AMERICA’S ROLE IN ISRAEL-SYRIA TALKS

Success of the Turkey mediated Israeli-Syrian talks would promote vital US interests in the region. If the current US administration is not prepared to facilitate and join them, we urge the next president to do so as soon as possible after he takes office.

For nearly 60 years the United States has tried to encourage peace and reconciliation between Israel and all of its neighbors. Only recently have there emerged new policy priorities—the “global war on terrorism,” the invasion and occupation of Iraq and support for Lebanese independence—that have complicated a commitment deeply rooted in American national interests. While the Bush administration hopes to bequeath to its successor serious progress on the Israeli-Palestinian track of the peace process, it has signaled no such ambition with respect to the Israeli-Syrian track.

Indeed, the announcement of Turkish-mediated Israeli-Syrian peace talks was greeted with less than enthusiasm by the Bush administration. “That Israel has been able to open some sort of indirect conversation about these matters with the Syrian government, with the good offices of Turkey, is a good thing,” said Assistant Secretary of State . “I mean, I’m not saying it’s not. And we hope it prospers. But where we’re making the major investment right now is on the Palestinian track.”

The Israeli-Palestinian track is indeed the “main event” of the Arab-Israeli peace process. Moreover, Syria has presented problems for Washington with respect to Iraq (both before and after the 2003 invasion) and more recently in Lebanon. Indeed, Syria and its Lebanese allies (led by Hezbollah) have thoroughly frustrated the emergence of a pro-American Lebanon; something President Bush had hailed as a dividend of regime change in Iraq. The administration sees the Syrian regime as murderous and duplicitous; as a state sponsor of terrorism, an ally of Iran, a conduit for foreign fighters to Iraq, and an enemy of Lebanese democracy and independence.

The Israeli view of the Assad regime differs little in substance from Washington’s, and President Bush was applauded in the Knesset when he declared, “Some seem to believe that we should negotiate with the terrorists and radicals, as if some ingenious argument will persuade them they have been wrong all along.” Still, Israel cannot afford to operate in accordance with the view that diplomacy aims for conversion and repentance.

• Peace treaties with Egypt and have produced little in the way of warmth and nothing in the way of apologies for past behavior, but they have gone far to enhance Israel’s national security. • Likewise, no serious Israeli expects Palestinians to insert the phrase, “We were wrong all along” into a treaty of peace setting the terms for a sustainable two- state solution. • Just as the United States seeks common ground with a regime in Pyongyang easily as noxious as any on earth, so Israel is exploring the possibility of peace with a country that has, at times, been the bitterest of its enemies.

From Israel’s perspective the potential benefits of peace with Syria are great:

• Syria would no longer provide support for armed action by Hamas and other militant Palestinian groups against Israel; • A treaty with Syria would clear the way for formal peace with Lebanon; • A treaty with Syria would mean the end of arms shipments to Hezbollah; • Comprehensive peace on all tracks would trigger normalization with the entire Arab world in accordance with the Arab Peace Initiative; and • Iran’s posture in the Arab-Israeli arena would be weakened and Syria’s relationship with Iran would be stripped of its anti-Israeli content.

If the potential strategic payoff to Israel is monumental, so would be the price: the return to Syria of all land lost to Israel during the June 1967 war. While the effects of Israel’s withdrawal can be mitigated by treaty provisions meeting its concerns about security (demilitarization), ownership of water and access to the full circumference of the Kinneret, most Israelis do not wish to part with the Golan Heights under any circumstances. There is an emotional attachment to the Golan that Israeli and Syrian leaders will have to take fully into account if they expect peace talks to result in a ratified, implemented treaty.

From Syria’s perspective the full recovery of territory lost in 1967 is a national imperative. No Syrian government can be seen as setting aside this goal without suffering in terms of its own legitimacy. Yet it is also clear that wants and needs the United States deeply involved before coming to closure with Israel; perhaps even before the onset of truly serious, detailed, face-to-face negotiations. This was true in the 1990s and is even more so now. Unlike the previous round of peace talks, however, this new Israeli-Syrian- Turkish initiative has an “800-pound gorilla” in the room: Iran.

Iran’s overt hostility toward Israel and Syria’s close relationship with Tehran makes the current round much more than a technical discussion of how to reconcile Syria’s desire for a specific boundary with Israel’s security, water, and normalization concerns.

• Unless Iran itself enters into a détente with the United States, Israel, and the West in general, it will not be possible for Syria to be at peace with Israel unless the Damascus-Tehran relationship undergoes a fundamental change. • In the 1970s Egypt’s relationship with the Soviet Union changed fundamentally. Yet while Anwar Sadat had somewhere to go—the United

2 States—President Bashar Al Assad faces the road to Washington blocked by harsh words and economic sanctions: obstacles largely of his own making. • Sadat—the unchallenged ruler of a legitimate government—was himself not inclined to dive blindfolded into a potentially empty pool when he dismissed the Soviets. Assad—who rules a markedly weaker state than Egypt—will want someplace safe to land if he has to break from the embrace of an Iran still hostile toward Israel. That someplace would be the United States.

There are those who argue that Syria really has no intention of breaking strategically with Tehran; that its supposed interest in peace talks with Israel is a sham aimed at neutralizing a perceived American threat as it swallows Lebanon, evades the Special Tribunal investigating the murder of Lebanon’s Rafiq Hariri, and waits out the presidency of George W. Bush.

Likewise there are some who maintain that Israel is interested in process only—that it hopes to obtain a modicum of Syrian restraint with respect to the Palestinian track, introduce some tension into the Iranian-Syrian relationship, and keep Syria from encouraging Hezbollah adventurism—but in the end has no intention of returning territory to Syria, certainly not to the extent desired by Damascus.

Finally, some commentators do indeed believe both parties are deadly serious; that Damascus firmly believes in the “If Palestine first, Syria never” truism about the recovery of territory, and Israel truly believes that, with the proper inducements, Syria can be persuaded to abandon the Iran-Hezbollah camp. Some claim that considerable technical progress has already been made by virtue of years’ worth of quiet, unofficial, “track II” discussions.

Virtually all commentators agree that Syria wants the United States “in the room:” facilitating matters, offering security-related guarantees, and melting the ice in which the Washington-Damascus relationship has long been frozen. Indeed, some argue that Syria wants a warm relationship with the United States more than it wants the Golan Heights— that the prospect of the Hariri Special Tribunal has sent genuine shivers up the spine of the regime. It appears, in any event, that the United States has something of value in the eyes of Syria.

President Bush’s definition of diplomacy—at least the one articulated recently in Jerusalem—may rule out any near-term exploration of what (if anything) the United States might get from Damascus in return for an active American facilitation role. The recent Hezbollah military foray into Sunni and Druze areas in and around Beirut led to a Qatari- sponsored Lebanese political accommodation that, among other things, protected Hezbollah’s right to bear arms. This was a setback for the United States and its allies in Lebanon. Presumably there are things the United States wants from Syria in the context of securing Lebanon’s independence—an exchange of Syrian-Lebanese ambassadors and official delineation of Syria-Lebanon boundaries being two that are high on the list. By setting aside the diplomatic “tool box,” however, the Bush administration seems to be

3 signaling a preference for defeat over dialogue when it comes to the prospect of engaging the regime of President Assad.

As a practical matter, therefore, the question of what to do about Israeli-Syrian peace talks may well fall squarely on whoever occupies the Oval Office on the afternoon of January 20, 2009. We think the following factors are worth considering:

• As Iraq shows signs of gradually stabilizing, American-Syrian talks might yield agreements producing substantial benefits for the government in Baghdad while helping to relieve Syria of the enormous Iraqi refugee burden it is carrying. • If there is a degree of genuineness in this Turkish-Syrian-Israeli initiative, the parties can conduct their respective “due diligence” processes and tackle some technical negotiating details without American assistance between now and early 2009. While we would like to see the Bush administration convert an apparent demand for American facilitation services into a gain for U.S. foreign policy objectives, we suspect the president prefers a different course. • Contrary to the apparent beliefs of the Assad regime, a new American president—Republican or Democrat—will not automatically sign up to the proposition that the United States should dive into Israeli-Syrian talks forthwith and approach the bilateral relationship with Damascus with a blank slate. Iraq and Lebanon will be inherited issues. If Syria wants a positive relationship with Washington, cooperation over Iraq and an accommodation over Lebanon are essential. The new administration would do well to define what it wants, when it wants it, and what it is prepared to give in return. In short, tough-minded and disciplined diplomacy should come back into vogue—it is a tool of American power that no American commander-in-chief should be reluctant to use. • If Damascus proves unwilling to be helpful with Iraq and determined to restore its suzerainty over Lebanon, it will be difficult for any American administration to obtain the requisite domestic political support to play an active role in helping Syria, through facilitation and mediation, recover the lands it lost to Israel in 1967. • The dilemma for which Damascus holds an important key is that notwithstanding its bad relationship with Washington, a comprehensive Arab- Israeli peace is essential to American national security interests. As the United States tries to rebuild its image, influence, and prestige in the Arab and Muslim worlds, the quality of its efforts to bring about a comprehensive peace between Israel and all of its neighbors will be of transcendent importance. While no American need ever apologize for the special relationship between the United States and Israel and while no one need ever doubt the depth and permanency of America’s commitment to Israel’s security, it is important that the United States be seen as striving for peace and justice in the Arab-Israeli context. Without sacrificing any legitimate national security interest, Syria—if it wants a good relationship with Washington and if it wants a vital American role in its discussions with Israel—can help make it possible for the next president (and even this one) to pursue a peace whose achievement would disappoint only Osama bin Laden, his disciples, like-minded extremists, and Iran.

4

Therefore, success of the Turkey mediated Israeli-Syrian talks would promote vital US interests in the region. If the current US administration is not prepared to facilitate and join them, we urge the next president to do so as soon as possible after he takes office.

– July 7, 2008

Marshall Breger : Professor, Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of America;

Nathan Brown : Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University;

Thomas A. Dine : Senior Policy Advisor to the Israel Policy Forum, former Executive Director of AIPAC, former President of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty;

Frederic C. Hof : lead drafter of the Mitchell Report (Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee) in 2001, former U.S. Army Attaché in Lebanon, and Director for Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Palestinian Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense;

Scott Lasensky : Senior Research Associate, United States Institute of Peace;

Ambassador Samuel Lewis : former U.S. Ambassador to Israel under Presidents Carter and Reagan, Director of Policy Planning at the State Department in the first Clinton term, Senior Policy Advisor to the Israel Policy Forum;

Robert Malley : Director, Middle East and North Africa Program, International Crisis Group;

Ambassador Robert Pelletreau : former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, former U.S. Ambassador to Egypt, Tunisia, and Bahrain, member of the U.S. delegation to the 1991 Madrid Middle East Peace Conference;

Steven L. Spiegel : Director of the Center for Middle East Development and Professor of Political Science at UCLA, National Scholar of the Israel Policy Forum;

Ambassador Edward S. Walker : Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs in the George W. Bush and Clinton administrations and U.S. Ambassador to Israel, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates.

The views expressed in this report are those of the study group participants and do not necessarily reflect the views of the institutions with whom they are affiliated. The references to their present and former titles are for identification purposes only; all those who signed did so strictly in their private capacity .

New York: 165 East 56 th Street, 2 nd Floor / New York, NY 10022 / Tel: 212-245-4227 Washington, DC: 122 C Street, NW, Suite 820 / Washington, DC 20001 / Tel: 202-347-3811 Jerusalem: 43 Emek Refaim Street, Suite 10 / Jerusalem / Tel: 972-2-561-7258

www.israelpolicyforum.org 5