SMALLER OPERATIONS: , CLARK AIR BASE by Dr. Joe F. Leeker

First published on 4 March 2013, last updated on 24 October 2021

I) Kadena Air Base, Okinawa

In the 1950ies, CAT’s scheduled flights from Taipei to Japan had to stop on Okinawa. But the airport they used was not Kadena Air Base, but Naha.1 For example, on 31 July 52, “Doc” Johnson flew C-46 B-846 on the scheduled flight Taipei-Naha-Tokyo (Haneda), on 21 September 59, he flew DC-6B B-1006 on the scheduled flight from Naha to Taipei, and on 25 September 59, he flew B-1006 on the scheduled run Taipei-Naha-Tokyo. During the same period of time, he flew C-46 B-136 Taipei-Kadena-Taipei on 5 June 52, C-46 B-138 on the same route on 11 August 52 or C-46 B-136 Taipei-Kadena on 1 September 59 – apparently on flights for the US Government, as Kadena Air Base was off limits for ordinary people.2 In that way, Kadena could remain the port of call for flights for the US military and the CIA. So the 45 CAT “International Scheduled” flights that touched Kadena Station in January 54,3 probably were mostly scheduled flights for the USAF (under Booklift) and for the CIA (flights for “Advertisement” / “ADS” or under the “Air Force Special Contract”). Interestingly, CAT seems to have sometimes tried to hide that they served 2 airports on the Island of Okinawa, just using “OKI” as airport code for airline service.4 As early as April 1952, CAT had received the right to operate to and from and within the Ryukyu Islands, but had limited itself to the route to Japan. As to domestic traffic within the islands, a group of Ryukyu businessmen organized a company known as “Ryukyu Airways” in 1956, and they chartered a C-46 from Civil Air Transport Co Ltd that performed the scheduled domestic flying until 1963. On 27 June 56, CAT pilot “Doc” Johnson flew CAT’s passenger C-46 B-848 on such a charter, running from Naha to Yamayam via Miyako and the same way back to Naha. On 29 July 56 and on 23 December 56, he flew similar missions.5

“Ryukyu Airways” charters flown on 27 June 56, 29 July 56, and 23 December 56 by CAT pilot “Doc” Johnson (Pages from Doc Johnson’s log book kindly supplied by his son James on 14 February 2013)

CAT’s Captain “Doc” Johnson made similar flights within the Ryukyu Islands also on 28 March 57, 3 June 57, 24 June 57, 25 July 57, 26 August 57, 18 November 57, 16 and 26 December 57, 13 January 58, 31 August and 22 September 58, always using a C-46:

1 See, for example, CAT international schedule effective 19 September 1952 (in: CAT Bulletin, vol. V, no.10, p.7), where the airport code is given as NHA. 2 Pages from “Doc” Johnson’s log book kindly sent to the author on 14 September 2012 by James Johnson. 3 CAT, Operations Division, Monthly Report for January 54, p.5, in: UTD/Leary/B21F1. 4 See, for example, the “Annual Report of the Board of Directors of Civil Air Transport Company Limited for the Fiscal Year ended 31 March 1965”, in: UTD/CIA/B11F4. 5 Page from “Doc” Johnson’s log book kindly supplied by his son James on 14 February 2013. 1

Sometimes, these flights are given as flights for OTA, i.e. the Okinawa Travel Agency Ltd.6 In 1963, the U.S. High Commissioner, Gen. Paul Carroway, ordered new airports to be built on 3 islands – Kumejima, Yonaguni, and Minami Daito – to improve business on the islands. Quite early, Japan Air Lines stepped forward, proposing to operate the inter-island service to be opened in 1964, but because of the military and CIA installations on Okinawa, the U.S. High Commissioner preferred an American company to operate the service. As no US airline was interested and as CATCL was a Chinese company, at the end Air America was given the job, although opposition from the business companies working on the Ryukyu Islands was to be expected.7 For airline services that Air America operated on Okinawa in the sixties, see my file about Scheduled Air Services Ryukyus within my The History of Air America.

1) Operations for the Composite Service Group, Camp Chinen, Okinawa: From the very beginning, some of CAT’s flights to Okinawa were of a very special nature: In 1951, “Zebra” flights that were to carry “Third Force” agents to Saipan for training, often stopped at Naha, Okinawa, on their way from Hong Kong to Atsugi in Japan, as Taiwan had to be avoided.8 As it seems, as early as 1951, i.e. as a reaction to Chinese activities during the Korean War, the CIA made plans to establish a CIA logistical support base on Okinawa in order to support the efforts of the Taiwan-based Western Enterprises Inc and of CAT’s Japan- based “Third Force” project against Communist China.9 By mid-1952, this support base had been established.10 The former USAF B-17 that CAT would use for overflights over continental China in 1952 and 1953 was picked up at Kadena Air Base, Okinawa.11 In their Monthly Report for January 1954, CAT’s Operations Division noted: “There were three C-46 Taipei/Kadena/Taipei weekly banana flights completed during the month in conjunction with the weekly Flight 500”.12 For February 1954, the same type of reports notes: “There were three C-46 Taipei/Kadena/Taipei weekly banana flights completed during the month in conjunction with the weekly Flight 500. One banana charter flight was cancelled on February 3 upon charterer’s request.”13 Apparently, these were flights for the CIA. Effective 1 February 56, CAT Inc had a contract – no. DA-92-321 FEC 323 – with the US Army’s First Composite Service Unit (FCSU).14 The FCSU was a CIA entity that fulfilled airlift requirements on a charter basis, connecting Atsugi, Okinawa, Saipan, Taipei, and Korea – the CIA’s main operational use of CAT at that time.15 This unit was based on Okinawa,16 it was even the official name of Camp Chinen.17 By 8 August 56, this contract had been

6 Pages from “Doc” Johnson’s log book kindly sent to the author on 14 and 18 February 2013 by James Johnson. 7 Leary, Manuscript, pp.492/3, in: UTD/Leary/B19F4. 8 See my file CAT and Air America in Japan. 9 Leary, Manuscript, p.41, in: UTD/Leary/B19F1; the CIA code was JBEDICT. 10 Leary, Manuscript, p.129, in: UTD/Leary/B19F1. 11 Interview with Robert E. Rousselot, conducted by Prof. William Leary on 10 August 1987, written resume, in: UTD/Leary/B43F4. 12 CAT Operations Division, Monthly Report, January 1954, pp.2+8, in: UTD/Leary/B21F1. 13 CAT Operations Division, Monthly Report, February 1954, p.11, in: UTD/Leary/B21F1. 14 Tachikawa Station Monthly Report for January 56, p.2, in: UTD/Leary/B21F1. 15 Leary, Manuscript, pp.324-31 + 376a, in: UTD/Leary/B19F2. 16 On 19 April 56, several servicemen of US Army’s First Composite Service Unit (FCSU) received the “Soldier’s Medal” because of their heroic action at Bucknerville, Okinawa when a USAF aircraft had crashed there on 28 April 1955 (See Department of the Army, General Order no.14, at: http://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/pdf/go5614.pdf). 17 “The name “Camp Chinen” was used only informally. From 1951 to 1957, the base’s official name was the First Composite Service Unit (FCSU). In 1957 it was re-designated the US Army Composite Service Group (USACSG or simply (CSG). It retained that designation until it closed in August 1972. […] Chinen was forced to close by July 31, 1972” (Info kindly supplied on 19 April 2014 by someone who lived at Camp Chinen in the sixties and early seventies). 2 replaced by a new one – contract no. DA-92-321 FEC 414, also with the US Army’s First Composite Service Unit (FCSU) –, and CAT Inc was requested “to establish scheduled flights.” Indeed, in July 56, CAT flew 207:14 hours, in August 170:31 hours.18 Since November 56, CAT’s Tachikawa Station Monthly Report was no longer sent to the Company’s President at Taipei, but to CAT’s official “Executive Field Office” at Kadena.19 The reason for upgrading CAT’s station at Kadena to become the “Executive Field Office” in 1956 seems to have been double: After the reorganization of the CAT-complex in 1955, CAT Inc – the American company that flew the missions for the US Government – was to be based outside Taiwan; but while Tachikawa had been at the heart of the USAF’s Booklift operations during the Korean War, after the war the center of CIA activities in the Far East shifted from Atsugi NAS in Japan to Okinawa. This was also true for the activities of CAT Inc, so that when CAT Inc was to be renamed in 1958, one of the proposals was to call it the “Okinawa Corporation” as to show that the center of its activities was in Okinawa.20 The other reason also had to do with the reorganization of the CAT-complex: While the US company CAT Inc could fly to Okinawa under a section of the US Administrative Act, after the reorganization, the airline CAT had become a Chinese company and so had to file an application for a foreign air carrier permit under the US Civil Aeronautics Act in order to receive landing rights on Okinawa. This had to be done by an amendment to the Sino- American Bilateral Agreement. But Northwest Airlines’ President Donald Nyrop, who considered this to be an unfair competition as CAT was US Government-owned, threatened to reveal CAT’s real ownership. As the CIA did not want to lose its cover, CAT tried to make arrangements with Northwest, but without much success. So a CAT Inc “Executive Field Office” on Okinawa may also have had the purpose to help open certain doors for the airline. Anyway, CAT continued the application for flying rights into Okinawa,21 and – of course – continued to have its real “Executive Field Office” at Taipei, where Air Asia personnel, under the Services Contract, managed the airline CAT and CAT Incorporated.22 In July 57, CAT’s new contract was no longer with the subordinate US Army’s First Composite Service Unit (FCSU), but with the higher US Army’s Composite Service Group (CSG).23 The US Army’s Composite Service Group (CSG) was based at Camp Chinen on Okinawa,24 and that was exactly the place, where the CIA had their main support base: As General Lansdale puts it:

“CIA: 1). Okinawa-Support Base Okinawa Station is in itself a paramilitary support asset and, in critical situations calling for extensive support of UW [= unconventional warfare] activity in the Far East, could be devoted in its entirety to this mission. Located at Camp Chinen, it comprises a self-contained base under Army cover with facilities of all types necessary to the storage, testing, packaging, procurement and delivery of supplies-ranging from weapons and explosives to medical and clothing. Because of its being a controlled area, it can accommodate admirably the holding of black bodies in singletons or small groups, as well as small groups of trainees....”25

18 CAT Inc. Tachikawa Station Monthly Reports for July and August 56, in: UTD/Leary/B21F1. 19 CAT Inc. Tachikawa Station Monthly Report for November 56, in: UTD/Leary/B21F1. 20 Leary, Manuscript, p.389, in: UTD/Leary/B19F2. 21 Leary, Manuscript, p.331, in: UTD/Leary/B19F2. 22 See my files Company Management I and Company Management II within this e-book. 23 CAT Inc. Tachikawa Station Monthly Report for July 57, in: UTD/Leary/B21F1. 24 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Forces_Japan . 25 Memorandum (July 1961) from Brig. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale, Pentagon expert on guerrilla warfare, to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, President Kennedy’s military adviser, on Resources for Unconventional Warfare, SE. Asia, excerpts at: https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon2/doc100.htm . 3

Indeed, CSG was nothing else but the cover for this CIA base.26 This was the CIA’s main logistics base in East Asia,27 code-named ZRBLUSH.28 Effective October 57, a new flight schedule was established for CAT’s flights for the CIA, and under the new schedule, the aircraft were not to come to Tachikawa any longer.29 So the flights operated by CAT Inc and later by Air America under this contract with the CSG, Okinawa, were no longer dealt with in the Company’s Tachikawa Station Monthly Reports. In the late fifties, CAT’s US-registered C-54 N2168 was assigned to the CSG and based at Okinawa. Under the CSG-contract, CAT’s C-54 N2168 performed logistical support and moved personnel from CIA units in Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Okinawa, the , Saipan, South Vietnam and other South East Asian countries on a scheduled and emergency basis. Also under this contract, a CAT C-46 provided parachute training on Saipan.30 On the Japan-Okinawa-Iwakuni- route, CAT had to use a navigator.31 Kadena, Okinawa, home of Detachment 2, 1045th Operational Evaluation & Training Group, reporting directly to CIA headquarters,32 was also the place where the surviving CIA B-26s that had returned from Indonesia to Tainan in May 58, were ferried in the summer months of 1958 and where they received new fake serials: On 31 July 58, Connie Seigrist ferried an unknown B-26 from Tainan to Kadena, on 12 August 58 he ferried B-26A “3522” (believed to be 44-35221), and on 23 August 58 it was B-26 “3524” (believed to be 44- 35242). At least some of the first four B-26s to arrive at Tainan in 1959 – that is “8264”, “8765”, “8248”, and “8188”33 – were survivors from Indonesia that had received new serials at Kadena, Okinawa. Probably as early as 1959, Kadena Station became the official “Air America Inc., Field Executive Office, Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, APO U.S. Forces 96239”. That is also the address, where, from November 1967 to the end of 1972, the Air America Log was officially published (later officially at Bangkok), although from the Flight Operations Circular of 1 April 73, we know that the Company’s DPRA (Director of Public Relations Advertising) had his office at Taipei.34 That is what the editor – George L. Christian III – admits himself in a later issue of the Air America Log.35 Probably for the same reason, Kadena Station never appeared in the lists “Distribution” of the Flight Operations Circulars. But this was only a fake for political reasons, as the President and his staff had their offices at Taipei all the time. To hide this, traditionally, only the locations of the Base Managers, Station Managers, and

26 In a review to the book by Antonio J. Mendez: The Master of Disguise: My Secret Life in the CIA, a former CIA man who called himself “A customer” notes: “I probably would not have even bothered reading this book except for one minor issue: I know Mr. Mendez personally. As a teenager, he and his family lived on a small Army-type facility in Okinawa from 1968-1971 called the Army Composite Service Group. I assure you, there was nothing ‘Army’ about it. It was all CIA and they were conducting operations all over Southeast Asia” (http://www.amazon.ca/product-reviews/156740491X). 27 It seems that the families of CIA men who were on TDY somewhere else in the Far East, also stayed here: That is what CIA man Antonio J. Mendez (The Master of Disguise) reports about his family: “We would be living in military-style housing at a secret Agency base on Okinawa, supporting clandestine operations over a broad area” (p.76). “Back at the base, my family and I lived within the military cocoon: We shopped at the commissary and PX. Milk was pasteurized, and the children ate fast food at the base club. Karen and I played golf on weekends” (pp.78/9). 28 See Leary, “Secret mission to Tibet”, p.69. The first 2 letters indicate country, for example CY stands for Laos and MA for Thailand (James N. Glerum, Interview conducted on 30 October 95 at Watkinsville, GA by Prof. William Leary, in: UTD/Leary/B45F8). 29 CAT Inc. Tachikawa Station Monthly Report for October 57, in: UTD/Leary/B21F1. 30 Leary, Manuscript, p.290, in: UTD/Leary/B19F3. 31 Leary, Manuscript, p.290, in: UTD/Leary/B19F2. 32 Trest, Air Commando One, pp.81-83. 33 E-mail dated 25 January 2008, kindly sent to the author by Steve Seigrist. 34 List “Distribution”, in: Flight Operations Circular of 1 April 73, in: UTD/Kaufman/B1F14. 35 George L. Christian III, Editorial, in: Air America Log, vol. VII, no.9, 1973, p.8. 4

Operations Managers were perceptible by their denomination as, for example BMBKK.36 The Flight Operations Circular of 1 April 73 is the first known Air America circular of that type that lists all addressees by location.37 There were probably at least 2 reasons for this fake: It may have been difficult for a Taiwan-based company to fly missions for the USAF, but it was not for an “airline” whose headquarters was on a USAF Air Base. It may also have been problematic for the Government of the Republic of China to lodge an “airline” that was called Air America, so was visibly not Chinese, and was – moreover – rumored to be owned by the CIA. Between 1959 and 1962, Air America’s missions to support the Tibetans originated at Kadena, Okinawa.38 It was probably on the Pacific island of Saipan and at Yomitan on Okinawa rather than at Camp Chinen that the Tibetans received parachute training in the late fifties and early sixties. At Camp Chinen, there were “three ‘safe-houses’ where, on occasion, foreign nationals could be housed and receive specialized training.”39 But “no para-military training went on there. […] The base was simply not set up for that sort of thing. Certainly no parachute training took place, as it would have been much too dangerous (because of the terrain) and too conspicuous. […] Some [Tibetans] were indeed brought to Okinawa for jump training, but I believe that was done at Yomitan which always served as the primary jump- training area for 1st Special Forces. […] The same might be true for weapons training. We had a small, rather informal firing range (i.e., no butts or firing points), but it seems that it was used primarily for weapons- and ordinance-testing. […] Relating to the subject of training, it was an important part of TSD’s mandate to train agents (or their case officers) in basic trade- craft, especially photography, communications taps, secure communications, etc. But most of this was done on a TDY basis, with Chinen staff travelling to the location of need. Chinen TSD people traveled a lot.”40 At that time, Air America continued to have a contract with the US Army CSG, i.e. the CIA, on Okinawa: For example, in a contract list dated 1 November 63 that Air America’s President Hugh Grundy sent to the FAA, we read: “Contractor: Headquarters U.S. Army Composite Service Group, Ryukyu Islands. Nature and Scope [of the contract]: Furnishing, within the capabilities of Air America, Inc., flying services, on a call basis, of up to five C-46 aircraft to be made available at Tainan Air Base, Tainan, Taiwan and DC-4, DC-6, De Havilland DHC-4A, Dornier Do-28A, C-45, and Helio Courier aircraft to be made available at the location of the aircraft when requested and additional flight crew personnel. Date: 31 Aug. 61. Duration: 1 July 61 – 30 June 64.”41 For many years, contracts with the CSG at Kadena were for flying services on a call basis. Two of these contracts are preserved at the Air America Archives at Dallas: Contract no. DAJB09-68-C-0077 between Air America Inc and Headquarters U.S. Army Composite Service Group, Ryukyu Islands, was effective 1 July 67 and expired on 30 June 1970. Contractor aircraft subject to call under this contract were nearly all types of aircraft in Air America’s fleet – DC-6, DC-4, C-46, C-47, DHC-4A, Volpar, C-45/Ten Two, Do-28, PA-23, PC-6, H-395, Bell 205, and Bell 204. Modifications, maintenance and supply support were delegated to Air Asia at Tainan, and the point of origin was to be Tainan. On 27 May 69, Air America asked for negotiating new prices for the period 1 July 69 to 30 June 70.42 The follow-on contract between Air America Inc and Headquarters U.S. Army Composite Service Group, Ryukyu Islands, – contract no. DAJB09-70-C-9100 –

36 See, for example, the “Distribution” in Flight Operations Circular of 15 July 71, p.1, in: UTD/Hickler/B8F7B. 37 See “Distribution”, in: The Flight Operations Circular of 1 April 73, p.1, in: UTD/Kaufman/B1F14. 38 See my file Missions to Tibet. 39 Info kindly supplied on 19 April 2014 by someone who lived at Camp Chinen in the sixties and early seven- ties. 40 Info kindly supplied on 4 June 2014 by someone who lived at Camp Chinen in the sixties and early seventies. 41 Letter dated 1 November 63 sent by Hugh Grundy to the FAA, in: UTD/Bisson/B5/microfilm reel no.2. 42 Contract no. DAJB09-68-C-0077 and related documents, in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no.25. 5 was effective 1 July 70 and was extended for another year on 1 July 71. Again, modifications, maintenance and supply support were delegated to Air Asia at Tainan, and the point of origin was another time Tainan. However, this time a paragraph about Hazardous Flight Time was

CSG contract no. DAJB09-70-C-9100, Supplemental Agreement no. P00001 of 1 July 70 (in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel 25) added, i.e. “flight time over areas in which active combat operations are in progress or over areas controlled or occupied by unfriendly forces”; and the list of aircraft types subject to call under this contract is smaller: DC-6, DC-4, C-46, C-47, DHC-4A, Volpar, PC-6, and Bell 204B, as Air America’s C-45s, Dorniers, Apache, and Helios had already been put out of service.43 While probably many of Air America’s flights operated under this contract were the traditional CIA resupply routes to Atsugi NAS, Kadena, Saipan, and Guam, the addition of the paragraph about Hazardous Flight Time indicates that this time, CIA flights to the war areas of Laos and South Vietnam were also included. Indeed, there was a very important mission that these Air America flights out of Kadena had for many years: the delivery of special, i.e. sanitized equipment: “Special multi-year contracts with Civil Air Transport (CAT) and its post-1959 successor, Air America, […] enabled logistics officers to deliver many tons of equipment from Camp Chinen to locations anywhere in S.E. Asia.”44 There were several warehouses at Camp Chinen, and “each warehouse contained a carefully-managed supply of equipment that might be needed for clandestine operations, including weapons of every sort and origin (including suppressed weapons), ammunition, clothing, rucksacks, specialized communications equipment, food,

43 Contract no. DAJB09-70-C-9100 and related documents, in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no.25. 44 Info kindly supplied on 19 April 2014 by someone who lived at Camp Chinen in the sixties and early seven- ties. 6

Map of Camp Chinen’s Lower Base showing the warehouses in the east (kindly supplied on 4 June 2014 by a former resident of Camp Chinen) and medicine. In addition, one could find a variety of rubber and solid-hull boats whose outboard engines had been specially modified to run silently. […] All the gear packaged and delivered to the field via Camp Chinen was ‘sanitized’ so that that its provenance could not be traced to the American government.”45 “One warehouse (Number Nine) served as a paraloft, where the staff inspected, repaired, modified, and packed parachutes used in aerial drops. Given the magnitude of the Agency’s ‘Secret War’ in Laos alone, the paraloft staff faced a considerable workload. The riggers were Okinawans, trained and supervised by CIA specialists.”46 Indeed, “After the US military took over covert paramilitary operations in Vietnam from the CIA in Operation Switchback (OP 34A) in 1964, Camp Chinen took on the responsibility of supplying the highly secret Studies and Observation Group (SOG) with sanitized clothing and gear, undetectable wiretapping devices, and untraceable weapons such as Swedish K machine guns, CAR-15s, and High Standard HD suppressed pistols.”47 Probably in 1963 or 1964, a similar contract – contract no. AF49(604)-4194 – was signed between Southern Air Transport and the USAF’s Logistical Support Group (LSG), expiring

45 Toward this end, they worked closely with the US Army’s Counter Insurgency Support Office (CISO) which was located north of Naha at Machinato on the western side of the island. CISO procured all of the clothing, rations and personal gear needed for SOG operations in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. 46 Toward this end, they worked closely with the US Army’s Counter Insurgency Support Office (CISO) which was located north of Naha at Machinato on the western side of the island. CISO procured all of the clothing, rations and personal gear needed for SOG operations in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. 47 Info kindly supplied on 19 April 2014 by someone who lived at Camp Chinen in the sixties and early seven- ties. 7 on 30 June 65,48 and being replaced by contract no. AF49(604)-4379 probably on 1 July 65, probably expiring on 30 June 69.49 As to the aircraft flown under this contract, in 1965 we have the 4 Air America-owned DC-6As – N90771, N90781, N90782, and N90784 – operated out of Tachikawa, in 1966 we have these 4 Tachikawa-based DC-6As plus 2 Taipei-based C- 54s – B-1012 and B-1014 –, but in May 68, only DC-6A N90782 is left under this Southern Air Transport contract with the LSG, and now this aircraft was based at Kadena in a cargo configuration.50 Apparently, this was the CIA’s contract for “black” long-range flights originating in the Far East, mostly at Kadena, as the aircraft that flew the Tibetan support missions to “Oak Tree”, i.e. Charbatia Air Base in Eastern India, were operated under this SAT-contract.51 And the supplies these aircraft delivered to India came from Camp Chinen via Kadena Air Base. From November 1967 to the end of 1972, the Air America Log was published at Kadena, Okinawa, and most of the time, the publisher’s official address was given as “Air America Inc, Field Executive Office, Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, APO U.S. Forces 96239”. In the fall of 68, Air America was “erecting a new building at its Kadena, Okinawa base. The all- reinforced concrete structure is being built by Westpac, Incorporated, who use time-saving, demountable steel tube scaffolding to support the upper floor of the building as the concrete is poured. The building’s ground breaking ceremony, duly attended by a Shinto priest, took place last February; it will be completed shortly.”52 But “Chinen was forced to close by July 31, 1972 […] Although the CIA vacated Camp Chinen, the base itself did not dissolve immediately. Instead it came under the control of the US Army’s 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) who used it as a training base and as a language school. An additional function, however, was to continue providing logistical support for the CIA’s on-going operations in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Thus, the Okinawans who had worked in the Agency’s logistics unit were simply placed under the authority of the Special Forces Group. By 1974, however, the wars in Vietnam and Laos were ending, so the US Army left Camp Chinen.”53 And there was no longer any need for Air America flights to Kadena.

2) US Army maintenance Already in June 63, Air America felt that there was a possibility of a 30,000 man-hour contract from the U.S. Army for light plane maintenance at Hamby Army Air Field, Okinawa.54 On 10 September 63, it was reported that “although no contract has been signed, it appears that Air America will be awarded the maintenance contract at Hamby Air Base, Okinawa. The contract is for the provision of maintenance requiring the services of approximately fifteen persons for a one year term. Although the contract is small, it will put Air America in business on Okinawa servicing local requirements and is a desirable expansion of its other operations at that location.”55 And the contract arrived: For Fiscal Years

48 “Aircraft Status” as of 7 July 64, in: UTD/Kirkpatrick/B1F7. 49 Contract no. AF49(604)-4379 is mentioned in Air America’s fleet lists of 1 November 65 (in: UTD/Kirk- patrick/B1F1), 4 May 66 (in: UTD/Hickler/B1F2), and 1 May 68 (in: UTD/Herd/B2), but not in the list of 15 August 69 (in: UTD/Hickler/B1F1). 50 Contract no. AF49(604)-4379 between SAT and the LSG is mentioned for the first time in Air America’s fleet list called “Revised Status of Aircraft” as of 1 November 65, in: UTD/Kirkpatrick/B1F1. 51 For details, see my file: Missions to Tibet. 52 (Anonymous), “Kadena Kaleidoscope”, in: Air America Log, vol. II, no.5, 1968, p.7. 53 Info kindly supplied on 19 April 2014 by someone who lived at Camp Chinen in the sixties and early seven- ties. 54 Minutes of Meeting of Executive Committee of Air America, Inc of 11 June 63, p.3, in: UTD/CIA/B3F4. 55 Minutes of Meeting of Executive Committees of Air Asia Company Limited and Air America, Inc of 10 September 63, p.3, in: UTD/CIA/B7F2. 8

1964 and 1965, it was contract no. DA-92-321-FEC-2141, and for Fiscal Year 1966, it was contract no. DAJB09-66-C-0001.56

3) Ground handling Most contracts that Air America had with other airlines were ground handling contracts for certain airports in South East Asia. For many airlines, ground handling was done at Kadena Air Base, Okinawa or at Clark Air Base near Manila. Most of the airlines served in this way made charter flights for the US Military during the war in Vietnam, transporting military personnel or their dependents or military cargo to Southeast Asia or bringing servicemen home to the United States. Contracts of this type existed between Air America/CATCL and Airlift International, Alaska Airlines, Braniff International Airways, Capitol Airlines, The , International Airlines, Northwest Orient Airlines, Overseas National Airlines, Pan American World Airways, Saturn Airlines, Slick Airways, Southern Air Transport, Southwest Airlines, Standard Airways, Trans Caribbean Airways, Trans World Airlines, Trans International Airlines, United Air Lines, World Airways, and Universal Airlines. Similar contracts also existed with Japan Air Lines at certain airports in Japan on a call basis.57 In August 69, for example, Air America Kadena handled 4 Braniff flights, 23 Northwest flights, 3 Pan American flights, 32 Southern AT flights, 50 Flying Tiger flights, 1 Trans International flight, 60 Trans World flights, and 90 United Air Lines flights.58

Two pictures of Air America’s Kadena Base taken in 1972 (Air America Log, vol. VII, no. 2, 1973, p.6)

The Air America documentary Flying Men, Flying Machines shows very well what Air America ground handling meant: As Robert J. Aubry, Air America’s Station Manager at Kadena, Okinawa, points out, Air America ground handled some 225 commercial airliners per month at that time, that is in 1970/71, and these aircraft operated under contracts that airlines like The Flying Tiger Line, Seaboard World Airlines, Trans World Airlines or United Air Lines had with the .59 In the same documentary, Col. Hugh L. Baynes, Commanding Officer of the 603rd Military Support Squadron, Kadena at that time,

56 List of Air Asia Maintenance Contracts for 1964-66, in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no. 28. 57 All of these contracts are available at UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no.31. 58 Flight Operations Monthly Report for August 69, formerly in: UTD/Leary/Ser.I/B4F1, now UTD/Leary/ B33F4? 59 R.J. Aubry, in: Flying Men, Flying Machines, at 60 minutes. 9 adds that Air America ground handled the majority of commercial aircraft arriving and departing Kadena. This not only meant having all arriving passengers leave the aircraft and completely offloading all their baggage, ground handling the passengers and their baggage during the 1-2 hours ground time they had at Kadena, and helping them re-board their aircraft and loading all bags onto the aircraft. For in the meantime, Air America personnel also had to clean and straighten up the cabin, that is put new blankets in the overhead bins or prepare the seat belts.60

Air America ground handling contract airliners that had brought military passengers to Kadena in 1970 – assisting the passengers and cleaning the cabin (Air America documentary Flying men, flying machines, at 59 minutes)

Air America’s Kadena Base was officially closed on 31 December 1972.61 But already on 20 November 72, Air America’s Station Manager Robert J. Aubry could report: “An end to an era came on 15 November 1972 at 1600L hours when this station ground handled its last MAC flight, a Seaboard World DC-8 cargo mission from Kadena direct to Travis AFB. Contrary to some beliefs there were no shouts of joy but a completely dejected group of hard workers who could only shake their heads in disbelief that Air America after 22 years on Okinawa was now a non-existent organization on Kadena AFB. A really sad and heartbreak- ing sight to behold. […] Effective 15 November 1972 at 0900L hours direct Company communications between Yokota/Kadena was discontinued.”62 On 29 December 72, the Station Manager reported that “all Third Country Nationals and Indigenous employees at Kadena have requested that this office convey to the Management their sincere appreciation for the liberal termination benefits granted to all. […] The 33rd Air Sea Rescue Squadron now occupies the entire facility with the exception of two (2) AAM offices on the second floor and a small area on the ground floor used for packing and crating of Company property items.”63 On 26 January 73, Robert J. Aubry talked about problems he had had to sell the property on

60 Col. Hugh L. Baynes, in: Flying Men, Flying Machines, at 60/61 minutes. 61 See photos in: Air America Log, vol. VII, no. 2, 1973, p.6. 62 Kadena Station Weekly Progress Report of 20 November 72, in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no.6. 63 Kadena Station Weekly Progress Report of 29 December 72, in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no.6. 10

Kadena Station Weekly Progress Reports of 20 November 72 and 29 December 72 (in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no. 6) which the Company house sits.64 And in his last report dated 9 February 73, the former station Manager described the problems he had with Japanese Customs to have the Company’s Hi- Lift Van shipped to Vientiane.65 Air America’s Station at Kadena closed business on 15 February 1973.66

64 Kadena Station Weekly Progress Report of 26 January 73, in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no.6. 65 Kadena Station Weekly Progress Report of 9 February 73, in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no.5. 66 Memo “Close Out of Air America Kadena Station” dated 2 March 73, in: UTD/CIA/B31F2. 11

II) Clark Air Force Base

Shortly after CAT had opened scheduled airline services to Manila in December 1949,67 there were 2 airports in the Philippines that were served by CAT. The other one was Clark Air Base close to Manila, used for all sorts of covert missions. “Al Kindt, as Manager in Manila, looked after the Philippines. That included coordinating with Clark Air Force Base where the often prepared aircraft for operations to be performed by CAT.”68

1) Special operations: Since the early fifties, Clark Air Base served as starting point for a lot of special operations: “All Paper flights were considered ‘secure’ or ‘black’ and thus were routed through Clark Air Force Base and parked at the extreme southern end of the airstrip.”69 CAT’s Icebox missions to Indonesia in 1951-52 had Clark as the station where the PBY-5A retreated before returning to Taiwan. In April 53, the CAT pilots of Operation Squaw I were trained at Clark. In mid-April 1954, the 816th Troop Carrier Squadron of the 483rd Wing moved to Clark with fifteen C-119s, tasked to make six round trips daily to Indochina in support of operation Squaw II. Clark was also the staging point for CAT’s support to the Indonesian rebels in 1958.70 And in 1957 and 1958, CAT’s first missions to support the Tibetans originated also at Clark Air Base.71 Although the CIA operated a counter-guerilla school at Fort McKinley close to Manila – The Security Training Center (STC)72 –, there seems to have been no direct support by CAT: No CAT or Air America aircraft that could have supported such an operation was ever stationed at Manila – unless Air America’s flights to Clark AB also supported this school. One exception is known: On 14 and 15 June 51, CAT pilot “Doc” Johnson flew C-47s B-815 and B-817 on local flights out of Manila that lasted only about an hour. As CAT did not operate any local flights out of Manila, these flights may have been support flights for The Security Training Center (STC). Johnson then brought B-815 back to Taipei.

(Page from “Doc” Johnson’s log book kindly supplied by his son James on 14 February 2013)

67 Arthur Fung, “Bizz Buzz”, in: CAT Bulletin, vol. III, no.4, 15 January 50, p.8. CAT C-46 XT-828 inaugurated the service to Manila on 27 December 49 (South China Morning Post of 28 December 49, clipping in: Whiting Willauer Papers, Box 5: Public Policy Papers, Dept. of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library). 68 Rosbert, The pictorial History of Civil Air Transport, p.177. 69 Letter dated 3 June 1981, sent by E.C. Kirkpatrick to William Leary, in: UTD/Kirkpatrick/B1F8. 70 See my file Working in Remote Countries: CAT in New Zealand, Thailand-Burma, French Indochina, Guatemala, and Indonesia. 71 See my file Missions to Tibet. 72 “The Security Training Center (STC). This is a counter-subversion, counter-guerrilla and psychological warfare school overtly operated by the Philippine Government and covertly sponsored by the U.S. Government through CIA as the instrument of the Country Team. It is located at Fort McKinley on the outskirts of Manila. Its stated mission is: ‘To counter the forces of subversion in Southeast Asia through more adequate training of security personnel, greater cooperation, better understanding and maximum initiative among the countries of the area.’ The training capability of the STC includes a staff of approximately 12 instructors in the subjects of unconventional and counter-guerrilla warfare.....” (Memorandum [July 1961] from Brig. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale, Pentagon expert on guerrilla warfare, to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, on Resources for Unconventional Warfare, SE. Asia, excerpts at: https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon2/doc100.htm) 12

2) Flights over Mainland China apparently resumed in the late fifties In the late fifties, overflights over Mainland China were resumed – apparently using the 2 USAF C-118As that had belonged to the 581st Reproduction Squadron in the early fifties,73 as “all C-118s and C-54s74 (two each) were reserved for ‘special’ missions, some of which supported an agency beyond the operational purview of the US Air Force – the CIA.”75 In 1959, the unit became Detachment 2, 1045th Operational Evaluation & Training Group (OE&TG) at the end,76 but, as Michael Haas puts it, “prior to 1959, Detachment 2’s largest aircraft, a four-engined C-118 transport, had been frequently used for flights conducted by Civil Air Transport, a CIA proprietary airline operating throughout Asia. And CAT had indeed been busy during the earlier stages of the . According to the highest ranking USAF special operations officer at the time, Brig General Edward Lansdale, CAT had by 1959 completed numerous overflights over mainland China77 and Tibet.”78

An unknown CAT / Air America-flown C-118A at Kurmitola, East Pakistan, in 1958/9 (with kind permission from Ken Conboy)

Although Haas’ text then only speaks of CAT’s and Air America’s missions to Tibet,79 the CAT crews themselves do mention flights they made into China in USAF DC-6 (C-118A) aircraft. In an interview with Prof. Leary, CAT pilot Thomas C. Sailer said that he made a number of flights from Clark AFB into Central China in B-17 and DC-6. He recalled one drop of people north of Chungking. At least one Chinese agent made several trips – because of the pistol he carried he was known as “P-38”. According to Sailer, Bob Aubrey and Charlie Davenport made many of these flights.80 James McElroy, who, in 1957 was in charge of the Agency parachute loft and storekeeper for the FE airborne equipment stored in Okinawa and who in 1959 was charged with supporting all FE airborne operations in technical, training and material and was directly responsible to Headquarters’ Air Branch for these activities, also recalls that “the C-118 was used on non-STBARNUM drops” around 1958-60, i.e. on drops

73 Probably C-118As 51-3820 and 51-3822; see the DC-6 file within my The Aircraft of Air America. 74 That is of that unit. 75 Haas, Apollo’s Warriors, p.81. 76 See the file Missions to Tibet within my History of Air America. 77 Emphasis added. 78 Haas, Apollo’s Warriors, p.140. General Lansdale’s words of July 1961 were that CAT had made “more than 200 overflights of Mainland China and Tibet” (Memorandum from Brig. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale, Pentagon expert on guerrilla warfare, to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, President Kennedy’s military adviser, on Resources for Unconventional Warfare, SE. Asia, excerpts at: https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon2/doc100.htm). Evidently, this number includes overflights made during the Korean War and flights to Tibet, so the real number of overflights over Mainland China made after 1958 cannot be calculated from this quotation. 79 Haas, Apollo’s Warriors, pp.140-45. 80 Thomas C. Sailer, interview made with William M. Leary at San Francisco on 8 September 1985; professor Leary’s notes, preserved at UTD/Leary/B43F5. 13 that were not related to Tibet.81 Although much of the briefing and training was done on Okinawa, apparently at Kadena and Camp Chinen, the real starting point of these missions was Clark AFB, which was also the point that the spies dropped into northern China were to contact: Yue Zhengwu, the man from Taiwan who had been dropped on 13 February 1960 and survived, reports that he “launched a telecom espionage war with the Communist Army’s communications unit before talking to the commander of the communications station at Clark Base in the Philippines.”82 Jim Keck, a former CAT/Air America navigator who took part in several of those overflights, states that they used the same C-118s out of Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, that were also used in the Tibetan support program. C-118A 51-3822 (msn 43569) was the favorite aircraft of CAT / Air America navigator Jim Keck,83 until it was forced down over Armenia on 27 June 58.84 The aircraft returned to Okinawa only in January 60,85 when Air America did no longer use USAF C-118As. “Some of the trips into Mainland China were rather long. [...] In a DC-6, if we lost an engine back there it would mean exiting via a route towards the lower land of South East China. That thought was always spooky!”86 As navigator Jim Keck said, these Mainland China trips were completely separate from the Tibet operation. The program had a different case officer and the only things in common with the Tibet missions were the airplanes and the CAT crews.87 These flights started about 1958 and mostly delivered some Chinese passengers as well as some requested supplies that were all parachuted at the designated drop zone in Mainland China. Often, they were flown once a month during full moon, but sometimes, they were several months apart.88 Before the tenth or eleventh flight, probably in late 1958 or early 1959, the briefing at Okinawa was different announcing that the people who were to be inserted were very important to a new program that was about to take place. A box full of gold coins and the photos and addresses of some one hundred Chinese locals were also to be dropped. CAT navigator Jim Keck recalls the words that the case

81 James McElroy, Letter to Prof. William Leary dated 18 July 1997, formerly in: UTD/Leary/Ser. I, B12F1, now probably in UTD/Leary/B46F12. 82http://www.66cf.com.tw/desktopdefault.aspx?PortalId=1&panelid=4&tabid=24&mid=239&ArticleId=2710& mode=Select (text of the Google translator). 83 Jim Keck remembers to have flown in the C-118 that was forced down over Armenia in June 58: “We had a favorite plane that Det.2 always gave us. It had low time engines, good fuel economy, and carried very few ‘squawks’. It had many of the part numbers removed or modified so that it might not be traced if captured. There was a small metal frame (about 12 inches square) on the side of the body, near the rear door. We used to put different country’s flags into this frame as needed. Usually on an overflight we would be ‘bare’. [...] On that C- 118, our favorite, I taped up a pin-up girl from an issue of playboy, right next to my Nav. Station. As everyone left the cockpit after a mission, they would stop, say thanks and give her ‘pats’ on her butt. As I was always the last to leave I always gave her a special thanks and a thankful pat. The Air Force used these airplanes during the rest of the month, when we weren’t flying missions, on various other flights. Nobody ever miss handled ‘our gal’. One day and stormy night Det. 2 had a flight from Kadena to somewhere along the Turkey-Russian border. The weather was poor. And a fake Russian radio station put out a really strong signal. They believe that’s what happened. Anyway they crashed and I think our little pin up is on the wall of some dirt shack, high in the Russian Mountains” (Letter dated 10 July 2001, written by Jim Keck to the author). As the crews were never allowed to log any flight time for these flights nor to make any photos, there are no written records about the aircraft used, as Jim Keck points out. However the fact that their favorite C-118 went down in Russia allows to identify this particular aircraft: The USAF C-118 that was forced down by Russian fighters over Armenia on 27 June 58 was 51-3822 (msn 43569) (Eastwood / Roach, Piston Engine Airliner Production List, p.336). It returned to Okinawa only in January 60 (Interview conducted by Prof. William Leary with Lawrence Ropka at Ft Walton Beach, FL, on 29-30 August 1990, transcript preserved at: UTD/Leary/B43F4), when Air America did no longer use USAF C-118As. 84 Eastwood/Roach, Piston Engine Airliner Production List, p. 336. 85 Interview conducted by Prof. William Leary with Lawrence Ropka at Ft Walton Beach, FL, on 29-30 August 1990, transcript preserved at: UTD/Leary/B43F4. 86 Letter dated 10 July 2001, written by Jim Keck to the author. 87 E-mail dated 29 January 2002, sent by Jim Keck to the author. 88 E-mail dated 12 February 2002, sent by Jim Keck to the author. 14 officer pronounced on this occasion: “These cards and money will help our agents to establish a second front in Mainland China! The big picture is, this front will grow and move toward the coast line, changing all of China into a free nation!”89 The trip inbound was as smooth as could be expected, and the drop zone was hit about four minutes ahead of schedule. The drop altitude was near 1,200 to 800 feet,90 but the third Chinese to leave the plane jumped out some seconds too late. The flight back was uneventful, but two weeks later the CAT crew was told that none of the three passengers or the important box was ever found by the agents they were destined for. The overflights were stopped for three months, and in 1959, they were resumed with C-130As. Two years later, reports said that the money and the cards had been handed over to the Chinese government.91 A.L. Judkins “recalls numerous overflights of China and Tibet. He started out on the DC-6. He remembers one flight from Takhli with Bill Welk; they flew 17 hours in the unpressurized aircraft on a mission to the vicinity of Koka Nor.”92 Pete Peterson made one trip into Northern China with Welk and Johnson in the DC-6 – apparently around 1960.93 This may explain an oddity in “Doc” Johnson’s log book: On 18 April 59, “Doc” Johnson flew a C-130 from Kadena to Clark (3.4 hours), then apparently remained at Clark for several days, and took another or the same C-130 back from Clark to Kadena on 23 April 59. This makes believe that between 19 and 22 April 59, another Air America crew flew the C-130 into Tibet and was later released on the return flight from Clark by “Doc” Johnson.94 It can only be guessed what “Doc” Johnson did at Clark Air Base from 19 to 22 April 59, which is not exactly the ideal place for recreation – perhaps he was on a flight to China that he wasn’t allowed to log. For those flights into China apparently used the USAF’s special mission C-118As out of Clark Air Base.

The training mission to Clark on 18 and 23 April 59 (Page from Doc Johnson’s log book kindly supplied by his son James on 18 February 2013)

PDO Miles L. Johnson recalls a flight in a C-130A: “On the trip with Andy and Pete we had one agent, I believe the mission was close to the Mongolian border. The DZ was on a very high plateau and the flight deck crew could see it from a long distance.”95 It is unknown, if these overflights were covered by any of the contracts mentioned above – contract no. DAJB09-70-C-9100 with the CSG or contract no. AF49(604)-4379 (SAT’s contract no. with

89 Chapter 4 of Jim Keck’s forthcoming autobiography, pp.8-13, quoted from the manuscript kindly supplied to the author by Jim Keck and published here with his kind permission. 90 “What we did do was this: Using my radar altimeter (which would read out the exact absolute altitude in feet) I would find a fairly level terrain in-between the IP and the DZ that showed the ground elevation and add the absolute altitude to it. The pilots would then set this on their altimeters” (E-mail dated 13 June 2002, sent by Jim Keck to the author). 91 Chapter 4 of Jim Keck’s forthcoming autobiography, pp.13-25, quoted from the manuscript kindly supplied to the author by Jim Keck and published here with his kind permission. 92 Interview with A. L. Judkins conducted by Prof. William Leary on 9 September 85, written resume, at: UTD/Leary/B43F3. 93 Telephone interview with Miles L. Johnson conducted by Prof. William Leary on 18 July 1991, written version, at: UTD/Leary/B43F3. 94 Page from Doc Johnson’s log book kindly supplied by his son James on 18 February 2013. 95 Letter dated 17 January 1992, sent by Miles L. Johnson to Prof. William Leary, in: UTD/Leary/B69F11. 15 the Logistical Support Group) –, but probably this was not the case, because, as it seems, the aircraft involved were USAF C-118As from Okinawa. The flights probably stopped in the early 1960ies, together with the flights to Tibet. The purpose of all of these flights can only be guessed: Of course, the words of the case officer quoted above make believe that he hoped to help creating, among the ethnic minorities living in the northwestern provinces of China (Qinghai or Xinjiang) like Uyghurs, Kazakcs, Kyrgyz, Tibetans or Mongols, some sort of insurrection against the central government – and this sounds like a patriotic dream of the late 1940ies kept alive for many years by the government of Chiang Kai-shek. But this was probably only a concession to the propaganda of Chiang Kai-shek and his government. It is more likely that at a time when spy satellites did not yet exist or gave only unprecise pictures, the real purpose of these flights was to drop spies that could locate the installations of China’s nuclear program and perhaps could also sabotage that program. “Kennedy and his national security advisor, McGeorge Bundy, had already discussed the possibility of sabotaging China’s nuclear program […]. One problem was U.S. Intelligence could not yet identify the Chicom nuclear facilities with confidence. Indeed, the PRC’s plutonium facility was not at Baotou. It was later discovered to be at Yumen.”96 This is confirmed by a recent article by Yue Zhengwu (岳正武),97 former Major of the National Security Bureau of Taiwan and leader of the CIA’s Blue Bell Flower Group (藍鐘花組) of Taiwan. According to the Google translation, this article begins with the words: “The main task of the US CIA training Taiwan’s Blue Bell Flower Team is to collect information on the co-development of atomic bombs.” When the US learnt that Communist China was developing nuclear weapons, they decided to “send intelligence agents to collect and destroy the CCP’s atomic reactor and other equipment.” After very good results in his military career, Yue Zhengwu joined the “Sino-US Joint Intelligence Center” in the mid- fifties, and he was one of 4 candidates selected to receive special intelligence training in the US. Before leaving Taiwan, the 4 candidates were trained at the CIA station on Okinawa. “After staying there for a while, the four of them officially went to California […] The main thing to learn [there was] ‘CBR’”, that is chemical, biological, and radioactive weapons and what can be done against them. They studied CBR in California “mainly to investigate the CCP’s remote sparsely populated areas in the Northwest – Gansu, Qinghai, Tibet, and Xinjiang. What secret weapons are the CCP military developing there? To what extent is it developed? […] The four of them spent a total of eight months of work, accepting and completing a full set of arduous training courses for American intelligence personnel, and then returned to Okinawa in Ryukyu.” After the four men had returned from California, they taught others what they had learnt, Yue Zhengwu’s article continues. Small groups were formed that also included “three outstanding students. Among them, the Blue Bell Flower Group is led by Yue Zhengwu. They are ready to challenge impossible tasks every day! On February 13, 1960, after the Blue Bell Flower Group was airdropped to the Qingkang-Tibet Plateau, it began a series of entanglements with the Communist Army. Yue Zhengwu also launched a telecom espionage war with the Communist Army’s communications unit before talking to the commander of the communications station at Clark Base in the Philippines.”98 “After fighting for more than half a month in the mountainous area of Qinghai, some members of the team were killed on the spot and some comrades were arrested and surrendered. Start a guerrilla war that lasts more

96 Fu / Pocock, The Black Bats, p.82. 97http://www.66cf.com.tw/desktopdefault.aspx?PortalId=1&panelid=4&tabid=24&mid=239&ArticleId=2710& mode=Select (info sent to the author on 12 August 2021 by Ken Conboy); this article can be read via the Google translator. 98http://www.66cf.com.tw/desktopdefault.aspx?PortalId=1&panelid=4&tabid=24&mid=239&ArticleId=2710& mode=Select (text of the Google translator). 16 than seven months.” Yue Zhengwu started fleeing and then “got into a Tibetan tribe” who brought him into contact with Tibetan resistance fighters.99 Somehow, he later escaped. On 2 September 1958, CIA’s General Cabell briefed the Secretary of State on CHALICE, i.e. super-secret matters. One of them concerned the results of a mission to northern China: “General Cabell then stated that the first sortie approved for overflight of Communist China had been highly successful. […] General Cabell advised that the President had previously approved a second Chinese sortie to the North, but thus far weather had precluded its accomplishment.”100

Briefing of the Secretary of State, 2 September 1958 (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP63-00313A000600020004-0.pdf )

While the above document speaks about the success of the first sortie to China’s North, that is to the area of China’s nuclear activities – believed to refer to a C-118 flight, as the U-2 flights of Project Tackle covering Nuclear Energy Targets in Communist China began only in January 1962101 –, another document quoted below seems to recommend that this type of sorties should be repeated as a sideline to the Tibetan operation already existing in 1958. For on 30 October 1958, the U.S. Intelligence Board noted: “With respect to nuclear weapons development and production, there was considerable information, from which it was possible to reach fairly firm conclusions as to the extent of nuclear programs now in existence, and, in broad general terms, the present state of intentions of fourth countries. However, in many respects the available information did not permit confident judgments of the timing and extent of future programs, to the degree that we believe information could be obtained with a higher priority effort. […] In our judgment, it should be possible to increase the scale of appropriate operations to obtain fuller and more accurate information, and we believe that such information will become increasingly important.”102 “Intelligence on Communist Chinese

99http://www.66cf.com.tw/desktopdefault.aspx?PortalId=1&panelid=4&tabid=24&mid=239&ArticleId=2710& mode=Select (text of the Google translator). 100 Briefing of the Secretary of State at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP63- 00313A000600020004-0.pdf . 101 U-2 supplied data about Nuclear Energy Targets in China exists since January 1962 (see https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP92B01090R002600100003-6 ). In June 1962, 3 high- performance U-2s were used on all TACKLE missions, that is for flights over Communist China (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01676R001900120003-8) . 102 Post-Mortem on NIE 100-2-58: Development of Nuclear Capabilities by Forth Countries: Likelihood and Consequences, dated 1 July 1958, p.1, at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA- RDP79R00961A0010000600001-0.pdf 17 initiation of nuclear weapons programs (or the transfer of nuclear weapons from USSR to Communist China) falls clearly within the Second Priority Objectives under the Priority National Intelligence Objectives […], and has an important bearing on overall Communist Chinese strategy and intentions, a First Priority Objective.”103 Among the actions to be taken was the recommendation to review the problem with the Department of State, “with a view to stepping up operations within existing priorities.”104 That sounds like the recommendation to establish a sideline to the already existing Tibet program, and that is how the C-118 and C- 130 flights to northern China could indeed be characterized.

(https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79R00961A0010000600001-0.pdf )

103 Post-Mortem on NIE 100-2-58: Development of Nuclear Capabilities by Fourth Countries: Likelihood and Consequences, dated 1 July 1958, p.2, note, at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA- RDP79R00961A0010000600001-0.pdf 104 Post-Mortem on NIE 100-2-58: Development of Nuclear Capabilities by Fourth Countries: Likelihood and Consequences, dated 1 July 1958, p.3, at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA- RDP79R00961A0010000600001-0.pdf . Emphasis is mine. 18

As early as July 1959, the US Embassy at Taipei reported to the US Department of State that Chiang Kai-shek and his government thought that “while hard evidence is lacking, […] Soviets would logically have to supply ChiComs with rockets and nuclear weapons to cope with US nuclear capability in Pacific and missile installations (Nike Hercules and Matador) established on Taiwan. In any case he quoted an old Chinese proverb that ‘it is better to believe they exist (i.e., missiles on mainland) than to believe they do not exist.’”105 On 28 July 59, National Intelligence Estimate NIE 13-59 stated: “Communist China has probably initiated a nuclear weapons development program, but will almost certainly not have developed a nuclear weapons production capability of its own by 1963. […] There is no reliable evidence regarding the presence of nuclear weapons in China. We believe it highly unlikely that the Soviets have transferred nuclear weapons to Chinese Communist control.”106 On 22 June 1960, there was an interesting discussion at the meeting of the National Security Council: When the Vice President asked, “whether CIA could make any estimate as to when the Chinese Communists might acquire a nuclear capability”, CIA’s “Mr. McMahan said specialists were now reviewing this question.”107 This sounds like an indirect confirmation of the fact finding missions flown over northern China and the spy teams dropped there by USAF C-118s and C-130s at that time. In December 1960, the National Intelligence Estimates seem to present the results of this inquiry. “Communist China will probably have exploded a nuclear device during the period of this estimate and may have produced a small number of elementary nuclear weapons.”108 “3. The Chinese Communists have acquired a small but highly competent cadre of Western-trained Chinese nuclear specialists. Their nuclear research effort has expanded rapidly since the early 1950’s and more than twenty nuclear research facilities have been established at institutes and universities. In addition to the Soviet-supplied research reactor and cyclotron, there are a variety of cyclotrons and other accelerators, most of which are of Chinese manufacture. The Chinese have access, through the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research, to the large Soviet accelerators at Dubna. China’s share of the financial costs of the institute is 20 percent, a share exceeded only by that of the Soviet Union. We believe that the widespread Chinese training and research effort is coordinated to the needs of the military atomic energy program. The Chinese Communists are now capable of comprehending and exploiting the large body of open scientific literature in the nuclear sciences. However, the present shortage of trained scientists and engineers will probably persist throughout the period of this estimate. This shortage would hamper Chinese efforts to design, construct, and operate facilities for the production of fissionable materials and would be particularly serious, should the Soviets decide to reduce or terminate their technical aid. […] 9. On the basis of all available evidence, we now believe that the most probable date at which the Chinese Communists could detonate a first nuclear device is sometime in 1963, though it might be as late as 1964, or as early as 1962, depending upon the actual degree of Soviet assistance.”109 On 26 June 1961, a Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara predicted “that China would move as rapidly as possible to develop ballistic missiles”.110 On 5 September 1961, the US Government’s Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) decided that US satellites observing China should be employed for making reconnaissance photos of military installations rather than for photo-

105 Telegram from the US Embassy in the Republic of China, Taipei, to the Department of State, 13 July 1959, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v19/d287 . 106 NIE 13-59 of 28 July 1959 at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v19/d292 . 107 Memorandum of Discussion at the 448th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, 22 June 1960, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v19/d338 . 108 NIE 13-60 of 6 December 1960, § 5, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v19/d362 . 109 NIE 13-2-60 of 13 Dec. 1960, § 3+9, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v19/d364 . 110 Memorandum dated 26 June 1961, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense McNamara, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v22/d36 . 19 mapping photography: “2. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance has weighed the relative importance at this time of obtaining CORONA-reconnaissance photography versus ARGON photo-mapping photography. […] 3. All members of COMOR except the Army believe that, while recognizing the importance of obtaining photo mapping to aid in the improvement of geodetic control, it is of first importance that we use our assets to acquire data bearing upon missile deployment. The needs in this regard are accentuated by the current international crisis, and missile deployment information could be highly critical for policy- makers in the near future.”111

COMOR decision of 5 September 1961 (at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP75B00621R000100140001-1.pdf)

On 26 October 1961, the US Government’s Policy Planning Council proposed ways how to deal with a future nuclear power China. They included “(16) We should explore the feasibility of including Communist China in case of renewed negotiations for a nuclear test ban despite the likelihood that its response would be negative” or “(21) We should increase the non-nuclear military capabilities in the western Pacific area, including capabilities related to counter-guerrilla operations.”112 Today, we know that China’s first nuclear test took place at Lop Nor, northern China, on 16 October 1964.

111 Memorandum dated 5 September 1961 for the Chairman, US Intelligence Board, re Scheduling of CORONA and ARGON missions, at: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP75B00621R000100140001-1.pdf 112 Draft Paper dated 26 October 1961, prepared in the US Government’s Policy Planning Council, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v22/d76 . 20

So, the mysterious C-118 and then C-130 flights to northern China were missions meant to drop spy teams that were to find out more details about the development and progress made by Red China’s nuclear programs. But why was this done by US aircraft flown by US crews and not by RoCAF aircraft and RoCAF crews? First, probably because the Republic of China Air Force (RoCAF) did not have the aircraft that could transport spy teams that far north. On 14 December 1960, President Chiang Kai-shek sent a letter to President Eisenhower, saying “In particular, I wish you would authorize the delivery to us before you leave office [of] several long-range and large-capacity C-130s or other transport planes with similar capabilities.”113 Apparently, this was not approved by the White House, but on 12 January 1961, Eisenhower sent a telegram to the Embassy of the Republic of China at Washington, telling Chiang Kai-shek: “In this connection I am glad to tell you that, after careful consideration of your request for the delivery of several C-130 or other transport planes, I have authorized the delivery to your Government of one C-130B at this time. You will appreciate, I am sure, that in view of the large number of countries which look to the United States for military equipment, as well as the requirements of our own armed forces, it is difficult to make immediately available to your Government more than one of these aircraft. However, if in the light of your experience with this aircraft it should become apparent that another of the same type could be effectively utilized, I am confident that the United States Government would give serious consideration to a further request from you.”114 However, “the C-130B was not sent. A memorandum of January 24, 1962, from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense William P. Bundy to Secretary of Defense McNamara states that the Department of State had delayed action because of ‘certain reservations about the probable use to which the C-130 would be put’ and that arrangements were made to substitute a C-54, which was delivered on August 28.”115 This was probably the second reason, why the flights that dropped Taiwanese spies into northern China were carried out by USAF aircraft flown by American crews: Apparently, President Kennedy knew about Chiang’s ardent wish to go “back to the Mainland” and did not want to risk an overzealous action that might have caused an international crisis. The C-54 sent to Taiwan – former Agency C-54G 54002 msn 36030 ex 45-577 – did not have the range and the capacity to carry larger groups of commandos that far north into China. Furthermore, there were other ways to get more information about the Chinese nuclear program. Since December 1957, RoCAF P2V’s flew ELINT missions over mainland China for Project Goshawk. Since July 1960, US covert satellites also observed mainland China. And from January 1962 to the end of the 1960ies, U- 2 spy planes made long overflights of Mainland China (Project Tackle), since 1967 also out of Takhli in Thailand.116 A memo dated 27 July 62 sent by the US Government’s Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) to the Director of Central Intelligence, states : “Since the beginning of the program in January 1962, there have been five U-2 missions [,…] over priority strategic targets in China other than in the Taiwan Straits buildup area and South China.”117 A memo dated 4 February 1963 sent by the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) to the Director of Central Intelligence about Nuclear Energy Targets in China states that “COMOR has examined what targets in Communist China might be associated with nuclear energy activities over and above those which are already being programmed for U-2 coverage in the forecast of IDEALIST/TACKLE overflight activities for February. COMOR has recommended that the approved TACKLE flights should be so planned that they cover, insofar as possible and without detriment to the priority targets, the

113 See https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v19/d365 (Letter dated 14 Dec. 1960, President Chiang to President Eisenhower). 114 See https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v22/d1 . 115 See https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v22/d1 , note 3 of this document. 116 Fu/Pocock, The Black Bats, pp.40, 71-74, 93, and 95. 117 See https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP75B00621R000200070001-8.pdf 21 other targets noted on the attached map. COMOR does not believe these are sufficiently suspect of nuclear association to warrant missions designed with them as the primary targets. The additional targets are, on the basis of available information and research, those targets which are even marginally nuclear energy associated. […] We presently have underway a research project which will take the form of a map showing useable coverage of China by U-2 and satellite since January 1962. Meanwhile selected search areas continue to be programmed for satellite coverage. COMOR will continue to examine all newly acquired photography and collateral in order to recommend new targets whenever warranted.”118

COMOR to DCI, 4 February 1963 (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP92B01090R002600100003-6.pdf)

Evidently, as early as 1963, the Agency’s primary source of information about China’s nuclear capabilities were the U-2 missions, followed by satellite coverage. Human spies to be dropped into northern China were no longer a factor. So there was no real need for big long-

118 See https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP92B01090R002600100003-6.pdf . 22 distance transport aircraft that could perhaps also carry paramilitary commandos. In 1966, 3 Lockheed P-3As were handed over to Taiwan as replacements for the old P-2Vs, but as the

China covered by U-2 flights in June 1963 (https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP66R00546R000100100024-8.pdf)

US remained opposed to Chiang’s plans for paramilitary action against Mainland China, they were flown to Okinawa shortly afterwards and were finally stored, as Project Goshawk was closed. One last overflight over Mainland China was made by a specially trained RoCAF crew flying a specially equipped, USAF-owned C-130E that dropped sensors into northwest China in May 1969.119 Evidently, the US never wanted to give the Republic of China the means to attack and destroy the nuclear program of Red China. And so, in the late fifties and early sixties, Taiwanese spy groups who had to find out more details about Red China’s nuclear program and its progress were inserted into northern China. And they were dropped from USAF aircraft flown by American crews, and not from RoCAF aircraft flown by RoCAF crews.

3) Special Training In 1967, Hal Harper, Air America’s Superintendent of Technical Training at Clark, conducted several training courses on aircraft powerplants, for both USAF and Air America personnel at Clark, helping qualified personnel prepare for the US FAA “A&P” (Airframe & Powerplant) written examination. The first powerplant class was completed in early June 67, others followed.120 In April 69, Charles Chambers, Air America’s Station Manager at Clark, received the following commendation from Saturn Airways, Inc:

119 Fu/Pocock, The Black Bats, pp.91-93 + 96-101. 120 Hal Harper, “Clark conducts A&P courses”, in: Air America Log, vol. I, no. 1, November 1967, p.7. 23

(Air America Log, vol. III, no.3, 1969, p.2)

4) Ground handling The documentary Flying Men, Flying Machines also shows that Air America offered similar, if not greater ground handling services at Clark Air Base in the Philippines, as Bill Palmer, Air America’s Station Manager there, explains. Again, the customers were commercial airliners operating flights for the Military Airlift Command. “We act on their behalf in all areas”, Palmer explains, for at Clark AB, Air America’s services offered to various carriers not only included ground handling in the strict sense of the word, but also maintenance and managing traffic and operations on a scheduled basis – comparable to the services that a scheduled airliner would receive in the United States.121 During the second half of the sixties, Air America added to their ground handling contracts catering services offered at Kadena and Clark Air Bases, as can be seen in the letter to Capitol International Airways of 3 August 1968. In August 69, for example, Air America at Clark handled a total of 150 flights, that is 93 Braniff flights, 5 Northwest flights, 14 Seaboard World flights, 33 Southern AT flights and 5 Flying Tiger Line flights.122 But in the fall of 1972, when the Vietnamization

121 Bill Palmer, in: Flying Men, Flying Machines, at 91/2 minutes. 122 Flight Operations Monthly Report for August 69, formerly in: UTD/Leary/Ser.I/B4F1, now UTD/Leary/ B33F4? 24

A contract airliner taking off from Clark Air Base in 1970 (Air America documentary Flying men, flying machines, at 77 minutes) program made commercial flights for the Military Airlift Command no longer necessary, all ground handling services at Kadena Air Base were stopped.123

Letter of 3 Aug. 68 to Capitol Intl. Airways and Inter-Office Routing Slip of 17 Oct. 72 (both in: UTD/Bisson/B5 reel 31)

Already on 15 June 71, Charles B. Chambers, Air America’s Station Manager at Clark Air Base, reported to the President that “the past six months have given rise to many queries from

123 Letter dated 3 August 68 to Capitol Intl. Airways, and Inter-Office Routing Slip dated 17 October 72, both in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no. 31. 25

Memo dated 15 June 71 about the status of Air America on Clark Air Base (in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no. 6) several organizations on base as to the ‘status of Air America’. Upon ‘phase down’ the 15th of May, inquiries have intensified, coming from the 13th Air Force, 6200 AB Wing (Base Civil Engineering), 604th MAC Squadron, 69th MAC Group and the latest one having great impact from Lt. Bailey, 22nd AF Contract Administrator.”124 The loss of status would involve the loss of things like APO privileges, Supply support, Duty and Tax-free import privileges, the office building at Clark that the Air Force wanted to have back and other things. Chambers then reports that at the end of several meetings, several points had been cleared, including that

“1. Air America has a MAC contract and even though the route is not through Clark, it could very well be directed to operate through here in the future which would be cause for the Company to maintain a facility. 2. Yes, Air America had been established in Clark for over 10 years and by the nature of the war and politics may have need for maintaining a status quo of benefits, privileges.”125

Chambers concluded that the issue may be closed for that time, but might continue to arise with change of personnel. After the last American troops had left South Vietnam on 29 March 73,126 Air America’s Station at Clark was probably closed. On 18 June 75, the Company still had 1 employee at Clark.127

© University of Texas at Dallas, 2013-2021

124 Clark Station to President, Memo of 15 June 71, in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no. 6. 125 Clark Station to President, Memo of 15 June 71, in: UTD/Bisson/B5, microfilm reel no. 6. 126 See http://www.uswings.com/about-us-wings/vietnam-war-facts/ . 127 Minutes of Meeting of Executive Committee of Air America Inc. of 18 June 75, in: UTD/CIA/B10F3. 26