SOUTH DAKOTA STATE UNIVERSITY

POLS 343: RUSSIAN POLITICS

Concepts addressed: • The nature of political systems (representative democracy, democratic versus authoritarian systems, parliamentary versus presidential systems, etc.) • The nature of economic systems (capitalism, socialism, communism, mixed systems, etc.) • The nature of political systems (representative democracy, democratic versus authoritarian systems, parliamentary versus presidential systems, etc.)

WHAT IS A ? IT IS A POLITICAL FORMULA THAT OUTLINES INSTITUTIONS RULES OF THE GAME EXPECTATIONS ABOUT POLITICAL LIFE SET OF UNDERSTANDINGS AND ASSUMPTIONS THAT GIVE STRUCTURE, MEANING AND DIRECTION TO POLITICS OPERATES DEPENDENT ON POLITICAL CULTURE HISTORICAL CONTEXT ESTABLISHES THE CRITERIA FOR CITIZENSHIP AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

RUSSIAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIENCE FUNDAMENTAL LAW 1906 MOST POWER REMAINED IN THE HANDS OF THE TSAR DECLARE WAR APPOINT MINISTERS VETO LEGISLATION DISSOLVE OR SUSPEND THE DUMA RULE BY DUMA LOWER HOUSE ELECTED BY LANDOWNERS, PEASANTS, WORKERS AND TOWNSPEOPLE UPPER HOUSE APPOINTED BY THE TSAR NEVER ACQUIRED ANY REAL POWER FAILURE UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION DISCREDITED MODERATION AND A GRADUALIST APPROACH TO CHANGING CONSTITUTION OF 1918 CREATED DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT ALL RUSSIA CONGRESS OF SOVIETS WAS THE HIGHEST LEGISLATIVE BODY ELECTED THE ALL RUSSIA CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE RAN GOVERNMENT ON DAY TO DAY BASIS Development of this review sheet was made possible by funding from the US Department of Education through South Dakota’s EveryTeacher Teacher Quality Enhancement grant.

CONSTITUTION OF 1924 ADOPTED FEDERALISM UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS REPUBLICS HAD THE RIGHT TO SECEDE 1936 (STALIN) CONSTITUTION NO SEPARATION OF POWERS POWER DIVIDED BETWEEN THE CENTRAL AND REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENTS CENTRAL GOVERNMENT MADE IMPORTANT DECISIONS, CONTROLLED BUDGETS AND PERSONNEL REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENTS IMPLEMENTED NATIONAL POLICY BASED ON THE GUIDELINES SET BY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT LEGISLATURE COUNCIL OF THE UNION EQUAL REPRESENTATION OF ORDINARY CITIZENS COUNCIL OF THE NATIONALITIES REPRESENTATION OF THE NATIONALITIES NEVER EMERGED AS SIGNIFICANT POLICY MAKING BODIES LARGELY BECAUSE OF BRIEF AND INFREQUENT LEGISLATIVE SESSIONS MOSTLY RATIFIED DECISIONS MADE BY THE PRESIDIUM STANDING COMMITTEES PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN DRAFTING LEGISLATION SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN OVERSIGHT SOME CONSTITUENT SERVICE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS WAS THE EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE ARM OF GOVERNMENT MORE MANAGABLE (IN TERMS OF NUMBERS) PRESIDIUM OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS BECAME THE REAL EXECUTIVE 1977 (BREZHNEV) CONSTITUTION ESTABLISHED A PRESIDENCY WHO HEADED THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET STRENGTHENED THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT VIS A VIS THE REPUBLICS GORBACHEV CONSTITUTION LEGISLATURE—CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES REPRESENTATION OF COMMON CITIZENS THROUGH SINGLE MEMBER DISTRICTS, NATIONALITIES, ORGANIZED GROUPS IN SOCIETY MORE ASSERTIVE BODY SERVED MORE AS A DEBATING FORUM THAN AS A SOURCE OF LEGISLATION AGGRESSIVE OVERSIGHT ROLE PART OF GLASNOST SOME CONSTITUENT SERVICE Development of this review sheet was made possible by funding from the US Department of Education through South Dakota’s EveryTeacher Teacher Quality Enhancement grant.

ELECTED THE SUPREME SOVIET SUPREME SOVIET WAS THE REAL LEGISLATURE DEALT WITH FULL RANGE OF GOVERNMENT BUSINESS POWER TO RATIFY TREATIES AND DECLARE WAR OVERRIDE PRESIDENTIAL VETOES AN INDIRECTLY ELECTED PRESIDENT FIRST RUSSIAN CONSTITUTION INITIAL CONSTITUTION MODELED ON THE GORBACHEV CONSTITUTION DISSATISFACTION WITH THIS CONSTITUTION CENTERED AROUND THE QUESTION OF EXECUTIVE OR LEGISLATIVE SUPREMACY CONSTITUTION PLACED ALL POWER IN THE CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES ISSUES SEPARATION OF POWERS COMPETITION BETWEEN EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES CONSTITUTION CALLS FOR A STRONG WEAK LEGISLATURE APPROXIMATES THE FRENCH SYSTEM PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP RUSSIA'S POLITICAL CULTURE HAS BEEN SHAPED BY STRONG RULES AND ACCEPTING OF THEIR DOMINANCE YELTSIN ESTABLISHED A STRONG PRESIDENCY DISTINCTLY PERSONALISTIC RULE BASIS OF HIS POWER WAS HIS DIRECT ELECTION IN OPPOSITION TO THE SU COMMUNIST PARTY CONCENTRATION OF POWER IN THE PRESIDENCY SHOWDOWN WITH THE CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES, 1993

1993 RUSSIAN CONSTITUTION MIXED PRESIDENTIAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM PRESIDENT IS RESPONSIBLE TO THE PEOPLE CABINET IS RESPONSIBLE TO THE PARLIAMENT REQUIRES A CONSTRUCTIVE WORKING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER CLOSE RESEMBLANCE AGAIN TOTHE FRENCH SYSTEM PRESIDENT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY PRIME MINISTER IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BALANCE OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

PRESIDENCY Development of this review sheet was made possible by funding from the US Department of Education through South Dakota’s EveryTeacher Teacher Quality Enhancement grant.

ESTABLISHED A DOMINANT PRESIDENCY FOUR YEAR TERM POWER TO MAKE LAW BY DECREE POWER TO DISSOLVE PARLIAMENT HEAD OF STATE GUARANTOR OF THE CONSTITUTION POWER TO SCHEDULE REFERENDA VETO LEGISLATION SPECIAL POWERS OVER FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY GUARANTOR OF THE CONSTITUTION AND HUMAN AND CIVIL RIGHTS ARBITOR BETWEEN THE CENTRAL AND REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS APPOINT AND DISMISS THE PRIME MINISTER AND GOVERNMENT PRIME MINISTER APPROVED BY THE STATE DUMA OTHER MINISTERS ARE AT THE PRESIDENT'S WILL APPOINT AND DISMISS THE CHAIR OF THE CENTRAL BANK, PROCURATOR GENERAL, MEMBERS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE HIGH COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES POWER TO ISSUE (YUKAS) CAN BE USED TO CIRCUMVENT THE LEGISLATURE HEAD OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL APPOINTS ITS MEMBERS NOT SUBJECT TO LEGISLATIVE CONFIRMATION HEAD OF THE POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL FORMULATES MILITARY DOCTRINE SEPARATE ADMINISTRATIVE BODY SEPARATE FROM THE GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY APPOINTS AMBASSADORS AND REPRESENTATIVES TO THE TERRITORIAL REGIONS MAY DECLARE WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE FEDERAL COUNCIL SCHEDULES ELECTIONS AND MAY DISOLVE THE STATE DUMA PROPOSE LEGISLATION TO THE STATE DUMA

GOVERNMENT NEED CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER PRIME MINISTER HAS OVERALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WORK OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH MOST MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT ARE CAREER ADMINISTRATORS RATHER THAN PARTY POLITICIANS

Development of this review sheet was made possible by funding from the US Department of Education through South Dakota’s EveryTeacher Teacher Quality Enhancement grant.

KEY FIGURES IN THE CABINET PRIME MINISTER ANSWERABLE TO THE PRESIDENT RESPONSIBLE FOR DEFINING THE BASIC GUIDELINES FOR THE ACTIVITY OF THE GOVERNMENT FIRST DEPUTY AND DEPUTY PRIME MINISTERS KEY POLICY FIGURES RESPONSIBLE FOR SPECIALIZED AREAS POWER MINISTRIES FOREIGN AFFAIRS, INTERNAL AFFAIRS, FEDERAL SECURITY SERVICE, FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, FEDERAL BORDER SERVICE, FEDERAL AGENCY FOR GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION ISSUE ORIENTED MINISTRIES FUEL AND POWER ENGINEERING, RAILWAYS, AND THE MEDIA OTHER MINISTRIES AGRICULTURE AND FOOD, FINANCE, LABOR, JUSTICE, NATIONALITIES AFFAIRS AND REGIONAL POLICY, LAND POLICY

LEGISLATURE FEDERAL ASSEMBLY DUMA 450 DEPUTIES 225 SINGLE MEMBER DISTRICTS 225 FILLED BY PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION CAN OVERTURN A PRESIDENTIAL DECREE RIGHT TO APPROVE PRIME MINISTER MAY HOLD A VOTE OF NO CONFIDENCE PRESIDENT MAY NOT DISSOLVE WITHIN ONE YEAR OF ELECTION OR IF IMPEACHMENTS CHARGES HAVE BEEN BROUGHT RELATIVELY AUTHORITATIVE AND EFFECTIVE BODY FEDERAL COUNCIL TWO REPRESENTATIVES FROM EACH FEDERAL REGION APPROVES LAWS CONCERNING THE BUDGET, TAXES, FINANCIAL MATTERS, RATIFICATION OF TREATIES, BORDERS, WAR AND PEACE APPROVES PRESIDENTIAL DECREES MAY IMPEACH THE PRESIDENT

EXECUTIVE LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO REMOVE THE PRESIDENT RUSSIAN PROCEDURE IS MORE CUMBERSOME THAN THE US COMPARISON LEGISLATION MUST BE APPROVED BY THE DUMA GOVERNMENT MUST HAVE THE CONFIDENCE OF THE DUMA Development of this review sheet was made possible by funding from the US Department of Education through South Dakota’s EveryTeacher Teacher Quality Enhancement grant.

PRESIDENT HAS THE POWER TO ISSUE DECREES BUT PRESIDENT CANNOT BE CERTAIN THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL COMPLY WITHOUT DUMA APPROVAL

PRESIDENT CANNOT GO AGAINST THE WILL OF THE DUMA FOR A LONG TIME FOR OVER IMPORTANT ISSUES BECAUSE THE DUMA CAN REJECT HIS CANDIDATES FOR THE PRIME MINISTERSHIP AND CAN DENY THE GOVERNMENT CONFIDENCE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON DISSOLVING THE DUMA

RESEMBLANCE TO TSARIST AND SOVIET SYSTEMS MANY SIMILARITIES WITH TSARIST AND COMMUNIST REGIMES WEAK INSTITUTIONS HEAVY RELIANCE ON PERSONALITY AND PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS DRIVE FOR CONCENTRATED AND CENTRALIZED POWER HIERARCHICAL ORGANIZATION OF POLITIAL LIFE PRESIDENCY HAS COME TO RESEMBLE THE CENTRAL COMMUNIST PARTY ORGANS OF THE SOVIET ERA PRESIDENT AND HIS ADMISTRATION RESEMBLES THE MACHINERY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE BOTH IN STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION

DIFFERENCE FROM THE FRENCH AND OTHER PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT REFLECT THE BALANCE OF PARTY FORCES IN PARLIAMENT MAJOR REASON HERE IS THAT PARTIES ARE NOT YET REALLY DEVELOPED MOST MINISTERS HAVE BEEN CAREER ADMINISTRATORS RATHER THAN PARTY MEMBERS AGAIN TO SOME EXTENT THIS IS SIMILAR TO THE FRENCH SYSTEM MOST FRENCH CABINET MINISTERS ARE THE TECHNICAL ADMINISTRATORS OF THE VARIOUS FRENCH MINISTRIES AS IN FRANCE, SOME DO HAVE DIRECT TIES TO PARTIES PARTIES DO NEED TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT TO SOME EXTENT BECAUSE THE DUMA HAS THE POWER TO DENY THE GOVERNMENT ITS CONFIDENCE

DUAL QUESTIONS FACED BY RUSSIA IN MAKING THE TRANSITION FROM A COMMAND TO A MARKET ECONOMY IS THE PASSAGE FROM A COMMAND ECONOMY TO A MARKET ECONOMY POSSIBLE UNDER A DEMOCRACY?

Development of this review sheet was made possible by funding from the US Department of Education through South Dakota’s EveryTeacher Teacher Quality Enhancement grant.

IS IT POSSIBLE TO MAKE THIS TRANSITION WITHOUT ALSO MOVING TOWARD DEMOCRACY

ALTERNATIVE REFORM MODELS POLISH MODEL SHOCK THERAPY RESTORE MACROECONOMIC BALANCE BETWEEN WHAT A SOCIETY SPENDS AND WHAT IT EARNS ELIMINATION OF SOURCES OF INFLATION AUSTERITY PROGRAMS CUTS IN STATE SPENDING INCREASES IN TAXATION END OF PRICE CONTROLS OPEN FOREIGN TRADE STRUCTURAL REFORMS OF THIS KIND LOWERS THE STANDARD OF LIVING FOR MOST GROUPS OF THE POPULATION UNTIL LIVING STANDARDS START TO RISE, THIS TYPE OF REFORM CREATES POWERFUL POLITICAL OPPOSITION EAST GERMAN MODEL LIBERALIZATION AT THE LOWER LEVELS WHILE MAINTAIN CONTROL OF THE MAJOR INDUSTRIES NEP APPROACH BUCHARIN DEVELOPED THIS AND LENIN IMPLEMENTED IT FOLLOWING THE RUSSIAN CIVIL WAR FOUND THAT A PURE SOCIALIST ECONOMY DID NOT WORK PROVIDED FOR A MARKET ECONOMY FOR MOST ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES PROVIDED FOR A COMMAND ECONOMY FOR THOSE ASPECTS OF THE ECONOMY THAT WERE IMPORTANT TO ITS DEVELOPMENT EX: FACTORIES AND ENERGY PRODUCTION APPROACH THAT GORBACHEV, IN FACT, FOLLOWED UNTIL 1990

CHINESE MODEL ECONOMIC GROWTH BEFORE DISTRIBUTION ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IS SEEN AS FIRST PRIORITY TO ACCOMPLISH THIS, THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF INTEREST GROUPS AND PARTIES MUST BE RESTRAINED PROSPERITY WILL EVENTUAL BENEFIT ENOUGH PEOPLE TO CREATE A NEW POLITICAL BASE FOR THE REGIME WHEN THIS SUPPORT IS OBTAINED AND ENOUGH LOYALTY TO THE SYSTEM IS DEVELOPED, THEN POLITICAL RIGHTS CAN BE EXPANDED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WILL BUILD A BASE OF SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY UNTIL THIS HAPPENS, A STRONG DEVELOPMENTAL BUREAUCRACY IS NEEDED TO PREVENT PARTICULARISTIC Development of this review sheet was made possible by funding from the US Department of Education through South Dakota’s EveryTeacher Teacher Quality Enhancement grant.

INTERESTS FROM SQUANDERING RESOURCES NEEDED FOR GROWTH GOVERNMENT MUST NOT LIBERALIZE POLITICALLY UNTIL AFTER IT HAS LIBERALIZED ECONOMICALLY ASIAN TIGERS MODEL SOUTH KOREA, SINGAPORE, TAIWAN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES THAT PURSUED CAPITALIST GROWTH STRATEGIES FOR DECADES BEFORE BEGINNING TO SHARE POWER WITH POLITICAL RIVALS FUNDAMENTAL FEATURES OF A MARKET ECONOMY IN RUSSIA WERE DESTROYED OR NEVER EXISTED ENFORCABLE LEGAL RIGHTS TO OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF CAPITAL ASSETS SYSTEM OF PRICES THAT APPROXIMATED EQUILIBRIUM SUPPLY AND DEMAND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FOR BUYING AND SELLING DEBT REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS ENFORCING THE RULES OF THE GAME FUNDAMENTAL FEATURES OF A COMMAND ECONOMY CREATE OBSTACLES MONOPOLY OR NEAR MONOPOLY ENTERPRISES THEIR DOMINANCE OF THEIR MARKETS MADE IT DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE FOR NEW FIRMS TO ENTER THE MARKET WITH THE END OF THE COMMAND ECONOMY MANY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS ARE COMPLETELY DEPENDENT ON THE ECONOMIC HEALTH OF A SINGLE EMPLOYER UNDER SOVIET SYSTEM, ENTERPRISES WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR SOCIAL WELFARE, NOT THE STATE COLLAPSE OF ENTERPRISES ALSO MEANS THE COLLAPSE OF THE WELFARE SYSTEM COMMITMENT TO DEFENSE INDUSTRIES CUTBACK IN DEFENSE SPENDING HIT SUCH PLANTS HARD EXTREME DIFFICULTY IN RETOOLING TO PRODUCE CONSUMER GOODS GEOGRAPHIC SIZE OF RUSSIA NEED FOR NEW INFRASTRUCTURE HIGHWAYS, RAIL LINES, HIGH-SPEED DATA TRANSMISSION, MICROWAVE COMMUNICATIONS LINKS HUGE PHYSICAL SCALE IMPOSES LIMITS ON THE SPEED WITH WHICH CHANGE CAN OCCUR HUMAN CAPITAL INCENTIVE SYSTEMS IN THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM DIFFER ENCOURAGES WORKING IN A HIERARCHICAL, STATE-CENTERED SYSTEM

Development of this review sheet was made possible by funding from the US Department of Education through South Dakota’s EveryTeacher Teacher Quality Enhancement grant.

PROFITABILITY AND EFFICIENCY WERE WELL DOWN ON THEIR LIST OF PRIORITIES MORE CONCERNED WITH MEETING PRODUCTION QUOTAS AND SOCIAL WELFARE NEEDS DISCOURAGED THE RISK AND REWARD SYSTEMS NECESSARY TO MAKE CAPITALISM WORK ALMOST NO SOVIET MANAGERS HAVE EXPERIENCE WITH DECISION-MAKING UNDER MARKET CONDITIONS ENTREPRENEURSHIP WAS ILLEGAL THIS IS A CULTURAL FACTOR AS WELL RUSSIAN CULTURE UNDER THE TSARS DESPISED THE ENTREPRENEUR BECAUSE S/HE WAS SELFISH AND UNWILLING TO SHARE PROFITS WITH THOSE LESS FORTUNATE PROFIT MAKING BUSINESS WAS IMMORAL DEATH PENALTY FOR CAPITALIST ACTIVITIES

Development of this review sheet was made possible by funding from the US Department of Education through South Dakota’s EveryTeacher Teacher Quality Enhancement grant.