sri Lanka. The aggravation of the ethnic conflict and the prospects of finding a political solution receding to the background, the relations between the two countries have worsened. I have tried vii to explain and analyse various problems and their solutions available in Acts, Pacts, talks and documents of Sri Lankan and Indian governments. The study also relies upon the sdiolarly researches* papers and contributions to newspapers, >V debt to all of them has been acknowledged in the footnotes at the end o£ each page.

.^,

9th November 1990 (VASUNDHARA SHARMA) ValvenithuTi /!^nl<5!?a|^P.,i', VADXMARACHCHI

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SRI LAIMKA

Mi INDIAN OCEAN Scale 1:2.500,000 1

SRI LANKA : AN INTRODUCTION

The links between India and Sri Lanka are* indeed/ unique. Besides being neighbours, there is a direct linkage between the peoples of Sri Lanka and India, ©le two dominant Sri Lankan communities, the Sinhalese and Tamil •> both owe their origin to India. The Sinhalese came from Eastern India thousands years ago and the Tamils from South India simulta­ neously. Other group of Tamils from South India went to Sri Lanka in l9th and first half of 20th century as workers in coffee and tea plantation. Former Tamils are called Sri Lankan Tamils, others are Indian Tamils. Although the ancestors of both the coromuiities hailed from India, they speak different languages, have their own distinctive cultures and follow different faiths. The island is a small one. Two communities. wishing to preserve their individual idaitities have, however, over the centuries been in conflict.

The main problem concerning the Indian Tamils was the problem of citizenship, as they were decitizenised in 1948, Simply/ they were asked to leave the island/ which was a big injustice towards them. Nowhere in the world/ have a vtoole people grandparents, parents, youth, children - been told that they must get out. These people have lived there/ not for some few years but for two or three generations; they know no other place. When the Sri Lankan Tamils also became victims of atrocities of Sri Lankan policies/ the whole Tamil speaking community (including both the Sri Lankan Tamils and the Tamils of Indian origin) Joined hands. The degrada~ tion of man in Sri Lanka began as a rift within the instrument as between the resident Sinhalese and the 'imported Tamils', The beautiful, pearl-shaped island republic of Sri Lanka is now torn apart by internal conflicts intersecting at several/ 2 political/ geographical and emotional points. What exactly has led to this state? To understand and analyse this complex sitviation/ it is necessary to understand the country's

1. Menon, N.C.,"Solving the Sri Lankan Tangle/' in The Hindustan Times, 12 November 1986, 2. Sengvpta, Bhabani, "Eyeless in Lanka" The Hindusij^an Times, 11 August 1989. historical/ demographical and geographical characteristics,

A. Physical Featureg' •

The island of Sri Lanka lies in the Indian Ocean 20 miles off the Southern coast of India between the northern latitudes 5^55' and 9 50* and the eastern Icaagitudes 79 42' and 8l°52'. The total land area is 65# 609.88 square kilometres. The maximum length of the island is 353 kilometres and at its widest point it measures 183 kilometres. Lying some 400 miles north of the equator, the island is a detached portion of the mainland of India, a part of its vast southern plateau. This nearness to India has affected considerably the course of her history as it has opened her for the influence of currents of thoughts and feelings from India and has provided her ruling dynasties. Ubfortunately, she had to pay for these, by frequent invasions v^ich greatly damaged her material civilization.

The economy of the couitry is based on agriculture. Rice is the main food crop. Since tea, rubber and coconut are grown extaisively, Sri Lanka is a leading exporter of these commodities. Due to the close proxinity of the two nations, whereby India, being an industrialized nation

1. Navasivayam, S., The Legislatures of Cevlon. p. 1, among the world's developing covjntries# is a convenient source of si^jply for many of the items that Sri Lanka needs.

Strategically also, Sri Lanka is very important. Dr. p. Saran writes, "Ceylon is half way house between the East and the West. Its position in the Indian Ocean has proved favourable and today Colombo is an important port of call for all steamships that cross the Indian ocean from East to West and vice versa via the Suez Canal". Mr. Senanayake in his statement on defence in the House of Representatives also reiterates, "we are in a specially dangerous position because we are in one of the strategic highways of the world. The covntry which captures Ceylon could dominate the Indian Ocean".

B. Historical Retrospect;

The complexities of the island's ethnic conflict go deep into the history. "By whom Ceylon was originally peopled is a question which is very much involved in obscurity/

1. Saran, P.* Government and politics of Sri Lanka, (New Delhi, 1982) , p. 2. 2. Jacob, Lucy M., Sri Lanka t From Dominion to Republic, (New Delhi, 1973), p. 23. and we fear, can never be satisfactorily solved". Sri Lanka's population had from the beginning tvioethnic streams, the Tamils and the Sinhalese. The Sinhalese came from the north and the east of India during the third and the fourth centuries B.C. About the same time or perhaps a little later, there was emigration, in periodic waves, of the Dravadian people from the South of India. Still earlier, there were people who had come in from East and West APia, Sri Lanka being a vital point in the sea route linking South­ east Asia with the eastern mediterranean.

Buddhist legends and mythology have the story of prince Vijaya, who founded dynasty of Sinhalese Klxigs, •Sinhala' being the name of a powerful tribe of the early In do-Aryan Immigrants frcm northern India, who went to Ceylon in the fifth century B.C. The Indian link gained a special sanctity when prince Mahendra, son of Emperor Ashok, took the message of the Buddha to Sri Lanka. The Buddhist chronicle 'KAHAVANSA', from which Sri Lanka's early history is traced, sanctified this all. Also traced to Mahavansa is the growth of a second current of immigrants from India, this time from the South. According to it, in the second

1. Chitty, Simon Casie, Cevlon Gazetteer. New Delhi, 1989 (first published in Ceylon in 1834), p. 51. century B.C., Tamil invaders reached Southwards and conquered the Anuradhapura Kingdoiti.

History during the subsequent centuries was different in regard to Indo-Sri Lanka contacts. The break in the links with north India meant for the Sinhalese a certain measure of cultural isolation. Now, their language and their religion were their own to guard and to preserve without any kind of backing frcm abroad. This situation tended to promote signs of Sinhalese ethnocentricity. This impulse was possibly stressed by an awareness that the Tamils of the northern areas could, because of proximity, continue their links with South India. For the Tamils, although smaller in number and with extremely limited natural resources, this latent source of strength tended to build for them a sense of confidaice to withstand any possible assault from the South of Sri Lanka.

Colonial Pepio^: Against such polarization of the co\xitry# the entry of the European colonialists created an altogether new situa­ tion. The Portuguese were the first to come from the West, in 1505, followed by the Dutch in 1658, The Dutch were

1. Ramaswamy, p., New Del^i and Sri Lanka i Pour Decades of Polj.tics and DiplOfnacv, (New Del hi. 1^87^ . p. 5. invited to Ceylcjn by the able and ambitious King of K^ndy* Rajasinyha - II (183 5-1887), who had been brought up in the Portuguese tradition, but who had not received frcrn the Portuguese all he wanted."^ The British came during early 19th century. The impact generated by these colonial powers brought about many changes. For the first time the British brought the island uider a unified structure and centralized adninistratico. This tended to integrate Tamil areas into the governmental structure of a Uhited Ceylon. On the other hand, unlike in India, local government institutions were slow to develop and often almost noo-existent. Thus, at independence, new rulers inherited a workable machinery for governing the whole country, while the minority et^mic and religious groups found no institutional framework within which to organise themselves, even in the areas where they were dominaTifc. The British failed to prepare the natico for self-rule when they left it in 1948 by not recognising adequately enough its separateness in terms of national and cultural components. And successive governments In free Sri Lanka ccnipounded the problem by ignoring the realities of the couitry's composition exactly as the British had done. Sri Lanka, today, is a continuation of the political system, the British left behind.

1. Collins, Charles, public Adninis,;tyat^op In Cevlon, p. 6. 8

The first immigrants went to Sri Lanka some 150 years ago, when the British transformed the island's subsistence agriculture. The British found the Sinhalese smart, handsome and companionable, but so far as their performance in terms of their work output was concerned/ they were indifferent and unaccountable. The Tamils, on the other hand» were clever, hard-working and dependable and, therefore, efficient employees. So, the Tamils were brought in, first by the British as administrative personnel because they were better educated and trained in bureaucratic "clerkdom** and had no local axe to grind and were thus no security risk to the Raj. Secondly, thousands of Tamils were btrought in as tea garden labour because once again, they had field experience in 2 India's South. Mr. Gopal Gandhi writes in his novel 'Refuge', "Defeated by their gamble with the monsoons at home, they decided to gamble with their fortunes overseas",^

1. Ramaswamy, P., op.cit., p. 103» 2. Mencai, N.C., "Solving the Sri Lanka Tangle", in T*he Hindustan Times. 12 November 1986. 3. Gandhi, Gopal, Refuge (Novel). Delhi, 1989, p. 3. This novel is based on encoiwters with a large number of Plantation workers during writer's four years? stay in Kandy between 1978 and 1982, as First Secretary in the Assistant High Commission of India. Hence the plantation eccnomy of CeylOD was built upon the basis of an alliance of British capital and Indian Tamil labour. These develcptnents led to an economic migration. Economic Migration roust be understood as applying not only to the migrant workers themselves but also to members of their 2 families accompanying them.

In the early years, the numbers ranged between 30,CX)0 and 60,000 including women and children. But when the coffee plantations became well-organised* the system of 'indentured labour*, by which the planters entered into contracts with the people who worked as agents to brii^ in labour from India, came into existence. These agents got fees from both sides. It was only in the late seventies and eighties of 19th coatury, when the coffee plantations were destroyed by a blight, that Ceylon turned to tea and the flow of Indian labour increased and became better organised. By 1931, the Indian Tamil immi­ grants outnvrobered the Sri Lankan Tamils, and together, the two Tamil groins comprised some 2594 of the country's population.

1. Jacob, LucyM., Sri Lanka : Frcm pominion to Republic, (New Delhi, 1973) , p. 12. 2. International Mi aralpion. Studies and Reports News Series, No. 54, lX,(y , Geneva J35"9^ p, 2. 3. Raroaswamy, p., op.cit., p. 35. 10

Soon the British began the colooial game of playing one section off against the other to ensure their hegemcny. The most successful way to alineate a groi^) of people is to get them to administer another and more indigenous groip. That was precisely what the British managed to do in Sri Lanka. When rising population began to put pressure on avai­ lable jobs* the outsiders began to stand out in greater relief/ adding to the resaitment of the local populatico« After all, an economic base for psychological reactions has not been an uncommon phenomenon throughout the world. The colonial period saw the emergence of a stronger sense of ethnic Identity among both Sinhalese and Tamils,

Though island's economy changed remarkably with ti^ plantation economy/ but social scientist reviewed the histo­ rical impact of this situation as a "nasty legacy which/ despite numerous commcn ties and interests, has vitiated Indo-Sri Lanka relations without respite ever since indqpen- dence. Indian emigration had assumed the size of a world problem on account of British imperial interests".

There are two more aspects of the colonial impact. y.4gs.ti,Y* by the twentieth century, education in English had

JbijS., pp, 3^-37, 11

become the key factor for access to the higher posts in governnent services. Because of numerous Christian mission schools, teaching in English medium in the Jaffna peninsula, the Sri Lankan Tamils secured a lead in their knowledge of the English language. Secondly, the process of constitutio­ nal development in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had its impact on the elite among the Sinhalese and the Tamils.

The evidence of Sinhala-Tamil differences were mani­ fest well before and during the time of the transfer of power, yet, unlike the rest of British South A3ia, the comtry suffered no violence. The new state emerged in an atmosphere of ccmparative peace and harmony, to the extent that Sri Lanka came to be referred to as the 'model colony*. During national movement in Ceylcn, indeed the Hindu Tamils were in minority, but they were advised by Indian natiora lists, particularly by Nehru, to join hands with the Sinhalese Buddhist majority to present a uiited front against the British to win the ind^endence.

C. Demographic and Geographic Characteristics: Most of the South Asian States have multi-ethnic character. Many of the ethno-linguistic groi;^s which co-exist

1. Pandey, B.N. South And S9uth-east Asia, 1945'1979sfcob^fms and Politics (London, 1980) , pp. 12-13. 12 in these states have their own customs and traditions/ which by and large/ guide their life styles and influence their behavioural norms. The inter-ethnic growqp cleavage being basically political, the ethnic conflict is mainly the compe­ tition for power-sharing and its exercise. The continued neglect and mishandling of the initial demands for linguistic accommodation and employment avenues often turn the autono­ mist into secessionist which retards the nation-building process . In South Asia, the case of ffftcdHptfaseMiPakistan , in which the political demands for autonomy of East-pakistan was ultimately driven by repression to secession, is an exampl, e . 1

Plural Structure of the Society;

Sri Lanka has a plural society, a blend of self- aware communities distinguished from one another along ethnic, religious or linguistic grounds. An island-wide national 2 sense is yet to be effectively evolved" .

Sri Lanka has a total population-of 16,755,000 persons. This population is split into separate ethnic, linguistic

1. Sahdevan/ P. & Nayak, S.C, "Ethnic competition and Nation Building in Sri Lanka* in Dharmdasani M.D (ed.) Sri Lanka :; An Island in Crisis (varanasi, 1988), p. 40, 2. saran P., Government and Politics of Sri Lanka. (New Delhi, 1982)/ p. 6« 13 and religious canminitles. It Is split \2p as follows:

Percentage population

SlnhalBS 74% 12,398,700 Sri Lankan Tamils 12.S4 lesi 3,015,900 Indian Tamils 5.58;

Muslims (Moors) 73C 1,172,850

Others 1% 167,550

Total 1CD% 16,755,000

The Sinhalese, who form the majority, and are prin­ cipally Buddhist and speak Sinhalese, an In do'European language, could further be divided into Kandyan and Low covntry Sinhalese, a distinction which arose out of the different rates at which these two communities developed during the colonial era. The largest community, the low-country Sinhalese, refji;:esent the most subject to European influence. The majority of Chris­ tians belong to this community. Its geographical spread is from North Western province to southern province. A large part of them live under urban influence. The I^odyan Sinhalese are

1. Mairo, David (ed) Chambers world Gazetter;An A-Z Geographical Information, w. fc R. Chambers Ltd., Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 611. 14 those living and inhibiting the inland area of the Kandyan Kingdom which remained independent vaatil 1815. They are almost entirely Buddhist and rural. The Tamils are Hindu and speak Tamil. They also could further be divided into Sri Lankan Tamils and Indian Tamils. Sri Lankan Tamils believe that their ancestors pre-dated the Sinhalese settlers. These early immigrant indigenous Tamils who have idoatified Noirthem and Eastern provinces as their traditional home lands belong to the country in the same way as the Sinhalese. The Indian Tamils were first transported to Sri Lanka from India when Britain ruled both the countries (between 1850-1940) . They are concaitrated in Central areas of Sri Lanka, and are the least privileged of any community.

According to the 1981 census, Tamils, including persons of Indian origin, constitute 9 5.'^ of the population in Jaffna, 89.8?6 in Mullaithivu, 75,2% in Vavixiia, 7256 in Batticaloa and 63.9% in Manwar. In the Nuwa^a Eliya district of the Central province the Indian Tamils comprise 4 7.336 while the Sinhalese are 35.9%, This is the only district where the Indian Tamils have their highest concentration, 2 though they spread all over the island. Sri Lanka has a small

1. Jn>p, James, Sri Lanka t Third World Democracy (Londoh, 1978) , pp. 31-32. 2. Ali Sayed Ashfaq, Indian Overseas (Bhopal, 1984), p. 77. 15 but significant Miislinj population also, categorised into the Ceylon Moors, the Indian Moors ana the Malays. The Ceylon Moors claim to be the descendants of the Arab-traders. The Indian Moors are South Indian traders. The Malay Muslim trace their ancestry to South East Asia, The residual populaticn consists mostly of Burghesc/ Dutch and Portuguese,

Since Sinhalese-Buddhists are politically and socially divided/ and are not sure of their own strength and cohesion, they tend to regard the non-Buddhist minorities, especially the Ceylon and Indian Tamils and Roman Catholics, as a greater threat than they actually are.

Another element vhich promoted the pluralistic charac­ ter of Sri Lankan society, is the religion based division of ccmmuaities. Many invasions and foreign penetrations have left Sri Lanka with a highly complex communal structure. It is the only country in the world with substantial representation from the four major religions of Buddhism, Hinduism, Christia- nity and Islam. 2

1. Wilson, A.J., politics of Sri Lanka t 1947-1979 (2nd edition), London, 1979, p. 58. 2, Jupp* James, op,cit», p. 32, " 16

Population of Sri Lanka by religicn is as follows;

Percentage pcpulaticn

All religions 10C% 16,755,000

Buddhists 69% 11,560,950 Hindus 1S6 2,513,250 Christians ^/i 1,340,400

Musi ims &i> 1,340,400

This shows that Buddhism is the religicn of majority in Sri Lanka, followed by Hinduism, Christianity and Islam, 9 2% of the Sinhalese are Buddhist, 904 of Tamils are Hindus and 9C% of the Christians are Roman Catholic. In other words nine out of ten Sinhalese are Buddhist; nine out of ten Tamils are Hindus; almost all Moors are Muslims; and Christians, although constituting the majority of the Eurasian category, 2 fonn substantial minorities in the other ethnic categories. Whereas in India Buddhism emerged as an urban religion of a merchant-plebein gro^p, in Sri Lanka, almost from its inception, it became predominantly a peasant religion, and persisted in

1. Mvnro, David (ed.) Chambers Wor;Ld Gazetteer; An A-z geographical Information, W fc R, Chambers Ltd. # Cambridge University press, 1988, p, 611. 2. phadnis, lanmila, ReJ.iqj.on and politics in Sri Lanka (New Delhi, 19 76) , pp. 3-6. 3. Saran, P., 9p«cit., p. 5, 17

Sri Lanka even after Buddhism had lost much of its influence in India. ^

As in many other independent 5'hird World cointries, the scenario has a religious dimex^ion to it. It is a part of local history that Buddhism has place of pride. Tamils are not only historic enemies but also pose religious and cultural threats. The paranoid belief that "Buddhism is in 2 danger" is often uttered by Sinhalese. Sadly* the Buddhism in Sri Lanka appears to be not of the "Ahlmsa Paramo Dharma" but of a more violent mutation.

Caste Systemt Another factor responsible for the heterogeneous nature in the Sri Lankan population is the prevailing caste system. Since no census of Sri Lankan castes has been taken in this century, the size of the caste grovps can only be estimated. However, it is generally argued that the Sinhalese caste structure is dominated* hierarchically and numerically by the Qoyigama (cultivators) caste* which comprise aboiib one-half of Sinhalese population. Other castes are of lower status.

1. Baxter* Craig and others* Govemmept and ppj.itic5y ±n Sri ;.anka ( Lahore -* 19 %B) * pp. 3-6. 2. JiJ^p* James* op.cit. . p. 36. 18

These are the Karawa (flsherm«i) , the Salagaroa (cinnamon peeler) and the Durawa (toddy tapper) .

The Sri Lanka Tamil caste structure is also aominated by the cultivator caste, known as "vellala", which controls the land, economy and politics and enjoys more Opportunities in education and employment. Other important castes include Koriyar (dsmestic servants) , the Karayar and the Mukkuvar 2 (fishing castes) .

AS far as Indian Tamils are concerned, a majority of them belong to lower caste. But the Indian commercial grov:qp mainly from "Chettiar" community has earned thanselves si;qpe- rior status among all the Indian Tamil castes. The structure of caste distinctions in SinVelese areas is much looser than 3 it is in Tamil areas of Sri Lanka. Untouchability is much mor e canmon among the Tamils than it is among the Sinhalese.

****

1. Baxter, Craig, op.cjL^., p, 307. 2. Sahdevan, p./Nayak, S.C. "Ethnic Competition and Nation Building in Sri Lanka" in Oharmdasani, M.D. (ed.) , Syi Lanka ; An Island in Crisis^ (varanasi, 1988) , p. 48. 3. saran. P., Government and Politics ip Spi Lanka (New Delhi, 1982) , p. 7. 2

Chapter - 2

THE POLITICAL PROBLEM ; CITIZENSHIP

Though the problems of Indian migrants# viio include Plantation workers of Indian origin are differoit from the problem of Sri Lankan Tamils* but since both have joined hands for commcxi cause the problems in general cover the Tamil speaking community as a whole. In particular, the main political problem of the Indian migrants is the lack of * citizenship or of statelessness. Other ettnic problems like language* education* emploionent and the settlement of

* In theory, this problem is now almost settled. 20

Sinhalese in Tamil dominated areas are of cxucial relevance to the Tamil community as a whole.

Countries which have succeeded in creating an enduring base for genuine national unity in situation similar to Sri Lanka have done so only by evolving a ao\xx6 framework of inter-racial justice. The first is the sharing of political power and governmental responsibility. This has played a key role in situations where groups have territorial bases. The second is the opportunity for economic development which provides adequate growth and employment to each ethnic gro\;p. The third is the environment for preserving and promoting the cultural integrity of each groi^. Exactly* the main issues which have divided the Sinhalese and the Sri Lankan Tamil commuiities fall into these broad categories. Several writers have directly or indirectly made suggestions concerning the FACTORS that have led to the rift and the nature of the rift itself. For instance, Donald E. Stnith emphasizes that the interaction of politics and religico has led to the rift in Sri Lanka. Michael Roberts, on the other hand seems to place great emphasis on historical factors. He has emphasised the

1. De Silva, C.R., "The Sinhalese - Tamil Rift in sri Lanka" in Wilson, A.J., The States of South Asia (London, 19 78), pp. 170-171. 21 role of the Sinl^aiese ccsncept of Sinhadipa and Dhatnmadlpa emphasising how these old ideas came to be fused with the western concept of a nation-state during the colonial era. He has pointed out that the Sinhalese use the same word for race and nationality. It is difficult to argue that perceptions inherited from history do not contribute to ethnic tensions.

Efforts to underplay the factors of history and cul­ tural tradition and to bring economic factors to the fore have been made by seme radical writers. Marxist and other Left wing writings on the subject emphasise that the conflict over the official language issue had more to do with economic advantages, especially for the Sinhalese* who were educated in their validity in this argument but proponent of this theory often tend to undervalvte the strength of ethnic and religious loyalities and to argue that ethnic conflict will disappear with the advent of a socialist state. Another explanation for the factors which cause the rift was advanced by James Manor, who suggests that the failure of politicians on both sides to arrive at a political accoinroodatioo is due In part to the lack of political integration in Sri Lanka.^ Political integration is defined as the establishment of a two way connection between the elite and the mass.

1. ibi^^ 22

It might be stated that the factors which created and widened the Sinhalese-Tamil rift since independence were ccxnplex. History and tradition resulting in inter-groip suspicions have provided some barriers to accommodation. The slow growth of economy worsened tensions among the groups seeking to share limited wealth and resources. The weakness of the political structure and of political organization no doubt contributed to increase the conflict. Multi-racial, multi-religious and mv^lti-lingual Sri Lanka had known free and fair election with universal adult franchise since 1931. But soon after independence Sinhala nationalism directed its hostility at the Tamil minority, perhaps out of a perceived fear of being swamped by India, the big neighbour across the Palk straits. Whatever the reasons for Sinhaia belligerence, the first group to be victimised was the immigrant labour, mostly Tarn it-speaking, the British had brought in from India to run the island's plantations. They were disfranchised and deprived of citizenship. Then the attack was turned on the ethnic Tamils in the Northern and Eastern provinces. And from 19 56, the drive for Sinhala-Buddhist svpreroacy was further aggravated through linguistic, educational, religious, land colonisation and other policies, all designed to margi­ nalise the Tamils. 23

CltizenshipL The first major conflict that arose in the newly independait nation was over citizenship of the Indian Tamils. The soulbury Constitution (which was drafted by Lord Soulbury in 1948) did not define citizeiship of Ceylcm. when the British left/ the island had Sinhalaj, Ceylcm Tamils, Indian Tamils, Burghers, Ceylon Moors (Muslims) and Tamil-speaking Muslims.'^ The majority of the island's population was Sinhala on ethnic and language lines and Buddhist by religion. Indeed, Buddhism is very much identified with Sinhala ethnicity in Sri Lanka. Kunari Jayawardene, a radical historian who is a Sinhala says this ideology assumed that the island was the land of the Sinhala-Buddhists and# therefore, all other groups inhabiting it were aliens out to exploit its people. 2 The Sinhala-Buddhist ideology flowed from three preroisess The Sinhaias were the original and true inhabitants of the island and the others were usurpers. Secondly/ the Sinhala- Buddhists see Sri Lanka as a blockaded island with no one oxitside to look for help. Thirdly, Sinhalese believed that they have a special relationship to Buddhism/ having been chosen and ordered by the Buddha to protect the faith.

1. Mohan Ram, Sri Lanka ; The Fractured Island, (New Delhi, 1989) / p. 36. 2. Ibi,^, / p. 82. 24

Due to these reasons, the largest non-Sinhala groxap, the Tamils, were seen as an immediate threat to the Sinhala identity. Anong the early enactments of the multi-ethnic, but Sinhala-doroinated, United National party's (IKP) government were the Acts to deprive most residents of Indian origin of their right to citizenship and franchise. Sri Lanka's political leadership contended that despite their Icng resi­ dence in the island* the immigrants did not belong to it and had a live interest in the couatry of their origin and were, therefore, aliens. But India thought ttiey were or ought to be Sri Lankan nationals.

Thus very early in life of the new state* three laws came into force : the Ceylonese citizenship Act of 1948, the Indian and Pakistani Residents (citizensh^) Act of 1949 and the pari iamaitary Elections (Amendment) Act of 19 49. All three taken together effectively removed the vast majority of Indian Tamils from the electoral registers. A million Tamil plantation workers who had toiled for the prosperity of the island for more than a century were disfranchised. Indeed they were robbed of their basic hunan rights and rendered stateless. The Act of 1948 provided that citizenship would

1. Subramanya, T.R., "problem of Stateless in Intematicaial Law" in International studies, \tol. 26, No. 4, Oct.-Dec. 1989, p. 346. 26 be aeterminea either by descent or by stringent conditions of registration. There was no provision for citizenship by- birth or by virtue of the country's rnanbership of the British Commonwealth. In this way, the Acts of 19 48 and 1949 had created a very different situation. The people of Indian origin in Ceylon had become divided into different categories such as citizQis by descent and by registration/ people holding permanent residence permits and those with temporary residence permits etc. Both the Indian and the Sri LanJcan governments also found that b«cause of travel restrictions, the problem of "illicit immigration" either way had also developed.

Further* the Senanayake government disfranchised the •stateless' immigrants, through the Pariiaraeatary Blections (Amendnent) Act of 1949, restricting voting rights to citizens (They were re-franchised only fn 1989) . It was dane because the IKP government feared that the Indian Tamils, if allowed to continue as a political force might someday join hands with the indigenous Tamils to create a problem for the majority oommvnity.

U Ramaswamy, P., New Delhi and Sri Lanka t Four Decades of politics and Diplomacy/ (New Delhi, 19 87) , p. 50» 26

The plantation labour haa voted at every election. 100,000 of them had been registered when adult franchise was introduced in 1931 and the nunber rose to 145,000 In 1936. A 1946 order had provided that every British subject resident in the island for six months or who was otherwise qualified could vote and hold office. But now non-citizens could not vote. Therefore, the proporticwi of the Tamils, who had 33% of the voting power in the legislature in 1948, had come down 2 to 2054, The Sinhalese wc« a two-thirds majority in parliament rendering the Tamils helpless and unable to block Sinhala policies affecting them.

L^to 1950, there were seven Indian members from the Kandyan plantation areas in the Sri Lanka parliament. The Indian and Pakistani citizenship Act 1949 and the election rules came thereafter depriving plantation labour of Indian origin 3 of their franchise. The following figures show the effect:

1. Mohan Ram, op. c^t., pp. 36-37, 2. Ibid.. p. 82. 3. Ramaswamy, p., op.cit., p. 237. 27

s. Constit uencies NO. of voters in No. of voters No. of Plan­ NO. (Kandyan Area) 1947 elections after the re­ tation Tamil vision of 19 50 voters after revision of 1950

1. Nuwara Eliya 24,295 9,279 nil 2. Talawakele 19 ,299 2,914 244 3. Katagele 17,092 7,738 137 4. Nawalapitiya 22,580 9,935 675 5. Maskeliya 24,427 8,691 203

6. Heputala 11,123 7,049 322 7. Badulla 43,396 28,134 1,291

There was no more any question of Indians (settlers of Indian descent) representing Kandyan Sinhalese in the Sri Lankan parliament, mese measures were openly racist. The Indian Tamils were immediate target. The statements made by elected officials at this time increased the fears of the minorities.

Gopal Gandhi writes in his novel 'Refuge', "their disfranchisement" father Gio said, "is unbelievable. It is indefensible. This comtry won its freedom in 1947 and within two years denied that very freedom to almost a tenth of its peculation. Hundreds of thousands were made stateless and 28 they are asked to go to India. To Indi^lwhy not to Timbuctoo? What is India to them? A distant memory of granc%)arents. Are there many instances of such all rouid deprivation among peoples?" These Tamils (both Sri Lankan and Indian) have played a crucial role in the improvement of the economy of the island and they would naturally like 2 to live there as full citizens.

The Indian Tamil citizenship issue did not at that time create a rift between the respective influential secticns of Sri Lankan Tamils and Sinhalese- The Tamil congress led by G.G. pounambalam continued to work as part of the government. But gradually the Sri Lankan Tamils feared that it woxild extend to them in some other form. Consequently, a section of the Tamil congress broke away under the leadership of S.J.V. Chelavanayakam and formed the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi (in strict translation, the Ceylon Tamil State party) or the Federal party. He said, "Today justice is being d«:iied to Indian Tamils. Some day in the futur'e, when language becomes 3 the issue, the same would befall the Ceylon Tamils". His words were prophetic. And in the first party convention in

1. Gandhi, Gopal, 'Refuge' (Delhi, 1989), p. 67. 2. Kiishra, P.K., South ^ia in International politics, (Delhi, 1984) , p. 214. 3. Mohan Ram, Sri Lanka t The Fractured Island, (New Delhi, 1989) , p. 37. 29

19 51, it was declared that, "The Tamil speaking people in Ceylon constitute a nation distinct from that of the Sinhalese by every fundamental test by nationhood".

Initially the Indian 90vemment led by Jawahar Lai Nehru was inclined to cc«isider most of the labourers as Sri Lankan nationals. On the other hand/ D.S. Senanayake, the prime Minister of Sri Lanka, did not favour granting Sri Lankan citizenship to the entire labour force of Indian origin working on the estates. The Indian constitution which caroe into force in 1950 already laid down qualifications for the Indian citizenship. The divergent approaches of the two goverrwents to the political status of the persons of the Indian origin, ultimately rendered a sizable section of the Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka as "stateless" persons.

Nehru and Senananayake met in London in 19 51 for talks. Further in January and October 1954^ there were Nehru-Kbtelwala pacts in New Delhi, These were significant attempts by the leaders to resolve this human problem. However/ these efforts did not result in any fruition. According to an estimate made in September, 1962, the 1954 Agreement settled the status (as

1. Kearney, Robert N., Comjnxjnalisro and LanquB^q<^ in the politics of Cevlon, (Durham, N. CarolIna, 1967) , pp.93-94. 30

Ceylon or Indian Nationals) of two lakhs of peqple of Indian origin while the total number of these people was nearly ten lakh. About 8 lakhs were left as 'stateless*. The bulk oc the estate labour as they were born in Ceylon, qualified for the Ceylon citizenship under Ceylon laws. But it became a practice to turn down every application for Ceylon citizenship of these emigrant labourers and their families as the slightest evidence of the applicant having maintained any contact with India. AS a result« so many hundred thousands were not Indian citizens under Indian laws, and if they were not recognised at any given moment in time as citizeos of Ceylon, they were stateless persons.

In 1964, the Indian and the Ceylon governments estimated 2 that there were 975,000 'stateless* persons in the island. To resolve this problem, the Prime Ministers of two countries, Mrs.. Sirimavo Bhandarnaike of Sri Lanka and Mr, Lai B«hadur Shastri of India signed an Agreement in October 19 64, which is commonly known as 'Srimavo-Shastri Agreement* . According to this Agreement, it was decided that Ceylon and India would divide the 'stateless* persons in a 4;7 proposition, i.e. for every four persons accepted by Ceylon, India would take seven

1. Raroaswamy, p., op.cit. , pp. 58-59, 2, Mohan Ram, op.cit., p. 111. 31

back. In effect, Ceylon was to give citizenship to 30CJ000 persons, while India was to accept 525,000 in a period of fifteen years slowly. The status of the 150,OoO left out in the sharing exercise was to be decided later. Natural increase in the stipulated number for repatriation to India and grant of Ceylon citizenship respectively, were also covered by ttie agreement.

In a way, this agreement would mean that an enormous nanber of poor people who had beccme aliens in their own homes in India and settled in Ceylcn, would be \xproote6 and put to great hardship if forced back into India. The plight of these people can be understood with the help of these lines of the novel 'Refuge', "And now, when we (plantation labourers) have lost all link with our native land« when we have sent our roots deep into this soil like the tea bushes planted by us, we are told that we do not belong here, that we must go back to India, that if we stay on here, we w;Lll teve no rights,Is

2 ^• this fair? Is this just?"

The Indian government has shown sympathy and utmost consideration in accepting the liability of the stateless

1- Ibi^T 2, Gandhi, Gopal, op.cit,, p, 149, 32 persons which it was not obliged to consider. The greater responsibility in the implementation of this all lay with Sri Lanka because of the physical presence of the stateless persons there. But the Lankan Government showed tardiness in the implementation of the terms of the agreement due to political factors.

The Ceylon government's enactment to implement the agreement took effect in 19 68 and following this the two governments invited applications for citizenship. While 700,000 opted for Ceylonese citizenship (the agreement provi­ ded for Ceylon accepting only 300,000) , only 400,OoO sought Indian citizenship despite India having committed itself to taking 52 5,000 back as repatriates. Ceylon insisted on following the 4j7 ratio and took only 225,000 of the 700,000 who had opted for Ceylonese citizenship while India accepted all the 400,000, who had opted for its citizenship. So, in addition to the 150,OoO stateless people whose fate had not been decided when the agreement wa9 signed/ there were a further 200,000 for whom there was no place in either country.

In January 1974, the Sri Lankan prime Minister, Sirimavo Bhandaranaike and Indian Prime Minister, Smt. Indira Gandhi, signed an agreement to decide the fate of 150,000

1. Mohan Ram, op.cjL^., pp. 111-112. 33 perscns (as it was decided at the time of 1964 agreement, would be looked after in a supplementary agreement) . This agreement decided that the 150,000 would be divided equally between the two countries. But these agreements and enactments did not solve the problem of the other stateless Tamils/ mainly, those who had opted for Ceylcn in 19 64 but had not been granted citizenship. By further agreement the period of validity of the agreement was extended to 1981.

In January 1986, the Sri Lankan parliament - as a result of growing pressure from Minister S. Thondaman and his Ceylon worker's Congress (CWC) - enacted legislation for the benefit of the citizenship applicants. Also, in 19 86 Sri Lanka and India entered into an accord on the stateless Tamils in the Island. According to an official announcement, India will proceed with the process of conferring citizenship oa 85,000 Tamils of Indian origin who applied for Indian citizenship prior to October 30, 1981. The Sri Lankan government will sijnultaneously take action, both legislative and executive, to grant citizenship to all remaining Stateless Tamils of Indian origin. According to the Indian estimates, this will entail Sri Lanka conferring citizenship on a total of 469,000 persons

1. Kodikara, Shelton U., Foreigp policy of Sri Lankat A Third Worl^ Perspective (Delhi, 1982) , p. 35. "" 34

and tbe natural increase. This figure includes those who have already been granted Sri Lankan citizenship.

There are according to Sri Lankan estimates, 94,000 stateless persons of Indian origin who are leftover from the Indian quota of 600,OOO under the 1964 Agreement. These persons had failed to apply for Indian citizenship prior to October 30, 1981 in the hope of being given Sri Lankan citi­ zenship,Thus, this nunber will now be added to the Sri Lankan quota of 375,000,^ The Sri Lankan government also issued a statement announcing its decision to confer Sri Lankan citi­ zenship on residual nanbers of stateless Tamils of Indian origin.

These steps were opposed by the Buddhist leaders and also the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) . Though agreement was there, yet the actual implementation again got stuck in various committees and sub-committees of the government, and only about 3 20,000 were in fact granted citizenship. Apart from a lack of enthusiasm at various levels of government especially among the predominantly Sinhalese bureaucracy, there were practical

1. Sinh, Rai,"Dimensions of Indo-Sri Lanka Relations" in Dharmdasani, M .D. (ed.) , Sri Lanka i.JSn_,l8land in Crisis, (varanasi, 1988), p. 102. 2. I-bid., 3. Tikku, M.K., "Citizenship for Tamils", in The Hindustan Times, 21 October 1988. ' 35-5^ difficulties as well. Many of the beneficiaries were not in possession of enough evidence to press their claim/ others had moved places in the intervening years and were not easily traceable, and still others were not responding due to illi­ teracy cind lack of awareness.

By 1988, India had granted citizenship to 422,OoO people of Indian origin, Sri Lanka, in turn was obliged to grant citizenship to 468,000 people of Indian origin and also other remaining stateless persons. However, till November 1988, only 238,000 people had been granted citizenship by Sri Lanka, another 230,000 were left stateless.

To end this problem Sri Lanka parliament approved a bill 2 in Novenber 1988 , which conferred citizenship on over 268,000 Tamil plantation workers, and also the rights and privileges

1. Times of India, 13 October 1988. 2, Approved by the Sri Lanka Cabinet on 12 October, 1988 and by the parliament of Sri Lanka on 9 November, 1988 (Times of India, Nov. 11, 1988) . The relevant portion of the bill reads as foilowsj "Notwithstanding any other law, every person who (a) is of Indian origin lawfully resident in Sri Lanka; (b) is neither a citizen of Sri Lanka nor of India and (c) has not at any time applied or been included in an application to the Indian High Commissic« in Sri LSnka for the grant of Indian citizenship shall have the status of citizen of Sri Lanka with effect from the date of commencement of this Act and shall be entitled to all the rights and privileges to which the other citizens of Sri Lanka are entitled by law." 37 which the other citizens of Sri Lanka enjoyed. It was done to get Tamil votes(for presidential election) that Mr. Thondaroan and his Ceylon worker's Congress (CWC) controls. On a rough reckoning, it was assumed that Mrs. Sirimavo Bhandarnaike and Mr. R. premadasa will split the Sinhalese votes between them almost equally, it would be the minority \ote that may decide the outcome and given the general indifference of the Sri Lankan Tamil of the North-east in that situatiion, it were the Indian Tamils who would tilt the balance.

Prom the very beginning the problem was complicated. There were many hinderance in the Implementation of citizenship agreements. Now, though this problem is almost solved in theory/ practically it still remains there.

Important among the factors which hindered the implemai'- tation programmes have been divergence of party - political 2 approach towards these agreemoits in Sri Lanka. There has been a basic difference between the two main political parties in Sri Lanka as regards the reciprocity requirement for grant of Sri Lankan citizenship and repatriation to India under the terms of that agreement. Divergent interpretations relating to the 19 64 agreement and delay on Sri Lanka's part in executing it

1. Tikku, M.K., OP.cit.. The Hindustan Times, 2i October 1988. 2. Kodicara, Shelton U., op.cit., pp. 35-37. 38

were among the main political problems which slowed down the implementation of 1964 agreement.

SLFP governments under Mrs. Bhandarnaike strictly adhered to the letter of the agreement stipulating grant of Sri Lanka citizenship to 4 persons for every 7 persons actually repatriated to India. However/ when the government of Dudley Senanayake of UMP (1965-70) belatedly enacted the Indo-Ceylon Agreement Implementation Act in-mid 1967, this stipulation was changed such that it became sufficient to grant Sri Lankan citi­ zenship to 4 persons for every 7 persons registered as Indian citizens, though staying temporarily in Sri Lanka until the date of their repatriation on residence permit. When in 1970* Mrs. Bhandarnaike came back to power, an amendment to Implemen­ tation Act was passed making employment of a temporary residence permit overstay, an offence. The UNP government of J.R. Jayewa; dene, once again restored, by amendment of the Act, raciprocity the grant of Sri Lanka and Indian citizenship respectively, retaining the 4:7 ratio. Residence permit overstays became a nagging problem for successive Sri Lankan governments. Some of the overstays were no doubt caused by delays in payment of Employees provident Fund (EPP) benefits and gratuity by the Sri Lankan authorities. At the same time, Sri Lanka officials have averred that often repatriates are not to be found in the addressffy given by them, and that large sums of EPF are lying 39 unutilized.

Another outstanding problem was that after receiving applications, it was found that approximately 625,000 stateless persons of Indian origin had applied for Ceylon citizenship/ while only 400/000 persons bad applied for r^atriaticn to India. "^ In other words, India had a shortfall of 126,000 to fulfill its targets vnder 1964 agreement, while the applicants for Sri Lankan citizenship were more than twice the number envisaged uider the agreement. So, the citizenship was the biggest problem for the Indian migrants in Sri Lanka, The denial of citizenship for them was direct attack on their feelings. The core, the very pith of the matter is feeling. Feelings of belonging, of association, of sentiments.

**ft«

1. Ibid. 2. Kodicare, Shelton U., OD,cit., p. 36, 3. Gandhi, Gopal, Re^ug^ (Delhi, 1989), p. 175. 3

Chapter - 3

THE ETHNIC PROBLEMS

Various ettmic problems have made Sri Lanka, a battle- grovnd. The citizenship problem was purely a political problem and affected only the Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka. But later on, the ethnic problems like, language, education, employment, regional autonomy, colonisation of Tamil areas by Sinhalese and religio-cultural problems came up, which affected Tamil- speaking community as a whole, including both the Sri Lankan Tamils and Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka, The rigid stand taken by the Sinhalese-dominated governments in the name of ethnocen- tricity has made the situation grave and miserable for the Tamil community. Important of these problems are discussed here in detail. 41

A. Pro-blem of Language; In Sri Lanka, each ethnic grovjp has its own language. The Sinhalese speak Sinhaia language brought to the island by migrants frxxn North India about 25CD years ago. The Tamil is the mother tongue of the Tamils. The Moors speak Tamil. Those who are settled in the Sinhalese areas speak English as well as their mother tongues,

A more specific but less complex issue concerns the language rights of the Tamils. It can be said that discri- minaticwi in ensuring the linguistic rights of minorities/ which include principally the right to education/ manage public affairs and coromunicaticn in their own language/ is one of the essential requisites for the procnoticn of national integration and racial unity. In any plural society/ the minorities are more sensitive towards their linguistic rights as they feel that the preservation of their ethnic identity and cultural and eccnomic development are based on the guaran­ tee of their language rights.

The language issue sprang from the thrust of the nationalist movement itself. Agitation for the use of Swabhasha

1. Sahadevan, p., and Nayak/ S.C., "Ethnic Competition and Nation Building in Sri Lanka", in Dharmdasani/ M.D. (ed.) / Sri Lanka ; An Island in Crisis (varanasi, 1988), p. 51. 42

(by which was meant Sinhala and Tamil) as state languages began in the 1920s. It seemed logical that with independoice the language of the colonial roaster should be replaced in government, administration and education by the language of local people. At independence, all political gro»;ps were cormitted to gradually making Sinhala and Tamil the official languages of the country in place of English. The demand for naticanal languages was reasonable as only 6% of the population were English-educated and the remaining 9454 were more or less alienated from the a

In the beginning agitation was for the use of Swabhasha, which included both Sinhalese and Tamil. But the assault on the language rights of the Tamil minority was to begin soon. Some politicians took the opportunity to ferment the situation. S.W.R.D. Bhandarnaike quit the Uhited National party (UNP) , still led by Anglicised elite, to form the sri Lanka Freedom party (SLFp) in 19 5i. Its orientation was Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism. Radical rhetoric and Sinhala Clfiuvinism were involved by it to win the sipport of the sections of the polity which had no links with the plantatic«> economy that had

1. Jacob, Lucy, M., Sri Lanka ; From Dominion to Republic,. (New Delhi, 1973) , p. 155. 43

produced the Anglicised elite.

The SLFP was too new to be able to make language the issue at the 19 52 elections. This issue got more corrplicated when Prime Minister John Kotelawala sparked a controversy by premising parity of Sinhala with Tamil when English was phased out. The English versus swabhasha deraandr which related to the replacement of a foreign language was more or less accep­ table. But the parity of Sinhala and Tamil concerned the relative status of two indigenous languages. In sum, the Tamil- Sinhala parity issue was substantially more sensitive. At its inception, the SLFP had called for the parity of Sinhala and Tamil, But by the end of 19 55, it was advocating the primacy of Sinhala, as the sole official language in the place of English, and shortly afterwards entered into a coalition with a few smaller parties to form the Ma ha lana Eksath peram una (M.E.P.) . But the UNP was still for parity. So were the main left parties, the Lanka Sama Samaj Pairty (LSSp) and the Communist Party of Ceylon.

The issue began hotting vp as the four years term of the parliament elected in 1952 was ending. The Tamil congress which had settled for responsible co-operation with the ruling

1, Mohan Ram, Sri Lanka ; The Fractured Islapd (New Delhi,1989), p. 38. 44

[JtiP fouid it necessary to end the alliance because there was growing Tamil anxiety over the language issue. All the Tamil Congress ministers and Parliament members resigned because the UNP conference would not discuss issue concerning the Tamil minority or the language issue in particular. The Tamil Congress leaders annouQced a united front to defend the Tamil language and culture and to carry on the struggle for a Tamil state which would offer to federate with the Sliihala state on terms of ccmplete equality.

The year 19 56 was a landnark in the history of Sri Lanka's political development as well ap ethnic conflict. In the 19 56 elections a united frcnt headed by the SLFP led by S.W.R.D. Bhandamaike rode the bandwagon of Sinhala Buddhist resurgence and defeated the ruling IJNP. Thereafter/ Buddhism and the Sinhalese language began to receive government patro­ nage to the detriment of the Tamils.

That year, the Buddhist committee of Enquiry published its report which was a clear indictment of the ruling UNP for its neglect of Buddhist interests. Its recommendations were extremely cammvxial. Besides demanding the creation of a Buddha Sasana (adninistration) it asked for the repeal of the Section

1. Mohan Ram* op.cit.. pp, 38-39 45 in the constitution dealing with protective clauses pertaining to the minorities. The report which was called "Betrayal of Buddhism" was a significant docunent of Buddhist resurgence and became an effective political instrument in the hands of the Buddhist chauvinists. Among the earliest measures of the new government headed by Mr. Bhandaranaike* was the "Sinhala only" Bill in 19 56. This Bill was adopted in the House of Representatives on 15 June 19 56 by 66 votes (peoples united Front, UNP and Independents) to 2 (Lanka Sama Samaj, Federalists and Communists) . The Senate passed the Bill on 6 July by 1 19 to 6. Later on, it was incorporated in the constitution of 19 72. It declared that the Sinhala language shall be the official language of Sri Lanka. Breaking the monopoly of higher education exercised by the English-educated classes, the two Buddhist universities, Vidyodaya and Vidyalankara Pirivenas, were started in 19 59 opening the doors of the University educa- 2 tion to the Sinhalese-educated students.

The Tamils perceived this step as a breach of trust on the part of the leadership of dominant political parties because earlier, both the UNP and the SLPp had supported the substitu­ tion of English by Sinhala and Tamil, This was a severe blow

1. Saran, p.. Government and politics of Sri Lanka (New Delhi, 1982) , p. 11. 2. Jacob, Lucy M., op,cit., p. 156. 46 to Tamil interests/ and caused much resentment among them. Thv£/ vvith the induction of mass politics and the demise of English as the official language, the phase of Sinhalese- Tamil ccmpetitive co-existence moved into a phase of ethnic conflict.

In early 19 57, tension and violence increased. The Federal party, headed by Chelavanayakam, decided to launch a civil disobedience movement to press for parity. After nego­ tiations with prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bhandamaike, the Bhandarnaike-Chelavanayakaro Pact was signed on 20 July 19 57. In it, Tamil was recognised as the 'language of a national minority', it would be a 'Language of administration' in the northern and eastern provinces without prejudice to Sinhala as the official language. Pro-Sinhalese organizations protested against the pact and it was promptly abrogated by Bhandaroaike, in 19 58.

With this, the mutual suspicion between the two commu­ nities assuned a sharper edge. The Federal party issued a statement on lO ^ril 19 58 calling x^jon all Tamil-speaking people to embark on a non-violent civil disobedience movement in order to receive an honourable place in the community for themselves and their language.

1. Saran, p., op.city, p. 11. 47

in 19 65, Chelavanayakaro entered into a new pact, this time with Dudley Senanayake. But this pact also fomd its way into the dustbin of history. The first Republican constitu­ tion of Sri Lanka of 19 72 also did not contain adequate pro­ visions for safeguarding the interests and language of the Tamil minority. Consequently, the Tamil canmunity, which had all along stood for regicxial autonomy under a federal consti­ tution, began to demand the establishments 6f a separate Tamil state.

As the situation was deteriorating day by day, the second Republican constitution of Sri Lanka of 19 78 tried to improve the status of Tamil language as it declared Tamil a netional language alongwith the Sinhala after retaining latter as the only official language of the country. But again, when discriminatory standards based on language were applied to the Tamil students seeking entry to iziiversities^ during Sirimayo Bhandarnaike's regime, the Tamil youth was enraged, giving birth to separatist tendencies.

Dr. Colvin R. De Silva, academic theoretician and legal expert of LSSp (Lanka Sama Samaj party) ,had warned parliament in 19 56 when the 'Sinhala Only' Bill was debated by saying,

1. The Times of India, 22 December 1975. 48

"Tvo torn little bleeding nations may yet arise ovt^fone little state."^ parity for Sinhala and Tamil might have held the. nation together and the Bhandaranaike-Chelavanayakam Pact might yet have saved the island from a disaster. This was realised by Sinhalese leaders after 30 years that decisicn on an official 2 language was a major mistake.

In 1987, president Jayewardene has wisely accepted that giving Tamil a second rate status way back in 19 56/ was a retrograte step and has contributed in a large measure to the alienation of the Tamils from the couitry's mainstream. It was the kind of a mistake Pakistan committed in East Pakistan when it imposed Urdu on Bengalis. In an interview a day after signing the Inc3o-Sri Lanka Accord of 29 July 1987, he said that it was his and his party's mistake to have backed the Sinhala Only demand.

B. Probj.em of ^;Laher Eeducation and Employpnept?

Education has become one of the most controversial issues in ethnic relations in Sri Lanka and has clearly been one of

1. Mohan Ram, Sri Lanka t The Fractured Island, (New Delhi, 1989) , p. 41. 2. Ibid. 3. An Interview of President Jayewardene with N. Ram in Thg Hindu, 31 July 1987. 49 the major causes underlying the intensification of ethnic conflict. The Tamils were systematically discriminated by the Goverrments at Colombo since 1970.

The Tamil-dominated northern and eastern provinces in Sri Lanka have always been poor in resources, affording little scope for economic development. The Tamils of the region have, therefore, looked to education as the means of eccnomic advan­ cement. Entry into the professions was a means of social mobi­ lity and the British, who were masters in the art of dividing a people among themselves, encouraged then because of their policy of playing them off against the S^Jihala majority. Christian Missionary Schools brought education to the Tamil areas. The Buddhist priests, who were traditional educators and communicators in pre-colcmial days, were against Christian educational activity in the Sinhala areas. So the Buddhist voice arose from the anxiety that ''the Christian institutions 1 were being utilized as vechicles for conversion".

The diligent Tamils were very mobile. Jaffna exported manpower for white-collar jobs and the professions in the rest of the island and beyond to other British colonies. At the time of independence, the Jaffna peninsula had an educational

1. Saran, P., op.cit., p. 9. 50

infrastructure, whereas the rest of the island lacked it, with exception of the Colombo region. And the promotion of free education, after independence, helped a phenomenal expansion of primary and secondary school enrolment among the Tf^iils. However, the growing prejudice to the Sinhalas, added to the pressure of competition at the higher level. The Tamils looked to higher and more specialized professio­ nal education (engineering, medicine and Science) to stay ahead in the competition, because the number of white-collared jobs were declining for them. With Sinhala as the sole official language since 1956 those who did not know it, were at a disadvantage. Despite an expansion of the adminis­ trative jobs in the Sinhala areas were lost to them. A similar expansion of services in the Tamil areas did not help much because the proportion of Tamil school-leavers were, more than could be absorbed there. So the Tamils tri^d to meet the new situation by turning out a disproportionately large number of Science graduates aspiring to enter the specialized professions. This attempt to solve the problem only brought new problems instead. For instance, unemployed Science graduates started teaching in schools, and there was a majority of Tamil school-leavers in Science.

1. Mohan Ram, op.cit ^ ^ p, J+6. 51

The main task before the Sri Lankan government in the beginning of 19703 was to restructure the educational system for imparting scientific education at the school level/ No doubt, the Sri Lankan Tamils maintained their ratio in Science education before I965 with the help of their missionary-schooling. But they have lost their preponderant position following the expansion of secondary education in the Sinhalese areas by neglecting the Tamil dominated provinces and transition to vernacular teaching from English. With a clear move to restrict considerably pupils coming from Tamil minority schools with superior laboratory facili­ ties, the government systematically ignored the timely needs of the Tamil schools. For example, in 1972 most of the Tamil and Muslim schools were, functioning without English and Science teachers, even though more than 2000 candidates 2 enrolled their names during 1970-72.

The Ministry of Education followed the ratio of 80 (Sinhalese) : 12 (Tamils) :8 (Muslims) for the recruitment of teachers in 1976. The ratio prescribed for recruitment of teachers gave overpercentage to the Sinhalese as according to the population of each ethnic group, the ratio

1. oahdevan, P./Nayak, S.C., "Ethnic Competition and Nation Building in Sri Lanka" in Dharmdasanl, M.D. (ed.) QP.cit.f p. 53. 2- Sri Lanka. National State Assembly Debates. Vol h-(h) No. 8, 28 December I972, Col. 2116. ' 52 should have been fixed at 72J2ls7. It not only created a barrier to develop a standard in education, but also became an instrument to cause iinbalance between cornrnxinities in the realm of education. On the other side, the question of admis­ sions to universities also gave rise to a serious crisis. Upto 1969, admissions were based on the final examination at the senior secondary school level. Despite all the discrimination/ those who studied in the Tamil lenguage formed the major proportion of those who were admitted to desired disci­ plines .

In 19 70, the SLFP dominated United Front Government* having reviewed the exceptionally good performance of Tamil students in the Science disciplines, politicised the higher education. Mrs* Bhandarneike government succuntsed to the Sinhalese pressure to abandon the university admissions based on merit, which placed the Tamils in an advantageous position, as it had devised new admission policies every year with the motive of increasing the percentage of the Sinhalese to higher education. For example, a formula with different

Ibid., Vol. 21(1), Ko. 8, 3 December 1976, Col. 1687. ^3 grading marks was used in 1971-72 to admit students in Universities. Subsequently, standardization-cum-district qiota system, and merit-cum-district quota scheme were used in 1973, 197^ and 1976 respectively.

This new system of selection called 'standardization' was introduced in I97I , when United Front Government took up the position that it was difficult to compare the relative standards of Sinhalese medium and Tamil-medium students. It was decided to set cut-off points to regulate the quota of the admissions from each ethnic group. In effect it weighed the marks of the Tamil applicants downwards which meant that they had to score more marks than their Sinhalese coun­ terpart to ccxnpete with them for access to higher education. In 1969, the Tamils secured 50% of the admissions to the medical faculty and ^8.3:^ to engineering. After the 1971 standardization formula, their share dropped to 28% and 19^ respectively in 1977. The formula was scrapped in 1978 but was reintroduced in a modified form to placate Sinhala opinion and the discrimination against the Tamils continued.

It may be argued that the primary concern of every democratic government is to establish balance between different

1. Sahdevan, P./Nayak,S.C,, "Ethnic Competition and Nation Building in Sri Lanka" in Dharmdasani, M,D, (ed.), Sr± Lanka; An Island in Crisis (Varanasi^ I988), pp,5V-^5. 2. Mohan Ram, Sri Lankat The Fractured Island (New Delhi, 1Q89) p. "+7. 5^ communities in attaining education, employment and the economic development. It is the responsibility of the government to see that the underprivileged are brought upto national mainstream with the help of special provisions. At the same time, when it gives priority to any under privileged section, it should not be on the ethnic conside­ ration but on the basis of backwardness. But the Sri Lankan experience reveals that the governments'were more particular to improve the Sinhalese under privileged section than the non-Sinhalese in backward areas. Because among the non- Sinhalese, the Indian/Tamils were the most backward community in education whose representation to the higher education was at times zero and the illiteracy rate in 1978 was ^3 J It obviously led to considerable frustration and disappoint­ ment among Tamil youths.

Employment;

At the time of independence, a number of important positions in the public services and the armed forces were held by the Christians and Ceylon Tamils, This fact led the Sinhalese to think that they were denied the employment that was due to them in proportion to their population. Therefore,

1. Central Bank of Ceylon^ Report on Consumer and Soctio- Bconcmic Survey 1978-79^ Table 1^^ p. 28. 55 parallel to the demand for better educational facilities, the demand for more employment also came up from the Sinhalese. Hence, the demand was met when Mrs. Bhandarnaite's SLFP Government nationalised majority of schools in 1960.

Objectively, the grant of official status to Sinhala provided the Sinhala educated middle class prospects for better opportunities for employment and promotion in public . services. In a scarce resource society, with the state being the largest employer, the language issue was thus not merely an emotive issue but was infused with hard economic implica­ tions. The Tamils had dominated the civil service and the professions in the past but their share began declining. In I98O, Sinhalese who were about 70i^ of the population held Q5% of all the Jobs in the state sector, 82/S in the professional and technical categories, and 83^ in the administrative and managerial services. The Tamils had only 11^ of the public sector jobs, 13^ of the professional and technical posts, and 1^^ of the administrative and managerial positions. The Tamils constituted 5^ of the civil service in 1970. In 1977 2 no Tamil gained entry to it.

1. Wriggins, W. Howard, Ceylon ; Dilemma of A New Nation (New Jersey, I96O), p. I9. 2. Mohan Ram, op.cit., p. ^7. 56

In the context of recruitment to the Sri Lankan public services, there are three major forms of patronage system. These can be visualised as based on comraunalism partisan attitude and nepotism. Communal patronage, unlike in other Third world countries, is not on the consideration of socio­ economic backwardness of a particular community but in terms of ethnicity. The favouratism and nepotism were institutiona.-.: lized following political competition between the SLFP and the UNP. They followed the policy of awarding public post to their partymen purely to reciprocate the gift of votes at the election. Since the governmental power is shared periodically by the tvo Sinhalese political parties, (SLFP and the UNP), the Sri Lankan patronage system has assumed a more exclusive and discriminatory form.

Till the standarsization was introduced in higher education the Tamils had a high percentage in technical employment due to their large number in Science courses. But they have lost their proportion since 1970. Further, because of the language and other barriers to employment in the public sector, quite a lot of Tamils were findijtg self-employment or setting up their own enterprises. All this consistent injustice gave an impetus to the Tamil militant movement in northern and eastern part of Sri Lanka, 57

C. Colonisation of Tamil Areas;

The resettlement of the Sinhalese from the densely populated south-west to the sparcely populated Northern and Eastern provinces which the Tamils regard as their traditional homelands also has caused ethnic tension between the two co'^raunities since 1960s. All governments since independence have made efforts to reduce Sri Lanka's dependence on rice imports. One means of doing this was to construct irrigation schemes or to restore ancient ones in order to encourage popu­ lation in the densely populated Sinhalese areas to migrate to the north-central and eastern regions of the country, which had remained sparcely populated for centuries. The problem has been amplified by the Mahaveli development project. Most of the irrigated farmland created by the Mahaveli project has 1 been distributed to Sinhalese settlers. Most of the settlers being Sinhalese, the Tamils feared that such colonisation schemes would be used by Sinhalese - dominated governments to coT»v«rt Tamil majority areas in Sinhalese majority areas. This led to tensions in these areas.

1. Baxter. Graig and others, Government and Politics in South Asia (Lahore ^ 1988)^ pp. 3^-7-314-8. 58

The change in the ethnic composition due to coloni­ sation schemes gave rise to suspicion and fear among the Tamils, who viewed it as an endeavour to"makB the Tamils a slave race." The Tamil leaders made it clear that they were against enly the Government's attempt in converting the Tamils into a minority group in northern and eastern pro­ vinces by settling the Sinhalese, not against the latter buying lands in Tamil areas. They even sought Justifiable places to be allotted to the landless local Tamils while selecting colonies in the Tamil provinces. But, turning down the Tamil's plea, the Government justified the Sinhalese migration from west zone to North and East as their fundamental rights granted in the constitution. But, the government's failure in preserving the interest of the citizens and maintaining equality amoVthem in every sphere, shows the inherent esta­ blished idea to secure political gain.

In later 1970s, deterioration of tranquility in Sri Lanka forced the Government of Sri Lanka to come to an understanding with the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) on the settlement issue. The expected result of endeavour was an arrangement of colonies in such a way that the demographic

1. Sahdevan P. and Nayak, S.C., "Ethnic Competition and Nation Building in Sri Lanka", in Dharmdasani, M.D. (ed.) Sri Lanka ; An Island in Crisis^ p. 59, 59 composition of the territories wil] not be disturbed. But the whole picture was changed after the historic violence of July 1933. To make things worse, the government had finalised a plan in 1985 to settle 30,000 Sinhalese families in the Tamil North with the ultimate aim of creating parity in the population of communities there. The proposal said, "the prospective settlers would be 75% ethnic Sinhalese in line with the overall population breakdown of the country". Atulathumudali, the National Security Minister, announcing the proposed plan, stated that "the only way to root out terrorism was to remove the concept of 'traditional homeland* and create parity between different c-cmununities, He added that the new settlers would be given military training and equipped with arms to safeguard 2 themselves". The Tamils, on the other hand, made the Government clear that if the colonisation scheme goes through, there can be no solution than the division of the country.

Others;

There are other issues which created pro\»lems. The problem of decentralisation of power is very significant. One

1 Ibid., p. 60, 2. Ibid. 60 of the foremost demands of the Tamils from the beginning was to establish a federal system in Sri Lanka. To this effect, the Federal Party called a Convention at Trincomalee in 1956 which demanded establishment of one or more Tamil linguistic states as a federating unit or units enjoying the ardent autonomy.^ Responding to Federal Party's demand, in 1957 the then Prime Minister, SWRD ^handarnaite signed an agreement with Chelavanayakam (called BrC. Pact) which provided for the establishant of Regional Councils in Sri Lanka. But soon it was abrogated due to mounting Sinhalese pressure on the government. As a result, the Tamils were reverted to resume their cry for federalism which gathered its momentum in 1970s.

For the Tamilt, the unitary form of government is the rule by the majority community and the minorities are subjected to them. They feel that direct participation of the minorities 2 could only be possible in the federal system. In this context, it was viewed that, "unless the electorate directly participate in the administration, it can not be said that there is freedom in the country". -* In contrast to it, the

1. Suntharlingam, C, Ceylon ; Beginning of Freedom Struggle.(Colomboy 1967), p. 31. 2. Sahdevan, P. and Nayak, S.C., op.cit.y p, 63. 3. Ceylon Constituent Asssmblv Debates. Vol. I, No. 12. 16 March 1971, Col. ^4-32. 61

Sinhalese perceived it as an attempt to disintegrate the country in the future. Dismissing the Sinhalese speculation, the 18.1)11 Parliamentarians reaffirmed their dedication in preserving the unity and integrity of the country as they said,

II we ar e not asking for the division of Sri Lanka on racial basis. We stand for a division of power and thereby achieving unity in diversity". At the same time, the Tamils warned the Sinhalese of grave consequences if their share was denied to them. In this regard a Member of Parliament said "whatever the federal principle was recognised all people gained a lot. Wherever It was denied the loss was not only to the minority, 2 but to the majority too".

In the response to the Tamil federal demand, the United Front Government headed by Mrs. Bhandamaike introduced a 'Political Authority' system as a measure of administrative decentralisation in 1973. According to the scheme each district was placed under a political authority who was a ruling party's local M.P. The Central fund to each district under the decentralisation budget was placed under the control of the District Planning Authority (DPA),

Decentralisation of power under the DPA system was only a name sake, practically it had increased the role of the Central

1. Ibid.y cols. If0l-lf02. 2. Ibid., col. h03. 62 administration at the district level. An outcome was that the Tamil yotith's demand soon became secession and not just devolution of power or federal autonomy any more, crystallizing into the demand for a sovereign homeland in 1976.

At this time, the UNP government headed by J.R. Jayewardene optimistically devised a new scheme for decentrali­ zation in 1978. It was a District Minister (M) scheme and District Development Council. All the DMs belonged to the ruling UNP. At the apex, the President of Sri Lanka was the Supreme authority from whom they derived their powers. The Tamils never extended their participation, - Following the debacle of this scheme, he devised District Development Councils (DDC) as a local government structure in I98O. In this scheme also, there was strict control, and could not satisfy the Tamils, In 1987, under Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement North and Eastern Provinces were merged and elections were held. So, the issue of decentralization of power has become a complicated problem froni the very beginning.

The inequal financial distribution to the Tamil district was also considered to increase the complexity since

1. Sahdevan, P., op.cit., p. 65. 63

1970. While releasing funds to districts under the decentra­ lised budget, it was the general policy of the government to talce into account such criteria as population of the districts, rate of development of the area, the potential for development and the unemployment rate. But such criteria were not followed in the case of the Tamil districts. Thus, the Tamils were denied of their due share vrhile the Sinhalese district having same criteria of the Tamil districts for allocation, were given more than the latter. This had aggrevated the problem.

Geologically, Sri Lanka was an extension of the Indian mainland. Its religion, its social structure, its political institutions, the language, its agricultural economy, all came from India. Its connections with India were never repudiated, yet the Sinhalese were something other than the Indian, and this otherness was often categorically asserted as being the Intrinsic quality of Sinhalese culture. The modernity of nationalism lies in the belief that culture and politics should be agreeing that each culture must have its own political 2 roof and territorial homeland. Therefore, their past continued to have a sense of exclusive identity. The 1972 constitution

1. Ramaswainy, P., New Delhi and Sri Lanka ; Four Decades of Politics and DiplomacY, (New Delhi, iQfl?^, p. on 2. Singh, S.B.,"Tamil Minority in Sri Lanka" in Dharmd«Lsani, M.D. (ed.), op.cit., p. 153. 61+ accorded special privileges to Buddhism. According to it, all citizens had the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. But Buddiiism had the 'foremost place*. This discrimination provided complications.

The psychological problem was also there. Both the co:^imunities remain suspicious of one another. The situation can be characrerised as a majority suffering from a minority complex because of the fact that across the country the mino­ rity is a majority. So this 'minority complex' of Sinhalese majority in the island has led theSinhalese politicians on the road to repression of the Tamil minority. The people of Indian origin in Sri Lanka including the tea plantation labour and other settlers, although geographically and even socially separated from the indigineous Tamil • were also counted by the Sinhalese as a potential force hostile to them.

It is clear from the above discussion that the problem of language, education, employment, colonisation of Tamil areas for the Sinhalese and various other misunderstandings created fears, which nurtured a feeling of insecurity and distrust, particularly amongst the minority community youth.

**** A

Chapter - h

SRI LANKAN ATTITUDE

Most of the problems, which are discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, were created by the 3ri Lankan Governments through various legislations which were discriminatory towards Tamil community. Simultaneously, there were positive efforts also to solve the problems. All the moves of .Government are discussed here to make the governmental attitude clear. The response from the Tamil leadership and the Sinhala society is also discussed. 66

A. GUVERNMSNTAL ATTITUDE?

Sri Lankans traditionally have not been very mobile, ori Lanka's demographic history shows the extent to which population growth has been affected by this large scale migra­ tion of a mobile Indian labour force. By the 1930s labour absorption in the plantation industries reached saturation levels, and the growing problem of unemployment in the country arose.^ A growing interest in the repatriating surplus Indian labour also emerged at this time. Sri Lanka demonstrated that national consciousness would be based upon 'Exclusive* concept of belongingness and wot the 'Inclusive'one' . The Tamil tea- estate workers of Indian ancestry were immediately defined as non-belongers . In 1950 not only eastate workers but also Ceylon Tamils, whose history on the island stretched 2^00 years back, found themselves isolated as non-belongers when Mr. Bhandarnaike decided to play the Sinhala card in the political game.

Before independence, when Jawahar Lai Nehru visited Sri Lanka in 1939t ^ir John Kotelawala bluntly told him that.

1. Korale, R.B.M. and others, "Dimensions of Return Migration in Sri Lanka" in Asian Population Studies^ Series No. 79, Returning Migrant.. Workers: Exploratory Studies/ECOSOC for Asia and the Pacific, U.N. 1986), p. 15. 2. Tinker, Hugh, "South Asia at Independence: India-Pakistan and Sri Lanka" in Wilson, A.J., (ed.), States of South Asi^. Problems of National Integration, (New Delhi, 1982), p 2A 67

"Indians would not be employed in Sri Lanka when there were not enough jotis for the local population". More remarks made by Sir John Kotelawala show the Sinhalese attitude towards the Tamils (to whom they regarded as aliens) . Alluding to a sugges­ tion that Sinhalese labour might take the place of Indian labour so that the latter might be sent back to India, Sir John said, "If we are going to replace the Indian coolie with Sinhalese labour, I say, God help Ceylon, I will be worse than allowing the Indian coolie to come in. Once the Sinhalese came as coolies, they will lose the desire for land, they will lose their culture and self-respect, they will be a wandering set of 2 people in Ceylon". This narrow ethnocentricity continued even after independence.

The most important legislative enactment affecting migration is the Immigrants and Emigrants Act. No. 20 of 1948. This Act repealed the Aliens Registration Ordinance No. 30 of 3 1935 and Passport Ordinance No, 20 of 1923. Although the background for the 194 8 Act was mainly based on the problem of

Indian estate labour, it provided for comprehensive regulation

1. Ramaswamy, P., New Deljti jin^ Sfi Lapka t ^our Decades of Politics and DiploroacvV (New Delhi, 1987), p. 19. 2* Ibi(j•, pp. 35-36. 3. Asian Population Studies, op.ciip., p. 15. 68 of influx and exodus of Persons to and from the country. It also provided for a Controller of Immigration and Emigration, and the Depariment of Immigration, and Emigration was established in 19^9 J Prior to 19^9 and the enforcement of the immigrants and Emigrants Act, there was no effective control over the entry of non-nationals, for residence or employment into Ceylon.^ Before this Act was passed in 19^8, S.W,R.D. Bhandarnaike, who in later years became the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka said, "I shall die a happy man when the last Indian le-aves these (Sri Lankan) shores".-^

Changes in Government policy on migration from time to time influenced legislative developments and the functions and activities entrusted to the Departoent of Immigration and Emigration. The other relevant Acts that were subsequently u passed between 19^8 and I985f run as follows»^

Citizenship Act:,No. 18 of 19^-8; Indian and Pakistani Residence (Citizenship) Act No. 3^+ of 19^9; Compulsory Public Service Act No. 70 of I96I ;

^ ' Ibid., p. 16. 2. Jacob, Lucy, Sri Lanka ; From Dominion to Repg^piic (New Delhi, 1973)', pp. "lO^-'lb?. 3. Ramaswaray, P., op.cit .^ p. I78. h. Asian Population Studies, op.cit.y pp. 15-16. 69

Indo-Ceylon Agreement (Implementation) Act No. 14 of 1967;

Temporary Residence Tax Act No. 15 of 197i;

Passport (Regulations) and Exit Permit Act No. 63 of 1971;

Foreign Employment Agency Act No. 32 of 1980; and

Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment Act No. 21 of 1985.

In this way, there were continuous blows on migrant population in Sri Lanka particularly on the Indian migrants. Donoughmore Constitution of 1931 granted universal adult franchise, but the Sinhalese opposed it as that would grant the vote to "Indians" in tea estates qualifying as 'credentials' and the Sinhalese would be at disadvantage in Kandy. And this did happen. Out of seven seats in Kandyan constituencies, si>: were won by Indian Tamil candidates in 194 7. But after theii- disfranchisement by enactment of 1948, the people of Indian origin were out of the periphery of Ceylon's national politics, though they number including some 700,000 plantation labourers, 2 nearly a million.

1. Ramaswamy, P., op.cit., p. 106. 2« Ibid,., p. 112. 70

Jir John Kotelawala stood up bluntly against Indian Ta^iils. In his autobiography 'iV Prime Minister's Di^^ry*, he said, "we are certainly not going to keep Indians in employment when our own people are unemployed. When it was a question of retrenchment, the Indians had to go". Since 1956, cultural ethnlcism of Sinhalese (Sinhala for Sinhalese) became -i central concern of Sri Lankan politics. This happened largely because the two major parties United National Party (UNP), and the Sri Lanka Federal Party (SLFP) , competed for 2 maximum support of the dominant Sinhala community.

In 1958, the Federal Party (which was formed in I9I+9 in protest of denial of franchise to Indian Tamils) was dec lared illegal as a preventive measure against further deteriora­ tion of the crisis and its members were placed in preventive detention. In 196^-, due to the efforts of the Prime Minister of India, Sri Lai Bahadur Shastri, an agreement regarding the citizenship of Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka, was signed. The Sri Lankan counterpart, Mrs, Sirimavo Bhandarnaike signed it^ taking the theoretical liability to implement it effectively, but failed to do so in practice.

1. Ibid., p. h-h. 2. Gupta Anirudha, "Cultural Dimension" in Prasad, Bimal (ed.) Regional Cooperation in South Asia : Problems and Prospects (New Delhi, I989), p. 1M. 71

In 1972, new constitution was brought. This made Ceylon a Republic and gave a new name, Sri Lanka. So far as the minorities, the Tamil in particular, were concerned, the new constitution negatived past commitments and signified objectives to counter the most important of the Tamil demands. It entrenched the unitary state structure ignoring the Federal Party's demand for Tamil autonomy -I through a federal set up. The 'Sinhala Only' enactment of 1956 acquired constitutional status through section 7 of the Constitution. Though the Tamil Language (special provisions)- Act of 1958 (further vnended in I966) qualified the 19^6 enactment to permit the limited use of Tamil in the northern and eastern provinces, the new constitution institutionalized the disadvantageous position of the Tamils in the rest of the country. The Sinhala Xanguage was to be the sole language for all the laws and enactments as well as for the courts and 2 tribunals throughout the island.

1972 Constitution also accorded special priveleges to Buddhism. According to $,6, "it shall be the duty of the state to protect and foster Buddhism. But at*the same time all other

1, Mohan Ram, Sri Lanka ; The Fractured Island (New Delhi. 1989), p. UlT, — * 2. Ibidf 72 religions were assured complete freedom of wo;x5hip". With the declaration of the nation as a 'unitary state' the Constitution of 1972 rejected the Tamil demand for the federa­ tion. But the most flagrant act of discrimination was the distinction the new constitution made between 'persons' and 'citizens' in the matter of fundamental rights. While all persons were equal before law, only a citizen had rights of freedom of thow^ht, conscience and religion, speech, publica­ tion, movement, choice of residence and .the right to promote his own culture. The losers here were the stateless plantation workers of Indian origin who had lost their citizenship in 2 19l^.8-^9. Tamils then concluded that the doors were finally closed against them and all the Tamil parties, the Federal Party, the Tamil Congress and Ceylon Worker's Congress (of Indian plantaticn labourers) formed the Tamil United Front (TUF) in 1972. This was a front for agitation.

In 1970s, the Sinhalese saw themselves as a deprived lot vis-a-vis the Tamils who had better access to education and employment. The Sinhala majority now tried affirmative discrimination through 'standardization' of works to deprive the

1. Saran, P., Government and Politics of Sri Lanka. (New Delhi, 1982), p. 30. 2, Mohan Ram, op.cit., p. 8^-, 73

Tamils of the advantage they enjoyed. In the face of the government's policies there was little the Tamils could do. The harrassment of workers of Indian origin after nationalization (company owned tea estates both foreign and domestic were natio- 1 nalized in 1972 and 1975), has been one of the major complaints of the CWC, the largest plantation workers* union. It was said that, "thousands of Indian labourers, their wives and children had been ejected from the nationalized estates and were roaming 2 the countryside begging for food".

Secession has always been the latent option of oppressed minorities in a plural society and the Tamils were driven to it In 1976, when TUF was renewed as Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), hardening Sinhala attitude further.

By 1977, the Sri Lankan political system had thus achieved a high degree of ethnic centralization in favour of the Sinhala-Buddhist majority. Any adjustment of Tamil ethnic interests was seen at the cost of the majority. As a result, the Tamils were politically marginalized, and were shown to be irrelevant to the system.

1. The Surona World Year Book. Vol. II (London, I989), p. 2372. 2. Ali, 3. Ashfaq, Indian Overseas^ (Bhopal, 198^), p. 78. 3. Mohan Ram, op.cit., p. ^O. 7^

In the 1977 elections, the UNP was returned with a five-sixth majority and gave the island the presidential constitution in 1978. The new constitution only gave further legitimacy to the Sinhala-Buddhist ideology. Whil£ retaining the majority Sinhala language as the official language of the Republic,the new constitution conferred an enhanced •national language status' to Tamil.'' It also reaffirmed the special position accorded to Buddhism in the 1972 consti­ tution. It sought to protect and foster not just Buddhism but the Buddhist Sasana (order).^ It firmly declared that Sri Lanka would be a unitary state yielding no ground to the demand for either a federal set up or regional autonomy for the Tamil regions.

The iJayewardene Government claimed that, "it had done more for the Tamils than any previous regime had done. Tamil had been constitutionally recognised as a national language along with Sinhalese and made the language of admi­ nistration in Tamil areas, Tamil plantation workers of Indian origin had also been granted voting rights in local government elections, and the dual system of citizenship - citizen by descent and citizenship by registration - had been

1. Singh, Rai, "Dimensions of Indo-Sri Lanka Relations" in Pharmdasani. M.D. (ed.), 3ri Lanka; An Island in Crisis (Varanasi, I988), p. 86. 2. Mohan Ram, op,cit., p. 85. 75 done away with.

This conciliatory approach did not, however, mate­ rially changed the situation and in 1978, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelara (LTTEi a militant branch of TULF, started sabotaging and killing police officers. The Jayewardene government reacted by enacting the Proscribing of the LTTE Law (No. 16 of 1978). In July 1979, the government repealed this law and replaced it with the Preveption of Terrorism Act (No. lf8 of 1979) which gave wide powers of search and arrest to the police and the army. He declared a state of emergency in the Tamil areas from July 11, 1979.

At the same time, a new philosophy was epitomized in a thesis propounded by Cyril Mathew, one of President Jayewardene's ministers during the July 1983 Tamil massacres. He controlled the ruling party's labour wing, the Jatiya Sevaka Sangaraaya (National Worter's Organisation), which was believed to have played a leading role in the massacres. According to Mathew's thesis (inspired from the Mahatir-Bin-Mohammad, a Malaysian politican, who later on became his country's Prime Minister), the other racial groups should not be allowed to

1, 3in:gh,Rai, op.cit.^ p. 9U. 2. Mohan Ram, 3ri Lanka ; The Fractured Islan^ (New Delhi, 1989), p. 86i 76 compete with the dominant ethnic group. According to him, in 3ri Lanka, the Tamil minority dominated everything from the professions to trade and commerce. This could not be tolerated forever. Worse, the Tamil wanted a country of their own. According to Mathew, the Sinhala people were ready to prevent the division of the country by non-violent or violent methods. His thesis with its immense appeal to the Sinhalas helped institutionalize political violence aimed against the Tamils, which led to violence in 1977» followed by more violence in I98I and the worst ever in 1983.

Tamil riots in 1 977 and 1981 were different from the riots in 19^8. These were not directed merely against the ethnic Tamils (12.5% of total population) or limited to the areas inhabited by them. These riots extended to the Tamils of Indian origin (5.5i^ of total population) living mostly in the plantation districts. More than 50,000 Tamil plantation workers had sought asylum in the North. They \>ecame the 2 targets of organised attacks. The reason for the spreading of the violence to cover all segments of the country's Tamil population was that the plantation Tamils, though they did not support the secession demand, had begun making common cause

1. Singh, 3.B.,"Tamil Minority in Sri Lanka',',in Dharmdasani, M.D, (ed,), Sri Lanka : An Island in Crisis (Varanasi, I988), p. 157. 2. Kokikara, Shelton, U., Foreign Policy of Sri Lanka (Delhi, 1982), p. lfl+. 77

with the ethnic Tamils. This was disturbing the Sinhalas.

After 1983, the prevailing situation, poignantly summed up by a Tamil for Michael Hamlyn of 'The Times* shows the attitude of Sri Lanka towards the Tamils, **Yon are shot if you stay at home, you are shot if you go out/ you are shot if you run when challenged, you anfe shot if you standstill. What can we do?" Thousands of Tamils fled into the jungle or crossed the sea to India, the fate of Tamils if they remained was clear, because Jayewardene had declared that 2 Tamil terrorism continued there would be a thousand July 1983s". After July 1983 riots, when Mrs. Indira Gar*ahi sent Foreign Minister Narsimha Rao to Colombo, the gesture was angrily resented by the authorities in Sri Lanka as a typical case of a 'Big Brother' threat. President. J.R. Jayewardene himself declared, "he would ally himself with the devil if necessary to protect the country against invasion from outside•*. But soon the Sri Lankan Govt, woke up and realized the imperatives for re­ solving the ethnic crisis. In 1984, at the initiative of India's

1. Singh, S.B,, auLtSLit.*. P» 1^7. -v..^.,. 2. Mohan Ram, on.clt •. p. 88. y'^"*" ^*^ 3. Ramaswamy, P., op. cit., pp. 129-130. | •«/ P)o I Q r\Q 78 mediation, the UNP government prepared to convene an All Party Conference (APC) in which it affirmed to give the Tamils directly elected District Councils,Intex-District coordina­ ting and collaborating units, and a second chamber to ensure a more equitable exercise of political power by all members or sections of a multi-ethnic society.'' But it failed and from 198^ onwards militarization by the government began yi a massive scale with the 'declaration of a 'security zone' in north and east Sri Lanka.

again in 1985, there were efforts to solve the crisis. Due to the efforts of India, two rounds of talks were held In Thimpu. But these talks failed as both the parties were firm on their stands. The Sri Lankan delegation had outrightly rejected four principles of the Tamil groups for the reason that, "they constitute a negation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, they are detrimental to a United Lanka and are inimical to the interests of the several 2 communities and religion in Sri Lanka".

1. Sahadevan P., Nayak, 3.C., "Ethnic Competition and Nation Building in bri Lanka", in Dharmdasani, M.D. (ed.). Sri Lanka ; An Island in Crisis. (Varanasi. 1988), pp. 66-67. 2. Sri Lanka, Department of Information, The Thimpu Talks; The Stand taken by Sri Lanka. Text of the opening statement made by Dr. H.W. Jayewardene, (Colombo, 1985), p. 3. 79

It is true that Sri Lankan attitude towards Tamil minority has been hard from the very beginning, but it is also important to remember that no country would like to tolerate the talks of secession too long, and at one time or the other, even the most moderate would be forced to come out openly against the secessionists. So by 1987, the Sri had Lankan armed forces/finally come of age. And Sri Lankan Government tried to sought help from various foreign coun- 2 tries to chalk out plans to meet the Tiger threat.

At last, due to efforts of Rajiv Gandhi^the Prime Minister of India, an accord was signed between India and Sri Lanka. The signatories were Rajiv Gandhi and the Sri Lankan President J.R. Jayewardene. Under this agreement,

Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPHF) was sent to Sri Lanka to create peace in north-east provinces. The north and east provinces were merged into one and elections were held. But soon, it was realised that "a foreign force is se^.dom welcomed in any country for a long time and the Indian army is no exception. They are seen as liberators neither by the Sinhalese •a nor by the Tamils".-" And in September 1989, an Indo-Lankan

1 . Sinh, Rai, "Dimensions of Indo-Sri Lanka Relations", in Dharmdasani, M.D. (ed.), op.cit.,. p. 100 2. Suryanarayan, P.S.. The Peace Trap : An Indo Sri Lankan Political Crisisf (Madras, I988), pp. 39-^0. 3. Sengupta, Bhabani, "Fall out of Lanka Accord", The Hindyistan Times, 5 February I988, 80

Agreement was signed on the complete withdrawal of the IPKF from Sri Lanka by the year end. It was pulled out completely in March 1990.

The idea of replacing the accord by a more comprehensive treaty was mooted by Former Sri Lankan President Jayewarddne as early as January I988 and again by his successor R. Premdasa,

But India found their drafts to be too vague and prepared a revised document for their consideration but Sri Lanka's 1 zest had already faded out.

Despite the efforts of various governments in Sri Lanka, from D.S. Senanayake to R. Premdasa to solve th£ vexed problem*, the Sinhala majority hindered them to implement the concessions towards the Tamil people,

(B) TAMIL RSSPONSB;

The views of Indian Tamils can not be derived easily as they / silent people electorally. Due to the highest level of illiteracy and the geographical isolation, they gave allegience

1. Mishra, P.K. "Indo Lanka Ties : Can a Treaty help?" in Link (New Delhi), k March I990, p. 10. 81 only to their own leaders. In the plantations, the leadership was with an Indian Tamil, Mr. Natesa Iyer. Later, when the Ceylon Indian (Workers') Congress was formed in 19^-0 by Mr. S. Thondaman, the plantation labourers came under its wing.^ He became the sole leader of these people. 2 "Mr. Thondaman rules the country" is a belief widespread among Kandyan Sinhalese.

The Ceylon Tamils remain overwhelmingly under conser­ vative and constitutionalist leaders and cling to their traditional social practices. On the whole they are ready to compromise with the Sinhala majority in return for fairly limi­ ted concessions. The Indian Tamils remain engrossed in trade union struggles and in the determination of their citizenship.

The unions are almost the only political form of pressure open to the estate worters who are disfranchised and geographically isolated, being very unlikely to Join the Sinhalese dominated parties in their areas. The whole poli­ tical life of the largest single proletarian force in Sri Lanka centres on the Ceylon Workers' Congress (CWC) led by Mr. Thondaman and Democratic Workers' Congress (DWC) led by

1, Ramaswamy, P., New Delhi and Sri Lanka ; Four Decades of Politics and Diplomacy (New Delhi^ 1987)^ p. k^ , 2. Jupp, James, Sri Lanka-Third World Democracy (London, 1978), p. 1^5. .82

A. Aziz. Because of their overwhelmingly Indian Tamil membership, they can only exert political pressure to a limited extent. Since I96O, they have done this by aligning themselves with one or other of the major elements in the Sinhalese party struggle, Mr. Thondaman, after a brief alliance with Mrs. Bhandaranaite of SLFP, in I96O became firmly allied with the UNP and in 1965, Dudley Senanayake nominated him to Parliament. A Aziz, the rival leader of DWC, though critical of the communalism of SLFP, was always identified with Left and was nominated to Parliament by Mrs. BhandaranaikB in 1970. As pressure groups,the main task of both CWC and DWC has been over the representation or naturalization of 1 Indian Tamils.

Till 19^9, Mr, Ponnambalara Ramnathan had been leader of all Tamils but when he joined Senanayake cabinet, a big chunk of his partymen led by Mr. Chelavanayakam broke away and formed the Federal Party, making the very beginning of the politics of dissent among Tamils in Sri Lanka. Federal Party redrafted the aims and goals of the Tamils as a whole, one of which was that the Tamil speaking population should include the Indi.an Tamils of the tea estates. At the convention of

1- JLkliL., p. 177. 83

Federal Party in Trincomalee in 19^6, Mr. Chelavanayakam listed 3 demands:

"(a) an autonomous region for the indigenous Tamils-speaking people comprising the northern and the eastern provinces linked to the rest of the island under a federal set up; (b) parity of status for the Tamil language with the Sinhalese language; and (c) citizenship rights for the Indian Tamils who wished to make Ceylon their permanent home".

Since Independence, until 1956, the Sri Lankan Tamil Politics was one of responsive co-operation. The Tamil congress had participated in the government since 191+7. In 1956 (aftar the 3LFP won the elections riding a wave of Sinhala - Buddhist nationalism) began the Tamil non-violent 2 non cooperation move in the hope of securing their demands. At this time, the Federal Party, through a pact between its leader SJV Che lav an ay a kam and the Prime Minister SWRD Bhandarnaike in 1957, tried to win some of its demands. But

1, Ramaswamy, P., op.cit,^ pp. 113-11^. 2. Mohan Ram, Sri _Lanka ; The Fractured Island (New Delhi,I989), p. ^2. 84

Bhandarnftike abrogated it in 1958 under Sinhala pressure. In 1958, there were anti-Tamil riots over the language issue. The Federal Party launched a peaceful agitation over the language issue in Tamil majority northern provinces. After sometime/ in 1964, the FP moved one step further and organised a 'Tamil only' campaign in which it appealed to the Tamil speaking people to transact all their business in Tamil. These campaigns caused problems for the central adminis­ tration.

In 1965 elections, the Federal Party with fourteen seats supported UNP, which formed a government. In the same year a pact was signed between SJV Chelavanayakam and the Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake. But the promises made in this pact were not fully honoured and the pact did not end the conflict. Before the 19 72 Constitution of Sri Lanka was passed, the Tamil parties demanded a ban on caste discrimination and end to the distinction between Ceylon Tamils and Plantation Tamils of Indian origin. But the Constitution did not represent a consensus. The plantation Tamils were not represented in the Constituent Assembly. In protest, the

1. Ibid., p. 44 85

Federal Party, the Tamil Congress, the Slathamilar Ottumani Munol and theAll Ceylon Tamil Conference joined together in 1972 to form the Tamil United Front (TUF) to protect 'the freedom dignity and rights of the Tamil people'. "The TUF 2 had adopted a six point action plan for the Tamils:

1, A. defined place for the Tamil language; 2» 3ri Lanka should Me a secular state; 3, Fundamental rights of ethnic minorities should be embodied in the Constitution; h. Citizenship for all who applied for it; 5. Decentralisation of the administration; and 6, The caste system to be abolished.

In October, 1972, the TUF launched a non-violent struggle to achieve its objectives. But various discriminatory policies of Sri Lankan government, led them in May I976 to adopt a historical resolution calling for complete independence of the Tamil nation. The name was changed to that of Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF). It denounced the I972 constitution saying it had reduced the Tamils to a 'slave

1. Singh, S.B. "Tamil Minority in Sri Lanka", in Dharmdasani, M.D. (ed.) Sri Lankat An Island in Crisis (Varanasi^ I988), P. 155.

2. lb id X. 86 nation' by the Sinhalas.

The Tamil youths were not satisfied with the conser­ vative Tamil political leadership. Vellupillai Prabhakaran, then 13, formed the Tamil New Tigers in 1972, which became Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LITE) four years later. A. special session of Parliament in early August 1983 amended 2 the constitution through the Sixth Amendment to ban poli­ tical parties advocating secession. TULF was banned and was stripped of its representation in Parliament, because it refused to tate the anti-secession oath. But it was still the only political party of the Tamils, while the guerilla movement h-3xi grown and fragmented into numerous groups. Foremost among them was the LTTE, structured as an urban guerilla organisation. Its main influence was in Jaffna. The second largest, but militarily not as significant, guerilla group was the people's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), set .up in I98O by Uraa Maheswaran, who was the Secretary General of the LTTE before he founded his own organisation. He laid premium on mass political action

1 . Mohan Ram, op.ci,ttf p. ^3, 2. Tambiah, S.J,, Sri Lanka ; Ethnic Fractriclde and the Dismantling of DemocraCY^ (London^ 1Q86^T P- ^'^- The Sixth Amendment requires that all members of Parliament, office holders of various kinds, and even every attorney at Law shall make an oath to the effect that "they will not directly or indirectly, in or outside Sri Lanka support espouse, promote, finance, encourage or advocate the establishment of a separate State within the territory of Sri Lanka." 87 and disapproved of the hit-and-run tactics of the LTIE. He realised the importance of Indian Tamils. He writes , "A factor which may well act as a catalyst to give a thrust to democratic move is the emergence of the Indian Tamils as a solidphalanx of the largest organised workers' force in the island. It is necessary for us to make a common cause with them",

The Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students (EROS), a small group, was founded by E. Ratnasabapathy in London in 1975 and was Marxist-Leninist in orientation. Unlike the other groups it claimed links with the plantation Tamils (which it refused to call Indian Tamils) and viewed them as part of the island's Tamil people in search of a nation.

The Eelams People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) under Padmnabh, another Marxist group, was the result of a split in the EROS in 1981. It concentrated its 'activities in the eastern province. It became important in recent years when it formed the provincial council under the Chief Minis- terohip of its leader VaradraJ Perumal in 1987, The other identifiable groups of Tamil militants are the Tamil Eelam

1. Maheswaran, Uma (Mukundan), "Sri Lankan Tamil Options" "i-n The Hindustan Times. IQ April I986. 88

Liberation Organisation (TELO) , the Tamil Eelam Liberation Army (TELA), the Tamil Ee lam Liberation Front (TELF) , theTamil People's Democratic Front (TPDE) and the National Front for Liberation of Tamil Eelam (NELTE),

The terrorist violence has come at the end of what the Tamil youth and radicals interpret to be a persistent, unfair, and sporadically terrorizing campaign of discrimina­ tion and domination on the part of the^ . majority Sinhalese th^t began especially in 19^6, with the accession to power of Buddhist Sinhala Chauvinism. And the constitutional, democ­ ratic and lawful action and protests by the Tamils have been rewarded with violence. Angered by the imposition of an alien language,frustrated without the possibility of higher education plunged into the dispair of unemployment, the Tamil youth grew millitant with an iron determination to fight back the national oppression. And this fight is still continued. On the question of outcome of this long drawn struggle, Vanniasingham writes, "Empires have never lasted long and the

1. Tambiah,3.J,, Sri Lanka : Ethnic Fractricide and the Dismantling of Democracy, (London, 1986), p. f?. 89 oinh-^la reign over Tamils is bound to be shortlived".

(C) 3INHALA RESPONSE;,

The Sinhalese believe that Sri Lanka is largely a Sinhala-Buddhist country and all other religions or language groups are aliens. Sri Lanka, they argue is the only country o of and for the Sinhalese people. From the beginning, the efforts to implement various concessions to the Tamils, were protested by the Sinhalese. The government's timidity was because of the Sinhala pressure which was backed by the ultra- left Janata Viraukti Peramuna (JVP). It even attempted an abortive Insurrection in 1971.

The. nationalist Sinhalese view has been that the resident Indian Tamils constitute threat to the Sinhalese population for many reasons. In the highlands, Indians have deprived the Sinhalese of employment opportunities in the tea and rubber plantations, and those of them who are traders

1 . Vanniasingham Somasundaram, Sri Lanka ; The Conflict Within (New Delhi, I988). The writer is the Former Head of Department of Econcxnics at Jaffna College, who earlier retired from the'lColombo Technical College under compul­ sion of Sri Lanka's linguistic policy. 2. Hennayaka, Shanta K., "The Peace Accord and the Tamils in Sri Lanka", in Asian Survey, Vol. XXIX, No. k, April 1939. The writer is the Lecturer in Department of Geography, University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka. 90 drain profit to India. But more important, the Sinhalese nationalists fear the Indian residents as a political threat. They could in various ways link up with Sri Lankan Tamil political organizations and have indeed done so. The spark of the Sinhalese chauvinism bee fame an all-consuming fire in 1983 with the killings of the Tamils. In 1983, the hardened oinhala attitude was reflected in Jayewardene's resolve : "nothing will happen in our favour until the terrorists are wiped out". He further said, "you can not cure an appendix patient, until you remove the appendix".

One of the factors which hardenes the Sinhala attitude is the factor of similarity and close linguistic interaction of Sri Lankan Tamils with those of Tamil Nadu, leading to the self-perception of the Sinhalese majority as a linguistic minority in the shadow of India. They are a majority with a minority complex, which is partly the product of Sri Lanka's small size, both territorially and demographic ally.-^ Sinhala objections to the idea of a homeland for Tamils run even deeper.

1. Mohan Ram, Sri Lanka : The Fractured Island (New Delhi: 1989), p. 5^r 2. Wriggins, Howard, Ceylon ; Dilemmas of a New Nation, (Princeton, N.J., 1960),p. 252. 3. Tamhiah, S,J.^ op.cjt., p. 92. 91

"Geographical autonomy based on ethnicity", many Sri Lankans argue, "is not supportable in these times when life is so inte rdependent".

The 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord and the role of IPKF have been projected by the JVP as contemporary manifestation of the proverbial Indian imperialism and expansionism that is 2 rooted deeply in the Sinhala Psyche. It is evident that oinhala response towards theproblems of Tamil community is of very rigid nature are of not sharing anything with them,

After this discussion, it can be concluded that 3ri Lankan Governments adopted a mixed response towards the problems of Tamil community. They engineered the discriminatory policies towards Tamils, which created problems. At the same time, there were efforts to find the solutions. But it was never done wholeheartedly. And the main hinderances came from the Sinhala community which always protested concessions to Tamils. The Tamils adopted a balanced view and they put justifiable demands to be fulfilled and agitated for that peacefully. It was only in late 1970s, that the Tamil youth became violent because of the carelessness of government towards their demands.

1. Chadha, Maya, "India's dilemma in Sri Lanka", in The Hindustan Times, 3 August I988. 2. Muni, 3.D. "JVP and the IPKF", in The .Hindustan Tin.^^ 29 August 1989. 5

INDIAN ATTITUDE

Various affinities between India and its neighbours in South Asia, particularly with the people just across its borders, have often a tendency to create situations which lead to India's involvement in the internal affairs of its neighbours. For example* there are close affinities with Bangladesh on the basis of language and with Nepal on the basis of religion. So is the case with the neighbour in the

1. Gi^ta, Anirudha/ "Cultural Dimensions'* in Prasad, Bimal (ed.) , Reqione^j. Cooperation in Sout^ Asia ; Problems and Prospects, (New Delhi/ 1989) , p. 13 7. 93

South. As a large number of Indian migrants were residing in Sri Lanka, India was not totally unaware of their problems. There were links between two countries even before independence« The official link with Sri Lanka was the Ayent to the Government in India whose office was opened in Kandy in 1924. His main job was to watch over the welfare of Indian plantation labours# their living conditions, wages and occasional incidents which often led to more serious agitations. Due to these agitations, Indian National Congress became serious about the problems of these people* It was owing to the local Indian agitation against the 'all Sinhalese' government that the Indian National Congress deputed Mr. Jawahar Lai Nehru to go to Ceylon in 1939 to study the situation and explore the possibilities of a settlement. He went to Sri Lanka in 1939 and talks were hel<3 for three days. He said, "I am proud of being an Indian and will not tolerate a single hair of an Indian to be touched by any other. Indians, wherever they are should not sxiffer indignities from anyone. I will sooner see Indians crushed to atoms rather than suffer 2 degradation and dishonour'*.

^mmi^^m^t^ 1. Ramaswamy, P., Ngx pg,;^h4,.,„^p.d. Sji. I^flpk^ » F9.VU:. JPe.ga^gg of Polit^icp ^nd Diplomacy (New Delhi, 1987) , p. 198.

2. Ibid., p. 153. 9^

He pleaded with the Slnhala nationalists that the discrimination and the deduction of a large number of Indian employees from government services, for no other reason than they were Indians, contravened international practice guided by an ILO convention and was certainly against the close nature of Indo-Sri Lanka historical and cultural ties. But Sinhalese were totally unresponsive. He had talks on Indian immigrants with the Sinhala Board of Ministers on the need for an understanding for fairplay and justice in accordance with accepted international practice, but failed. During this visit, he thought need for a union of plantation labourers to look after themselves. He suggested the establishment of Ceylon Indian Congress, which came into existence and was inaugurated in an upcountry town called Oampola in 19^0.

After independence, the situation is complicated by the different positions taken by the various Indian govern­ ments. Nehru's governments up to the time of his death refused to get involved and the vast majority of Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka was declared to be 'stateless', a baffling

1. Ibid., pp. 16i+-67. 95

problem In Internstlonal law. But that does not mean that India was not looking at the problem of these people. In fact pxjblic agitation in India had been mounting over since Acts in 1948 and 1949 were passed. Mr. R. Venlcataraman then a Congress M.P. from Madras (President of India« at present) had said/ ".... it was for the people, of Ceylon to try and influence the Ceylon Government to see that the Indians who had done so much to build up the civilization and 2 economy of the island are not dropped like hot potatoes**. At that time, Ceylon was of the view that she would not accept responsibility for the stateless persons. And the Indian position had been put forward by Mr. Jawahar Lai Kehru in several statements. As early as February 1951, at the Ahmedabad Congress, he saids

"Ceylon is a small country rather afraid of this great big continent of India. We do not want them to be afraid of us. They are culturally the same as we are. We want them to be friendly with us. We do not want

1. Wilson, A.J., "Sri Lanka and its Future i Sinhalese Versus Tamils", in Wilson, A.J. (ed«) The States of South Asia t P^obl^m? of National Iptearation (New Delhi, 1982) , p. 301. 2. Ramaswamy, P., pp.cit«, p. 52. 96

to interfere with their freedom in any way. Vie wish to respect their independence. But naturally, we also want our nationals there to be respected. We also want that those people who thought they were of Indian ori­ gin, have settled in Ceylon to be treated as Ceylonese and we go on pressing for that".

In 1951 » J.L. Nehru met Dudley Senanayake, the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, in London. Talks were held on the issue of the stateless plantation workers of Indian origin. Further two pacts were signed with Sir John Kotelawala in January and October 19^ in New Delhi, commonly known as Nehru-Kotelawala Pacts. Though these were significant attempts by the leaders to resolve this human problem, these efforts did not result in any fruition. Nehru's successor, Lai Bahqdur Shastri, presumably because of India's problems with Pakistan and People's Republic of China, preferred to maintain good neighbourly relations with Sri Lanka.

The CWC leader, Mr. Thondaxnan, the defacto spokesman of Indian plantation labour in Ceylon, paid a visit to New Jelhi in October I963 and, on noticing the pressure from

1• Ibid,, p. ^9. 97

Ceylon on India to reopen negotiations# contacted several authorities in New Delhi and told them that, "the problem of the stateless in Ceylon had ceased to be an 'Indian problem*. It had become a problem of human rights. But Shastri thought that a settlement with Ceylon was inoperative. Due to his efforts an agreement with Sri Lanka known as Sirimavo-Shastri Agreement was signed in 1964. This agreement was signed to solve the problem of citizenship of the people of Indian origin in Sri Lanka. According to this agreement both India and Sri Lanka took responsibility to grant citizenship to these people in a fixed ratio and number. The fate of remaining was to tie decided later. Though it was a good effort towards solving the biggest problem of Indian migrants/ but the implementation was not fully effective.

In 1974 the late Indian Prime Minister# Indira Gandhi and Sirimavo signed a pact to grant citizenship to remaining people. These were those 15#000 persons* who were left out of the Sirimavo - Shastri Agreement of 1954. Indira Gandhi, had once enunciated the country's foreign policy towards its neighbours. This came to be known as the 'Indira doctrine' in diplomatic parlance. In simple

1. Ramaswamy, P., H^yi D^lhi. an^ Sri Lanka (New Delhi, 1987) , p. 62. 98 terms, the doctrine is as follows: "India will not interfere in the internal affairs of its neighbours, but it cannot remain a silent spectator if the domestic events in a neighbouring country were to impinge on India's own ethnic sensibilities".''

In 1931, India had held that the anti-Tamil riots were an internal matter of 3ri Lanka, -t^ut India's involvement in the ethnic problem began in a direct and continuing manner after the communal riots in 1983, when India offered her good offices to explore a political settlement, Indira Gandhi's government saw in the Tamil struggle a chance to enhance New Delhi's prestige by projecting itself as the 'big brother' in the region. Simultaneously, by appealing to support the Tamil demands, New Delhi hoped to pick up political gains in Tamil Nadu, Tamil Nadu being a very sensi­ tive state and playing a crucial role for safeguarding Tamil 2 interests, New Delhi can not afford to ignore its sentiments. The DMK party (during the terra of office 1967-77) under M. Karunanldhi was sympathetic to the cause of Tamils in .iri

1. Suryanarayan, P,t>., The Peace Trap (Madras, I988), p. ^. 2. Mishra, P K, dogth Asiq, in .International Politics, (Delhi, 1$8lf)7p7^2TV. 99

Lanka. In such a context, the attitude of the Government of India and the government of Tamil Nadu to the Tamil question in Sri Lanka, especially their attitude to the question of Eelara has become a matter of fundamental concern for Sri Lanka government. India has again and again made her attitude clear. In June 1979, Indian High Commissioner in Sri Lanka Mr. Thomas Abraham said, "India would never support i 2 the demand of the TULF for a separate state in Sri Lanka". But in practice, India's strategy was slowly becoming clear. In its essence, the Indian response to the conflict across the Palk strait was having two folds: one was, support to Tamil aspirations, short of approving the secessionist demand, the other was, support to the militant activity aimed at secession.

Indira Gandhi sent her External Affairs Minister P.V. Narsimha Rao to Colombo in 1983, while the massacres were still going on. This provoked Sri Lanka. An invitation to A. /vmrlthalingam, the leader of the TULF, for talks, added to the fury. After sometime she named the journalist turned diplomat G. Parthasarathi, a Tamil, as her special envoy. He

1. Kodikara, Shelton, U., Foreign Policy of Sri Lanka; A Third 'v^orld Perspective (New Delhi, 1982), pp. M-O-i^i-l. 2. Reported in Ceylon Daily News, 25 June 1979. 3. Mohan Ram, op.cit. ^ p, 123. 100 talked to the Sri Lankan leaders and the TULF and along with President Jayewardene, drafted a set of proposals for devolu­ tion of power, known as Annexure C, centred on the creation of separate regional councils for the northern and eastern provinces. These councils were to be granted substantial powers. But these proposals were rejected by Sinhala opposi­ tion. The SLFP denounced them as an Indian product. 3o Jayewardene put across a new set of proposals known as Annexure B, which did not aim at any meaningful devolution of power but merely extended the scheme of decentralization at the district level to the provincial level. This time the proposHls were rejected by the TULF. Jayewardene then went back to military operations against the guerillas. But in retaliation, guerillas massacred 150 Sinhalese at Anura- dhapura in May 1985.

Then Jayewardene responded to India's offer of. help to implement the new proposal i.e. Annexure C, After his visit to New Delhi in June 1985, it was agreed that India would help bringing about a ceasefire and arrange direct negotiations between the Tamil groups, the TULF and the five main guerilla groups the LTTE, PLOTE, EROS, EPRLF and TELO,

Ibid.. p. 56. 101

In theory the major problem between India and Sri Lanka - the problem of the stateless persons had been resolved after an agreement in 1986 between India and Sri Lantca. But the i^sue of the 'stateless', like the refugee overflow, was only a surface indication of the real compulsions behind India's involvement in Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict. The real reasons for India's involvement had more to do with its domestic political compulsions on one hand and its geostrategic concerns on the other. Indian Tamil sympathy for the Sri Lankan Tamil secessionist cause was the domestic compulsion. The army atrocities against the civilian population in rela­ tion to bolder terrorist attacks since the end of 198^ has 1 resulted in an exodus of Tamil refugees'to India, The reaction in Tamil Nadu to Sri Lanka's military operation was the determin,ant of New Delhi's response.

J.N. Saxena writes^ "The burden on India is not only economic but social and political also, however, it has not askfid the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) so far for any economic assistance. As soon as Sri Lankan refugee lands in India» the Indian authorities provide him with a basic

1, Singh, S,B.^ "Tamil Minority in Sri Lanka" in Dharmdasani, M.D. (ed.), Sri Lanka t An Island in Crisis. (Varanasi, 1986), pp. 166-167. 2. Saxena, J.N. "Legal Status of Refugees : Indian Position" in Indian Journal of International Law. Vol. 26, I986 (New Delhi), p. 507. 102 need kit. In addition, each refugee (adult) received 55 rupees each fortnight, a child gets Rs. 27.50, India has made all possible arrangements in about 70 camps for their lodging and extended medical facilities in almost all the districts of Tamil Nadu".

3ri Lankan Government, in 198M-, realised the need for resolving the crisis. At the initiative of India's mediation, an All Party Conference (APC) was called, but it could not succeed.

Thiropu Talks:

Following the breakdown of the All Party Conference, India had actively engaged in advancing the process of reconciliation and negotiation between the dri Lankan Government and the Tamil groups. It acted as a bridge between the two disputants, involved in the task of creating peaceful atmosphere for negotiations and arranged, peace talks at Thimpu, capital of Bhutan. The LTTE, EROS, EPRLF, TELO and PLOTE toegther authorised the TJLF to speak for them because it had experience of negotiations which they lacked. The long-divided Tamil movement was able to express itself unitedly at last. 103

The Sri LanKan delegation placed before the Tamil groups the old proposals of the APC of 198^ for the devo­ lution of power. The talks broke down after two rounds of meetings in July and August 1985. The proposals seemed inadequate to the Tamil groups, who enunciated four basic principles to be recognised in any new proposal for solving the problem. These principles werej

1. Acceptance of the Tamils as a national minority, 2. Recognition of their traditional homelands, 3. The right to self-deterrairiation; and h. Citizenship rights and the right to live in 3ri Lanka for all Tamils who had made Sri Lanka their homeland.

But these were rejected by the Sri Lankan delegation and talks failed. In this atmosphere of failure to reach any settlement between Sri Lankan government and the Tamil groups themselves. New Delhi was left with no choice but to give up its limited third party mediatory role to the third party in the crisis, India expressed serious concern on 5 January

1. Mohan Ram, op.cit.^ p. 57. 104

1987 over the economic blockade imposed by the government of Sri Lank«, on the northern peninsula where the Tamil population is concentrated. India officially informed the Sri Lankan Government on 10 February 1987, thit India was suspecting its good offices in respect of negotiations until certain major steps were taken to clear the extra-ordinary situation, like curbing the military option arid check on violence against Tamils in north 2 east. Other factors which determined India's stand on the

ethnic issue in Sri Lanka was the readiness of Israel to help Colombo in its military solution to the ethnic problem, and the 3 growing Pak-Lankan military nexus. There is one ffict we should never forget that India can not shed its geo-political responsi- 4 bilities. Apart from it, Sri Lankan contacts with Britain, South Africa and America compelled India to come in. Washington also realised that no solution of the problem was possible unless India helped. All these situations paved a way for the signing of an agreement between India and Sri Lanka on 29 July 1987. The

Asian Recorder. Vol. XXXIII, No. 11, March 12-18, 1987, (New Delhi) , p. 19365. Ibid., Vol. XXXIII, No. 20. May 14-20, 1987 (New Delhii, p. 19465. Singh Rai, "Dimensions of Indo-Sri Lanka Relations'* in Dharmdasani, M.D. (ed.) op.cj-t•, pp. 104-105. Singh, K. Natwar, "India and Her Neighbour" in Mainsty^e^my Vol. XXVIII, NO. 11, Jan. 6, 1990. 105

overriding objective of the Accord was to bring about an end to violence* make all communities feel secure/ create an atmosphere wherein different ethnic groups can live together in dignity and honour yet preserving their cultural and linguistic identity. Most of them to make all feel that they are equal citizens with equal opportunities. This is to achieve through creation of provincial governments and appropriate devolution of powers/ recognition of Tamil and English as official languages along with Sinhala. The most significant concession/ however/ was related to the merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces, having one elected provincial Council, one Governor, one Chief Minister and one Board of Ministers.

India has taken upon itself a number of responsibilities to ensure implementation as also to under-write Sri Lanka's unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity. There is no need for outside involven)ent or presence. It was also provided In the Accord that in the event that the Government of Sri Lanka requests the Government of India to afford military assistance to implement these proposals the Government of India will co-operate by giving to the Government of Sri Lanka such military assistance as and 2 when reciuested . This was done because good-neighbourliness is

1. Bhandari, Romesh, "Indo Sri Lanka Accord : The Challenge Ahead" in Dharmdasani, M.D. (ed.), op.clt.* p. 110, 2. Section 2 (16)(c) of Indo- Sri Lanka Accord, 1987. For full Text of the Agreement see ^^ews Review on South Asia, IDSA, New Delhi, September, 1987. 106

a basic tenet of India's foreign policy". This stems from India's awareness that her own security and welfare are inextricably linked with the security and welfare of her neighbours. By all means, this accord was a bold and innovative role for India to take over as a responsibility as South Asia's leading power with its deep concern for the welfare of the entire population of Sri Lanka, 2 Sinhsla and Tamils alike. It provided the basis for ending hostilities between the Lankan majority Sinhala community and the minority Sri Lankan Tamils. In effect India was required to demilitarize the conflict by means of a peace keeping role.

Under this agreement India sent the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKP) to Sri Lanka. This is not the first time India has sent its troops on extra-curricular mission. Jawaharlal Nehru's government helped King Tribhuvan of Nepal* regain his throne which he had almost lost to the Ranas, India sent lAF helicopters to Sri Lanka in 1971 at Mrs. Sirimao Bhandarnaite's request. And 4 it brought about the liberation of Bangladesh. India has had the same prime humanatarian objective in the case of Sri Lankan

1. Foreign Affairs Redord, New Delhi, January 1985, p. 13. 2. Sengupta, Bhabani, "Lankan Policy needs delicate handling" in The Hindustan Times, 28 August 1997. 3. Hubbel, L. Kenneth, "The Devolution of Power" in Asian Survey, (New Delhi) November 1987, p. 1176. 4. Dua, H.K. "Launching Peace in Sri Lanka" in The Hindustan Times. 5 August 1987. 107

Tamils. Though India is sympathetic towards Tamils in Sri Lanka she never wanted a Tamil Selam, mainly because India with all the problems, it is facing at home can not afford to support separatist movement across the Palk straits. It was also opposed to a Tamil Eelam because of the memories of Tamil separatism which tried to acquire a dimension - although unsuccessfully - in the 1950s. A Tamil Eelam across the Palk Strait could create* problems in Tamil Nadu one day* so ran the unspoken argument. At the same time New Delhi could not be indifferent to the plight of the Tamils in Sri Lanka. Here New Delhi's domestic compulsions appeared to be

1 '• dictating policy towards a neighbour. Also« the Tamil struggle was seen as a chance to enhance New Delhi's prestige by projecting 2 itself as the 'big brother' in the region.

Under the supervision of IPKF, elections were held in North East Province of Sri Lan);a (after merger of the two provinces) . The most violent and militant Tamil group LTTE surrendered with arms to a large extent. The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord and the role of IPKF was hailed by both the Super Powers, USA and USSR. But, as far as the issue of the plantation Tamils is concerned/ the accord left the future of the plantation Tamils (of Indian origin)

2. Joshi, Manoj, "The Ignored Signals" in Frontlitie, July 7-20, 1990. 108

untouched, which was a major lacuna, for the Tamil demand is not limited to a provincial council and parity for Tamil with Sinhala as the official language. Rajmohan Gandhi, a leading journalist 2 looks on accord as an error. He writes "The pro-Tamil thrust of India's Lankan policy has tended to make the Lankan majority and the Lankan authorities anti Indian add more suspicious of their Tamils. The Accord, sadly, was another error. Though the Government of India was not a party to the dispute in Sri Lanka, it became a party to an accord for resolving the dispute. The joint demand of the LTTS, the JVP, the students of Sri Lanka and the Colombo Government, for withdrawal of the IPKP was a conclu­ sive proof of the Accord's failure".

On the other hand, there is the massive influx of Tamil refugees into Tamil Nadu. Thousands of refugees have come so far< hundreds refugee camps have been set up in the Southern State. The political parties in Tamil Nadu are making it a political issue already. It seems an undending turmoil. Now India has called back her forces. The last soldier returned home in March 3 1990. Rajesh Kadiyan writes , "After 956? days in Sri Lanka at a reported cost of Rs. 300 crores and at a loss of 1155 lives with

1. Mohan Ram, Sri Lanka : The Fractured Island, p. 138. 2. Gandhi, Rajmohan, "Common Sense on Sri Lanka" in The Hindustan ZinSLs. 21 June, 1989. 3. Kadiyan, Rajesh, India's Sri Lankan Fiasco, Peace-keepers at War^ Vision Books, Ne^ 3»«»h\ \99o 109 three tirnt^s as many wounded, the Indian Army was home. The end result of this huge Indian undertaking was similar to the rest of th>c Indian involvement in Sri Lanka - it was marked by failure - because 90,000 refugees were still in India when the IPKF withdrew from the island in March 1990.

Indian attitude towards the problems of Tamil community (both Indian and Sri Lankan) in Sri Lanka has been sympathetic. India tried her best to resolve the most genuine problem of Indian migrants/ the problem of their citizenship. And this problem is now almost settled. In case of other problems inclu­ ding regional autonomy, language etc. India has spoken in favour of Tamil community. But India never supported the separatist movement in Sri Lanka, because India is responsible enough in creating and preserving peace in the region. If India ignores the problem, other world powers would get chance to enter in the region which would lead to a more complex situation. That is why India's role has become very important to protect the region.

***« CONCmS ION

The major political problem, concerning the Indian migrants in Sri Lanka, was the question of their citizenship which is now settled. But after so many efforts and steps taken by both the countries, the basic ethnic differences still persist. It can be said that the efforts made so far were not enough and appropriate. There were some mistakes on all parts.

Had successive Sri Lankan Governments' offers not been so late and so little, they could have pacified their Tamils with half of what they have to give now. Had the Buddhist clergy and the

Sinhala citizens been less chauvinistic, the government of Sri

Lanka would have made better offers to the Tamils. If in earlier decades popular Tamil leaders had been more united, initiative would not have passed to the LTTE or sirailar bodies. Now, without a long term solution of the Sinhala-Tamil conflict in Sri Lanka there can be no peace or stability in Sri Lanka, and hence in the whole region. India and Sri Lanka will remain problems for each other. To cut across these problems, any solution to the ethnic conflict needs to be radically different and to have as its foun­ dation, a recognition of Sri Lanka's reality - that it comparises two ethnic groups. In order to work sucJi a solution the Sinhala mcijority needs to be more generously accommodative and adjusting and to be neutralized on the Tamil demands and be persuaded to Ill recognise the Tamil right to their identity as the price of the keeping the nation - state together. The majority cottinunity, the Sinhalese are unaware of the fact that a nation-state rests not only on the sense of shared historical memories# interests, values and sense of belonging together* but also despite linguis­ tic, cultural and religious multiplicity. It follows that the greater the absence of commitment on the part of majority community to accommodate various minorities' identities, the greater is the potential for ethnic conflict. There appears to be little hope for an immediate solution to the guerilla warfare in the north-east and the lack of Parliamentary representation denied to the Sri Lankan Tamils since 1983. Since then, there is a gradual evolution of authoritarianism that has threatened democracy and institutuonalized the politics of violence and terrorism. In fact, Sri Lanka provides an- interesting laboratory to social scientists in order to experiment the linkage between politics (both internal and external) and the tensions generated out of racial disharmony. Sooner or later, Sri Lankan Government and the people have to realize that they have to build a poli­ tical system in which the different ethnic minorities be allowed to live with reasonable political satisfaction. To build this type of political system, there should be acceptance of pluralism, enforcement of rule of law to protect minorities and renxinciation of Tamil linguistic and ethnic separatism. Formation of a 112

national government and fresh elections can serve the purpose to a large extent. To take these decisions may look difficult, but it is essential for the survival of the nation. What India can contribute at this juncture is the ejection of LTTE from Tamil Nadu.

The ethnic divide is so deep and the ability of the nation.'s political leaders to stop the drift so uncertain that Sri Lanka would need a lot of good luck to emerge from the present chaos. And I wish Sri Lanka a good lucki

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