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THE REVOLUTION OF 1848 IN COLOMBIA

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Authors Grusin, Jay Robert, 1948-

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University Microfilms International 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 USA St. John's Road, Tyler's Green High Wycombe, Bucks, England HP10 8HR 8RUIXN, JAY ROBERT "THEREVOLUTIONOF 1648 IN COLOMBIA. THE UNXVER0ITY OF ARIZONA, PN.D,, 1979

University Microfilms International 300 n zeeb road, ann arbor, mi 4B106

JAY ROBERT GRUSIN

Jay Robert Grusin

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

In the Graduate College

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

1978

GRADUATE COLLEGE

I hereby recommend that this dissertation prepared under my direction by Jay Robert Grusin entitled The Revolution of 1848 in Colombia

be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

/2—/hg^Jk 111 7% Dissertation Director Date

As members of the Final Examination Committee, we certify that we have read this dissertation and agree that It may be presented for final defense.

"? / i ^ f

VvUKAqjtJ C. . cU d-1 ! I°!l^

Final approval and acceptance of this dissertation Is contingent on the candidate's adequate performance and defense thereof at the final oral examination. STATEMENT BY AUTHOR

This dissertation has been submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for an advanced degree at The University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be made available to bor rowers under rules of the Library.

Brief quotations from this dissertation are allowable without special permission, provided that accurate acknowledgement of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the copyright holders.

SIGNED: TO SARAH

AND TO

M3T PARENTS

iii PREFACE

Between 1848 and 1854 Colombia became the first nation in

Latin America, and one of the few in the world, to experience a true

Revolution. It was a movement as radical and as convulsive as similar upheavals in Europe. It was an independent movement brought on by local problems and conditions, only slightly influenced by foreign ideas. The Colombian Revolution attempted, with varying success, to end vestiges of Spanish economic, political, and social institutions, thus moving in one effort from the colonial period to the mid-nineteenth century. However, despite the significance of this period for both

Latin American and European historians, the Colombian Revolution remains largely unstudied. Works on the epoch generally consider the reforms merely an extension of European influence and they suffer from poor documentation, political biases, and narrow focus. These weaknesses have generated historical misconceptions that have found their way into studies of other aspects and other periods of Colombian history. This dissertation is aimed at correcting this void in historical knowledge

- / y * concerning the presidencies of Jose Hilario Lopez and Jose Maria Obando.

A combination of events during 1848 brought on the Revolution.

During that year many unresolved social and political problems, that had their roots in the years following independence in 1810, re-emerged as focal points of debate. The issues became particularly important

iv V after the 1840 civil war, which introduced new political tensions into

Colombia. President Tom^s Cipriano de Mosquera (1844-1848) tried to solve these problems, but succeeded only in creating an atmosphere that stimulated calls for more radical change. At the same time the central government was plagued with problems, the working class evolved into a political force for the first time in Colombian history. Workers orga nized as a result of years of abuse and poverty, a consequence that climaxed in the wake of the impact of many of Mosquera's reforms. A group of young intellectuals, members of the Generation of 1850, anxious to assume a role in national politics and eager to press for significant institutional reforms, joined the workers to oppose the government.

The intellectuals used the terminology generated during the upheavals in Europe to guide their programs and to articulate their demands.

Pressing national problems, unrest among the workers and the intellec tuals, and the influx of foreign ideas culminated in the election of

Jose' Hilario Lopez to the presidency and in the outbreak of an intense, often violent, struggle against the old order.

Lopez' administration moved quickly to complete many of the projects started during Mosquera's last years in office and to liberal ize other aspects of Colombian society. At first, the government faced a multitude of problems including a lack of competent loyal bureaucrats and intense conservative opposition to reform programs. The scarcity of appointees was soon resolved, however, and Conservative antipathy proved to be more apparent than real. At the policy-making level the programs of both the government and the opposition were almost identical, except on the issue of Church-State relations, and Liberal and Conservative congressmen frequently voted together to approve or

defeat legislation. With bipartisan support, Congress approved projects that affected almost every facet of national life, including political organization, economic structures, social institutions, the

Church, and the military. The reforming impetus lasted until early in

1854, when a series of dramatic changes in political alignments "brought on a revolt of the military and artisans against the government. Al though finally defeated, the rebels forced the government to assume a more moderate position. However, the Revolution did not die and the reforming impulse continued well into the last years of the decade.

Projects such as this are never completed without the aid of others. Funds for research and maintenance were provided by a

Fulbright-Hayes Fellowship to Colombia during the 1974--1975 academic year. The Fulbright Commission in Bogota' under Dr. Francisco Gnecco

Calvo's able direction, was especially helpful in making my stay in

Colombia both professionally and personally rewarding. The adminis trators of the Ernest Turville Prize in History at The University of

Arizona provided welcome supplementary funds.

Many others were also helpful in the preparation of this study.

I would like to thank Dr. George A. Brubaker for providing invaluable guidance throughout my graduate studies, and especially during the final drafts of this dissertation. Professors Michael Meyer and

Ursula Lamb also provided useful criticisms of the text. Dr. Frank

Safford devoted considerable time and energy giving me advice, vii criticism, and encouragement at the earliest stages of research.

Dr. J. Leon Helguera's suggestions on sources and his willingness to share his materials further facilitated this study. Glen T. Curry also gave me the benefit of this criticisms, as well as many hours of prof itable discussion on nineteenth-century Colombian history. A special debt is owed to Leopoldo Gdmez Montes, Director of the Archivo del

Corigreso in Bogotef, for making my prolonged stay in the archive a most enjoyable one. Courtesies extended by Dr. Jaime Duarte French, Director of the Biblioteca Luis Angel Arango, and the staffs of the Biblioteca

Nacional and the Archivo Nacional eased many of the burdens inherent in research in Latin America. I would also like to extend my gratitude to

Dr. Jorge Ancizar Sordo for unrestricted use of his family's well- organized archive, as well as for many hours of delightful conversation.

A similar debt is owed General Jaime Duran Pombo, one of President

Lopez' direct descendants, for allowing access to his valuable collec tion of memorabilia and letters written during the 1860s. viii

"...'the true republic'—a thing that seems to all of them like a millennium, always at hand, but alas I never yet seen."

Isaac F. Holton

New Granada: Twenty Months in the Andes TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ABSTRACT x

1. ROOTS OF REVOLUTION: ISSUES AND CLASS CONFLICTS 1

2. NEW FORCES TRIUMPHANT: LOPEZ CCMES TO POWER 42

3. CONSERVATIVES UNDER LOPEZ: POLITICAL AND MILITARY OPPOSITION AND IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE 66

4. ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM: THE BUREAUCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 92

5. THE ECONOMIC REVOLUTION: LIBERALISM AND THE STATE 121

6. THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION 157

7. LIBERALS AND THE CHURCH: THE UNWANTED TRIUMPH 197

8. THE END OF AN ERA 217

9. CONCLUSION 252

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 256

ix ABSTRACT

The years between 1849 and 1854 marked a profound change in

Colombia's historical development. New political alignments, ideolo gical developments, and important social, political, and economic legislation characterized this era during which the country attempted to move at once from the colonial era into the mid-nineteenth century.

It was a Revolution as violent and as far-reaching as any in Europe.

', The Colombian Revolution was an indigenous movement resulting from a combination of events during the late 1840s. European ideolo gies such as liberalism, conservativism, and utopianism, did not spark the reform movement, rather the ideas provided progressives with terminology necessary to express problems and write legislation. Un rest among the educated and working classes, the tensions brought on as a result of the 1840 civil war, and developments during the last two years of the presidency of Tomas Cipriano de Mosquera, provided the other elements. In the ensuing struggle between Mosquera's sup porters, who became the Conservative Party, and his opponents, who became the Liberal Party, the opposition to the government triumphed in March, 1849.

With the Liberals' triumph, President Jose'Hilario Lopez began the task of restructuring Colombian administrative, economic, social, and religious institutions. He accomplished this task frequently with

z the aid of Conservatives who, except on issues concerning religion, shared the same views as Liberals on questions of reform. Lopez also received considerable support, and pressure, from workers and intel lectuals who were the core of the Liberal Party and responsible for engineering his victory over a clear Conservative majority.

The center of activity was the national Congress, where legis lators, frequently cooperating with the Executive and sometimes op posing him, considered proposals affecting virtually every aspect of national life. Congress moved to modernize the bureaucracy, eliminate restrictions on economic development, and stimulate commercial expan sion. The legislators also strengthened individual liberty and tried to improve the judicial, penal, and educational systems. They attacked the economic and moral influence of the church and moved to diminish the power of the military. Many of the proposals were never passed and others failed to meet expectations because the government lacked the funds and administrators to implement them.

The reform movement slowed following a revolt of artisans and the military in April 1854. The uprising was a consequence of politi cal realignments during which Liberal and Conservative elites united to oppose the emergence of an alliance between the military and the working class. The army withdrew support from the government because

Congress threatened military prerogatives and attempted to reduce the troop strength. The workers abandoned the Liberals because party leaders refused to support protective tariffs and generally ignored xii the needs of the working class. The soldiers and the workers found a leader in Lopez1 successor to the presidency, General Jos^Maria Obando.

Obando was willing to lead the revolt against his own government because

Congress was unwilling to pass what he thought was necessary legisla- / tion. The uprising was engineered by General Jose/ Maria Melo, who resented congressional assaults on the military. The revolt ended with a victory for the Liberal-Conservative alliance.

The revolt slowed, but did not stop the reforming impetus.

Under the victors' government, led by Manuel Mallarino, Congress , i*. • adopted a moderate program continuing earlier programs, but eliminating excesses that brought on revolt. The Liberal-Conservative coalition ushered in a stability lasting until 1860. CHAPTER 1

ROOTS OF REVOLUTION: ISSUES AND CLASS CONFLICTS

At the heart of the Colombian Revolution are themes and class antagonisms that date from the first days of independence from Spain in

1810. By the mid-184-Os these elements combined in a milieu of incoming foreign ideas and changing political climate to bring the nation to the brink of a reform movement that forever altered the complexion of

Colombian national life.

The foreign intellectual currents that influenced Colombians came from a variety of sources. Efforts of the French and English bour geoisie to promote liberalism and federalism attracted Colombians who also saw a need for reforming archaic institutions.^ Rapidly mobilizing European workers undoubtedly directed Colombians' attention to a new potential power base.

Through their books and articles, European ideologists provided

Colombians with the "tools" for interpreting their own situation for formulating solutions to national problems. Romantics preached that with optimism and enthusiasm, existing institutions could be changed

1. E.J. Hobsbawn, The Age of Revolution, 1789-1848 (New York, 1962), pp. 1-18.

2. Ibid., 163-169, 259-272.

1 2 and made more "modern."3 Progressive French conservatives, such as Benjamin Constant and Abbe Felicite de Lamenais, provided Colombian traditionalists with a forward-looking, but pro-clerical program.4 Liberalism, both French and English, suggested ways to promote economic and individual freedom. French liberals such as Alphonse de Lamartine and Eugenio SuErand English liberal Richard Cobden were especially influential in reform of the Colombian government and the Church.5 More radical thinkers also found advocates in Colombia Utopians Robert Owen, Charles Fourier, and Saint-Simon were widely read. After the election of Liberal Jost Hilario Ldpez to the Colombian presidency in 1849, revolutionaries such as Louis Blanc, Giuseppe Mazzini, Pierre Proudhon, and Edward Cabet showed some popularity.6 The ideas of these more destructive thinkers, however,

4. See Guido de Ruggiero, The History of European Liberalism, trans., R.G. Collingwooa (Lonaon, 1927), pp. 84-89; Carilla, Romanticismo, I, 72-73; R.G. Law and Bobbie W. Law, From Reason to Romanticism (New York, 1973), pp. 47-60; G.D.H. Cole;- Socialist Thought: The Forerunners 1789-1850, Vol. I: A History of Socialist Thought (London, 1959), pp. 186-189. 5. On Liberalism see Ruggiero, Liberalism, pp. 13-16, 43-60, 98-108, 123-127, 158-176, 186-187, 347-356, 370-374; William de Grampp, Economic Liberalism: The Classical View, 2 vols. (New York, 1965), II, 40-68, 94-105. 6. Cole; Socialist Thought, pp. 2-7, 37-61, 86-127; Hobsbawn, Age of Revolution, pp. 285-28'7; Jaime Jaramillo Uribe, El pensamiento colombiano en el siglo XIX (Bogot~, 1964), p. 45. 3

were poorly understood in Colombia, and their influence was more

apparent than real.

184-2 the influx of foreign ideas reached what many

Colombians thought was dangerous levels. Increased foreign trade

brought many liberal merchants into ports.''' Students easily obtained

previously banned books and by the mid-l840s many became part of the a National Library collection. During the last years of the decade

foreign ideas became so popular that many potential Colombian writers

formed the "Literary Society" as forum for discussion and literary

criticism; many of the members were later active in Lcfpez1 adminis

tration.^ Newspapers printed serializations of major European works

and writers frequently explained and analyzed popular intellectual

currents.

Although Colombians were influenced by foreign ideas, they

did not provide impetus for the Colombian Revolution. Rather the

themes of the 1848 movement surfaced between the years 1810 and 1821.

7. Robert Louis Gilmore, "Nueva Granada's Socialist Mirage," Hispanic American Historical Review 36, no. 2 (1956); 192; Hobsbawm Age of Revolution, p.

8. Luis Agosto Cuervo, ed., Epistolario del doctor Rufino Cuervo, 3 vols. Biblioteca de historia nac^onal, nos. 22, 24, 25 (Bogota, 1918-1922), II, 275-278; Jose Maria Samper, Historia de una alma. 1834-1881, 2 vols. (Bogota, 1946), I, 129. , 1 ^ . 9. Rufino J. Cuervo and Angel Cuervo, Vida de Rufino Cuervo y noticias de su Ipoca, 2 vols. fBogotS, 1946), II, 84-85; Samper^ Alma, I, 184--186.

10. EL Censor, November 28, 1848, pp. 2-3; December 18, 1848, pp. 2-3, December Z8, 1848, pp. 2-3; El t>ia, February 3, 1849, p. 4-; February 7, 1849, pp. 3-4; August 11, 1849, p. 2; August 15, 1849, p. 2; August 18, 1849, p. 2; August 22, 1849, p. 2. 4 The struggle between centralists and federalists over territorial orga

nization, a major factor in the collapse of the First Republic

in 1816, persisted through the 1820s and was only temporarily resolved

in the 1832 Constitution. The issue resurfaced in the late 1830s and

was an important cause of the devastating 1840 civil war.^-

Other national issues had similar histories. The controversy

over the role of the church in society developed during the first days

of independence and continued as a center of virulent debates during

the 1820s. During Simon Bolivar's dictatorship (1828-1829) the problem

was resolved, but later became an important issue in the 1840 civil

war.-*-2 The presence of a huge military organization and the institu

tion of slavery in a republic posed serious problems and provoked

heated debates.Fiscal reform, government, private monopolies,

tariffs, Indians, immigration and public education also became issues

11. Much material on the centralist-federalist controvery exists. For some indication of its recurrence in Colombian history see Jose de la Vega, La federacion en Colombia 1810-1912 (Biblioteca de autores colombianos, no. 4; Bogota, 1952), passim.

12. Jose Manuel Restrepo, Historia de la revolucion de Colombia 4 vols.; 2nd ed. (Benzan6n, 1858), I, 266, 270, 302; Ibid., Diario' politico y militar, 4 vols.( BogotC 1954)> I> 117-118; III, 116; David Bushnell, The Santander Regime in Gran Colombia (Westport, Conn., 1970), p. 220; Republica de Colombia, Codificacion nacional: de todas las leyes de Colombia desde el afio de" 1821 (Bogota, 1924—)> I, 332-333; II, 285-290, 394-395, 408-409, hereafter cited as Leyes.

/ 13. Juan Garcia del Rio, Meditaciones colombianas, 2nd ed. (Bogota, 1945), p. 83; Bushnell, Santander, p. 273; Leyes, I, 14, 159, 167; II, 251. of largely futile debating.^ The failure of the Colombians to resolve

these problems left much of the nation's colonial heritage intact and

the break from the Spanish was never completely accomplished.

Problems of the first thirty years of republican life brought

on a devastating civil war in 1840, in which the pro-government

ministeriales (conservatives) aligned against an odd alliance of pro- clerical and liberal elements. It ended with the defeat of the latter in 1842.^ The war left the nation in disarray.^ Destruction was so widespread, particularly in the agrarian sector, that many conserva tives, who hoped to rebuild the nation, shifted their support from efforts to promote industrial development to proposals that would stimulate agricultural expansion.1'''

14. For remarks on these see Garcia del R^o, Meditaciones, p. 95; Bushnell, Santander, pp. 154, 175; Luis Ospina V£squez, Industria y proteccidn en Colombia, 1810-1930 (Medellrn, 1955), p. 99; Restrepo, Historia de la revolucifin, III, 409-410; Leyes, II, 241, 405; III, 401-451.

15. Jos6 Manuel Restrepo, Historia de la Nueva Granada, 1832- 1854* 2 vols. (Bogota, 1963), I, 123-233; Ibid. Diario, III, 180-208:, Tomas Herrer^, Tomas Herrera presidente del estado del istmo (Panama, 1841); Telegrafo del estado soberano de Cartagena (.Cartagena, 1841).

16. Mariano Ospina, Exposicion del secretario del interior y relaciones exteriores al congreso constitucional de 1842 (.Bogota, 1842), pp. 6-7. This volume is part of a series of annual reports to the Congress from officials of the Executive branch. The reports appeared under a variety of titles, but will hereafter be cited as Memoria, followed by the office and year. Complete reference in bibliography; Frank Safford, "Commerce and Enterprise in Central Colombia 1821-1870" (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1965), p. 80.

17. Ospina, Vasquez, Industria, pp. 181-184; Republica Colombia, Archivo del congreso, senado, 1850, IV, fols, 1-97, 222, 231, hereafter cited as ACSen, followed by volume and folio numbers. 6

Efforts of the government to prevent future civil wars and to

promote lasting stability set in motion a sequence of events that cul

minated in the Revolution of 1848. For many officials, the unrest of

1842 pointed out the need to establish firm control over potential

sources of disturbances, especially the provincial and municipal

governments and the school system. The strong shift of the national

government toward centralization was first articulated in Secretary of

the Interior Mariano Ospina's report to the 1842 Congress. He blamed

problems on the influence of "certain foreign" ideas on Colombian

schools, government institutions, and morals. The country, he con

tended, suffered from the absence of a work ethic, lack of respect for

authority, excessive liberty of the press, and want of national unity.

Viewing their influence on Colombian institutions and their lack of relevance to national reality, Ospina recommended reform of the school

system, an end to vagrancy, judicial reform to assure swift and firm

justice, road construction to regionalism, and general institutional

changes to make the bureaucracy consistent with Colombian needs.1

Ospina's report served as the blueprint for government pro grams during the administration of Pedro A. Herran (1840-1844).

Herran, as well as other ministeriales, thought economic development the most effective means to increase political stability and social order. To stimulate the economy Rufino Cuervo, who as treasury minis ter shaped economic policy, attempted to reduce expenditures, improve

18. Ospina, Memoria del secretario del interior, 1842, pp. 7-18. 7 accounting procedures, and increase supervision on government contrac tors. While cutting expenses Cuervo urged Congress to continue the ten percent tax on agricultural products —the dlezmo— high tariff sched ules, and indirect taxation, which he thought more effective than direct imposts. Other ministeriales supporter Cuervo's efforts and formed clubs intended to promote commercial expansion. Cuervo's efforts alleviated some of the most critical fiscal problems, balanced 19 the budget, and returned civil employees to full salary.

To establish political order, the 1842 Congress adopted the harsh "Law on Ways to Assure Public Security," which authorized the

President to bring in foreign troops to quell unrest, banned internal travel without a passport, prohibited unlicensed possession of fire arms, and placed all heavy weapons under government control. It also condoned the arrest and indefinite exile of those who even slightly appeared to be a threat to public order. Officials who were reluctant to enforce the law lost their posts and incurred large fines. As order was restored, Congress modified the law to allow exiles to serve their terms in remote parts of the country and to permit the central

19. Rufino Cuervo, Memoria del secretario de la hacienda, 1843, pp. 21-23; Anibal Galindo, Historia econ6mica y estadistica de la hacienda nacional desde la colonia hasta nuestros dias (, Bogota, 1874), "dp. 37-461; Rufino and Angel Cuervo, Cuervo, II, 70-71; Ignacio Gutierrez Ponce, Yida de don Ignacio Vergara y episodios de su tiernpo, 1806-1877, 2 vols. (vol. I, London, 1900; vol. II, Bogota, 1973J, I, 351-352. Safford, "Commerce," p. 65; Restrepo, Diario, III, 337, 345. 8

government to mitigate sentences deemed excessive. The law proved

effective and by late 184-2 order returned to Colombia. 20

To make stability permanet, the government embarked upon a

program aimed at "moralizing the masses." The scheme, which focused

on control of the schools, was intended to produce a generation of stable, moral Colombians. Under the leadership of Mariano Ospina,

Congress passed laws authorizing the exiled Jesuits to return to

Colombia and resume teaching and preaching activities. Another measure revised the curriculum of the universities forcing each school to offer only certain degree programs, thus improving the quality of education and increasing technical training while reducing emphasis on law and technology. Legislation expanded primary education making certain that

every Colombian would have at least two years of schooling. Other legislation established normal schools to assure an adequate supply of teachers for the ambitious program. To further expand mass education

Ospina recommended, though with little apparent success, publication and distribution of periodicals filled with moral maxims and practical knowledge.^ Ospina was equally unsuccessful in restricting the students' exposure to radical ideas.^2 Aside from these minor

20. Lino de Pombo, Recopilacifoi de leyes de la Nueva Granada (Bogota', 1845), pp. 82-83; Restrepo, Diario, III, 318; Ospina, Memoria del secretario del interior, 1844? pp. 21-25.

21. Restrepo, Historia de la Nueva Granada, I, 340; Ospina Memoria del secretario del interior, 1842, pp. 45-52.

f 22. Pombo, Recopilacion, pp. 236-2^7, 240-241; Estanisla^> Gomez Barrientos, Don Mariano Ospina y su epoca, 2 vols. (Medellm, 1913-1915), I, 278^257: 9 setbacks, by 1843 Ospina's plan was largely implemented. Two years later he boasted that the program was in full operation and producing noticeable improvements in the quality of instruction.^3

The government's efforts to fulfill Ospina's plan culminated in the promulgation of a new constitution in 1843 to replace that of

1832. At first Congress seemed reluctant to reform the constitution, but Herr^n's threats to resign forced the legislators to reconsider their positions and adopt c. proposal.^4 The new document provided for a strong executive and ended any pretense of provincial autonomy. It also reaffirmed the place of the church as a pillar of society making

Catholicism "the only cult supported and maintained by the Republic."

To help stem inflammatory polemics, Congress included tough provisions against libel in the press. The constitution also created a political elite by establishing property and income requirements for voting or holding office. The new charter provoked considerable unrest in the coastal areas where strong federalist sentiments prevailed and in the southern provinces where bitterness over the recent defeat in the civil

23. Mariano Ospina, Memoria del secretario del interior, 1844, pp. 30-39; Ibid., Memoria del secretario del interior, 1&+5, pp. 51-65.

24. Blackford to Webster, March 18, 1843> United States Department of State, Dispatches from United States Ministers in Colombia, 1820-1906 (United States National Archives Microfilm Publi cations: Washington, 1959), Roll 10 dispatch 16, hereafter cited Dispatches, Ministers. war still lingered. Only Herran's moderate temperament prevented

renewed violence.^

The relative tranquility established between 184-1 and 1843 continued through the first three years of the Mosquera administration.

Mosquera had come to power largely on the basis of his performance

during the recent civil war, but his record in the wars against Spain,

his ties to Bolivar, and his proven administrative skills further

enhanced his reputation. Mosquera sought the presidency eagerly and

carried on a vigorous campaign against his two opponents, Eusebio

Borrero and Rufino Cuervo. To gain an edge over them, Mosquera made

campaign pledges to undertake ambitious public works projects and to

promote commercial activity. Mosquera's reputation and flamboyant

campaign led him to easy victory. The election provoked no sharp

reactions and the country settled down to four more years of ministe-

rial rule and tranquility.

Mosquera's term, however, did not progress exactly as his

supporters had anticipated. In his efforts to promote economic devel

opment, Mosquera was willing to bring the best minds into the govern ment regardless of political affiliation. He appointed many liberals

25. Blackford to Upshur, October 20, 1843> U.S. Department of State, Dispatches, Ministers, Roll 10, dispatch 16; Restrepo, Diario, III, 372; Mariano Ospina, Memoria del secretario del interior, 184-5, pp. 8-9. 26. J. Leon Helguera and Robert A. Davis, eds. Archivo epistolario del General Mosquera 3 vols. Biblioteca de Historia Nacional nos. 108, 116, 117( Bogota, 1966-1972), I, 23-36; Joaquin Tamayo, Don Tomas Cipriano de Mosquera (Bogota, 1936), pp. 29-4-4. to posts in the "bureaucracy and even named several to governorships.^7

At the same time, he alienated many supporters with his lavish spending on ambitious road and port construction program. Many of the projects employed foreign technicians and artisans, all brought to Colombia at government expense. In addition, the President mitigated several of the harsh measures passed in the wake of the civil war, modified

Ospina's plan of studies, moved to professionalize the army, and sup ported legislation that reduced the influence of the military in the government.^ Ambal Galindo correctly assessed the mood generated by Mosquera when he said that "the yeaa? 184-5 closed the period of quietism and fear of all economic innovation that had been dominant since 1833; and the year 1847 positively opened the era of the great liberal reforms

One of those who made the reforms possible during the Mosquera years was Florentino Gonzalez who, as Secretary of the Treasury, formu lated many of the legislative projects. On the surface little existed in Gonzalez' background to indicate any basis for supporting Mosquera.

He had always been a strong liberal and close associate of Santander / s and Vicente Azuero. Gonzalez had opposed Bolivar and had participated

27. Restrepo, Diario, III, 413; Rufino and Angel Cuervo, Cuervo, II, 94-98; Leyes, XII, 27-28.

28. For Mosquera's early reforms see Restrepo, Historia de la Nueva, Granada, II, 7-70; J. Leon Helguera, "The First Mosquera Administration, 1845-1849" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1958), p. 169.

29. Galindo, Historia economica, p. 50. in the September 1828 plot against the life of the Liberator. His journalism career during the 1830s reflected nothing but contempt for ministeriales. Forced to leave Colombia as a result of the reaction following the 184-0 civil war, he fled to Paris where he operated a shop until returning to Colombia in 1845, when he resumed his career in journalism and politics. At that time Mosquera became attracted to

Gonzalez' newspaper editorials on economic development that would not disturb existing social structures. He saw the business community as the most stable element in Colombian society and he wanted to strengthen its position. This philosophy was consistent with

Mosquera's plan to promote controlled progress, and when the office of Secretary of the Treasury fell vacant in September 184-6 he named

Gonzalez to the post.30

Gonzalez' economic policy took shape during late 184-6 and early 1847. To increase efficiency in public finances, he recommended reorganization of the treasury and improvements in tax collecting and accounting procedures. He also proposed tightening control of the salt monopoly, a measure strongly opposed by the popular classes.

More important, Gonzalez proposed reorientation of the economy away

30. On Gonzalez see Florentino Gonzalez, Memorias, (Medellxn, 1971), passim; Jaime Dimrte French, Florentino Gonz&lez, raz£n y sin razon de una lucha politics. (Bogota, 1971), passim; Restrepo, Historia de la Nueva Granada, II, 36-39; Luis Nieto Arteta, Economia y cultura en la historia de Colombia, 2 vols.; 3rd ed. (Medelliii, 1970), I, 116; German Colmenares, "Formas de la conjiencia de clase en la Njjeva Granada, Capitulo V. Florentino Gonzalez, El Mentor," Boletfn Cultural y Bibliografico, 9, (1966), 1548. 13 from industrial development toward agricultural expansion, which he saw as the basis for national prosperity. To accomplish the shift, he pro posed abolition of monopolies on export crops, especially tobacco, and adoption of a policy of low tariffs to discourage domestic industrial and crafts development. Such a policy would also force unemployed artisans and laborers to find jobs in the fields and divert capital to the agricultural sector.-^- During 1847, Gonzalez tried, but failed, to convince Congress to adopt his programs. The church, which resented the Secretary's position on the diezmo, joined Congress in opposing

Gonzalez. Gonzalez was finally driven from office in April 1848.32

Within several months of his resignation, however, Congress adopted several of Gonzalez' most important proposals. The legislators abolished the tobacco monopoly, lowered tariffs, reformed the diezmo, reorganized the treasury, and improved the nation's currency supply.33

These measures reflected the final triumph of Gonzalez' plans to improve fiscal management and redirect the economy. They also signaled the ascendancy of the commercial class at the expense of the workers.

The reforms of the last years of the Mosquera administration effectively ended the stability of the 1840s. They created an

31. Florentino Gonzalez, Memoria del secretario de la hacienda, 1847, pp. 1-19.

32. Restrepo, Diario, III, 509-513.

33. Ibid., 502-510, 523-524, 556; IV, 15; Helguera and Davis Epistolario, III, 146-147; Florentino Gonzalez, Memoria del secretario de la hacienda, I848 (^Bogota, 1848), pp. 1-18; Abel Cruz Santos Economic y hacienda publica, Historia extensa de Colombia, vol. 15 (Bogota, 1966), p. 384. 14

atmosphere that seemed more receptive to change than at any time since

the 1820s. The liberals became optimistic about the possibility for

change and re-entered national politics. The growing rift in minis

terial ranks over whether or not to support Mosquera's reforms further

encouraged opposition.34 Workers, discontent over the consequences of recent tariff reform, demanded social legislation to match economic reform. Merchants, sensing the possibility of obtaining still more

concessions pressed for an end to all restrictions on commercial activ

ity. By mid-1848, the Mosquera administration had lost control of the

economic revolution so carefully planned the year before.35

The workers' growing opposition to government policies marked a turning point in Colombian labor history. The efforts of the admin

istration to redirect the economy toward agriculture at the expense of the artisans brought to a head resentment that had been building through decades of abuse and suffering. It transformed the working class from an amorphous mass into a well-organized political force that became the major pressure group in the Revolution of 1848. Some contemporary observers included craftsmen, day laborers, and the un employed, as well as the unemployable, in their definitions of the

34. .Rufino and Angel Cuervo, Cuervo, II, 86-93; Salvador Camacho Roldan, Memorias, Bolsilibros tfedout no. 74 (Bogota, n.d.), pp. 18-19; Helguera, "First Mosquera Administration," pp. 220-222, 279-281.

35. Nieto Arteta, Economia y cultura, I, 118-119; Jose Maria Arboleda Llorente, Vida Llmo. senor Manuel Jose*Mosquera, arzobispo de Santa Fe de Bogota, 2 vols., Biblioteca de autores colombianos, nos. 108, 109 (Bogota, 1956), II, 245-249. Las Brujas, December 10, 1848, pp. 13-14. 15 laboring class. Others expanded it to include priests, friars, some lawyers, lower-echelon managers and bureaucrats, soldiers, unsuccessful medical doctors, women, and homeless children.36 The core, however, consisted of skilled artisans and those below them who served as domestic workers, laundresses, street sweepers, and sanitation workers --those trapped in a cycle of poverty by chronic political unrest and colonial economic structures.37 Artisans themselves later included small farmers in their ranks.

The slow growth of the working class between 1825 and 1848 provides some insight into why the group was so difficult to define.

During the wars with Spain many craftsmen, who stopped practicing their trades and joined the army, did not return to the shops. Also, the wars decimated the working class, which provided most of the rank-and file troops.38 The laboring class only gradually recovered from the impact of the wars in the next twenty years. It grew during periods of agricultural expansion when landowners required the services of semi- skilled planters, harvesters, and hunters, as well as more skilled laborers such as blacksmiths. The development of new towns also

36.- El Pobre, September 9, 1851, pp. 1-2; Januario Salgar, 11 Los chinos, 11 Mus eo de cuadros de costumbres, 4 vols. , Biblioteca banco popular, nos. 46, 47, 48, 49 (B_ogot!!, 1973), II, 247.

37. Ernst Rothlisberger, El-dorado, est~as de viaje y cultlira de Colombia Suramericana, trans. Ailtoru.()e Zub~aurre, 1st Spanish ed •. (Bogoti!, 1963 ), pp. 77-82; Miguel Samper, La niiseria en B-Jgota y otros escritos (Bogot~, 1969), pp. 14-39.

38. Rafael E. Santander, 11 Los artesanos, " Mus eo de cuadros de costumbres, III, 156-158. encouraged increases in the working class as the need for services increased. The process was much the same in already-established towns and cities where merchants, lawyers, and absentee landowners employed artisans as bricklayers, carpenters, ironworkers, painters, cabinet and furniture makers, tailors, and saddlemakers. Unfortunately, the increase in demand for skilled labor did not raise the quality of work, and demand for domestic goods remained small.^9

As the size of the working class increased, the problems of unemployment, relations with shop owners and wealthy customers, and general living became important factors in increasing working-class consciousness. Craftsmen and unskilled workers rarely had steady employment. The closing of shops and business was a frequent occur rence during depressions. This, coupled with a lack of credit and the problems of seasonal labor created a staggering rate of unem ployment. El Nacional estimated that of a total population of two million, approximately 4-00,000 were of prime working ages (eighteen to forty.) Of those, only 50,000 had year round steady work; this figure increased to 100,000 if priests, soldiers, and proprietors were included. About one-half of the remaining 300,000 were employed six months of the year. The rest, nearly 150,000, were simply unem ployed. Because of the editors probably did not consider small

39. Ospina Vasquez, Industria, p. 173; Samper, MiserijL^pp. 36-39; Restrepo, Diario, III, 423; Isaac Farwell Holton, NewGranadaj; Twenty Months in the Andes (New York, 1857), pp. 268-269. 17 cultivators and tenant farmers as employed and because no way existed to accurately count workers, the estimates were somewhat misleading.

Still, the numbers starkly revealed the inability of the economy to absorb the entire working population.^®

The cruelty of shop owners and the avarice of customers added to workers' problems. Apprentices and child laborers were beaten for poor craftsmanship and wages were kept low even as skills improved.

Fourteen-hour working days were common and employers incessantly interfered in the artisans' personal affairs. For all this abuse workers received a basic daily wage of one to two reales or seventy to one hundred and fifty pesos per year. Employers frequently used the threat of arrest to control discontented workers and lack of capital and fear of long-term indebtedness prevented unhappy employees from opening their own shops. Even those who managed to start independent shops were kept poor by unscrupulous customers who set low prices and reluctantly paid for work commissioned. The only sure way out was through education, but even this path to lower and middle-echelon business and bureaucratic posts was beyond the reach of all except the sons of highly successful artisans. A few other fortunate artisans found wealthy patrons to put their children through school enabling them to leave the working class. For the most part, however, such

4-0. Figures from El Nacional, July 5, 1848, p. 3. 18

achievements remained merely the dreams of artisans. Their children

generally entered apprenticeships instead of classrooms.^

Single, unskilled working-class women often suffered more than men. Many had widowed during the chronic civil unrest, had been with

out pensions and were forced to raise families alone. Driven to submit

to the whims of wealthy men in an effort to have a steady income, many

were forced into prostitution or begging. The beggars, their meager

possessions stored in a sack, lived in the streets and picked through

garbage to find food. Their children became thieves.4-2 Women from

rural areas who drifted into provincial capitals looking for word were

frequently arrested for vagrancy and sent into the jungles as labor

ers. 43

Living conditions among working class families were harsh.

Most lived in one room, street-level apartments with no courtyards, no

41. Rafael E. Santander, "Los artesanos," Museo de cuadros de costumbres, III, 160-163; Medardo Rivas, Obras, 2 vols. {Bogotgf, 1883-1885), I, 92-95; Holton, New Granada, p. 300; Samper, Miseria, pp. 37, 95; Ambrosio Lopez, El desengafio o confidencias de Ambrosio Lopez, -primer director de la sociedad de artesanos de BogotaJa.oy "Sociedad democratica" (Bogota. 1851). p. 10; Ramon Torres Mendez, Costumbres santaferefias (Leipzig, n.d.), p. 14; El Pobre, September 28, 1851, pp. 1-3; October 26, 1851, pp. 1-2; El Estudiante, May 28, 1848, pp. 1-2; Safford, "Commerce," pp. 22-23.

42. On women workers see Rivas, Obras, I, 92-93; Holton New Granada, p. 269; Torres, Costumbres, pp. 15, 27, 41, 60; Gabriel Girald<2 Jaramillo, /ed., Colombia en 1850: album de la camislon corografica (Bogota, 1946), p. 39; El Pobre, September 14, 1851, pp. 1-2.

43. Manuel Ancizar, Peregrinacion de alpha por las provincias del norte de la Nueva Granada en 1850-1851 (Bogotd, 1956). windows, and no sanitation facilities. Incessant rains kept the

interiors perpetually damp. Furnishings were scarce and frequently

consisted of nothing more than an ironing "board, a small dining table,

another table that served as an altar, and some religious decorations

on the walls. Dress was simple. Women wore black shirts and matching

veils and men wore a ruana (poncho) and alpargatas (sandals), rough

pants, and a shirt. Health care was lacking and tuberculosis and alcoholism were endemic. Those poor forced into charity hospitals frequently died from lack of care and exposure.44

Conditions in rural areas were hardly better than those in urban centers. Competition from foreign manufactures had forced the closure of many local factories creating a major unemployment problem.

One parroquial district (a town and surrounding area) reported that of a population of 2,928 only 900 were working. Of the remaining resi dents, 1,000 were too young and several hundred were ill with cholera, but nearly 800 could not find work. Poor land and lack of credit made agricultural expansion impossible. The lack of opportunity forced many to migrate, thus depopulating the area. Those who remained were forced to gather forest products for a living or become wards of provincial poor houses.^

44. On workers' lives see Samper, Miseria, pp. 8-10,* Holton, New Granada, p. 152; Miguel Maria Lisboa, Relaci<5n de un viaje a Venezuela, N.ueva Granada y Ecuador (Caracas, 1954), pp. 273-274-; Santander, "Los artesanos," Museo de cuadros de costumbres, III, 152- 155; El Pobre, September 14, 1851, p. 1.

/ / 45. Ancizar, Peregrlnacion, pp. 43-77; Republica de Colombia, Archivo del congreso, cSmara de representantes, 1849, XI, fols. 29-30, 1849, V, fols. 153-158, hereafter cited as ACCR followed by year, tomo, and folio numbers. 20

Rural dwellers with jobs faced the same type of hardships as urban counterparts. Manuel Ancizar, one of Colombia's outstanding intellectuals, remarked that no leisure time existed, especially for those producing for weekly markets. Unsuspecting wage earners fre quently fell prey to tinterillos, who were usurers and pettifoggers.

The lives of harvesters and field hands were nearly barbaric. Wages were so low that many workers regularly stole part of the crop. Sugar workers, especially those laboring in the mills, toiled over hot kettles and dangerous millstones. At night they slept in hovels with no facilities and only a small oven to prepare scant meals. Their status was so low that frequently they were forced to live in complete isolation from other workers on the hacienda.^6 Even small landholders did not escape economic hardships. A typical finca (small farm) encompassed only about one fanegada (1.5 acres) of land, much of which could not be cultivated. On the usable land, farmers raised corn, bananas, and root plants. Around the house, which was generally a one room hut, they might plant coffee, peppers, and papaya.^ For those renting the land or working under a contract with a large landholder, exploitation and harassment compounded the difficulties. The landowner or contractor dictated the choice of

46. Ancizar, Peregrinacion, pp. 37-38, 155; Medardo Rivas, Los trabajadores en la tierra caliente, Biblioteca banco popular no. 25 CBogot£, 1972), p. 238; Camacho Rolddn, Memorias, p. 100; Eugenio Diaz, Manuela, Bolsilibros Bedout no. 17 (MedellCi, 1973), pp. 42, 355-356.

47. Ancizar, Peregrinacion, pp. 93, 156, 366; Ospina Vasquez, Industria, p. 277; Diaz, Manuela, pp. 76-79. 21

crops to be planted and established price schedules, which were often

far below prevailing market prices. The situation in Ambalema, a

center of tobacco cultivation, was particularly serious. A government

report submitted in 1851 compared the workers' plight to medieval

serfs. Those renting land on a hacienda were forced to sell their

tobacco at twenty-five percent below market value. The owner Gould do

this, the report continued, because he held the farmers' mortgages and

controlled their credit at the hacienda store where the workers were

forced to buy food and liquor. Those who tried to resist the landowners

or compete with them for the export market were often beaten, forced

off their land, or threatened with having their crops burned.4® Those

abused by large landholders and contractors later became some of the

leading advocates for radical economic and social reform.49

Reformers in urban areas capitalized on the discontent of the

rural populace and made conscious efforts to enlist their support.

Endeavors began even before Lopez assumed office in April 1849. Earlier

in that year reform-minded newspaper editors published articles de

fending farmers against the often cruel humor of city dwellers. In one

48. Archivo Hist6rico Nacional, Gobernaciones, "Gobernacion de la provincia al secretario del gobierno," April 27/ 1851, tomo 167, fols. 305-309, hereafter cited as AHN, Gob.; Safford, "Commerce," pp. 223-226; Luis F. Sierra, El tabaco en la economia colombiana del siglo XIX (Bogota, 1971), pp. 67-73; Sur Americano, January 26, 1850, p. 2.

49." Nieto Arteta, Economia" y cultura, I, 120-121; Alvaro Tirado Mejia, Introducci&i a la historia econ6mica de Colombia (Bogota, 1971), p. 121; Juan de Dios Restrepo (Emiro Kastos), Articulos escogidos, Biblioteca banco popular no. 31 (Bogota, 1972), p. 76. Hereafter referred to as Kastos. such piece the editor declared that agriculture was essential to the

nation and blamed dandies who did not like farmers for the tasteless

jokes. Soon after Lopez' inauguration Sur-Americano published an

editorial demanding that the government protect small farmers against

the rich, unscrupulous landholders.^0 Undoubtedly, working class

organizations in small communities echoed these sentiments and drew

discontented fanners and laborers into their ranks.

Until 1838 workers had done little to improve their situation.

Workers presented several petitions to Congress requesting assistance,

but they ."were only individual efforts. The laborers' position changed

suddenly when, in 1838, the Sociedad democratica co-republicana de

artesanos y labradores progresistas (Democratic Co-Republican Society

of Artisans and Progressive Laborers) was established under the direc

tion of Lorenzo Maria Lleras. The liberal lawyer and teacher founded

the organization in response to the formation of the conservative

Sociedad Catolica (Catholic Society) under the Papal Nuncio's leader

ship. The purpose of Lleras' group was to oppose then President Jose

Ignacio de Marquez' administration and to work for the election of

liberal candidates. The organization never attracted mass support,

but it did establish chapters in Tunja and Villa de Leiva. After the

1838 elections, government pressure forced the group to disband. Some

evidence exists, however, to show that the Catholic Society continued

50. El Republicano, January 21, 1849, pp. 2-3; Sur Americano, January 26, 1850, p. 2. 23 to grow during the 184-0 civil war, "but it was not noticeably active after peace was restored.

Economic issues revived the artisans' political activity in the closing years of Mbsquera's presidency. Although proof exists to suggest that inflation might have been a factor, tariffs were the central issue.^2 The question of tariff protection for domestic industries dated back almost to the wars of independence. Workers first petitioned Congress for high duties in 1836. In the request, carrying only fifteen signatures, workers demanded protection for the textile industry. They contended that low imposts threatened their livelihoods and that the artisans needed more time to recover from the impact of the wars for emancipation which had decimated their ranks. The petitioners promised that the quality of the work would improve if only Congress granted protection. The commission review ing the request refused to consider it and asserted that prevailing economic principals discouraged protectionism.^

The intervening ten years did not alter the position of

Congress. During debates on a tariff bill in 1846, artisans again

51. ACSen, 1834, II, fol. 9; ACSen, 1839, XIII, fols. 1-8; Acta que establece la sociedad catdlica en el canton de. Santa Rosa (Santa Rosa, 1840); Andres Soriano Lleras, Lorenzo Maria Lieras (Bogota, 1958), pp. 35-36; Restrepo, Historla de la Nueva Granada, I, 139-140.

52. On inflation see Miguel Urrutia, "Estadisticas de precios," Compendio de estadisticas historicas de Colombia, eds. Miguel Urrutia and Mario Arrubla (Bogota, 1970j, pp. 89-90.

53. ACCR, 1836, VIII, fols. 156-159. 24 asked Congress to maintain high duties on clothes, shoes, tools, and other domestically manufactured goods. In sharp terms reflecting years of resentment, the workers accused the congressmen of seeking to destroy the laboring class and nascent industry. They charged that Congress was intentionally currying the favor of merchants and other well-to-do

Colombians by making foreign products cheaper. Artisans pointed to the numerous closed ironwork shops and to the increase in begging as proof that the popular classes were in financial straits because of the tariffs. Three hundred discontented craftsmen and laborers signed the petition. During the next year, Congress responded to the request with'

Gonzalez' tariff law that eliminated many existing import restrictions and replaced others with a single tax. Outraged by years of abuse and refusals of the government to grant relief, the artisans decided to organize.54

The new working class society was a revamped version of

Lleras' organization. It was officially established in October 1847 under the name Sociedad de artesanos (Artisan Society), but was later changed to Sociedad democratica (Democratic Society) or simply

Democraticas (Democrats.) The founders were tailor Ambrosio Lopez anrt ironworker Miguel Le^n, members of the two trades most threatened by the tariff law. Twelve artisans and one lawyer, Cayetano Leiva Millan, attended the first meeting on November 18, 1847.

The aim of the organization was to promote the arts and the well-being of laborers. Artisans and "supporters of the arts," as

54. ACSen, 1846, VI, fols. 118-126. well as farmers, were invited to join, although membership was contin gent upon approval of two-thirds of those in attendance. A board of directors, composed of twelve elected men, supervised the organization and a slate of elected officers ran daily affairs and meetings. Ses sions were held twice weekly in the evenings and included lectures on temperance, moderation and crafts. Meetings were orderly and even smoking was banned. Though mutual aid in the form of financial assistance was an integral part of the program of the Society, the tariff question remained the membership's major concern. Except for the tariff issue the organization was essentially apolitical and rules prohibited overt political activity. Because of government hostility, membership increased slowly and the organization was faced with finan cial problems. To overcome them, rank and file members worked diligently among other artisans to gain new adherents. The efforts of the Society paid off and by mid-1848 boasted nearly three hundred members, although financial problems continued to plague the democraticas.^

The Democratic Society did not retain its original form for long. Between the founding of the organization and L&pez' election it dramatically changed its direction from one of a narrowly based, one-issue group to a major vehicle for social and political change.

The transformation was so complete and so rapid that many conservatives

55. Sociedad de Artesanos, Reglamento para su regimen interior y econ6mico (Bogota, 1847); Ambrosio Ldpez, Desengano, pp. 15-18; Agustin Rodriguez, Informe que presenta a la sociedad democratica el director de ella(Bogota, 1849), PP. 8-9; Voz del Pueblo, January 14, 1849, p. 2; Leyes, XIII, 214-233. 26 doubted that the Democratic Society was ever intended to be anything but a pressure group.56 The change began soon after the first presi dent of the association, Ambrosio Lopez, left office in mid-1848. His successor, fellow artisan and charter member Francisco Londono, ex panded activities to include a literacy program which conducted night classes in reading, writing and arithmetic. Londono's successor,

Emeterio Herida, broadened the literacy program to include political indoctrination. For teachers he turned to the colleges of El Rosario and San Bartolome, where newly-graduated lawyers were still smarting from the harsh policies implemented in the schools. Young lawyers were drawn into the artisans' organization because it was the only forum available from which to oppose the government. Among the new graduates who entered the Society were Jose Marfa Samper, Medardo

Rivas, Carlos Martin, Antonio Maria Pradilla, Januario Salgar, and

Prospero Pereria Gamba, all of whom later became leading figures in the Revolution. The lawyers assumed full direction of the literacy program and infused the lessons with liberal anti-government ideology.573' Many of the artisans became embittered about the new program and left the Democratic Society. Those who abandoned it often wrote letters to newspapers explaining why they resigned. The letters, despite obvious biases, provided keen insight into the rapid

56. Restrepo, Historia de la Nueva Granada, II, 76-77; La Oposicion, November 1, 1851, pp. 2-3. • / 57. Rodriguez, Informe, p. 1; Camacho Roldan, Memorias, pp. 81-82; La Civilizacion, May 15, 1851, pp. 365-366. radicalization of the organization. One artisan stated that when he

first joined the association its sole purpose was to press for tariff reform and to improve trade skills. He enjoyed the addition of the

literacy program, but complained that soon the teachers began lec

turing on Mosquera's evils and the virtues of liberalism.^ Another

disillusioned worker complained that soon after lawyers joined the

Society in Socorro, he was forced to read Roman History and to listen to lectures on civil liberties and on how to present demands to

Congress. He complained that after Lopez had declared his candidacy the meetings became even more politicized and that teachers urged the members to form political parties. The artisan left the chapter in

March 1849, and lived in fear for his life.59 Political activities also drove Ambrosio Lopez out of the Democratic Society. In his letter of resignation, published in pamphlet form, Lopez declared that the officers were violating the charter that banned political activity. He lamented that the original ideals had been obscured by the polemics and he expressed bitterness over the growing influence of the lawyers in the Society. The members, he concluded, had become tools of the educated class and called for the society complete with drawal from politics.^

Pleas such as Lcfpez' went unheeded, and under the direction of the lawyers the Democratic Society's program broadened considerably.

58. EL D^a, August 11, 1849> p. 4.

59. El Dj"a, October 10, 1849, p. 6.

60. L<$pez, Desengafio, pp. 18-23. 28

Workers adopted a position that centered on "the regeneration of the popular masses."^- The regeneration, they contended, could only be realized by TnaTHng themselves an integral part of the political pro cess through a program that included universal suffrage, freedom of teaching, liberty of the press, restrictions on presidential power, elimination of monopolies, reduction of the army# fiscal reform, increases in the size of the national guard, curbs on ecclesiastical power, and constitutional reform. In addition, the workers called for large-scale programs of public instruction as the best means of fulfilling their plans. In essence, the workers wanted, or at least thought they wanted, "instruction, morality, liberalism of the masses...."62 Even the original tariff reform program was broadened into a scheme of economic nationalism that called for abandonment of liberal economic principals and the establishment of a controlled market system complete with large workshops to limit supply more effectively.^3

In addition to broadening the program of the workers, the educated members helped expand their newly developed class conscious ness. They accomplished this through literacy lessons and in other ways that helped the artisans see themselves as a group distinct from other segments of society. Jose Mar^a Samper, for example, lectured

61. "KL ~7~de Marzo, December 23, 1849, p. 2

62. Italics theirs. "El"Democrata, ^Rfohacha) May 15, "184-9, p". "2; El 7 de Marzo, December""23T1849, p. 2.

63- El Comunismo Social, November 3> 1850, pp. 5-7. 29

regularly on the need for class solidarity in the struggle to establish

"true democracy.Sophisticated and detailed petitions to Congress

on various subjects indicated further definitions of class interests.

Prior to the entrance of the lawyers, petitions for relief were simple

and reflected limited goals and little class solidarity.^ After 1848,

petitions reflected precise thinking on a variety of subjects including

slavery, monopolies, education, and health programs.^6 The petitions,

which were read and explained prior to circulation among the member

ship for signatures, were important in helping the worker to define

his interests in relation to the rest of society.

Newspapers also served to intensify class consciousness well

before Lopez became president. As early as 1834, El Proletario

appeared under Alejandro Osorio's editorship. Aimed at opposing free-

trade, Osorio's newspaper eagerly sought support from artisans, who

also favored high tariffs.^ In 1846 another labor-oriented news

paper, La Tarde de los Agricultores y Artesanos, appeared in Bogota.'

64. Sur Americano, February 3, 1850, p. 4; February 10, 1850, pp. 3-4; Samper, Alma, I, 220.

65. See for example ACSen, 1834, II, fol. 73; ACSen, 1839, XII, fols. 1-8.

66. ACCR, 1850, I, fols. 42-43; X, fols. 28-45; ACCR, 1851, VI, fols. 463-464; ACSen, 1851, V, fols. 3-5; Repdfclica de Colombia, Archivo del congreso, Leyes Autografas, 1851, IV, fols. 81-87, hereafter cited as Leyes Autdgrafas.

67. Antonio Cauca Prada, Historia del periodismo colombiano (Bogota, 1968), p. 108; El Proletario, April 1, 1834? pp. 1-3; April 6, 1834, pp. 5-13; April 13, 1834, pp. 14-17; April 20, 1834, pp. 18-29; May 11, 1834, pp. 43-46; May 18, 1834, pp. 34-50; June 8, 1834, p. 51. 30

Published by Jesuits, it sought to increase working-class pride in both

rural and urban areas, as well as to bring the workers under greater

religious influence.^ After 1849, Colombia saw a proliferation of

working class newspapers.^9 The Democratic Society's own newspaper

carried a variety of articles that articulated working-class inter

ests.^

The same vehicles used to promote class consciousness were

used to promote the idea of class conflict. The process began as

early as 1846 when editors of La Tarde de los Agricultores y Artesanos

published several articles that warned readers to guard against the abuses and unscrupulousness of the wealthy.^-'- After 1849, such admo nitions became more frequent and far more virulent. Editors pointed out the natural antagonisms between the classes and defended the rights of the poor against the rich. They often condemned the wealthy as unproductive parasites who controlled all of the property and who kept workers out of national politics. Though the theme of violent

68. La Tarde de los Agricultores y Artesanos, March 15, 1846, pp. 3-4.

69. El Artesano de Cartagena, February 1, 1850, pp. 1-2; El Pueblo, July 13, 1851, pp. 1-3-

70. Jose Maria Samper, Apuntamientos para la historia politica y social de la Nueva Granada desde 1810 y especial mente de la adminis- tracign del 7 de marzo (Bogota, 1853J, P- 515; Joaquin Posada Gutierrez, Memorias historico-politico, 4 vols., Biblioteca de Historia Nacional, nos. 41, 42, 43, 44 (Bogota, Imprenta nacional, 1929), IV, 2V0-291; El Democrata, (Socorro), May 15, 1850, pp. 1-2; May 26, 1850, pp. 1-2; June 2, 1850, p. 3.

71. La Tarde de los Agricultores y Artesanos, March 15, 1846, pp. 3-4. 31 revolution did not dominate the newspapers, at least one editor called for a war to the death against the aristocracy and its ally, the church.^ The Conservatives reacted to the Liberals' efforts with

editorials of their own that labeled class conflict largely the result of government propaganda."^

By 1849, the transformation of the Democratic Society was complete. The formerly orderly meetings became boisterous affairs beginning with vivas to Lopez and his administration and ending with more cheers to their heroes, Francisco de Paula Santander and George

Washington; the shouting often lasted until midnight.^ Attendance grew from seventy-five to an estimated two thousand and sessions were held in large government buildings rather than in customary meeting halls. The educated members completely controlled the organization through the manipulation of elections and literacy programs•^

Democratic Societies in other cities underwent similar trans formations. Local members of the educated class, who were often government officials as well, dictated chapter policies and told

72. Sur Americano, November 29, 1849, pp. 2-3," January 15, 1850, p. 6; El Estandarte del Pueblo, July 14* 1850, p. 1; La America, June 11, 1848, pp. 1-2; Voz del Pueblo, January 7, 1849, p. 2; El 7 de Marzo, January 20, 1850, pp. 2-3J El Canon, January 13, 1850, p. 1.

73. El Nacional, December 28. 1848, p. 2; Charles Mazade, El socialismo en~america del sur (Bogota, 1852), p. 4.

74. La Democracia, April 10, 1851, p. 1.

75. Jose Maria Coddrvez Mour^, Remiriiscencias de santa fe^de Bogota, edicion, prcftogo y notas por Elisa Mujica (Madrid, 1962), p. 1373; El Dia, February 27, 1850, p. 1; Sur Americano, January 19, 1850, pp. 1-2. 32 members how to vote in elections. Several chapters boasted that workers were supported by the cabildo, the alcalde, local judges, school offi cials, national guard officers, the police chief, and other leaders.

One chapter even had the aid of the local bishop.^

Some chapters resisted politicizing influences, remained loyal to the original ideas of the Democratic Society, and carried out activ ities that truly benefitted the workers. In Buga, for example, local teachers ran a night school during chapter meetings. The chapter in

Cali organized legal defense funds cared for the sick, and established an effective mutual education system. In yet another town, wealthy members donated farm lands, a fruit orchard, and a shoe repair shop to provide revenues to the chapter and to unemployed members. In the same town master craftsmen offered free room and board to children wanting apprenticeships or living quarters while attending school.''"''

By late 1849 the appeal of reform programs, the influence of educated members, and government support combined to make the Democrat ic Society an important force in national politics. Virtually thou sands of artisans and sympathizers joined as new chapters appeared throughout Colombia, including conservative strongholds such as

76. Gaceta Oficial, January 26, 1851, p. 58; February 20, 1851, p. 106; July 12, 1851, p. 4-87; February 7, 1852, p. 81; El Dia, July 27, 1850, p. 4; March 22, 1851, p. 1. Unos Artesanos, Programa de la sociedad de artesanos de sanjil con el nombre de Obanao (socorro, -ubj-), pp. 1-2; Manuel Saigado y otros, Reglamento de la sociedad democrata de Baranquilla (Cartagena, 1850); Frai Niporesa, Cartas (Bogota^ 1849), p. 6.

77. Gaceta Oficial, December 15, 1851, p. 673; January 3> 1852, p. 2; El Sentimiento Democratico, December 6, 1849, pp. 98-99. 33

Popayan, Pasto, and Medellin. The Gaceta Oficial, the official news paper, published news of the start of over two hundred chapters, over half of which were established during the first two years of the Lopez1 administration. In 1850 one liberal newspaper in Bogota estimated that about ten thousand Colombians belonged to the Democratica. Two years later another periodical predicted that a regional artisans' convention in Jamundi, near Cali, would attract over twenty thousand workers, a figure that represented only a fraction of the total membership. Thus, an active total enrollment of fifty to seventy-five thousand members would not be an exaggeration.^ The Bogota' society provided the model for other chapters and it became the center of a communications net work reaching out to all artisan organizations. The chapters in Bogota also carried on correspondence with similar societies in Ecuador, Peru, and Chile in an effort to form a continent-wide republican front against repression.^

The artisans' new-found power, however, proved to be more apparent than real, and between 1850 and 1853 the Democratic Society suffered setbacks that seriously reduced its strength. The central government, fearing that it could no longer control the workers,

78. AHN, Gob. "Provincia de Socorro al presidente," December 27, 1851, tomo 170, fol. 83; AHN, Gob. "Pascual Afanador al nobleza," August 9, 1851, tomo 170, fol. 72; Pascual Afanador, La democracia en Sanjil (Socorro, 1851)? pp. 11-13; Sur Ameiricano January 19, 1850, p. 7; La Democracia, December 21, 1851, p. 1; Gustavo Arboleda, Historia contempor^nea de Colombia ( 6 vols. Bogota', 1918- T.

79. The note to Chile in El 7 de Marzo, February 9, 1850, p. 1; with Quito in El Demdcrata (Riohacha), May 26, 1850, p. 1 34 withdrew support and began arresting troublemakers.At the same time,

many members realized that Congress would not or could not fulfill

promises of higher tariffs and increased access to education; the sense

of futility led to further declines in membership and forced several

chapters to dissolve for lack of interest.®! Internal ideological dis

putes between moderates and radicals drove still more from the ranks.

Competition for a new bipartisan organization, the Sociedad de la union

de los artesanos (Society of the Union of Artisans), pledging a return

to lost working class ideals further weakened the Democr^ica. ®3 The

loss of membership and official support nearly destroyed the Democratic

Society and it did not recover again until 1853-

Conservatives were slow to respond to the activities of the

Liberals and took no action of their own until January 184-9. Until that

time they saw the Democratic Society as a one-issue organization posing

little threat to either the administration or to political stability.

By late 184-8, however, the artisans' growing political activity coupled

with the impending presidential election forced conservatives to form

their own organization.^ The result was La socierifld "popular de

80. Restrepo, JDiario, TV, 112; Restrepo, Historia de laNueva Granada, II, 244; El Dia, May 17, 1851, p. 1

81. El Porvenir, March 5, 1850, p. 4; El Dia, May 17, 1851, p. 1.

82. Frai Niporesas, "Cartas," pp. 1-5; Resena historica de los acontecimi entos politicos de la ciudad deCali desde el afro 1848 hasta 1855 inclusive (Bogota. 1856), pp. 51-57.

83. El Dia, May 13, 1851, p. 1; May 18, 1851, p. 1.

84. Helguera and Davis, Mosquera, III, 146-147. 35 instrucci6n mutua y fraternidad cristiana (The Popular Society of Mutual Instruction and Christian Fraternity), which was a revival of the Catholic Society of the 1830s. The association first met in January 1849, and was intended to be primarily an artisans' organization, though others were invited to join. All prospective members faced careful screening and needed approval from two thirds of the membership. The Sociedad Popular, as the group was also known, emphasized education and mutual aid. Educated and skilled members were required to present lee- tures on morals and crafts, and all masters were required to teach vocational classes. Mutual aid included payment of marriage fees and medical bills for poor members, legal assistance for those arrested, aid in finding jobs, and grants for the purchase of tools. Though largely apolitical, leaders were drawn from among Conservative politicians who tried to forge the Society into a political force. They often required members to vote in a block and to serve in various cam paign activities.85 Though the origins of the Sociedad Popular are not completely clear, most contemporaries, both liberal and conservative, agreed that the Jesuits were the main force behind conservative working class organization.86 As early as 1848 the Jesuits started several congre gations composed solely of workers. They taught parishoners religion,

85. Reglamento de la sociedad fraternidad cristiana Bogota, 1849 ; . February 6, 1850, p. J. ' 86. El 7 de Marzo, February 2, 1850, pp. 3-4; Camacho, Memorias, p. 82. 36

respect for authority and the constitution, and morals. Through their

work and their newspaper, La Tarde de los Agricultores y los Artesanos,

they forged ideologically conservative workers who provided the base

for the Popular Society.®^

While the clergy were key in the earliest stages of conserva

tive worker organization, the educated Conservatives gave it direction.

Like its Liberal counterpart, the Sociedad popular was the only readily

available forum for those opposing the Liberals. Thus some of the most

brilliant and influential Conservatives supported the association in-

/ / ^ eluding past President Jose Ignacio de Marquez, author Eugenio Diaz,

artist Ramon Torres Mendez, and former cabinet officials Mariano Ospina

and Alejandro Osorio. Despite the great influence of the educated

members in the association, no resentment of them among the rank and

file was reported.®®

The lack of friction among members was a result of strict

adherence to the precepts of the founders. Meetings were extremely

orderly with women and children almost always in attendance. Dinner

and parlor games replaced vivas, and odes to the graciousness of women

and the greatness of Bolivar replaced partisan political debate.

87. E. Tio Santiago^(Bogota, 1848), pp. 71-74; Jose Joaquin Borda, Histona de la compaftia de jesus en la Nueva Granada, 2 vols. (Paris, 1872;, II, 197.

88. For membership lists see La Civilizacidn, January 17, 1850, pp. 96-98; January^ 24, 1850, p. 100; February 21, 1850, pp. 116- 117; Juan Francisco Ortiz, Reminiscencias, 1808-1861 (Bogota', 1907), p. 203.

89. El Dia, May 22, 1850, p. 2. 37

Political activities were low-keyed and based upon newspaper editorials

and well-organized petition drives. Chapters grew quietly in number

without the fanfare that accompanied the establishment of the Democra- • ticas. Local chapters were formed in major cities including Medellin,

Mompos, Tunja, Santa Marta, Call, Cartagena, and Popayan. No estimates

of total membership existed, but the Bogot/ chapter boaster over one

thousand members and that in Medellin over eight hundred. Still, the

total enrollment was undoubtedly much smaller than that of the Demo

cratic Society.90

The emergence of the Democratica and the Sociedad popular

marked the beginning of organized political violence in Colombia. Be

tween 1849 and 1851 politically-motivated episodes of murder, riot and

vandalism became frequent occurrences. Even the efforts of Vice-

President Rufino Cuervo to reconcile the two groups failed miserably.^

The new trend in national politics rested for the most part

with liberal and conservative intellectuals who flocked to the workers'

organizations between 184-8 and 1850. The intellectuals, the Conserva

tives far more subletly and somewhat later than the Liberals, molded

the workers into forces that reflected their own goals.

90. Ortiz, RpTm'niscencias, P» 207; Helguera and Davis, Mbsquera, III, 222-226; G. Arboleda, Historia, III, 48; El Correo de la Costa, April 10, 1850, pp. 2-3; La Civilizacion, January 17, 1850, pp. 96-98; February 14* 1850, pp. 113-114.

91. El 7 de Marzo, January 20, 1850, pp. 1-2; El Dia, April 24, 1850, p. 1; La Civilizacidn, March 14, 1851; pp. 329-330; Restrepo, Historia de la Nueva Granada, II, 179; Ortiz, Reminiscencias; p. 203; Posada, Memorias, IV, 289; El Correo de la Costa, February 20, 1850, p. 1. 38

Young liberals left the conservative dominated universities and law schools anxious to dismantle ministerial policies.92 Historians have labeled this reform-minded group The Generation of 1850.93 it was composed of men bom between 1818 and 1828 and who dominated Colombian politics from Lopez' rise to power in 1849 until Rafael Nunez' death in

1892. They were tight-knit and many were close friends in school and remained so throughout their lives.94 The Generation of 1850 was viewed by many contemporaries as the last hope against archaic institutions.

One newspaper editor supporting this position declared that with the maturing of the Generation of 1850 Colombia had "passed the epoch-of transition into that of progress and movement...."95 Another contempo rary saw the young lawyers and journalists as "political messiahs" who had come to lead the struggle against the status quo and usher in an era of progress.96

92. Samper, Alma, I, 116-118.

93. For discussions on life in'conservative universities see: Ibid., pp. 120-25; Ignacio Gutierrez Vergara, "Cachaco," Museode cuadros de costumbres, I, 195-199; Samper, Alma,, I, 116-118; Jloberto Echeverril. Rodriguez, pas golgotas, episodios de la vida politica colombiana (Barranquilla, 1944), PP» 39-54; Samper, Alma,I, 120-122, 127; Venacio Ortiz, Historia de la revolucion del 17 de abril de 1854, Biblioteca banco popular, no. 36 (Bogot^ 1972), pp. 22-23; Abel Naranjo Villegas, Marfologia de la nacion, Vol. 22: Historia extensa de Colombia (Bogota; 1966), p. 221.

94. Samper, Alma, I, 131-132, 137, 227-228, 240; This profile also based upon biographical data collected on those serving in the Congress between 1849 and 1854•

95. Italics theirs. Sur Americano, August 23, 1849, p. 1

96. Kastos, Articulos escogidos, p. 48; El Siglo, April 1, 1849, p. 1; Sur Americano, August 30, 1849, p. 2. 39

For at least two years the young men of the new generation worked closely with the Democratic Society. By mid-1850, however, they

decided to form their own organization, the Escuela Republicana (Repub lican School.) Reasons for leaving the workers' association were not clear. Most likely the educated members sensed the artisans' growing hostility over the lawyers' growing influence and their failure to press for higher tariffs. In addition, the new graduates undoubtedly wanted a more formal setting for discussions than the crowded chaotic artisans' meetings provided. They were also anxious to separate them selves from the Democratic Society in order to avoid identification with the workers' increasing role in crime and political violence.

The Escuela opened its first session on September 25, 1850, the anniversary of the attempt on Bolivar's life. Initially, member ship was limited to leading law students from San Bartolome'and the

National University, but later opened to allow young journalists and bureaucrats to join. Like the artisan society, the Escuela Republicana enjoyed government support and Lopez and several cabinet members became members. The association attracted the leaders of the Generation of

1850 including Manuel Murillo Toro, Anibal Galindo, Jose Maria Samper,

Santiago Perez, Rafael Nunez, Francisco Alvarez, and Januario Salgar.

All but Alvarez, who maintained a highly successful law practice, served in the Congress between 1849 and 1854.9? The group's program

y7. Camacho, Memorias, pp. 1-9-200; Restrepo, Diario, IV, 105- 108; Anibal Galindo, Recuerdos historicos, 1840-1895 (Bogota, 1900), pp. 53-54; Helguera and Davis, Mosquera, III, 229-230; Arboleda, Historia, III, 127. 40 was a mixture of political discussions and presentations on learned

subjects including metaphysics, literature, and poetry. Their politi

cal platform was identical to that of the Democratic Society, except that the Escuela, hoping to enhance its standing in national politics, took a strong stand against crime and political violence.9^

In imitation of the liberals, conservative youths, who were also members of the Generation of 1850, established their own society called the Filotemica. The first session was held in Bolivar's

country estate on October 28, 1850, the date of the Liberator's death.

About sixty men, all recent university graduates, initially joined the society. None of the members were particularly noteworthy and did not

enter politics until the 1880s.99 Though politically opposed to the

Lopez administration, the Filotemica shared many of its ideals and adopted an extremely progressive program. It included demands to

protect the poor, establish direct elections, free municipal govern ment, promote education, establish religious toleration, abolish slavery, reform the constitution, emancipate women, and protect the rights of children. They also made direct appeals to artisans in the

98. Galindo, Recuerdos, p. 54; Oiscursos pronunciados en las sesiones de 7 i 9 de marzo de 1851 dedicaaos a la gran mayoria liberal del cuerpo legislativo, (Bogota^ 1850), pp. V, VI; Una sesidh solemne de la escuela republicana de Bogota? (Bogota, 1850), pp. 3-4; La Civilizacidn, November 21, 1850, p. 263; El Dia, February 8, 1851, pp. 1-4; Gaceta Oficial, November 10, 1850, p. 598; January 2, 1851, p. 1.

99. On the opening session see Helguera and Davis, Mosquera, III, 229-230; Restrepo, Diario, IV, 108; Camacho, Memorias, pp. kiuk- 203; La Civilizacion, October 31, 1850, p. 249. 41

Democratic Society for support.100 The program reflected the similari ties "between the two parties and served to intensify the already raging

"battle between Liberal and Conservative thinkers to become the National ,

Party.

By mid-1848 the forces that were to bring on the Revolution had taken definite shape. The influx of foreign ideology had given re formers the terminology to articulate existing conditions and a vision of what Colombia might become. The major themes of the movement such as territorial organization, economic reform, individual liberties, and church-state relations were firmly established. The working class had emerged as an organized pressure group supporting a broad reform pro gram. The Generation of 1850, hoping to reverse prevailing policies, joined the artisans. The coming together of these elements in the atmosphere of the last two years of the Mosquera administration signaled an end to the stability of the 1840s and the start of an intense, often violent struggle against the old order.

100. El Filotemica, November 17, 1850, pp. 1, 4; January 26, 1851, p. 46. CHAPTER 2

NEW FORCES TRIUMPHANT: LOPEZ COMES TO POWER

Jose' Hilario Lopez came to power in early 184-9 on the crest of the political and social changes that shook Colombia during 1847 and

1848. His term in office, which marked the start of the Revolution, was often as turbulent as it was triumphant. He experienced problems finding competent bureaucrats and administrators, dealing with Congress, and keeping radical elements within his own party under control. Ulti mately, Lopez found himself trapped between Conservatives and moderate

Liberals on the one side and more radical elements on the other, a situation that produced serious consequences for both Colombia and the

Revolution.

The presidential campaign of 1848 marked a new era in Colombian political development. In the earliest stages of the race, permanent political organizations formed for the first time. The factions that eventually evolved into the two parties had formed during the "patria boba" and in the 1820s, but they did not fully emerge until the 1830s.

During the 1830s, the civilistas, who had opposed Bolivar's militarism, divided over the 1831 constitutional reform project. One faction, the liberals, assumed a more progressive stance on questions involving the church and the military, and the other faction, the ministeriales

Cministerials) emerged as defenders of traditional institutions. The

42 controversial presidential election of 1836 and the 1840 civil war widened the rift between the two factions. The ministeriales, who gained power during the late 1830s, maintained control over the govern ment during the 1840s. However, despite government efforts, liberals regained some of their former strength, and, with the aid of disillu sioned supporters of the administration, decided to form an electoral organization to take power from the ministeriales. To counter the liberal faction, the ministeriales formed their own party. Two minis teriales, Jose''Eusebio Caro and Mariano Ospina, first used the terms liberal and conservative to describe the two organizations in the

May 21, 1848 issue of El Nacional.-1-

Conservatives could not make effective use of their new orga nization because of mounting internal struggles. President Mosquera's ministeriales were deeply divided over his reform programs, especially those formulated by Florentino Gonzalez. Jose''Joaquin Gori and

Alfonso Acevedo Tejada, both moderates, led the opposition against

Mosquera's efforts to weaken the Council of State and to negotiate an unpopular treaty with Spain. Many of Mosquera's followers also ob jected to the administration's continued support for the Jesuits.

1. The history of Colombian political parties is extremely complex and still awaits a comprehensive study. This paragraph is based upon Restrepo, Diario, II, 232-233; HI, 116, 185-211, 328, 424; Josd'Joaquin Guerra, Viceversas liberales: documentos relativos a la historia del liberalismo colombiano (Bogota^ 1923), p. 2$; Milton Puentes, Historia del partido liberal colombiano, 2nd ed. (Bogota', ^ 1961), p. 98; Ospina Vsfsquez, Industria, p. 184; Nieto Arteta, Economia y cultura, I, 108-110; Restrepo, Historia de la revolucidn, IV, 375, 384; Samper, Alma, I, 180; El Nacional, May 21, 1848, p. 1. 44

Debate for these issues reached such proportions that one leading min isterial asserted that "the factions fight among themselves sometimes with an ardor almost equal to that used against the reds.The editor of El Nacional first tried to heal the split with appeals to patriotism and admonitions against excessive vanity and then with calls for the establishment of a "Conservative Union" to end the rift. He hoped that such a union would encourage the party to unite behind one candidate for the presidency. The nominee would be chosen at a national political convention on the model of conventions in the United States. The editor reserved a meeting place and appointed a board to supervise the gather ing and to outline the rules. He also pledged financial support and aid in finding accommodations for the anticipated one thousand dele gates.3

Efforts to maintain unity failed and several members of the newly formed Conservative Party decided to seek the presidency. Vice-

President Rufino Cuervo was the leading candidate. An experienced administrator and an outstanding scholar in the fields of economics and international law, he had solid qualifications for office. Unfor tunately, because of his close ties to Mosquera, which many Conserva tives thought would limit Cuervo's independence, and his lack of appeal to moderates, the Vice-President generated little enthusiasm among

2. Jose^Eusebio Caro, Historia del 7 de marzo (Bogota^ 1895), p. 130; Posada Gutierrez, Memorials, IV, 246-247; Helguera, "First Mosquera Administration," pp. 80-102, passim, 198-264, passim.

3. El Nacional, June 6, 1848, pp. 1-3. party faithful. Mosquera also disliked him, because he was not a

military man.4

JoseX Joaquin / Gori, who was one of Mosquera's strongest oppo

nents, proved to be a popular alternative to Cuervo. Gori also had

excellent credentials that included experience as Vice-President under

Pedro Herran and then as Supreme Court judge from 1845 to 1849. He

generated a great deal of enthusiasm among moderates, who saw him as

the candidate of reconciliation able to appeal to both parties. Gori's

program included such progressive provisions as constitutional reform,

restrictions on monopolists, reduction of the army, an end to forced

labor camps, and reform of the courts and the treasury. Gori also

strongly disliked the Jesuits, but did not call for their expulsion

from Colombia. Because of his program, Gori attracted support both

from artisans who hoped for tariff relief and from clergy who were

impressed with his moderate stance on church-related issues.-'

Among other Conservative hopefuls were two old military

generals, Eusebio Borrero and Joaquin Barriga. Borrero, a veteran of

the wars against Spain, favored the military and opposed Santander and

his liberal successors. Borrero's political experience, however, was

4. For biographical material see Camacho, Memorias, pp. 24-27; Rufino and Angel Cuervo, Cuervo, II, 4.3, 53> 68, 110-111; Helguera, "First Mosquera Administration," p. 260.

5. Camacho, Memorias, pp. 23-24; Ortiz, Tio Santiago, pp. 36- 38j Arboleda, Historia, II, 365-368; Restrepo, Diario, III, 188; El Dia, February 24, 1849, pp. 1-4; February 28, pp. 1-4; March 3> 1^49, pp. 1-2; El Clamor de la Verdad, July 16, 1848, p. 4. 46 limited to a brief term as Secretary of War under Mosquera.6 Barriga sought the presidency reluctantly, because he personally liked Lopez and did not want to run against him. However, he entered the race because of broad support in the aimy and among the clergy, as well as from Mosquera himself who admired Barriga's military background and political experience.'''

The candidacy of Florentino Gonzalez, a moderate liberal, added to the Conservatives' woes. His advocacy of a moderately progressive administration attracted many Colombians who either disliked mainstream

Conservatives or who feared the Liberals' growing radicalism. To sup port Gonzalez' candidacy, independents formed an organization in

Cartagena in April 184-8. Conservative leaders such as Lino de Pombo and Julio Arboleda joined the campaign, and others from both parties continued to gravitate toward Gonzalez as he asserted his independence from the Liberals. However, Gonzalez' moderate position could not survive the increasing political polarization and his campaign served only to further divide the Conservatives.®

6. Camacho, Memorias, p. 33.

7. Leonidas Scarpetta and Saturinino.Vergara, Diccionario biografico de los campeones de la libertad de Nueva Granada. Venezuela. Ecuador 1 Peru (Bogota^ 1879), pp. 41-42; Camacho, Memorias, pp. 28-29; Urtl*2, Tio Santiago, p. 21; Helguera, "First Mosquera Administration," pp. 260-261.

8. On Gonzalez' candidacy see El Siglo, June 3, 1848, p. 1; June 29, 1848, p. 1; La America, July 2, 1848, pp. 1-2; Arboleda,^ Historia, II, 374; Duarte French, Florentino Gonzales, pp. 377-378. 47

The Liberal Party was able to avoid such internal strife because of the lack of suitable candidates, a consequence of the ex clusion of liberals from politics during the ministeriales' hegemony.

To find a candidate the Liberals had to search among their heroes of the 1820s and 1830s, many of whom were dead. Gonzalez would have been a sound choice, but he was too closely tied to Mosquera and the former minister's free-trade policies had alienated the working class.

Ezquiel Rojas considered entering the race, but then backed out. Jose''

Maria Obando was very popular among party leaders, but he was in exile for his role in the 1840 civil war. Also, his presence so irritated the Conservatives that his candidacy would have encouraged them to end their differences and unite behind one candidate. Thus, almost by process of elimination, the Liberal Party decided to support General

Jose^Hilario Lopez for the presidency.9

The uncontroversial Lopez proved to be an ideal choice to oppose the Conservatives. Unlike Obando, he would not encourage the opposition to unite and his ties by birth to southern Colombia would help make him more acceptable in that conservative region. In addition, many in the party were convinced that Lopez' well-known lack of intel lect would make him easier to manipulate once in office.^ Also,

9. On selection of the Liberal candidate see Arboleda, Historia, II, 365-373; Rufino and Angel Cuervo, Cuervo, II, 108-110; Posada Gutierrez, Memorias, IV, 245.

10. Indalecio Lievano Aguirre, Rafael Nunez (Bogota^ 1944), p. 53; Jose'Hilario Lopez, Memorias, 2 vols. [Bogota, 1942), I, 1. Lopez had qualifications that reflected an attractive combination of

military prowess, administrative experience, and genuine support for republicanism. Born in the province of Popayan in 1798, he was raised

by his grandmother in a modestly wealthy home and attended primary school and the local high school. Never an outstanding student, edu

cation soon bored him and he abandoned school in favor of a military

career. He joined the local militia at the age of twelve and then

entered the army. Ldpez rose steadily through the ranks. His efforts as a double agent while serving a term as a royalist prisoner-soldier

* earned him Bolivar's esteem and two more promotions. In the late

1820s he served in a series of military-administrative posts that gave him valuable political experience. His reputation as a strong republican grew during his opposition to Bolivar's authoritarian plans at

Ocania in 1828, and with his opposition to the dictator, Rafael

Urdaneta in the early 1830s. Ldpez' career continued to flower under

Santander when he served in a variety of administrative posts including the cabinet. He also successfully defended the integrity of Colombia in several sensitive diplomatic missions. In 1839 he was rewarded with an appointment as representative to the Vatican. While in Europe he traveled widely including Greece, Turkey, Malta, England and France.

After returning to Colombia, he continued to serve in various capac ities in the government until deciding to seek the presidency. Lopez left office in April 1853 and retired to his hacienda in Neiva. In

1855 Lopez moved to Paris, France and returned to Colombia only in 1860 in order to support Mosquera's revolt. He resumed his political 49 activity serving as a delegate to the Convention of Rionegro, as a cabinet minister in Mosquera's administration and President of Tolima, and finally as chief of the army. The General and President died peacefully in his home in Neiva in 1869.^-

Contemporary observers looked forward to the campaign as the first real political contest in twelve years. University students, many of whom were participating in politics for the first time, entered the campaign, adding to the excitement. Campaign debates centered on the ever-present issues of slavery, the church, municipal liberties, monopolies, communal holdings, and economic reform.^

Liberals attacked Mosquera as a traitor to the working class, an extravagant spender of public monies, and a friend of the Jesuits.^

Liberals, as well as many Conservatives, also alleged that Mosquera was plotting with Juan Jose"*Flores of Ecuador and Jose"'Antonio Paez of Venezuela to establish a dictatorship. Despite evidence that the rumors were well-founded, those publishing the allegations were brought to trial and convicted of slander. The convictions sparked a series of

11. On Ldf>ez' life to 1840 see his Memorias, I, II, passim; after 1840 see Abel Cruz Santos, "Jose''Hilario Ldpez," in General Jos^Hilario Lopez. Homenaje de las fuerzas armadas en el~centenarlo de su muerte I Bogota, 1969), pp. 58-59.

12. Camacho, Memorias, p. 34; Idem., Notas de viaje, 3rd ed. (Paris, 1897), p. 173; Idem., Escritos varios, 4 vols. (Bogota^ 1892- 1895), III, 337; Lievano, Niinez, pp. 54-56; El Estudiante, May 28, 1848, pp. 7-8; June 4, 1848, pp. 10-11.

13. Nieto Arteta, Economia y cultura, I, 170-175; La America, April 16, 1848, pp. 1-2. riots in which several students were killed. The violence reinforced

the rumors of conspiracy, costing Conservatives many votes.^

The parties tried to formulate platforms to clarify their posi tions on issues. Liberals developed a program called "Lopez' Twelve

Points," outlined in a speech by the candidate's spokesman. Ezquiel Rojas. The platform was a moderately progressive one including calls for "true" representative government, "bureaucratic reform, legal reform, an end to nepotism, limitations on presidential power to negotiate contracts, improvements in the nation's credit, and re strictions on the power of the church to influence civil matters.

Later, to consolidate support, Lopez added pledges to reduce the size of the army, reform the constitution, and expel the Jesuits.^ The

Conservative Party was too divided to present one program that repre sented the views of all supporters. Rather, each candidate developed a platform that reflected his and his followers' views. Gonzalez spoke for independent Conservatives, Gori for moderates, and Cuervo,

Barriga, and Borrero for various shades of more traditional elements.

Not until after the March 1849 election, when the Conservative Party united to oppose Lopez, was the party able to develop a program that reflected all points of view.

14. Restrepo, Historia de la Nueva Granada, II, 79; EL Nacional, June 24, 1848, pp. 1-3; El 7 de jnarzo, January 12, 1§49, p. 4; La"Frateraidad, August 5, 1849, 'pp. 1-3•

15. Twelve points listed in Gomez Barrientos, Don Mariano Ospina, II, 100-104; La_Mdrica_, March 17,~1849," pp. 1-T. 51

The campaign itself was simple, because of the candidates'

limited resources and the difficulties of travel. The most important

factors were the candidate's reputation and an effective pamphlet and

newspaper campaign to create an image of broad popularity. Little

personal contact with voters occurred and only local office seekers

were forced to confront the electorate. Political organizations made

some efforts to influence electors in local voting assemblies, but

seemed to have little success. All the various campaign techniques

were more useful in forging party unity than in influencing voters.1^

The Liberal Party, despite divisions in the opposing camp

and popular discontent with Mosquera's administration, was still un

certain about the outcome of the election. Congress, controlled by

the Conservatives, could cheat the Liberals out of a popular victory

if Lopez did not win the general election and the decision left to the

legislatorsAware of such a possibility, the Liberals began

searching for still broader support, especially among the membership

16. The Colombian election system was similar to the electoral college system in the United States, in which the President is indi rectly elected. On the process see La Fraternidad, October 19, 1849, PP« 3-4; Carta de un elector a otro [Bogota^ I848); A los electores (Bogota^ 184s); on pampnieteering see for example El futuro presidente (Bogota^ 1852); Para presidente de la republica en el proximo perit)do~ constitucional el ilustrado ciudadano Dr. Rufino Cuervo (Cartagena, 164a); on the press see Kestrepo, Diario, IV, 14-15; Rufino and Angel Cuervo, Cuervo, II, 113-114.

17. This possibility suggested in Aliro Gomez Picon, El golpe militar del 17 de abril de 1854 Biblioteca de Historia Nacio- nal no. 120 (Bogota", 1972), pp. 26-27; Luis Martinez Delgado and Sergio Elias Ortiz, Epistolario y documentos oficiales del general Jose^Maria Obando, 3 vols. (Bogota', 1973), II, 370-378. 52 of the Democratic Society. Though educated members had already done much to turn the workers against the Conservatives, the artisans had still made no firm political commitments. The artisans, however, grav itated toward Lopez because they thought he might encourage the growth of their organization and give the workers a greater voice in govern ment planning. Thus, the Liberal Party was in an extremely strong position when, in May 1848, the artisans held a mock election to de termine which candidate the Democratic Society would support.

On June 4, 184-8, the artisans publicly declared their support for Lopez. The decision, the workers contended, was based upon long and serious discussions of the qualifications of the candidates.

They held that Lopez1 concern for the nation, his status in the army, and his popular orientation were the major factors in their choice; the Society immediately established several committees to promote their candidate. The political endorsement was by no means unanimous and many members left the organization to work for Gori and other

Conservatives. The popular phase of the election took place during June and

July 1848. A total of 1700 electors, previously elected by all quali fied voters, met in local assemblies to cast ballots. No candidate received enough votes to win the election. Lopez received 735 votes while the Conservatives split the remaining ballots: Cuervo received

18. On Liberals and artisans see Ambrosio Lopez, Desengano, pp. 15-18; Rodriguez, Informe, P. 1; El Nacional, June 11, 1548, p. 3; La America, May 25, 1848, p. 2; June 4, 1848, pp. 1-2; El Clamor de la Verdad, June 1, 1848, p. 4. 53

304 and Gori 384. The rest were divided among Mariano Ospina (81

votes), Joaquin Barriga (74 votes), Florentino Gonzalez (71 votes), and

Eusebio Borrero (52 votes.) Because no candidate received sufficient

votes, the Congress had to choose the President from among the three

leading contenders. The results demonstrated that the Conservatives

were still the majority party, but that internal divisions prevented

victory. The Liberals, however, demonstrated that their party had

nationwide support, especially in regions of new economic development

and growing social unrest. Other candidates did well only in their

home provinces.^ Because of the returns, Mosquera sensed the

Colombians1 desire for social and economic reform and shifted his

support from Barriga to Gori as the party's only hope.20

Despite the outcome of the popular election, the Liberals were

far from certain of final victory. If the Conservatives could resolve

their differences, they would then triumph in the congressional elec

tion scheduled for the first week in March.^ The Liberals only barely

adverted the reunion of the Conservatives just prior to the election.

They did this with direct appeals to the goristas (Gori's supporters)

19. Camacho, Memorias, p. 116; Restrepo, Historia de la Nueva Granada, II, 133-134; Arboleda, Historia, II, 383-384; David Bushnell, "Elecciones presidenciales colombianas 1825-1856," in Compendio de estadisticas historicas de Colombia, pp. 258-265.

x 20. Martinez Delgado and Ortiz, Epistolario de Obando, II, 370-374.

21. El Nacional, February 24, 1849, p. 3; El Aviso, February 14, 1849, pp. 22-23. in which they promised them a share of the political power if they supported Lopez. The goristas, who knew their cause was lost, proved receptive to the overtures from the Liberals. When the rest of the

Conservative Party learned of the compromise, efforts to reunite the party, which had been going on the week before the congressional run off, collapsed.^3

The Liberals were not certain of the goristas' support and, to assure victory, they decided to mobilize the artisans. Events in neighboring Caracas, where in January 1849, workers helped pressure

Congress into electing Monagas president, inspired their tactics.

Beginning in February 1849, Colombian artisans met regularly in the

* ^ Plaza de Bolivar, where they heard speeches and held pro-Lopez demon strations.^ On March 1 the Democratic Society unsuccessfully petitioned Congress for weapons to form a police force, preserve order and, assure an honest election.^5 Despite the setback, the artisans decided to form an unarmed police unit and they assigned four members to each congressman in order to pressure him into sup porting Lopez. Mosquera was conscious of the growing intimidation and placed nearly one thousand troops on alert near the election site.

23. On gorista-Liberal ties see Rufino and Angel Cuervo, Cuervo, II, 122-123; El Termdmetro Neogranadino (Bogota"? 1849).

24- Caro, El 7 de Marzo, p. 14.3• • 25. For artisan activity of March 1 see El Dia, October 10, 1849, p. 6; El Aviso, March 1, 1849, pp. 46-47.

26. Camacho, Memorias, p. 75; Ibid., Escritos, III, 340-341; Restrepo, Historia de la Nueva Granada, II, 102-103. During the week prior to the election, scheduled for March 7, the mood for the final balloting was set. When Congress convened on

March 1, artisans packed the galleries and shouted insults at Conser vatives. Mariano Ospina, President of the House of Representatives, could not quell the disturbance, and one legislator proposed that the election be held in a small hall to reduce crowd size and protect congressmen from abuse. Congress denied the measure and unrest con tinued throughout the week.2?

Pre-election disturbances reached a climax during the session of March 6. While legislators agreed to meet in the spacious Church of Santo Domingo to accommodate spectators, they took the precaution of erecting a barrier between themselves and the spectators. As

Congress began certifying the results of the popular election and reading them into the record, the crowd, pressing forward to hear the proceedings, grew restless. A Liberal representative sensed the un easiness and demanded that arrangements be made to allow the specta tors even better access to the meeting. After twenty minutes of heated debate, the barrier was lowered and the crowd moved uncomfort ably close to the legislators. The session resumed and after several more hours of vote counting adjourned until the next day.28

27. On the March 1 session, see ACCR, 1849, XV, fol. 5; Rufino and Angel Cuervo, Cuervo, II, 126-127.

28. Archivo de Congreso, Sesiones Especiales, 1834-1850, no pagination, sessidh of March 6, 1849, hereafter cited as AC Sesiones Especiales; Posada Gutierrez, Memorias, IV, 252-254; Camacho, Escritos, III, 345-346. March 7, the long-awaited day of the congressional election, was overcast and marked with periodic rain. Despite the weather the

church was nearly filled and by 9 a.m. a large crowd had already

gathered outside the building. Much of the crowd resulted from con siderable planning on the part of Liberals. Students and professors arrived early to pack the galleries. They were joined by hundreds of artisans dressed in red. To assure even more support, Liberals re cruited spectators from among the city's working-class cafes and markets. Although they had not been officially organized, many

Conservative followers appeared to shout in favor of Cuervo and Gori.

Other Conservatives, who feared violence, went into temporary hiding.

By 10 a.m., when the session was called to order, a crowd variously estimated at between three and eight thousand people were either observing the proceedings or milling about in front of the church.

Contemporaries reported that while a tense calm prevailed, many in attendance were armed and prepared for violence.29

The session began with a consideration of procedural problems.

Several congressmen were unable to attend the meeting and substitutes

Iiad to be sworn in. Significantly, all four of those unable to attend were Conservatives. Only one of the missing legislators was replaced, and the substitute was a Liberal. Congress then set the rules for the

29. Arboleda Llorente, Vida de Arzobispo Mosquera, II, 264- 268; Samper, ApuntaTnientos, pp. 445-455; Camacho, Escritos, III, 346- 353; Codotvez Moure, Reminiscencias, pp. 414-415; Restrepo, Diario, IV, 17-18; Posada Gutierrez, Memorias, IV, 251; El Siglo, April 29, 1849, pp. 1-3. election and determined that forty-three of eighty-six votes were

required for election and that ballots would be secret. The legisla

tors then finished tabulating the popular election results and offi

cially declared the results inconclusive; the stage was set for the

final balloting.

The election took four tense ballots to con^lete. On the

first vote, party lines remained firm. Lopez and Cuervo each received

thirty-seven votes and Gori ten. Angered by the results, the crowd

pressed against the barrier that had been re-erected, but it held firm. Because of procedural rules, only Cuervo and Lopez could be on

the second ballot; the goristas had to commit themselves. Though the results of the second ballot were still inconclusive, Cuervo showed

growing strength with forty-two votes to Lopez' forty; two were cast blank. The Liberals, however, also picked up some support and had forced two goristas to cast blanks. The crowd, though, misunderstood the results and thought Cuervo had been elected. They swarmed over the barrier and moved toward the legislators at the front of the church.

While the president of the assembly tried to restore order, several

congressmen moved toward him to form a shield and others climbed on tables to urge calm. The mob moved back, but not before threatening several legislators. After order was restored, military units were brought into the area outside the church. On the third ballot, the

Conservatives began to lose strength. Lopez received forty-two votes

30. AC Sesiones Especiales, 1834-1850, no pagination, session of March 7, 1849; Caro, El 7 de Marzo, pp. 165-166. 58 and Cuervo thirty-nine; three were cast blank. The crowd again became restless and to prevent another assault the president of the Congress called in soldiers to clear the building and remove the barrier. At the same time, Conservatives tried in vain to have the election post poned for several days. On the fourth ballot, even more dramatic shifts in political alignments occurred and Lopez received forty-five ballots to Cuervo's thirty-nine. The three neutral votes had declared for Lopez and the Liberals triumphed. The session adjourned at

5:00 p.m.^1

Reasons for the vote changes between the third aiid fourth bal lots were not altogether clear. Two of the three additional votes were undoubtedly goristas who realized that their interests lay with a

Liberal victory. The third vote definitely came from Conservative

Mariano Ospina, who declared that he had voted for Lopez to prevent violence. Later he privately confided that he had also changed sides because he feared that Mosquera would use any post-election violence as an excuse to declare a dictatorship.^ Though the goristas and Ospina cast the deciding votes, the role of the artisans in the victory was crucial. The steady pressure placed on Congress during February and

31. This account based upon AC Sesiones Especiales, 1834-1850, no pagination, session of March 7, 1849; Posada Gutierrez, Memorias, IV, 257-265; Restrepo, Diario, TV, 18-20; Caro, El 7.de Marzo, pp. 166- 168; El Riohachero, April 17, 1849, p. 1

32. On vote changes see Gomez, Mariano Ospina, I, 427-431; Rufino and Angel Cuervo, Cuervo, II, 134; Camacho, Escritos, III, 359- 361; Ibid., Memorias, pp. 41-46; Posada Gutierrez, Memorias, IV, 256- 258, 262-264; Caro, El 7 de Marzo, pp. 138-141. 59

March, followed "by their activities on election day, had convinced the goristas and at least one stalwart Conservative to abandon Cuervo. The workers had forced a Conservatively-controlled congress to elect a

Liberal candidate, who might otherwise have been deprived of a popular victory.

Wild celebrations that lasted throughout the night followed the announcement of Lopez' triumph. Conservatives, while they did not share the joy of the Liberals, were relieved that civil war had been averted. They were nevertheless enraged over Mosquera's failure to control the mob. Mosquera had left his home after the second ballot in order to be at the church to congratulate Cuervo on his victory.

He arrived unaware of the voting changes and assumed that the street festivities were for Cuervo. When told of the actual outcome, Mosquera could not control his emotions and, to avoid embarrassment, retired to his residence. He later recognized Ldpez' election. Other Conserva tives, divided and defeated, could do little else but follow the

President and leave the scene quietly.33

Lopez' inauguration took place on April 1, 184-9. He arrived in Bogota'after a triumphal march north from his hacienda in Neiva.

During the journey rumors of a conspiracy surfaced, but no mishaps occurred. He reached the outskirts of the capital on March 25, and

3.3 • On celebrations and Conservative reaction see Camacho, Memorias, pp. 43-44-; Posada Gutierrez, Memorias, IV, 267-268; Restrepo, Diario, IV, 20; Helguera and Davis, Mosquera, III, 227-229; El Dia, July 25, 1849, p. 3; Helguera, "First Mosquera Administration," pp. 300- 301, his account of Mosquera's reaction differed from the version in this study. 60

was met by a crowd of over two thousand supporters. On the appointed

day, Lopez rode to the ceremony in a parade. After taking the oath of

office, he delivered a speech in which he pledged to fulfill the obli

gations of president and to establish a true democracy in Colombia.

After pledges of support from the clergy and the bureaucracy, the new

president gave another speech in which he restated his campaign plat

form and also promised to curb the "oppressive" use of wealth.34

Lopez brought to office a well defined political philosophy,

best articulated in book written while in retirement in Paris. In

bold print the ex-president declared "I AM AND HAVE BEEN LIBERAL TO

THE EXTENT THAT IT DICTATES MT CONVICTIONS: BUT I AM NOT RADICAL...

AND I HOPE TO LIVE AND TO DIE IN THIS FAITH AND BELIEF..."35 Lopez

was a liberal of the Generation of 1810 brought to power by the

liberals of the Generation of 1850.

Unfortunately, President Lopez was unable to put his beliefs

into practice. Almost from the day he took office, he was plagued

with serious problems that threatened his administration. The most

immediate issue confronting the new government was a lack of experi

enced Liberals to assume posts in the bureaucracy. The President was forced to appoint inexperienced men to key posts, a situation that

prevented him from rapidly developing concrete proposals for Congress,

34. On the inauguration see Santos Cruz, "Jos£"Hilario Ldfrez," p. 51; Gomez, El Golpe, pp. 56-57; AC Sesiones Especiales, 1834-1850, no pagination, session of April 1, 1849; Gaceta Oficial, April 4, 1849, p. 109; Francisco Cristancho, Una Calumnia Desvanecida (Bogota, 1849).

35. Para la Historia (Paris, 1856), p. 73. 61 giving the impression that his government lacked direction. Lopez also lacked loyal, experienced candidates for governorships. He could not find anyone to serve in unhealthy climates or anyone trustworthy or uncontroversial enough to serve in Conservative regions. Thus, in the south, Lopez was forced to name unpopular obandistas (Obando's followers) to sensitive governorships. Even though the administration was willing to name such men to the posts, a lack of candidates per sisted and over fifty percent of those nominated refused to serve. The crisis delighted Conservatives who thought the Liberals would discredit themselves and suffer setbacks in the next election.36

Lopez' problems with political appointments reached dangerously into his cabinet. The President tried to maintain an ideological balance within the cabinet so that his administration would reflect his close ties to Liberals of his own generation and repay his debt to the

Generation of 1850 and the goristas. Lopez' first cabinet almost re flected that balance. Although he named no goristas, the President appointed an old but extremely competent moderate, Ezquiel Rojas, to head the national treasury and another old but more progressive Liberal,

Francisco Javier Zaldua, as Secretary of Government. Tomas Herrera, a

Panamanian Liberal, was named to head the war ministry and Manuel

Murillo Toro, leader of the Generation of 1850, was appointed to

36. Rufino and Angel Cuervo, Cuervo, II, 104i Camacho, Memorias, pp. 5J3> 62, 67; Arboleda Llorente, Vida.de Arzobispo Mosquera, II, 280-285; J. Ledn Helguera, "Aatecedentes Sociales de la Revolucion de 1851 en el Sur de Colombia (184-8-1849)," Anuario Colombiano de Historia Social y de la Cultura, 5 (1970), 59-60. 62

oversee foreign affairs.3? The choices reflected the moderate course

that Lopez had chosen for the Revolution. Two moderates of his own

generation controlled the two most important posts and two more pro

gressive Liberals headed lesser ministries.

Lopez could not sustain his balanced administration, because

of the political situation. While radical elements decried efforts to

bring moderates into the government, Conservatives criticized the

President as too radical. Lopez' supporters were especially piqued with the appointment of Rojas, who often spoke in favor of the un

popular tobacco monopoly. The Conservative majority in Congress also

disliked him and defeated virtually all his proposals for economic development. The hostility from both sides proved too much for Rojas and he left office in May 1849. To replace Rojas, Lopez was forced to appoint radical Murillo Toro to head the treasury and was able to maintain only a semblance of balance in his cabinet because of his appointment of gorista General Jose''Acevedo to the post of Secretary of Foreign Relations.

Radical elements strongly opposed Acevedo's appointment and forced Lopez to further alter the complexion of his government.

37. On Lopez' initial appointments.see Arboleda, Historia, III, 8-9; •TflT'flTn-illo Uribe, Pensamiento Colombiano, pp. 158-159, 165; Cruz Santos, Economia y Hacienda Pvlblica, pp. J39ji-394; Samper, Apuntamientos, pp. 469-470; Restrepo, Diario, IV, 29^30, 39; Posada Memorias, IV, 269-271.

38. ACSen, 1850, III, fol. 25; Samper, Apuntamientos, pp. 479- 488; Arboleda, Historia, III, 13-14; Cruz Santos, Economia y Hacienda Publica, p. 394- 63

Criticism of Acevedo focused on his ties to the Mbsquera administration,

despite the fact that he had opposed many of the former president's

policies. The Democratic Society entered the fray and accused Lopez of

placating the enemies of the people. They warned him to remember their

support for him in the election of 184-8. The Secretary tried to defend

himself against the savage and often untrue criticisms, but in early

June, Lopez, sensing the growing discontent within his party, asked for

Acevedo's resignation. The goristas felt betrayed and blamed the deci

sion on Lopez' submission to outside pressures.39 From Acevedo's resignation until late 1851, Lo"pez followed the dictates of the radicals

and appointed only their favorites to the key posts of Secretary of

Government and Secretary of the Treasury.^0

In late 1851 Lopez was able to use his keen political abilities to reverse the radicalization of his administration, return it to a more moderate course, and sustain party unity. In the face of mounting resistance to his policies from both in and outside Liberal ranks,

Lo£ez fired Murillo Toro. The ouster of the radical leader precipi tated a cabinet crisis leading to the resignation of the other minis ters. Much to their surprise, Ldfrez accepted their offers and replaced

39. El Aviso, October 22, 184-8, pp. 2-3; El Siglo, May 20, 1849, p. 1; El Dfa, May 26, 1849, p. 2; June 13, 1849, pp. 3-4; El Neogranadino, May 24, 1849, p. 165; June 19. 1849, pp. 197-198; Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores (Bogota, 1849); Ingenuo, Carta Primera (Bogota*, 1849).

40. Restrepo, Historia de la Nueva Granada, II, 210-211; Ibid., Diario, IV, 80-81; Gaceta Oficial, August 1, 1850, p. 371; March 1, 1851, p. 187; La Democracia, November 14-, 1850, p. 1; Ricardo Alfaro, Vida del General Tomb's Herrera (Barcelona, 1909), pp. 179-182. 64 them with moderates.41 The changes revived what had appeared to be de clining Liberal fortunes, and the Party swept all general elections during the next two years.42 Colombian contemporaries recognized the election and the ad ministration of Ld'Pez as a turning point in the nation's history. For them, it signaled the start of the long-awaited "regeneration" and "reawakening" from the "national sleep" following the 1840 election.

Ldpez 1 victory assured the overthrow of the colonial legacy and the establishment of liberty and democracy.43 The triumph of the Liberals, declared party supporter Francisco de Paula Borda, was the revival and the continuation of the wars and to achieve true independence from the

41. Restrepo, Historia de la Nueva Granada, II, 224-225; JoseEusebio Caro, Epistolario, Biblioteca de Autores Colombianos, no. 62 (Bogota:, 1953), pp. 348-349; Gaceta Oficial, March 21, 1852, p. 188; April 2, 1852, p. 221. 42. AC Sesidnes Especiales, 1851-1864, fols. 4-6, 36-37; Gaceta Oficial, August 29, 1852, pp. 435-436; Jose(Marra Restrepo Sa~nz and Raimundo Rivas, Genealogfas de Santa Fe'de Bogota, 1 vol. of projected but uncompleted multi-volume work (Bogota>, n.d. ), I, 294-296; AC Sesiones Especiales, 1834-1850, no pagination, session of March 23, 1850; Restrepo, Diario, IV, 99, 105, 109-114; El Neogranadino, August 12, 1849, pp. 281-282; January 4, 1850, p. 2 43. Camacho, Memorias, yp. 52-53; Ibid., Escritos, III, 540; Rivas, Trabajadores, p. 33; Ramon Mercado, Memorias sobre Aconteci mientos·del Sur,Es ecialmente en la·Provincia de Buenaventura Durante la Administracion del 7 de Marzo de 1849 Bogota, 1 53 , VII; El Dia, September ;, 1849, p. 1; El 7 de Marzo" December 1, 1849, p. 1; Gaceta Oficial, September 12; 18.50, p. 464; La Fraternidad, September 9, 18491 p. 1 65

Spanish legacy, and Lopez was heir to the ideals of Santander.44 Jose'"

Maria Samper, in his astute memoirs, captured the sense of impending change well when he stated that "a revolution ought to rise from the popular victory of March 7: revolution in political customs, in ideas, in institutions...the era of oppressive systems, of colonial tradi tion.. .has ended.

44. Francisco de Paula Borda, Conversaciones con mis hijos, 3 vols., Biblioteca Banco Popular, nos. 65, 66, 67 [Bogota' 1974J, II, 30; see also Manuel Murillo Toro, Memoria del Secretario de la Hacienda, 1852 (Bogota, 1852), pp. 2-3; Samper, Apuntamientos, pp. 2, 12-13; El Neogranadino, January 3> 1851, p. 1; Gaceta Oficial, July 23, 1851, p. 515; La Sociedad de Artesanos a la Naciofi (Bogotsf, 1849).

45. Samper, Apuntamientos, p. 450. CHAPTER 3

CONSERVATIVES UNDER LOPEZ: POLITICAL AND MILITARY OPPOSITION

AND IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE

The Conservative Party remained active in national politics following the Liberal victory. Soon after the March 7 election, Con servatives launched a relentless attack against the administration in newspapers and pamphlets and through petition drives and popular demon strations. By mid-1851^ friction between the parties reached the breaking point and Conservatives joined in a violent, but unsuccessful, revolt against the government. The intense partisanship even pene trated the realm of political ideology where Liberals and Conservatives struggled to make the same ideas their own in an effort to define party ideology.

Opposition to Lopez began in the press and in Congress almost immediately after the run-off election.^ Earliest criticisms appeared in the press and focused on the legality of the election, contending that Lopez had been brought to power on the points of the "knives of the seventh of March.Conservatives in Congress echoed this senti ment and attempted to alter the official record of the election

1. Holton, New Granada, p. 528.

2. AC Sesiones Especiales, 1834-1850, no pagination, session of March 12, 1849; see also Camacho, Memorias, pp. 44-45; Restrepo, Diario, IV, 20-21. 66 67

proceedings to reflect the workers' pressure on electors; their effort

was defeated, however, because of the goristas' loyalty to the admin

istration.3

While attacks in the press and Congress continued, Conserva

tives organized popular opposition. In December 1849, the Sociedad

Popular met in Bogota' to plan working class resistance. Conservative women, advised by Mariano Ospina, formed the "The Society of God's

Children" as a focal point for antigovernment demonstrations; similar women's groups formed in other cities. Conservatives also formed the

"Society of Arts, Agriculture, Commerce, and Science" to provide a forum for more formal opposition to L<5pez.^

The greatest efforts to form an organized opposition to the government, however, centered on reviving the divided Conservative

Party structure. Several party leaders looked to Mosquera to undertake the task, but he refused. Party leaders were unable to find another candidate, and the Conservatives suffered more devastating setbacks in the congressional elections of June and July, 1849.^ Mosquera

3. Camacho, Escritos, III, 355; Julio Arboleda, El Misoforo (Bogot/, 1850), passim; Helguera and Davis, Mosquera, III, 173-178; Jaramillo, Pensamiento colombiano, pp. 32-34, 71-81, 181-208; Jaime Ospina Ortiz, "Las Convicciones Militantes de J.E.Caro," Prometo, I, no. 5 (July, 1955 ,5-22; El Dia, July 4, 1849, pp. 3-4;" July 25, 1849, pp. 3-4; August 7, 1849, p. 1; September 1, 1849, pp- 1-2; September 8, 1849, pp. 1-2; October 10, 1849, pp. 1-3; February 2, 1850, p. 1.

4. Restrepo, Diario, IY, 55-56; Cordovez M., Reminiscencias, pp. 423-424; Samper, Apuntamientos, pp. 521-522; El Pensamiento, June 17, 1849, p. 1; El DIa, August 10, 1850, pp. 1-2.

5. Helguera and Davis, III, 154-155, 182-185. 68 hesitated to assume responsibility because he was convinced that the

Party could not be revived in its old form. Its philosophy, so closely tied to repressive policies of the early 1840s, prevented it from competing for support from Birring progressive Conservatives and moderate

Liberals. In November 1849, Mosquera sent letters to his supporters that detailed a plan to form a totally new party. To avoid any connec tion to the old party, he decided to name his new organization The

Progressive Party. He adopted a program that, he contended, was based upon principles rather than personalities and upon the establishment of national harmony. Aimed toward moderates in both parties, it included support for democratic government, municipal independence, federalism, religious toleration, mass education, liberty of teaching, progressive taxation, and constitutional reform.^

Mosquera's plan failed because of a lack of interest outside major urban centers and because of opposition from fellow Conservatives.

Except in Cartagena, the provincial electoral leagues, which were to be the basis for the new party, never developed enough to oppose Ldpez.

Mosquera's followers, among them his close friend General Ramon Espina, would not support the new party because they thought that in Colombia's heated political atmosphere centrist organizations could never compete withjmore ideologically polarized groups. They favored reforming the

6. Ibid., 202-208; L. Cuervo, ed., Epistolario, III, 249-252; El Correo de la Costa, November 14, 1849, p. 1; December 12, 1849 > pp. 1-2; January 9, 1850, p. 1;.March 27, 1850, p. 1;..Tomb's Cipriano de Mosquera, Circular del Sr. Jeneral Mosquera i reflexiones que sobre ella hacen njuchos liberales (.Santa Marta, 1849). 69

existing Conservative Party. That the Liberal Party publicly supported

Mosquera's efforts lent strength to arguments that a third party would

serve only to weaken opposition to the administration.''' Though

Mosquera's plan failed, others tried with equal persistence to orga- s 8 ~ nize moderate unions throughout the Lopez years.

This mounting opposition from the Conservative Party convinced

many in the government that all opposition employees had to be purged

from the bureaucracy and universities. Lopez thought this necessary to

make certain that directives were implemented without resistance and to

prevent sedition from within. The removal of Conservatives was also

necessary to make room for the young party faithful, who had deluged

the President with requests for government positions.9 The purge was

very effective. During the Lopez years, hundreds of employees hired

during the ministerial regime lost their positions and others faced

continual harassment. Ex-President Herran lost his post as Colombia's

representative to the United States, and others, such as Jose" Eusebio

7. Helguera and Davis, Mosquera, III, 209-226; L. Cuervo, ed., Epistolario, III, 24-8-249/ El Correo de la Costa, February 27, 1850, p. 2; March 27, 1850, p. 3J La Libertad, July 25", 1850, pp. 2-3.

8. On efforts after Mosquera see Caro, Epistolario, pp. 322- 324; El Patriota Imparcial, February 15, 1850, p. 4; March^l, 1850, p. 4; El Filotunica, June 23, 1851, pp. 129^-130; Jos^Maria Uribe Restrepo, Unidh Electoral del Partido Conservador ( BogotsfT 1850).

9.^ Lopez, Para la Historia, pp. 17-26; Samper, Alma, I, 212- 215; El Canon, January 24, 1850, pp. 1-2; El 7 de Marzo, December 1, 1849, pp. 1-2; Qaceta Oficial,'.November 7, 1850, p. 592; Academia Colombiana de la Historia, Archivo Lopez. A collection of letters to L

Caro and Lino de Pombo, lost long-held appointments in the court system.

Key figures in the customs office, the salt monopoly, and the military were removed from office. The President also revoked appointments already made to judgeships, the military school, and to local political offices. In the universities the faculties were almost completely cleansed of opposition teachers and administrators. Those who resisted removal often found their classrooms invaded by angry artisans. Conser vatives were often illegally removed from lists of eligible jurors, and local officials frequently harassed opposition youth organizations and interrupted sessions of the Sociedad Popular.^

Conservatives blamed the persecutions on a cabal that manipu lated Ldpez. They contended that artisans, along with a small group of journalists and politicians, forced the President to condone the purge.

Workers pressured Lopez, the Conservatives asserted, into following their recommendations for appointments and into forcing employees to follow guidelines set up by the artisans. Manuel Murillo Toro led the cabal and became what one opponent declared "...the president in the presidency of Ldpez...."11 The allegations were fairly accurate. The

10. 0rt£z, Historia de la Revolucidfi de 1854, p. 26; Helguera and Davis, Mosquera, III, 16J3-173, 214-216; Restrepo, Historia de la Nueva Granada, II, 1.36-137, 148-149; Idem"., Diario, IV, 106-107, 124; Sur Americano, November 25, 1849> p. 4; El Dia,.August 8, 1850, p. 4; February 12, 1851, p. 4; La Civilizacion, Janyar^ 2, 1851, pp. 289-291; R.S. Domingo and Diego J^eome, El Dr. Augustin Nufiez Ex-Gobernador de Ocafia ( Bogota, 1852).

* 11. Ortiz, Reminiscencias, 196; Gomez B., Ospina, II, 4-6, 39; Restrepo, Diario, IV, 81; El Dia, April 27, 1850, p. 1; August 7, 1850, p.. 1; La Civilizacion, September 19, 1850, p. 255; Mariano Ospina Rodriguez, Ojeada sobre los primeros catorce meses de la a-dTTiinistracion del 7 de Marzo dedicada a los hombres imparciales i justos (Bogota, 1850), pp. 1-63. ~~ government-controlled Gaceta Oficial admitted that a club of congress men existed and that it often sent Ldpez position papers on pending legislation and government policies. Another pro-government source reported that some of the most significant legislation passed during the Lopez years was formulated during evening meetings of Liberal

Party leaders.^ Many Conservatives, seeing opposition impossible, left Colombia. Lopez' opposition in the south fled to Ecuador. The

President's three predecessors, Marquez, Herran, and Mosquera, went to the United States. Ezequiel Rojas and Florentino Gonzalez went into self-exile in Europe.^

Jose Maria Obando's return from exile added to the political strife. After several failures in the early 1840s to convince Congress to allow him return, Obando finally received permission to return to

Colombia under a general amnesty declared in Mosquera's last days in office. Obando arrived in Bogota' just after Lopez' inauguration.^

Immediately, his supporters in Congress moved to reinstate Obando to his old rank of general and to allow him an opportunity to prove his innocence in the murder of Antonio Sucre. The various projects on these subjects met strong resistance from men of both parties.

12. Camacho, Memorias, p. 163; Gaceta Oficial, January 2, 1851, pp. 5-6; June 11, 1851, p. 396.

13. Caro, Epistolario, pp. 303-306; Restrepo, Historia de la Nueva Granada, II, 180; El Neogranadino, March 14, 1851, pp. 86-87.

14. ACSen, 1848, IV, fols. 21-29, 151, 174. 72

Liberals considered Obando a mediocre politician insensitive to social problems. They also feared his rise in power would unite Conservatives, who wanted to keep him out of power because of his role in the 184-0 civil war. Though a bipartisan alliance defeated all proposals intended to aid Obando, he retained tremendous popularity among the workers because of his support of high tariffs. Popular sentiments forced

Lopez to ignore the actions of Congress and appoint him commander of military forces in Bogota'and later to the governorship of Cartagena.

From his base on the coast, Obando won election to Congress, where he served as President of the House of Representatives, a position which helped him to lay the groundwork for his presidential candidacy in

1853.15

The increased influx of radical foreign ideas further incensed anti-administration forces. Many Liberal newspapers gave extensive coverage to violence in Europe events and made available to Colombians copies of progressive legislative proposals, as well as minutes of foreign congresses. After 1851 the works of extreme radicals such as

Pierre Proudhon and Edward Cabet appeared in both official and unoffi cial periodicals, and several editors openly admitted that such thinkers

15. Samper, Alma, I, 229; Restrepo, Diario, IV, 20-21, 32-34> ACCR, 1849, XII, fol. 4; ACSen, 1849, VI, fols. 35-38, 74-111; El Dia, June 20, 1849, p. 2; July 25; 1849, pp. 1-2; August 4, 1849, p. 2; El' Correo de la Costa, January 9, 1850, p. 2; El Panameno, July 22, 1849, p. 4; El Siglo, June 10, 1-49, pp. 1-3. 73 influenced the content of their newspapers.16 Conservatives were alarmed by the influx of radical ideas and began distributing pamphlets that portrayed Colombia to be the center of a continent-wide conspiracy against republicanism. Also, several Conservatives traveled throughout the country spreading rumors of imminent communist revolt. The Catho lic press joined in the general alarm with numerous articles refuting foreign ideologies and exhorting the workers to obey the law and avoid politics.^

By mid-1850 party strife had completely polarized Colombian society. Politics became the center of life —a situation that led one contemporary to observe that "politics is the mania of the epoch."!®

United States diplomats in Bogot^ reported that party strife was so widespread that Colombians almost ignored economic development, and, according to one shopkeeper, their pending bills.^ Young women frowned at men whose political affiliations they disliked and all mem bers of the opposition were excluded from social functions. Political

16. Examples of radicalism in the press in El Taquigrafo, no date (week 1), 1850, p. 1; El Nacional, January 6, 1849, pp. 3-4; Gaceta Oficial, January to July, 1852; El Socialista; Amigo del Pueblo, January 29, 1852, p. 2.

17. Caro, Epistolario, p. 289; Helguera and Davis, Mosquera, III, 245-250; El 7 de Marzo, February 2, 1850, p. 1; El Dia, March 30, 1850, p. 4; El Catolicismo, October 1, 1850, pp. 195-196, 201-203; November 1, 1850, pp. 213-214; November 15, 1850, p. 228; December 15, 1850, p. 238; El Dropeito, Las Reptfblicas Hispano-Americanas i el socialismo. Carta al sr jeneral Jose Rufino Echenique (Bogota", 1852).

18. Kastos, Articulos, p. 112.

19. Samper, Alma, I, 248-251; Foote to Clayton, January 12, 1850, Dispatches, Ministers, Roll 12, Dispatch 5; EL 7 de Marzo, April 1, 1850, p. 4. attacks often descended to slander. Conservative newspapers pictured

Lopez as a jackass or a hideous demon, and Liberals labeled several

Conservatives as mentally deranged or ridden with syphilis. These

verbal and visual assaults frequently led to personal hatreds and

pistol duels, the most well known of which involved the Conservative

journalist, JosexMaria Caicedo Torres, and Murillo Toro. When Caicedo

accused Murillo of pilfering the treasury and of adopting burgeois

manners, they had a duel in which Caicedo barely escaped death.20

Politically motivated murders increased and a small but bitter

revolt broke out in the southern "province Jof Tifquerres. The uprising,

led by several local priests, was easily quelled, but Lopez, afraid to

severely punish the rebels, pardoned all the rioters.21 In other

regions, rival working-class organizations clashed violently. In

Bogota' a serious confrontation between the Sociedad Popular and a

police patrol composed of Liberal artisans led to demands for a con

gressional investigation into government brutality. However, Liberals

quickly defeated all proposals aimed at inquiring into the incident.^2

20. Holton, New Granada, p. 528; Samper, Alma, I, 240-242; Francisco de Paula Borda, (Jonversaciones con mis hijos, Biblioteca del Banco,Popular, nos. 115 116, 117 tBogotsT, 1974), I, 61, 63-69, 73, 77; El Dik, February 6, 1850, pp. 1-2; April 10, 1850, p. 4; March 1, 1851, p. I; El-Democra^a, May 26, 1850, p. 3; June 2, 1850, p. 1; El Canon, January 20, 1850) p. 4. 21.^ Restrepo, Diario, IV, 114; AHN, Ministerio del Gobierno, "Gobernacion de la Provincia de la TUquerres al Secretario de Gobierno" (November 2, 1850), Tomo 556, fols. 637-640; Leyes, XIV, 373-374.

22. On.working class violence see Helguera and Davis, Mosquera, III, 231-234; Gaceta Oficial, March 13, 1851, pp. 150-151; ACCR, Actas, 1851, fols. 19-22, 65; ACSen, Actas, 1851, fols. 16-17. The reference to Actas refers to the session minutes that are copied in good hand. 75

Political polarization culminated in a Conservative anti-

government revolt in the Cauca Valley and in Antioquia. In Cali, na tional political issues combined with local land-tenure problems to cause the unrest. The land problem revolved around the hacendados1 incessant encroachments upon communal holdings that were cultivated or grazed by peasants. In the 1770s local Spanish officials ruled in favor of those who worked the common lands, but the hacendados renewed their claims to the land in the 1840s. A sympathetic governor ruled in favor of the large landholders, forcing those working the land into poverty. They appealed to Mosquera for relief, but the President, who preferred to leave office in peace, did nothing. In December 1848, a more moderate governor ruled for the peasants, but he was unable to enforce the decree.^3

The revival of the land question provoked a wave of violence that increased after radical Ram^n Mercado became governor of Buena ventura in August 1850. Mercado considered the upper class of Cali, which was largely Conservative and controlled most of the land, to be a "retrogressive aristocracy" and saw the land issue as a good opportu nity to break its grip on local politics and commercial activity.^4

23. ,0n the land problem see Resena historica de los aconteci- jnientos politicos en la ciudad de Cali, pp. 9-12;. Restrepo, Historia de la Nueya Granada, II, 169-171; Helguera, "Antecedentes sociales," p. 55.

24. -On early violence and Mercado's tenure.see Resena hlstorica/ de los acontecimientos politicos de la ciudad de Cali, pp. 35-39; Ramon Mercado, Memorias Sobre.los Acontecimientos del Sur, VIII-LXI, passim; Restrepo, Historia de la Nueva Granada, II, 168-169; Gaceta Oficial, February 6, 1851, pp. 83-84; February 27, 1851, pp. 122-126. The governor encouraged farmers and artisans to challenge the wealthy

landowners. The local Democratic Society "became a willing participant

in several assaults on haciendas and on local Conservative political leaders. In nearby Cartago, for example, two Conservative businessmen were murdered and mutilated while their wives looked on. The violence forced many to emigrate to Popayan or Bogota, but even those fleeing often faced attacks while enroute. Only in April 1851 did Lopez finally speak out against the violence and order the army, under

Eusebio Borrero's command, into the area to restore stability. How ever, while sending aid Lopez strongly denied that his administration was implicated in attacks on Conservative landholders and politi cians.^

Other problems contributed to unrest in the Cauca Valley. The dominant Conservative power structure in the region fiercely opposed efforts to abolish slavery and to curb church power. Several local military leaders, including Borrero, who feared that Lopez was intent on weakening the army, sympathized with Conservatives. The appointment of Liberal bureaucrats to key local posts and the emergence of a strong

Democratic Society in Popayan further convinced Conservatives that their traditional powers were seriously threatened.. To counter the growing presence of the Liberals, the Conservatives revolted in May

1851.26

. 25. Restrepo, Diario, IV, 120, 131-1.32, 147^148; Restrepo, Historia de la Nueva Granada, II, 193-196; El Filoteriica, July 6, 1851, 138; El Dia, February 22, 1851, p. 1; March 18, 1851, p. 1; Gaceta Oficial, April 16, 1851, p. 229.

26. Helguera, "Antecedentes Soeiales,"pp.59-63. 77

In Antioquia, land, slavery, and the church were not key issues.

One of the leaders of the revolt, Julio Arboleda, had been an arch opponent of the Jesuits and had written the most important polemic on the subject. Residents of the region openly supported the abolition movement and proudly recorded voluntary slave manumissions. Statis tics revealed that in 1850 slaveowners in Antioquia freed as many, if not more, slaves than in other regions before the government officially abolished slavery. '

The central issue in Antioquia was Liberal ideology. El

Antioqueno, the leading newspaper in the region, summarized prevailing sentiments accurately in a series of articles published in late 1850 and 1851. Liberalism, the editor wrote, was an "immoral and savage" ideology that spread chaos throughout the nation and threatened the minds of school children. The paper blamed Lopez for the nation's moral decay and demanded that students' access to foreign ideas be restricted and that the schools adopt stricter discipline. In other articles the editor blamed liberalism for the purges against Conserva tives, attacks on civil liberties, and for offensive laws such as those permitting divorce. He also charged the Liberal Party with conspiring

27. Julio Arboleda, Opusculo Publicado por el Seflbr Julio Arboleda Defendiendo su Voto en la Ccfmara de Representantes y la Presentacicfn del Proyecto de Ley Declara Ilegalla Existencia en la Repflblica de la Asociacldh de Religiosos Llamada CbmpafTia de Jesifs (.Bogota', 1848), pp. 1-32; AHN, Ministerio del Interior y Relaciones Exteriores, "Gobernacidfr de la Provihcia de MedelliJi al Secretario del Gobierno" (October 23, 1851), Tamo 2, fols. 13-15; Gaeeta Oficial, February 23, 1851, p. 117; July 14, 1851, pp. 497-498; El Antioqneno; Periodico Conservador, November 11, 1850, p. 13; November 17, 1850, pp. 22-23. to destroy the economic power of Antioquia with measures that removed the province's jurisdiction over the Gulf of Uraba' which was a vital link to European trade routes, and that reduced the number of mail routes within the region.28

Though these were key issues in provoking the residents of

Antioquia, the problem of federalism, closely linked to liberal ideology, finally sparked revolt. The division of large provinces into smaller, more efficient, provinces met little resistance in regions outside of Antioquia. In that province and especially / Medellin efforts to divide Antioquia into three provinces were inter preted as a direct attack on Conservative political and economic power

Division, provincial Conservatives argued, would prevent what they thought was the "sacred mission" of the province, which was to aid other regions in the struggle against liberalism. They favored feder ation over federalism. Large autonomous states, Conservatives thought fulfilled the same purpose as small provinces, but would allow more local control over the influx of radical ideas. In the words of the editor of El Antioqueno, "federation is the only way the republic has to save itself from shipwreck."29

Conservative anti-federalist forces in Medellin, however, wielded virtually no influence among Liberal legislators in Congress.

28. El Antioqueno; Periodico Conservador,;January 5, 1850, pp. 49-51; October 13, 1850, p. 1; October 20, 1850, pp. 1-2; October 27, 1850, pp.'9-10; November 3> 1850, pp. 13-14; November 10, 1850, p. 19; November 17, 1850, pp. 21-22; December 29, 1850, pp. 45-46; January 19, 1851, pp. 58-59. 29. El Antioqueno; PeriocLico Conservador, January 26, p. 61. 79

They were overshadowed "by representatives of the interests of the city / of Rionegro, which was Medellin's arch-rival and then under Liberal

control. The Liberals argued that unless divided, Conservatives would

continue to control regional politics and successfully prevent the

implementation of government programs. The Liberal majority in Congress

accepted this argument and voted in May 1851 to divide Antioquia into

three provinces, effectively destroying the Conservative Party's most

important power base in the country. Conservatives in the area re

volted about six weeks later. Throughout the upheaval, the Conserva

tives justified their actions almost exclusively on the issue of

federation, even to the extent of calling their newspaper, EL Federal.30

In Popayan, the Conservatives were defeated in less than four

weeks. Though receiving aid from Ecuador, which hoped to annex the

region, rebel troops under the command of Manuel Ibanez, Juan Gregorio

Lopez, and Manuel Delgado lacked sufficient weapons and skilled mili

tarists. They faced the well-provisioned soldiers under the able • leadership of General Manuel Maria Franco and provincial governor Juan

Bautista Guzman. The rank and file of local chapters of the Democratic

Society served as important National Guard auxiliary forces.

30. ACCR, 1851, III, fols, 257-357; ACCR, Actas, 1851, fols. 161-162; Diario de Debates de la Cmnara de Represeritantes: 1850, pp pp. 1.36-139* 22,3-228, 257-258; Leyes, XIV, 402-404;-Eco de los Andes, March 16, 1852, p. 81; El Antioqueffo; PeridcLico Conservador, January 5, 1851, p". 52; January 26, 1851, pp. 61-64; El Federal, August 3>> 1851, pp. 1-4; August 10, 1851, p. 3} Division de Antioquia (Bogota', 1851). 80

The revolt in Antioquia was ended as quickly as that in the

Cauca Valley. When the upheaval began, rebels were able to occupy • Medellin and establish their leader Eusebio Borrero, who had broken with Lopez, as "civil and military chief." The city of Rionegro, under the leadership of Governor Antonio Mendoza, raised 1,500 troops and re took Medellin. Tama's Herrera, who had come north from the fighting in

Popayan, brought more men and completed the rout. Peace was restored by mid-July. What began in both regions as a violent protest left a total of three hundred dead and fifteen hundred wounded.

In the aftermath of the revolt, the Liberal Party launched a vicious attack against Conservatives. While many Liberals genuinely thought that the government was in danger, others simply used the revolt as an excuse for trying to destroy the opposition permanently.

During the course of the fighting, scores of Conservatives, including

Mariano Ospina, had been arrested on vague charges of sedition. Mem bers of the Escuela Republicana organized a police force and arrested members of the rival Filotemica, a move that completely destroyed the organization. In addition, government pressure forced Conservative • / newspapers such as El Dia, La Civilizacion, El Catolicismo, and El

Filotemica to halt publication. Abuses became so widespread that even

Liberals protested the treatment of suspected rebels. In the conquered province of Antioquia, the governor established a secret police force

31. Camacho, Memorias, pp. 222-223; Posada, Memorias, IV, 279- 280; Restrepo, Historia de la Nueva Granada, II, 194-200; Restrepo, Diario, IV, 134-158; Valerio Barriga, Memoria del Secretario de la Guerra, 1852, pp. 31-33; Gaceta Oficial, July 5, 1851, p. 461. 81 to report on political gatherings and to open mail of those suspected of conspiracy, and he ordered the local Democratic Society to watch over the population. Though most of the rebel soldiers received par dons, Congress revoked their pensions and considered legislation that would have made the death penalty mandatory for military men involved in future revolts.-^ Although it was easily quelled, Lopez did not ignore the implications of the revolt. Reacting to public opinion, the President took a stronger stand against crime, began to withdraw support from the Democratic Society, and took steps to restore an ideological balance in his cabinet.

The ideological struggle between the two parties was less apparent than political and military opposition, but it was far more important. The Liberals and Conservatives, while polarized politi cally, lacked clearly defined ideologies desperately needed to consoli date party constituencies and to broaden the party power bases. The parties failed to develop coherent philosophies because the Liberal and

Conservative intellectuals who could have forged them all sotight to claim the same moderate liberal, pro-religious position and the title

32. Restrepo, Diario, IV, 155-172; Restrepo, Historia de la Nueva Granada, II, 95; Borda, Hijos, I, 57-58; Leyes, XIV, 661-662; AC Leyes Autdgrafas, 1852, I, fol. 49; ACSen, 1853, II, fols. 32-35; AHN, Gob., "Un Granadino al Lopez" (August 28, 1851), Tomo 167, fols. 493-504; AHN, Mlnisterio del Interior y Relaeiones Exteriores, "Gober- nacion de la Provincia de Medellin al Secretario de Gobierno" (June 22, 1852), Tomo 2, fol. 148; AHN, Ministerio del Interior y Relaeiones Exteriores, "Decreto de Gobernador de Medellifi"'(November 4, 1851), Tomo 2, fols"; 22-23; La Reforma; PeridSico de la Escuela Republicana, August 24, 1851, pp. 1-2; El Catolicismo, February 22, 1852, pp. 381- 382; El Filotemica, July 13, 1851, p. 141; Una Confesion (Bogota^ 1852.) 82

of National Party. This situation existed largely "because they shared

common "backgrounds. The biographies of over five hundred legislators

and writers who served in the government between 1849 and 1854 revealed

that they came from essentially the same family backgrounds, attended

the same schools, and practiced the same professions. Liberals and

Conservatives alike admired European democratic ideas and used the

terminology surrounding them to express their views on Colombia. What

actually separated the parties philosophically was an emotional re

sponse to one issue —religion. This one issue, however, provoked such

virulent hatreds that the party leaders could not share common intel

lectual bonds and they moved to capture the ideas as their own.33

The fight for the progressive liberal position began in May

1848 with the arrival of news of the start of the uprisings in Europe.

Details of the revolts, which reached Colombia by way of Venezuela,

were first learned by Conservative Mariano Ospina. Contemporary

Salvador Camacho Roldan related in his Memorias that when Ospina read

of the uprisings in the post office, he ran out of the building and

across the plaza toward the central cathedral. He frantically tried to

enter the locked tower to ring the bells in celebration, and only the

33. Remarks on upbringing based upon qualitative analysis of the biographies of the nearly five hundred .men involved in the legisla tive process between 1849 and 1854; see also Camacho, Memorias, pp. 9- 10; Restrepo, Diario, III, 554, 561-562, 566-567, 571; IV, 9, 13; for examples of press coverage of the events in Europe.see La Gaceta Mercantil, July 12, 1848, pp. 2-4; July 20, I848; pp. 2-3; El Nacional, January 20, 18^9, pp. 2-3; El Correo de la Costa,.October 31, 1849, pp. 1-4; El Dia, August 22, 1849, pp. 3-4. 83 intervention of friends prevented him from breaking down the door. As word of the unrest spread, newspapers of all political persuasions devoted considerable space to events in France, Germany, and Italy.34

While news of foreign events was still sweeping across Colombia, both the Liberal and Conservative Parties moved to integrate the ideals manifested during the revolts into their various political programs.

By August 1848, the party programs were so similar that they were sepa rated by "no more than a word, and only from illusion...."35

During 1849 and 1850 Conservatives continued to strongly asso ciate themselves,.with ideas traditionally considered the preserve of

Liberals. Conservative politicians, such as Mosquera and members of the Filotemica, advocated municipal independence, religious toleration, abolition of slavery, emancipation of women, constitutional reform, and protection of the poor against the rich, as well as freedom of expres sion and rights for illegitimate children. They even went so far as to usurp use of the Liberal slogan "Liberty, equality, and fraternity," for their own party and made direct appeals to the Liberals' working class allies for support.36

34. Celebreon Pinzon, Memoria del Secretario . de Relaciones Exteriores, 1849, p. 7; Restrepo, Historia de la Nueva Granada, II, 80, 89; Mercado, Memorias, V-VIII; El Nacional, June 18; 1848, pp. 1-2; La Gaceta Mercantile December 27, 1848, pp. 1-2; El Siglo, June 29, 184^7 p. 1; May 6, 1849? pp. 2-3; ACCR, 1850, X, fols. 35-38.

35. El Nacional, August 6, 1848, p. 2; Plus-Cafe' July 12, 1849, p. 1. 36. On the Conservatives7 program see Kastos, Articulos, pp. 46-48; El Filotemica, November 17, 1850, pp. 1, 4) December 29, 1850, pp. 27-28; La Juventud Granadina, September 15, 1849 > pp. 2-4; El Ariete, November 2, 1850, pp. 1-2; El Siglo, June 22, 1848, pp. 1-3; El Dia, October 29, 1850, p. 4. 84

To further strengthen their claim to liberalism, Conservatives

began calling themselves the "true Liberal Party" and developed a defi

nition of liberal ideology that clearly separated them from Lopez'

administration. The true Liberal Party, Conservatives argued, was heir

to programs begun under Mosquera and Florentino Gonzalez. True Liberals

were moderate and progressive; they supported morality and public order,

but realized that the world was in transition and accepted the fact

that new systems of thought were developing. True Liberals, however,

rejected violent change and favored improvements in public morality to

complement changes in social and economic institutions. Those who did

not advocate these ideas were simply "false Liberals," a position that

led one Conservative to declare that "if in New Granada there exists a

Liberal Party, it is necessarily the Conservative Party

While Conservatives attempted to identify themselves with pro

gressive ideology, Liberals moved closer to what was traditionally

considered to be Conservative philosophy. To accomplish this, Liberals

were anxious to identify themselves with Christianity, an effort crucial

in weakening the Conservatives' claim to the ideals of Catholicism. It was also important as a means of .making reform programs compatible with the religiosity and narrow focus of their working class allies and for

37. La Sociedad Popular, January 15, 1850,,p. 6; Manuel Maria .Madiedo, TeoriS. Social (Bogota"^ 1855). pp. 32-41," Ortiz, Tip Santiago, pp. 5-7; El Dfa, May 4, 1850, p. 1; December 21, 1850, p. 4; January 25, 1851, pp. 3-4; El Siglo, June 22, 1848, p. 2; El• Antioqueflb; Peri^dico Conservador, December 15, 1850, pp. 37-38; El Correo de la Costa, February 6, 1850, pp. 2-3; El Samario, February 2, 1849, pp. 2-4. 85

encouraging moderate elements to support the Liberal Party.38 Liberals

argued that primitive Christianity was an essentially progressive doc

trine that emerged out of Jesus' opposition to the Roman Empire and his

subsequent execution. The ideals of equality, popular sovereignty, and

democracy emerged from His death. In the words of one Liberal thinker who supported this view, "liberty, this precious gift from heaven was

sealed with the blood of the man God on top of Golgotha...."39

Liberals used religious terminology and symbolism to further reconcile their programs with Christianity. Christ was portrayed as a

leader of social reform and his teachings were used in working class • newspapers to explain Liberal legislation and to make abstract political concepts meaningful to the lower classes. For example, Liberals used

the role of the priest to explain that "the mission of the government

in politics is like that of the Christian priest in the faith: to

instruct, to teach, and to correct, they are the ways that should be

employed for the baptism of democracy."40 The ideals of socialism, as

Colombians understood them, were compared to religion as a way to reha bilitate fallen man. At a literacy center for workers Liberal

38. El Atalaya, November yi, 1849, pp. 3-4> Sociedad Popular, December 28, 1849; pp. 1-3•

39. El Democrata (Socorro), November 24, 1849, pp. 3-4; El Democrata Periddico de la Sociedad de Artesanos, May 15, 1850, p. 3; La America, June 25, 1848, p. 4; July 2, 1848, p. 2.

40. Gaceta Oficial, August 29, 1850, p. 436. 86

instructors compared their role to that of the twelve apostles.41 In

one extreme case Liberal propagandists substituted Lopez for Jesus

himself. His election was readily compared with Jesus' resurrection

and one newspaper editor declared that "General Lopez is the Granadine

Jesus Christ designated by the nation to save it from ruin, and to save

the humane philosophical doctrine of liberalism...long live President

Lopez who is the God of New Granada J By Mm we win be saved."42

Conservatives tried to discredit the Liberal religiosity. They

mocked those who tried to reconcile liberalism with Christianity, call-

ing them Golgothas and using Liberal thinkers, such as Jose^Maria

Samper, as characters in humorous stories and plays.43 On a more

serious level, Conservatives portrayed Liberals as serious threats to

the Church.44 Conservative journalists readily compared liberalism

41. AHN, Gob., "Programa del Instituto de la Escuela Democra- tica" (July 23, 18497, Tomo 152, fols. 725-727; AHN, Gob., "Cuadro de los Directores de los Institutos Democra'ticos de la Provincia de Neiva" (February 5, 1850), Tomo 159, fols. 177-178; Gaceta Oficial, August 16, 1849, pp. 373-374; El Nacional, January 13, 1849, p. 3; El Neogranadino, March 14, 1851, pp. 88-90; El Socialista; Amigo del Pueblo, January 29, 1852, p. 1; La Reforma; Pericfdico de la Escuela Republicana, August 31, 1851, pp. 3-T.

„ 42. Quotes from La Chacota, August 24, 1849, pp. 3-4; see also Diaz, Manuela, yp. 19, 26-30; Gaceta Oficial, October yi, 1850, pp. 571- 572; El Demdcrata, Periodico de laSociedad de Artesanos, May 15, 1850, p. 3; May 26, 1850, pp. 2, 4; El Socialista; Amigo del Pueblo, January 29, 1852, pp. 1-2-; El 7 de Marzo, February 16, 1850, pp. 1-2; El Neogranadino, February 10, 1849, pp. 43-44•

43- Caro, Epistolario, pp. 427-428; Mazade,.Socialismo, pp. 17-18.

44. El Porvenir, December 25, 1849, pp. 1-2; El Atalaya, October 21, 1849, p. 2; November 21, 1849, pp. 1-2;.El Socialismo a Las Claras, November 17, 1850, pp. 19-25; November 24, 1850, pp. 26-30. 87

with the detested doctrines of Lutheranism and Atheism. They serial

ized histories of the Reformation in which its ideas were closely

linked to administration programs. As one such article stated, "to be

a good liberal it is necessary to be Protestant....

Liberals countered with new efforts to protect their ties to

religion. They contended that anticlericism was not the same as

atheism and that they strongly supported religion, but not the church

as an institution.46 Liberals reaffirmed their advocacy of primitive

Christianity and declared that the church had drifted from early

teachings.

Conservatives ignored this defense and, to further strengthen

their grip on the religious issue, consciously moved to ma Tee Catholi

cism the core of a revived Conservative Party. Conservatives Jose"'

Eusebio Caro and Mariano Ospina first attempted to rebuild their party

around religion, but initially were foiled by the Liberals claim to the

ideals of Catholicism.4-8 By 1852, however, they were ready to try

again because recent legislation passed against the power of the church

had largely discredited the administration's efforts to become the party

45. Diaz, Manuela, p. 429; El Filotemica, February 23, 1851, pp. 51-52; El Clamor de la Verdad, October 29, 1848#. pp. 1-2; November 5, 1848, p. 4.

46. Julio Arboleda, Misoforo, pp. 17-22; Nuestra Opinio£, June 15, 1850, pp. 1-2.

47. El 7 de Marzo, January 20, 1850, p. 3; Sur Americano, October 28, 1849, pp. 2-3.

48. Arturo Gomez Jaramillo, El Programa Conservador de 1849 (Manizales, 1967), pp. 15-20. 88 of religion. In a letter to Caro, Ospina contended that the govern ment's actions created an excellent opportunity for Conservatives to reassert their support for the church and religious doctrine. He astutely observed that anticlericism was the issue most likely to po larize Colombians and rally mass opposition to government policies.49

Ospina was correct in his assessment. By late 1852 religion was the one issue that intensified party loyalties; it was instrumental in unifying the Conservatives in time to pose a serious threat to Liberals in 1852 and 1853-

Conservatives were aided in their efforts to use religion as the basis for a revived party by the claims of many young Liberals that they supported socialism. Philosophically, Colombian socialism differed little from the position of the Liberal Party. They supported Lopez'

Twelve Points, but were somewhat more sensitive to the plight of the lower classes than were the majority of Liberals. The socialists thought that the government had an obligation to aid the workers in living full and useful lives, a position that included free education, protection against the rich, reform of debtor laws, and improved medical care. Though anxious to aid the poor, they did not want to confiscate personal fortunes or property to do it. Rather, the socialists hoped to eliminate what they thought were the causes of poverty, especially the monopolies, commercial restrictions, and tax schedules that encour aged the accumulation of large amounts of money. This would make a

49. Caro, Epistolario, pp. 348-356. 89 larger share of the wealth of the nation available to more people, thus raising the general standard of living. A socialist government would promote egalitarianism by improving conditions for the lower classes, not by social leveling.^

For implementing their scheme, Colombian socialists favored establishment of a system of associations. Some thought the organiza tions should be composed largely of capitalists, who would foment agri cultural industries and construct factories to provide steady employ ment, as well as sponsor charity houses to care for the indigent. Other

- X socialists, such as Jose Maria Samper, thought that the associations should be formed in each parroquial district and be composed of members from all classes. They would be apolitical and aimed at promoting mutual understanding, literacy, and aid for the sick. Samper best sum marized the importance that socialists attached to the associations when he declared that "socialism, this immortal system full of charity, of love, and of fraternity, is the intimate ally of the laws and cus toms transmitted by way of the Popular Associations."51

Conservatives seized upon the ideology espoused by the social ists as evidence that the Liberal Party had abandoned progressive

50. El Neogranadino, JUay 24, 1850, pp. 173-174; December 27, 1850, pp. 433-434; La Democracia (.Cartagena), February 20, 1851, pp. 1- 2; Una Sesion-Solemne de la Escuela Republicans (Bogota^ 1850), pp. 4- 12; Discursos pronunciados en las gesiones de 7 i 9 de marzo, pp. 32-38.

51. La Reforma; PeridcLico de la Escuela Republicana, July 20, 1851, pp. 1-2;. Eco de los Andes, February 10, 1852, pp. 41-42; Discursos pronunciados en las sesiones de 7 i 9 de marzo, pp. 76-80. 90 liberalism and Christianity. They labeled all Liberals "reds" and accused them of opposing property, family, and God. Conservatives associated all legislation intended to aid the working class with communism and Atheism. While the Liberals accepted the designation

"red" as their color, asserting that it represented the ideals of tolerances and liberty, they sharply denied any links with communism and issued numerous statements that emphasized their support of God, property, and the family. Conservatives ignored the Liberals' defense.52

The struggle between the parties to occupy the same philo sophical position had significant implications in the national Congress.

Reform proposals, committee reports, debates, and voting patterns all indicated that because both parties wanted to foster progressive images they frequently supported and opposed the same legislation. If any differences existed they were ones of degree rather than of principle,

Thus, Liberals and Conservatives became sometimes willing, sometimes

52. Restrepo, Diario, IV, 47; Sociedad Popular, January 15, 1850, pp. 6-7; March 9, 1850, pp. 4-6; El Porvenir, January 26, 1850, pp. 1-2; El Antioqueno; Perio'cl.ico Conservador, November 10, 1850, p. 17; November 24, 1850, p. 25; Sur Americano, November 22,.1849, p. 4; EL Neogranadino, March 14, 1851, pp. 88-90; April 5, 1850, p. 105; El Socialista; Amigo del Pueblo, January 29, 1852, p. 1; La Reforma; Perio'dico de la Escuela Republicana, August 31, 1850, pp. 1-4; November 17, 1850, pp. 23-26; El Dia, JuIyTl, 1849, p. 1; October 26, 1850, pp. 1-2; El Filotemica, May 4i 1851, pp. 101-102;.May 11, 1851, pp. 105- 106; June 1,1851, pp. 117-119; La Voz del Pueblo, February 18, 1849, p. 3; El Comunismo Social, January 19, 1851, pp. 29-30. 91 reluctant allies in efforts to reform political and social institutions, promote economic development, and curb the power of the military.

The Conservative opposition was successful in stemming what

Party leaders thought was an onrushing tide of radicalism. Their incessant articles in the newspapers and their revolt against the government forced Ldpez to moderate his policies, and even to alter the complex of his cabinet. They were not successful, however, in forging a coherent appealing party philosophy that clearly separated them from the Liberals and established their claim as the National Party. The

Liberals were also unsuccessful in achieving a centrist position and remained identified with the violence of the seventh of March. On one hand failure to develop separate political philosophies forced the parties to fall back on the issue of religion and sheer emotionalism to strengthen party loyalties. On the other hand, the absence of clearly defined positions on many issues encouraged Liberals and Con servatives both in the press and in the Congress to support many of the more progressive reform projects, a situation that proved to be critical in passing needed legislation and in controlling the artisans and the military in 1853 and 1854-

53. This paragraph based upon materials found in the congres sional archives, especially roll call votes, and articles in newspapers. CHAPTER A

ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM: THE BUREAUCRACY

AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM

Despite the political problems that Lopez1 administration faced,

the Revolution moved from the streets and meeting halls and into the chambers of Congress where concern over the bureaucracy became a major issue for both Liberals and Conservatives. To many the bureaucracy was thought to have perpetuated inefficient fiscal management, inhibited fair

administration of justice, promoted government corruption, and concen trated excessive power in the Executive branch. Although hampered in its

efforts by poor party leadership and financial problems, the Congress tried with varying degrees of success to bring efficiency and integrity

to the bureaucracy. Laws to reduce the bureaucracy failed to meet

expectations, but the 1853 Constitution compensated for the legislative

setbacks and incorporated the ideas of the reformers as the basis for national institutional organization.

Of greatest urgency was the need to improve the fiscal situation which had deteriorated since the 1840 civil war that had left the treasury in chaos. Officials ignored administrative directives and pilfered funds, and collectors on provincial and municipal levels were paid irregularly and frequently refused to work, leaving badly needed funds uncollected. Both Lino de Pombo and Florentino Gonzalez, who served as treasury ministers under Mosquera, did much to improve the

92 situation. Pombo introduced reforms that reduced theft and improved collection and accounting procedures. Gonzalez divided Colombia into seven fiscal districts each with a head responsible only to him. In addition he clearly defined the duties of each employee and routinely read volumes of ministerial correspondence to make certain that all directives were implemented. Virtually all projects concerning the treasury debated between 1849 and 1854 were based upon Gonzalez1 efforts."*" In 1849, for example, Lopez signed a law that further out lined the duties of employees in an attempt to forge "unity of responsibility . . . unity of collection . . . and unity of accounting.

The intention was to make one responsible for each major phase of tax collection, thus allowing the central government to check easily for fraud. To cut administrative expenses, which accounted for a large portion of the treasury budget, the law eliminated Gonzalez' fiscal districts and replaced them with new divisions that coincided with existing provincial boundaries, a plan that allowed national officials to use the facilities of local governments for treasury activities. 2

Although the responsibilities of the national treasury for tax collection declined after 1850, Congress continued to standardize pro- 3 cedures to improve efficiency and reduce costs.

1. Rufino Cuervo, Memoria del Secretario de la hacienca, 1843, pp. 14-19; Lino de Pombo, Memoria del secretario de la hacienda, 1846, pp. 6-8, 19-24; Leyes, XI, 294-303, 466-467, 489-498; XII, 146-189.

2. Quote and details from Leyes, XIII, 493-499.

3. ACSen, 1850, VI, fols. 293-296; ACCR, 1853, VI, fols. 33-34 55-59; ACSen, 1854, III, fols. 131-148; Leyes, XIV, 228-230, 311-340, 480-523; XV, 245-248. 94

To further stabilize the fiscal situation, Congress tried to

reorganize the national debt. The debt was divided into an exterior

portion, which stemmed from bonds sold between 1819 and 1830, and an

interior portion, which consisted of money owed those who bought bonds

after 1830. Because the national debt was floating, it grew along with

ever-increasing budget deficits. Interest was paid for with grants of

public land or with proceeds from public land auctions, a practice that

separated much of the best land from government control and made payment irregular.^

Congress wanted to consolidate the interior and exterior debts and to service them at a fixed interest rate. The subject produced intense debate because some legislators did not want to honor much of the debt and others wanted to fix very low interest rates. These differences prevented any effective action until 1850, when Congress reformed the interior debt, but left the exterior debt untouched. As a result, Colombia's foreign credit immediately declined and in 1853 the government was forced to suspend all interest payments. To regain credit abroad, Congress authorized the President to renegotiate the debt, using all the resources of the nation, to back pledges to renew interest payments. Although this drastic measure was intended as only a temporary solution, Congress failed in efforts to permanently stabilize

4. On the debt see Estadistica jeneral de la Nueva Granada conforme al decreto ejecutivo de 18 de Diciembre de 1846 (Bogota? 1848;, p. 223. 95 the national debt and the credit of the government continued to decline.^

Congress also reformed the currency system because debasement, shortages, and fraud threatened fiscal stability and trade. Mosquera had made some effort to alleviate the problem when, to increase confi dence in Colombian money, he approved a measure that created the real to replace the faltering peso. Congress based the new coin on silver rather than gold and made it the equivalent of several European coins which allowed foreign currency to circulate as legal tender thus increasing the amount of specie available.^

After Mosquera left office, the government did little to improve the money supply until 1853. In that year, because of a critical lack of silver, Congress returned Colombia to a gold-based currency and resurrected the peso as the standard monetary unit. To sustain confi dence, however, the peso was renamed the "strong peso" and was assigned a higher value than the old coin. To maintain high standards the government strengthened control over the mints. Later, to make coin production profitable, Congress assigned private concerns power to produce the currency under close government supervision. In another

5. ACCR, 1850, IV, fols. 3-6; XI, fols. 69-144; ACSen, 1852, II, fol. 289; ACCR, 1853> VI, fol. 65; Sesiones especiales, 1851-1860, fols. 33-34; ACSen, 1854, III, fols. 152-153; Leyes Autografas, 1850, III, fol. 18; Leyes, XV, 596-597.

6. On monetary supply problems see Safford, "Commerce," pp. 114- 127; Leyes, XI, 331-334. 96

action aimed at facilitating currency exchange, Congress adapted the

French metric system to Colombian currency,7

While struggling with fiscal reform, reformers also attacked

problems within the judicial system, which was near chaos. Local courts,

where many judges were illiterate and few kept abreast of new laws, were

especially ineffective. In informally administered courts, in which even

judicial robes were lacking, transient magistrates and corruption com

bined to create a crisis in confidence that led many Colombians to take g the law into their own hands.

Efforts to reform the judicial system began almost immediately

after Lopez assumed office. Using the results of a comprehensive survey

taken among judges, Congress formulated proposals that standardized the legal process and protected the rights of the accused.9 The many projects

debated in Congress, sometimes as many as fifteen during one three month

session, prevented rapid passage of any comprehensive measure before

1852.^ Almost all of the many proposals became part of a major reform

bill approved in May 1852, which established rules of evidence, regulated

7. ACCR, 1852, XII, fols. 76-78, 91-92; ACCR, 1853, I, fol. 158; Leyes, XIV, 97, 286-308;^ XV, 340-350, 591-599, 679-682; Safford, "Commerce," pp. II-III; Cordovez Moure, Reminiscencias, p. 1545.

8. Mariano Ospina, Memoria del secretario del interior y relaciones exteriores, 1844, p. 39; Ibid., 1845, pp. 65-71; Alejandro Osorio, Memoria del secretario del gobiemo, 1847, pp. 14-18; Torres Mendez, Costumbres, p. 5.

9. ACCR, 1849, VIII, fols. 199-205, 214-236, 244; ACCR, 1850, IX, fols. 1-70; XI, fol. 35; XII, fols. 7-13, 50-54; Francisco Zaldua, Memoria del secretario del gobierno, 1850, pp. 13-15.

10. The exception was a law expanding the power of district judges to hear appeals. ACCR, 1850, IV, fols. 278-342; Leyes, XIII, 453-454. 97 trials, and standardized the appellate process.11 However, the law proved inadequate and, in 1854, jurist Justo Arosemena presented a comprehensive judicial code that regulated all phases of the legal process including criminal investigations, arrest procedures, appoint ment of defense attorneys, sentences, appeals, and pardons. The project entered debate, but a political crisis in April 1854 prevented full discussion.1^

Congress also tried to improve the integrity of the courts which 13 had been subject to bribery by the rich. Efforts to establish equality before the law began slowly and then ended when, in 1850, differences over wording prevented passage of an important project that gave the courts complete control over the judicial system, limited magistrates to certain second occupations, and increased the salaries of judges.1^

Congress did not take any new initiatives until 1852, when

Lopez himself seized leadership in the controversy during a speech in which he severely criticized the courts for incompetence and favoritism.

So harsh were the President's words that the Supreme Court published a protest and ordered an investigation, later halted by Congress, to

11. ACCR, 1853, VIII, fol. 52.

12. ACCR, 1854, II, fols. 203-233.

13. ACCR, 1850, IV, fols. 98-99; ACCR, 1853, XII, fols. 233-241; Diario de debates, pp. 10-11. 14. ACCR, 1851, IV, fols. 96-126. 98

determine if Lopez had violated the constitution in his remarks.15 The

sharp remarks spurred complacent legislators into action, but efforts to

pass legislation to improve court performance were "blocked by the X6 Senate. Congress ultimately approved other less comprehensive

measures that regulated judicial appointments and improved court 17 reporting. Congress also adopted proposals that established new

courts on the provincial and local level. Although it also created the

post of fiscal in all courts to make certain that the rights of Indians,

slaves, and workers were protected, legislators refused to eliminate 18 court fees, leaving many outside the judicial system. The legislation failed to improve the integrity of judges and as late as 1854 the 19 central government was still trying to improve the judicial system.

The Congress was somewhat more successful in efforts to improve the election process. Motivated by numerous allegations of fraud from

both Liberals and Conservatives, Congress investigated over a dozen cases in 1851 and 1852 and considered several measures to standardize the

15. ACCR, 1852, V, fols. 480-489.

16. ACCR, 1852, V, fol. 28, ACCR, 1853, XII, 228-231.

17. ACCR, 1850, IV, fols. 44, 67; ACSen, 1851, I, fol. 250; Antonio del Real, Memoria del secretario del gobierno, 1854, p. 19; Leyes, XIII, 512-515; XV, 137-141; Diario de debates, p. 196.

18. ACCR, 1850, IV, fols. 140-164; ACCR, 1852, IV, fols. 39-76; Leyes AutograTas " 1851, III, fols. 67-68; Leyes, XIV, 392-395; Diario de debates, p. 192. 19. Pastor Ospina, Memoria del secretario del gobierno, 1855, p. 24. 99 20 electoral process. With support from Conservatives who hoped that fair elections would reverse their fortunes, legislators in 1849 approved laws to protect electoral assemblies from outside interference 21 and to regulate run-off elections in the national Congress. In 1852, after almost two years of debate, Congress passed a more comprehensive reform project to complement earlier statutes. 22 In June 1853

Congressman Florentino Gonzalez successfully sponsored a more far- reaching reform project that dealt with ballots, polling places, and vote 23 tabulation. The electoral reforms were so effective that the Liberals were unsuccessful in preventing Conservatives from making considerable gains in the 1853 and 1854 elections.

Congressional efforts to reduce corruption extended beyond the electoral process to the conduct of political officials. Contemporary reports revealed that favoritism was evident in budget-making, awarding contracts, granting amnesties, and in regional development projects.

Some evidence also existed indicating that high-ranking officials,

Murillo Toro among them, were speculating in treasury funds. When

20. El Dia, October 13, 1849, pp. 2-4; September 24, 1850, p. lj December 14, 1850, p. 1; March 18, 1851, p. 3; La Civilizacion, August 14, 1850, pp. 275-276; La Democracia (Cartagena), December 5, 1850, p. 1; December 19, 1850, pp. 1-3; Ospina, Ojeada, p. 29; ACSen, 1851, IV, passim; ACSen, Actas, 1851, fols. 23-24, 32-34, 45-46, 52-53, 84, 106, 121-122, 178-180, 221-225; ACSen, 1852, IV, fols. 292-299, 396-397.

21. ACCR, 1849, I, fols. 187-200; Leyes, XIII, 456-458; Leyes autografas, 1849, VI, fols. 62-97.

22. ACCR, 1851, I, fols. 114-117; ACCR, 1852, I, fols. 13-30; Leyes, XV, 166-169.

23. ACSen, 1853, I, 308-311; Leyes, XV, 523-543- 100 abuses were uncovered at any level private citizens, as well as govern ment officials had the right to force an investigation. However, the procedure was largely ineffective and political corruption remained . 24 rampant.

Congress tried unsuccessfully to alleviate the crisis. In 1849 and 1850, legislators defeated several projects that gave the courts 25 jurisdiction over all accusations of malfeasance in office. They also rejected a measure that would have created the post of ministerio publico,^ an office intended to deal solely with corruption. 26 Congress even failed to pass a law that prevented conflicts of interest among 27 legislators. Though reasons for the failures were not clear, some indication was given in a speech by Liberal Pedro Jose'Nieto, who opposed further laws against corruption. He believed that enough statutes already existed and that if more were enacted Colombians, fearing almost certain prosecution for small infractions, would be reluctant to enter government service. 28 Conservatives, who feared such

24. La Civilizacion, April 25, 1850, pp. 152-153; November 28,1850, p. 269; El Demdcrata, May 26, 1850, pp. 4-5; Voz del Pueblo, February 4, 1849, p. 1; Rufino Cuervo, Epistolario, III, 181-182; ACCR, 1849, V, fols. 96-100; VI, fols. 1-40; IX, fols. 10-23; XII, fols. 22-31.

25. ACCR, 1849, XII, fols. 119-129; ACSen, 1850, VI, fols. ACCR, 1851, I, fol. 144; II, fol. 2; ACCR, 1853, VIII, fols. 105, 344, 349.

26. ACSen, 1850, VII, fols. 19-25.

27. ACCR, 1849, XI, fol. 3-

28. Diario de debates, p. 83. 101

laws might hasten the purge, joined the Liberals in opposition to the

reforms.

"The administration was equally unsuccessful in curbing

empleomania, the desire for government posts. After Lopez' inauguration,

the government received hundreds of requests from supporters who sought

appointments to national, provincial, and local posts. Both Liberals

and Conservatives agreed that empleomania discouraged the rich from

entering commerce and the poor from learning a trade. Inasmuch as the

search for a government job required the aid of someone in power, they

believed it created a web of personal relationships that ran counter to 29 republican ideals.

Congress, undoubtedly waiting until administration supporters

were firmly entrenched, did not act on the problem until 1850.

Legislators ignored pleas to establish a school of administrative science.

Even when congressmen acted to stem the flow of job-seekers, their

efforts focused on maMng offices accessible to more applicants rather

than on reducing empleomania. One project created a system of promotion

and retirement that constantly opened lower-echelon positions to young

aspirants. Another measure automatically terminated employment in the

bureaucracy thirty days after a national election. Because these reforms

merely regularized upward mobility and retirement from government

service, the quality of the bureaucrats did not improve. In addition,

the laws encouraged applicants and provided the national government with

29. The Lofiez Archive contains many letters reflecting this prob lem. See also Ortiz, Reminiscencias, pp. 135-136; El Patriota Imparcial, February 15, 1850, p. 14; June 1, 1850, pp. 3-4; June 15, 1850, pp. 102 legal methods of ridding the administration of holdovers from the . . 30 previous regime.

Although improving the efficiency and integrity of the treasury, courts, elections, and government appointees was important to legislators, such endeavors were secondary to efforts to decentralize the enormous economic and political power of the executive branch.

Liberals and Conservatives were both anxious to reverse the trend begun in the early 1840s, which weakened Congress and crippled provincial and local government.

The first target of the Congress was the tremendous power con centrated in the presidency. Before 184-0, the President had the power to negotiate treaties, grant concessions, and appoint and remove pro vincial governors, as well as lesser bureaucrats. The 1843 Constitution granted members of the executive branch below cabinet level the right to serve in Congress and congressmen to serve in the bureaucracy while

Congress was not in session. Over fifty percent of the legislators exercised this prerogative and took appointments to supplement their incomes as congressmen. They served as provincial governors, tax collectors, university teachers and rectors, as well as government con tractors. This system allowed the President to exercise extraordinary

30. ACCR, 1850, IV, fols. 18, 32, 240; ACCR, 1853, I. fol. 18: X, fols. 277-278; Leyes Autografts?1851, III, fol. 170; Leyes, XV, 291-292. 103 influence over many congressmen, seriously reducing the independence of

Congress. 31

Though efforts to break the power of the president generated broad bipartisan support, it was not enough to force the needed measures through Congress. Legislators in the House of Representatives, easily defeated proposals to restrict the president's power to grant salt concessions, negotiate debt settlements, remove provincial governors, and make war. The only success Congress registered was a measure that 32 regularized, but did not limit, the president's veto power.

Congress fared only slightly better in efforts to make itself independent of presidential influence. In May 1849 legislators approved a law that prohibited treasury appointees from serving in local electoral assemblies. It also forced members of the executive branch to resign their office if elected to Congress and ordered legislators to give up any post dependent on the president for reappointment. This law, however, was not effective and later congresses tried without success 33 to strengthen it. Reasons for the failure to curb the Executive were not clearly stated, but evidence suggested that Liberals sensed

31. ACCR, 184-9, XI, fols. 98-99; Diario de debates, p. 9; Patriota Imparcial, March 1, 1850, pp. 3-4; El Dia, May 13, 1851, p. 3; La CivilizacitSh, April 25, 1850, pp. 152-153; Ospina, Ojeada, p. 56.

32. ACCR, 1849, V, fols. 121-122; ACCR, 1851, IX, fol, 127; Diario de debates, p. 9.

33. ACSen, 1850, VII, fols. 53, 55; ACCR, 1853, VIII, fols. Ill, 115; Leyes, XIII, 400. 104 the need for a strong president to overcome the Conservatives, and, therefore, sustained presidential powers. 34

Congress was far more successful in decentralizing the

Executive's political and economic decision-making power through laws that established a federal system of administration. The idea of federalism emerged in Colombia long before the rise of the Liberals.

From the 1820s many officials of all political persuasions thought decentralization the best means to allow local administrators to resolve 35 local problems. During the last years of Mosquera's administration, cabinet members Florentino Gonzalez and Alejandro Osorio came out in favor of federalism. Gonzalez, who had been a federalist since 1838, was convinced that local autonomy was essential for economic develop ment. Osorio declared his support for Gonzalez' position in his report to the 1847 Congress in which he lamented that local officials lacked both the funds and the authority to deal with even the most minor problems. Osorio concluded that such restrictions discouraged competent men from serving in local offices and he urged Congress to establish smaller, more independent provinces to alleviate the situation.^

34. See for example the roll call vote in ACCR, Actas, 1853> fols. 359-360. 35. Mariano Ospina, Memoria del secretario del interior, 1844, pp. 8-21; Restrepo, Historia de la Nueva Granada, II, 33; Leyes, XI, 29-31. 36. Duarte French, Florentino Gonzalez, pp. 227-228; Alejandro Osorio, Memoria del secretario del gobierno, 1847, pp. 7-8. 105

Pressure from the cabinet, and ever-increasing pressure from local officials, forced Congress to take action. In 1847 legislators passed a measure to create provincial tax collection systems and to grant provincial officials more power to supervise district govern ments. The next year Congress adopted a major bill that defined and further expanded the powers of local government. Though still subject to Bogota's ultimate control, provincial legislatures were given authority to levy and collect taxes, contract for loans and public works, supervise the division and sale of Indian communal lands, regulate markets, form national guard units, promote general economic development, and to expand the power of the cabildos. 37

The law of 1848 did not satisfy federalists after Lopez came to power. Augustin Codazzi, a map maker and geographer who traveled throughout northern Colombia in 1850, reported that both citizens and local officials demanded sufficient power to regulate their affairs.

In Panama, both North American residents and Colombian officials called for autonomy in local administration. Some Panamanians even considered demanding annexation from Colombia to enhance local powers. The

United States minister in Colombia related to his superior that federalists in the area were even discussing the possibility of splitting the nation at the Magdalena River and joining the western half * 38 to Central America which was far more accessible than Bogota.

37. Restrepo, Diario, III, 529; Alejandro Osorio, Memoria del secretario del gobierno, 1847, pp. 7-8; Leyes, XII, 187-189; XIII, 229-245. 38. Republica de Colombia, Jeografia fisica y politica de las provincias de la Nueva Granada, 4 vols. (Bogota', 1957-1959), IV, 291- 106

Federalists "based their arguments on the need for more effi

ciency in government. In their numerous petitions to Congress, cabildo

and provincial officials contended that existing provinces were too

large to be governed effectively. Remote parts of many provinces were

cut off from the center of power by geographical obstacles. Several of

the provinces, because of boundary demarcations, did not have the

resources and population necessary to sustain a government. Smaller

provinces, the Federalists concluded, would diffuse political power,

thus preventing the growth of dictatorships. Conservatives generally

supported these arguments not only as a means of fostering effective

administration, but also as a way to control Liberal influence on the 39 local level.

Responding to these demands, Congress began to change provincial

boundaries. Legislators forged new provinces from neighboring cantons,

and divided existing provinces into smaller entities. Between 1849 and

1854, Congress increased the number of provinces from twenty-one to thirty-four. The divisions followed no set patterns, and decisions to

divide or create a new province was generally based on the amount of

292; ACCR, 1850, V, fols. 26-27; ACSen, 1852, III, fol. 21; Leyes Auto- grafas, 1849, V, fol. 79; El Aviso, February 9, 1849, pp. 4-5; El Correo de la Costa, March 27, 1850, p. 3.

39. ACCR, 1849, IV, fols. 363-398, passim; ACCR, 1850, VI, fol. 44; IV, fols. 381-394; ACCR, 1851, III, fols. 288-296; IV, fols. 13-34; ACSen, 1951, I, fols. 118-122; VIII, fols. 5-24; ACSen, 1853, VI, fols. 184-185, 277-292; ACCR, 1853, VI, fols. 15-26; Leyes Autografas, 1850, I, fols. 36-46, 78-80; II, fols. 240-243; 1852, II, fols. 426-463; Diario de debates, pp. 29-31, 257. 107 pressure placed on Congress by local residents and administrators. In

addition to hastily and haphazardly adding new provinces, Congress

responded to the demands of the Panamanians and granted them almost com

plete political and economic autonomy from Bogota.^

To further improve local administration, Congress integrated the

national territories into provincial administrations. Mosquera created

the territories in 184-6 out of remote areas, such as the Goajira

Peninsula and Caqueta, which were territories difficult to administer from provincial capitals. Territories were governed by prefects who acquired considerable power because of their isolation from the central government. Abuses resulting from this situation, coupled with the lack of sufficient revenues in the territories to sustain a government, 41 forced Congress to restore them to provincial control.

To encourage local officials to take advantage of the smaller

divisions, Congress granted them power to handle their own affairs. In

184-9 legislators approved a project that gave cabildos the right to contract for public works, control the construction and maintenance of 12 churches, and to plan budgets and regulate the police. In 1850 Congress

40. ACCR, 1850, I, fols. 30-41; IV, fols. 224-228; ACCf*, 1851, III, fols. 358-359; VI, fols. 413-414; ACSen, 1851', V, fols. 134-135; ACCR, 1852, I, fols. 474-480; ACCR, 1853, I, fols. 347-426; ACCR, 1854, II, fol. 2; Leyes, XIII, 403, 425-426; XIV, 25-26, 29, 160-162; XVI, 18-19; Diario de debates, pp. 26-27, 179-181.

41. ACCR, 1850, XI, fols. 64-68^ VII, fols. 245-261; Leyes, XIV, 160-162; Diario de debates, p. 377; Diaz, Manuela, pp. 84-857~"214, 217- 218, 222, 392; Kastos, Articulos, pp. 148-153.

42. ACCR, 1850, XIV, fols. 21-22; Leyes Autografas, 1849, V, fols; 83-84, 89-90; 114-115, 122-123, 132; Leyes, mi, 4ji9-44!?. 108 approved a more comprehensive measure that greatly expanded local government. It prohibited the Executive from interfering in cabildo activities and authorized cabildo members to overrule the provincial government's veto of local legislation. These two provisions made independent entities cf the towns and gave them full control over local affairs.^

Between 1851 and 1854 Congress considered several other projects to complement the 1850 Reform. One of the most important proposals focused on the problem of gamonalismo, local bossism. The decentraliza tion of political power gave provincial leaders, generally the rich, an opportunity to accumulate power. So widespread was gamonalismo that novelist Eugenio Diaz used his great novel, Manuela, to expose what he thought to be a form of feudalism. To combat this problem, Congress passed a measure that prohibited two members from the same family from serving in the cabildo.^ Congress also debated, but did not pass because of the need to deal with other problems, several other projects that clarified earlier reforms, restricted the power of political chiefs.^

To allow the provinces to make the most of their political power, Congress passed legislation to increase local economic

43- ACCR, 1850, VII, fols. 108-124; Leyes, XIV, 154-160. 44. ACCR, 1851, III, fols. 67-69; ACCR, Actas, 1851, fols. 45, 92-93, 96, 144-145; Leyes, XIV, 460-463.

45. ACSen, 1851, I, fols. 50-53; ACCR, 1852, I, fols. 112-117, 182-195, 219-220, 234; ACSen, 1852, II, fols. 294-295; ACCR, 1853, V, fols. 3-4, 12-20; VIII, fols. 64-78; ACCR, 1854, I, fols. 10-13. 109 independence. Provincial and local officials experienced chronic economic crises, and often had to ignore development projects in order to meet daily expenses. Because of the lack of money, many Colombians would not serve in local posts and many important positions such as scribes and notaries were left vacant. The national government, plagued with its own financial crisis, could not meet its obligations to local administrators, let alone finance desperately needed schools, hospitals, and roads. This critical situation forced officials to devise a means to rid the government of its financial obligations and placate demands for local fiscal autonomy. Thus, in a series of meetings in late 1849 and 1850, cabinet ministers Murillo Toro and Jose Maria Plata formulated a plan for decentralizing economic decision-making power. Murillo's plan granted provincial and district administrators substantial new revenue sources and assigned them obligations formerly met by the central government. Murillo argued that the plan eliminated the huge treasury budget, sharply curtailed time spent on budget planning, and drastically reduced the financial drain on the government's limited revenues. He added that the decentralization plan would promote new areas of economic 46 growth and make municipal independence a reality.

Conservatives did not share Murillo's enthusiasm for the plan.

They argued that while economic decentralization might be sound in times

46. ACCR, 1849, VIII, fols. 108-110; AHN, Gob., "Decreto del gobernador de Socorro" (January 20, 1849), tomo, 154, fol. 783; Restrepo, Diario, IV, 69-70;^ Camacho, Memorias, pp. 163-164; Galindo, Historia economica i estadistica, pp. 84-85; Murillo Toro, Memoria del secretario de la hacienda, 1850, pp. 18-23. 110 of prosperity, it represented gross irresponsibility and cowardice in a

moment of crisis. They pointed out that most of the provinces, especially

those recently created, did not have the tax base necessary to finance

bureaucracies and promote economic development. Those without sufficient

funds, the Conservatives concluded, would sink into bankruptcy and

become a burden to the central government. Liberals countered with

arguments that decentralization was compatible with sound economic

planning, as well as with the ideals of democracy. They added that

Colombians would be more willing to pay taxes if they Imew that the

money would be used locally.47

Congress approved Murillo's plan in April 1850, and gave pro

vincial and district officials almost complete economic autonomy. Under

the law, the national government retained control over customs revenues,

the salt monopoly, proceeds from the sale of public lands, and tolls

collected on national roads. The provinces and districts were assigned

portions of the diezmo, court fees, liquor taxes, sales taxes and other indirect taxes, road tolls on local routes, and river transit imposts.

More importantly, the law also authorized officials at provincial and local levels to levy and collect taxes or to abolish them without interference from the central government. The only condition placed upon them was a set of fixed expenses that had to be met and certain

47. La Civilizaciofi,. March 28, 1850, pp. 135-136; April 11, 1850, pp. 143-145; Gaceta Oficial, December 1, 1850, pp. 645-646; El Neogranadino, April 12, 1850, pp. 113-114; April 19, 1850, pp. 121-122; April 26, 1850, pp. 129-131. Ill / g accounting and budget-making procedures that had to be followed.

Following passage, the Law of April 1850 underwent some revision as

Congress clarified provisions, forced officials to meet their obliga tions, set minimum salaries for those paid from local revenues, and limited or expanded the power of the provinces to legislate on such problems as judicial taxes and land sales.49

Government efforts to diffuse political and financial power created more problems than they resolved. Because of the law that decentralized political power, cabildo members and local political chiefs often ignored their duties and abused their offices. Low standards set by local governments allowed many illiterates to assume posts, a situation that led one cabinet minister to assert that only two hundred of eight hundred cabildos in Colombia were functioning properly. On the provincial level, officials often used their prerogatives to eliminate unfriendly judges and to create what the 50 central government feared were provincial armies.

48. Leyes, XIV, 32-40.

49. ACCR, 1850, I, fols. 144-147; XIV, fols. 72-73; ACSen, 1850, VI, fols. 64-65; VII, fol. 1; ACSen, 1851, I, fols. 54-57, 282; ACCR, 1851, III, fols. 474-476; ACSen, 1852, I, fols. 238, 242, 326; ACCR, 1852, I, fols. 211-222, 257-259, 361; ACCR, 1854, II, fols. 284-285; X, fol. 265; ACSen, 1853, II, fol. 22, VIII, fol. 273; ACCR, 1854, II, fol. 48;. Leyes, XIV, 457-459; XV, 677-678. 50. ACCR, 1850, IV, fol. 36; VIII, fol. 58; Jose'Maria Plata, Memoria del secretario del gobierno, 1852, pp. 11-12; Patrocinio Cuellar, Memoria del secretario del gobierno, 1853, PP. 17-21, 25; Antonio del fteai, Memoria del secretario del gobierno, 1854, pp. 6-7. 112

The multitude of problems generated considerable opposition to federalism among Liberal provincial governors and politicans. Governor

Murillo Toro of Bogota complained that the divisions weakened local government and that many provinces had been created without adequate knowledge of local needs. Federalism, Murillo concluded, had drained the provinces of competent men, limited public works projects, and stifled commercial expansion. Federalist Jose' Maria Samper, who served in district government, added that federalism threatened civil order and accused those supporting small provinces of not fully understanding the consequences of their positions. He concluded that "the Granadine territory is not like a piece of bread that you are able to cut where 51 you want." Popular dissatisfaction and discontent among Liberal news paper editors lent considerable credibility to the assertions of 52 Murillo and Samper.

As a result of the unrest, as well as of their doubts about the success of decentralization, Congress began limiting federalist tendencies. They became more cautious about establishing new districts and cantons, and rejected several projects that created new provinces or divided old ones. Despite the policy reversal, however, Congress was determined to protect gains already made and denied several measures

51. La federacion en la Nueva Granada (Bogota*^ 1856), p. 26.

52. ACCR, 1849, V, fols. 130-139; VII, fols. 258-260; ACCR, 1851, III, fols. 307-312, 317-320; ACCR, 1852, IV, fols. 201-213; ACCR, 1853, I, fols. 376-394-; ACSen, 1853, IV, fols. 231-252; ACCR, 1854. Ill, fols. 140-147; V, fols. 37-38, 317-318; Leyes Autografas, 1852, II, fols. 126-128; La Democracia (Cartagena), February 8, 1852, p. 1. 113 that reduced the number of provinces or that gave the President

authority to tamper with divisions.53

The problems that grew from economic decentralization were not

as easily resolved. The reform had allowed provincial and local govern- 54 ments to show budget surpluses by 1852. Officials used their new

wealth to undertake ambitious projects that included improvements in

the mails, road construction, prison remodeling, and expansion of 55 schools and hospitals. However, because local officials also used

their new powers to eliminate taxes of colonial origin, which were the

major sources of revenues, the initial success of the scheme was short

lived.^ The old taxes were not replaced because of intense opposition

to new imposts, so revenues sharply declined and local officials were

53. ACCR, 1849, IV, fols. 1-8; V, fols. 114-120; XI, fols. 86-87, 121-213; XV, fol. 110; ACSen, 1849, VI, fol. 40; ACCR, 1850, X, fols. 20-22, 50-57; ACCR, 1851, II, fol. 3; VI, fol. 36; ACSen, 1852, I, fols. 68-81; II, fols. 12-31; ACCR, 1853, VI, fols, 88, 105-106; IX, fols. 343-366; ACCR, 1853, VIII, fols. 17, 22; ACCR, 1854, III, fols. 1-2, 87, 172; El Neogranadino, October 15, 1852, pp. 242-243.

54. Mariano Ospina, Memoria del secretario del gobierno, 1845, cuadros 5, 6; Alejandro Osorio, Memoria del secretario del gobierno, 1847, cuadro 9; Francisco Zaldtfa, Memoria del secretario del gobierno, 1850, p. 79; Manuel Camacho, Memoria del secretario del gobierno, 1851, pp. 61-62; Patrocinio Cuellar, Memoria del secretario del gobierno, 1853, cuadros 6, 7; data for 1852 does not exist. 55. Camacho, Memorias, pp. 167-168; Manuel Camacho, Memoria del secretario del gobierno, 1851, p. 5; Manuel Murillo, Memoria del secretario de la hacienda, 1851, pp. 2-3, 7-8; Ibid., 1852, pp. 39-40.

56. Camacho, Memorias, pp. 165-167; Restrepo, Historia de la Nueva .Granada, II, 148, 162-163, 166, 202; Murillo, Memoria del secretario de la hacienda, 1851, pp. 3-7; Ibid., 1852, 39-42. 114 forced to rely upon illegal and excessive tolls and to neglect financial 57 obligations in order to remain solvent.

Many provincial and local officials appealed to the central government for relief in the form of loans, grants, and more revenue 58 sources. However, provisions in the decentralization law, as well as a lack of funds, prohibited any aid. Congressmen also refused to help

because they thought that if left alone the fiscal crisis would diminish as local administrators made necessary adjustments. Though this attitude generally prevailed, Congress did not set completely adrift the provinces and districts. Legislators approved several measures to alleviate the financial crisis, including laws that allowed provincial governments to combine their resources to meet essential obligations, provided loans and new revenues to certain provinces, and exempted some local administrations from certain expenditures. For the most part, however

Congress relied on strict enforcement of the law to cope with the 59 crisis and to make certain that officials met their obligations.

57. Restrepo, Historia de la Nueva Granada, II, 211; Restrepo, Diario, IV, 204; Holton, New Granada, pp. 50, 97; ACCR, 1851, IV, fols. 52-54; ACSen, 1853, VI, fols. 329, 439; ACCR, 1853, IV, 4, fols. 36, 194, 503; Gaceta Oficial, December 5, 1850, p. 663-

58. ACCR, 1851, III, fols. 104-105; VI, fol. 456; ACSen, 1851; V, fols. 6-11; ACCR, 1852, V, fol. 20; ACCR, 1853, IX, fols. 95-97; ACSen, 1853, VI, fols. 525-526.

59. ACCR, 1851, VI, fols. 256-257; VII, fol. 6 ; ACSen, 1852, I, fols. 1-10, 241-242; II, fols. 139-141, 207, 252, 258-259, 357; ACCR, 1852, I, fol. 128; ACCR, 1853, IV, fols. 49-50; ACCR, 1854, III, fol. Ill; Leyes Autografas, 1851, IV, fol. 24; 1852, I, fols. 11-15; Leyes, XTV, 385, 407-408, 435-436, 634-639; XV, 55-64. 115 The various bureaucratic reforms culminated in the promulgation of the 1853 Constitution to replace that of 1843. The new charter reflected many of the ideas of the reformers including administrative changes and economic and political decentralization, some of which had already been rejected in previous debates. As in other aspects of reform, support for and opposition to altering the 1843 Constitution did not always follow party lines. Though Liberals generally thought the document undemocratic and elitist, Conservatives were divided over 60 the issue. While some saw the 1843 charter as "truly liberal in the correct sense of the word," others, who hoped to foster a progressive image, supported reform.^" This attitude was reflected in articles in several Conservative newspapers which stated that a new constitution would establish a true democracy and end special privileges. 62

Though Liberals and Conservatives often agreed on the need for reform, they were internally divided over whether to formulate a new charter in Congress or in a special convention. Many Conservatives thought that a special delegate election would yield a moderate deliberating body and therefore supported a convention. Other

Conservatives, who wanted reform in Congress, believed that conventions

60. Kastos, Articulos, pp. 35-41; El Aviso, February 2, 1849, pp. 2-7; La Gaceta Mercantil, May 31, 1848, pp. 3-4; August 2, 1848, pp. 1-2; August 10, 1848, pp. 2-3; January 24, 1848, pp. 2-3; February 7, 1849, p. 3; February 14, 1849; pp. 2-3; ACCR, 1850, VI, fols. 48-51; ACCR, 1852, IV, fols. 81-83.

61. Posada, Memorias, IV, 237.

62. El Censor, December 8, 1848, pp. 1-2; El Siglo, July 20, 1848, p. 3; August 3, 1848, pp. 1-2; August 17^ 1848, pp. 1-2; August 24, 1848, pp. 1-2; August 31, 1848, pp. 2-3; El Dia, March 21, 1849, p. 1. 116 served only to heighten political passions. Liberals were similarly

divided. During the 184-9 congressional sessions, the Liberal and 64- Conservative forces favoring a convention triumphed. However, the

convention did not convene.

At the same time that Congress debated the merits of a Conven

tion, legislators also considered several proposals developed by a

special commission that reformed the Constitution piecemeal. However,

because they opposed partial changes, the congressmen defeated all but , 65 one proposal.

In 1851 Congress elected another special commission to present

another reform proposal and revoked the now useless law requiring

calling a constitutional convention, and adopted a measure that allowed

Congress to reform the charter during regular sessions. 66 Legislators

debated the project of the commission for nearly a month before

adopting a modified version on May 23. The reform, which Congress

considered a legislative act rather than a full-scale reform project,

reaffirmed the Colombians' basic liberties, established religious

toleration and freedom of expression, expanded the concepts of political

63. El Siglo, May 20, 1849, PP- 2-3; La Civilizacio'n, December 12," 1850,, pp. 277-278; March 27, 1851, pp. 337-338; El Antioqueno; Periodico Conservadora, October 27, 1850, pp. 11-T2".

6/+. ACCR, 1849, XI, fols. 121-122; Leyes, XIII, 391-392; El Siglo, May 20, 1849, pp. 2-3; La America, April 14, 1849, p. 1.

65. Leyes, XIII, 455-456; El Neogranadino, April 28, 1849, pp. 135-136.

66. ACCR, 1851, I, fol. 112; Leyes, XIV, 387-388. 117 and economic decentralization, provided for direct election of President,

Supreme Court judges and congressmen, and curbed the Executive's discretionary powers.^

Despite its provisions, the 1851 Reform did not placate radicals.

They wanted more far-reaching reforms such as universal suffrage included in any new document. Congress and Lopez were able to keep the radicals in check until the anti-Conservative reaction that followed the 1851 revolt. 68 Between that period and 1853 the radicals increased their influence enough in Congress to force renewed consideration of a more comprehensive constitutional reform project. In March 1853 the legislators declared the constitution totally unsatisfactory and ruled that under the 1851 Reform the charter could be revised during regular 69 congressional sessions. However, the charter was not easily altered because by 1853 the Liberal Party was deeply divided between moderates and more radical elements. Voting patterns indicated that issues such as civil liberties, the death penalty, and federalism generated align ments that almost prevented many of the most radical measures from being adopted.* + * 70

67. Leyes, XIV, 424-433-

68. ACCR, Actas. 1852, fols. 298, 305, 307, 309; ACSen, Actas. 1852, fols. 3-4; Jose^Maria Samper, Derecho publico interna._d,e. .Cnlnmh-is. 2 vols. Biblioteca banco popular nos. :>9 (, Bogota, i, <^iu; i.a neforma; Periodico de la Juventud, May 10, 1853, pp. 3-4; May 17, 1853, pp. 3-4.

69. Samper, Derecho publico, I, 210; ACSen, 1853, I> fols. 7, 161-193; Leyes, XV, 2W.

70. The Liberal Party split is fully analyzed in chapter 9. Observations based upon qualitative analysis of roll call votes concerning the reform. 118 Radicals in the Liberal Party triumphed, however, and in May 1853 newly elected President Jose Maria Obando signed a bill that implemented

a completely new constitution. The new charter was one of the most

progressive in the world, embodying all the hopes and aspirations of

reformers who sought to bring progress to Colombia. In terms of bureau

cratic reform, it expanded the power of local government, limited the powers of the presidency, and assigned the Supreme Court jurisdiction over political crimes. The document also curbed the power of the Church and implemented progressive statutes on education, the courts, and elections.^

The new constitution provoked a wave of reaction from all sides of the political spectrum. The Church was concerned about anticlerical provisions. Moderate Liberals, as well as many Conservatives, sensed that it was contrary to prevailing public opinion. Other Liberals thought that the provision for universal suffrage would, because of the priests' influence over voters, spark a Conservative revival. Because the constitution did not clearly define how congressional deadlocks should be resolved, the President feared—correctly—that legislative activity 72 would come to a halt. Legislators were sensitive to the opposition and made some effort to correct the problems. A group of congressmen,

71. Gibson, Constitutions of Colombia, pp. 201-214.. s / 72. Miguel Maria Lisboa, Relacion de un yiaje a Venezuela, Nueya Granada y Ecuador (Caracas, 1954), p. 324; Aquileo Parra, Memorial eds. Vicente Parra and Laureano Parra (Bogota", 1912), pp. 99-100; El 17 de abril, August 31, 1854, pp. 1-4; El Termometro, September 4, 1$5T, pp. 2-3; ACSen, 1854, VII, fols. 237 119 among them both Liberals and Conservatives, sponsored a proposal that called for a convention to make the necessary modifications. However, a military revolt, which was largely aimed at the constitution, prevented legislators from debating the plan. 73

Efforts of Congress to improve the bureaucracy reflected at best mixed results. Many of the most important proposals were never debated successfully and many of those approved failed to meet expectations.

Reasons for the failures included the lack of party discipline, which prevented block voting on legislation, and the lack of party leadership to see proposals through the debating process, as well as a set of legislative priorities that placed the relatively mundane bureaucratic reforms well below the importance of more socially relevant projects.

For these reasons the President remained the most important figure in the government and continued to exercise inordinate influence over

Congress. Fiscal reform failed miserably, judicial reforms proved to be ineffective, and political corruption and favoritism became institutionalized. While political and economic power was decentralized and provinces divided for reasons of efficiency, the changes failed to meet expectations because of lack of funds and competent administrators on the local level. This situation allowed the central government to continue its tremendous influence over local affairs. The 1853 Constitu tion compensated for the legislative failures. Passed during a time of

73- ACCR, 185-4, II, fol. 127; ACCR, Actas, 1854, fols. 6-7, 9,20, 3-4, 49-52; ACSen, 1854, IV, fol. 11; ACSen, Actas, 1854, fols. 66, 97. 120 deepening political crisis, the charter created a liberal state in a society moving toward the political center. The ambiguities of many of the provisions paralyzed the government and became a major factor in the outbreak of revolt in 1854. Thus, in the final analysis many of Colombia's bureaucratic structures remained vestiges of the colonial experience and those that changed often caused more problems than they resolved. CHAPTER 5

THE ECONOMIC REVOLUTION:

LIBERALISM AND THE STATE

The Executive and the Congress were both anxious to use the reforming impetus to free the Colombian economy from its colonial lethargy. This task, already begun under Mosquera, was to be accomplished through legislation that ended restrictions on economic freedom and stimulated private enterprise. Thus, although the

Executive branch was anxious to improve the economy, Congress became the center of reform. The President and his cabinet served largely as a source for reform proposals. The administration found considerable support for its legislation from among Conservative commercial interests who, like the Liberals, realized that government monopolies, high tariffs, archaic commercial codes, traditional landholding patterns, and unfair tax schedules prevented Colombia from reaching its full economic potential. Unfortunately, many of the projects were not approved because a lack of revenues outweighed the principles of liberal economics. Also, Congress failed to stimulate private enterprise because it would not legislate the necessary incentives. The government was forced to fill the void, but lacked both the funds and expertise to enter commercial endeavors.

The Colombian economy in 184-9 was in desperate need of radical reform. Existing laws kept much of the national wealth off the market

121 122

and discouraged investment. Government monopolies on tobacco, salt, and liquor restricted capital investment and prevented increased employment in those industries. The landholdings of the state, the church, and

Indian tribes kept much arable land off the free-market, thus hindering agricultural development. In July 184-8 the editor of El Nacional estimated that limited access to economic opportunity cost the nation almost eleven million pesos annually in lost production.^"

To expand economic opportunity for all levels of Colombian society, Congress moved against government monopolies, the most important of which was the tobacco monopoly. State control of the tobacco industry dated back to the colonial period and was continued as an important soxirce of revenue into the republican era. Through the monopoly, the government controlled the quantity and quality, as well as the marketing of the plant. By the 1830s, however, demand for Colombian tobacco in Europe had greatly increased. This situation, combined with new capital accumulations during the stable 1840s, led to new pressure on the government to expand cultivation. 2

In response to the demands the government increased access to tobacco cultivation between 184-5 and 1848. In 1845 the Mosquera administration expanded the industry through a series of contracts that authorized private companies to grow tobacco and then sell it to the

1. Estimate from El Nacional, July 5, 1848, pp. 1-3; Urrutia, Labor, pp. 3-5.

2. Sierra, El tabaco, pp. 100-104-; John P. Harrison, "The Evolution of the Colombian Tobacco Trade to 1875," Hispanic American Historical Review, 32 (1952), 163-168. 123 government, which acted as marketing agent to ship the crop to Europe.

The contract system was successful, and by 1847 production and exports were almost three times that of 1835.3

By 184-8, however, Mosquera was forced to support total abolition of the monopoly. The contract system was inadequate to allow all available capital to enter the lucrative business. Also, the impoverished central government was unable to purchase the ever-increasing crops destined for export. The working class, which saw tobacco cultivation as a means of supporting their families on small plots of land, placed additional pressure on the President. The intention of the Liberal Party to campaign on an anti-monopoly platform further encouraged Mosquera to support free tobacco cultivation.4

Under Florentino Gonzalez1 guidance the monopoly gradually ended during 1848 and 1849. Gonzalez first tested congressional sentiments with a measure that reaffirmed the government's right to regulate tobacco 5 cultivation; it was defeated. Encouraged by the defeat, the Secretary successfully submitted a proposal that ended the monopoly in the territory • of San Martin. In February 1848 the same was done for the Islands of San

Andres.^ Finally, in May 1848 Congress approved legislation that ended

3. Sierra, El tabaco, pp. 42, 62-65; Tirado Mejia, Historia economica, pp. 183-185; Camacho, Memorias, pp. 172-173, 178-179; Rivas, Trabajadores, pp. 148-159; Safford, "Commerce," pp. 202-208; Harrison, Tobacco,1' 168-169.

4. Sierra, El tabaco, pp. 91-96; Safford, "Commerce," pp. 202-208.

5. ACCR, 1847, IV, fols. 326-332.

6. Leyes, XII, 271-272; XIII, 26-27. 124 all controls nationwide by January 1, 1850. The law authorized free 7 cultivation and sale, but subjected both to taxation.

Despite their support for a free economy, many Liberals after

1849 were not certain that ending the monopoly was a sound move. The heavy taxes on the cultivation and sale of tobacco were a vital source of revenue and any reduction would worsen the critical fiscal situation in the government. In addition, the government would have to compensate planter-contractors who, if not paid promptly, could damage Colombian credit and reputation abroad. Those who favored freeing cultivation countered these fears reasoning that the nation's most important resource had to be promoted. Expanded growth would open new areas of cultivation that would more than compensate for the temporary loss of revenue. Many capitalists had already invested large sums in land and seeds and, therefore they agreed, any delay in ending the monopoly would threaten them with financial disaster. A coalition of doctrinaire

Liberals and commercially active Conservatives defeated pro-monopoly forces led by Ricardo Vanegas, Jose de Obaldia and Murillo Toro; g Mosquera's abolition of the monopoly was upheld.

Though legislators saved the law, they were far from satisfied with its provisions. Congressmen from both parties were especially unhappy with the tax on sowing that had to be paid prior to harvest, a

7. Leyes, XIII, 174-175.

8. ACCR, 1849, XI, fol. 89; XII, fols. 20-27; ACSen, VI, fol. 230; La Gaceta Mercantil, May 9, 1849, p. 1; El Siglo, June 3> 1849, pp. 2-3; El Dia, February 7, 1849, p. 2; May 23, 1849, p. 2; Diario de Debates, pp. 51-60. 125 requirement that effectively eliminated all but wealthy capitalists from

the industry. Legislators also thought that the measure should have

included provisions for educating the population in the technology

necessary to start cultivation.9

The Congress in 1849 and 1850 passed laws aimed at reducing the

tax burden. After intense debate over the extent of reduction, the 1849

Congress finally reduced the imposts by fifty percent. The same measure

banned provincial and city taxes on tobacco and exempted tobacco

merchants from paying transit taxes. To replace revenues lost by the

tax reduction, the legislators imposed a twenty-five percent consumption

tax on tobacco used domestically.^ The 1850 Congress was still not

satisfied with the tax situation because large companies could still

drive small cultivators out of business, and legislators approved a

measure that abolished all sowing and export taxes.11 The laws failed to fulfill expectations. Large enterprises, through speculation and a

system of contracts, maintained control of the industry. Those few

able to buy or lease plots were at the mercy of purchasing agents and

neighboring hacendados. Thus, the monopoly simply shifted from govern- 12 ment to private control, and no small landholding class emerged.

9. ACCR, 1849, XII, fols. 28-29. 10. The spread of tobacco technology was part of the government's mass education program and is discussed in another chapter; ACCR, 1849, XII, fols. 11, 18-19; Leyes, XIII, 509-511, 579-580.

11. Leyes Autdfcrafas. 1850, II, fols. 153-154; Leyes, XIV, 56.

12. ACCR, 1850, XII, fol. 275; El Canon, January 13, 1850, pp. 1-2; Samper, Alma, I, 284; Camacho, Viajes, pp. 73-75; Camacho, Memorias, pp. 182-183; Safford, "Commerce," pp. 210-226; Sierra, El tabaco, pp. 93, 94. 126

Congress also acted to end the government monopoly on salt

mining and marketing. Nearly all sources of salt were state owned and

operated under a concession system. The concession fees, as well as other taxes on the industry, produced important revenues that became

even more crucial after abolition of the tobacco monopoly and passage 13 of economic decentralization measures.

The salt monopoly faced considerable popular opposition, which increased as Lopez1 term progressed. Working class leaders argued that monopolists kept prices artificially high and often failed to meet local demands. Thus, many who lived in areas without ready supplies of salt were forced to smuggle it in from neighboring Venezuela and Ecuador.

In many remote regions, salt was so precious that it became a medium of exchange. The regulations, protestors added, threatened the livelihoods of small cattle ranchers and added significantly to the unemployment problem. Lopez' cabinet ministers were sympathetic to these arguments and supported legislation aimed at weakening the monopoly and expanding production.

Despite widespread discontent and cabinet-level support for reform, Congress did little to alter the monopoly. For fiscal reasons,

13. Holton, New Granada, p. 98; Restrepo, Historia de la Nueya Granada, I, 373-374; Galindo, Historia economica, Cuadro 7.

14. ACCR, 1849, V, fols. 159-173; ACCR, 1851, IX, fols. 298-299; ACSen, 1851, V, fols. 221-224, 242-244; ACSen, 1854, V, fols. 158-161; Manuel Murillo Toro, Memoria del secretario de la hacienda, 1850, pp. 8-9; Juan N, Gomez, Memoria del secretario de la hacienda, 1853? pp. 19-26; Ancizar, Peregrinaci<3h, pp. 243-244; La Fraternidad, August 26, 1849, pp. 1-2; El Neogranadino, May 24, 1849, pp. 165-167; July 7, 1849, pp. 235-236; El Dfa, September 29, 1849, pp. 4-6; El Siglo, July 8, 1850, pp. 1-2. 127 legislators sharply rejected any projects that lowered taxes or prices and refused to even consider proposals that weakened government control.15

Until 1853 Congress also failed to expand production. In that year, however, legislators approved a measure that allowed the President to open new salt works in provinces currently importing salt, and made salt 17 creeks the property of those who discovered them. Despite this small concession few of the working class were able to enter the industry and the salt monopoly remained a source of chronic unrest throughout the

Lopez era.

Congress was even more remiss in responding to calls for an end to the government monopoly on aguardiente, a popular liquor. The state did not maintain a formal monopoly on the drink, but regulated production through a licensing system that began in the 1830s. It was an extremely lucrative enterprise. The average distillery produced about 16,000 bottles a month and profits were normally 300 percent. With government aid, the wealthy license holders were able to protect their privilege well. Government agents sought out and destroyed illegal stills that flourished in small towns and the distillers' own agents ruthlessly hunted down and beat those who produced contraband liquor. Petitioners

15. ACCR, 1850, X, fols. 111-112; ACCR, 1851, II, fol. 173; ACCR, 1852, I, fol. 147; ACCR, 1853, XI, fols. 380-381; ACCR, 1854, I, fols. 72-79; Leyes, XVI, 56, 214-217.

16. ACCR, 1849, XV, fols. 157-158; ACSen, 1850, VI, fols. 287-288.

17. ACSen, 1851, V, fols. 242-244; ACSen, 1853, VI, fols. 2-4; ACCR, 1853, VIII, fols. 2-5; XII, fols. 65-66; Leyes, XV, 593-594; Abajo los monopolios! (Bogota, 1852). 128 who sought to end the monopoly system cited these abuses and added that

concessionaires frequently bottled inferior products, a situation that

often led to the deaths of unsuspecting consumers. The Democratic

Societies supported the petitioners, adding that such restrictions kept 18 many from earning honest wages.

The liquor monopoly did not concern even the most popularly

oriented officials, and Congress refused to alter the system. Anxious

to sustain the monopoly, legislators denied all requests to establish

independent distilleries and rejected all tax reform proposals.

Legislators also refused to allow local governments to use liquor tax revenues for local projects or to have any voice in how the system was

administered. Congress was determined to maintain the concession as one

of the few sources of steady income for the central government. As a

result, the popular classes were unable to find employment in the

industry.1^

The issue of tariff reform was another important aspect of

economic development schemes, but generated considerable debate within

the ruling Liberal Party. Government officials were divided over

whether to sustain tariffs and over what purpose import duties should

serve. One group, including artisans and Conservatives, wanted

S * 18. Kastos. Articulos, p. 126; Diaz, Manuela, p. 72; El Sentimiento Democratico, September 6, 1849, p. 79; AHN, Ministerio de gobierno, "Solicitude para un indulto," (June 22, 1849), tomo 567, fol. 832; ACSen, VIII, fols. 12-16, 44-48.

19. ACCR, 1849, XI, fols. 195-199; ACSen, 1849, yi, fols. 1-3, 35-42; VII, 44-51; ACSen, 1353, VI, fols. 179-180; Murillo Toro, Memoria del secretario de la hacienda, 1850, p. 12. 129

duties to protect domestic industry. Another faction led by successive

treasury ministers Jose Maria Plata and Juan Nepomuceno Gomez, wanted to

preserve tariffs, but only as a source of income without regard to the

needs of the working class. Yet another faction remained true to

doctrinaire liberalism and opposed all restrictions on foreign trade.20

An alliance of fiscally responsible Liberals and Conservatives

ultimately triumphed and Congress adopted laws that preserved tariffs, but only as revenue sources and not as a means to help artisans. In

1849 and 1850 Congress improved customs collection with legislation that increased the number of custom houses at ports of entry and added staff 21 to those already in operation. To reduce contraband, Congress approved a controversial law that increased the percentage of crates inspected at ports of entry from ten percent to over fifty percent. Merchant interests strongly opposed the law because they believed the new inspection rate would create backups in the ports, destroy patterns of internal trade, and increase the amount of damaged goods. They wanted either a reduced rate of inspection or a system of imposts based upon weight rather than upon contents. The 1853 Congress considered such legislation, but did not adopt it. 22 Congress also approved two rate

20. Ospina Vasquez, Industria y proteccion, pp. 157-159, 200-201, 206; Murillo Toro, Memoria del secretario de la hacienda, 1850, pp. 6-8; Juan N. Gomez, Memoria del secretario de la hacienda, I?53, pp. 8-19; Jose'M. Plata, Memoria del secretario de la hacienda, 1854, pp. 10-12; Diario de Debates, p. 2541

21. Holton, New Granada, p. 35; ACCR, 1850, VII, fols. 59-65; Leyes, XIII, 453: XV, 656-659. 22. ACCR, 1849, VII, fols. 79-82; ACSen, 1852, I. fol. 81: Annp, 1853, I, fols. 56-71; Leyes Autografas, 1851, VI, fols. 285-286; Leyes, XIV, 524-557; XV, 613-632. 130 increments. The first, passed in 1849, raised all duties ten percent and the second, in 1852, added a twenty-five percent surcharge to all foreign 23 goods. In 1854-, because of food and raw material shortages, tariffs 24 were temporarily lowered on those items.

The government tariff policy was disastrous for the artisans.

Leaders of the Democratic Society argued that the general tariff increases did not help them because raw materials became more expensive, thus raising the cost of the finished products and making them less competitive with foreign manufactures. Workers demanded a shift in policy toward selective tariffs aimed at making their goods cheaper and at limiting imports of foreign goods that competed with domestic products.

Some sympathizers in the 1850 Congress sponsored a project that met the workers' needs. They argued that such a law would create jobs and pro mote economic development. The legislators added that all nations, even those advocating free trade, used tariffs to protect workers. Opponents countered that the project benefitted artisans at the expense of con sumers, was socialistic, and threatened to destroy competition. Only higher quality and lower prices, they argued, would make the wealthy buy domestic products. An alliance of doctrinaire Liberals and anti-worker

Conservatives defeated the proposal. Among those who had supported the measure were Lorenzo Maria LIeras and Jos£"Maria Obando, both of whom

23. Leyes, XIII, 431.

24. ACCR, 1854, VI, fols. 353-356; ACSen, 1854, I, fols. 3, 39-44; Leyes, XVI, fols. 69-70. 131 were to be instrumental in the revival of the Democratic Society in

1853.25

Efforts of the government to end restrictions on the circulation of property proved to be equally controversial. The issue of land tenure was an integral part of the plans of the administration to improve the lot of the workers and to promote economic growth, as well as to establish new areas of colonization. Government officials viewed land as a major element in social stability. Private property, they thought, would create a politically moderate working class and help develop a strong work ethic. To implement the reform, the government supported what it called "a democratic solution." That is, rather than confiscating land, officials wanted legislation that prevented future accumulations of unalienable property. Though the government position strongly favored the concept of private property, Conservatives accused the administration of socialistic tendencies and opposed all land reform proposals.2^

Considerable popular support for land reform existed, especially among Colombians who wanted more efficient use of publicly owned land.

Citizens already cultivating such land wanted permanent ownership of their farms. Others wanted new laws to prevent the growth of large estates among foreign interests who received grants as payment for bond

25. ACCR, 1850, X, fol. 27; Diario de Debates, pp. 254, 302-312; Leyes, XV, 311-343.

26. ACSen, 1851, V, fols. 232-234; VI, fols. 419-420; Gaceta Oficial, November 28, 1850, pp. 638-639j Lino Calderoh, Democracia Verdadera (Bogota, 1849); Venacio Ortiz, De la propiedad en la Nueva Granada (Bogota, 1852). 132 interest. Mbsquera had made some efforts to regulate distribution of such land, but focused on the problems of the farmer and ignored the encroach- 27 ments of debt bondholders.

After 1849 Congress continued to debate the land issue.

Legislators briefly considered using a lottery system to regulate distribution, but rejected this measure in favor of more radical solu- 28 tions. After two years of intense partisan debate, Congress adopted a law that limited purchases or grants of public lands to about fifteen hundred acres per person and forced cultivation of that land within five years. Ltfpez voiced strong objections to the bill and signed it under protest. He argued that the measure would discourage colonization because it prevented the accumulation of large tracts of land. He added that it effectively prohibited large-scale argiculture and mechanization of farms, and would create a problem of small landholdings. The President concluded that if implemented the law would create panic among landowners and buyers who would be uncertain about the status of their land. The measure embittered LSpez and it became a major factor in the resignation 29 of treasury minister Murillo Toro in 1852.

Congress also attempted to eliminate municipal communal holdings in an effort to free more land for circulation. Under the Law of

27. ACCR, 1849, VII, fols. 277-279? Leyes, XI, 502-503; XIII, 254.

28. ACSen, Actas, 1850, fols. 149, 166, 168,* ACCR, Actas, 1851, fols. 28, 32, 75-76, 88, 133; ACCR, Actas, 1853, fols. 369, 388, 533; ACSen, Actas, 1853, fols. 202, 253; ACCR, Actas, 1854, fols. 54-55; Juan N. GCmez, Memoria del secretario de la hacienda, 1853, PP« 55-60.

29. Restrepo, Diario, IV, 200; Leyes Autofrafas, 1852, I, 230-233- 133

June 2, 1848, cities were authorized to set aside vacant land for community use. The Lopez administration opposed the common lands, but because most of the acreage was used by the lower classes, the government was reluctant to move against them. After considerable vacilation,

Congress adopted a policy that preserved the common holdings already set 31 aside, but would not extend the right to other cities.

Because of the social implications, bringing Indian communal holdings into the free market posed another difficult problem for legislators. Congress saw the breakup of Indian resguardos, common lands, as an essential part of efforts to integrate the Indian into society. Thus, any efforts to alter traditional landholding patterns had to be coupled with measures that would insure the right of the

Indians to purchase the land and become private owners, as well as protect them from hacendados eager for both land and labor. Congress failed to legislate this protection and only approved proposals that reaffirmed the obligation of provincial governments to divide and 32 supervise the sale of Indian communal holdings.

30. Celebreon Pinzon, Memoria del secretario de relaciones exteriores, 1849, p. 15. 31. ACSen, 1851, I, fols. 186-187; ACCR, 1853, VI, fol. 76; ACCR, 1853, VI, fol. 70. 32. Congress originally tried to approve a separate piece of legislation that forced provincial governments to sell Indian land, but this was not passed. The proposal had not been found until this researcher discovered it in the congressional archive. Until then historians thought the order to sell land was simply part of a general municipal reform act. ACCR, 1850, IV, fol. 8. 134

The action of Congress brought mixed responses from Colombian

Indians. Some supported the move and thought their interests could best be served without communal holdings. One tribe in Panama, for example, wanted their holdings converted into free property to better protect their land from encroachments. An Indian pueblo in Tundama demanded the power to sell town holdings, arguing that restrictions on land sales 33 violated their liberty. Mosx Indians, however, opposed the policy.

They contended that resguardos were part of their heritage and that if broken up the whites would take over most of the land.3/ Jose^ liaria

Samper, who as alcalde of the town of Ambalema supervised the sale of communal lands, confirmed the Indians' arguments that false claimants 35 and speculators obtained much of the land.

Congress tried with some success to correct these abuses. In an effort to make certain that Indians had the first chance to purchase the land, Congress forced provincial officials to authenticate all claims to the land. Legislators also rejected a proposal that allowed the children of claimants to request land. Such a law, opponents argued, would lead to numerous applicants from illegitimate children and others pretending to be the children of legal purchasers. These moves proved only partially successful and in 1854- Pastor Ospina proposed

33- ACCR, 1853, VIII, fols. 241-254; La Fraternidad, September 9, 1849, pp. 3-4.

34. ACCR, 1849, IX, fol. 186.

35. ACCR, 1849, IX, fols. 184-188; ACSen, 1853, VI, fol. 571; Samper, Alma, I, 264. 135 a more comprehensive measure that required provincial governments to legislate against all abuses of the Indians' interests, but political unrest prevented passage of the project.

Congress was equally anxious to force the church to sell its large landholdings, which were controlled either through mortmain or censo payments (percent of revenue from land paid the church as the result of a provision in a will). Efforts to force the sale of land held in mortmain failed miserably in 1851, 1852, and 1853.*^ Moves against the censo payments were based upon proposals developed by

Gonzalez in 184-7 that allowed the civil government to convert the value of the property into fixed incomes payable to the church by the treasury. Such a system weakened the financial resources of the church and made certain that land could be transferred freely without fear that unknown liens against it existed. It also provided the central government with badly needed funds that would have otherwise gone to the Church. Though Gonzalez was unable to implement his scheme,

Murillo was able to generate wide support for it because of the need to 38 finance troops fighting in the 1851 revolt. Thus, in June 1851

Congress approved the censo reform and authorized Colombians to pay half their obligations to the government in exchange for bonds. In 1852

36. ACCR, 1849, VIII, fols. 111-115; ACCR, 1851, II, fol. 12; ACCR, 1854, II, fols. 36-47. yi. ACSen, Actas, 1852, fol. 374; ACSen, Actas, 1853, fols. 136- 137, 153-158. 38. Camacho, Memorias, pp. 245-246. 136

Congress reaffirmed the privilege and, in 1853> rejected efforts to make the program less attractive. The clergy opposed the reform asserting that it would affect charitable endeavors and that it violated the

Church's right to hold property. The hierarchy also complained that many

Colombians paid only the portion owed to the government and neglected 39 the money owed to the Church.

Despite the many laws aimed at placing more land on the free market, considerable property was still kept out of circulation. For this reason the 1853 Congress moved to hasten the process. After intense debate legislators adopted a proposal that prohibited all "acts or documents of any kind, whose objective would be to prohibit, limit, or restrain in any way the free circulation of real estate or entailed 4.0 property...." The measure also authorized religious corporations to sell freely their holdings. In one stroke Congress eliminated entailed estates, abolished the concept of mortmain, and ended all censo obligations. Thus, in a generation much more property would be 41 available for purchase.

No such sweeping reforms were approved in Congress to alter the archaic tax structure, which was largely a remnant of the colonial era, and which held back industrial expansion, internal and foreign trade,

39. ACCR, 1853, VI, fol. 68; ACCR, 1854, II, fols. 82-85; ACCR, 1854, V, fols. 19-20; Leyes, XIV, 455,-456; XV, 152-155; Gaceta Oficial, July 5, 1851, pp. 462-463;Juan N. Gomez, Memoria del secretario de la hacienda, 1853, pp. 48-52.

40. ACCR, 1853, I, fol. 209.

41. ACCR, 1853, I, fols. 206-211; Leyes, XV, 516-517. 137 and inter-city travel. The numerous indirect sales and consumption taxes placed a heavy burden on the poor and on pensioners. One retired soldier reported that taxes consumed nearly sixty percent of his monthly income.

Collection methods, based upon tax farming, were often arbitrary and frequently brutal. The efforts of Congress to alleviate this situation failed/2

As a result of these frustrations, Congress attempted to replace the existing tax structure with a schedule of direct imposts. After briefly debating a property tax, which legislators rejected as difficult to assess and impossible to collect, Congress focused its attention on projects that established a direct proportional tax on income.43

General support for the idea, that had its roots in the 1820s, surfaced in the 1849 Congress during debates on how to compensate for lost tobacco revenues. The executive branch, through the official newspaper, also 44 came out in favor of a direct income tax. Radical elements both in and out of the government favored the scheme because it would eliminate indirect taxes thus making more consumer goods within the reach of the lower classes and the artisans' goods competitive with foreign products.

42. ACCR, 1849, V, fols. 254-263; El Comercio Libre, October 6, 1849, pp. 1-3; On taxes see ACCR, Actas, 1851, fols. 29, 44, 56, 61, 172-173, 179.

43. ACCR, 1853, VIII, fols. 59-60; Lionel Gisborne, The Isthmus of Darien in 1852 (London, 1853), PP. 84-85. 44. Gaceta Oficial, May 27, 1849, pp. 218-219; October 6, 1850, p. 520; October 13, 1850, p. 534; October 17, 1850, pp. 541-542; October 20, 1850, pp. 547-548; October 24, 1850, pp. 555-556; October 27, 1850, pp. 563-564. 138

At the same time, radicals reasoned, a direct tax would force the rich

to help support the government and encourage the growth of a middle

class by preventing unlimited accumulations of money. It would, in the

final analysis, establish a balance between individual rights and social

welfare because direct taxes would force all members of society to

contribute to the general good. Only extreme radicals of the newspaper

El Comunismo Social disagreed with this argument, asserting that all

taxation was an encroachment on man's liberty and property.^

Though enthusiastic about the idea of direct taxation, legislators,

afraid of losing still more revenue, did little to implement it. The

1849 and 1852 Congresses both considered proposals that established an

income tax, but did not adopt them. Several provinces, using the powers

granted in 1850, adopted income taxes, but with little success.

Colombians would not voluntarily pay their taxes, and collectors, though

armed with summary powers, could not deal with delinquents rapidly

enough.. 46

While willing to consider legislation that freed the economy of

government interference, both Congress and the president realized that

state assistance was essential in promoting commercial development.

Manuel Murillo Toro, the leading Liberal economist in the administration,

45. Camacho, Escritos, III, 421-463; Kastos, Articulos, pp. 164-170; Murillo Toro, Memoria del secretario de la hacienda, 1851, pp. 4-5; El Neogranadino, October 8, 1852, pp. 232-233; Gaceta Oficial, May 11, 1^53, pp. 379-380; El Comunismo Social, November 10, 1850, p. 9.

46^ ACCR, 1849, XI, fols. 281-282; ACCR, 1852, I, fol. 132; La Rejeneracion de Sabanilla, November 25, 1852, p. 6; May 26, 1853, pp. 195-196. 139 argued that republican governments should promote the welfare of the nation and give each citizen a sense of dignity. He contended that the state had "to accelerate the regeneration of the people enervated and degraded by the regime of privilege, hypocrisy, and force."47 Jose , Maria Samper agreed with Murillo Toro. In an often-cited statement he declared that "liberty is perfectly reconcilable with official initiative, assuming that governments always avoid competing with private efforts and carrying its action only to the point that it fills a demand caused by an absence or weakness of private effort."48 Thus, Liberals tried to balance the need to limit regulation of the economy with the need for government stimulation to promote growth. Following this philosophy, the national government took an active role in improving the chaotic and primitive water transportation system. A good water transportation system was vital in efforts to expand tobacco cultivation and marketing and to lower the cost of domestic manufactures on foreign markets.49 As one phase of a general program to improve water transport, Congress considered numerous petitions for authority to start new steam shipping companies. The legislators, however, refused the petitions and chose to expand the operations of existing companies. This policy sparked considerable protest from the petitioners who criticized the companies for excessive

47. Memoria del secretario de la hacienda, 1852, p. 3·.

48. Ensayo sobre las revoluciones pcnftic~s, P. 232. 49. Lisboa, Viaje, pp. 234-239; Holton, New Granada, pp. 54, 58, 64; Ospina Vasquez, Industria y proteccion,- pp. 216-218. 140 50 rates and poor service. Congress ignored the protests and added

incentives for the companies to expand with a measure that abolished

all river-use taxes and tolls for ten years. Under the same law,

however, Congress made certain that enough ship tonnage would be avail

able to handle foreign commerce with a provision that allowed foreign

ships to sail interior waterways without paying discriminatory imposts."51

Though this law assured sufficient cargo space, it conflicted

with efforts of Congress to promote ship construction. Prior to passage of

the law in 1852, ship building was encouraged with a system of dis

criminatory tariffs that forced foreign ships to pay higher duties than

domestic carriers and which banned foreign ships from interior water- 52 ways. These restrictions ended with the freeing of river traffic and

Congress was forced to find another means to promote a national merchant fleet. Legislators experienced little success and they were only able to pass an ineffectual measure that ended tariffs on ship- building materials. 53

50. Restrepo, Historia de la Nueva Granada, II, 22-23, 50-51; ACCR, 1852, I, fols. 297-298; ACCR, 1853, VI, fol. 90; ACCR, 1854, IV, fol. 80; El Panameno, February 10, 1850, p. 1.

51. ACCR, 1849, XI, fols. 248-250; ACSen, 1851, V, fols. 46-48; ACCR, 1851, II, fol. 189; Leyes, XV, 85-86.

52. Blackford to Webster (June 3, 1843), U.S. Dept. of State, U.S. Ministers, Dispatches, Roll 10, desp. 10; Ospina Vasquez, Industria y protecciSn, p. 147.

53. ACCR, 1851, II, fols. 187-189; ACSen, 1851, I, fols. 171-181; Leyes, XII, 20-21; Ospina Va'squez, Industria y proteccion, pp. 231-232. 141

Congress was more successful with measures that opened new port facilities to foreign commerce and that established duty-free ports.

Mosquera had begun the trend when he named the Pacific port of

Buenaventura a duty-free port of entry. Lopez continued the practice and numerous cities applied for the improved status. Officials in

Cartagena, who hoped to replace rival Santa Marta as the leading

Atlantic port, were especially anxious to have Cartagena become a free port. Although Congress rejected the city's request, legislators improved the Atlantic Coast shipping situation when they authorized two other coastal ports to handle foreign commerce on a duty-free basis. This measure provided isolated regions, such as Riohacha in the

Goajira, with direct access to foreign commerce. Congress did the 5L same with Pacific ports when it exempted them from collecting duties.

Overland communications posed far more difficulties than did water transportation. Railroad construction was confined exclusively to the Isthmus of Panama, and even that enterprise was not completed until the late 1850s. The possibility of constructing a system of telegraphic communication attracted several entrepreneurs and Congress granted Ricardo de la Parra a concession to string a line from Bogota" to Honda on the Magdalena River. However, Parra did not begin con struction and the telegraph did not come to Colombia until the late

1860s.55

54. ACCR, 1851, IX, fol. 301; ACSen, 1852, I, fols. 38-43; ACSen, 1853, II, fol. 30; Leyes Autografas, 1851, III, fols. 141-151; Leyes, XIII, 246-248; XV, 309-311. 55. ACCR, 1851, III, fols. 479-480; Leyes Autografas, 1851, III, fols. 3-9; Leyes, XIII, 112-113, 507-508; XIV, 375-376; Ospina Vasquez, Industria y proteccion, p. 269. 142

The delay in bringing railroads and the telegraph to the nation

forced Congress to focus its attention on improving the road system.

Travel throughout the country was extremely difficult. Roads, even

around the capital, were little more than paths, and journeys of only a few miles took hours. The poor roads discouraged internal commerce,

hindered foreign commerce, and fostered localism. Mosquera had made

considerable progress in improving the road system, especially when

private interests refused to undertake road construction. Mosquera's

plan was to develop a national network from existing routes and then

to expand it with new roads. The scheme almost bankrupted the central

government, a crisis that confronted the Lopez administration when 57 formulating reform projects in other areas.

Despite financial problems, however, enthusiasm for road con

struction continued after the Liberals took power. Journalists repeatedly called for new roads and in at least two provinces local 58 citizens formed societies to promote construction. Congress shared this interest and after initial setbacks in 1849, approved in 1850 a project for a road system that included routes from Bogota'to the

Pacific coast and the Magdalena River, and across Panama.

^ 56. Holton, New Granada, pp. 26-28; Camacho, Memorias, p. 87; Aripizar, Peregrinacion, pp. b4-b5; Republica de Colombia, JeogrdTica fisica, I, 17S-197, 219, 224-226; II, 28, 226-227; III, 148, 216, 283, 295; IV, 269, 275, 286, 297, 303, 329, 440-471; Safford, "Commerce," pp. 88-102. 57. Safford, "Commerce,".pp. 100-102; Restrepo, Diario, III, 438-439; Leyes, XI, 89-91, 117-121, 243-244, 400-402. 58. Victoriano Paredes, Memoria del secretario de rclaciones exteriores, 1851, pp. 13-17; La Fraternldad, July 1, 1849, pp. 1-2; Gaceta Oficial, September 22, 1852, p. 654; March 21, 1853, p. 305. 143 In 1853 a group of legislators tried to expand this system to include inland waterways and the Panama Railroad, but the majority decided that 59 the government could not afford to maintain them.

The failure to expand the national road system reflected a trend that began soon after the initial burst of. enthusiasm for road construc tion. The central government, especially after economic decentralization, lacked the funds necessary either to improve existing routes or to build new ones. To alleviate the situation, Congress began approving legisla tion that placed many of the roads under the control of provincial governments.^ The legislators also approved several very generous concessions to contractors who promised to build key roads such as those that linked the cities of Cali and Popayan with the Pacific coast.

However, none of the builders ever fulfilled their contracts and these vital routes, as well as many other lesser important roads in other 61 parts of the country, were not completed until years later.

Congress was more willing to assume responsibility for promoting immigration, which was an integral part of Lopez' plans for economic development. Members of both parties supported immigration as the only way to rapidly develop the economy, improve the quality of the work

59. ACCR, 184-9, IX, fols. 159-168; XI, fols. 202-208; ACSen, 1852, II, fols. 163-169; ACSen, 1854, III, fols. 19-20; ACCR, 1854, II, fols. 26-27; Leyes, XIV, 85; El Dia, February 7, 1849, pp. 2-3.

60. ACCR, 1851, I, fol. 108; ACCR, 1853, I, fols. 5-30; Leyes, XV, 289.

61. ACCR, 1850, I, fols. 199-208; ACCR, 1851, VI, fols. 209-310; ACSen, 1854, I, fols. 26-34; ACSen, 1854, II, fol. 58; ACCR, 1854,^11, fols. 12-15, 20; Leyes, XIII, 79-80, 85-86; XIV, 26-29; Leyes Autografas, 1851, IV, fols. 51-53; El Dia, October 5, 1850, p. 4. 144 force, and colonize outlying provinces. Leaders of the Democratic

Society also favored it and urged the government to advertise in

Europe that Colombia was a republican paradise. 62 Those who supported immigration realized that the central government would have to lead the way and seldom mentioned the possibility that private enterprise might have a role.

The Lopez administration, partially building on legislation passed in 1847 during the Mosquera regime, adopted several measures aimed at attracting immigrants.^ In 1850 the President ordered the

Secretary of Foreign Relations to send a circular to governments in

North America and Europe that outlined Colombia's generous immigration policies.^ In addition, Congress approved legislation that exempted immigrants who moved to remote areas from serving in local political offices, a policy that appealed to colonists but proved disastrous for local governments. 66 Legislators also eliminated import duties on 67 construction materials destined for new areas of settlement. They

62. El Aviso, October 29, 1848, pp. 2-4; El Nacional, October 14, 1848, p. 2; El Dia, May 16, 1849, p. 1; El Democrffta, June lb, 1BX), p.

63. La Democracia, September 26, 1850, pp. 1-2; ACCR, 1854, V, fols. 262-264; Reptfblica de Colombia, Jeografica fisica, XIII, 279-281.

64. ACCR, 1846, V, fols. 100-103; Leyes, XII, 32-39, 135-137, 389-400; XIII, 279-281.

65. Victoriano Paredes, Memoria del secretario de relaciones exteriores, 1851, pp. 45-47.

66. ACSen, 1851, I, 290.

67. ACCR, 1853, I, fol. 353; Leyes Autografas, 1852, II, fol. Leyes, XV, 82, 85-86, 293. 145 also continued the old practice of granting land to settlers, but sharply reduced the number and included stipulations that such con cessions be improved rapidly, especially those located along national roads. Because of the new rules, most of the land grants were awarded to those settlers in the Cauca Valley and in Antioquia. 68 Congress also expended considerable effort to colonize outlying regions, especially the Goajira, that were becoming important ports and potential 69 sites of rich mineral deposits.

Efforts of the national government to attract foreigners were generally unsuccessful. The two great migrations of the 1850s, the movement southward through western Colombia and movements to new areas of economic development, were a consequence of unofficial efforts and involved virtually no foreigners. The colonization schemes of the antioquenos were the result of local conditions and land grants in the 70 area were an effect, not a cause, of migration patterns. Movements toward new areas of economic growth, especially the tobacco growing region around Ambalema, were a consequence of high unemployment in the

68. ACCR, 1849, XI, fols. 167-171; ACCR, 1850, IV, fols. 196-199; ACSen, 1851, V, fols. 251-252; ACCR, 1853, XI, fols. 369-371; ACSen, 1853, I, fols. 113-114; Leyes autografas, 1849, I, fols. 165-176, Ibid., 1853, no fol. no., dated May 27, 1853; Leyes, XIII, 395-396, 583; XIV, 729; XV, 304. 69. ACCR, 1850, I, fols. 49-70; El Democrata de Riohacha, October 14, 1849, p. 3; El Riohachero, January 30, 1849, pp. 2-3; Leyes, XIV, 59-61, 410-411. 70. James J. Parsons, Antioqueno Colonization in Western Colombia, Ibero-Americana, 32 (1949), Passim; Ospina Vasquez, Tndustria y protecci<5n, pp." 189-192. 146

cities and rural areas and the high wages offered field hands. Those few foreigners who settled in Colombia hardly met the expectations of

government officials. Many of them were drifting sailors and Venezuelan

political refugees, and most settled in urban areas rather than in remote regions. Of the scant 281 naturalized between 1843 and 1852 only four were teachers, eight were scientists, ten were skilled 71 artisans, and fifteen were merchants.

The two documented private immigration companies were as unsuccessful as the national government. In 1850 one of the foreigners involved in constructing the Panama Railroad petitioned the local government for permission to bring Irish to Colombia to populate settlements in Panama and Antioquia. The colonizer, who claimed to have considerable influence with Irish immigration officials, went as far as sending an agent to Europe to make arrangements for passage, but no proof that colonists arrived exists. In 1851 a group of entrepreneurs that included Jose'Maria Plata and Manuel Abello, formed a joint stock company in Antioquia to establish settlements along the Pacific coast to

Panama. The shares were sold, but no mention of the settlements founded 72 by the company exists. Both official and private efforts to bring immigrants to Colombia were doomed by political instability, language barriers, and unhealthy climate.

71. Celebredn Pinzon, Memoria del secretario de relaciones exteriores, 1849, p. 24; Victoriano Paredes, Memoria del secretario de relaciones exteriores, 1851, cuadro 4; Jose'M. Plata, Memoria del secretario de relaciones exteriores, 1852, p. 46.

72. El Correo de la Costa, April 17, 1850, p. 3; Gaceta Oficial, February 4, 1851, p. 78; El Dfa, February 8, 1851, p. 4. 147

The government was also active in plans to promote the mining industry. Colombia possessed considerable mineral wealth, including

deposits of silver, gold, platinum, copper, lead, alum, silex, sulfur, and coal, but lack of roads and technicians, as well as restrictive regulations, discouraged exploration and mining operations.73

Unfortunately, Congress lacked the knowledge necessary to effectively legislate on the mining industry and, therefore, refused to approve clarifications of claims procedures and limitations on the size of 7/ claims to prevent the growth of large companies. Because of the lack of expertise, Congress also bent under pressure from mining interests, who contended that all regulation hurt the industry, and defeated a measure that would have established water pollution controls, created a Director of Mines to oversee the mine owners, and provided for dissemination of mining technology to the popular classes. After that failure, the government did not attempt to interfere with mining until

1854, when jurist Justo Arosemena formulated a comprehensive code.

Congress was enthusiastic about the project, but was unable to complete 75 debate because of political unrest.

Congress was somewhat more successful in encouraging mining through legislation that facilitated the export of precious metals.

Laws passed during the Mosquera epoch placed high duties on gold exports

73. Tomas Cipriano de Mosquera, Memoir on the Physical and Political Geography of New Granada, trans. Theodore Dwight (New York, 1853), p. 33; AnciTzar, Peregrinacion, p. 106.

74. ACCR, 1848, XII, fols. 123-124; ACCR, 1850, X, fols. 1-2.

75. ACSen, 1850, VI, fols. 68-175; ACCR, 1854, II, fols. 130-136. 148 and banned silver exports, thus making large scale mining impossible.76

In 1849 Congress came under considerable pressure to eliminate these restrictions. Petitioners argued that free export of precious metals would increase government revenues, reduce contraband, and place more money in circulation. The congressional committee that reviewed the petitions supported these arguments and added that such reforms would encourage mineral production. As a result of outside pressure and the committee's endorsement, the 1849 Congress approved two laws that reduced limitations on mineral exports. The first allowed free transit of gold and silver to seaports or other cities after a small initial tax had been paid. The second measure allowed unlimited export of gold, 77 silver, and platinum—subject to a three percent tax. The reforms would have undoubtedly stimulated the industry, but the lack of roads, technical expertise, and labor prevented significant growth and the 78 industry did not expand again until the 1870s.

Both Liberals and Conservatives recognized that if commerce and industry were to expand, the government would have to overcome the serious lack of technical skills. The absence of trained technicians and craftsmen was so great that one observer was forced to lament that

"in New Granada there are no chemists, nor botanists, nor architects, nor mechanics, nor stone cutters, nor woodworkers . . . there are only

76. Leyes, XI, 289-294; ACCR, 1848, IX, fol. 5.

77. ACSen, 1849, VII, fols. 150-153; Leyes, XIII, 447-451, 500-501; Leyes Autografas, 1849, V, fols. 164-1VU.

78. Ospina Va'squez, Industria y proteccion, p. 283. 149 79 politicians in great abundance...." Reformers thought that not only would technical training aid economic development but that it would also create a stable working class, reduce crime and the number of welfare cases, and strengthen democracy. Some optimists contended that with government assistance a skilled laboring class could be formed within - 80 four years.

Congress shared this enthusiasm and in 1850 created vocational schools in all the national high schools. Legislators hoped that the effort would raise the status of the crafts to that of other branches of learning and that students in vocational classes would also be able to 81 take basic literacy instruction. The law was initially successful. In

1852 the high school in Tunja reported that its vocational training pro gram offered courses in tailoring, cabinetmaking, and masonry. Outside of Bogota^ a small school for instruction in hatmaking, shoemaking, and carpentry reported doing very well. However, these and other schools soon suffered from lack of funds. The national government tried to stabilize the programs through a system of lotteries to raise money, but 82 it was not successful. Funding problems also blocked the success of

79. V. Ortiz, Historia de la revolucion, p. 15.

80. ACCR, 1853, XI, fols. 282-284; Francisco Zaldua, Memoria del secretario de la hacienda, 1850, pp. 38-39; La Democracia, February 14, 1850, p. 1; El Artesano He Cartagena, March 24, 1850, pp. 1-2.

81. Leyes, XIV, 143-144.

82. Cronica del Colegio de Boyaca' March 1, 1852, pp. 3-4; Gaceta Oficial, October £, 1852, p. 681; November 16, 1852, p. 730; January 25, 1854, p. 67; El Dia, December 28, 1850, p. 1; ACSen, 1853J IV, fols. 6-11. 150

several schools intended to produce an adequate supply of civil

engineers.^

At the same time that the national government tried to promote

technological training through the schools, unofficial groups also did so through industrial exhibitions. Soon after Lopez' inauguration several Colombians joined in forming the Philanthropic Society to promote industrial arts. As part of the 18-49 celebrations of Independence Day, the organization sponsored an exhibition during which the best example of printing, painting, cabinetmaking, woodcarving, metalcraft, hatmaking, g/ lithography, bookbinding, and flower arranging received a prize.

Another group, the Central New Granada Society, formed to organize

Colombia's participation in a worldwide industrial exhibition scheduled for London in 1851. Leaders of the Society, composed of both Liberals and Conservatives, hoped the nation's participation would expand com- 85 merce and promote enterprise. In 1853 Guillermo Wills, a Colombian resident in England, unsuccessfully attempted to establish a permanent 86 exhibition of products as a way to encourage technological advancement.

83. ACCR, 1852, I, fol. 8; ACCR, 1853, VIII, fols. 258-260, 264.

84. 20 de julio. Fiestas nacionales (Bogota', 1849), pp. 4-10; El Siglo, July 15, 1849, p. 1; Sur Americano, September 6, 1849, p. 4; Gaceta Oficial, February 24, 1850, p. 1; El Neogranadino, September 30, 1850, p. 331.

85. 20 de julio, pp. 51-54. > 86. Angel and Rufino J. Cuervo, Cuervo, II, pp. 161-162; El Dla, August 17, 1850, pp. 2-3; Gaceta Oficial, July 7, 1850, pp. 321-324; July 11, 1850, p. 331; November 24, 1853, pp. 905-908. 151

To encourage agricultural technology, the central government considered using tax credits. Mosquera had used exemptions to encourage 87 cultivation of new crops such as vanilla, olives, and grapes. After the Liberals assumed power, farmers petitioned Congress to expand this system to include subsidies to those who planted such high-risk crops.

Legislators, however, could not even fund essential programs and they 88 flatly refused to aid the farmers. Even without tax incentives some farmers introduced new strains of wheat, potatoes, and cattle to 89 improve agricultural output.

Private interests tried to fill the void left after Congress failed to stimulate agricultural technology. The most notable effort was from three brothers who called for the establishment of an experimental farm and agricultural training school north of Bogota? In the school the brothers hoped to introduce Colombians to new crops, scientific farming methods, and veterinary medicine. Classes planned included lessons in plowing, planting, crop rotation, diagnosing and curing plant diseases, animal husbandry, and tool manufacturing, as well as in reading, writing, and manners. Unfortunately, Congress could not provide funds to aid the brothers. Congress also refused funds to Cabinet official Juan N. Gomez who, in 1853, proposed establishing 90 such schools throughout Colombia.

87. Leyes, XIII, 46. 88. ACCR, 1849, XII, fols. 6-10; ACCR, 1850, IX, fols. 265-267; X, fols. 102-103; Diario de Debates, pp. 228-233.

89- Camacho, Memorias, pp. 87-88. 90. ACCR, 1852, V, fols. 100-116; Juan N. Gomez, Memoria del secretario de la hacienda, 1853, pp. 52-55. 152 Congress was far more successful in legislating regulations for

economic activity than in stimulating it, because such measures required

no funds to implement them. In 1851 Congress created commercial courts

in each judicial district to be supervised by judges elected by resident

Colombian and foreign merchants. The magistrates, paid from special

imposts, dealt solely with cases of fraud and bankruptcy. Lopez

strongly supported the measure, contending that it would facilitate

commercial activity. The courts proved successful and Congress reaffirmed 91 their prerogatives in 1853- During that same year, after two years of

debate, Congress approved a commercial code aimed at aiding the courts

and at eliminating many of the problems that surrounded business trans

actions. The code, which included over one thousand articles, provided guidelines for foreign merchants, contract negotiations, corporations,

shipping insurance, interest rates, land and water transportation,

selling practices, and many other phases of business. Because the code

was so comprehensive, many merchants feared that it would interfere with

their activities and wanted it either revoked or modified. Despite the number of merchants in Congress, however, the code remained in force as originally passed. To further regularize business transactions,

Congress sharply denied a proposal that banned commercial activity on 92 Sundays and feast days.

91. ACCR, 1851, III, fols. 429-436; ACCR, 1853, XII, fols. 119- 130; Leyes Autografas, 1852, I, fols. 205-208; Leyes, XV, 97-103. 544-537:

92. ACCR, 1850, X, fol. 25; ACCR, 1853, VIII, fol. 108; ACCR, 1853, X, fol. 164 ff; Leyes, XV, 351-515. 153

In related legislation, Congress tried to improve the postal system and standardize weights and measures. Though successfully adopted, the reforms failed to meet expectations. Changes in the mail network were so complicated that most postal workers could not under stand them. The law on weights and measures, which formally adopted the French metric system, was not successful because it did not include a ban on other standards of measurement. This oversight doomed the new system to be mixed with those already in use, thus adding to the 93 confusion.

To further improve the climate for business, legislators acted to expand the banking system and make an instrument for promoting economic development. Though the first banks opened under Mosquera's leadership, they did not appear in any number until Lopez' tenure in office. As a result of the profusion, Congress decided to regulate the banks and expand their usefulness. In 1852 legislators approved a measure that established procedures for bank officials to follow. It also converted each savings institution into a mortgage bank that could 9/ provide funds for agricultural development and loans to workers.

While anxious to produce short-term economic gains, Congress also wanted to make long-range development plans. Therefore,

93. ACCR, 1849, XI, fols. 274-280; ACSen, 1849, VI, fol. 129; ACSen, 1853, I, fols. 245-262; Leyes, XIV, 342-360; XV, 51B-519; 632-641; Restrepo, Historia de la nueva granada, II, 207.

94. Restrepo, Diario, III, 443; Gaceta Oficial, January 1, 1854, pp. 10-12; Leyes Aut6grafas, 1852, I, fols. 259-276; L"eyes, XII, 125- 130; Safford, "Empresarios nacionales y extranjeros," 105-106; Angel and Rufino J. Cuervo, Cuervo, II, 247. 154 legislators enacted measures that would provide them with accurate census and geographic data necessary to plan reforms. In 1849 the

Secretary of Foreign Relations and the Interior completed negotiations, begun several years earlier, for the start of a mapping expedition under the leadership of Augustin Codazzi. Codazzi, who had recently completed mapping neighboring Venezuela, was ordered to prepare a map of the

Republic and to record information on landforms, natural resources, political conditions, commerce, industry, and land use, all to be compiled in an atlas. The expedition, which was well-funded and included some of the nation's leading artists and naturalists, began 95 in 1850 and continued until 1860. To keep the expedition's information current, the 1851 Congress ordered that a census be taken immediately and then every ten years. To avoid duplication of Codazzi*s efforts,

Congress approved only the collection of population figures and data on local schools.^

The issue of public health emerged in the Lopez era as an important aspect of plans for economic development. This was especially true following the outbreak of a major cholera epidemic in 1849 that decimated the working class at a time when labor was needed in the fields and when immigration was being encouraged. To help stop the epidemic the official government newspaper began a series of articles outlining the cause of cholera and recommending diet changes and

95. Repifblica de Colombia, Jeografrica fisica, I, 9-19; Leyes, XIII, 436; XV, 80-81. 96. ACCR, 1850, IV, fols. 259-261; Leyes, XIV, 219-224; Diario de Debates, pp. 19-20. 155

exercises to help "build resistance to infection. The government also approved strict ordinances to control waste disposal, sanitation in distilleries, restaurants, and water sources. However, government

efforts stopped short of banning inter-city travel, which would have harmed commercial activity. Unofficial newspapers called on the govern ment to complement efforts to improve public health with physical education programs in the schools. The papers also printed exercise programs for those who led sedentary lives.97

For long-term protection of public health, the Lopez administra tion established a program intended to eradicate epidemic diseases through vaccination. Such programs were underway as early as 1842 98 and grew steadily under Mosquera. Lopez greatly expanded the program.

With Congressional approval he appointed traveling medical teams to supervise systematic innoculation programs. Vaccine was imported and a permanent office was established to coordinate the scheme. In 1852

Congress funded a position for a professor who would do nothing but

97^ Gaceta Oficial, August 12, 1849, pp. 369-270; September 9, 1849, pp. 410-412; September 13, 1849, p. 428; August 1, 1850, pp. 375- 376; February 12, 1851, pp. 95-96; November 30, 1853> p. 920; December 10, 1853, PP- 947-948; December 13, 1853, p. 952; La Civilizacion, March 7, 1850, p. 126; El Demo/crata de Socorro, September 29, 1849, pp. 1-3; December 22, 1849, p. 3; Alfonso Acevedo Tejada, "Aviso importante" (Bogota^ 1849); Antonio Vargas Vega and_J. Maldonado, Instrucciofi popular sobre el ccflera morbo (Bogota'', 1849); Leyes, XIV, 145.

98. Prior to 1849 see Mariano Ospina, Memoria del secretario del interior, 1842, pp. 35-38; Ibid., 1845, pp. 40-41; Leyes, XIII, Felipe J. Salas, Esposicion de la vacuna dirijida a los padres de familia (Bogota' 1843T 156 develop new vaccines.99 Though no statistics on its effectiveness exist, the program undoubtedly reduced the severity of the epidemics and did much to improve the health of Colombians.

The economic aspects of the Revolution were at best only partially successful. The lack of revenue and the chronic fiscal crisis forced the government to compromise plans to establish economic liberalism as a national policy in Colombia. The lack of funds also hindered reforms in other areas and was at the very heart of the limited success of the Revolution. Only sectors that showed promise of producing added revenues, such as tobacco cultivation and mining, were freed of close government supervision. The national government was also hampered by the lack of support of private initiative. Thus, the state, which lacked the funds and ability to undertake new enterprises was forced to try to replace private entrepreneurs. Lack of funds and inadequate management also prevented full implementation of those projects approved by Congress. At least on paper, however, reformers did much to remove colonial restraints from the economy, especially in agriculture, mining, and land tenure.

99. Gaceta Oficial, January 7, 1849, pp. 3-4; January 28, 18-49, pp. 30-32; February 4, 1849, pp. 38-40; February 18, 1849, pp. 51-52; February 25, 1849, pp. 60-61; July 1, 1849, p. 287; July 29, 1849, p. 355; August 26, 1849, p. 391; September 2, 1849, p. 400; Jose"M. Plata, Memoria del secretario de relaciones exteriores, 1852, p. 33; Leyes Autagrafas, 18>1, ii, fols. yu-72; itfi, fols. 243-256; Leyes, XIV, 663-664. CHAPTER 6

THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION

Liberal and Conservative Colombians alike shared a vision of a society based upon equality, individual freedom, economic justice, and free access to education. They differed only on the extent of the reform and on how rapidly it should be introduced into the country. Because of this limited concensus, Colombia moved rapidly into the mainstream of mid-nineteenth century social development. In terms of legislation, the country became as progressive as the most radical societies in Europe.

The ideal of equality was an essential part of the Revolution.

Although Colombians recognized natural inequalities, such as intelligence and skills, they disliked the legal distinctions that connoted class privilege and favoritism.^" The 1849 Congress moved to eliminate legal differences between the ruling class and the population. The target of the reformers was Mbsquera's law that assigned aristocratic titles to 2 officeholders and outlined the honors due each at public functions. In a series of bipartisan votes, legislators replaced the aristocratic titles with the term "citizen" that was to appear before office titles. The only legal distinction that remained was the required use of formal

1. Eco de los Andes, February 3, 1852, p. 54; El Pueblo de Santamarta, April 4, 1850, pp. 3-4; El Ariete, July 27, 1850, pp. 171- 174; El Pensamiento, May 20, 1849, pp. 1-2.

2. Leyes, XI, 426-428.

157 158 pronouns in written and oral communications. 3 This policy was expanded in 1853 to include a ban on the use of professional titles such as doc tor.^ The impact of the law varied. On the national level it was followed closely, but on the local level titles remained very much in vogue.5

The idea of racial equality also remained a legal one, and the government made little effort to upgrade the image of either blacks or Indians. £

Individual freedom was also an important part of the reformers' vision of Colombian society. For this reason, the government, with broad popular support, pressed for the abolition of slavery. Abolitionists argued that slavery was barbaric, contrary to Christian ideals, and a violation of the Rights of Man. Members of the Democratic Society echoed these sentiments and added that abolition was part of the "social regen- x 7 eration" promised by Lopez during his campaign. Though not as well publicized, economic factors motivated abolitionists almost as much as humanitarian concerns. For artisans, it meant an end to a source of free labor. For large agriculturalists it meant formation of a mobile labor

3. ACCR, 1849, V, fols. 107, 109; XI, fols. 4-12; Leyes, XIII, 385.

4. Leyes, XV, 691-692.

5. R. Cuervo, Epistolario, III, 249-250; see for example of impact on local level ACSen, 1850, VIII, passim; ACCR, 1854, V, passim.

6. For what little was done see Diaz, Manuela, pp. 65-66; Gaceta Oficial, October 13, 1850, pp. 535-536; El Socialista; Amigo del Pueblo, January 29, 1852, pp. 3-4.

7. ACCR, 1850, VIII, fol. 269; ACSen, 1850, VI, fols. 266-267; ACCR, 1851, VI, fols. 42-43; El Neogranadino, June 23, 1849, pp. 209- 210; Jaime Jaramillo Uribe, "La controversia juridica i filosofica librada en la Nueva pranada en torno a la liberacion de los esclavos y la importancia economica social de la esclavitude en el siglo XIX," Anuario Colombiano de Historia y de la Cultura (1969), 81-86. 159

force to work in the new fields and an end to the threat of a slave

revolt. For government economists, abolition would force hacendados to g make more efficient use of their land.

Though virtually all Colombians disliked slavery, they were

divided over how rapidly to free the slaves. Those who favored gradual

manumission argued that immediate abolition, which ruled out prior

compensation to slaveowners, amounted to confiscation of property. They added that Congress had to have time to make certain that the freedmen

entered the labor force so that a new set of problems did not develop.

Those who favored immediate abolition rejected these arguments asserting that the idea of private property did not include human beings. Liberty, they added, was far more important than monetary or social concerns.

Though anxious to free the slaves, the abolitionists realized that compensation was necessary and they pledged their support for an organized indemnification scheme with fixed revenue sources to follow abolition.9

The abolitionists in Congress waited patiently during 184-9 and

1850 for the gradualists to develop an effective compensation plan. After several failures, legislators finally adopted a lengthy project in

June 1850 that accommodated all factions. The plan regulated the system

8. Restrepo, Historia de la Nueva Granada, II, 189; Nieto Arteta, Economist y cultura, I, 171-172; El Siglo, April 22, 1849, p. 2.

9. ACCR, 1850, VII, fols. 231-232; Leyes Autografas, IV, 18J0, fols. 75-76; El Neogranadino, June 23, 1849, pp. 209-210; El Filotemica, March 16, 1851, pp. 69-70; Gaceta Oficial, March 13, 1851, pp. 153-155: Diario de Debates, p. 72. 160 for evaluation of slaves and payment procedures. It also established

the order in which slaves were to be freed. This allowed officials to

make certain that self-sufficient slaves, who would not agitate among

those still in bondage, were manumitted first. The measure also revived an old colonial law that protected from abuses those left in bondage.

The press hailed the law as a great compromise that reconciled property with human rights. For his efforts, Lopez, a major force in formulating the plan, received a medal from the African Institute in Paris,

France.it 10

The membership of the 1851 Congress was dissatisfied with the plan of June 1850. One disgruntled legislator calculated that under the plan slavery would not be abolished until 1860. He and many of his colleagues demanded that slavery be totally abolished and the owners compensated after all had been freed. Inspired by popular support, the legislators moved against the hated institution. Because a considerable faction still favored prior compensation, debates on the subject produced intense polemics that created sharp divisions within both political parties. In the final balloting, however, differences disappeared and abolition was approved by a wide majority. The bill, signed with great pomp on May 21, 1851, freed all slaves as of January 1, 1852. It also strengthened the compensation program with new revenue sources.^" Several

10. ACCR, 1849, V, fols. 230-234; ACCR, 1850, VII, fols. 203-208, 277-316; Leyes, XIV, 162-167; Diario de Debates, pp. 18, 258-265, 281-292, Gaceta Oficial, August 29, 1850, p. 435; El Neogranadino, April 5, 1850, pp. 104-107. 11. ACCR, 1850, VII, fols. 216-218; Leyes Autdgrafas, 1851, IV, fols. 61-64; Leyes, XIV, 415-419, 630-631, 714-719; Diario de Debates, pp. 258-265, 281-292; El 7 de Mar20, April 7, 1850, p. 2. 161

months later Colombia signed an anti-slavery treaty with England, thus 12 joining the worldwide struggle against trafficking. In the months

following abolition, Congress devoted considerable energies to enforcing 13 the law and supervising payments to former slaveowners.

The sudden abolition of slavery greatly affected certain parts of

the country. Of the 16,468 slaves manumitted, 12,4-42 lived in the mining

regions that stretched from Chocd' to Pasto and from the Pacific coast

to Medellin. Without offering high wages, mine operators in the region

could not entice freedmen to return to the mines, and the industry

entered a decline that lasted over a decade. In addition, the freedmen

did not migrate to tobacco growing regions, thus leaving those areas

in desperate need of labor. In general the former slaves preferred

to enjoy their freedom and live by collecting forest products. Some

migrated to the cities to find menial jobs, a situation that lowered daily

wages and added to the growing unemployment problem.1^ Thus, though a

moral victory, abolition failed to meet economic expectations.

The efforts of the national government to integrate the Indians

into society produced essentially the same results as did abolition.

Estimates on the size and location of the Indian population varied widely

12. Leyes, XII, 45-46; XIV, 681-701.

13. ACCR, 1851, I, fols. 170; ACCR, 1852, I, fols. 58-59; ACCR, 1854, III, fol. 127; Leyes AutQ-grafas, 1851, IV, fols. 65-70, 92; 1852, II, fols. 38-39.

14. Restrepo, Historia de la Nueva Granada, II, 210; Ancizar, Peregrinacion, p. 423; Urrutia, Labor, p. 25; Ospina Vasquez, Industria, p. 196; Jaramillo, "Controversia," 68-69. 162 because so many were unsettled and could not be counted. However, in

1853 ex-President Mbsquera, who was an able geographer and observer, estimated that about 301,000 sedentary and 120,000 wandering Indians were included in the total population of 2,243,837 Colombians. The largest concentrations of settled natives lived in the provinces of Boyaca', • Bolivar, Cauca, Cundinamarca, and Tolima. Unsettled Indians lived 15 largely in the Goajira, the Llanos, Guanacas, and San Martin.

The national government wanted to reach both groups of Indians not only to provide new markets and sources of revenue, but also because socializing the natives was consistent with the liberal idea that all 16 y men could be perfected. The Lopez administration, as well as that of

Obando, experienced little success in.working with unsettled Indians.

In 1849 the President ordered priests into the national territories of s Casanare and San Martin to teach and evangelize Indians, but the clergy made little contact with the natives. Congress was anxious to support the priests, but simply could not find funds to pay them or to fund schools. The only officially acknowledged success was the foundation of / 17 a new Indian town in the territory of Caqueta'by a local priest.

The government was more successful in forcing settled Indians to enter the mainstream of national life. Secretary of Government Francisco

15. Mbsquera, Memoir, p. 97; Idem., Compendio, pp. 120-121.

16. Francisco Zaldiia, Memoria del secretario del gobierno, 1850, pp. 42-50.

17. ACSen, 1850, IV, fol. 195; ACCR, 1851, I, fol. 104; ACCR, 1852, I, fols. 344-352; ACCR, 1853, VIII, fols. 123-129; Leyes, XIII, 435-436; Gaceta Qficial, April 8, 1849, p. 117. 163

Zaldua issued several decrees aimed at discouraging dependence on tradi

tional social and economic patterns. In September 184-9 Zaldua denied

city officials the power to appoint a protector of the Indians to aid

natives in their struggles against other citizens. At the same time,

Zaldua prohibited Indian councils from acting on behalf of individual

villagers. In October the Secretary ordered civil authorities not to 18 interfere in contract negotiations between Indians and other citizens.

In 1852 Congress hoped to expand on Zaldua's decrees with a project that

derrogated all laws separating Indians legally from the rest of society.

The Indians opposed the project, arguing that existing laws protected

them from unscrupulous "whites." An alliance of moderate Liberals and

Conservatives defeated the measure. Despite the setback, Indians could

no longer fully rely upon old institutions to protect them. Zaldua's

decrees, combined with attacks on communal holdings, forced Indians to 19 at least partially enter national life.

Reformers were also anxious to give women a greater role in

society. Legislators argued that women should not only be good mothers

and wives, but also develop their "natural faculties" to study and to

"restore their dignity as people." Such sentiments found support outside

Congress. Conservative novelist Eugenio Diaz went beyond the ideas of legislators suggested that women could actively participate in

18. Juan Freide, El indio en la luche t>or la tierra. 2nd ed. (Bogota', 1972), passim; Gaceta Oficial, September 2, 1849, P. 398: October 28, 1849, pp. 485-4%7T^l pra, September ^2, 1849, p. 1.

19. ACCR, 1852, I, fol. 138; 17, 115-118. 164 20 politics. Those who disagreed with these ideas argued that any changes in the role of women could create disharmony between the sexes and contradict the will of God, who had made women inferior to men. The editor of El Porvenir best summed up the anti-feminist position when he wrote that "the woman has been created for the domestic hearth and 21 not for offices and palaces."

Those favoring the status of women triumphed, and Congress decided to use the schools as the most effective medium to develop female potential. Public instruction would encourage women to expand their horizons, learn grammar, and study religion, endeavors almost unheard of before Lo'pez. Once educated, legislators hoped that women would become a stabilizing influence in the family. 22 Despite good intentions,

Congress could not find the funds to finance public women's schools or to subsidize private schools which at the time provided most of the 23 facilities for female education.

20. Discursos pronunciados, pp. 21-23; Diaz, Manuela, pp. 48- 49; El Filotemica, November 17, 1850, p. 2; December 1, 1850, pp. 11-12; December 8, 1850, pp. 17-18; April 27, 1851, pp. 96-97; El Neogranadino, September 6, 1850, pp. 268-269.

21. El Porvenir, August 1, 1849, pp. 2-3; El Neogranadino, September 6, 1850, pp. 293-294.

22. Camacho, Escritos, I, 12; El Nacional, January 27, 1849, pp. 3-4; El Censor, December 18, 1848, pp. 1-2, 4; El Siglo, May 27, 1849, p. 1; Francisco Zaldua, Memoria del secretario del gobierno, 1850, pp. 17-18.

23. Remarks based upon statistics for four provinces unaffected by territorial divisions between 1849 and 1854 found in the reports of the Secretaries of Government. ACCR, 1854, VII, fols. 201-204; Leyes Autografas, 1849, III, fols. 143-150. 165

Though efforts to expand women's education were not successful,

Congress made progress in other areas. In the 1853 Commercial Code

women were given the right to enter commerce, though only with their

husband's permission. In addition, they could use their personal

assets as collateral to secure commercial loans. On the provincial level, the government of the province of Velez gave women the right to 2/ vote in the 1855 elections. However, few exercised their franchise.

Congress was somewhat more successful in endeavors to lift traditional restrictions on Colombian youth. In 1850, after debates that spanned two years, legislators lowered the age of majority from twenty-five to twenty-one. Congressmen considered the law a major step in the eventual "emancipation of children" and the end of the "paternal yoke" established during the colonial era. Lopez was not elated over the law. He thought that exposing young people to the full force of the law so suddenly would cause problems. However, he could not convince 25 Congress to reconsider the measure. In another important move, Congress denied a project that strengthened the patria potestad, the right of 26 parents to discipline and control their children. The legislators, however, stopped short of assuring the inheritance rights of illegitimate 27 children.

24. Kastos, Articulos, pp. 170-175; Leyes, XV, 352-353.

25. Leyes Autografas, 1850, I, fols. 161-177.

26. ACCR, 1849, XI, fols. 184-190; La America, July 14, 1849, p. 4.

27. ACCR, 1851, II, fols. 95-98. 166

The national government was also intent on improving the lot of all segments of society with laws that assured economic security.

Liberals, who had traditionally stressed individualism and limited government, broke with their philosophy and supported welfare schemes.

They did this because they realized that private and religious organiza tions could no longer provide care for all the poor and indigent. The

State, Liberals argued, had to fill the void. Conservatives, who were historically paternalistic, echoed these sentiments and supported the

Liberals in their newspapers. 28

Though willing to finance welfare, schemes, Congress could not find the funds to do so. In 1849 legislators tried unsuccessfully to 29 strengthen private philanthropic organizations. During the same year,

Congress considered establishing a national pension plan aimed at lower-echelon bureaucrats and teachers who often lived in poverty fol lowing retirement. Under existing laws, pension grants were subject to political prejudices and incessant budget cuts. Despite the need for a broad, well-organized plan, Congress could not appropriate the money to finance it and denied national pension plans for teachers and other 30 civil employees in 1849, 1851, and 1854. So great was the fiscal

28. Discursos pronunciados, p. 31; El Neogranadino, March 21, 1850, p. 81; Gaceta Uficial, uctober 17, 1850, pp. 542-543; November 21, 1850, p. 624; November 24, 1850, p. 632; December 5v1850, pp. 655-666; La Civilizaci<5n, May 18, 1850, pp. 169-170; El Taquigrai'o, No. 1, 1850, pp. 2-3; April 18, 1850, pp. 2-3; Mazade, Socialismo, p. 14.

29. ACSen, Actas, 1849, fols. 66,79.

30. ACCR, 1849, XI, fols. 214-215; ACCR, 1851, II, fols. 13-15; ACSen. 1854, HI, fols. 2-3. 167 crisis that the 1853 Congress nearly eliminated all pensions paid from

the national treasury. Lack of funds also prevented the government from

upgrading and expanding seriously over crowded charity homes. 31

Congress attempted to shift responsibility for the poor to the provinces,

which after 1850 had far more resources than did the national govern

ment. However, local officials refused to fill the void. In fact, they

bombarded the central government with requests for financial assistance 32 to aid the indigent.

Lack of funding also kept the nation's poor cramped in small

inadequate hospitals in time of illness. The facilities were noisy, filled with both physically and mentally ill in common rooms, and lacked

steady supplies of food and water. Doctors were scarce and the regular

staff was untrained and underpaid. 33 Legislators tried, but simply

could not find money for charity hospitals. However, though unable to appropriate funds, the Liberal Congress would not abandon its anticlericism long enough to turn care of the poor over to religious organizations able to do so. 34

31. ACSen, 1851, I, fol. 110; ACCR, 1852, I, fol. 2; ACCR, 1853, XII, fols. 100-110; ACCR, 1854, VII, fols. 9-10; El 7 de Marzo, December 30, 1849, p. 3. 32. Celebreon Pinzon, Memoria del secretario de relaciones exteriores, 1849, p. 16; Victoriano Paredes, Memoria del secretario de relaciones exteriores, 1851, p. 29; Leyes AutcJgrafas, 1849, VI, fols. 295-296; 1851, IV, fols. 131-141; ACCR, 1853, VIII, fols. 84-88; Gaceta Oficial, March 9, 1851, p. 143. 33- El Neogranadino, ^June 9, 1849, pp. 186-187; El Dia, June 9, 1849, p. 3; La Reforma; Periodico de la Escuela Republican, July 20, 1851, pp. 3-4; AHN, Gob. "Informe que el gobernador de la provincia de Mariquita presenta a la camara de las sesiones de 1849" (September 15, ]849), Tomo 152, fols. 645-646. 34. ACCR, 1849, XI, fols. 27-30, 49-68; ACSen, 1851, V, fols. 338-358. 168

To further aid the popular classes, Congress attempted to eliminate "civil imprisonment," confinement for crimes against society such as vagrancy and indebtedness. Prior to the Liberal Party's victory, these crimes, especially vagrancy, were considered moral problems. After 1848, however, the government changed its policy and began to think of vagabondage as an economic problem that could be solved with job training and commercial expansion. Reformers from both parties thought that existing laws, which often sent vagrants to forced labor camps, military service, or remote colonies, were remnants of the colonial era and served only to limit individual liberty.35

Although popular and official sentiment favored reform, Congress failed to mitigate vagrancy laws. In 1849, 1850, 1851, and 1853 > progressives from both parties presented projects that abolished jail 36 terms for vagrancy, but all were defeated. Congress even rejected efforts to lessen the harsh penalties regularly metted out to the unemployed, and repeatedly refused to grant pardons to those con- 37 victed. Reasons for the legislative defeats were the serious short ages of labor in the mines and fields affected by abolition and the 38 fear that unpunished vagrants would add to the crime problem.

35. Mariano Ospina, Memoria del secretario del interior, 1842, pp. 41-43; Sur Americano, October 11, 1849, pp. 2-3; El Siglo, May 6, 1849, pp. 1-2; El Sentimiento Democra^tico, August 9, 1849, pp. 63-64; ACCR, 1850, X, fols. 11-12. 36. ACCR, 1849, XI, fol. 191; ACCR, 1850, IV, fol. 40; ACCR, 1851, I, fol. 109; ACCR, 1853, VIII, fol. 6. 37. ACCR, 1850, IV, fol. 34; X, fol. 7; ACSen, 1851, I, fols. 70-77, 127, 136; ACCR, 1854, V, fols. 33-35. 38. Republica de Colombia, Jeografica fisica, IV, 323> 367. 169

Congress experienced somewhat more success in reforming harsh debtor laws. Those who opposed existing statutes argued that debt imprisonment was a barbaric holdover from the colonial period. The harsh sentences hurt not only the debtor, but also his family who suf fered shame and deprivation while the husband was in jail. In addition, the debtor was frequently corrupted by contact with hardened criminals, and confinement prevented debtors from ever repaying their obligations.

Radicals contended that debtor laws favored merchants and usurers over the rights of workers. The courts, they declared, sacrificed individual liberty for property rights. 39 However, far too many legislators from both parties were involved in commerce to permit total abolition of debt imprisonment. They were successful, though, in providing means for debtors to pay their creditors. In 184-9, with little debate, Congress adopted a law that allowed jailors to assign debtors to work details, with creditors receiving fifty percent of the wages. After meeting his obligations, the convict was freed.^ After this success Congress did nothing else to aid the financially troubled. Liberal and Conservative commercial interests allied to defeat projects that eliminated imprison ment for small debts and that reduced penalties for those suffering only temporary setbacks. The poor finally found relief in the 1853 Constitution

39. Gaceta Oficial, November 14, 1850, pp. 6-5-606; El Neogranadino, December 6, 1850, pp. 4-09-410; Camacho, Escritos, I, 14-23.

40. ADSen, 1849, VI, fol. 43; Leyes, XIII, 171-172. 170

which limited confinement to purely criminal activities. Contemporaries

reported that this provision reduced the number of debtors sent to prison

Legislators also attacked archaic marriage laws. Since 1848,

Liberals had pressed Congress to make matrimony a civil affair similar

to a contract, which could be broken through divorce. They argued that

an indissoluble marriage often created serious friction in a home. Such

a personal commitment, they added, was contrary to human nature which

naturally rejected permanence. Divorce would make marriage a more humane institution that could accommodate "errors of love." On a less

emotional level, Liberals added that existing statutes not only violated the doctrine of religious toleration and limited civil liberties, but j 2 also placed matrimony beyond the reach of the poor. Conservatives who abandoned Liberals on this issue, held that civil marriage was pagan and nothing more than legalized concubinage. Indignantly they declared that the idea was "an authentic and perpetual document of the material 43 and intellectual corruption of the impious party of New Granada."

The Liberals finally triumphed, but the struggle with

Conservatives spanned five years. It began even before the parties formed when in 1848 Congress defeated a measure that recognized civil marriage between non-Catholics and allowed the union of non-Catholics

41. ACSen, 1852, II, fol. 230; ACCR, 1853, VIII, fol. 90; El Neogranadino, March 18, 1853, p. 93.

42. Camacho, Escritos, I, 1-13; El Dia, March 4, 1851, pp. 1-2; Discursos pronunciados, PP* 62-67; ACSen, 1852, IV, fols. 70-75.

43. Simon Jose"Cera, El Argumento sin replica (Bogota' 1853); El Catolicismo, March 15, 1851, pp. 288-290; upuscuj.5 sobre el matrimonio ("Bogota, 1854). 171 resident in Colombia.^ In 1851 and 1852 legislators debated, but rejected, a project that authorized divorce between non-Catholics living in the country. The 1852 Congress also sharply denied a bill 4.5 extending the right of divorce to all Colombians. Finally, in

June 1853, after weeks of intense debate that caused deep divisions even within the Liberal ranks, Congress approved a major reform of the marriage statutes. The measure, which remained in effect until revoked in 1856, made marriage a civil matter and legalized divorce for adultery, abandonment, or mutual consent if the union was less than two years old. It also included provisions for property division, 46 child custody, and the father's obligations to his family.

The Law on Marriage generated tremendous opposition, most of which was led by Liberal President Obando. He strongly objected to the measure, but signed it because he feared the nation would be left without any laws governing marriage. He hoped that the 1854 Congress would revoke the law. 47 On the local level, Obando received support from priests who told parishoners to ignore the new law and from provincial legislators who feared that enforcement would upset

Conservatives and lead to civil unrest. Sensitive to the opposition,

44. ACCR, 1848, XV, fol. 51; Clamor de la Verdad, April 16, 1848, pp. 1-2; Alejandro Osorio, Memoria del secretario del gobierno, 1848, pp. 34-35.

45. ACSen, 1852, II, fols. 146-147, 227-231; Restrepo, Diario, IV, 212.

46. ACSen, 1853, I, fols. 339-346; Leyes, XV, 598-607.

47. Gaceta Oficial, August 17, 1853, p. 672. 172 the 1854- Congress moved to modify the project, hut was unable to complete / g debate before a revolt broke out in April 1854.

Endeavors to establish freedom of the press did not generate nearly as much opposition as other reform measures. The need for reform became apparent to reformers in the wake of what one contemporary called "periodical mania," during which the number of newspapers /Q increased from about fifty to over two hundred. Many of the papers that appeared during the boom, which lasted from 184-8 to 1854, were polemical tabloids that launched vicious attacks on opponents' personal 50 habits, private lives, and family virtues. Libel laws were ineffectual, but Colombians were divided on how to improve them. While both Liberals and Conservatives supported the idea of a free press, some wanted 51 slander controlled and others wanted all restrictions lifted.

Between 1849 and 1851 those who favored some controls held the majority in Congress. Legislators decided to use existing "Press

Juries" to review abuses of the press, and passed a law strengthening

48. AHN, Gob., "El gobernador de socorro al secretario del gobierno" (January 24, 1854), Tomo 190, fol. 78; ACCR, 1854, V, fols. 22-24, 476-477; ACSen, 1854, III, fols. 4-18.

49. El Dia, December 28, 1850, p. 2; Ibanez, Cro'nicas, IV, 418; the boom produced the first daily newspaper, Plus-Cafe'', which lasted only a short time.

50. Sur Americano, November 11, 1849, pp. 1-3; December 2, 1849, pp. 1-2; February 2, 1850, p. 1.

/ / 51. Kastos, Articulos, pp. 233-236; El Dia, October 10, 1849, pp. 1-3; El Siglo, April 8, 1849, p. 4. 173 52 them. Using their new powers, jury members investigated many allegations, including some that dealt more with political doctrine than slander. This led to the persecution of several editors who 53 had "socialist" sympathies. Because of such obvious abuses, the

1850 Congress considered establishing complete freedom of the press.

However, the Executive branch, including Liberals such as Murillo Toro, still favored restraints. As a result of the pressure, legislators, who were themselves uncertain of what to do, defeated a project that severely limited the power of the juries. 5/ The 1851 Congress was more determined and finally passed a bill that eliminated all restraints on the press. The law was approved because Conservatives, who thought that a free press would encourage more attacks on the administration, allied with Liberals who favored free printed expression. This same * 55 alliance overrode Lopez' veto of the project. In 1852 and 1853,

Congress tried without success to extend this freedom to the spoken word.* 56

52. Leyes, XIII, 405-407; Gaceta Mercantil, January 31, 1849, p. 1; El Neogranadino, August 25, 1849, p. 297; September 1, 1849, pp. 305-306; September 7, 1849, pp. 313-314; El Dia, January 6, 1849, p. 2. 53- The case involved the editors of El Alacran, as well as other papers. See ACCR, 184-9, VI, fols 41-105; El Alacran, June 22, 1849, pp. 1-7; January 28, 1849, pp. 3-5; February 8, 1849, pp. 2-3; February 11, 1849vpp. 1-2; February 15, 1849, pp. 2-3; February 18, 1849, pp. 2-4; El Dia, January 31, 1849, p. 4; March 21, 1849, p. 3; El 7 de Marzo, February 24, 1850, p. 4. 54. Camacho, Memorias, pp. 244-245; La Civilizacion, February 28, 1850, pp. 119-122; ACSen, 1850, VII, fols. 63-64. / 55. ACSen, 1851, I, fols. 1-15; Leyes, XIV, 458; El Dia, May 27, 1850, pp. 1-4. 56. ACCR, 1853, VIII, fols. 33, 130-131; La Reforma; Periodico de la Juventud, April 26, 1853, p. 3- 174 Progressive elements also triumphed in their efforts to reform

the archaic penal system. However, they had to move cautiously because

of what appeared to he a soaring crime rate. A general state of anxiety

pervaded in the urban and rural areas. Several families often slept

together for mutual protection and citizens never ventured out at night.

The police, because of widespread corruption, were not reliable. In

rural areas, gangs controlled many towns and successfully resisted

local judicial control. Conservatives openly, and many Liberals

secretly, blamed the Democratic Societies for many of the most violent

crimes. They also accused lenient judges of encouraging crime with 57 unwarranted dismissals and short sentences. Because of widespread

concern over the crime problem, Congress had to combine liberalization

of the penal system with a tough anti-crime program.

The most controversial aspect of the liberalization scheme was

the bail system. Those who pressed for implementation of the plan

argued that confining a suspect prior to trial violated the doctrine

that a man was innocent until proven guilty. Congress, they demanded,

should rid the nation of such colonial legal institutions and find a

balance between the rights of men and those of society. The 1850

Congress agreed and adopted a project that established bail for all

57. ACCR, 1850, V, fols. 121-122; VIII, fols. 159-160; AHN, Gob., "Gobernador de Mariquita al secretario del gobierno" (April 17, 185177"" Tomo 167, fols. 305-309; Caro, Epistolario, pp. 334-335; Ibanez, Cronicas, IV, 426-429; CordcTvez M., Reminicencias, pp. 78-90; El Patriota Imparcial, July 15, 1850, p. 3; El Dia, June 8, 1849, p. 3; August 14, 1850, p. 1; May 3, 1851, p. 3; May 6, 1851, p. 1; El Siglo, June 17, 1849, p. 4; Gaceta Oficial, July 28, 1850, pp. 364-3^51 August 11, 1850, pp. 392-393• 175 crimes except piracy, murder, rebellion, treason, arson, and counter feiting. Thus, those accused of assault, robbery, or disorderly conduct, 58 crimes most common in Colombia, were to be free pending trial.

The law provoked opposition from both Liberals and Conservatives.

Conservatives argued that swift trials and certain sentences were better than bail because many of those free on bond committed additional crimes. Liberals and radicals objected because the system discriminated against the poor who could not raise bail. In 1851 Congress, with the radicals' tacit agreement approved a law that restricted the granting of bail. The 1852 Congress further restricted bail with a measure that prohibited bond for those awaiting sentencing. 59 These laws satisfied

Conservatives who feared violence from those on bail and Liberals who wanted the system administered more justly.

Establishing the jury system, another crucial aspect of penal reform, provoked similar opposition. Juries were brought to Colombia during 1850 and 1851. In 1850, under great pressure from resident

North Americans, Congress introduced juries into the province of Panama for use in all criminal trials. In 1851, with considerable bipartisan support, legislators extended the system to the entire country, but only for use in assault, robbery, and murder cases. The law also established

58. ACCR, 1850, I, fols. 217-232; Diario de Debates, pp. 115- 127; Leyes, XIV, 146-147.

59. Leyes Autografas, 1851, III, fols. 93-98; Leyes, XIV, 388- 389; XV, 210-211; Gaceta Oficial, March 17, 1851, p. 170; March 21, 1851, p. 195.

60. ACCR, 1850, I, fols. 217-232; Leyes, XIV, 146-147. 176 literacy requirements for jurors, carefully outlined the role of juries 61 in trials, and set the jury size at five men.

Though implemented with ease, the jury system created some concern among workers. They argued that it should be used in all judicial pro ceedings. In addition, artisans, because many were illiterate, wanted literacy requirements eliminated. They thought that juries would then more faithfully reflect a cross section of the population. To protect the accused from prejudice, workers wanted defendants to have the right to dismiss openly hostile jurors. They concluded that the jury system should become a means to educate the people in the ideals of justice and democracy. Several administration officials agreed with the workers and added that crime-conscious jurors often recommended harsh 62 sentences that did not suit the crime.

The 1852 Congress was receptive to these objections and adopted a compromise reform project. Although the law sustained the literacy requirements, it expanded the jury to seven men and allowed defendants to dismiss up to twenty prospective jurors if they appeared hostile.

In addition, under the law the court was obligated to find adequate defense for the accused and to limit the power of the juries to pass sentence. Any irregularities in procedures would mean immediate dismissal

61. Leyes Autografas, 1851, VI, fols. 13-25; Leyes, XIV, 464- 468. 62. ACCR, 1852, IV, fols. 81-83; El Pobre, September 14, 1851, pp. 2-4; September 28, 1851, pp. 3-4, Jos^ M. Plata, Memoria del secretario del gobierno, 1852, pp. 14-15; Idem., Memoria del secretario de relaciones exteriores, 1852, p. 18. 177 of charges. During the same year some effort was made to educate potential jurors in the rules of evidence and in other aspects of trial procedures in order to make them more responsible.^" In 1853 and 1854

Congress considered extending juries to all criminal proceedings, but failed to complete debate on any of the projects.^

Efforts to curb crime, which were so vital a part of the liberalization program, began slowly. Until 1851 Congress did almost 66 s nothing to inhibit lawbreakers. In 1851 Lopez prompted new action when he leveled a virulent attack against organized gangs and the evils of the bail system and challenged legislators to move against 67 criminal elements. Congress responded with a law that ended bail for assault and robbery cases. It also authorized the creation of a special court in Bogota to deal solely with these crimes. The court, to be funded by the Province of Bogota"', was staffed with two judges and would function until violators were under control. 68 Legislators also sharply defeated two projects granting general amnesties. In addition, they debated, but defeated for financial reasons, a proposal

63. Leyes Autografas, 1852, I, fols. 125-163; Leyes, XV, 142-152.

64. Joaquin Acosta, Almanaque para el ano de 1852 (Bogota, 1852), pp. 41-44.

65. ACCR, 1854, II, fols. 65-79; VII, fols. 78-178.

66. ACCR, 1849, XI, fols. 82-83; Leyes Autografas, 1849, I, fols. 17-20.

67. Gaceta Oficial, April 13, 1851, pp. 221-222.

68. ACSen, 1851, I, fol. 106; ACCR, 1851, III, fols. 393-400; VI, fols. 318-326; Leyes, XTV, 398-399. 178 that expanded police powers.69 This failure was compensated for with local private forces composed of workers and members of the Escuela 70 Republicana.

The government also moved decisively to curb gang activities.

Officials were especially anxious to rid the country of the group led by former judge Raimundo Russi, who controlled bands in several cities. Russi was a member of the Democratic Society and a one-time friend of President Lopez, thus making his demise still more vital to protect the reputation of the administration. In June 1851 Russi and fifteen accomplices were implicated in a brutal murder and were quickly brought to trial. The proceedings were crucial not only for the anti- crime program, but also for the jury system which was being used for the first time in a major trial and for workers who had managed to place one of their own on the jury. The trial lasted for over a week and attracted almost three thousand spectators daily. In the end

Russi and four others were condemned to die and the other ten were sentenced to long terms in labor camps. Government officials hailed the verdict as evidence of their intentions to eradicate crime. Russi, however, was not nearly as pleased and pleaded for his life. His cries went unanswered and he and his accomplices were shot in July 1850.

69. ACSen, 1851, I, fols. 129-157; ACSen, 1853, II, fole. 13, 52.

70. La Reformat Periodico de la Escuela Republicana, July 20, 1851; El Dia, May 13, 1851, p. 1. 179 • Their skulls are still on display in Bogota's National Museum—a monument 71 to Liberal zeal.

Statistics on the number and type of crimes committed during

Lopez1 term confirm that his efforts to fight crime were genuine and that Conservative allegations were largely inaccurate. Between 1846 and the end of 184-8, when the ministerials firmly held power, a total of

10,034 suspects were arrested and brought to trial. Of that total, 3,178 were convicted. The first three years of Liberal domination, 1849 through 1851, police arrested 10,532 and convicted 4,055. During 1852 and 1853 total arrests declined, but the percentage of those convicted was about the same as during the first three years. The high rates of acquittal were a consequence of procedural errors and lack of evidence, rather than lenient judges. Records also indicated that between 1846 and 1854> with the exception of strife-torn Cauca and Antioquia, no increase in violent crimes such as murder, robbery, assault, or attacks 72 on property was reported. The significant increases in western

Colombia, however, undoubtedly gave Conservatives the impression that it represented a nationwide trend.

Though divided over other aspects of the penal reform program,

Colombians of both parties supported efforts to restrict capital punish ment and public shaming. The death penalty repulsed virtually all

71. Caro, Epistolario, pp. 306-307; Restrepo, Diario, IV, 128-131, 150; Jose' Raimundo Russi, A1 publico sensata; a los nobles republicanos; a los hombres que tengan corazon i honor (Bogota'1', 1851); Gaceta Oficial, July 5, 1851, pp. 467-468.

72. Based upon records in the reports of the Secretary of Government, 1846-1854. 180

citizens. Executions took place in a festival atmosphere. Schools

were dismissed to allow students to attend. After the execution, the

children were forced to view the body as a reminder to obey the laws.

Public shaming was equally distasteful. Reminiscent of autos de fe^

they were carried out in front of a large crowd that was the result of

a week-long publicity campaign. The sentence of flogging and exposure

was carried out amid music and pictures of the victim with captions

describing his crime. 73 Those who opposed such punishments, especially

the death penalty, viewed public executions as a violation of "man's natural right to his own existence." Society, they continued, could not replace God, who alone had the right to end life. Opponents saw

the death penalty as nothing more than legalized revenge that did nothing to curb crime.7 /

The struggle against the death penalty began in 18-45 and ended in 1851. Progress toward reform was directly related to the continuation of political stability that followed the end of the 184-0 civil war.

In 1845 Congress approved a project that allowed the President and provincial governors to commute death sentences. Legislators in 1847 tried to continue the trend, but were unable to muster enough votes to 75 replace capital punishment with life terms in prison. In 1849, with

73. Borda, Hijos, I, 87-92; Correo de la Costa, February 13, 1850, p. 1.

74. El Censor, November 28, 184-8, pp. 2-4; El Neogranadino, February 21, 1851, p. 62; ACCR, 1853, VIII, fols. 201-203; AHN, Gob., "Gobernador del socorro al secretario del gobierno" (June 19, 1850), Tomo 162, fols. 539-556.

75. ACSen, 1847, III, fol. 25; Leyes, XI, 97-99. 181 strong bipartisan support, Congress finally passed a compromise measure

that not only eliminated the death penalty for political crimes but also

banned public shaming. Both penalties were replaced with longer prison 76 sentences, loss of political rights, or exile. In 1850 and 1851

Congress tried to extend the ban to all crimes in exchange for terms

at hard labor. These projects, however, angered progressives who

opposed long sentences and conservative elements who wanted still

harsher penalties. An alliance of the two factions led to the defeat 77 of the proposals.

The wave of reaction that followed the 1851 revolt ended

legislative efforts to abolish the death penalty. Bent on revenge,

many congressional Liberals wanted capital punishment fully restored.

Those who opposed such moves argued that if restored, executions

would become a tool of the ruling party. In addition, criminals who faced the prospect of certain death would never surrender. If rebelling

soldiers took this stand, they continued, they would never stop fighting.

Despite these arguments, Tomas Herrera introduced a measure that

exempted military men from the ban on executions. The Senate approved the measure, but it was defeated in early debates in the House of 78 Representatives. Despite the defeat, efforts to continue the struggle

76. ACCR, 1849, XI, fols. 13; Leyes, XIII, 427-428.

77. ACSen, 1851, I, fol. 105; Diario de Debates, p. 41; Gaceta Oficial, April 17, 1851, pp. 234-236.

78. Camacho, Escritos, III, 387-389; El Dia, June 3, 1851, p. 1; ACCR, 1851, II, fols. 166-167. 182 against the death penalty declined and executions remained part of the 79 judicial process.

The abolition of capital punishment encouraged the government to re-evaluate the entire prison system. Since many offenders would now

have to be returned to society, reformers thought that confinement

should be a rehabilitative experience, rather than simply a place for

punishment. For a model they looked to the United States, especially the penal facility in Philadelphia. Like North Americans, the Colombians wanted a system that combined hard work with Christian doctrine in order 80 to forge good habits and to inculcate respect for authority.

The target of the reformers' zeal was the woefully inadequate prison system. Prisoners of both sexes were often crammed into small cells without sufficient clothing or food. To prevent escapes, administrators frequently chained inmates to their beds. Facilities were so poor that in Cartagena convicts were kept in old ammunition storage vaults in the walls of the colonial fortresses. Over sixty men were cramped into twenty by sixty feet cells without beds or adequate air and light. Guards at all the facilities were recruited from the worst elements in society. Forced labor camps, which were considered the equivalent to death sentences, were set in the tropics.

79. ACCR, 1852, I, fols. 383-384; ACCR, 1853, VIII, fols. 197-200.

80. ACCR, 1853, VIII, fols. 224-226; ACCR, 1854, hi, fol. 140; El Republicano, March 11, 1849, pp. 2-5; Gaceta Oficial, April 19, 1851, pp. 240-241; El Termometro, September 15, 1853, pp. 1-2; La rejeneracior. (Bogota' 1853); Victoriano Paredes, Memoria del secretario de relaciones exteriores, 1851, p. 23. 183

Inmates lived in small perpetually damp huts. The grueling work and

unhealthy conditions kept twenty-five percent of the convicts in the

crude hospital and killed at least fifteen percent of the prisoners 8l annually. Several facilities were well run, largely because

administrators employed inmates in profitable enterprises, such as

cigarmaking, which made the jails economically self-sufficient. 82

Despite the apparent need for immediate reform, Congress did nothing until 1853. Until that time legislators openly refused to

eliminate the oppressive forced labor camps. Their failure was a result of financial need. Prison labor was necessary to maintain the national road system. Also, any reform would have forced Congress

to integrate the inmates into regular facilities which would have go been an expensive task. So great was the need for labor that in

1851 Congress approved a measure that permitted the President to freely 84 move the camps to provide labor for public works projects. Only in

81. Camacho, Escritos, I, 26-31; Gisborne, Parien, pp. 1-5; AHN, Gob., "Gobernador de Mariquita al secretario de relaciones exteriores" (June 5, 1850), Tomo 167, fol. 210; AHN, Gob., "Estable- cimiento del presido del 3? distrito" (December 31, 1851), Tomo 216, fol. 446; Gob., "Gobernador de la provincia de Mariquita al secretario del gobierno" (February 23, 1849), Tomo 151, fol. 797; Plus-Cafe*^ July 12, 1849, p. 2; El Neogranadino, August 5, 1852, p. 161; El SigloT August 19, 1849, p. 3; Eco de Padilla, February 29, 1852, p. 1; El Panemeno, October 28, 1849, p. 3; Gaceta Oficial, Mkrch 29, 1853, p. 230.

82. Gaceta Oficial, January 10, 1852, pp. 18-19; June 5, 1852, p. 434; October 20, 1852, p. 710; February 5, 1853, pp. 103-104; October 29, 1853, p. 852; January 28, 1854, p. 78.

83. Gaceta Oficial, June 19, 1852, p. 484.

84. ACCR, 1851, III, fols. 158-159; Leyes, XIV, 557-558. 184

1853 did Congress discard economic considerations and abolish the camps and order the transferral of inmates to other facilities with a twenty-five percent increase in sentence. The measure also limited daily labor in all prisons to six hours, except where a workshop was in operation.^

Efforts to improve regular prisons were also gradual. In 1849 and 1852, because of financial problems, Congress denied several proposals which would have made prison reform a national priority. 86

During the 1853 sessions legislators debated several projects on prisons and finally adopted a comprehensive project. The law was largely an administrative reform that set minimum standards for medical care, rehabilitation programs, religious instruction, food, clothing, and corporal punishment. To finance the changes, convicts were required to work in any legal industry that contracted with the government for a wage set at fifty percent of non-prison salaries.

Congress ordered the wage distributed evenly to the prison, the inmate's family, a savings account for the convict, and the prisoner 87 in the form of a stipend.

The 1853 Congress also authorized the construction of a large central prison which was to incorporate the most modern ideas of prison

85. ACCR, 1852, II, fol. 7; ACCR, 1853, I, fol. 41; Leyes, XV, 343-344. 86. ACCR, 1849, XV, fol. 16; ACSen, Actas, 1852, fols. 24, 351, 382.

87. ACCR, 1853, VIII, fols. 197-200; Leyes, XV, 723-753- 185 design and use. Thomas Reed, the government's architect, submitted plans in 1853, but they were not discussed until 1854. His scheme called for a large two-story complex with cells located on the top and a workshop and retail store located on the ground level. Because of the high cost, however, Congress objected to the plan and asked Reed to cut expenses. Reed refused to alter the plan because he thought it would ruin the basic concept that combined security with economic self-sufficiency. Many legislators also objected to the plan because it would force convicts from warm climates to be jailed in the cold climate of Bogota'', where the facility was to be constructed. They wanted district prisons that would allow inmates to be confined in their native environments. For these reasons, Congress defeated Reed's 88 proposal and a national prison was not constructed for some time.

The educational system was nearly as inadequate as that of the prison system. The universities trained competent lawyers, but virtually ignored technical fields, used outmoded teaching methods, and lacked sufficient libraries and staff. Most high schools suffered similar ills. Discipline was severe and instruction centered around religious studies. Primary schools, especially in rural areas, had no facilities for female students, had almost no books, and often employed almost illiterate teachers. Many towns had no permanent teaching staff and relied on itinerant instructors. The primary school system was

88. ACCR, 1853, I, fols. 50-54; ACCR, 1854, II, fols. 141-143, 167-170; III, fols. 135-136. 186

not likely to change because Colombia had no well-organized normal 89 school system to train teachers.

Efforts to improve this dismal situation generated considerable

support. Liberals were anxious to dismantle the paternalistic system

constructed during the 1840s and to promote technical training and

make school available to all who wanted to attend. They wanted to

forge an educated electorate and to end the schools' traditional elitist

orientation. Their working class allies voiced similar arguments.

They thought that inadequate instruction kept the workers outside national

political life and left them unable to resist the power of the rich.

The artisans saw public education as the only effective means to

destroy colonial institutions. Conservatives lent their support in

favor of reform, asserting that the Colombian system was hopelessly out

of touch with modern trends, especially on the university level. They

wanted Roman law banned from the curriculum and replaced with a

philosophy more receptive to liberal doctrines. In addition, they

called for increased language training which they hoped would give

Colombians more access to modern works, especially those on economics.

To pressure the government, many Colombians from both parties formed

societies to promote public instruction. Their goal, like that of the

89. Lisboa, Viaje, pp. 279-286; Samper, Alma, I, 224-225; Holton, New Granada, pp. 32, 37, 263-286, 327; Borda, Hijos, I, 102- 105; Anci^ar, Peregrinacion, pp. 4-6-47, 83, 106, 115; AHN, Gob., "La comision de cuentas a la honorable cajnara de esta provincia" (September 28, 1848), Tomo 152, fols. 525-526; Diario de Debates, p. 130; El Democrata, Riohacha, April 30, 1849, p. 2. 187 politicians, was "to create liberal minds and a liberal society in a 90 liberal country."

To attack the elitism of the university and to increase access to education, the Lopez administration supported "liberty of studies," a concept based upon the premise that knowledge necessary to earn a degree could be obtained outside traditional institutions and without 91 the aid of an instructor. Also, anyone could teach in any field without official permission. Some radicals even went so far as to call for the elimination of all degrees, but most reformers only wanted 92 to help the working class enter professional and political life.

Conservatives, led by Julio Arboleda, also supported "liberty of studies," arguing that it was consistent with the need to attack monopolies and help workers compete for better jobs. Artisans, who saw the plan as a way to break the cycle of poverty, and students, who objected to compulsory class attendance, also lent support to the scheme.93

90. ACSen, 1850, VIII, fols. 54-57; ACSen, 1852, IV, fols. 3-5; El Neogranadino, June 24, 1849, pp. 218-220 was source of quote; La Jeringa, November 25, 1849, pp. 6-8; Diario de Debates, p. 133; La Gaceta Mercantil, January 31, 1849, pp. 2-3; El Nacional, October 7, 1848, pp. 1-3; El DJ&, May 12, 1849, p. 1; El Siglo, August 10, 1848, pp. 1-2; El Catolicismo, March 15, 1850, pp. 91-94; Sur Americano, December 9, 1849, pp. 1-2; January 1, 1850, p. 6; Los Deseosos deTnstruccion, April 15, 1849, pp. 1-3. 91. Many of the reforms passed under Lopez had their roots in the Mosquera era. See Leyes, XI, 94-97; XII, 111-114, 326-336, 402-455, 476- 477, 481-486, XIII, 71-73.

92. La America, May 28, 1848, pp. 2-3; May 5, 1849> p. 1; Gerardo Molina, Las ideas liberales en Colombia, 1849-1914 (Bogota, 1970), pp. 28-29. 93. El Nacional, August 15, 1848, pp. 2-3; El Siglo, April 22, 1849, p. 1; ACCR, 1850, VIII, fols. 269-271; Leyes Autografas, 1850, II, fols. 107-110; AHN, Instruccion publica, "Algunos estudiantes al poder executivo" Despite such broad support, Congress did not act quickly on the

problem because legislators were divided over the extent of liberty

to be granted. One group even tried to block debate completely,

arguing that such discussions violated the very liberty Congress

supported. Because of the differences, no solution could be reached,

and the 1849 Congress defeated a bill that would have ended degree

requirements for jobs. In 1850, after initial setbacks and considerable

debate, legislators finally approved a compromise measure that

established "liberty of studies" and ended degree requirements for all

jobs except medicine and pharmacy. Though most degrees and all academic

titles were preserved, the Bachelor's Degree was suppressed. In

addition, to ease expenditures and standardize course offerings,

Congress integrated the universities into the national high school

system, which placed them under government control. A board of

examiners replaced formal instructors for those learning outside the

schools. In 1852 Congress considered extending the law to abolish 9/ all degrees and academic titles, but it was defeated.

Contemporaries of all political persuasions agreed that the 1850

Reform was a disaster for the schools. Because of the changes,

discipline disintegrated, students no longer took exams seriously, and

(March 23, 1849), Tomo 120, fols. 147-150, 502-503; Eustorijo Salgar, "Ciudadanos senadores i representantes" (Bogota"? 1850).

94. Restrepo, Historia de la Nueva Granada, II, 215-216; Diario de Debates, pp. 11-14; ACCR, 1850, X, fols. 81-99; XIV, fols. 52-53; ACSen, 1852, II, fol. 293; Lorenzo LIeras, Ciudadanos repre- gpnat.arit.p.q (Bogota' 1850). 189 several fine high schools closed for lack of students. Jose'Maria

Samper lamented that the young men seemed to have lost the ability to learn. He feared that this would create a generation of what he called pepitos, who inhabited the salons but remained children intellectually.

Samper and other intellectuals called for a return to degree programs, 95 but Congress failed to respond.

As a result of the reform, the National High Schools became the major centers of learning, and Congress was forced to improve the facilities. Legislators had already taken some steps when in 1849 they authorized administrators in the high schools to grant degrees in most 96 fields, thus giving them more control over financial matters. In

1850 Congress expanded this measure with a far-ranging proposal that created three national high schools in the same facilities and with the same funds that formerly housed the universities. To effect changes in priorities, legislators added technical courses to the curriculum, eliminated medical schools, except in Bogota' and sharply reduced funding for legal training. To make course work more relevant,

Congress ordered instructors to present weekly lectures in which lessons taught during the week were applied to solving national problems. The project also eliminated admission requirements in a move to attract the

95. AHN, Instruccion publica, "Algunas bachilleras al poder executivo" (August 14, 1849), Tomo 120, fols. 712-714; R^strepo, Historia de la Nueva Granada, II, 204-205, 288-289; Ortiz, Reminiciencias, p. 213; Samper, Alma, I, 127-128; Patrocinio Cuellar, Memoria del secretario del gobierno, 1853, p. 39.

96. Leyes, XIII, 416-418, 481-482. 190 97 poor to classes. Students opposed the curriculum changes and pro tested the reform. However, the government was determined to sustain control, and in 1853 Obando issued two decrees that strengthened the national system. In 1854 Congress, also determined to maintain control, sharply defeated efforts to place the schools under the supervision of a neutral board. Only the distinguished college of El Rosario was 98 returned to independent status before 1854.

To further centralize control over education, legislators integrated the nation's major seminary in Bogota' into the national system. Those who favored the move, mostly Liberals, argued that the

Church should not control temporal matters such as education. Also, separating priests from the rest of society during school fostered retrogressive ideas.99 Those who opposed the idea declared that it violated the right of property and ran counter to the Church's divine right to educate its priests.Lopez, who was concerned about growing political unrest, supported the Conservatives and asked Congress to let the seminary remain independent. Congress ignored the President's pleas and, in May 1851, integrated the seminary into the national

97. Leyes, XIV, 238-264.

98. ACCR, 1851, I, fols. 14-22; ACCR, 1853, I, fols. 314-318; AC£en, 1854, IV, fols. 98-104; Leyes, XV, 275, 609-613, 692-714, El Dia, September 10, 1850, pp. 3-4.

99. El Dia, March 22, 1851, p. 4; Leyes Autdgrafas, 1852, II, fols. 203-212; III, 191-199.

100. La Civilizacion, April 3, 1851, pp. 311-312; El Dia, March 22, 1851, pp. 2-3. 191 system. Lopez vetoed the project, but the legislators angrily overrode it and narrowly missed censuring the President for obstructing the legislative process. Contemporaries reported that because of the law liberal instructors taught many of the classes, lectured regularly on the virtues of liberalism, and frequently told students that the

Archbishop had no control over them."^

Efforts to integrate the military school into the high school system provoked another clash between the President and Congress.

I/I/hen Lopez assumed office, the academy was located amid a row of dirty shops near the central plaza in Bogota'. It had an enrollment of only twenty-five cadets, all of whom were sons of old military officers or members of important families. The President wanted to keep the school independent, strengthen it and expand it on the model of the United

States Military Academy to produce both engineers and officers. To fulfill his plan, Lopez issued a series of decrees designed to expand enrollment, add new courses, and create a preparatory school for those 102 seeking admission. Many congressmen objected to these efforts because they duplicated existing facilities and fostered militarism.

Others sided with Lopez asserting that the school was vital to national defense. They pointed to the Mexican War as evidence of the need for

101. ACCR, 1851, I, fols. 151-153; IX, fol. 5; Leyes Autografas, 1852, II, fols. 370-372; Leyes, XV, 75-76; Restrepo, Historia de la Nueva Granada, II, 221; El Dia, March 22, 1851, pp. 3-4.

102. Borda, Hijos, I, 94; Tomas Herrera, Memoria del secretario de la guerra, 1850, pp. 22-25; Francisco Barriga, Memoria del secretario de la guerra, 1853, pp. 23-27; Leyes, XIII, 501-502; XIV, 278-279; XV, 259-261; Helguera, "First Mosquera Administration," pp. 185-186. 192

a trained officers corps. Those who favored the school's independence

triumphed and defeated successive efforts to suppress it from 1850 to 1854.103

In addition to efforts on the university and secondary levels,

Congress focused considerable, but futile, energies on upgrading the primary school system. Between 1850 and 1853, Congress consistently rejected bills on primary instruction and refused to force local governments to provide facilities for basic literacy training.

Reasons for the failure were largely financial, but philosophical differences were also to blame. Legislators were divided over whether the schools should provide simple literacy training or become part of a larger socialization process that would include lectures on religion, political theory, and manners.Only under tremendous pressure from parents and teachers did legislators bury their 105 differences and attempt to finance primary schooling. Congress assigned the income and property of abandoned convents and unused pious

103. ACSen, 1851, VII, fol. 13; ACCR, 1851, I, fols. 14-22; ACCR, 1853, VI, fol. 116; ACCR, 1854, III, fols. 103-104; Gaceta Oficial, March 27, 1851, pp. 177-178.

104. ACSen, 1849, VI, fols. 61-66; ACCR, 1850, X, fol. 23; ACSen, 1851, I, fol. 371; AHN, Instruccion pAlica, "Solicitude para una beca" (May 14, 1849), Tomo 120, fol. 368; Gaceta Oficial, July 15, 1849, pp. 333-334; December 31, 1851, p. 886; Leyes, HII7T42, XTV, 664-666.

105. AHN, Instruccion publica, "Algunos profesores de ley al Obando" (July 30, 1853J, Tomo 133, fol. 193; ACCR, 1849, IX, fols. 113- 115; ACCR, 1850, V, fol. 136; Leyes Autografas, 1849, IV, fols. 130-131. 193 funds to local schools. Legislators also authorized district and provincial officials to contract debts with the national treasury, a 107 policy that became very popular in the early 1850s. For long-term funding the government assigned large tracts of public lands to schools 108 for use as income property. Despite these efforts, however, most schools lacked sufficient funds and public instruction never assumed the universal scope that officials anticipated.

To partially compensate for the failure to provide mass education, the national government carried on a broad education program through the Gaceta Oficial, the official newspaper. Though use of the paper for instructional purposes had its roots in the last year of the Mosquera administration, such use of the Gaceta greatly expanded as the result of a controversial law approved in 1850, which authorized the

President to purchase a printing press and to hire an official editor to supervise government printing operations. The law required the editor to expand the scope of the paper to include foreign news and articles on health, politics, literature, economics, morals, and the virtues of work. Though easily approved, many Liberals and Conservatives

106. ACSen, 1849, VI, fols. 41-45; ACCR, 1850, IV, fols. 254-257; ACSen, 1852, I, fols. 235-237; II, fols. 365-373; ACCR, 1852, I, fols. 22-23; ACSen, 1854, II, fol. 152; ACCR, 1854, III, fol. 35; Leyes Autografas, 1852, I, fols. 124, 224-225.

107. ACCR, 1854, II, fol. 1-5; Leyes Autografas, 1849, IV, fols. 113-121; 1851, V, fols. 166-179; Leyes, XIII, 430-431; XIV, 436.

108. ACCR, 1853, I, fols. 343-344; ACCR, 1854, VII, fols. 194-197, 211; Leyes, XV, 291. 194 feared that the law would politicize the paper, mix national and party 109 interests, and drive private printers out of business.

Their worst fears came true when in July 1850 the new format first appeared. The paper rapidly became a forum for Liberal opinion and for sharp attacks on Conservatives. It was also used as a vehicle for developing class solidarity and promoting the need for association.

Along with politics, however, the Gaceta also included valuable instructions for planting new crops and for starting new industries.

The education and political indoctrination program continued through

1851 and then tapered off in 1852 and 1853. Reasons for the change are not clear, but growing political unrest may have been a factor.

Though illiteracy undoubtedly diminished the impact of the government's efforts, it represented a bold attempt to shape public opinion and to spread technology to the lower classes in hopes of bringing them into the national4.' economy.110

Congress attempted, with only limited success, to complement reforms with other changes in the field of education. Soon after Lopez' inauguration the government negotiated a contract with English architect Thomas Reed to teach his profession to students. However, no funds were available to pay him and he was left only with his duties as

109. Leyes, XIV, 68-69, 203-205, 207-208, 218, 222; Diario de Debates, pp. 68-70, 134; Camacho, Memorias, p. 196; Helguera, "First Mbsquera Administration," pp. 515-517.

110. Paragraph based upon materials found in every issue of the Gaceta Oficial between July 1850 and March 1852, and 1853 and 1854. 195 official architect. A proposed school of shorthand, intended to train stenographers for government service, suffered a similar fate. Financial considerations were also behind the legislators' failure to provide funding for students who wanted to complete their education abroad.

Efforts to start a national institute for scientific inquiry suffered more from a lack of interest than lack of funds, and it was never 111 successfully established.

The one major success among the educational reforms was improvement of the National Library. Changes in the facility, first established in the 1840s, centered around the purchase of the Anselmo

Pineda collection of documents, newspapers, and books in 1851.

Legislators thought the collection vital in aiding higher education, providing information for congressmen, promoting continuity between 112 administrations, and encouraging historical studies.

Purchase of the Pineda materials, as well as the acquisition of the libraries of Joaquin Acosta and Manuel Ancizar, sparked demands to change the library into a popular center for learning that would offer literacy classes and provide an atmosphere conducive to study. Such facilities, reformers from both parties contended, would compensate for the lack of adult education classes and provide an alternative to the

111. ACCR, 1849, VII, fol. 273; XI, fol. 34; Leyes, XIII, 397-398.

112. El Dia, March 1, 1849, pp. 1-3; Gaceta Mercantil, September 5, 1849, pp. 1-2; La Civilizacion, October 25, 1849, p. 3; ACSen, 1849, IV, fol. 34; ACCR, 1850, IV, fols. 233-239; Leyes, XIII, 452, XIV, 444-445. 196

11? highly politicized lessons offered in the Democratic Societies.

Congress responded favorably, but could not find the funds to effect the

changes. Yet, the Lopez government laid the basis for Colombia's

National Library.

The social revolution was the most successful aspect of the

reform movement. Liberals and Conservatives alike shared a vision of a

society based upon the highest and noblest ideals of nineteenth-century

liberalism. With only limited resources, they boldly attacked the

problems of equality, minority rights, economic welfare, penal and

prison reform, and public instruction. Legislators created one of the most liberal, progressive societies in the world. Unfortunately, many

of the reforms remained only on paper or in the minds of congressmen

and other progressives. This was because neither the central nor local

governments had funds to implement ambitious reform programs. Other

schemes suffered because the administration was forced to abandon social needs in favor of economic necessities. Internal party strife,

especially among Liberals, and lack of enforcement also contributed to the failures. The social reform program was largely a "paper revolution"

that suffered not from a lack of will, but from a lack of money.

113. El Liberal, April 22, 1852, pp. 2-4.

114. ACSen, 1854, VIII, fols. 338-339; Leyes, XV, 235-236. CHAPTER 7

LIBERALS AND THE CHURCH:

THE UNWANTED TRIUMPH

Colombian reformers saved their most vicious attacks for the

Catholic Church. The government was determined to curb traditional

ecclesiastical influence in educational, economic, and political affairs, and to bring the Church under tighter government control.

To accomplish this, Congress moved against the Jesuits, forced the

Church to become financially dependent on the government, established religious toleration, and reformed the patronato and the fuero. These changes, however, generated intense opposition and created more problems than the reforms resolved. By 1851 the administration reversed its policy and began to support complete separation of Church and State as a means of settling the religious question. The separation,

completed in 1853, failed to settle the controversy over the church.

The religious issue continued unresolved throughout the nineteenth century. It emerged as the one issue that polarized Liberals and

Conservatives; the religious debates were so savage that the otherwise

bipartisan atmosphere of the Lopez and Obando years was completely

submerged.

Antagonism toward the Church, though existing since the colonial period, became particularly intense during the late 1840s. Many

197 198

Colombians, especially in the rural areas, lashed out against corruption

and immorality among the clergy. Many priests, they insisted, neglected

their duties and often speculated with parish funds. The poor complained

that the high taxes paid for Church support kept them destitute. Many

Liberal intellectuals, as well as some Conservatives, thought the

hierarchy inconsistent with republican ideals of liberty and religious

toleration. The power that the prelates had accumulated in the wake of

the Liberals' defeat in 184-2, reformers declared, had rendered the

Church hopelessly reactionary. They wanted to reverse this situation and make the Church an agent for social change. To do this reformers adopted a "positive" approach, arguing that the clergymen living under ecclesiastical rules were not fully protected under the national consti tution, a situation that could be corrected with laws that brought them and the Church into secular society.^"

Reformers thought that the Society of Jesus epitomized the wor_>t aspects of ecclesiastical power, secrecy, and privilege. The

Jesuits, expelled in 1767 by Charles III, had returned to Colombia in

1842. The government brought them back to aid in the efforts to counter the modern philosophy which many politicians blamed for the 1840 civil war. Officials also hoped that the Jesuits would compensate for the

1. On anticlericism see Ancizar,. Peregrinacion, pp. 54-55, 65, 189; Medardo Rivas, Conversaciones filosoficos (Bogota, 1873), pp. 27, 45, 48, 55, 61, 69; Kastos, Arti'culos, pp. 31-35; Zaldifa, Memoria del secretario del gobierno, 1850, pp. 39-42; Salvador Corredor, y Otros Vecinos, Los vecinos i naturales del distrito parroquial de cota a sus conciudadanos (Bogotsf, 1853); ACCR, 1850, VIII, fols. 240-242. 199 lack of teachers and priests in certain areas and they would evangelize

Indians in remote regions. However, the Jesuits located in urban

centers, especially in Popayari and Bogota' and did not move out into unsettled areas. Also, they refused to swear loyalty to the national government. After 184-6, because of these violations of their entry permits, public sentiment began to turn against them. Editorialists labeled the order an enemy of the state. The 1846 Congress agreed and failed only by a few votes to approve a measure expelling them from the country. In the 1847 Congress, opposition to the Jesuits intensified and legislators refused to fund their missionary activity. 2

During 1848 ministerial congressman Julio Arboleda assumed leadership of the anti-Jesuit movement, and published a brilliant pamphlet in which he presented a cogent legal attack against the priests.

Arboleda pointed out that Charles Ill's, expulsion decree was still in effect, because the law authorizing the Jesuits to return had not officially derrogated it. He also argued that the order's secrecy and forced conformity were undemocratic, posing a serious threat to

Colombian liberties as proven by the priests' refusal to take the required loyalty oath. In conclusion Arboleda warned that the nation's institu tions were not strong enough to withstand the Jesuits' possible 3 intrigues. He urged they be expelled. Arboleda's pamphlet inspired

2. On the Jesuits before 1847 see Restrepo, Diario, III, 307, 311, 321, 426-427, 457-459,^480, 515; Restrepo, Historia, II, 12, 26-27, 31, 62, 75, 81; Jose Joaquin Borda, Historia de la compafiia de Jesus en la Nueva Granada, 2 vols. (Paris, 1872), II, 191; El Demo'crata, (Riohacha), May 19, 1850, pp. 2-3; La Noche, November 2, 1845 to September 16, 1846, articles on Jesuits. 3. Argument found in Julio Arboleda, Opusculo publicado, passim. 200

new attacks on the order by newspapermen, as well as by secular priests,

who envied the Jesuits' power.^

Antipathy toward the order intensified after the triumph of the

Liberals. Using Arboleda's arguments, opponents of the order, including

members of both parties, called for immediate expulsion. 5 Those who

supported the Jesuits countered with claims that the attacks violated the

doctrine of religious toleration. They added that ousting the priests

would deprive the poor of a means to educate their children inexpensively

and deny others the right to give their children religious instruction.

To demonstrate popular support for their arguments, the pro-Jesuit

faction began a well-organized nationwide petition drive that gathered

over twenty-thousand signatures. In addition, during 1849 and early

1850, they organized a series of public demonstrations in favor of the

Jesuits. A group of businessmen also allegedly offered the government

three million pesos to allow the Jesuits to remain in Colombia.^

4. On the impact of Arboleda's speech see El Clamor de la Verdad, March 21, 1848, p. 4; May 7, 1848, p. 3; November 30, 1848, p. 4; December 2, 1848, p. 2; Los Jesuitas i Los Anarquistas, May 14, 1848, p. 1.

5. El Sur Americano, August 23, 1849, pp. 3-4; El Siglo, July 1, 1849, pp. 1-2; September 9, 1849, pp. 2-3; September 16, 1849, p. 1; Cronica Oficial de Panama'', November 3> 1849, pp. 1-2; Dialogo entre un artesano i un campesino sobre los Jesuitos (Bogota^ 1850); Restrepo, Diario, IV, 84; ACCR, 1849, VII, fols. 255-257; ACCR, 1851, III, fols. 173-1%.

6. On the pro-Jesuit,faction see Ibafiez, Cronicas, IV, 421; Borda, Historia de la compania, II, 216; La Civilizacioti, November 8, 1849vpp. 53-58; November 15, 1849, p. 62; May 16, 1850, pp. 163-166; El Pia, March 21, 1849, p. 1; April 1, 1850, pp. 1-8; May 15, 1850, pp. 1-2; June 26, 1850, p. 4; July 17, 1850, p. 2; April 14, 1851, pp. 1- 2; El Catolicismo, June 1, 1850, p. 127; August 1, 1850, pp. 165-170; El Sur AmericanoT" January 19, 1850, p. 7; ACCR, 1850, XI, fols. 180-357. 201

Though anxious to rid Colombia of the Jesuits, the administration did not act on the problem until 1850. Lopez was uncertain that the priests, who numbered only about twenty-four, posed an actual threat to the government. He also realized that harsh action would provoke sharp reactions from pro-clerical elements. Congress was also reluctant for the same reasons and carried on a protracted examination of the legality of the Jesuits' presence. Forces outside the central government, however, lost patience with the administration's procrastination and placed tremendous pressure on the President to act without congressional approval. At first Lopez was able to resist the workers, journalists, and many congressmen who favored expulsion. However, by mid-1850 Lo'pez realized that his political support was eroding and he was forced to take action. To obtain a consensus among his close advisors, Lopez named

Jose de Obaldia Secretary of Government to replace Francisco Zaldua, who opposed expulsion.7

Lopez finally decreed the Jesuits' expulsion on May 21, 1850.

Restating Arboleda's arguments and declaring Charles Ill's earlier exile order still in force, he ordered the priests to leave Colombia within g two days. Congress quickly congratulated the President and declared a state of siege to prevent civil unrest. The priests tried but failed

7. ACCR, 1850, XI, fols. 145, 169-173, 249, 301-304; ACCR, Actas, 1850, fols. 203, 206-210; Samper, Alma, I, 229-233; Ibafiez, Crcfoicas, IV, 431; Restrepo, Diario, IV, 80, 83; Posada, Memorias, IV, 276-278; Sur Americano, January 19, 1850; Gaceta Oficial, May 5, 1850, pp. 214-216; May 23, 1850, pp. 237-240; El Liberal, June 9, 1850, pp. 1- 4; El Dia, May 15, 1850, pp. 1-2; Helguera, "First Mosquera Administra- tion," p. 219. 8. Gaceta Oficial, May 21, 1853, p. 233. 202 to get the order postponed and so began leaving New Granada on May 24-.

Their exit sparked little of the anticipated unrest. Only in Popayan was there any resistance to the decree, but local officials soon quelled the disturbances. Jesuits from Bogota' and the northern regions traveled to the Atlantic Coast and then to Jamaica where they started a school. Those in the South traveled to Ecuador where they conspired against the Colombian government. By June the exile was complete.9 It enraged many Conservatives and did much to unite their divided party.^

Congress moved to bring less offensive religious orders under closer supervision, but expelled no other brothers. In 1851 nearly five hundred men and women resided in monasteries and convents. Most remained aloof from politics and performed useful social services.

They were fairly comfortable financially and took little from the government. While most of the regulars were an asset to the nation, a considerable portion of them did not faithfully fulfill their vows.

Local residents complained that they often refused to say Mass and they would not substitute for secular priests unable to perform their duties.

9. Restrepo, Diario, IV, 87-93; Caro, Epistolario, pp. 418- 420; Borda, Historia de la eompaftla, II, 228-239; Ib£nez, Crdfoicas, IV, 422-423; Diario de Debates, pp. 354-362; La Civilizacion, June 27, 1850, pp. 175-176; Gaceta Oficial, June 30, 1850, p. 311; El Dia, June 26, 1850, pp. 3-4; July 13, 1850, pp. 1-2; September 3, 1850, p. 4.

10. Caro, Epistolario, pp. 424-426; La Civilizacion, July 25, 1850, pp. 193-194; September 19, 1850, p. 227; September 26, 1850, pp. 231-232; October 10, 1850, p. 239; October 24, 1850, p. 246; October 31> 1850, p. 250; November 21, 1850, pp. 264-265; February 6, 1851, pp. 310-311; El Dia, February 22, 1851, pp. 2-3; ACSen, 1852, IV, fols. 175-176. 203 Some Colombians also accused them of immoral activities. One foreign observer reported rumors, which he never substantiated, that many nuns frequently rode horses, held theater productions, and consorted in male clothing. The Archbishop of Bogota/was unable to correct these abuses and the government seized the chance to exert influence over the religious communities.^"

Legislators concentrated on eliminating the secrecy of the orders and placing them under government control. After legislative defeats in 1849 and 1850, the 1851 Congress passed a measure that allowed open and unrestricted access to the orders, but which prohibited members from forcing a novice to take vows. The law authorized religious communities to freely establish new houses, though only with congressional permission. More importantly, Congress ended the Archbishop's power to reform the orders and authorized the civil government to assume super vision. Regular clergy protested the law, but Congress refused to alter .. 12 it.

Legislators attempted to bring the Church under still tighter government control by making the clergy totally dependent on civil authorities for funds. To accomplish this, Congress attempted to reduce or eliminate the diezmo, a ten percent tax on agricultural products that financed religious activities and Church construction. Those opposing

11. Holton, New Granada, p. 199; ACCR, 1851, III, fols. 183- 185; Leyes Autd^rafas, 1851, V, fols. 152-164.

12. ACCR, 1851, I, fols. 165-166; III, fols. 166-176; ACCR, 1852, V, fols. 346-347; Leyes, XIV, 397-398. 204 the diezmo, including Liberals and Conservatives, argued that it dis couraged agricultural expansion and limited the capital available to small farmers. In addition, the diezmo was difficult and costly to collect, thus yielding little net revenue. Some reformers wanted the tax replaced with a universal impost to support the Church. Others wanted existing procedures improved to give the central government more control over the tax. Conservatives, though in favor of some reform, feared that Congress would eliminate the diezmo and fail to replace it, 13 thus jeopardizing Church activities.

These different views were reconciled during the 1849 con gressional sessions. After considerable debate legislators approved a measure that lessened the burden of the diezmo by placing the clergy on fixed salaries. Thus, rather than paying a ten percent tax, farmers paid only enough to support religious activities. The law also tightened collection procedures and gave the national treasury respon sibility for distributing salaries and funds for construction. The project, therefore, assured priests of an income but made them more dependent on the civil government for their welfare. Congress considered several reforms of the law between 1850 and 1852, but approved none of them.

13. ACCR, 1849, V, fols. 264-266; ACSen, 1850, VI, fols. 209-221; ACCR, 1851, VI, fols. 155-156; Cuervo, Epistolario, III, 469-470; Manuel Murillo Toro, Memoria del secretario de la hacienda, 1850, pp. 11-12; Francisco Zaldifa, Memoria del secretario del gobiernoT"l%5l, p. 75; Sur Americano, September 6, 1849, pp. 2-3; October 18, 1849, pp. 1-2.

14. ACCR, 1849, XI, fol. 42; Leyes, XIII, 487-491, 562-576; ACSen, 1852, II, fol. 154; Diario de Debates, pp. 25-26. 205 Congress also moved against another major source of Church

income, the estola, a fee for baptisms, marriages, and funerals. However,

unlike the diezmo, efforts to reduce or eliminate the estola did not

generate bipartisan support. Liberals, who opposed the estola, argued

that it was undemocratic and had no basis in the Scriptures. In

addition, it restricted access of the poor to the Sacraments, which left

babies unbaptized, encouraged common law unions, and strained family-

budgets in time of death. They concluded that reduction or abolishing

the estola would not hurt the Church, but it would help many 15 Colombians. Those favoring the fees, virtually all of whom were

Conservatives, contended that without the estola the clergy would

become totally dependent on the civil government for funds. They added that because the poor were generally exempted from the fees, that the 16 tax would not strain the budgets of the lower classes. The 1850 and

1851 Congress debated the issue, but because of the political climate and because of the Church's genuine need for funds, denied all attempts to reform the estola. However, many local administrators, using their 17 powers established under economic decentralization, abolished the tax.

The diezmo reform and the abolition of the estola in many communities placed the Church in a desperate financial situation.

15. La Reforma: Perio'dico de la Escuela Republicana, July 27, 1881, pp. 1-2; El Neogranadino, March 1, 1851, pp. 66-67; October 31> 1851, pp. 353-354; ACCR, 1851, I, fols. 97-99.

16. La Civilizacion, February 21, 1850, p. 115; ElDia, March 9, 1850, pp. 2-3; Correo de la Costa, February 27, 1850, pp. 1-2.

17. ACSen, 1850, VI, fol. 286; ACCR, 1851, II, fol. 230; ACSen, 1851, I, fols. 91-92; Diario de Debates, pp. 23, 25, 32-35. 206

Because local hacienda officials failed to pay required salaries and

because cabildos refused to replace the estola, church buildings began to decay and religious schools closed. The priests lived in near poverty. Many clergymen begged among parishoners for aid and others combined their parishes into larger parroquial districts to cut expenses. Some particularly angry priests petitioned Congress demanding 18 that the government force local officials to meet their obligations.

During 1850 and 1851 Congress responded to the crisis and tried to aid the clergy. In 1850 legislators debated two projects that established minimum salaries for those paid from diezmos, but approved 19 neither proposal. They also revived the idea of a universal tax to support the tax, but failed to act on it. 20 The 1851 Congress considered several measures that forced provincial and municipal administrators to finance the Church, but a split in the Liberal Party over the issue of 21 local independence prevented passage. The congressmen also rejected a proposal that would have provided retired clergy with a monthly stipend.

They denied the bill because of differences over whether priests or

18. ACSen, 1851, V, fols. 28, 107-109; ACCR, 1852, I, fols. 102- 107; V, fol. 23; Nepomuceno Jimenez Acevedo, A los vecinos de Guaduas (Guaduas, 1851). 19. ACSen, 1850, VI, fols. 262-265, 318-384; ACCR, 1850, IV, fols. 414-446; Leyes, XIV, 332-343. 20. ACSen, 1850, VI, fols. 185-191; La Reforma: Periodico de la Escuela Republicana, July 27, 1851, pp. 1-2; Diario de Debates, p. 25.

21. ACSen, 1851, I, fols. 38-46; ACCR, 1851, I, fol. 60; ACSen, 1852, II, fols. 68-70. 207 22 parishoners would finance the program. Because of these legislative

failures, Colombian priests remained in a precarious financial state

and the Church was unable to fully carry out its programs. In addition,

they remained almost completely dependent on the civil government for

survival.

To further weaken the power of the Church, as well as to fulfill a long standing liberal goal, Congress established religious toleration for the first time in Colombian history. Non-Catholics had no place to worship or to bury their dead. This, United States diplomats reported, discouraged foreign merchants from residing in Colombia and drove 23 potential immigrants to North America. For political reasons,

Congress did not act until 1851, when freedom of worship was established as part of the constitutional reform act. This measure, however, did not satisfy Liberals who wanted stronger wording. Therefore, in 1852, legislators debated a project that reaffirmed religious toleration.

Unfortunately, a split in the Liberal Party between moderates and radicals prevented passage. In 1853 Liberals healed their differences long enough to make full toleration an important part of the new constitution.^

22. ACCR, 1851, II, fol. 137; Gaceta Oficial, March 20, 1851, pp. 169-170.

23. Blackford to Webster, March 18, 1843, U.S. Dept. of State, Dispatches, Min., Roll 10, Dispatch 9; Bidlack to Buchanan, June 15, 184-6, U.S. Dept. of State, Dispatches, Min., Roll 11, Dispatch 38; Holton, New Granada, pp. 111-112.

24. ACSen, 1852, II, fol. 172. 208

Liberals also attacked the Church through efforts to abolish the fuero, and thus hoped that the clergy, liable to civil law, would be less likely to oppose government policies. Prior to Lopez' rise to power, Mosquera in 18-45 had taken an important step toward ending ecclesiastical immunity when he approved a measure that made priests responsible for violations of national laws. However, defendants could 25 be tried in either civil or church courts. The 1850 Congress tried to expand on Mosquera's law and narrowly missed abolishing the fuero.

Legislators in 1851 were more determined and easily adopted a project that ended immunity for crimes that priests committed while in office.

The Supreme Court was assigned jurisdiction over cases involving prelates; lower courts had jurisdiction over lesser clergy. 26 The 1853

Congress discussed another project that would have made nuns and priests equal to other Colombians in civil matters. Such a law would have permitted them to undertake previously prohibited activities, such as military service or marriage, and would have forced them to assume full legal obligations as citizens. Representatives approved the measure 27 with little debate, but the Senators defeated it.

Liberals were also the moving force behind efforts to reform the patronato. The administration did not want to eliminate this effective privilege, but rather to decentralize it to the local level.

25. Leyes, XI, 4-4-46; Restrepo, Historia de la Nueva Granada, II, 14.

26. ACCR, 1851, III, fols. 54-55; ACSen, 1851, V, fols. 37-41.

27. ACSen, 1851, V, fols. 33-36; ACSen, 1852, II, fol. 300. 209

After failing to adopt such legislation in 1850, the 1851 Congress approved a measure that authorized parroquial cabildos to nominate

priests to the local Bishop and to control religious funding.28 The

1852 Congress strengthened local control when it defeated a proposal to allow Bishops to appoint their staffs without interference from the 29 parroquial cabildos or the government. These reforms placed priests at the mercy of local citizens who could dismiss them for any infraction of cabildo policy. It also forced Bishops to select parish priests from a list of nominees who might not agree with Church policies. The 30 situation grew intolerable and many priests fled the countryside.

The crisis precipitated by the various reforms enraged the

Conservative press and ecclesiastical hierarchy. Pro-clerical editors from several opposition newspapers formed an unofficial alliance against the government. They viewed the reforms as part of a conspiracy of workers, Liberals, and Freemasons to subvert social order, and called on Catholics to force Congress to revoke the laws. The clergy organized a pamphlet campaign in which they issued instructions for forging a united front against the administration. Pope Pious IX lent his support

28. ACCR, 1849, VII, fols. 253-254; IX, fols. 178-180; ACSen, 1850, VIII, fols. 6-11; ACCR, 1851, III, fol. 109; Leyes, XIV, 439-440.

29. ACSen, 1852, I, fols. 12-16; II, fols. 351-352.

3p. ACCR, 1851, II, fols. 222-225; ACSen, 1851, I, fols. 59-60; Jose'Maria Plata, Memoria del secretario del gobierno, 1852, pp. 17-18; Arboleda L., Vida di"l Manuel Jose' Mbsquera, II, 118-120. 210

to the opposition when he issued a Bull severely criticizing the 31 Colombian government for weakening the Church.

The Lopez administration moved against priests who led the opposition's attacks. Officials were especially anxious to silence

Manuel Jose' Mosquera, the Archbishop of Bogota' Mosquera, brother of former President Mosquera, had been an ardent defender of ecclesiastical 32 power since his appointment to the Archbishopric in 1834. The prelate opposed the Lopez regime from the pages of his newspaper, El Catolicismo, which became the semi-official church periodical. In his closely worded articles, Mosquera used complex theological arguments and citations from the Scriptures to defend the Church. He also became the leading force behind a nationwide conspiracy of Bishops to prevent implementation 33 of the reforms. At the same time, he carried on protracted corres- / 3Z. pondence with Lopez and Congress in an effort to have the laws revoked.

The intrigues of the government against the Archbishop began in May 1851 and ended a year later with his exile from Colombia.

31. El Atalya, October 21, 1849, p. 1; January 21, 1850, p. 4; April 21, 1850, pp. 2-3; El Catolicismo, March 1, 1852, pp. 393-395; April 15, 1852, pp. 415-416; El Revisor Catolico, May 8, 1852, p. 1; El Catdlico-Constitucional, March 7, 1853> pp. 1-3; El Pia, July 12,^1851; A.I., Carta de un cura~a otra cura (Bogota, l852)7""Sxposicion Catolico o principios i reglas de conducta de los Cato'licos en la situacioh de la iglesia granadina (Bogota", 1853); ACSen, 1852, VI, fols. 370-374.

, 32. Arboleda L., Vida de Manuel Jose^Mosquera, I, passim; Joaquin Ospina, Diccionario biografico y bibliogrgfico de Colombia 3 vols. (Bogota'', 1937-1939), III, 35-36; Restrepo, Historia de la Nueva Granada, I, 361-362.

/ 33. Arboleda L., Vida de Manuel Jose Mosquera, II, 102-105, 110-112.

34. See for example ACCR, 1852, V, fols. 365-375. 211

Congress was in charge of the investigation of Mosquera's allegedly anti-

government activities. The House of Representatives launched the

inquiry and voted to bring him to trial. The prelate was charged with

inciting opposition to the government during the recent revolt, publicly

supporting Papal supremacy in Church matters, and of organizing a nation

wide conspiracy to subvert national laws. Rufino Cuervo led efforts to

defend the Archbishop with a brilliant pamphlet that became a rallying

point for pro-clerical forces. The Catholic press lent its support with 35 calls for public demonstrations in favor of Mosquera.

Mosquera's trial before the Senate began in May 1852. A

commission composed of one Conservative and two Liberals reviewed the

charges and, with the Conservative member dissenting, recommended

expulsion. The Senate hearing was acted out in front of packed galleries

and hundreds of soldiers on duty to prevent disorder. After a trial that

spanned three sessions, the Senate voted to exile the Archbishop. He

left Bogota' immediately for the Atlantic coast. After a brief rest on

the coast to recover his broken health, Mosquera traveled to New York,

Paris, and Rome, where he died within a year.

Other prelates received similar treatment. Antonio Herran,

who became acting Archbishop, refused to fill vacant sees. His

35. ACSen, 1852, III, fols. 387-395; El Catolicismo, Ma^l5, 1852, pp. 4-40-450; Rufino Cuervo, Defensa del arzobispo de Bogota (Bogota' 1852).

36. ACCR, 1852, V, fols. 409-410; ACCR, Actas, 1852, fols. 242-243, 308-309, 312-314; ACSen, Actas, 1852, fols. 3, 7-10, 12-16; ACSen, 1853, VI, fols. 564-565; El Catolicismo, May 15, 1852, pp. 450- 455; September 15, 1852, p. 527; December 15, 1852, pp. 600-601. 212

intention was to force the government to revoke anticlerical laws or

face a shortage of priests. For his violation of national statutes,

Herran was arrested and brought to trial. After a brief hearing the

court deprived Herran of his office, sentenced him to six months in

public jails, and ordered him to pay a large fine and court costs. A

higher court upheld the harsh sentence, but Lopez granted Herran a

pardon because of the prelate's failing health and wide popular support

for leniency. 37 Papal Nuncio Antonio Barili also ran afoul of the

government. In a series of sharp exchanges with cabinet minister Jose"'

Maria Plata and Liberal leader Lorenzo Maria" Lleras the Papal representa

tive criticized Herran's prosecution and the administration's antagonism

toward the Church. Congress considered a project that ordered Barili

out of Colombia, but the 1853 Constitution rendered the question moot 38 when it reduced the Nuncio's status and powers. The government also

dealt swiftly and harshly with lesser clergy who refused to obey the

law.39

Despite the administration's ability to control overt opposition

to its policies, discontent over the reforms continued. By mid-1851,

this discontent had even spread into the Liberal Party. Many Liberals

37. AHN, Curas y obispos, "Antonio Herran al secretario de gobierno" (October 29, 1851), Tomo 7, fol. 893; ACCR, 1852, V, fol. 401; El Catolicismo, August 15, 1852, p. 503> fols. 246-248.

38. ACCR, 1852, V, fols. 412-432; Gaceta Oficial, April 2, 1852, pp. 221-222; June 22, 1853> PP. 521-532; Holton, New Granada, p. 168.

39. El Catolicismo, June 15, 1852, p. 459; August 15, 1852, p. 509; January 23, 1853, pp. 636-638; Gaceta Oficial, September 27, 1852, pp. 661-662. 213 thought the laws had created a multitude of unforeseen complications that genuinely threatened the religious activities of the Church. This situation, combined with the intense opposition that the reforms generated, unnerved even the most radical Liberals. As a consequence,

Liberals began searching for a final solution to the problem of

Church-State relations. They decided that the government should rid itself of the issue by completely separating Church and State. To rationalize the new position, intellectuals argued that the government had no right to interfere in matters of conscience. Citing the teachings of Jesus, they added that civil authority hindered God's work and that 40 the Church should be free to govern its own affairs.

Conservatives strongly supported the new Liberal position. Like administration supporters, they thought that the best hope for the

Church's survival lay in independence from civil authority. By mid-1851, ecclesiastical leaders realized that they could no longer resist govern ment pressure and also began calling for separation.^" However, unlike

Liberals, Conservatives wanted the break based upon a concordat with the

Papacy, which they thought essential for survival of the Colombian

Church, the protection of the clergy, and for financial solvency. In

40. La Reforma; Periodico de la Escuela Republicana, August 31, 1851, pp. 2-3; El 7 del Marzo, December 1, 1849, p. 1; December 23, 1849, p. 1; ACCR, 1850, XIV, fol. 2; Patrocinio Cuellar, Memoria del secretario del gobierno, 1853, pp. 29-32.

41. El Catolicismo, May 15, 1851, pp. 307-309; January 1, 1850, pp. 67-68; January 15, 1850, pp. 57-58; February 1, 1850, pp. 67- 68; April 4, 1850, pp. 99-101. 214 addition, a concordat would prevent unnecessary friction between civil L2 and ecclesiastical powers.

The legislative struggle to resolve the issue of separation lasted from 1851 to 1853. In 1851 Liberals could not muster enough support to approve any of the several projects that separated spiritual / O from temporal authority. The 1852 Congress considered, but did not adopt, a radical proposal that not only separated Church and State, but also established complete religious toleration and banned public religious ceremonies. The House approved the project with little debate, but a rift in the Senate between radicals and moderates prevented final passage. 44

Promulgation of the 1853 Constitution, which required separation of Church and State, ended the legislative deadlock. Congressmen were now forced to pass legislation that implemented the provision. This set the stage for a direct confrontation between the Liberal and

Conservative positions. Jose' Joaquin Gori led the Conservatives' struggle with a project that required the administration to attempt to negotiate a concordat with the Pope on the status of the Colombian

Church within eight months. If the Papacy refused to accept the govern ment's position, then the Church would be separated from the State

42. ACCR, 1852, V, fols. 382-440; El Catolicismo, June 1, 1851, pp. 325-328; January 24, 1852, p. 349; March 1, 1852, pp. 392-393; April 11, 1853, pp. 715-717; El Filotemica, July 6, 1851, pp. 137-139; La voz de unos Catdl'icos (Bogota' 1853), Jose'Manuel Restrepb, Cuestidft" relijiosa (Bogota*^ 1853).

43. ACSen, 1851, I, fols. 411-417; ACCR, 1851, I, fols. 191-196.

44. ACSen, 1852, II, fols. 212-248. 215 without any formal protection. Gori's proposal attracted "broad support, but not enough to offset the Liberal majority. As a result, his law was rejected in favor of a more radical measure. The new law, adopted in May 1853 effectively abolished the patronato, ended tax support for the Church, established total religious freedom, and eliminated the 45 patronato. The law had an immediate calming effect. Conservative

Rufino Cuervo noted that since its passage both official and public opinion toward the Church had moderated. Clergy on all levels enjoyed new respect and freedom of action. Cuervo's only regret was that the problem of finances still lingered, but he was confident it would soon be resolved.^

The government's attacks on traditional Church powers were at once the most effective and most provocative aspects of the Revolution of

1848. The administration eliminated the threat of the Jesuits and brought other religious orders under closer government supervision. In addition, the Church became financially dependent on civil authority, religious toleration became a reality, the fuero was eliminated, and the patronato was reformed to make the clergy more responsive to local needs. By 1851, however, intense opposition to the reforms and the ever- increasing inability of the Church to fulfill its obligations because of the new restrictions forced the government to change its policy to one

45. ACSen, 1853, I, fols. 277-290; II, fol. 73; Leyes, XV, 520- 522, 684-686; El Catolicismo, May 8, 1853, pp. 746-748.

46. Cuervo, Epistolario, III, 599-601. favoring separation of Church and State. Despite the ultimate resolution of this problem, the religious issue remained the major factor in the political polarization of Colombian society. It was the one area that sharply divided Liberals and Conservatives. So intense were the polemics that they clouded over what was otherwise bipartisan reform movement. CHAPTER 8

THE END OF AN ERA.

A revolt of workers, soldiers, and radicals against the traditional Liberal Party in April 1854 slowed the thrust of the

Revolution of 1848. The uprising was a consequence of a dramatic shift of political alignments during which Congress became alienated from the

Executive branch, artisans, and the army, and a significant group of radical Liberals. At the same time Liberal and Conservative leaders allied to bring the Revolution under control. The violent uprising was aimed at forcing the government to sustain the momentum of many reform programs and to slow others. The upheaval ended with a decisive victory for the government. In its wake the power of the military was broken and the working class ceased to be a factor in national politics. The post-revolt government placed the Revolution on a moderate course and ushered in a period of political stability that continued until i860.

Though having roots in the early years of the Lopez administra tion, the 1852 Presidential election first brought the changing political alignments into focus. This became evident because the Liberal Party divided over its candidate in the election. The great majority of the

* party faithful looked to Jose x Maria Obando, who had assumed a key political position soon after returning from exile in 1849. He enjoyed

217 218 support from some congressmen and many provincial politicians.''' In addition, the working class was wildly enthusiastic about the General because of his lower-class origins, his illegitimate birth, and his life as a fugitive from government justice, as well as his continued residence in an artisan neighborhood. As early as 1851, the Democratic

Societies began organizing support for Obando's candidacy throughout 2 the nation. He also drew aid from radicals in the Escuela Republicana who saw him as the only leader capable of insuring continuation of reform programs. Military officers lent their endorsement because of 3 Obando's war record and because of his advocacy of a strong army.

Although Obando was the clear choice of the majority of the

Liberal Party, a significant faction did not want him to be the nominee.

Lopez himself was somewhat disconcerted over Obando's popularity because of his alleged complicity in Sucre's murder and the divisiveness he might cause if elected.^ Other Liberals were more openly hostile toward Obando. They feared his links with the Military and thought his

1. Restrepo, Historia de la Nueva Granada, II, 181; El Neogranadino, May 16, 1851, pp. 167-158.

2. Puentes, Historia del Partido Liberal, pp. 183-185; El Pobre, September 28, 1851, p. 1; El Dia, December 21, 1850, p. 2; El Liberal, June 16, 1852, p. 4.

3. La Reforma; Perio&ico de la Escuela Republicana, July 20, 1851, p. 1; Eco de Los Andes, March 9, 1852, p. 75; March 30, 1852, p. 97; May 21, 1852, p. 153; June 15, 1852, p. 178; El Socialista; Amigo del Pueblo, January 29, 1852, pp. 2-3; Discursos pronunciados, pp. V-VI.

4. El Liberal, June 16, 1852, pp. 2-3. 219

ties to the workers might lead to civil unrest. As an alternative they

supported Panamanian-born General Tomas Herrera, whom they thought was

less controversial and more likely to form a national government rather

than one dominated by the party. 5 Herrera's supporters attracted

Liberals who feared Obando and moderate Conservatives who saw the

Panamanian as the only hope for restoring national unity and for

weakening the Democratic Societies.^

The two factions polarized during the campaign. The

herreraistas preached national unity and a more moderate approach to

reform. They thought Obando too aggressive and too party oriented.

The obandistas, they declared, wanted nothing less than a dictatorship.

Obando's supporters countered with charges that the herreraistas were

hostile toward "liberal enthusiasts," who were the heirs of the

Revolution of March 7. To separate themselves from the emerging

Liberal-Conservative alliance, the obandistas asked their followers

to wear a red hat and arm bands bearing the letters P.D.P.O. which 7 stood for "The Democratic People and President Obando." By late 1851 the split in the Liberal Party was evident.

The young herreraista movement never had a chance against

Obando's well-organized nationwide campaign. Herrera's "Grand Electoral

5. El Liberal, April 22, 1852, p. 1; June 9, 1852, pp. 1-2.

6. Kastos, Articulos, pp. 132-139; El Liberal, July 7, 1852, pp. 2-3.

7. El Liberal, May 5, 1852, pp. 1-2; June 2, 1852, pp. 1-2; La Democracia, June 12, 1852, p. 2; El Socialista; Amigo del Pueblo, January 29, 1852, pp. 1-2; Eco de Los Andes, April 20, 1852, p. 121. 220

League," formed in early 1852, was humiliated in the election.

Obando polled 1548 electoral votes to Herrera's 329. Other candidates

shared the remaining 131 ballots. The obandistas had drawn their

support from every region except Panama where Herrera was a favorite g son. Though defeated, the herreraista coalition of Liberals and

Conservatives formed the core of a major new moderate political force.

Obando assumed office on April 1, 1853. In his acceptance

speech Obando declared that he was heir to'Lopez1 reform and that he would consolidate gains and bring them to fruition. He also reaffirmed his solidarity with the poor and warned those who had opposed them that g he would not tolerate abuse of the popular classes. Despite his oratory, however, Obando did not immediately assume a radical stance.

His cabinet reflected a progressive, but not zealous, position. He named Patroeinio Cuellar Secretary of Government, Jose Maria Plata to direct the treasury, Tomas Herrera to head the military ministry, and • Lorenzo Maria Lleras to supervise foreign affairs. The appointments were aimed at maintaining the course Lopez set in 1851 and at healing the rift in the Liberal Party formed during the election. The herreraistas, as well as other Conservatives, were pleased with the

8. El Liberal, May 19, 1852, p. 1; Los Directores de la Gran Liga Electoral, El presidente de la republica en 1853 (Bogota'', 1852); David Jushnell, "Elecciones presidenciales Colombianas 1850-1852" in Urrutia, ed., Compendio, pp. 266-76.

9. Restrepo, Diario, IV, 280-281; Gaceta Oficial, April 2, 1853j pp. 24-1-24-7; La Reforma; Periodico de la Juventud, April 26, 1853, pp. 3-4. 221 cabinet, but thought that outside pressures might force the new

President to change his position.

Within a year of assuming office, Obando made the herreraistas' worst fears a reality. The reason for the growing radicalization was the President's need for popular support against a Congress unwilling to implement necessary programs. The deadlock was a result of the 1852 elections which, though a personal triumph for Obando, brought a significant number of Conservatives into the national Congress and provincial administrations. They allied with a growing number of

Liberals who distrusted Obando. Because of the new alliance, Congress and the President became locked in a struggle during which little, if any, reform programs were approved.^ The situation worsened in the wake of the October 1853 elections during which still more Conservatives entered Congress. Conservatives and moderate Liberals also assumed control of the Supreme Court, several provincial legislatures, and a considerable number of governorships. Because of electoral setbacks,

Obando was rapidly losing control of his government and many of his 12 plans were being frustrated. Congress became unable to act and the 13 legislative process was paralyzed.

10. Restrepo, Diario, IV, 282; Cuervo, Epistolario, III, 597-599. 11. Restrepo, Historia de la Nueva Granada, II, 262, 275; figures on vetoes taken from Archivo del Congreso.

12. On the elections see G. Arboleda, Historia contemporanea, III, 443-493, passim; Restrepo, Diario, IV, 326-328; G<5mez Picofi, ET golpe militar del 17 de abril de 1854, ppi 129-131; El Neogranadino, October 13, 1853, P- 367. 13. Restrepo, Historia de la Nueva Granada, II, 298-299; Machos Resueltos, A los hombres honorados (Bogota^ 1853); ACSen, 1854, IV, 222

Obando tried to counter the setbacks with changes in his cabinet. By September 1853 both Herrera and Cuellar had been forced out of the cabinet. Santiago Fraser, who was more radical than

Herrera, assumed leadership of the war ministry, and rising radical

Rafael Nunez replaced Cuellar. By December, Nuitez became disillusioned and left the cabinet and was replaced with the equally radical

Antonio del Real. During the same period, Plata's influence declined in the wake of the Secretary's criticisms of Obando's ability to 14 govern.

With the changes in the cabinet, the rift in the Liberal Party widened and the factions assumed the characteristics of separate political parties. The obandistas adopted a program of reform, but hoped to eliminate the excesses brought on by many of the new laws. They also came out against the new constitution which many obandistas argued was 15 contrary to popular sentiments. For their position, they became known as the "Draconians." The herreraistas also came out for moderate reform, but supported the new constitution and opposed the growing influence of the military and Obando's close ties with the artisans. They became known as the "Golgothas" because of the growing influence in the group of the Escuela Republicana, most of which had abandoned Obando soon

14. Gaceta Oficial, September 1, 1853, p. 717; Joaquin Tamayo, Don Jos^Maria Plata y su epoca 1811-1891 (Bogota*^ 1938), pp. 152-T50T

15. Camacho, Memorias, pp. 200-202; La Reforma; Periodico de la Juventud, April 19, 1853> PP« 1-2. 223

after the 1852 election."^ Several Liberal leaders tried to heal the

split, but were not successful and by November 1853 the division was . .17 beyond repair.

To strengthen his hand against the Golgothas, Obando appealed

to the artisans. The workers, who became increasingly alienated from

the legislators, were receptive to the President's overtures. The

alienation was a result of Congress' liberal economic policies, which ran counter to the workers' interests. As early as May 184-9 the

Democratic Society in Cartagena petitioned Congress to increase the

tariffs. The legislators refused the request, stating flatly that 18 higher duties were contrary to prevailing economic principles.

Workers presented the 1850 Congress with a similar request, but when

the student members of the artisan organization learned of the

petition liberal legislators lectured the artisans on the virtues of

competition and free-trade. During one of the lectures, an exasperated

worker jumped up and shouted "we already know that you are against 19 us!" Discouraged and in decline, the workers did not renew their pleas until 1853. In the new petition they lashed out against liberal

16. Roberto Echeverria Rodriguez, Los segundos liberatadores, bosquejo de un golpe cuartel (Baranquil3a, 1950), pp. 49-50; Samper, Alma, II, 41-42; El Neogranadino, November 17, 1853, p. 417.

17. On the split see El Termometro, September 18, 1853, p. 1; La Reforma; Periociico de la Juventud, April 19, 1853, PP. 1-2; El Neogranadino, November 17, 1853, p. 417.

18. ACCR, 1850, X, fol. 41.

19. Samper, Alma, I, 237-239. 224 doctrine and warned that the working class would be destroyed without tariff relief. In the course of rejecting the plea once again, a group of congressman mocked the artisans for their ignorance of economic theory. This incensed the workers more than did the defeat, and violence was barely adverted. 20 Prior to their revolt against the government, the Democratic Society tried once again, but met the same 21 frustrations. Because the rebukes came from a Congress estranged from the President, the workers blamed the legislators and not Obando for the low tariffs.

Inflation and monopolies also angered workers. One contemporary observer noted that in late 1853 and early 1854 food prices increased about one hundred percent over former levels. The price hikes were a result of a frost that destroyed a large portion of the corn and potato crops. The government could not relieve the shortages because much of the harvest was committed to feed railroad workers in Panama and the residents of frost-free coastal areas such as Cartagena could not compen sate because most of the farmers had abandoned their fields for higher paying jobs on the railroad. The Democratic Societies did not accept this explanation and blamed the monopolists, who were protected by

Congress, for creating the crisis. "Down with the monopolists!" became 22 one of the workers' rallying cries before they revolted.

20. ACCR, 1853, I, fols. 76-77; ACCR, Actas, 1853, fol. 501; El Termometro, September 4, 1853, p. 3; Ortiz, Historia de la revolucidfi del 17 de Abril, pp. 36-38.

21. ACCR, 1854, IV, fol. 20.

22. Restrepo, Diario, IV, 364-367. 225

The treatment artisans received from lawyers and the judicial system further alienated them from Congress. Artisans claimed that local attorneys of the "monetary aristocracy" frequently harassed them.

Workers also accused the courts of metting out harsh sentences to those of the lower class convicted of even the most minor crimes. After the trial of a worker convicted on weak evidence of murder, artisan leader

Miguel Leon published a pamphlet in which he declared that the defendant was found guilty because "he had neither the title of doctor or of golgotha...Leon concluded that the artisans stood alone against 23 the courts and must protect themselves. The execution of working-class 2L ally Raimundo Russi also angered many workers.

The abuse workers received from many of the educated class both in and outside of Congress gave the artisans' position an anti- intellectual bent. Workers attacked the intellectuals in a pamphlet campaign which stressed the artisans' importance in sustaining society.

In petitions to Congress and in newspaper articles they railed against the educated class' slavish affinity to foreign ideas that were completely out of touch with reality. Many artisans thought the preoccupation with foreign ideas diverted the attention of the intellectuals away from promoting vocational training. They wanted the crafts to generate the

23. Miguel Leon, Artesanos i Desenganos! (n.p., 1853); Restrepo, Diario, IV, 316.

2-4. El Pueblo; Periodico que Sostiene los Derechos del Pueblo, July 20, 1851, pp. 2-4. 226 same respect as a law degree, and demanded that the educated class 25 improve the status of the trades.

The growing rift between Congress and the workers was the major factor in the revival of the Democratic Society, which had been in

decline since 1851. The revitalization was aimed at making the organization stronger and more independent from Liberal legislators and other intellectuals who had dominated it since 18-48. Under the reform, led by Lorenzo Lleras, a twenty-one member board assumed leadership.

Among the first board members, which included no active members of the

Escuela Republicana, were Ramdft Mercado, Lorenzo Lleras, and Generals

Jose^Maria Gaitan and Jose Maria Melo. These and other members of the board provided the leadership in the April 1854 revolt.

Under the new organization, the Democratic Society increased its political activity. The organizational reform in Bogota'provided other chapters with a model, and within months similar changes were implemented throughout the country. In the capital, the number of meetings greatly increased and the rank and file began calling for a dictatorship to circumvent the Congress. They also drastically altered their reform program to reflect working class needs rather than the exotic demands of earlier years. They demanded stricter enforcement

25. ACCR, 1850, X, fols. 28-31; El Democrata, (Socorro), May 19, 1850, pp. 3-4; Los Democr^hicos (Bogota*? 1854).

26. Ortiz, Historia de la revolucion del 17 de Abril, pp. 57- 59; Soriano Lleras, Lleras, p. 78; for calls for independence prior to 1853 see LOpez, Desenga'no, pp. 31-36. 227 of laws ending imprisonment for debt, reform of laws dealing with creditor-customer relations, establishment of industrial workshops for 27 the poor, abolition of the military draft, and tax reform. The new program reflected a growing consciousness of the plight of the working class and a decisive independent stance away from the intellectuals.

The rift between the two groups did not always remain peaceful.

Between March and July 1853 Colombia experienced a wave of political violence, most of which was centered in Bogota'! In March, workers attacked several congressmen who had voted against tariff increases. In the wake of the assaults, the legislators voted to have a guard placed around the meeting hall. The next week, in the working class neighbor hood of Las Nieves, disturbances forced cancellation of a bullfight festival. In late May and June, vicious encounters between the educated and working classes marred a religious festival. The army was ordered to restore order, but entered the fray only after vacilating for several hours. In the ensuing struggle several on both sides were killed and Florentino Gonzalez was severely beaten. The next day roving bands of workers invaded commercial districts and harassed prosperous businessmen and customers. Members of the educated class retaliated with raids into working class neighborhoods. 28 The artisans were quite

27. Ortiz, Historia de la revoluclon del 17 de Abril, pp. 57-59; Gomez Picon, El golpe, p. 112; ACCR, 1854, V, fols. 297-298.

28. Gomez Picon, El golpe, pp. 113-114, 118-119, 123-124; A. and R. Cuervo, Cuervo, II, 255-257; Restrepo, Diario, IV, 285, 300-306; Ortiz, Historia de la revolucion del 17 de Abril, p. 39; Gaceta Oficial, May 20, 1853, p. 417; June 13, 1853; p. 492; June 17, 1853, pp. 507-508. 228 pleased about the unrest and published a broadside that boasted of their assau s against Congress and other members of the educated class, and of the fame it had brought the Democratic Societies in Europe. Congress was not as pleased and refused to grant pardons to any of the workers 29 • arrested during the violence. Though Bogota returned to tranquility after the July riots, other parts of the country suffered from severe 30 outbreaks of violence. By September 1853, the alliance of workers and

Liberal intellectuals was dead, and Congress became the enemy of the popular classes.

The army joined the obandista-artisan alliance against Congress in mid-1853, joining the Democra^ica and becoming slow to respond to legislators' directives. Army leaders withdrew their support from

Congress because of a shift in policy among legislators that threatened the strength of the military. Between 18-49 and 1852, legislators pursued a decidedly pro-military course. They repeatedly reaffirmed the army's independence from civilian control, voted necessary funds to sustain the soldiers, authorized continued use of conscription to fill the ranks and provided substantial retirement benefits to all military

29. El valor de los artesanos (Bogota' 1853); ACCR, 1853, VIII, fol. 295; ACCR, 1854, HI, fol. 77.

30. Gaceta Oficial, October 18, 1853, pp. 821-822; Legislatura Provincial de Cipaquirsr^ Documentos que esplican la conducta de varios diputados a la camara provincial de Cipaquira i manifiestan los _ atentados cometidos contra la constitucion i contra la soberania popular por los ajentes del poder ejecutivo (Bogota^ 1853). 229 31 personnel. Legislators, despite some calls to the contrary, also

continued to view the National Guard as a supplement to the army, not as

a means to replace regular troops or to keep the military in check.

The approval of numerous measures were meant to make the National Guard

more effective as a defensive force, and was not meant to be a political 32 weapon.

Efforts to reduce the size of the army also had no political

motivation. Rather, reductions were aimed at easing the strain on the

treasury. Troop reductions had "begun well before the Liberals took

power. In the six years preceding Lopez1 election the army was reduced

from 5,000 to 2,500 troops. Lopez continued the cuts, but always made

certain that sufficient troops were available to meet any situation.

Congress supported this view and on several occasions voted additional

manpower when military leaders thought the need existed. In all cases

though the rank and file was reduced, the officer corps remained intact. 3A

31. On military policy see ACCR, 184-9, I, fols. 110-117, 130- 139, 112-113, 115; Leyes, XIII. 515-517; XIV, fols. 88-89, 147-148; XV, fols. 136-137, 555; Leyes Autografas, 1849, III, fols. 119-130. 32. Restrepo, Historia de la Nueva Granada, I, 202, 249, 250, 272; II, 144; Restrepo, Diario, III, 370; Toma^ Herrera, Memoria del secretario de la guerra, 1850, pp. 18-19; ACCR, 1851, I, fol. 85; Leyes, XIII, 525-529; XIV, 71, 135-136, 369; ACCR, 1852, I, fols. 155-162; ACSen, 1852, I, fols. 45-55; El Siglo, August 24, 1848, p. 3; El Democrata, May 15, 1850, p. 1; El Dia, February 10, 1849, p. 2; El Samario Noticioso, June 7, 1848, p. 4; El Panameno, November 25, 1849, p. 2; Gaceta Oficial, March 1, 1853, p. 147. 33. Leyes, IX, 325; X, 78-79, 501-502; XI, 40-41, 243; XII, 48; XIII, 48. 34. Leyes, XIII, 399; XIV, 84, 433; XV, 132; Leyes Autografas, 1851, V, fol. 141; 1852, I, fol. 69; Diario de Debates, pp. 208-211; Herrera, Memoria del secretario de la guerra, 1850, pp. 5-6; El Aviso, 230

«•>» Though some anti-militarism existed during Lopez' administration, 35 it had no impact on official policy. However, after Obando assumed power the situation changed dramatically when those who opposed the military found support with the emerging Liberal-Conservative alliance in

Congress. Many legislators thought the army a threat to republicanism and a bastion of title and privilege in a free society. They also feared that Obando might use the military to force Congress to cooperate with him."^

The sudden emergence of a powerful anti-militarist faction in

Congress resulted in a consistent, if not successful, program to curb the power of the army. Efforts began in 1853, when legislators easily defeated a bill that established primary schools in the barracks to give common soldiers literacy training. They also rejected a proposal that provided salary increases for active military and that gave more land to retirees. Though legislators rejected the bill for lack of funds, it still irritated military leaders. Congress considered another measure that integrated the independent military pension fund into the govern ment 's general pension fund, a move that would have placed veterans at

November 5, 1848, pp. 1-3; November 9, 1848, pp. 1-2; December 21, 1848, pp. 2-3; El Dia, February 8, 1852, p. 1; La America, June 2, 1848, pp. 3-4.

35. El Dia, November 16, 1850, pp. 3-4, El Filotemica, November 17, 1850, pp. 2-3; November 24, 1850, p. 8; December 1, 1850, pp. 9-10; La Reforma, PerioHico de la Escuela Republicana, July 20, 1851, pp. 1-2; Leyes AutcTgrafas, 1851, IV, fols. 167-182; Leyes, XIV, 59-61.

36. El Neogranadino, December 3, 1852,^pp. 299-301; ACCR, 1854, V, fols. 455-457; Arboleda, Historia contemporanea, IV, 40. 231 the mercy of vindictive congressmen. The proposal also authorized

Congress to review the legality of all pensions assigned to ex-soldiers.

Fortunately for the military, the majority of legislators did not want

the responsibility of handling the fund and rejected the proposal. 37 Congress also unsuccessfully attempted to abolish conscription.

The 1853 Congress also shifted its prevailing attitude toward

the National Guard and took steps to make the militia an independent 38 force capable of checking the regular army. Early in the sessions

legislators approved a lengthy measure that reorganized the National

Guard. It outlined the number and size of units, recruitment pro

cedures, basic training programs, and political indoctrination. Within

weeks, Congress passed another project concerning the Guard prohibiting regular army officers who also served in the Guard from holding

higher rank in the militia than when on active duty. This measure

effectively prevented the regular army from dominating the Guard, thus giving it more independence and allowing competent militia officers to 39 emerge from the ranks.

During the same sessions, legislators began using troop reductions as a weapon against the army rather than merely a means to

37. ACCR, 1853, VI, fols. 74-75; VIII, fols. 33-42, 93-97; ACSen, 1853, II, fols. 6-8; XII, fols. 202-206; ACSen, 1854, III, fols. 40-44, 150-151; ACCR, 1854, III, 174; Gaceta Oficial, March 16, 1851, p. 162; Francisco Barriga, Memoria del secretario de la guerra, 1853, pp. 13-15.

38. El Neogranadino, November 12, 1852, pp. 276-277.

39. ACCR, 1853, I, fols. 206-207, 296-302; V, fols. 39-45; Leyes, XV, 517-518, 661-668. 232

reduce government expenditures. The Secretary of War determined the

size of the standing army with a formula that called for enough troops

to man garrisons and patrols plus four hundred extra troops to

compensate for the sick, those imprisoned, and men still in training.^

Congress attempted to ignore this formula and reduce the size of the

army from 1,500 to 1,200 men. This figure, when the four hundred

inactive troops were subtracted, left an army of only 800, which was

well below required levels. Only after the military and the Executive

placed tremendous pressure on the Congress did it relent and authorize more troops. However, legislators preserved cuts in the officer corps which reduced the number of colonels from eight to three, and generals 41 from three to two. Though the power of the army remained intact, it was clearly being threatened by a determined Congress.

The 1854 Congress continued harassing the military. Early in the session, legislators rejected a project that would have funded a new military school in Bogota, increased salaries, and reaffirmed the army's traditional fuero. They also authorized an extensive inquiry into the legality of recent acquisitions of additional stable and barrack space.

Many congressmen accused officers of expropriating the property without permission. The officers hotly denied the allegations, but Congress

40. Barriga, Memoria del secretario de la guerra, 1853, p. 12.

41. ACSen, 1853, I, fols. 121-122; Leyes, XV, 305-306, 643-646. 233 j 2 continued to press the investigation. Legislators also renewed

JO debate on the draft, but again without success.

The 1854 Congress also continued to improve the National Guard.

This effort became imperative as the army gravitated toward Obando.

Conservative legislator Antonio Olando presented a project that gave guardsmen access to government arsenals, a move aimed at making them equal to the regular army in weaponry. In another proposal, all of the arsenals were placed under civilian control and provincial governors were authorized to recall all heavy weapons controlled by the army.

However, though vital to the security of Congress, legislators were unable to approve either of these projects before April.^

By mid-February 1854, rumors of a coup began circulating and

Congress tried desperately to reduce the size of the standing army. After refusing to discuss several "panic" proposals which would have totally abolished the army, legislators began debates on projects that set the standing force at from six hundred to one thousand men. Finally, after intense debate, the figure was set at eight hundred men. However, to destroy their leadership Congress eliminated all of the generalships and authorized only one officer as colonel. Obando quickly vetoed the bill and Congress was afriad to override it. However, legislators 45 revived the bill in early April and appeared determined to pass it.

42. ACSen, 1854, IV, fols. 30-64; Ortiz, Historia de la revolueion del 17 de Abril, p. 63. 43. ACSen, 1854, III, fols. 150-151. 44. ACCR, 1854, II, fols. 92-96. 45. ACCR, 1854, III, fols. 171-174, 198-202; ACSen, 1854, I, fols. 164-169; Camacho Roldan, Escritos, I, 60. 234

Obando's veto was only a part of his efforts to bring the army to his side. The President gave numerous speeches in which he lashed out at Congress for attacking the army. He also promised leading

General Jose*"Maria Melo a post in the cabinet should Congress eliminate his position. Melo responded favorably and moved to solidify the army's union with the obandistas. In addition to assuming a post in the

Democratic Society, he made several speeches in which he declared solidarity with the working class. The army, he declared, was the workers' friend, always ready to free them from oppression. By

March 1854, the military-artisan alliance was firmly established and it formed the core of the obandista faction.

Several other groups joined the obandistas. Many radicals joined the anti-congressional faction. Most were former members of the

Escuela Republicana who had left the organization when it abandoned

Obando in late 1852. While they might also have joined out of fear that the Liberal-Conservative alliance posed a serious threat to the reforming impetus, as political unknowns, they might have been attracted to Obando because he represented their only chance to break the power of the Liberal Party and provide them with access to govern-

jr? ment appointments. A small but influential group of old liberals

46. Antonio Perez Aguirre, Veinticinco anos de historia, Bogota^ Biblioteca Eduardo Santos, No. 18, (Bogota", 1959), p. 20; Restrepo, Diario, IV, 362; Gaceta Oficial, January 1, 1854, p. 9; July 25, 1854, p. 4.

47. The melistas appointed were largely political unknowns. For list see Ortiz, Historia de la revolucio'n del de Abril, passim. 235 from the 1820s and 1830s also supported Obando. Their allegiance was a result of personal loyalty to Obando, who was part of their generation, and to the army rather than a consequence of ideological affinity. Several leading Conservatives also joined the obandistas because they thought Congress too radical.

Continued unrest and rumors of a coup against the government marked the week prior to the revolt. In many parts of the country political societies became focal points for anti-government zg activities. Many Colombians feared the revolt would take place on

January 1, 1854, the day on which the new constitution was to go into full effect. Others thought that the uprising would come in February or early March. Congress was well informed of political developments, but refused to take steps to prevent unrest. They simply declared the rumors false by voice vote and went on to other business. Even as late as April 1 legislators refused to acknowledge the unrest and defeated a proposal that shifted the sessions to a more tranquil city.^

As rumors of a coup intensified, however, Congress was forced to act and moved to arm supporters. Throughout Colombia members of the Democratic Society raided local arsenals to find weapons and prevent

48. Cuervo, Epistolario, III, 595-596, 599-601; Tomas Cipriano de Mosquera, Restimen histo'rico de las acontecimientos que han tenido lugar en la repifblica (Bogota^, 1855), pp. 5-6.

49. Green to Marcy, January 4, 1854, U.S. Department of ^ State, Dispatches, Ministers, 1820-1906, Roll 13, dispatch 2; Ortiz, Historia de la revolucion del 14 de Abril, pp. 60-61, 65-69. 236 them from falling into the hands of congresistas. Legislators responded in early April with a measure that lifted all restrictions on the sale of arms and on instruction in their use. Obando reluctantly signed the measure, arguing that Congress was acting out of self-interest.

However, he wa? Iso aware that the law would speed the arming of his 50 partisans as ±1. The army was not as pleased with the law and feared that it would spoil their planned coup. As a result, plans for 51 the revolt were pushed ahead.

The final incident that precipitated the revolt was an organized judicial attack against General Jose'Maria Melo, commander of the 52 capital's garrison which was the nation's largest. Melo had always championed the prerogatives of the military. He wrote the 1853

Congress a long note protesting the new constitution, which he thought posed a threat to the military. Its egalitarianism, he argued, was inconsistent with army discipline and with the need for an independent

50. ACCR, 1854, II, fol. 96; ACSen, 1854, I, fols. 79-80, 153-154; II, fols. 100-110; III, fol. 164; Leyes, XVI, 23.

51. Ortiz, Historia de la revolucion del 14 de Abril, p. 73.

52. Melo was born of a ranching family in Tolima and raised in Ibague'. He was educated there and joined the army in 1819. He served well, but chose to support Bolivar and then Urdaneta. For his errors he was forced into exile. He traveled widely in Europe where he studied military science at the academy in Bremen, Germany. He returned to Colombia during the 1840s and continued his rise in the military. He also ran a merchant house in Ibague' He became general in 1851. He was considered a model soldier. See Restrepo, Historia de la Nueva Granada, II, 312; Gustavo Vargas Martinez, Colombia 1854: Melo, los artesanos y el socialismo, 1st ed. (Bogota"', 197k!,); Ortrz, Reminiscencias, pp. 214-215; ACSen, 1850, VIII, fol. 15; A. J. Lemos Guzmgn, Obando, 2nd ed. (Popayan, 1956), p. 392. 237 system of military justice. His protests were a major factor in the 53 legislators' reaffirmation of the military fuero in 1853. In 1854

Melo again came to the defense of the army when he petitioned the

Congress to reinstate those demoted or removed from the army for

participating in the 1851 revolt. He saw the legislators' refusal to pardon the soldiers as deliberate persecution, which he demanded be

ended. Melo couched his request in threatening phrases, concluding the petition with an admonition that "we [the army] cannot be indifferent 5/ to your prolonged delays."

Melo's role as the champion of the army was seriously jeopardized in the days just prior to the revolt. In addition to the threat posed to his job because of congressional efforts to weaken the military, Melo faced an intensive investigation of his role in the murder of another soldier. The alleged incident took place during

New Year's Eve celebrations. The soldier, Corporal Ramon Quiros, was acting as an attendant at Melo's party. Quiros was sent out for more food and when he failed to return Melo went after him. Witnesses testified that they saw Melo strike the soldier in a stable. Melo denied the charges and said that when he found Quiros he was wounded and a gang was fleeing the scene. A deathbed accusation from Quiros and further testimony, however, discredited Melo's story. The case might have been dealt with quietly except that the press and Congress

53. ACSen, 1853, I, fols. 389-391.

54. ACSen, 1854, II, fols. 49-57. 238

decided to make the General an example of the civil government's

control over the military. After a regular hearing, the case,

because of Melo's status, was bound over to Congress for trial for

murder. 55 Melo panicked. He saw the decision not simply as an attack

on him, but on the entire military establishment. Without him on the

scene, the army would be overwhelmed by the legislators. His

prosecution was an extension of the congressional anti-military

stance. Therefore, to save himself and the army, he decided to revolt

during the Holy Week, 1854.

-During the final hours before the revolt, the situation in the

capital deteriorated dramatically. Large numbers of prisoners fled

the jails and the government was unable to muster enough troops to recapture them. On Good Friday a group of soldiers and congresistas

clashed at a local cafe. The incident developed into full-scale riots which the army ignored. On Saturday, April 6, working class

demonstrations intensified. The Democratic Societies organized patrols to defend their neighborhoods and to assault congresistas. That night

Melo dined with Obando in what was later alleged to be a planning session. At 2 a.m. he left Obando and went to his garrison and ordered the troops to prepare to march.^

55. Ortiz, Reminiscencias, p. 216; Ortiz, Historia de la revolucion del 14- de Abril, pp. 71-72; Gomez Picon,~El golpe' militar, pp. 122, 141-172; ACCR, Actas, 1854, fols. 84-85.

56. Ortiz, Historia de la revolucion del 14 de Abril, pp. 73-77; Gomez Picon, El golpe militar, pp. 185-189; Camacho Roldan, Escritos, I, 63. 239

By 3 a.m. on April 17 the coup was well underway. It was a

revolt not against Obando, but against Congress. It was in favor of

the Revolution of 1848, but against its excesses and the administrative 57 paralysis that set in after the 1852 elections. In the early

morning sunlight soldiers and artisans, nearly two thousand strong,

swept through the streets of Bogota'T They burned the homes of leading

politicians, including those of Pastor Ospina, Manuel Murillo Toro, and

Urbano Pradilla. The noise and the sounds of cannon and military music

awakened the rest of the population to the news of the coup. Arrests

of the opposition, largely members of Congress, continued throughout

the morning. The melistas were especially anxious to silence those

involved in the Quiros investigation and trial. Many would-be victims

were able to go into hiding or to flee to foreign legations which gave

them asylum.^

Obando's role in the coup first surfaced during an emergency cabinet meeting held at 6 a.m. Vice-President Obaldia joined the session and asked Obando some embarassing questions about why no action against Melo had yet materialized and why the President was still in ,, • Bogota. Obando did not respond. Moments later Obaldia was answered m

57. This interpretation alluded to Echevarria R., Los ^ segundos libertadores, pp. 33, 100; Ortiz, Historia de la revolucion del 17 de Abril, pp. 211-212.

58. Ortiz, Historia de la revolucion del 14- de Abril, pp. 75- 77; Camacho Roldan, Escritos, I, 64-65; Restrepo, Diario, IV, 365-367; Borda, Hijos, I, 121-123; G. Arboleda, Historia contemporanea, IV, 43-45. 240

the form of a delegation from the melistas who interrupted the meeting.

They offered Obando a dictatorship, which he refused. The melistas

arrested him and placed him under house arrest. Though under light

guard, the President did not attempt to escape or to oppose Melo in

any way. When Melo learned of Obando's refusal, he declared himself

Jefe Supremo and the dictatorship was underway. 59

Melo immediately set out to give his government an ideological

foundation. In a series of articles published in the Gaceta Oficial

the rebel tried to develop the image that he was the new Lopez who

hoped to return the reform movement to its original course. The revolt,

he claimed, was aimed at reviving the ideals of the Seventh of March.

He blamed the 1853 Constitution for the loss of those ideals, and he

promised to reform it. To make the workers understand his position,

Melo imitated earlier Liberal strategy and developed a "Political

Catechism" in which his ideas were couched in religious terminology.

He even began calling himself Saint Melo in order to help the artisans

understand the reasons for the revolt.

The melistas long-range plan centered on a fundamental

restructuring of Colombian institutions. They wanted to eliminate

/ / 59. Ortiz, Historia de la revolucion del 14 de Abril, pp. 80-84.

60. Ibid., pp. 68-69, 85; Gaceta Oficial, April 24, 1854, pp. 349-350; May 1, 1854, p. 353, 356; June 4, 1854, pp. 375-376; June 20, 1854, pp. 383-384; 17 de Abril, May 21, 1854, pp. 3-4; May 28, 1854, pp. 3-4; Jose''Maria Melo, El jeneral commandante en jefe del ejg'rcito de la repifblica a los granadinos (.Bogota' April 17, TS52T 241 elements thought to be the cause of the current crisis. In addition to reforming the constitution, they wanted to end the influence of foreign ideas and of radicalism. This was all to be accomplished in a constituent convention, which would result in a government reflecting the general will.^"

At the same time that Melo was developing a cogent philosophy for his movement, he placed the capital on a war footing. On April 18, he issued a decree that became the basis for his short-lived administra tion. It restored the presidential powers granted in the 1843

Constitution, gave the Executive full control over all political appoint ments, and established a streamlined judicial system. The decree also reaffirmed many freedoms established during the Lopez years, including open access to all professions, security from illegal arrest, and the right of private property. Melo also declared Catholicism to be the state religion, a move that won him the Archbishop's tacit support. 62

He filled his administration with political unknowns drawn mostly from among the radicals who had joined his camp.

Unfortunately, Melo's guarantees seemed to apply only to his supporters. Within days, the political arrests resumed. Melo

61. Gaceta Oficial, May 1, 1854, p. 356; May 22, 1854, pp. 367-368; June 27, 1854, pp. 386-387; El 17 de Abril, May 14, 1854, pp. 1-2.

62. Leyes, XVI, 30-32, 41-48.

63. Gomez Picon, El golpe militar, p. 207. 24 2 established a secret police network to ferret out dissidents. He banned public meetings and established stiff penalties for spreading rumors. Suspects were tried before a special court that dealt only with political crimes. He also intimidated the press and forced at least one pro-Congress newspaper, El Neogranadino, to support his administration. The dictator also decreed forced loans from Liberal and Conservative merchants and authorized the looting of several haciendas. Melo relented only when his own supporters balked at carrying out his orders, but the terror resumed again as the position of the rebels deteriorated.^

Resistance to the coup organized slowly because the revolt had taken many congresistas by surprise. Opponents came out of hiding only to flee the city, which was not an easy task. Jose Maria

Samper, for example, was forced to flee at night on foot down the steep slopes from the plain of Bogota'to Honda in the lowlands.^

Those unable to escape the city hid in the foreign legations, which became centers of anti-revolutionary activity. Because the legations became involved in politics, the government threatened to revoke the right of asylum. The melistas also harassed diplomats incessantly, causing some to leave Bogota'./ 66

64. On the repression see Diario, IV, 419-420, 423, 428, 441, 459-463, 482-483, 486-487, 490-491; Gaceta Oficial, June 20, 1854, pp^. 382-383; El Neogranadino, April^27, 1854, pp. 69-73; Manuel Gongora de Corddva, Decreto~"( Bogota"", 1854).

65. Samper, Alma, II, 47-58.

66. On the role of the legations see Jose Manuel Restrepo, Autobiografia, Biblioteca de la Presidencia de Colombia, No. 30 (Bogota, 1957), p. 45; Restrepo, Diario, IV, 395, 438-441, 449, 470. 243 Pressure from the melistas in Bogot{, however, was too great to permit organized opposition in the city, and the center of action shifted to Ibagulwhere the legal government resided. Because Vice-· , , President Obaldia was still in hiding, Tomas Herrera, as designate assumed the presidency and organized a government in exile. This task was a difficult one because most of the administrators and congressmen were actively forming militia units to fight Melo. The Congress finally convened in September 1854, though composed largely of substitute legislators. They dealt almost exclusively with the problems of defeating Melo. They authorized the President to negotiate loans and eliminated all import taxes on weapons. In addition, to assure food supplies, as well as to secure the support of the lower 67 classes, Congress abol~shed. du t•~es on bas~c. f oo d ~•t ems. The organizing of military resistance to Melo was far more difficult than the forming of a government. The melistas enjoyed broad

495; Green to March April 22, 1854, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Ministers, Dispatches, Roll 13, Dispatch 7; Benet to Mercado, November 17, 1854, U.S. Department of State, Dispatches from U.S. Consuls in Bogota~ 1851-1906, 4 reels (Washirigton, National ARchives and Record Service, General Service Administration, U.S. National Archives Microfilm Publication), Roll 1, dispatch 5. 67. ACCR, 1854, I, fols. 30, 42-49, 92, 116-119; II, fols. 180-192, 449-454; VI, fols. 338, 343, 345, 352, 355, 360; ACSen, 1854, V, fols. 264-270; Ort{z, Historia de la revolucio'n del 17 de Abril, pp. 202, 204, 281-282, 329, 333; Leyes, XVI, 64-66, 75-77; ACSen, 1855, V, fol~ 299. 244 support in the army and controlled the wealth of the region around

Bogota". Loyalist forces had limited support from the army and was, therefore, forced to rely upon unseasoned militia troops who lacked adequate weapons and supplies. They also lacked competent leadership.

Tomas Herrera, who assumed command after Obaldia finally arrived in

Ibague', proved to be an inept officer and poor strategist. As a result, he committed his irregulars to pitched battles against the melistas near the capital and suffered humiliating and nearly disastrous defeats. In the wake of the setbacks, his army began to dissolve and total defeat seemed a certainty. 68

Fortunately for the loyalists, however, Melo refused to press the attack. Instead of pursuing Herrera's army, he remained on the plain of Bogota'' and established his headquarters at Facatativa' a town outside the capital. The main reason for his strategy was that the workers and troops refused to leave the cool climate to fight in the tropics. Because of this situation, Melo lost the opportunity to move into the lowlands and seize control of the Magdalena River, a move that would have restricted the congresistas1 access to supplies and to Bogota''itself. In addition, the delay gave the loyal forces a chance to regroup unmolested under the firm leadership of Conservative

Generals Toma"s Mosquera and Pedro Herrafi, both of whom had returned from the United States to fight the rebels. They led the troops in

68. Gomez Picon, El golpe militar, pp. 225-233; Restrepo, Diario, IV, 402; Ortiz, Historia de la revolucion del 17 de Abril, pp. 100-130. 245 the North while Jose'Hilario Lopez came out of retirement to lead the

troops in the South. The failure of the melistas to attract support

in other Conservative regions, such as Medellin, further aided the 69 government cause.

By November, loyalist forces were well organized and had

confined the melista movement to the area around BogotaT Rebel

strongholds at Villeta, Guaduas, and Pamplona had been routed and the

rich salt mines near the towns of Tequendama and Chita outside Bogota"''

had been retaken, thus robbing the meliste.s of needed revenues. The

defeats forced Melo to return to Bogota"'to make his last stand. His

revolt was crumbling. He lamented the bloodshed, but promised to

fight to the end. By late November congresista troops controlled the

outskirts of the city. Melo fortified the main plaza and awaited the

final assault. The area around the plaza was cleared of rebels in

bloody house-to-house combat. The final attack took place on

December 4. In the ensuing battle General Tomas Herrera and working

class leader Miguel Leon died. The fighting was savage, but by 11 a.m. 70 on December 5, the last melistas surrendered. The revolt was over.

69. Gomez Picon, El golpe militar, pp. 240-252; Ortiz, Historia de la revolucion del 14 de Abril, pp. 131-155; Mosquera, Resumen historico, pp. 9-14, 67-72; Camilo Echeverria, A los artesanos de Medellin~(Medellin, 1854); Juan de Dios Restrepo, A las armas habitantes de la antigua Antioquia (Medellin, 1854); Lulls Rosendo Roldah, Excitacion a los habitantes de la antigua Antioquia (Me delliR, 1854).

70. On the last phases of the war see Ortiz, Historia de la revolucion del 14 de Abril, pp. 175-436; Jose'Maria Melo, A mi compatriota (Ibague^ 1854). 246 The loyalists quickly moved to restore order. They were

determined to destroy the forces that had brought on the revolt.

Melo and Obando were placed under arrest and melista officers demoted

or ousted from the service. All civil servants who had aided the rebels were immediately removed from office. University professors,

such as Francisco Ortiz, received the same harsh treatment. Outside

the capital, the purge continued. In Cali, where hatred for the workers was especially intense, hundreds of melistas were rounded up and imprisoned in chains. Some were whipped and otherwise tortured.

Supposedly, the women joined in the punishments. Virtually all members of the Democratic Societies, especially in Bogota^ were arrested. Despite their pleas, three hundred workers were sent to forced labor camps in Panama; only two of those sent ever returned alive. The repression reached such extremes that many loyalist intellectuals pleaded with the government to stop the purge. Others collected money to help the families of those sent to prison. 71

Melo and Obando faced equally harsh judgment. Mosquera, who held much influence among the victors, wanted Melo shot, but more

71. Restrepo, Diario, IV, 517-525; No author, Resena historico de los aconte'clmientos poli'£icos de la ciudad de Cali, pp. 91-106; Borda, Hijos, I, 131-132; Gaceta Oficial, December 15, 1854, pp. 363-364; December 17, 1854, p. 365; December 20, 1854, p. 373; December 25, 1854, pp. 380-381; Leyes, XVI, 77-78, 84-87, 91-93) 96-98, 106-108; Unos Artesanos del 17 de Abril, Contestacion preliminar al cuaderno titulano "La Revolucion" (Bogota^ 1856); VHubo o no hubo conferencia sobre la conspiracidh del 17 del Abril entre el sehor don Antonio del Real i Pedro Gutierrez Lee? (. Bogota, l855); Un Observador, Al congreso nacional (Bogota? 1855). 247 moderate voices prevailed. Instead he was sent into exile. Melo traveled to Central America where he served in the Costa Rican and then the El Salvadorean officer corps. He then moved north to

Chiapas where he joined the troops of Benito Jilarez. He died in a 72 skirmish in 1860. Obando's fate had been decided well before Melo's final defeat. The Congress, while still in Ibague^ investigated the

President and his close advisors to determine the Executive branch's complicity in the coup. After some deliberation, a commission recommended that Obando and cabinet officers Jose'Maria Plata and

Celebredft Pinzon be tried before the Senate for treason. Attorney

General Salvador Camacho Rolda£ presented the case before the Senate after peace was restored and the legislators had returned to Bogota^

With little debate the Senate voted for impeachment, but freed the cabinet officers. In March 1855, Congress began the trial proceedings.

After hearing the arguments once again, the legislators found the

President guilty and removed him from office. With this act, the

Liberal-Conservative alliance officially destroyed the melista coalition.73

In the wake of the revolt a new administration came to power that changed the course of the Revolution of 1848. Obaldia's vice- presidential term ended in 1855. The new coalition, hoping to

72. Restrepo, Historia de la Nueva Granada, II, 312, f.n.

73. ACCR, VI, fols. 339, 357-358, 378-380, 384; Restrepo, Diario, IV, 490; ACSen, Actas, 1854, fols. 193-210; Camacho RoldafJ, Escritos, I, 47-142. 248 preserve tranquility yet sustain the reforming impetus, elected

Manuel Maria Mallarino Vice President and, therefore, head of govern-

ment until presidential elections were held in 1857. 74. Mallarino's

program was aimed at national reconciliation and continued reforms.

He pledged to support municipal independence, the ban on the death

penalty, election reform, public education, and economic development.

He also intended to continue reductions of the standing army, improve

the National Guard, and protect individual liberties. To prevent future disorders, Mallarino wanted to consolidate smaller provinces,

but not reduce local prerogatives. He also wanted to postpone constitutional reform, end government purges of the opposition from the bureaucracy, and move swiftly against subversives. To make good his pledge to reconcile Colombians, he appointed a cabinet that represented all factions including Rafael Nunez, Jose'''Maria Plata,

Vicente Cardenas, and Lino ds Pombo. So successful were Mallarino's efforts to stabilize the country that one observer called 1855 a 75 "non-year" in terms of political surprises.

Congress supported Mallarino's efforts. Liberals and

Conservatives allied to begin reversing the trend toward smaller provinces. They revived the old province of Antioquia, consolidated

74. On the election see A. C., Sesiones especiales, 1851- 1860, fols. 61-67; Restrepo, Diario, IV, 542-543.

75. Kastos, Articulos, pp. 209-210; see also Samper, Alma, II, 104-109; Samper, Historia del derecho interno, I, 231; Programa de la administracion ^Bogota*,' 1855). 249 the provinces on the Isthmus of Panama, and restored the old boundaries 76 of Pamplona. Legislators also continued, though without success, to debate total abolition of the death penalty, prison reform, an end to imprisonment for vagrancy, and expansion of public instruction.

They also discussed lifting censorship of theatrical productions, but that too was never approved. Despite the setbacks, the proposals reflected a continuation of the reforming impetus that began under

Lopez.

Though attempting to reconcile political differences and to continue reform programs, the Mallarino government generated some serious opposition. It came largely from surviving members of the melista faction who were willing to risk arrest to voice their opinions. The working class slowly revived its political activities through their newspaper, El Artesano. Though less inflammatory than before 1854, the editors were still anxious to defend working class 78 interests and to blame the rich for the artisans' poverty. By

November 1857 the old melistas felt bold enough to hold open memorial

76. On federalism see ACCR, 1855, I, fols. 86-93> 154-155, 160-163; III, fols. 300-307; ACCR, 1857, VI, fols. 204-205, 208, 212-213, 219-220; Pastor Ospina, Memoria del secretario del gobierno, 1855, pp. 16-20; Leyes, XVI, 110, 133-138.

77. For proposals see ACCR, 1855, III, fols. 236-237, 275-276; IV, fols. 131-134; ACCR, 1856, I, fols. 36-46; IV, fols. 357-358; V, fols. 403-404; ACSen, 1856, II, fols. 7, 37, 117-118, 160, 421-436; ACCR, 1857, VI, fol. 178; VII, fols. 2-3, 278.

78. Camacho Roldan, Escritos, III, 460-469; Restrepo, Diario, IV, 580-581; El Artesano, May 22, 1856, p. 2; June 5, 1856, pp. 1-2; June 15, 1856, pp. 3-4; July 9, 1856, p. 3; El Redactor del Porvenir, A1 piftlico (Bogota^" 1857). 250 services for Miguel Leon on the anniversary of his death. They declared April 17, the day of the coup, a holy day. The gathering sent shock waves through Bogota, and many braced for another 79 uprising. Tensions rose as the 1857 election approached, but no incidents occurred. To make certain that the army remained outside politics, however, Congress refused to reinstate rebel military officers and reduced the standing army to one thousand men. 80

The 1854 revolt slowed, but it did not stop the Revolution.

The uprising was a consequence of political realignments that destroyed the coalition that brought Lopez to power in 1848. In the wake of the shifts, the workers split with the Liberals, which controlled Congress, because of differences over economic policy.

The army also withdrew support from progressive Liberals because of what officers thought was a direct assault on the power of the military. The artisans and officers found a leader in President

Obando, who was unable to force the Congress to pass needed legislation.

They coalesced into what amounted to a new political party. Congress draw its support from a coalition of Liberals and Conservatives who opposed Obando and feared the military. This coalition had firm

79. Restrepo, Diario, IV, 705-706.

80. ACCR, 1855, I, fols. 73-74, 260; IV, fols. 14-16; ACSen, 1855, II, fols. 125-127; III, fols. 136-137; ACSen, 1856, I, fols. 355-357; II, fol. 85; ACCR, 1857, VII, fols. 211-213; Restrepo, Diario, IV, 592; Pedro A. Herrafi, Memoria del secretario de la guerra, 1855, p. 13; Leyes, XVI, 111-112.

f 251 ideological roots and represented a much stronger tie than had previously existed between Liberals and workers. The two traditional parties crushed the emerging military-working class alliance and imposed their own view of the Revolution on Colombia. Under the new government, gains were consolidated and controversial aspects of

Lopez1 programs were changed. The reforming impetus continued, but it was without the zeal of the Lopez years. The government sustained tranquility until i860.

I CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION

The Revolution was a critical turning point in Colombian history.

During the epoch, many vestiges of the colonial period were either

shattered, modified or mixed with the attitudes and ideas that became

prevalent between 1848 and 1854. The Revolution institutionalized con

flicts and themes preceding the reform movement and that were instru

mental in bringing it on. It also introduced new forces into Colombian

society that were key in changing political, economic and social patterns.

The tremendous power of the Revolution affected every aspect

of national life. The President, his party, and, frequently, pro gressive Conservatives together moved to modernize the bureaucracy, revitalize the economy and eliminate obstacles to commercial develop

ment, liberalize social institutions, and diminish the power of the

Church and the military, all in an effort to bring the country up to what they considered to be standards of modern nationhood. The

Revolution also brought the working class into national life for the first time and gave students and soliders their first sample of political power and influence.

The failures of the reform movement, and there were many, were based largely upon the problems posed by legislative priorities and the chronic lack of funds. Frequently, congressmen simply were unable to deal with the tremendous number of proposals, petitions,

252 253 and bills placed before them. This situation, combined with the absence of strong party leadership within the Congress, forced legislators to deal only with what they perceived to be the most pressing problems. Thus, while legislation with lower priorities, such as administrative reform, was debated it was often dropped in favor of economic or socially-oriented proposals.

Financial problems, even more than priorities, were at the heart of legislative failures. Reformers envisioned a society that required great amounts of money to finance schools, hospitals, charity houses, courts, health programs, and economic development programs. Capital was also required to allow congressmen to eliminate the onerous taxes that burdened the working class and slowed commercial activity. Colombia simply did not have the tax base to sustain what reformers thought was a modern liberal society.

Still, despite the problems of legislative priorities and finances, many reforms were made into law and successfully implemented that did much to alter the nation's bureaucracy and social and economic institutions. That many needed reforms remained largely on paper or in the minds of reformers neither diminishes the importance of the period nor refutes the contention that the years between 1849 and 1854 were truly revolutionary. The view of reality that shaped the course of Colombian development changed during those years from one tied to the colonial experience to one closely linked to modern trends. Failures were due to circumstance not intention. 254

The impact of the Revolution of 1848 is very evident in

contemporary Colombia. Liberals and Conservatives remain polarized

politically but, except on the issue of religion, remain essentially

the same ideologically. Issues debated in 1848 still dominate the

newspapers and broadcast media. Violent inter-party strife remains

an integral aspect of Colombian politics. The working class

continues to suffer from the consequences of economic liberalism

that came to dominate the thinking of policymakers during the Lopez

era. The Sunday newspaper supplements continue to publish articles mythologizing the reform movement and its leaders; the consequences of the reforms have even become the subject of theatrical productions.

The revolutionary experience of Colombia between 1849 and 1854 suggests that historians should begin examining nineteenth-century

Latin America in terms of indigenous political, social, and economic developments. To consider the period merely as a prelude to the twentieth century or, even worse, simply as an extension of European culture is both unjust and historically inaccurate. The Colombian

Revolution was a consequence of a combination of developments in 1848 that had their roots in national development since 1810. That they coincided with similar events in Europe was an historical accident and not a result of foreign influence.

The Revolution also suggests that historians should look beyond what appeared to be chaos in the nineteenth century and search for political continuity and stability. In the Colombian situation, political institutions survived and even thrived amid turmoil. The 255 government conducted relatively honest elections, levied taxes, and carried on a systematic foreign policy. Members of Congress followed procedural rules, carried on investigations of fraud and corruption, and carefully scrutinized pending legislation. The

Executive was not totally dominant and Congress was not isolated from the populace. Both the President and the legislators reacted to a variety of outside forces, creating a functioning political balance of power that worked smoothly despite unrest.

Finally, the movement for reform indicates that historians must revise traditional definitions of nineteenth-century liberalism and conservativism. Long-held views that liberals were progressive and that conservatives were retrogressive are invalid when applied to the Lopez and Obando period. Advocates of both philosophies shared common values and goals, differing only in the extent of reform. Only the issue of Church-State relations divided them sharply. This idea emerged from an examination of roll-call votes in the National Congress and from policy statements in newspapers.

The quantitative aspects of this approach are more accurate than qualitative definitions because they measure actual behavior patterns rather than simply patterns that emerge solely from periodicals and memoirs. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

MANUSCRIPTS

Leyes Autografas 1849, I-Vj 1850, I-V; 1851, I-VIj 1852, I-III; 1853, I; 1854, I-III.

Censo general de poblacion de la republica de la Nueva Granada con arreglo de las disposiciones de la lei 6 parte 1, tratado 1 de la reco- pilacidh granadina, en los meses de enero, febrero i marzo, 1851.