Conclusions

As we promised in the Introduction, the principal object of this book is to demonstrate that Hispano-​Muslim relations throughout the Early Modern age were not invariably marked by hostility. This is not to deny nor to minimize the magnitude of the chronic violence between the two sides. We cannot ig- nore the great naval battles of their respective fleets (Preveza, Lepanto, Djerba, and many others); the conquest and capture of cities on both shores of the Mediterranean (Mazalquivir, Oran, Bougie, Tripoli, Mahón, Ciutadella, Meh- diya, and Tunis, to name just a few); the unsuccessful invasions (particularly of Algiers); and the repeated assaults on Spanish fortified ports on the North African coast (Oran, Melilla, Peñón de Vélez, Peñón de Alhucemas, Ceuta). We must also recall the depredations of Spanish and Muslim corsairs, who seized hundreds of ships and cargoes and thousands of captives and slaves, and the violent expulsion of the Moriscos from Spain. There was constant conflict be- tween the parties between 1492 and 1767/​1791. But neither must we refuse to see, or underestimate, the fluid communication between them and the clear desire for negotiation that developed inevitably between these rival forces. It is generally acknowledged that mutual violence also favored contact be- tween the contenders. Although in a few encounters the enemies were slaugh- tered, in general their lives were respected. Even imprisoning or enslaving them showed a minimal form of respect, since otherwise the adversary would mistreat in turn the captives that it held. In most cases (though not always) captives were allowed to live, and slaves had to be treated well enough to avoid reprisals on the other side. Further, channels of communication had to be cre- ated and kept open so that captives could be ransomed. Both Christians and Muslims participated in these exchanges, whether as official ransomers or sim- ply as merchants, maintaining unbroken ties between the two shores of the Mediterranean – ​and, it bears remembering, ensuring mercantile contacts as well, however tenuous. It suited both sides to facilitate commerce to even a slight degree, since both were in need of particular products: Spain imported grain, wax, hides, and oth- er goods, while Muslim countries brought in minted silver coin. In North Afri- can ports some captured ships and their cargoes had to be released when North African markets could not absorb them. Ships and traders from third coun- tries, including France and England, assisted in many of these exchanges. In addition, both Christian and Muslim merchants could trade with the enemies of their sovereigns: Spaniards occasionally accepted French or English protec- tion, and brought their own ships into Maghrebi ports under the white flag of

© CORRALES, 2021 | DOI:10.1163/9789004443761_013 This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC 4.0 license.Eloy Martín Corrales - 9789004443761 Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 10:01:49PM via free access 604 Conclusions neutrality. Muslims were less active in this regard but still reached the Iberian Peninsula on many occasions, as the examples we have offered demonstrate. Political motives and reasons of state favored negotiations to a much greater extent than has previously been recognized. A quick review of the bibliogra- phy on Hispano-​Muslim relations in the sixteenth century amply confirms the importance of these negotiations, which were often consolidated by treaties of peace and friendship between sovereigns on both shores of the Mediterra- nean. In the sixteenth century and the first third of the seventeenth the Span- ish Crown signed dozens of treaties with the Wattasid, Saadid, Zayyanid, and Hafsid dynasties and with other kingdoms such as Kuku and Bu-​Tata. While no similar pacts followed, a sort of permanent cease-​fire was maintained with some countries, and Spain exchanged embassies with the Ottoman Empire and Safavid Persia. In the case of Morocco negotiations coexisted with hostil- ity, though they succeeded when Morocco ceded Larache to Spain and almost resulted in the Moriscos’ surrender of Salé. These relationships were not very different from those of Venice with Muslim countries. For political motives as well, each side received and aided exiles from the other. This phenomenon was especially clear in the case of Muslims: hundreds of them fled to Spanish soil with their families and partisans, seeking help in recovering their lost domains. Some were successful, others received some aid (not always generous) but died in the attempt, and a third group decided not to return home. Some of the latter converted to Christianity, while others re- tained their Islamic faith. They continued to reach the Peninsula during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, though in decreasing numbers and with waning political influence. In any event they created channels of communica- tion with their respective countries that affected Hispano-Muslim​ relations. Even the taking of hostages required agreements –​ never explicit –​ between Spanish and North African sovereigns. We should also stress the fact that confrontations with Islamic countries almost never involved an entire nation: it was much more common to form explicit or implicit alliances with sultans, monarchs, tribes, or notables against others of the same religion and/​or region. We spoke in the Introduction of pacts with Hafsids, Zayyanids, Wattasids, and Saadids against the Ottomans and their partisans in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. There were also alliances with sultans and monarchs who sought to eliminate their rivals for power, or with those rivals against the pretenders, all over the Maghreb; one result was a significant presence of Moroccan, Algerian, and Tunisian exiles in Spain. We recall the truces between the Spanish monarchy and the Sub- lime Porte in the sixteenth century, while in the seventeenth and eighteenth, without any signed agreement, an almost peaceful relationship prevailed

Eloy Martín Corrales - 9789004443761 Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 10:01:49PM via free access Conclusions 605 between them. Meanwhile, Spanish-​Persian negotiations showed great dyna- mism between the 1590s and about 1650: both sides hoped for an alliance of the two empires against the Ottomans, and the Osmanli embassy to Madrid in 1649 may have been an attempt to kill that possibility. The Spanish monar- chy took advantage of the rivalry between Moroccans and Algerians to support sometimes one group, sometimes the other; in the late seventeenth and ear- ly eighteenth centuries Algiers conspired with Spanish authorities in Oran to attack Morocco. This varying play of alliances, though they were ephemeral, produced the Moroccan embassy to Madrid in 1691–1692​ and the Algerian one in 1701. Also significant were the continual, though unsuccessful, negotiations with Barbarossa and Occhiali. As a rule, treaties were closely connected to embassies from one side or the other. Both sent frequent delegations, though we are not concerned here with Spanish missions to Muslim territory. In the sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth North Africans sent many envoys to Spain’s itinerant royal court and that of the Duke of Medina Sidonia in Sanlúcar de Barrameda, while in the seventeenth and eighteenth Madrid and the royal summer residences received many more. We should also include the large number of represen- tatives and agents of both sides who traveled between the opposing courts; though their numbers declined considerably in the last two centuries of our period, future research will surely establish how many there were. Again, we do not discuss here the Europeans and Jews who served as emissaries from sultans, deys, or beys to Spanish authorities. Relations and communication between the two parties were not always symmetrical, and the best example lies in the realm of religion. Christian cap- tives and slaves in Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli were allowed places of worship in their bagnios and prisons, as well as the protection and comfort offered by Franciscans, Trinitarians, Mercedarians, and other religious orders. While freedom of religion was also allowed to Muslim slaves and captives in the Peninsula, it was initially tolerated only in private. Little by little, semipub- lic religious practice was officially recognized by Spanish authorities: we have seen that in Cartagena, at least from the second half of the seventeenth centu- ry, there was a mosque and an Islamic burial ground. New research may bring fresh revelations. But we emphasize that in the three centuries covered by this book there were always free Muslims in Spain, whether exiles, merchants, trav- elers, or others, and unless they committed a true religious offense they were not pursued by the Inquisition. Muslim merchants, including those officially involved in ransoms, main- tained at least a slight presence in Spanish cities and ports – ​chiefly in the six- teenth century, but in decreasing numbers during the two following (up to the

Eloy Martín Corrales - 9789004443761 Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 10:01:49PM via free access 606 Conclusions signing of the peace treaties). There is no doubt, however, that their numbers were larger than has been recognized. Spanish men of business, on the other hand, frequented Maghrebi ports and cities in much larger numbers. We must not forget the presence of Muslims who converted to Christian- ity –​ far fewer than Christian renegades in Islamic lands, though the issue deserves fuller study for the sixteenth century. Again, there were many more of them than has been recognized heretofore. They have been studied only for the period of hostility between the two sides: after the peace treaties were signed and peaceful relations established a small number of Muslims contin- ued to convert, but we have not taken up the issue in this book. Many converts were fleeing political persecution in the Maghreb, tribal vengeance, or periodic famines and plagues, though some of them must have adopted Christanity out of true conviction. In short, even in periods marked by mutual hostility many Muslims arrived in Spain for a variety of reasons: exile, diplomacy, ransoming of captives, com- merce, conversion to Christianity, immigration, or travel. They remained in the country for shorter or longer periods, or permanently. This flow of Islamic sub- jects onto Spanish soil shows that mutual relations were more fluid than has been thought and that communication between the two shores of the Medi- terranean was never broken. Once the Treaties of Peace, Friendship, and Trade were signed between Spain on the one hand and Morocco, Algeria, Tunis, Tripoli, and the Ottoman Empire on the other, there is no need to prove that communication, negoti- ation, and cooperation between the parties were possible: clearly the lan- guage of the treaties, as well as daily practice, allowed and encouraged them. From that point onward the trends we outlined in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 grew in strength and intensity. We should not forget, however, the degree of conflict that continued to exist: Spain was at war with Morocco in 1774–​1775 and again in 1791–1792,​ and corsair warfare by Algerians, Tunisians, and Tripolitans per- sisted into the early nineteenth century. While some actors in the Regencies actually preferred open hostility because it boosted their investments in cor- sair ships, the advantages of commerce proved greater. Spanish imports from the Maghreb, especially of grain, brought the sellers such huge sums that peace treaties held in spite of frequent corsair activity. At this point we are speaking not of religious confrontation but of disputes over debts contracted by Spanish or Christian merchants or their agents; these had negative consequences for influential men in the Regencies’ political structure. The Spanish Crown and its successive governments realized the need to keep the peace with Muslim countries, especially in view of its rivalry with Great Britain (with which it was at war in 1779–1783,​ 1797–​1802, and 1804–1808)​

Eloy Martín Corrales - 9789004443761 Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 10:01:49PM via free access Conclusions 607 and France (in the wars of 1793–​1795 and 1808–1814).​ That policy brought some significant successes. The sultans of Morocco ignored England and France when those nations offered to help conquer Spain’s North African ports; on the contrary, one sultan ceded a naval base to the Spaniards from which they could harry English warships between 1779 and 1783. Moroccan, Algerian, and Tuni- sian ships, as neutrals in the wars, helped to resolve confrontations with enemy vessels, particularly English ones. North African ships (some Spanish-​owned but under Moroccan or Algerian flags) protected shipping between Spain and the Maghreb as well as Spanish coastal trade; Ottoman ships even participated in Spain’s commerce with the River Plate. It was also clear to all parties that Spain needed to be supplied with grain and other goods from North Africa; these were essential in times of scarcity or famine, for provisioning Spanish troops, and for supporting charitable institutions. That trade ensured the pres- ence of Maghrebi captains, pursers, and merchants in Spanish cities and ports to a degree not matched in any other European country. The hundreds of North African captains and traders who spent shorter or longer periods in Spanish ports coexisted with the flow of diplomats, envoys, exiles, immigrants, travelers, and others. They learned fairly quickly to deal with both Spaniards and foreigners, to bring their documents to notaries, con- sulates, and commercial tribunals, and to appeal to local and royal authorities. But all suffered from the absence of consuls or agents of their respective sover- eigns on Spanish soil, unlike Spanish merchants in North Africa who enjoyed such a service. Only the treaty with the Ottoman Empire required that an agent of the Porte be established in Alicante. (While the Ottomans placed agents in Barcelona, Alicante, Palma de Mallorca, and Cádiz, these were all Europeans, especially Venetians and Greeks, and we do not discuss them here.) The presence of so many merchants, sailors, captains, travelers, diplomats and others attracted Moroccan interpreters to Spanish ports; some of these acted, or tried to act, as agents for their fellow Muslims. It soon became clear that someone had to speak for and defend Muslim interests. The first attempt was made in Cádiz at the urging of the Spain’s consul general in Morocco, and was approved by both the governor of the port and the Secretariat of State: a Moroccan interpreter was named the representative for subjects of that coun- try. However, there is still much we do not know about the situation. We believe that we have fulfilled the three objectives proposed for this book in the Introduction. First, we have shown that merchants, envoys, ship captains, and other Muslims were present in Spain even in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in significant numbers –​ especially ambassadors, diplomats, and converts to Christianity – ​in spite of Spanish-​Muslim hostil- ity. Their numbers swelled after the Treaties of Peace and Commerce were

Eloy Martín Corrales - 9789004443761 Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 10:01:49PM via free access 608 Conclusions signed: dozens and dozens of captains, pursers, and traders appeared in Span- ish ports as well as cities in the interior, particularly Madrid and the royal res- idences. We have dealt only with those who presented some problem or were implicated in some incident, resulting in their appearance in documents from the archives –​ and of course we have not exhausted Spanish archival sourc- es. These Muslims seem to have contracted with Spanish partners, signed contracts before notaries, and appealed to consuls and commercial tribunals without great difficulty; they could also approach local officials, though they preferred to go directly to the Secretary of State or the king himself. We omit, of course, the vast majority who behaved discreetly while in Spain. There were certainly more Muslim tradesmen in Spanish ports than in those of France, Great Britain, and elsewhere. Second, we have proved to what extent both sides engaged in negotiations. Spanish authorities tried to give Muslims no cause to complain to their sov- ereign about their reception in Spain, while North Africans exploited every means and institution that Spanish law and mercantile practice allowed them. Both these strategies led to the naming of the first Moroccan agent in Cádiz in 1798. Our third conclusion rests on the two others. Spanish policy toward Mus- lim countries rested more on political, strategic, and economic factors than on ideological ones; it was skillful in manipulating Moroccan, Algerian, Tunisian, Tripolitan, and Ottoman ambassadors and envoys, and in its behavior toward sultans, deys, beys, and the Sublime Porte itself. As proof of the success of this policy, the many incidents provoked or suffered by Muslims in Spain failed to damage relations between the respective governments. This book does not seek to elevate Spain’s role above those played by Great Britian, France, and other Northern European countries in their relations with Muslim states. Our simple and necessary object is to cast light on individuals who have been forgotten or neglected, particularly Muslims who visited Span- ish cities and ports. We also bring Spanish-​Muslim relations to the fore, above all in the realm of negotiations. In this we hope to enrich the shared history of the Mediterranean by providing it with many new protagonists who, to a great- er degree than has been recognized, were moved by a wish to negotiate, not to fight. Spaniards and Muslims never forgot their common frontier.

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