“The market is free!”: Understanding gender and ethnicity in the marketplace in Lagos

Miriam Siun Master thesis in African Studies Supervisor: Dr. Mayke Kaag African Studies Centre Second reader: Dr. André Leliveld Leiden University !1 “The market is free!”: Understanding gender and ethnicity in the marketplace in Lagos

Miriam Siun

M A S T E R T H E S I S

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS AT LEIDEN UNIVERSITY SUPERVISED BY DR. MAYKE KAAG AND SECOND READER DR. ANDRÉ LELIVELD

African Studies Centre Leiden

2017

!2 Abstract

“The market is free!”:

Understanding gender and ethnicity in the marketplace in Lagos

Miriam Siun

Market women in Southern West Africa have a long tradition of being in charge of market governance. In the case of Southwest Nigeria, their authority has been institutionalized through the title of ‘Iyaloja’ (market executive). This type of market governance with women leaders is particular to the Yoruba people. The context of Lagos, however makes for a city that is predominately Yoruba, but has heterogeneous markets. Many of the non-Yoruba traders are men, which dominates trading in specific commodities, e.g., agricultural produce. While the ‘traditional’ Yoruba form of market governance remains as the predominant system in Lagos, newer actors are augmenting the established system by leveraging external networks, like the case of members of the Arewa Perishable Goods, who have their separate associations despite being part of markets under Yoruba women’s sphere of influence.

The study analyses market governance, dynamics and politics in three different markets in Lagos through interviews, focus groups, and secondary-sources. Balogun market is one of the biggest (textile) and most well-known markets in the city. It is also predominately female. Mile 12 is another large market, with one section Arewa Perishable Goods, being run by an exclusively male and predominately Hausa leadership. This section of the market is essential for food supply in Lagos [with much trade with other neighboring countries as well]. The last market is Dada Genla — a small, food stuffs market on the periphery of Lagos. This market was recently developed and presents a case which illustrates the importance of diversity in the success of markets.

This thesis contributes to the increasingly intersectional work on markets and networks in Africa. The study is named “The market is free!” which is a quote from an interview with a male market leader. While he stressed that anyone can enter the market to trade, this study shows that ethnic and gender relations in markets are highly complex as it to some extent is a space that allows for a plurality of actors, but is simultaneously not as ’free’ as he suggested.

Keywords: Networks; Nigeria; Gender; Ethnicity; Market Governance

!3 CONTENTS

Lists of maps and tables 7 Dedication 8 Acknowledgements 9

Maps 11 List of acronyms 13 CHAPTER ONE 14 INTRODUCTION 14 1.1 Introduction 14 1.2 Background 18 Women as market leaders 18 ‘Migrant’ traders in the South-west 20 1.3. Research objectives 20 1.4 Research questions 22 1.5 Structure of thesis 23 CHAPTER TWO 25 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 25 2.1 Introduction 25 2.2. Networks: social and migration network theory 27 Social networks 28 Migration networks 29 2.3 Intersectionality: focus on gender and ethnicity 30 Gender 31 Ethnicity 34 Intersectionality 37 Agency 38 Defining power and authority (in the marketplace) 39 2.4. Legacies, linkages and localities 40 Legacies 40 Linkages 40 Localities 41 2.5 Conclusion 41

!4 CHAPTER THREE 42 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 42 3.1 Introduction 42 3.2 Methodology and methods 44 Methods 46 Data analysis 48 3.3 Case selection and context of study 49 Balogun Market 50 Dada Genla Market 52 Arewa Perishable Goods in Mile 12 54 3.4 Ethical considerations 58 3.5 Conclusion 59 CHAPTER FOUR 61 MARKET DYNAMICS 61 4.1 Introduction 61 4.2 Gender and trading 62 4.3 Market entry 64 4.4 Strategic relations 69 4.5 Conclusion 71 CHAPTER FIVE 75 MARKET GOVERNANCE 75 5.1 Introduction 75 5.2 Iyalojas, Babalojas and Chairmen 76 Iyalojas 76 Babalojas 80 Chairmen 82 5.3 Associations 84 5.4 Overlapping associations 85 5.5 Conclusion 88 CHAPTER SIX 89 MARKET POLITICS 89 6.1 Introduction 89 6.2. The state versus the market 90

!5 LOCAL GOVERNMENT 94 6.3 The ’Mega-city’ project 100 6.4 The issue of power 104 6.5 Conclusion 105 CHAPTER SEVEN 107 CONCLUSION 107 7.1 Introduction 107 7.2 Findings 107 MARKET DYNAMICS 107 MARKET GOVERNANCE 108 MARKET POLITICS 109 7.3 ANALYSIS 110 IMPACT OF CHOICES 110 7.4 Recommendations for future research 111 7.5 Conclusion 111 REFERENCES 113

!6 List of figures and tables

Figure 1.1 Market administration’s hierarchal structure Page 16

Figure 3.1 Balogun Market Page 51

Figure 3.2 Dada Genla Market Page 53

Figure 3.3 Off-loaded onion shipment section Page 56

Figure 3.4 Foodstuffs market in Mile 12 Page 57

Figure 4.1 Excerpt from APG’s books for December 2016 Page 74

Figure 5.1 Overview of the market executive committee Page 77

Figure 5.2 Overview of commodities sectional committee Page 78

Figure 5.3 Overview of the APG executive committee Page 83

Figure 6.1 Governor Akinwumbi Ambode in Alausa Page 103 Figure 6.2 Aftermath of the demolition of Sabo Market in Ikorodu Page 107

Table 3.1 Participants according to gender Page 51

Table 3.2 Participants according to ethnicity Page 52

Table 6.1 Overview of taxes paid according to government body Page 101

Table 6.2 Objectives of the Lagos State Development Plan Page 104

!7 Dedication

For Ghenet

!8 Acknowledgements

This study is based on fieldwork carried out in Lagos, Nigeria for six months, between August 2016 and January 2017. The fieldwork was financed by Leiden University’s Curatorenfonds and the Uhlenbeck Scholarship, who I owe a great deal of thanks. My supervisor Dr. Mayke Kaag has been supportive of my study from its initial proposal stages to the completion of this thesis. She, together with Dr André Leliveld have both provided useful feedback throughout the research process. In Leiden I would also like to thank African Studies Centre librarian Ella Verkaik for always assisting me in acquiring material that I’ve requested which were not part of the library’s inventory. I’m also very thankful for Inge Ligtvoet at Leiden University who introduced me to her friends in Nigeria and was very supportive of my fieldwork.

The fieldwork which this thesis is based on would have been impossible without a number of people in Nigeria. I’m indebted to Adetokunbo Lawrence, who not only welcomed me to Lagos, but also helped me find housing, and connected me to Iyaloja Madame Bello who later became a key person in this study. I’m thankful for the helpfulness of lecturers at the University of Ibadan (UI). I spent two weeks in Ibadan with Professor Ayobami Ojebode and his family. I’m thankful for their kind welcoming when I first arrived in Nigeria. I’m also thankful for Dr Seunfunmi Olutayo at UI who provided me with literature and also assisted in arranging my journey from Ibadan to Lagos.

In Lagos, (late) Dimeji Ajikobi at the University of Lagos connected me to two key figures in the research process. Without his kindness and helpfulness I would not have been able to meet these people and would have had a harder time in integrating in Balogun Market. May he rest in peace. Moreover, Mr Ajikobi’s good friend (honorable) Adekunle Alli not only granted me an interview and provided me with insights, he also allowed me to use archival material from his personal collection on Lagos history. I’m very grateful for his assistance.

During my initial field visits I was partially assisted by students at the University of Lagos: Williams Oluwaseun accompanied me during the initial scoping process and ensured that I found my way around town. Oyindamola Abike was instrumental in introducing me to her mother and relatives who are traders in Balogun Market.

!9 I’m extremely thankful for all the insight and help bestowed on me by Suleimon Adeoye at Balogun Market. I met with Suleimon regularly during my visits at Balogun. He showed me around the market and introduced me to several traders that were later interviewed.

Needless to say, this study would have been impossible without the openness and friendliness of the research participants. I’m thankful for all those who participated, and assisted me in understanding their lived realities.

Lastly, I’m very thankful for my family and friends. I’m especially thankful for Lemlem Kibreab, and her family and Koye Oyeyinka and his family. They’ve all supported me in all my endeavors and cheered me on during the write up. Finally, I’d like to thank my mother Ghenet Hailemelekot, to whom this thesis is dedicated.

Leiden, July 2017 M.S

!10 Maps

Map 1 Overview of the 20 local government areas in Lagos

Source: Gidiguide.com

!11 Map 2 Nigeria divided according to six regional zones

Source: https://www.researchgate.net/figure/51795009_fig1_Fig-1-Map-of-Nigeria-showing-the- six-6-geopolitical-zones-For-interpretation-of-the

!12 List of acronyms

ACMWAMN Association of Commodity Market Women and Men Nigeria AG Action Group APC All Progressive Congress APG Arewa Perishable Goods LAWMA Lagos State Waste Management Authority LGA Local Government Area LMWA Lagos Market Women’s Association LSDP Lagos State Development Plan LSG Lagos State Government NNDP Nigerian National Democratic Party NOAS National Open Apprenticeship Scheme NWSN Network for Women’s Studies in Nigeria PDP People’s Democratic Party UPN Unity Party of Nigeria WIN Women in Nigeria

!13 CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

“The market is free!” - Babaloja Alhaji Shokunbi at Shitta Court, 2016

1.1 Introduction

West African countries Coté D’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, and Nigeria have a long history of women in long-distance trade (Robertson, 1979). This gave a rise in studies seeking to examine the role of family and kinship in trade as an enabling factor for women’s economic participation (Marshall, 1965; Mintz, 1971; Sudakasa, 1973; McIntosh, 2009). In addition to engaging in trade, women have been found to have influential leadership positions in marketplaces. The cohesion of their market associations were visible during anti-colonial movements as trading elites in Ghana, and Togo were active political participants and supporters of the liberation movements (Clark, 1994; Heilbrunn 1993; Cordonnier 1987). Studies on Benin and Togo have shown that individual traders who were successful in their business managed to secure their position as not only trading elites but also as the de facto [rulers] of markets through the political connections they had established during their support of liberation movements (Prag, 2013; Axelson & Sylvanus, 2010). These women later became referred to as ‘Mama-Benzes’ and ‘Nana-Benzes’ because of their lavish lifestyles. In the case of South-Western Nigeria, which is the focus of this study we see a similar history. However, women’s long-distance trade and market leadership has long been [culturally] institutionalized amongst the Yoruba. Markets have been seen as a women’s sphere of influence in traditional Yoruba society as the Oba (King) would appoint a female king (Iyalode) who was not only part of the traditional rulers but also the head of women and markets (Awe, 1977). Her role was to be women’s political representative and once (s)elected, the position was held for life. While important, the Iyalode does not oversee daily market activities, instead there are a number of positions below her which carry

!14 out the tasks of administering markets. Figure 1.1 shows Baker’s (1974) overview of the hierarchal structures.

Figure 1.1 Market administration’s hierarchal structure

Source: Baker (1974).1

1 The pyramid is based on the descriptions in the study. !15 The Alaga position was loosely translated by Baker as ‘chairmen’, however, they were and are mostly likely women as men mainly hold honorary positions (Falola, 1994). The title of Iyalode is today commonly referred to as Iyaloja (mother of the market). The holder of this position is the overall head of the market. As mentioned, men have been found in various honorary positions, the main function of including them (up until recently) had been to use their networks to the Iyaloja’s / egbe’s benefit. However, recent years have seen the introduction of the Babaloja (father of the market) — a title which is supposed to be the men’s representative in the market leadership. In addition to the Babaloja there are separate male-headed associations active in markets around Lagos. This is because although Lagos is part of the South-Western region, which is Yoruba dominated, it is also one of the most heterogeneous cities in Nigeria. [Traders from all parts of the country and outside the country are found there]. Most of the literature on markets in [South- western] Nigeria have focused exclusively on Yoruba traders. The few studies on ‘migrant’ traders, such as Cohen’s (1965; 1966; 1967 and 1974) seminal work on Hausa traders in Ibadan have tended to focus only on the ‘non-Yoruba’ traders. Studies such as Cohen (1974) and Albert (1997) have been important in documenting how (Hausa) migrant traders establish their own economic monopolies in the South-west, however we know little about how separate forms of market structures cooperate and compete today. This study seeks to build on existing knowledge on Yoruba market institutions and migrant trading structures, examining their interactions in the contemporary, diverse context of Lagos. Lagos markets mostly use the same structure as the rest of the Southwestern region. However, rapid urbanization means that the city’s traders (to a larger extent than elsewhere in the country) come from different parts of the country with their own market social structures. The aim of this thesis is to examine the interactions between the Iyalojas governing their markets and their traders [of different ethnicities], the [local] government, and male market leaders. It also pays particular attention to the heterogeneous nature of traders in marketplaces: examining how they relate to the Yoruba structure and how the market system incorporates them.

This will be examined in the context of Fafchamps (2003), who set out to “capture essential features of African markets and sharpen our understanding of their inner organizations” (p. 5). Although his work draws on limited empirical studies, but offers theoretical insights which can be replicated in other contexts. His assumptions on network segmentation is of particular relevance to this study. He argues that ‘market interaction’ can ‘perpetuate a lack of diversity in business’ (p. 332), this is because business networks can ‘influence firm entry, survival and investment’ (p. 448). If we

!16 therefore consider the Yoruba women as the biggest network that ‘controls’ markets in Lagos we want to understand how they maintain their dominance and whether we can confirm that the predominantly utilised ‘referral process’ excludes particular groups from markets and certain forms of trade, thus reinforcing segmentation (p. 450).

In addition, despite the illuminating theoretical frameworks submitted by Fafchamps (2003: 444) He concludes his work by saying that:

“The evidence suggests that given the chance, African businessmen and women can learn to play by new, more modern rules and that they can adopt more efficient market institutions. The challenge is to help them do that.”

This shows that while he is trying to convey the dynamic nature of African business people, his framing is based on Western market patterns, a process increasingly recognized as paternalistic and akin to ‘White saviourism’. It suggests that Africans are not actively engaged in institutional market development, which we can refute based on the intricate structures we see established over time and repeated in several markets. While this study draws on his theoretical discussions, it also combines it with discussions in other fields such as gender and women’s studies in order to reveal the nuances inherent in ‘indigenous institutions’, which highlight the autonomy of these systems.

The thesis is named ‘the market is free!’ as a result of interviews with traders who wanted to emphasize that anyone can enter the market and open a shop. Despite their reassurance that identity does not matter, it has been shown that (some) markets in Lagos are closed systems in which networks are important for market entry (Yusuff, 2013). Given the long history of Yoruba women in trading it is therefore not surprising that they make up the bulk of traders in markets. However, other ethnic groups specialize in specific forms of trade, e.g., Hausa firms are strong in agricultural trading, whilst Igbo firms dominate the electronics sections of markets. While this reflects the network segmentation that Fafchamps (2003) described, it should not be taken at face-value as there are nuances in how these associations and networks interact. Thus, while Nigeria has a particular history of ethnic politics which creates cleavages amongst groups, markets are spaces where you find people from all parts of the country engaging with each other on a daily basis. What this study is seeking to accomplish is thus to provide a case study that examines how identity affects market dynamics, governance and its politics. This means conceptualizing the marketplace as a space with particular sets of rules and regulations, whilst traders may have their own set of expectations of market relations. The focus is therefore on the multiple layers of

!17 ‘legacies, linkages and localities’ (Grabher & Stark, 1997) which together form contemporary markets in Lagos. The three Ls encompass the traditions, history, institutions, government, and the specificities of Lagos itself. The argument that this study follows is that ‘indigenous institutions’ such as the Yoruba market system is already changing in Lagos due to the specificities of the context. What we do not understand is how it is changing, to which extent and why? It is important to keep in mind that economists such as Fafchamps (2003) approach the topic from a developmental point of view, with their own set of assumptions and desired outcomes (e.g., market liberalization). However, the proposed changes are outcomes of the writers own aims and therefore diverge from how economists describe transformation.

The following section will provide overviews on some of the discussions that inform our understanding of where the existing gaps are and which debates this work can be placed in.

1.2 Background

Women as market leaders

The literature on African women has been critiqued for its dichotomous tendencies in which African women are described as being either voiceless, victims, or as ‘feisty, assertive, self-reliant heroines’ (Cornwall, 2005: 1). Western feminist activism in the 1970s and 1980s was concerned with the position of women and their [often] exclusion from the ‘public sphere’. It led to a wide body of literature examining women in governance and politics and “the search for the feminist or porto-feminist underpinnings of women’s collective action” (Cornwall, 2005: 11). This preoccupation with finding empowered women has been particularly evident in writings on Yoruba [market] women. As previously mentioned, earlier works focused on the position of women by examining the relationship between trading, gender equality, and economic independence (Marshall, 1964; Mintz, 1971; Sudakasa, 1973). However, from the 70s onwards studies mainly focused on their political position. Seminal texts such as Awe’s (1977) study on the Iyalode reconstructed the position of women in traditional Yoruba political systems and showed how titleholders had direct access to political participation and decision-making. Previous to Awe’s study, the Iyalode was mainly associated with the economic sphere, as the head of market women. Her work revealed how

!18 colonialism had substantially decreased the political power of Yoruba women. Subsequent studies on Yoruba women by other scholars have tried to document their importance in history as leaders of colonial opposition and queens (Denzer, 1994; Johnson, 1986), whilst others sought evidence of the longevity of their prowess by, for instance, framing agitation by market women against government policies as indicators of women’s agency (Mba, 1982; Eames, 1988). Studies on market women’s political activities such as Baker (1974) arguably forced market women’s associations into a political lobbying position by giving examples of how the women respond to policies and rarely advocate for policies on their own. While we can consider a position in which reactionary [as opposed to proactive] actions are considered less strong, this conclusion needs to come from the conceptualization of the studied individuals themselves. This particular case arguably indicates the pervasive quest to find pro-feminist underpinnings in collective action in groups who were not created for the purposes outsiders are trying to place them. The market women’s associations she refers to were created for purposes [economic as opposed to political]which diverged from the definition of power used by scholars leading to conclusions that women leaders had failed to yield substantial results for their fellow traders. This reflects Cornwall’s (2005) remark on how women’s position in governance falls into the dichotomous thinking of either ’women-as-victims’ or ’heroines’ (p. 10).

It is important to consider the framing of market women and their associations in the literature and engage with it in a way which captures nuances to their roles on the basis of their own perceptions of their role and responsibility as market leaders. This is crucial in order to not fall victim to the dichotomous narrative that has been so pervasive thus-far.

!19 ‘Migrant’ traders in the South-west

Most of the studies on Yoruba market women have been done in homogenous contexts. The least homogenous cities in the South-West are Ibadan and Lagos. Unfortunately most studies on market women in these two cities have only predominately focused on Yoruba actors to the neglect of minorities. However, studies on ‘migrant’ traders in the South-west do provide some insights into the role of minorities and neglect the role of the women. Hausa traders engagement in fatauci (long-distance trade) in West Africa has been well- documented (Adamu, 1978). Abner Cohen conducted seminal work on the relationship between ‘custom and political change’, by examining the role of trade and ethnic politics amongst Hausa migrants in Ibadan (1974). His work illustrated how political institutions were useful for economic institutions as the most successful traders were found in cases “when men from the same ethnic group controlled all, or most, of the stages of the trade in specific commodities [through] continual competition or strife with men from another ethnic group” thus leading to political organization in order to collectively protect the interests of their co-ethnics (p. 8). While Cohen’s work focuses on Ibadan, which has been one of the historically most important Yoruba cities, his work largely excludes the existence of Yoruba market women. This is surprising giving their important role in trade in the South-west. The organizational structure of both Yoruba women and migrant trader groups such as the Hausa have been studied separately, but little has been said about the interaction between both of these groups and their responses to each other. The influx of migrants from different parts of Nigeria to Lagos presents us with the opportunity to see whether these ethnic divisions have reproduced themselves over time as Fafchamps (2003) assumed or if there is more interaction between groups than the literature makes it seem.

1.3. Research objectives

This thesis seeks to understand how two identity markers — gender and ethnicity function in the marketplace. Function, in this regard is the role it plays in issues relating to the control and administration of a market, e.g., the dynamics, the (internal) politics, and vis-a-vis other actors such

!20 as the state government. Does it play a role? And if so how and why? Extant literature (Baker, 1974; Mba, 1994) has presented market women in Lagos as being a particularly cohesive (interest) group, as their studies focused on women specifically. Whilst women have historically been in charge of marketplaces in Southwestern Nigeria, more recent work such as Okome (2013) have pointed to the effects of colonial restructuring of ‘traditional’ market institutions. Okome showed that the restructuring decreased their autonomy by placing more power in local market councils, which are controlled by men. Baker (1974) wrote that “although the Yorubas dominate the city’s trade, some ethnic specialization appears in certain product lines which are favored by particular consumers or are supplied from distant regions” and that ‘immigration’ has not decreased their dominance (p. 225). However, Solaja et al., (2013) argue that the presence of Hausa firms are changing market social structures in the Southwest.

Given the portrayal of market women as being highly organized and homogenous it is possible to assume that there has been push-back against the influx of migrant traders. However, studies have yet to address whether this is still the case and what/how the response of Yoruba market women have been towards the increased competition from traders of other ethnicities and genders. As we can see there is a gap in regards to how gender and ethnicity currently affects the functioning of markets. This study seeks to fill this gap by taking an intersectional approach in examining three selected markets in Lagos. An intersectional approach means being not only gender-aware, but also mindful of the ‘matrix of domination’ (i.e., the intersection of social inequality, for instance in relation to gender and class) (Hill-Collins, 2000). The aim is therefore to present a nuanced analysis of how gender and ethnicity effects marketplaces in Lagos.

!21 1.4 Research questions

In order to take a holistic approach to the line of questioning as regards to authority in the marketplace the following research questions were posed:

Main research question

How do gender and ethnicity function in the marketplace in Lagos, Nigeria?

Subquestions

1. How do networks contribute to the in- or exclusion of traders in markets?

2. How are market governance and market associations organized in Lagos? How do women lead system function in relation to other associations?

3. How do market associations bargain with the Lagos State government?

As previously mentioned, the focal interest of this study is to understand how gender and ethnicity function in a market context. This requires a scope of inquiry which offers room for a layered analysis. The main question focuses on the women leaders specifically, given their de facto authority of market places. Whilst the three sub-questions seek to open up the possibility to examine the question from the perspective of: traders, male market leaders, and the (local) government. The final question seeks to build upon the findings from the previous questions in an attempt to put the findings into perspective with the current challenges facing markets across Lagos.

!22 1.5 Structure of thesis

This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter two is the literature review, which discusses the main theoretical debates on networks. Whilst this debate has mainly centered on economic development and informality, this chapter discusses more recent approaches that highlight the need to move beyond the focus on economic development to understanding the importance of the social and political aspect of markets, and locates the thesis within this debate. The chapter also discusses how intersectionality leads to a more holistic analysis and critiques the often reductionist approaches to the study of gender and ethnicity in African contexts.

Chapter three is the methodological chapter. It discusses the fieldwork, which this thesis is based on. Grounded theory, the use of empirical data to expand on a theoretical framework, was the overall methodological framework during the data collection. This chapter therefore discusses why this choice was made, and emphasizes the need to validate the knowledge of African — or in this case, Nigerian participants. It makes the case that knowledge production on Africa has largely been neocolonial, and that ethnographic authority is misleading considering the amount of assistance foreign researchers rely on during fieldwork. The chapter is a transparent account of how grounded theory allowed for the participants to help steer the direction of the study through insights they provided during the scoping phases. It is at once a ‘thank you’ to my participants and a call for moving beyond merely acknowledging the assistance of others, and writing reflexive accounts towards being transparent in how important participants are.

Chapter four discusses market dynamics and starts by giving an overview of gender and ethnicity in trading and marketplaces. The chapter traces the process of market entry on the basis of gender and ethnicity. It shows that Yoruba women do not necessarily have an overwhelming advantage over ‘migrant’ minorities in Lagos. It then tries to demonstrate the relating and unrelating to ones ethnicity in (economic) networks, by highlighting the strategies employed by various actors to expand their networks and their businesses both on the basis of ethnicity but also on the basis of downplaying its importance. These strategic alliances reveal the importance of intersectionality in accurately portraying market dynamics, as the actors differing bargaining positions is discussed.

!23 Chapter five examines how market governance is organized in Lagos. It discusses how market governance has traditionally been in the hands of women, through titles such as the Iyaloja (mother of the market) i.e., market executive[/leader]. Following the discussion on women in market leadership, the chapter examines male market executives; the male counterpart of the Iyaloja, i.e., the Babaloja (father of the market) and the end of the Lagos Market Women’s association in favor of a dual-sex association. Primarily looking at whether this introduction has shifted or even decreased the overall authority of women. It also looks at Chairmen, who essentially play the same role as the Iyaloja but often belong to other ethnic groups and are in male dominated trades. The chapter specifically examines Hausa Chairmen and uses the case of Arewa Perishable Goods section of Mile 12 market in Lagos. Lastly, this chapter goes into the functioning of market associations. It provides an overview of their services provided to traders, as well as the requirements placed on them. As the chapter will show, market associations have a limited function, which opens up the space for other associations to assist traders in other issues.

Chapter six discusses market politics and focuses on state intervention in the market by examining the developmental turn taken by the Lagos State government and the infrastructural changes taking place. What this chapter shows is that the developmental paradigm coupled with ‘good governance’ is guiding the Lagos state government in its ambitious goal of transforming Lagos into a ‘Mega- city’. This project presents a [potentially] major challenge to markets, which in the view of the government represent the opposite of modernity and orderliness. The chapter therefore examines the political bargaining powers of the markets in the study, and examining how they interact with the government.

The final chapter discusses the main findings of this study. It highlights the lessons drawn in each of the empirical chapters and makes the argument for more interdisciplinary and intersectional work on market traders in Africa generally and Nigeria specifically.

!24 CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

The study of markets in Africa has long been dominated by the informality paradigm, but has gradually lost traction as an increasing number of scholars have started to seek new ways to understand how regulation works in so-called ‘informal economies’ (e.g., Lund, 2007). Meagher (2010) critiqued the overemphasis on informality because it overlooks the numerous ways in which ‘informal’ institutions operate through internal regulative authority (e.g., market associations), but also in relation to the formal — namely, the state and private sector. Similarly, Lund (2007) argued that “institutions that exercise legitimate public authority, but do not enjoy legal recognition as part of the state, are out of focus” (p. 3). In the case of markets in Lagos, there is an ambiguous relationship between the state and the markets. Oyelaran-Oyeyinka’s (2014: 19) study of Computer Village in Otigba (one major market in Lagos) showed that Otigba:

“is viewed as informal by the state government because it is a residential zone converted into a business district by private individuals. On the other hand, it is recognized by the same state government, which relates with it through the umbrella association – the Computer and Allied Products Dealers Association of Nigeria (CAPDAN) – and collects taxes from the firms”

All three of the markets that are part of this study has a leadership that is legitimized by the government — both at local and state level. This means that the informality paradigm would obscure the legitimized status of the Iyalojas’ position(s) as heads of market associations and their regulative authority over their respective markets. Therefore, this thesis uses the concept of networks instead. As Meagher (2009) argued, “networks offer a useful conceptual tool for the analysis of non- state forms of economic and political governance”, while emphasizing the importance of using the concept in an ’empirically grounded’ manner. This is in order to not essentialize networks and the actors within them but instead to “problematize the social as a regulatory force” (Smith, 1994 in Meagher, 2009: 25). This requires the application of the concept in tandem with a ‘multi-stranded’ approach that factors the context specific interaction between culture, institutions and localities. The form of market governance and social structure found in Lagos stem from ‘traditional’

!25 Yoruba market organization. However, as this study will show this does not mean that the market institution is static, but rather it has evolved in relation to its context and actors within and outside the institution such as the state government. This thesis makes references to history in order to illustrate the dynamic nature of networks and to explain the contemporary structures which determine the ways market associations and its leadership are able to operate as an authority over market spaces. It therefore takes a constructivist approach in tracing factors which have impacted the present, and interrogates gender and ethnicity in relation to market structures as to avoid essentializing actors or referring to identity as being primordial. This requires an interdisciplinary approach. As the discussion in this chapter will show, various disciplines have approached markets with their own set of assumptions and aims. On the one hand, you have economists who examine market entry in order to understand how to make the market more ‘free’; whilst on the other hand, you have anthropologist who sought to find proof of women’s agency by examining their role in leadership positions. While the desired outcomes in the two fields differ, combining their discussions assists us in creating a holistic picture of the various processes occurring within markets, i.e., if we only concern ourself with equalizing market entry for multiple traders, we might overlook how market liberalization destroys the function of market associations, which may result in increased economic hardship for women. This approach has been used by other scholars (see Sylvanus, 2013) and it has provided a nuanced account of the lived realities in markets.

First, this chapter will present network theory as an appropriate framework in order to explain the research questions. ‘Networks’ is a diffuse concept, so the focus has been narrowed down to social and migratory networks as the two complement each other. Second, the concepts of gender and ethnicity will be presented and discussed in relation to intersectionality (and related to that is: agency and power). Third, a multi-stranded approach to networks will be presented by discussing legacies, linkages and localities. This approach reinforces the importance of the three supplementary concepts of gender, ethnicity and intersectionality. Finally, the conclusion of this chapter discusses consequences of the theoretical choices and how the different concepts together form a holistic approach, which is necessary in order to avoid relying on cultural determinism in the analysis.

!26 2.2. Networks: social and migration network theory

The literature on networks can be divided into three main approaches: structural, instrumentalist, and institutional. The structural approach to networks uses the basic conceptualization of networks in which individuals are nodes and relationships are links in a web of (social) interactions (Fafchamps, 2003: 293). The instrumental approach is agency-oriented as it focuses on uncovering how networks enables actors to use their (social) capital in the ‘pursuit of individual interests’ (Meagher, 2009). These approaches have been critiqued for their neglect of the institutional aspects of networks by overemphasizing ‘patterns of ties’ (Meagher, 2009). Scholars have therefore suggested that “the remedy of the apparent primacy of method over substance in network research is to bring the content of ties, rather than merely the structure formed by these ties, back in” (emphasis mine, Powell and Smith-Doerr, 1994 in Meagher, 2009: 10). The institutional approach frames networks as “informal forms of organization that shape economic behavior on the basis […] of the social relations and practices embedded in network ties” (Meagher, 2009: 10). Meagher (2009) emphasizes how this approach directs us to ‘the specific relations and practices taking place within networks in a given context’ (p. 10). This means that while studies examining the clientelist ties between market associations and politicians are examining networks from an instrumental approach, they neglect to explain how these relationship are embedded within larger structural and institutional frameworks. However, this is not to say that we should abandon structural and instrumental approaches in favor for institutionalism, instead it is to show the need to consider all three approaches and how they contribute to explaining the content of ties. Essentially, in order to be holistic this study uses a combination of the three approaches. This study is examining traders and their connection to each other within informal economic networks, which in this case refer to marketplaces where trading takes place. The structural approach helps us in identifying ties and how traders are related to each other. However, what we want to understand is whether the existence of ties plays a role in trader’s abilities to use networks to their own benefit. The structural and the instrumental approach are in that sense interlinked, as the patterns of ties determine the trader’s level of agency. These two approaches are necessary, as the relations extend beyond individual marketplaces. However, the marketplace and its specific set of rules and regulations requires an institutional approach as well. As already mentioned, markets cannot be understood merely through the informality paradigm because they are linked to ‘official’ or recognized institutions. Thus, if we do not look at the institutional framework that market associations and leaders are embedded in, we fail to understand how they function.

!27 Social networks

Bestor (2001) defined markets as “the web of relationships, institutions and distinct geographical spaces that enable economic transactions” (in Marfaing & Thiel, 2013: 649). Thus, what we are trying to understand is how gender and ethnicity function in marketplaces, but essentially within the networks that together create these spaces.. Marfaing & Thiel (2013) explain how social norms function in markets:

“market order is seen as the empirical expression of the normative sense making that regulates interactions between economic actors, practices and institutions. Norms possess regulatory potential because of their existence above and beyond the individuals who obey them. In their collective recognition, social norms as a rule reproduce and reinforce established orders – in that they convey the moral justification for their enactment. As such, social norms reproduce the practices from which they are themselves derived, and vice versa. Norms of interactions in the market do not, then, derive from judicial codes, but are the result of lived habits and social practices” (p. 662)

If we consider the ‘collective recognition’ that Marfaing & Thiel (2013) mentioned, it helps us relate back to the issue Fafchamps was concerned with, namely market entry. It is harder for traders outside networks to enter markets because there is no proof of them adhering to the social norms of business. Marfaing & Thiel (2013) argue that the sociality of norms makes it malleable and that while market order is mostly consistent it remains ‘permeable’ (p. 662). This raises questions as to how traders outside of established networks enter markets. In order for us to understand how and why some actors are in a better position to acquire social capital and make use of it, we need to use “institutionally-sensitive perspectives that reconnect social networks with issues of history, power, and institutional process” (Meagher, 2005: 224). In Fafchamps (2003) work we see that internal and external ties have ethnic origins which can be related back to history. In the case of Lagos, it is a combination of ethnic and gendered historical origins, which has impacted the patterns of networks we see today. It is therefore helpful to think of migratory networks as they to a large extent influence the social networks individuals build.

!28 Migration networks

Barnes (1975) conducted a study on associational activity in Lagos according to ethnicity, and highlighted that the city was overwhelmingly indigenous Lagosian Yoruba in the 70s as they constituted between sixty to seventy percent of the population. She found that this was an important factor in relation to associational participation as:

“for migrant Yoruba whose cultural compatriots largely control local governmental councils, the process of integrating themselves into the Lagos community is eased by familiarity. Once they have found alternative outlets, the supportive willingness of Yoruba to settle permanently in Lagos also bears witness to these facts” (p. 86).

What this tells us is that while Lagos is a metropolitan area, it has never been a blank slate. The city has been influenced and shaped by its many Yoruba inhabitants. It also shows that it was relatively easy for Yoruba migrants to enter established networks. Osaghae (1994:40) considers migration in Nigeria to be shaped by a set of ‘peculiarities’:

“These peculiarities, which are mainly political, derive from the entrenched system of regionalism which defines the patterns, attitudes and tendencies of migrants and their host communities. As each region struggled to be self-sufficient, migrant settlers suffered structural discrimination which engendered peculiar associational ethnicity, part of which gave birth to what we call migrant ethnic empires.”

Because of Nigerian history of regionalism, civil war, and rampant ethnic political discourse there is a rift between people on the local level. That is to say, we may be discussing networks within one country, but social history have many conceptualizing ethnicities and regions in a way akin to nationalism. As Uchendu (1970) argued, the main ethnic groups in Nigeria can be seen as nations. Studies such as Osaghae (1994) showed how Igbo traders in Kano sought to establish themselves in the North by adapting Hausa types of leadership institutions. He framed their new-found association as a ‘migrant ethnic empire’ and showed how permanent migrants “pursue their constitutive interests through the (re)creation of centralized political authority. Unlike conventional ethnic unions, migrant ethnic empires involve ‘traditional’ loyalties and ties which have a ‘king’ or ‘chief’ at the centre. Such emergent empires bring together migrants from related sub-groups to forge a new unity based on cultural and customary practices” (p. 41). Similarly, Abner Cohen’s studies (1965; 1966; 1967 and 1974) on Hausa traders in the South-west showed how they created their own leadership institutions and sought to remain outside of Yoruba institutions. The pattern that !29 emerges is thus that trading, networks and politics are intimately related, and that those deemed as ‘outsiders’ have sought to create their own institutions. Given the ease of integration for Yoruba migrants to Lagos, they are essentially not considered ‘migrant’ traders, with the phrase reserved for those who are considered as outsiders to the region. Thus a Yoruba migrant from Oyo is not perceived as a migrant in Lagos, while a Hausa trader who is a second generation Lagosian will be considered a migrant. This has an impact on not only access to networks, but also willingness to seek out networks deemed as ‘foreign’, i.e., traders may choose to join networks that were created by co-ethnics because they deem others as closed to them. This is also because migrants are often already part of a network when they move. Migration network theories, thus explains the process of settling in in new contexts and what networks migrants use in the process. Since migratory networks may influence the formation of social networks in new contexts it is likely to influence the way migrants relate to ethnicity and how that in turn, may limit or facilitate the formation of new networks.

2.3 Intersectionality: focus on gender and ethnicity

The theoretical concept of networks is supplemented by three concepts, namely gender, ethnicity and intersectionality. The application of the three concepts goes beyond mere textbook definitions, but instead seeks to uncover the various interpretations the research participants have of e.g., gender, but also the interplay in individuals’ understanding, and larger societal ascriptions, in which case intersectionality is helpful in the analysis. The following sections therefore presents a discussion on gender, ethnicity and intersectionality and how it has been employed in the study. It ends with a discussion on power and authority, as it informs our understanding and analysis of how identities operate along the multiple-axes highlighted in the discussion on intersectionality.

!30 Gender

Writings on African women’s relative social position on the basis of sex has historically been rather problematic. Many anthropological studies either maintained that women are severely marginalized or altogether absent (Galletti et al. 1956), whilst others misread social contexts by analyzing social relations mainly through Western feminist frameworks (Mintz, 1971). For instance, Galletti et al. (1956) who studied cocoa farmers in Western Nigeria considered only men as being farmers, while women were categorized as farm hands. However, the burgeoning literature shows that progress is being made. More recent work such as Farnworth & Colverson (2015) has shed light on how the lack of gender awareness [and arguably, reflexivity] in the study of gender obscures reality as it relies on a gender dichotomy that negates the importance of one party, which often is women. They pointed to the fact that farm work consist of collaboration between the genders, but that this is not reflected in the discourse due to a ‘conceptual lock-in’. A conceptual lock-in arguably stems from the lack of contextual specificities, and an over reliance on externally developed theoretical frameworks and concepts. The very definition of gender is that it is a social construct that creates and justifies differences and discrimination between men and women. It is therefore highly contextual, and requires us to acknowledge that as a social construct it will be “made and remade in everyday interactions and by institutions” (Oyewumi, 2002: 2). West African market women have received much scholarly attention for their high participation in economic activities and positions of power in market governance. Mintz (1971) wrote that “probably no people on earth has institutionalized women's rights to engage in trading activity so fully as have the Yoruba. […] Yoruba women not only have a wholly acknowledged right to trade and to use their capital largely as they see fit, but they also dominate the internal market system” (p. 260). She was seemingly impressed by their generally high participation in economic activities. However, she is arguably conflating economic activity with empowerment. Indeed, other scholars have pointed to how other occupations were deemed ‘unfit’ for women or how gender dynamics related to family structures played significant roles in enabling and justifying women’s activity in trade (Denzer, 1994 , Johnson 1986 and Olasupo et al., 2012). Writings such as that by Mintz (1970), nonetheless inspired other scholars to study Yoruba market women as they were “renowned for their economic independence and their almost total association with the public arena of the marketplace” (Eames, 1988: 82). The marketplace in Southwestern Nigeria, had effectively come to be considered a matriarchal space and Nigerian market women synonymous with empowerment. While scholars such as Eames (1988) admitted that she was “guided by an !31 optimistic Western feminist discourse” in her choice to “live and work with Yoruba women” her work still relies heavily on her interpretations of power and authority (p. 82). As argued by Adamako-Ampofo and Arnfred (2009) feminist knowledge is ‘rooted in experience’ and has to be ‘situated’ (p. 10). The question we must ask is whose experience counts as knowledge? Indeed the question becomes an epistemological (and methodological, see chapter 3) one as it challenges the foundations of the prevailing theoretical and conceptual frameworks which have dominated the discourse on African women. Oyewumi (2002: 4) argues that:

The difficulty of applying feminist concepts to express and analyze African realities is the central challenge of African gender studies. The fact that western gender categories are presented as inherent in nature (of bodies) and operate on a dichotomous, binarily opposed male/female, man/ woman duality in which the male is assumed to be superior and therefore the defining category, is particularly alien to many African cultures. When African realities are interpreted based on these Western claims, what we find are distortions, obfuscations in language and often a total lack of comprehension due to the incommensurability of social categories and institutions.

While Oyewumi (1997) has argued that gender in its Western conceptualization does not apply to Yoruba societies, many have challenged her (Bakare-Yusuf, 2003 and Boyce-Davies, 2015). Thus, while Oyewumi’s work ‘The Invention of Women: Making an African Sense of Western Gender Discourse’ may have inadvertently (in the words of Boyce-Davies, 2015:85) presented “an undifferentiated and static Yoruba society or perhaps an essential Yoruba identity”, what we should take away is her critique of both the over reliance on Western concepts, but also their uncritical application. The fact that much of the theoretical writings on gender originated in the West does not make them obsolete in African contexts. Colonialism meant that Western gender norms were transported to African countries, and severely impacts gender relations today. Moreover, the work of numerous Nigerian women studies scholars (e.g., Mama, 1997; Pereira, 2002) and the Women in Nigeria (WIN) movement and the establishment of the Network for Women’s Studies in Nigeria (NWSN) are a testament to the need to continue to examine gender and not reduce the discussion to a rejection of Western concepts. However, we should be mindful in how we ‘import’ theoretical toolkits and how they influence our analysis by (often) bringing us to normative conclusions. If we take the work of Mintz (1971) for instance, if we consider Yoruba women’s participation in economic activities as a sign of their independence from men and empowerment are we creating blindspots to the gendered challenges they may face in other spheres? The literature suggest that this is the case. Afonja (1980) showed that not only were Yoruba women often considered oluranlowo (‘a helper who is able to help the husband attain high status in the community’) (p. 99), but women traders whose incomes surpassed subsistence had to perform rites !32 to become accepted ‘since she was regarded as a threat to the men in her household’ (p. 99). Other Nigerian scholars also reject the widely accepted categorization of Yoruba women as autonomous because it is common that Yorubas are “socialized into believing that man is superior to woman, a nor[m] which affects male-female relationships in all spheres of activity” (Ajisafe, 1926 in Afonja, 1980: 96). This indicates the need to be contextually sensitive while using ‘foreign’ concepts. While Ake (1988, in Nnaemeka, 2004: 376) was discussing development, his perspective on ‘the indigenous’ is useful to consider in this discussion as well:

“The indigenous refers to whatever the people consider important to their lives, whatever they regard as an authentic expression of themselves. We build on the indigenous by making it determine the form and content of development strategy, by ensuring that developmental change accommodates itself to these things, be they values, interests, aspirations and or social institutions which are important in the life of the people”

Similarly, Ezumah (2009) defines women’s studies as “the study of women, which is geared towards reflecting women’s realities in various spheres of life by addressing the socio-cultural, economic and political constraints that have been engendered by gender inequality in the society” (author’s emphasis, p. 188). What these two perspectives show is the need to center the experiences of the individuals that are being “studied” and building our theoretical frameworks on empirical data instead of the other-way around.

While this study centers women’s lived experiences in the marketplace as it relates to dynamics, governance and politics it pays much attention to the role and experiences of men. The term gender has almost become synonymous with the feminine gender. However, in seeking to understand the lives of market women, it is necessary to factor in the position of men — especially so because markets are not as matriarchal as the literature make it seem. Markets in Lagos are often to a large extent dominated by women in numerical terms, but there is still a substantial amount of male traders. Moreover, as reflected by the works of Awe (1974); Eames; (1988); Marshall (1965); Mba (1982); Mintz (1970); and Suardakassa (1973) the form of market governance and social structures which is mainly dominated by women is specific to Yoruba peoples. However, Lagos is one of the most heterogeneous cities in Nigeria, and this diversity is highly visible in the marketplace where you find people from all over the country. Many of the more visible non-Yoruba groups in the marketplace are the Igbo and the Hausa. While Igbo women are active in trade as well (and to a lesser degree Hausa women), the most visible of both groups are men. The previous studies which laid the foundation for the study of !33 Yoruba market women are old and thus do not fully match the contemporary situation, especially not in Lagos. The changes in market composition corroborates the need to ground the theoretical framework on empirical data. Igbo men, for instance are a dominant group in the import of fabrics, and ready-made clothes, while Hausa men run the biggest depot for agricultural products in town — both of these are things which the Yoruba women traders sell. Given that men are in charge of the two, how does that position women traders? The bulk of traders are Yoruba women. The market administrative system in Lagos is largely shaped by the ‘traditional’ Yoruba way to structure markets. These factors raise questions as to whether ethnicity plays a role in the power (a) symmetries between different groups? It is not possible to merely define marketplaces (in Lagos) as being synonymous with Yoruba women, instead studies are required to consider the role of ’new’ actors.

Ethnicity

Ethnicity is a fluid concept as it changes depending on contexts, and depending on user, but generally refers to a “process by which people make claims based on their identification as members of an imagined community” often on the basis of culture and language (Bender-Shelther, 2015: 3). In utilizing the concept in this study, it is necessary to consider three things: 1) the conceptualization of ethnicity in network literature, 2) ethnicity in the study of networks in Nigeria, and 3) gender in the literature on ethnicity. The literature on economic networks in Africa has been dominated by a focus on ethnicity. The way much of the literature describes ethnicity on the continent has been to champion the primordial which creates misleading conceptualizations of ethnicity in networks. Brautigam (2003) argued that “indigenous African business networks are segregated by ethnicity as well as by social- economic status, and that African businesses seem less likely to be linked to other groups outside the region that could provide important models, ideas and resources” (p. 452). Whilst Fukuyama (1995) argued that ‘it would appear that in many contemporary African cities, older political structures and family ties have broken down with rapid urbanization but have not been replaced by strong voluntary associations outside of kinship” (p. 94). These assertions stem from a belief that culture is ‘the key regulatory principle of economic networks’ (Meagher, 2009). In contrast to Brautigam (2003) and Fukuyama (1995), Fafchamps (2003) claims that “the relationship between ethnicity and business networks remains loose even when business networks are ethnically concentrated” (p. 308). This is because ethnic groups are so large that the majority of ‘coethnics’ are

!34 not in the same occupation. Moreover, he argues that “ethnic concentration […] seems to result from nothing else than historical accident and socialization patterns that are reinforced by the practice of business itself” (p. 308). This is reflected in other studies as well, which argue that “socio-cultural identities provide a basis of trust and reciprocity in inter-firm relations […] That is to say a regulatory mechanism for inter-firm relations emerges from within the community and socio-cultural identities” (Nadvi & Schmitz, 1994 in Meagher, 2009: 12). The work by Fafchamps (2003) on ethnicity in African markets is important as it challenges what Meagher (2009) considered the tendency for the literature on economic networks to rely on cultural determinism. Fafchamps (2003) looks at the relationship between business networks and community. Community, in the way he uses it can be used interchangeably with ethnicity. His argument is that ethnic concentration is the result of referrals from friends and family when new actors or firms enter markets (p. 293). While he highlights that the argument is based on limited empirical evidence, his work on information sharing, (informal) contract enforcement and trust is what has led his work to deem networks within specific communities to be the best way for economic actors to minimize transaction costs (p. 293). This essentially means that as the practice of business requires actors to make decisions which best ensures low transaction costs and security, the basis for staying within (ethnic) networks is not because of a low awareness of opportunities outside the in-group, which is what Brautigam (2003) seem to suggest, but rather the result of weak institutions which can ensure that contracts are enforced. What happens when general [mis]trust in business practices are coupled with a troubled past marked by a gruesome civil war as in the case of Nigeria? There has been many studies on ethnicity in Nigeria, often with a focus on conflict. The overwhelming focus on studying the negative affects of ethnocentricity (e.g., in politics) is understandable given the unfortunate, reoccurring violence that has ravaged large parts of the country, and led to civil war between 1967 - 1970. However, understudied topics are cases of intra- ethnic contestations, but also inter-ethnic cooperation. As previously mentioned, Lagos’ markets are heterogeneous and while the three major ethnic groups (Yoruba, Hausa and Igbo) are seemingly in charge of different parts of trading networks there is cooperation between all three actors. Osaghae (1994) argued that “the academic study of associational ethnicity is that notwithstanding its popularity, much of it is undertaken within ‘worn-out’ theoretical frameworks which have dated empirical bases. This has limited the robustness of theories on associational ethnicity” (p. 1). Similarly, Ukiwo (2005) argues that “the assumption that […] ethnic groups were always at each others’ throats for no just cause tailored studies towards examining instances of ethnic conflicts and competition to the neglect of numerous instances of harmonious inter-ethnic cooperation” (p. 16). !35 These critiques d not mean that we should stop considering the role of ethnicity in relation to various aspects of lived realities, instead as Ukiwo (2005) reminds us there are important factors to consider in relation to ethnicity: 1) ethnicity is a product of social actors, 2) ethnicity can be manifested in contexts of cooperation too and 3) ethnicity is the result of both self-identification and external categorization (p. 5). If we relate this back to our discussion on migrant networks, it becomes evident that ethnicity is a sensitive matter which in many cases has lead to the establishment of separate networks. In the case of Hausa traders in Ibadan, Cohen (1967) showed that the choice to remain exclusive was partially made by the colonial government, but also advocated for by Hausa traders themselves, who considered it to be a way to maintain trading monopolies. This has been observed in other studies in Nigeria as well and it shows it stems from calculated “employment or mobilization of ethnic identity and difference to gain advantage in situations of competition, conflict or cooperation” (Osaghae 1995:11in Ukiwo, 2005: 4) Similarly, Nnoli (1976) noted that “the most crucial factor for the emergence of ethnicity in the contact situation is the degree of socio- economic competition involved” (p. 7). This was reflected in Peil (1972) study on ethnic attitudes, which found that “the Yoruba of Ajegunle were more prejudiced against strangers than other ethnic groups in Ajegunle or Yoruba living elsewhere”, the study attributed this to the Yoruba being a minority in Ajegunle. The economic situation following the civil war is also considered important as it may have contributed to the results in which the Yoruba had strong feelings against the influx of Igbo migrants. If we look at ethnicity within the context of Lagos, we see that the city has always been predominately Yoruba (Adefuge et al., 1986 in Peil, 1991). In 1968 the census placed 16% as non- Yoruba (Mabogunje, 1968 in Peil, 1991). The city is also considered to be part of the “Yoruba homeland and has been largely shaped by Yoruba migrants” (Peil, 1991). Indeed, early census figures show that roughly an equal amount of ‘local’ Yoruba and migrant Yoruba from neighboring states made up the bulk of the population. There were many wars between Yoruba people and for a long time there was no pan-Yoruba identity. The contemporary conceptualization of Yoruba is the result of decades of strategic essentialism and political agitation in light of nation-building post- independence in 1960. While Lagos remains Yoruba dominated until today, it has nonetheless become a centre where a plurality of Nigerian ethnicities interact. In fact, at one point “ethno- militant groups like the Ijaw National Congress (INC), the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), and the Arewa Peoples Congress (APC), all [had] vibrant branches in the congested and multi-ethnic neighborhood of Lagos” (Agbu, 2004: 19). However, !36 Peil (1991) argued “the Yoruba see Lagos as their city (or their farm), and want to reap most of the benefits for themselves” (p. 44). This makes it seem as if there is no cooperation between ethnic groups. It is important to not make such generalizations. Solaja et al., (2013) writes that “Hausa ethnic group have dominated many grocery markets in southwestern, Nigeria. Thus, most of the duties assigned to market bureaucrats are being carried out by Hausa executives in the market” (p. 45). By not looking at how Hausa networks are related to Yoruba networks it creates dichotomous categorizations (e.g., Hausa migrant and Yoruba locals) which obscures the reality of networks which cut-across ethnic boundaries. Relating back to Ukwio’s (2005) points, ethnicity exists in instances of cooperation too.

Bender-Shetler (2015) argues that the literature on ethnicity in Africa has been dominated by male perspectives and that it is ‘time for women’s role in the process of ethnic formation to be given analytical priority’ (p. 3). The approach he applied in doing so was ‘gendering ethnicity’. By acknowledging that both gender and ethnicity are social constructs that are contingent on actors and contexts, he sought to illustrate the ways in which an individual ‘chooses to assert a particular identity depends on the specific historical context and concerns of that individual’ (p.4). By defining our participants solely according to ethnicity, we fail to account for their agency in choosing how to relate to it. Thus, by giving primacy to the fluidity of these concepts we allow ourself to make a break with the cultural determinism that so often dominates the debate on gender and ethnicity.

Intersectionality

The term intersectionality was first coined by Kimberlee Crenshaw (1991) and refers to the intersection of oppression, i.e., issues of race, class and gender are not separate categories of oppression or privilege but they intersect and together create subjective positions of individuals. The concept is of outmost importance in any analysis of power (a)symmetries because it moves away from a single-axis framework towards the incorporation of the multiple facets that make up individuals and subsequently affect their (social) positions.2 Osaghae (1994) argued that “recognition of multiple identities has been referred to as the social network approach which ‘avoids analysis of attitudes and actions of individuals in terms of specific bounded groups, acknowledging instead that individuals are enmeshed in a web of social relationships that lie within

2 Intersectionality was reintroduced and made more defined by Hill-Collins (2009) through her concept of ’Matrix of Domination’, which was mentioned in Chapter 1. !37 and without several organizational and categorical boundaries” (author’s emphasis, p. 5). His argument mirrors that of intersectionality as it stresses the need to factor the multiple identity markers which individuals are (self) defined by. Similarly, Lindell (2010) points to the heterogeneous nature of associations and the need to consider the ‘multiple subjectivities’ of actors, i.e., “multiple fields of power that intersect and interact to shape configurations of advantage and disadvantage in specific contexts” (p. 14). This essentially means that the analysis of associations and individual traders should consider how individual’s positions change according to context. This means that, for instance, the framing of Yoruba women (traders) as independent due to their trading activities obscures their oppression in family contexts.

Agency

If we consider the ways associations relating to market women and ethnicity have been described in the literature we see a tendency to portray networks as ‘channels of popular agency’ as these groups manage to create their own structures and thus manage to ‘circumvent structures of political and economic exclusion within wider society’ (Long, 2001 in Meagher, 2009: 14). However, questions are rarely asked whether associations should be circumventing the state. The Nigerian state, for instance, is criticized for its weak delivery of public goods. While this is the case, this should not warrant opposition in all instances of state intervention in associational actives. The overemphasis on market women’s agency as being fixed in an oppositional position fails to encompass their agency to choose to agree with the state in regards to e.g., relocations of markets. In this sense, the overwhelming tendency to only frame agency in instances where the women successfully reject the state, we make a normative judgement on instances where there is cooperation. Agency should therefore not only be thought of in terms of circumventing, rejecting or opposing, but also in situations of cooperation, engagement and partnerships.

Networks are sometimes seen as ways to “unite people in commercial and other functional ties […] across regional and ethnic boundaries” (Rotchild and Foley in Meagher, 2009: 15). This is because networks enables groups to play active roles in civil society and fill existing gaps in the provision of social goods. However, associations often fill clear functions, and do not replace service provision that a state should deliver. Moreover, agency at an individual level means that membership in one association does not preclude membership in other groups. Thus, individuals may be part of heterogeneous associations, but they may still be segregated from other groups in society at large.

!38 We should be cautious with not overemphasizing the positive role associations can play in bridging gaps between people.

Defining power and authority (in the marketplace)

Latour (1984) argued that power comes from wielding authority over others, and is thus not something individuals ‘possess’. Much of the literature on market women leaders have attributed their power to this facet of their title, as they refer to their ability to shut down markets in protest to e.g., unfavorable economic policies, and thus damaging the economy (Eames, 1988; Falola, 1995). They have also been considered politically influential, as they have been frequently sought after by politicians seeking to be (re)elected (Baker, 1974; Mba, 1994). However, these perspectives focuses on their ability to wield power and mobilize a large constituency. The focal point of this study is to understand how power translates to everyday market governance and relations. To which extent do Iyalojas wield power over traders in their markets? As argued by Gugler & Flanagan (1978) “once an ethnic group was established in a privileged position, it wielded considerable influence over the opportunities open to others; patronage tended to go to kinsmen, covillagers, or any brother” (p. 6). If we consider this in relation to associations in Lagos we can assume that Yoruba women have a privileged position because they act as gate-keepers in many markets across Lagos. However, this needs to be confirmed by empirical data.

Because of the overwhelming focus of market women’s political power as pressure groups, it is helpful to think of non-confrontational forms of power as well. As Lukes (1974) writes that much of the analysis of power “focuses on behavior in the making of decisions over key or important issues as involving actual conflict”, but that power exists in other forms as well (p. 18). Lund (2007) developed his idea of ’twilight institutions’ as an ”analytical strategy for understanding of public authority in contexts where it is not the exclusive realm of government institutions, where institutional competition is intense, and where a range of apparently a-political situations become actively politicized” (p. 13-14 ). The a-political or regular bargaining between government and associations is of focus in this study as it seeks to move away from the dominant conflictual narrative of market associations.

!39 2.4. Legacies, linkages and localities

This chapter started with critiquing the informality paradigm as it does not encompass the regulatory practices of associations. Because of the highly organized nature of marketplaces in terms of their associations and dynamics it is useful to use an institutional approach. Grabher and Stark (1997) use a multidimensional framework through three main concepts: legacies, linkages and localities. As we will see, their approach is useful in connecting how different social realities and histories interact and create specific contexts, thus enabling us to attempt a layered analysis of markets.

Legacies

Grabher & Stark (1996) were seeking to understand the institutional legacies of socialism in Eastern Europe and how actors could seek to move away from socialism. Legacies in this sense refers to the “institutional practices embedded in networks” (Meagher, 2005: 225). How do past institutions influence the present? In the case of market associations in Lagos, they have been embedded in political institutions through networks which link market leaders and politicians. As shown in Barnes (1986), clientelism has been one way in which we can understand the effects of being absorbed into these structures. In the words of Brown & Lyons (2006) “the representational space for traders cannot be separated from wider discourse on the informal economy, and the political and institutional landscape in which they operate” (p. 45). Thus, thinking about how associations may seem to act independently but are in fact part of networks which bridge the so-called informal with the formal helps bring to the fore the political nature of associations, which in turn may limit their room for maneuvering.

Linkages

‘Linkages’ deal with networks in the process of social change through ‘branching points’ i.e, “conjunctures at which network members may form new connections to tap into organizational alternatives” (Meagher, 2009: 19). While linkages may serve as a springboard for individual actors to seek out other associations, Meagher (2009) highlights the possibility for it to lead to fragmentation and ‘the erosion of internal solidarity’ as members try to diversify their networks (p.

!40 19). This indicates how important it is to be intersectional in our approach to individual actors and their relationship to associations as they are not bound to one network but have the agency and ability to seek out other associations.

Localities

The dynamics found in markets are inextricably linked to the context they are in. In considering the role of localities in relation to the topic at hand, it helps us focus “attention on how the organizational capacities of networks are shaped by the local fabric of formal and informal institutions in which they are embedded” (Meagher, 2005: 225). As previously mentioned, Lagos has largely been shaped by its Yoruba inhabitants. Thus the market systems in Lagos reflect Yoruba forms of market institutions, in which women are the heads of markets. This means that traders seeking to establish themselves in Lagos are required to engage with Yoruba institutions. This is not to say that these institutions are static, but that their influence should not be overlooked. As Meagher (2009) reminds us “culture, agency and power combine to shape particular types of networks in specific contexts” (p. 18).

2.5 Conclusion

The argument put forward in this chapter is that it is crucial that an analysis of market associations and traders is holistic and empirically grounded. This means that we consider the multiple factors which affect the position of traders and associations. Why do we see ethnic and gendered segmentation in markets? What opportunities are there for traders and individuals to bypass divisions? Based on the theoretical framework we can assume that these patterns are related to historical socialization processes, for instance, in regards to high numbers of women traders. However, it also indicates the need to capture nuances in which traders use networks to link themselves to new networks.

!41 CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

”If Africans did not tell their stories, Africa will soon disappear.”

- Ousman Sémbene

3.1 Introduction

Academic discussions on scholarship on Africa have been discussing inequalities between Western and African academics. The disproportionate visibility of research produced in the West has been attributed to factors, such as: access to funding, publishing outlets, citations. The inequality is, thus, a “the result of a material reality of institutional and financial inequalities” (Mama, 2007: 4). These inequalities notwithstanding, there is much scholarship produced by African academics that never gets published in the West. Indeed, the dearth of Africa(n) produced scholarship in academic works on Africa does not reflect the reality of knowledge production on the continent as “Africans have always produced knowledge about Africa, even though their contributions have been “preferably unheard” in some cases and “deliberately silenced” (Pailey, 2016). The readings during one’s studies is important as they help shape the epistemological underpinnings that informs the course for one’s own (future) research. Due to the preference of ‘top-ranked’, Western-based journals in teaching it is not surprising to hear statements such as director and publisher Mary Jay at African Books Collective, who recently claimed that “you can get a Masters in African Studies without reading a single book published in Africa” (Nai, 2017). In a discussion on neocolonial knowledge production on twitter, academic, Alice Evans tweeted that “academia is like the colonial cotton industry. Harvest raw material from over there, using cheap labour. Manufacture theory here, export back” (Evans, 2017). This dynamic needs to be addressed not only at an institutional level, but also in terms of epistemology, ethics and methodology. This chapter is prefaced with a quote by Senegalese writer, and filmmaker Ousman Sémbene, which is relevant to consider in relation to knowledge production on Africa. !42 The institutional inequalities have been acknowledged, but what about the voices of research participants? How do we ensure that the voices of those we ‘use’ for our research, and the impact it has on the success of fieldwork is adequately reflected in our final write-up? If both the research and the institution backing the research is Western, then the only way for the ‘African’ to be seen and heard is through choosing methodologies and methods, which open up for this possibility. Reflexivity is a way to engage with the epistemological and methodological challenges that exist in carrying out ethically sound research that not only uses African data, but also highlight the importance African participants had throughout the research process.

This chapter presents the research design that guided the fieldwork on which this thesis is based. The study takes an intersectional approach to the study of market governance and market dynamics. It deals specifically with the role of networks in connecting different groups with each other, and how these may contribute to cooperation that cuts across ethnicity and gender. This requires a research design which offers ample space for tacit knowledge from traders themselves to take the lead in guiding the data collection, in order to try to decrease the influence of preconceptions and biases. Grounded theory was chosen as the methodological framework in order to gather data, which can answer the research questions posed from the viewpoint of the actors themselves. The choice to use this type of methodology is in order to acknowledge an obvious point — research such as this would be impossible without the help of participants in explaining and guiding the research through describing their lived realities. This chapter will explain how grounded theory was implemented during the research process, but also how choices made during the fieldwork have impacted the research findings. These are necessary things to consider as e.g., case selection impacts the dynamics on the ground, and consequently the conclusions drawn. The use of grounded theory is thus, not without the imposition of the researcher, but rather marked by conscientious and reflexive positioning throughout the research.

The chapter is organized as follows: first the methodology and methods employed are presented. Second, case selection and the context of the study is discussed. Third, ethical considerations are discussed.

!43 3.2 Methodology and methods

Charmaz (2006) posit that grounded theory is an approach where “method and content […] emerge during the research process rather than being preconceived before empirical inquiry begins” (p. 399). While this study was preceded by a research proposal which presented the [proposed] aim of the research, the viability of the initial line of questioning needed to be verified through cross- checking with what is on the ground. The decision to use this methodology stemmed from being conscientious about creating research that has been guided by the worldview of the research participants themselves. This approach suggests that flexibility and reflexivity are the best ways of accomplishing this. Reflexivity in this study uses Chiseri-Strater’s (1996) explanation of the difference between reflection and reflexivity, as she argues that “to be reflective does not demand an ‘other,’ while to be reflexive demands both an other and some self-conscious awareness of the process of self- scrutiny” (p. 130). Her definition aligns with grounded theory’s acknowledgement of the need to be self-reflexive in relation to the data collection process and our participants. The discussion on reflexivity first gained traction amongst anthropologists in the 70s as a way to position themselves in ‘non-exploitative and compassionate’ relations with their participants as a colonial critique (Pillow, 2003). It is commonplace today for researchers to include ‘reflexivity’ in qualitative work seemingly as a way to increase the validity of their work. Dosekun (2014) referred to ‘the practice’ of reflexivity as ‘something of a methodological box to be ticked” (p. 1). However, given the overwhelming Western dominance in the literature on African studies (at least at Western universities) it is important to ask: how have I been influenced by the literature I read before going into the field? What normative views do I have given my life history? Is it possible for me to accurately portray the lives of others? Should I even be portraying their lives? And if yes, what is the least invasive way of doing so? The fieldwork period was marked by constant interrogation of both the self but also findings in the field, in the quest to abstract the essence of social phenomena which (to the best of my ability) corresponds with the lived realities in the context of study. Reflexivity is thus a way to gain insights into how ‘knowledge is produced’ (Pillow, 2003). As argued by Charmaz (2006) “respect for our research participants pervades how we collect data and the content of our data” (p. 19). Neither does this imply that the researcher is obsolete, nor that other methodologies are less respectful — instead, it is about being reflexive throughout the research process. Issues that were of central importance during the fieldwork was

!44 reflexivity in regards to the role of me as a researcher and the well-being of the participants.3 Because of my ethnicity (Ethiopian and Eritrean) many felt comfortable expressing themselves with me because they considered me objective since I am not Nigerian. This meant that I potentially had greater access to people from different ethnic groups than had I been Nigerian. This indicates not only the sensitivity of the topic of study, but also the role of my own identity. However, self- realization will not result in the erasure of difference between myself and the participants as Pillow (2003: 187) almost mockingly critiques self-reflexivity:

Once the researcher knows herself, an other, and truth now she/he needs to transcend this. Prominent in much qualitative research is the idea that the researcher, through reflexivity, can transcend her own subjectivity and own cultural context in a way that releases her/him from the weight of (mis)representations. Self-reflexivity can perform a modernist seduction – promising release from your tension, voyeurism, ethnocentrism – a release from your discomfort with representation through a transcendent clarity.

Her argument is not to stop being reflexive in how we carry out research, but rather to realize that we will never be able to erase these differences, and perhaps that is not the point. It is the acknowledgement of the inherent problem and our position in it — that is, in Pillow’s words “a confession that often yields a catharsis of self-awareness for the researcher, which provides a cure for the problem of doing representation” (Pillow, 2003:181). However, this study does not seek to represent the ‘Other’, but used reflexivity in a way that shows how I as a non-Nigerian, and during my first visit had to rely on others to gain information on the workings of market dynamics. This, naturally calls into question ‘ethnographic authority’, which I would never want to claim. This requires transparency in how important guidance from others was in understanding and mapping the patterns of this study.

Beyond the ethical rationale of grounded theory, it is an approach which uses empirical data to build theory. This allows the researcher to work with the emerging patterns in the field in order to explain social realities instead of the other way around. The theoretical framework which was used in the preceding thesis proposal was tentative, and had to be ‘confirmed’ as appropriate by the findings in the field. These were the more abstract considerations that influenced the research design. The next section gives concrete examples on how it was implemented.

3 See 3.4 for a discussion on ethical issues !45 Methods

The data was collected through a combination of qualitative methods, namely: open and semi- structured interviews, participant observation, focus groups and archival material. Much time was spent in the three markets. The initial stages revolved on using the reputational technique. This enabled mapping of the existing hierarchies, the different names of each section of (the bigger) markets, as well as locating the appropriate market leaders for permission to carry out interviews in each section. Spending time in the markets, also helped in moving beyond the initial scoping process, as it became possible to establish some rapport between myself and traders. This proved to be helpful as many recognized me in markets, and it became easier to navigate the bigger markets on my own (partially because I became more familiar with the spaces). This shows how dependent I was on insights from traders themselves in how the markets are divided and how they relate to each section. Participant observation was particularly helpful at Balogun market, as it has a high concentration of traders and lots of narrow side-streets. By spending time in the market, and familiarizing oneself with the environment it also became possible to see how traders in one part of the market are connected to other sections through either ownership of multiple stores or familial connections. Markets are public spaces, and traders are happy to engage when it comes to customers, but this openness sometimes shifted to suspicion when asked about their business and the market. I (ironically, given the study’s topic) had to rely on the networks I had established in all the markets. Snow-ball sampling therefore became important in gaining sufficient trust from traders.4 A total of 50 semi-structured and open interviews were conducted both inside the three markets, but also outside when it came to key informants (see Table 3.1 and Table 3.2). 27 individual traders were interviewed, 9 market leaders (both male and female), 3 local government representatives, 2 university lecturers, 2 key informants on Lagos’ history, as well as a focus group discussion with 7 leaders of an Hausa ethnic association (Arewa Gari Yawaye) which some traders are members of. It was important to speak to a wide range of individuals in order to collect ‘rich’ data. Visits to government bodies, which have statistics on information proved difficult due to gate- keeping. Visits to these organizations led to hours spent going between individuals in the office and

4 Ethical considerations in regards to data collection and this approach will be elaborated on in section 3.4. !46 waiting. In the end, the requested material was later never provided. The key informants were therefore instrumental in acquiring archival material from their personal collections.

Table 3.1 Participants according to gender

Location: Women Men Total:

Arewa Perishable Goods 3 4 7

Balogun 5 10 15

Dada Genla 2 3 5

Key Informants & 1 3 4 Lecturers

Market Leaders 4 5 9

Local Government 0 3 3

Arewa Gari Yawaye 0 7 7

Total: 15 35 50

Table 3.2 Participants according to ethnicity

Location Hausa Igbo Yoruba Total:

Arewa Perishable 5 0 2 7 Goods

Balogun 5 5 5 15

Dada Genla 2 1 2 5

Key Informants & 0 0 4 4 Lecturers

Market Leaders 3 0 6 9

Local Government 0 0 3 3

Arewa Gari Yawaye 7 0 0 7

Total: 22 6 21 50

!47 If we look at the composition of participants in terms of gender and ethnicity we can see that Igbo traders are underrepresented. This is directly linked to the selection of markets and the sections I visited. For instance, the technologies section in Mile 12 is predominately Igbo but since I chose Arewa Perishable Goods, Hausa traders became overrepresented. We can also see that there are many Yoruba respondents as well, and that all local government representatives and lecturers were Yoruba. This is likely due to the general ethnic composition of the city. Thus it should be noted that these figures should not be taken to be representative of the situation in other markets, but that the case selection highly influenced the composition of participants.

Data analysis

The data collected was under continuous analysis during the fieldwork as the material was being coded following each visit to the fields. Extensive notes were also taken as part of the memoing process. These notes included both a discussion on emerging patterns, but also noted how conclusions were drawn. This could be by noting where certain information came from and was later cross-check by exploring the new information through follow-up interviews. Indeed, because of the memos it became possible to also return to participants to present emerging patterns and to see whether they find them accurate. I found it necessary to cross-check as much as possible in order to reduce my own biases and the risk of drawing normative conclusions, which may interfere with the analysis. This also proved helpful in the selection of markets to include in the study. The next section goes into how the cases were selected.

!48 3.3 Case selection and context of study

There are 52 registered markets in Lagos (BudgIT, 2017). Many of these markets are devoted to specific products, as there are textile and clothing markets, foodstuff, electronics etc. Given the vastness of both the available markets, and the city itself, the scope of inquiry had to be narrowed down by considering the existing dynamics in the markets. Aligning a grounded theory approach with case selection was initially a challenge but later evolved through the networks that I had established in Lagos. Speaking to both traders and Lagosians about the research proved to be helpful in this regard. Balogun was chosen during the proposal writing as a potential market to include in the study. This was after communicating with African Studies Centre lecturer Akinyinka Akinyoade, who claimed that Balogun offers a diverse set of traders, but is mainly headed by women. When in Lagos, I also consulted two lecturers, Dr Sherifat Yusuff at Lagos State University (LASU), who has carried out research on women in Balogun, and University of Lagos lecturer (late) Mr Dimeji Ajikobi, who had extensive knowledge on Lagos history. Both lecturers confirmed that Balogun would be a good option. When in Lagos I also discussed my work with Adetokunbo Lawrence. She had carried out some projects with market women in the peripheries of Lagos, Ajah and Ikorodu. She offered to introduce me to an Iyaloja, Madame Aisha Bello of Dada Genla market which she believed would be willing to participate in the study. Dada Genla would prove to be suitable in relation to research topic of the function of gender and ethnicity in marketplaces. When speaking to Madame Bello, it became clear that the Hausa led Arewa Perishable Goods (APG) section of Mile 12 market was very important for her own market. She therefore introduced me to the Chairman of Arewa Perishable Goods Alhaji Haruna Muhammed, and executive secretary Mohammed Abdul. While the initial interest in the market was sparked by its relationship to Madame Bello and Dada Genla, the market itself proved to be relevant for the topic as well, and thus the final market to be added to the study was chosen following a visit to the Chairman’s office with Madame Bello.

!49 Each market highlights nuances in the function of ethnicity and gender in marketplaces, and market governance. The three markets have their own histories and different positions in the overall market landscape in Lagos. Balogun and Mile 12 for instance are two well-known markets, while Dada Genla is semi-rural and unknown to people outside the community. By including a predominantly female (Balogun), male and minority-led (APG), and a rural, small-scale market Dada Genla, this study hopes to highlight how intersectionality plays a role in understanding how networks and power asymmetries impact the workings and position of market leaders.

Balogun Market

Balogun market is one of the biggest markets in Lagos. It consists of 11 sub-markets in Isale-Eko. These markets are: Owolowo, Gutter-Soka, Gutter-Ankara, Union-home, Martins, Ereko, Balogun East, Balogun West, Mandilas, Saudi Eko and Shitta Court (Dr Yusuff, personal communication., 7 September 2016). As previously mentioned, I discussed my topic with lecturers in Lagos before heading to the field (i.e. marketplaces). I conducted an interview with Dr Yusuff at LASU in order to get some insights on Balogun.

“Nearly all of them [market women at Balogun] are Yoruba […]. About 80% of them inherited their business from their mothers. [The remaining 20 %] came into the business with the invitation from their friends that sell in the markets or their cousins and sisters […]. Balogun market is open, but very closed because as you are, you can’t just say you want to go and rent shop there. You don't even know how they do the business. Its open to everybody but its a closed system. You need a connection. ”

(Interview, Dr Yusuff, 2016)

The market is mainly for textiles, but some sections are for imported clothes from Asia, and various small household items. While the market is predominately Yoruba and female, my visits to the various sub-markets showed that it is more diverse than this interview made it seem. Mandilas are predominantly Igbo, whilst Saudi Eko has many Hausa traders. Both the Igbo and Hausa traders in these two sections are predominately male. However, as Dr. Yusuff indicated, the market is a closed space as one needs referrals to enter the space. She, herself, had not carried out research on male, or minority traders in Balogun. What this showed was that not only is there a gap in our understanding in terms of minority market entry, but there is also a need to go beyond the seeming overrepresentation of women in the marketplace and uncover the nuances that exist in markets such as Balogun.

!50 Figure 3.1 Aerial shot of Balogun Market on Lagos Island

Source: bbc.com5

5 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/world-africa-40384341? ns_mchannel=social&ns_source=twitter&ns_campaign=bbc_live&ns_linkname=596726fee4b07bc e10080d2c%26%27Only%20600%2C000%20Lagosians%20pay%20taxes%27%26&ns_fee=0#pos t_596726fee4b07bce10080d2c !51 Dada Genla Market

Dada Genla is a small market located in the outskirts of Ikorodu in an area called Agunfoye. The market was established in 2014. The land of the market belongs to the Dada Genla family. They were offered to sell the land but decided to keep the ownership and create a market for the community. The market has approximately 5 small shops, and 5 stalls. The number of traders is less than 20, most only come to sell once a week and is thus the market is still in its early developing stages. During the first visit to Dada Genla, I met with Iyaloja Madame Aisha Bello, and provided an initial description of the study (although it had already been described by Adetokunbo prior to the meeting). Following the presentation, an interview was conducted. Madame Bello informed me that she had been a trader at Oshodi market, and had long experience with trading. She is not from the Agunfoye community, but from Lagos. She had been asked to come and be the Iyaloja given her long experience. Because of the peripheral location, Madame Bello has had to play an active role in the development of the market and the community. As will be discussed in Chapter 4, she herself had to seek out ways to invite traders to come and set up stalls in the market. While herself and the community are predominately Yoruba, the market itself is mixed with both Hausa and Yoruba traders and some Igbo traders. This market thus provided the possibility to examine how diversity is conceptualized in the start-up phases of a market and provides a good contrast to Balogun, which is oversaturated.

!52 Figure 3.2: Dada Genla Market

!53 Arewa Perishable Goods in Mile 12

Mile 12 was initially established in 1976 and was located in Iddo. The market experienced successive growth, which later led the military government of Murtala Muhammed to decide to relocate the market to its current location in Kosofe/Ikosi Isheri (Solaja et al., 2013). The new location is right beside the Ikorodu highway which offers easy access for truckloads to reach the market. As this section will show, this is very important given the function of the market. The main products sold in the markets are: foodstuffs, poultry from other parts of the country, and various agricultural products. The latter are one of the biggest and most important sections of the market, and fall under the Arewa Perishable Goods section (hereafter, APG). The name Arewa stands for ‘Northern’ and refers to the 19 states in the Northern region of Nigeria. This is because the agricultural products traded by them are primarily from those states. A wide range of produce is sold, for instance: tomatoes, onions, and cassava. Each of these products have their own section in the market (see Fig. 3.3), but they all fall under the umbrella of APG. In addition to primarily receiving products from the North, APG also has a ‘Northern’ executive committee, which makes it different from other markets in Lagos. Mile 12 consists of several markets, but the size of APG has lead to people speaking of Mile 12 as it it only consisted of APG as people would tell me that Mile 12 is ’Hausa’. It was during the interviews in Dada Genla that Mile 12 first surfaced (Chapter 4 will elaborate on this connection). Given the importance of APG for the Iyaloja in Dada Genla, the market was added to the scoping list. What the initial visit to the market showed was that it indeed is Hausa dominated in its leadership. However, as already mentioned, this is exclusive to the APG section. Figure 3.4 shows the market right beside APG. Aesthetically it is like any other foodstuff market. Moreover it is administered by Yoruba market leaders. Thus it became clear that the difference between APG and the other markets in Mile 12 is its function. APG has some stalls with traders selling vegetables like in other markets, however, the primary function of the market is to act as a depot for products coming in from other parts of the country and to then resell to other traders and markets in both Lagos and neighboring countries (this will be discussed in Chapter 4). The initial scoping had therefore revealed that APG will be a useful case study in the examination of how ethnicity and gender functions in (selected) markets in Lagos. It was therefore added to the two existing markets. Following the choice to include APG in this study, I searched for existing research on the market.

!54 Solaja et al., (2013) studied Mile 12 and argued that “it is conceived that Hausa firm presence may have caused a change in the market social structure since they are the dominant ethnic group in the selected grocery market” (p. 50). It is important to note that by referring to the market as “Mile 12” in their study, Solaja et al., presents all of Mile 12 as being Hausa ‘dominated’. As we have already determined, this is inaccurate. Their study was mainly quantitative, and their data showed that the ethnic composition of this section of the market was: 52.6 % Hausa, 39.8 % Yoruba and 7.7 % Igbo. They do not provide solid evidence for how the Hausa firm presence has altered social structures. Moreover, they seemingly misrepresented the function of the market. It should not be categorized as ‘regular’ markets which consist of many individual traders and shops, but rather as a depot or wholesalers section with sections that function as markets. Cohen (1966) describes how Hausa depots for long-distance trade emerged in the South-west:

“long-distance trade involves difficult technical problems which can be efficiently overcome when men from one tribe control all or most of the stages of the trade in specific commodities. Such a tribal control, or monopoly, can usually be achieved only in the course of continual and bitter rivalry with competitors from other tribes. In the process, the monopolizing tribal community is forced to organize for political action in order to deal effectively with increasing external pressure, to co-ordinate the co-operation of its members in the common cause, and to mobilize the support of communities from the same tribe in neighboring towns. In this way a closely knit network of well- organized Hausa communities developed during the past few decades, covering nearly all Yoruba towns, and enabled Hausa traders and commission agents to establish monopoly over the trade in a number of important commodities.” (p. 19).

Abner Cohen conducted several seminal studies on Hausa long-distance trade and establishment in South-western Nigeria. As this particular excerpt indicates, it has been commonplace for Hausa traders to develop monopolies, and essentially operate independently. The degree to which APG in Mile 12 has effected its environ is not clear in Solaja et al., (2013). Their descriptions of the actions carried out by the Hausa leadership, e.g., formal registration and the use of membership fee exist in other markets as well. The only different practice that they describe is la’ada (an additional rate placed on the original price of commodities) (p. 51). However, that is mere profit-making in business, as the market is essentially for middlemen. The study therefore does not provide clear evidence as to how the Hausa leadership has created different ‘market social structures’ compared to ‘Yoruba markets’. Morever, as Cohen (1966) showed, the process of establishing these monopolies came with concerted and calculated efforts. Ethnicity was important in competition in trading in particular products. It is therefore further corroborated that APG and its relationship with the overall (Yoruba) market governance that control Mile 12 would provide good insights on gender and ethnicity in Lagos. !55 Figure 3.3: Off-loaded onion shipment section

!56 Figure 3.4: Foodstuffs market in Mile 12

!57 3.4 Ethical considerations

My initial research idea focused on patron-client relationships between women market leaders and local politicians and the bargaining process between the different parties. However, prior to undertaking my study I was wary about the potentially sensitive nature of the topic at hand. I wrote about my concerns in a reflexive paper and argued that:

The openness in regards to how important support from market women are for elections in Southwest Nigeria is what drew me to the topic. However, the seemingly overt connections between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ actors do not mean that I will not encounter participants who do not wish to have their identities revealed. There may be cases where information disclosed in interviews is sensitive to the social relations of the actors in the study. E.g. in cases where the women might refer to their patrons in negative terms. Revealing their identities may thus jeopardize their future cooperation. This requires conscientious use of the data, in order to ensure that my participants’ livelihoods are not affected negatively by my study.

(Siun, Reflexive paper, 2016)6

What I encountered in the field (unfortunately) confirmed my initial fears. Participants were willing to openly discuss their relations to ‘patrons’, albeit under the condition that the conversation remain private. I therefore abandoned my initial idea and decided to focus on less sensitive relationships. Market women — or more specifically, market leaders remained as the focus of the study.

In presenting my research topic to various informants and my specific interest in gender and ethnicity I was met with openness, as people seemed to perceive me as being inquisitive without malicious intent. This presented a potential challenge as it may “give no indication that [my] rendering of them may be partially or wholly negative” (Newkirk, 1996: 36). As Newkirk (1996) pointed out, cases where the fact that the final writing might depict the participants in a negative light has not been disclosed in the initial encounter between researcher and participants can lead to feelings of betrayal. In order to create ethically sound research, it is important to be reflexive about how one’s presence impacts the participants’ lives, and to keep their (emotional) well being in mind. ‘Safeguarding’ the interests of the participants, and sound ethic are part and parcel of scientific accountability and the process of scientific inquiry. Thus while one might not expect that depicting the participants in a ‘negative’ light when it reflects reality can lead to a sense of betrayal

6 This paper was not published. It was part of a methodology course during the first year of this MA program. !58 it can happen. Kirsch (2005) urges researchers “to develop realistic expectations about our interactions with participants, recognizing that they are shaped, like all human interactions, by dynamics of power, gender, generation, education, race, class, and many other factors that can contribute to feelings of misunderstanding, disappointment, and broken trust” (p. 2170). Acker et al. (1996) reminds us that “given that the power differences between researcher and researched cannot be completely eliminated” (p. 428). As previously mentioned, I sought to use respondent validation by including the research participants as much as possible in research process by presenting emerging patterns and cross-checking my conclusions with them. However, respondent validation or co-interpretation7 was subject to time constraints and commitment of the participants. This problem has been highlighted by proponents of this method such as Kirsch (2005) as potential factors that can “inhibit or restrict the collaborative ideal we hope to achieve” (p. 2169). All participants were informed of the voluntary nature of their participation. They were also informed that they may chose to not answer questions, if they so wish. Thus while not all participants were presented with findings, all participants were offered the option of abstaining from interviews. It was important to be conscientious of subtle changes in the participants disposition when asked (potentially) sensitive questions. For instance, when speaking to market leaders about ethnic composition of their markets, they were quick to state that they “do not keep records of such”. It was therefore clear that it would be invasive to ask to conduct surveys on ethnicity, which is why that has not been done in any of the markets.

3.5 Conclusion

The quote introducing this chapter by Ousman Sembene relates to the arts, mainly cinema and literature. However, it is necessary to consider the role of African — in this case, Nigerian voices in this study and what that can tell us about African voices in academic works in general. This study, as well as other studies would be impossible without the participation of people who’s lives we seek to document and understand. While Africa will not disappear due to the lack of African voices, the agency and knowledge of participants arguably does in research which relies predominately on quantitative data. The mere application of qualitative approaches, however, sometimes also fail to highlight the role played by interviewees in offering insights into the functioning of the topic being studied. It is with this in mind that this study seeks to show that the participants understand their

7 A similar approach, advanced by Newkirk (1996).

!59 context to an extent that an outsider arguably never will fully grasp without their assistance. Grounded theory was therefore the most suitable choice of methodology as it leaves rooms for the acknowledgement of an obvious point — research such as this would be impossible without the help of many. This chapter has sought to be as transparent as possible about the research process and to illustrate the role played by participants and other informants in shaping the course of the study.

!60 CHAPTER FOUR

MARKET DYNAMICS

”Entrepreneurship, large or small, is seen as the prime opportunity for getting ahead — the main reason for coming to Lagos in the first place”

— (Peil , 1991: 194)

4.1 Introduction Lagos is one of the fastest growing cities in the world. The city is estimated to pass 24 million inhabitants by 2020 (Agbola & Agunbiade, 2009). Lagos is seen as “a land of opportunities where fortunes are easily made”, it is therefore likely that economic hardship is what pushed these migrants from their homes and drew them to the city (Adisa, 1994). The migrants entering the city are heterogeneous, and differ in terms of state of origin, religion, class and age. Many also come from neighboring countries. A large number of the migrants will end up in the many markets in town, as reflected by the quote above by Peil (1991) trading is why many move to Lagos. Those who already have connections in the markets through their social networks, e.g., through kinship often have an easier market entry with the help of apprenticeships. However, those without such networks have a harder time entering the market. As the name of this thesis suggests, people claim that the market is free — that anyone can enter the market and do business there. However, as Fafchamps (2004) has shown observed patterns of ethnic concentration has arisen from unequal opportunities for traders to enter certain trades. However, in the context of Nigeria, little has been said about how traders from ethnic minorities in Lagos are perceived and manage to enter the market. Baker (1974: 228), for instance, documented that:

“[Yoruba market women’s] separate social consciousness, however, has been further reinforced by urbanization. The influx of large numbers of immigrants with mixed social backgrounds has brought into sharper relief the homogenous socioeconomic character of the market women, a quality of sameness that accounts to a large extent for the internal cohesion they display […] The overwhelming majority are and have always been Yorubas, and immigration has not altered this pattern of ethnic dominance.”

This way of framing Yoruba market women arguably make it seem as if they are a united front which oppose the influx of others. As mentioned in Chapter 2 economic competition often !61 exacerbates the importance of ethnicity and negative perceptions of ‘others’. What this chapter is seeking to uncover is the interactions which lead to market in- or exclusion and the importance of networks. For instance, South-Western Nigeria has a particular history of women as being dominant actors in trade, this however does not mean that all Yoruba women have an easy time with trading, instead it means that it is a feminized space due to high numbers of women traders that have been socialized into the occupation because of gendered expectations. However, large numbers of Yoruba women will not be traders. As observed by Peil (1991) “the importance of ethnic differences varies from one situation to another […]. While the strong Yoruba dominance might set Lagos apart from most world cities and certainly shapes its character, the propensity of the Yoruba to divide into separate sub-groups when close to home makes the issue more complex. The emphasis on personal (or at most family) success means that ethnic groups are seldom cooperative units” (p. 43). Peil's observations were corroborated by findings in this study.

This chapter is organized as follows: first, the role of gender and trading will be discussed. This is done with the purpose of showing how identity ‘configurations of advantage and disadvantage in specific contexts’ (Lindell, 2010: 18). Second, ethnicity is analyzed as we look at the process of market entry. Finally, the chapter will discuss the strategic networks sought by actors in order to boost their markets.

4.2 Gender and trading

Feminist writings on Yoruba women and trading has often tended to obscure the gendered expectations which lead to their high numbers within that occupation. As we saw in Chapter 1 and 2, it is important to ground our understanding of gender in the context being discussed. Thus while trading has been framed as an indicator of progressive gender relations amongst the Yoruba, a closer examination reveals a more complex reality. Denzer (1994) and Johnson (1986) argued that colonial restructuring exacerbated gender inequality by conferring land rights to men. Denzer (1994) also pointed to the fact that men predominately cultivated cash crops, whereas in the instances that women engaged in agricultural work it was mainly for the family’s consumption. However, Suardakasa (1974) argues that “Yoruba women were traders long before the twentieth century. There is no evidence of their ever having !62 been cultivators […] It can be said that ‘their sphere of work is, first, the refining of agricultural produce to make it marketable, and secondly, the marketing itself [i.e., trading]” (p. 1). Her study is important as it challenged the widely accepted notion of trade as an indicator of culturally institutionalized gender equality amongst the Yoruba. She further argued that: “the large-scale participation of Yoruba women in modern trade activities cannot be attributed solely to the fact that they were traders in the traditional economy” (p. 2). Instead, she attributes it to two main factors: 1) there is an abundance of labor, and 2) there is a dearth of capital for expenditure in the distributive sphere of the economy. She writes that: ”where there is opportunities for employment in this sphere, it can be expected that persons who would otherwise remain unemployed would fill these positions […]. Most Yoruba women, having few alternative employment possibilities due to their lack of specialized skills, are induced to trade in order to make any money at all. Trading, then, is a means of earning cash in a society where money is necessary for the procurement of services and goods” (p. 2)

It thus becomes evident that because women had not been socialized into learning other skills, they started trading out of necessity to contribute to their families. Aluko (2015) argued that “there is no special status accorded women traders as distinct from other groups of women. […] A Yoruba woman’s overall role which includes first of all the roles of wife and mother. It is expected that by means of their trade activities, women will make some contributions to the upkeep of their families” (p. 2) This means that trade became a highly feminized practice, due to gendered expectations within households, and because of a lack of viable employment options. Baker (1974) argued that “[Yoruba] market women have always maintained a distinct and exclusive sense of group solidarity, partly because their internal organization is strong and partly because trading is the only profit-making activity regarded by both sexes and by several ethnic groups as culturally acceptable female occupation” (p. 228). It has therefore been argued that Yoruba women are in “an economically advantageous position when compared with women in other parts of the country and in other cultural settings who may not be expected or encouraged to engage in paid activities” (Aluko, 2015: 60). Indeed, the most visible non-Yoruba traders [in Lagos markets] are Igbo and Hausa men. This is because they are often the ones who migrate (first), and later either have their family join them or they are only seasonal migrants and therefore move back to their home communities (Barnes, 1975; Cohen, 1974). The following section focuses on how individuals from these three groups enter markets in order for us to understand contributing factors to network segmentation.

!63 4.3 Market entry

As mentioned in Chapter 2, we can consider markets as “the web of relationships, institutions and distinct geographical spaces that enable economic transactions” (Bestor, 2001 in Marfing & Theil, 2013: 649). Market entry, in turn was described by Marfing & Theil (2013) as “the establishment and mobilization of particular relationships that embedded in the socio-economic spaces and networks of the market grant newcomers access to the capital and resources necessary for independent economic activity” (p. 649). Market entry is regulated by market associations and individuals, who function as gate-keepers and regulators of the marketplace. Chapter 5 will go into more details into the role of associations, while this section will explain the role of individuals. Market entry is assumed to be unequal because of biases in networks (Fafchamps, 2004). Market entry in Lagos in most cases require a social network which reaches individuals who are either traders or have ties to traders. All of the shop-owners in Balogun market had gained market entry and their shops through social, kinship and religious networks. Yusuff (2013) who studied market entry for Yoruba women in Balogun and found that 80 % had inherited their shops from their mothers, while the remaining 20% had entered the market through referrals by individuals in their social networks. Referrals were crucial for market entry for all of the traders interviewed at Balogun except for the ones who inherited their shops. The fact that most Yoruba women have inherited their shops is likely to be the result of the (historically) gendered expectations that pushed women of earlier generations into trading as we saw in the previous section. Younger Yoruba women traders tend to be in trading due to lack of opportunities in other occupations, while for older women trading has been their main occupation. There are more Yoruba men traders today than a couple of decades ago. Their entry is similar to that of younger, Yoruba women i.e., challenges in other occupations made them make use of their familial ties to traders in order to make a living. When it comes to minority groups such as Igbo and Hausa traders, the emerging pattern suggest that most of them gained access through apprenticeships within their own ethnic groups. However, the ones who can afford to rent their own shop usually enter the market by renting from Yoruba landlords. In this sense, it reflects Babaloja at Balogun Alhaji Shokunbi claim that “anyone is free to do anything. The market is free — when you rent your shop you are free. The rest is just associations” (personal comm., 26 October 2016). Those with enough capital to bypass the usual referral process can thus establish themselves in the market without relying on personal networks.

!64 Dahiru, a Hausa trader, is a shop-owner in Balogun market but originally from Kano. He has a shop in Kwantin Kwari market in Kano, but wanted to expand his business and open a branch in Lagos. He specializes in the sale of ‘Islamic’ products, such as halal perfumes, prayer mats etc. Thus his shop is located in the Saudi Eko section of Balogun market, which is right beside the Lagos Central Mosque. He found it easy to open his shop in Saudi Eko, as he went to the head office to inquire about available shops, paid for the one he selected and registered in the market association. It is likely that other minority shop-owners went through the same process. Second-generation Lagosians (i.e., those who’s parent had migrated) with shops often inherit their businesses, which is similar to Yoruba patterns. Emeka, is an Igbo shop-owner in Balogun. He inherited his shop from his parents who were the first to arrive in Lagos in the 1970s. He has a BSc in Geology and would like to pursue further studies, but financial responsibilities have kept him in the market. He, however, is seemingly rather successful as he not only has travelled to Asia (India and China) in order to buy products, but also employs four apprentices. All of his apprentices are either from his home-state Anambra (he was born in Lagos, but he defined his home-state according to his parents origin) or have been introduced to him through family connections:

“When people see me back home with my car and house they approach me and say please take my son and teach him how to become like you.”

(Emeka, personal communication., 24 November, 2016)

When asked whether he could consider apprentices which were not introduced to him by family friends he replied:

“You need to be able to trust [your apprentice], sometimes you have to ask them to go to the bank with hundreds of thousands of Naira. If it’s someone you don’t know they might steal it, but when you're related they can’t do anything.”

(Ibid.)

His responses reflect what Fafchamps (2004) considered to be the nature of business. He argued that the best way for traders to lower transaction costs and gain information is through networks. By employing someone who is connected to himself through his social networks in either Lagos or Anambra he feels confident in that social norms will prevent the apprentice from breaching his !65 trust. This way of selecting apprentices is not particular to Igbo traders, but cuts across ethnicity. Dahiru responded that all his apprentices are of ‘blood relation’ and that he recruits them in Kano. His reasoning was the same as Emeka’s — being related or in the same network or community increases the trustworthiness of individuals. There has been similar observations amongst traders in Ghana and Senegal in which “up- and-coming merchants are integrated into the market through relations of patronage, usually involving a close relative. In the rare case where the apprenticeship-type relation is extended to a close acquaintance of the family, they are usually addressed as classificatory mothers or fathers – thus underscoring the elements of trust, respect and seniority in the relationship” (Marfing & Theil, 2013: 651). While Fafchamps (2004) focuses mainly on the business rationale behind the use of social networks, Marfing & Thiel (2013) cites Guyer’s (1994, 2004) [registration] of non-monetary indicators of success, such as “wealth in people”. Apprentices are seen as a way for ‘self- realization’ and a mean to propel oneself to the status of a “respectable and recognized person within established market networks” (Marfing & Thiel, 2013: 650). In this way, individuals become gate-keepers of the market, and apprentices become a vehicle to manifest one’s social position in the market. However, apprentices are not only a mean to acquire status, but are sometimes also a necessity to run the business. One Yoruba trader had a young girl from Benin that worked in her shop. During one visit the girl was not in the shop. The market woman said that “I discovered that she was stealing from me. Can you imagine? She had to go. I don’t know where she is now” (Anonymous, Interview, Balogun, 2017). This particular trader often had her daughter, who is a university student run the store during times she herself was ill. It is therefore a possibility that she had recruited the Beninoise girl because it is a cheaper option than seeking out individuals within Lagos. This reveals the dark side of apprenticeships due to lack of regulation, and lacking the oversight of social networks.

While shop-owners and their apprentices enter the market through their networks, hawkers provide an interesting contrast to the gated parts of the markets, that is shop-ownership, by seemingly by- passing the principles of patronage which normally precede entry. Hawkers are some of the most visible traders in markets in Lagos. Without a shop, and often only the items they are selling for the day, hawkers are seen standing in the peripheries of markets or walking around the marketplace in the search for customers. Hawkers are the set of traders which propelled Hart (1974) to coin the term ‘informal’ as they are seen as fending for themselves with little regulation or oversight. Recent studies (Sylvanus, 2013; Marfing & Thiel, 2014) have documented the role of Chinese traders in !66 creating avenues for traders to circumvent the norm of patronage within the main networks that dominate markets by giving them easier access to (their) products. Interviews with hawkers confirmed this as a group of them stated that “you just need to ask [make inquiries] where to get products and then you just come and sell. Anyone can come to the market and sell” (Focus group discussion, Balogun, August 2016). However, dealing with the Chinese and consequently affecting market prices will in most cases be met by resistance from established traders. One Iyaloja in Balogun market lamented that “the Igbos are spoiling the market! They’re buying from the Chinese” (Anonymous, personal comm., 19 September 2016). She had led her association in trying to prevent the traders from selling made in China textiles as their prices were lower than the average prices that similar textiles are sold for. The parties were unable to settle their dispute and the police ended up having to become involved. This particular case reflects observations on trader’s perceptions on individuals who do business with the Chinese. For instance, Marfing & Thiel (2013) found that “traders cooperating with Chinese businesses also often have a bad reputation within local commercial environments because they are not living up to the norm of returning parts of their profits to society” (p. 661). However, in this case it seems as if the ethnicity of the traders is what lead to increased agitation. The Iyaloja referred to the traders as “the Igbos”, thus making it seem as if it is only Igbos who are buying from Chinese wholesalers. Interviews with Yoruba, Hausa and Igbo traders alike showed that most of the products sold are made in China. Thus her description suggests a particular contempt against Igbo traders.

If we look at APG we find similar gate-keeping practices, in which traders enter the market through referrals.

APG functions mainly as a wholesale market and depot for agricultural produce which will be transported on-wards to other markets both within Lagos and outside the country. It also has sections which function as ‘regular’ foodstuffs markets, i.e., it is comprised of small stalls, both with physical structures, but also those that consist of products laying organized on the ground. The bulk of the revenue at APG thus comes from the re-sale of the inventory (see Figure 4.1) as they do not rely on rents in the same way as traders in Balogun. Moreover, they need a large supply of labor, because of their alabaro (carrier/porter) system. The alabaro’s work consist of lifting the heavy (up to 60 kg) baskets of various agricultural products, either from trucks off-loading at the market to the designated depot area in the market (and the reverse, i.e., for further transport) or for individuals or traders who use them to carry their purchases. Unfortunately, no interviews were

!67 carried out with the alabaro, as few of them speak english. However, other traders in APG said that they are mainly Hausa speakers who travel to Lagos with the trucks and sometimes stay to work. Many of these other traders are younger than the traders at Balogun. Kwara state was overrepresented amongst the respondents. This is likely to be the result of the ethno-linguistic composition of the state, which is mainly Yoruba and Hausa speaking. All of the traders who sell in market APG responded that they visited and registered at the head office and then proceeded to sell, i.e., there was little gate-keeping in their cases. However, APG’s financial secretary’s explanation of market entry in their market indicate that they have similar referral processes as those observed in Balogun:

“we always require somebody that can vouch for you like ‘okay I know this guy, he’s my family’, but it’s not written…it’s verbal […] If you come alone we will ask you a number of questions so we can be convinced that you come from a certain place. But [normally] you have to come with somebody that we know has been in the market for several years that can vouch for you.”

(personal comm., 14 December 2016)

The Iyaloja General in Ikosi Isheri Alhaja Iyabo Ahmed maintains that:

“This market belongs to Igbo, Hausa and Yoruba not only one person. People come from far away to come and buy and sell there. I’m proud over my market because it’s a good market. No wahala, no anything. Everything going peacefully. […] People speak Hausa, Igbo, Yoruba and English, because we are not only Yoruba there — it’s ‘Wazobia’”8

(personal communication., 20 December 2016).

However, representation of different ethnicities depends on what we are looking at, as stressed by the financial secretary:

“We have different categories of people. Some are farmers that bring their goods themselves straight to the market. But they have to give their goods to someone in the market to sell for them… a kind of agent. [For] some, its their business. They go to the farm and bring it down to the market. These [individuals] trade from the North and come to the South. Some are from the South but 90% are Northerners.”

(personal comm., 14 December 2016).

8 ’Wazobia’ is a word that was supposed to represent inclusivity in Nigeria as each syllable is from the three most widely spoken languages: Wa (come, in Yoruba), Zo (come in Hausa), and Bia (come in Igbo). !68 APG functions like a firm in itself, with its main preoccupation being the efficient and organized re- selling of agricultural products from their connections in the North of the country. They are thus on the one hand middlemen, as their system requires “an effective adaptation to special conditions imposed by the environment […] large quantities of perishable items must be distributed in small units for quick consumption by traders who have little capital to invest in display or preservation facilities. The existence of a large number of middlemen is thus a functional means of solving the problem” (Baker, 1974: 226). During the high season they receive 150 trucks per day with 250 baskets per truck. Each basket is 40 kg minimum (APG Financial secretary, personal comm., 14 December 2016).

The Wazobia aspect which Alhaja Iyabo Ahmed referred to is more visible when it comes to buyers. In addition to being the main supplier in Lagos, APG also receive many traders from neighboring countries. If we look at Appendix 4.1 we can see that the excerpt from the accounts for December 2016 shows that much of their sales went to Cotonou in Benin.9 One trader from Benin responded that:

I’ve been coming here with my mom since I was a child. We come here to buy vegetables that aren't in season in Benin or because the prices are cheaper here. Everything I buy I take back to sell at Dantokpa market in Cotonou 10

(Madame Mathilde, personal comm., 14 December 2016)

The final market, Dada Genla presents an interesting case which significantly challenges generalizations on how gender and ethnicity functions in the marketplace and will therefore be the focus of the next section which looks at strategic partnerships.

4.4 Strategic relations

Madame Bello’s agricultural market Dada Genla is located on the very outskirts of Lagos in local government area Ikorodu. It is part of a small community called Agunfoye (one of four

9 A closer examination of the names of the traders show the word iya which means ’mother’ in Yoruba. However, it is possible that the traders Yoruba from Benin and not Nigeria.

10 Translated from French. !69 communities which make up Igbogbo). The market has a central position in this community as it lies in the middle of a residential area. The market is relatively new, and started in 2014 after the leading family in the community, Dada Genla decided to keep the land and start markets for the community instead of selling them to property developers. The issue of being autochonos has been important in the control of the market, and despite being Yoruba, Madame Bello has had to carefully share her authority with an ‘indigene’ to the community, who has the title of Babaloja (see chapter 5). This is because of the malleable nature of the definition of ethnicity. To o u t s i d e r s Madame Bello and the local community belong to the same ethnicity, however, to the community she is an outsider. Thus while Lagos is generally seen as Yoruba, there is no pan-Yoruba conceptualization of ethnicity within this context. Instead, it is the local community which matters. Given the close-knit community, which favors locals over ‘outsiders’, it was a rather bold move of the Iyaloja to seek out the Chairman, Alhaji Haruna at APG in order to expand her market. The market is small with often no more than five stalls selling tomatoes, bell peppers, chillies and onions. All of these traders are Hausa-speaking and were recruited to Dada Genla by Madame Bello. She made a deal with the Chairman, who assisted in connecting her to traders in his market that sell products she was interested in having sold at her market. It is not clear what Madame Bello offered the Chairman, but her brother works at the Iyaloja’s office in the market next to APG. It is thus possible that her brother might have used his contacts in order to request the assistance on her behalf.

The Iyaloja made generous offers to the Hausa traders from APG. In order to incentivize their move, she offered rent-free housing for 1 year, and stalls at the cost of N300 per month and shops at N1,000 per month. When discussing this deal with the Iyaloja, she stressed the need to make her market flourish, and that she needed more traders. Her aim is to turn Dada Genla into a hub in Agunfoye and surrounding areas in order to attract costumers who would otherwise travel to Igbogbo or Mile 12 for their purchases. She was less concerned with the ethnicity or gender of the traders (who all happened to be male).

This particular case tells us a number of things on how important it is to consider networks and positionality in discussing market relations. Market entry is often challenging for minorities due to gate-keeping which is essentially a lack of access to networks. Given the locality, being Yoruba would have us assume that it leads to a strong position for market leaders who are in need of traders. However, in this particular case the Hausa traders at APG were in a stronger position than !70 Madame Bello because they wield authority of a large number of traders involved in the selling of products outside the network which Madame Bello was in need of. Thus, while she has a wide network amongst fellow Yoruba she was limited when it came to the special trade group she was seeking out. What facilitated her access to the Hausa network was what Granovetter (1973) referred to as ‘weak ties’, which her brother could assist her in accessing. Her market is still small, and she is in need of more assistance from APG. However, in their meetings it was apparent that her needs are not high priority for APG. If we look at the APG end of the deal: what reasons can be behind their decision for their first concession? In the particular deal with Madame Bello, the motivation to assist seemingly stemmed from the simplicity of the task. Not much was required by the Chairman — he simply provided traders as the Iyaloja had to persuade them herself. It is more a sign of good will, than an indication of merging of networks.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has sought to examine how traders experience market entry on the basis of their ethnicity. This is because market entry helps us understand the role of identity during the crucial initial stages of establishment for a trader. It also tells us how people relate to each other. Yoruba women have (historically) been socialized into the trading occupation, but as Fafchamps (2004) reminds us, ethnic groups are too big for all members to be in the same occupation. Older Yoruba (over the age of 50) in the market have often only had trading as their occupation, therefore many of their daughters (over the age of 35) inherit their businesses. However, in the younger generations (18 - 35) many are educated and have had other occupations, but resort to trading in instances where they become unemployed or cannot find other options. This means that there is, indeed, an advantage for those that are connected to networks which are dominant in the market as it facilitates easy entry by being hired by family members. This pattern is also visible for Yoruba men in the market, as many of the ones interviewed did not own the shop themselves, but their female relatives did.

For ethnic minorities (in Lagos) such as the Igbo and the Hausa, the traders with capital enter the market through acquiring shops from Yoruba landlords. These traders later become facilitators for other people from their social network (within their ethnic group) to enter the market. This is because many chose to hire people within their networks as a way to ensure that they can trust the

!71 individual. This also reflects observations by Fafchamps (2004) who argued that the issue of trust and contract enforcement is what compels traders to rely on networks within their ethnic groups as the referral process thus goes through individuals which vouch for the new-comer. While there are elements of what Guyer (2004) considered ‘wealth in people’, as we saw in the case of Emeka, the rationale behind the selection process is mainly because of trust. If we put this into context of Nigeria and perceived ethnic discrimination, we may cautiously argue that the findings suggest that traders do not chose to hire within ethnic groups because of xenophobia, but because it is the easiest way to ensure smooth(er) business operations. Moreover, Hausa and Igbos have a comparative advantage when it comes to the sale of specific textiles and clothing items. Most of the gini brocade material sold in Lagos has been purchased in Kano. The textiles in Kano in turn has been imported from China, but people associate the material with Hausa traders. Most of the ready-made clothing items sold by wholesalers around Lagos Island are controlled by Igbo importers. While both the sellers in Kano and importers in Lagos Island sell to people of other ethnicities, the segmentation in Balogun Market, with Hausas in sections for gini brocade and Igbos being well-represented in the ready-to-wear sections suggests that there may indeed be a comparative advantage for some ethnic groups in specific trades.

It is important to keep in mind that the dynamics described above are all from Balogun market. Due to the nature of products and competition within that trade, there will be a particular pattern for market entry with gate-keeping and fierce competition. As findings in Mile 12 (APG section) suggests, by virtue of being a depot for perishable goods there will be less gate-keeping (at the lower parts of the hierarchy, i.e., petty traders or re-sellers) as the main firm, APG are middlemen, but will want to have many re-sellers in order to quickly sell their products before they spoil. However, similarly to Balogun, market entry for traders in the market mainly enter through referrals. Non-Hausa traders (i.e., the ones outside the executive committee of the firm) are essentially buyers as they purchase the products from the association and only become traders again when they re-package and sell the products to others. As we saw in Figure 4.1 there are many non- Nigerian traders who visit the market. But similarly to domestic traders, these individuals are buyers and thus there will not be the same anti-foreigner bias as in Balogun because their profits rely on having many buyers.

The final case which we drew from in this discussion was Dada Genla. As we saw, the Iyaloja who is Yoruba was considered as an outsider in the community. This indicates the malleability of !72 ethnicity as it may change depending on context. It tells us that it is important not to merely rely on external indicators to decide the positionally of actors, but to remain context specific. In her case, being Yoruba in Lagos may have given her access to trading networks which later lead to her installment as Iyaloja (Chapter 5 will elaborate on this), however she has to rely on Hausa traders in order to build her market. As we can see, an intersectional approach to the study of markets reveal that actors considered ‘powerful’ in some cases have less power despite being in an advantageous context.

!73 Figure 4.1 Excerpt from APG’s books for December 2016

!74 CHAPTER FIVE

MARKET GOVERNANCE

5.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the functioning of market governance and social structures in Lagos by drawing examples from the three selected markets.11 Market governance refers to the market institution itself and examines the administration and bureaucracy involved in governing markets. Social structures examines how individual traders interact with the market system, and looks at the role of associations. As we have already seen in previous Chapters, Lagos markets have largely been dominated by Yoruba women. However, the contemporary position of market women diverges slightly from what is described in older literature. For instance, the renowned Lagos Market Women’s Association no longer exists in its old form. Instead, the major association in Lagos is the Association of Commodity Market Women and Men Nigeria (ACMWAMN). While long-distance trading and the establishment of separate associations is not a new phenomena, few contemporary studies have examined how these auxiliary associations interact with central associations such as ACMWAMN. The purpose of this chapter is therefore to build on existing knowledge and connect it to how markets are governed today. This chapter presents and discusses the main leadership titles in market governance in Lagos. It will show that the role of legacies, linkages, and localities are important in this context and not easily disrupted. As we will see, this is because there is tacit knowledge in terms of how to engage respectfully between different leaders.

This chapter is organized as follows: First, the market executives will be presented and discussed. Second, the market associational function is analyzed. Finally, the chapter will discuss how there are overlaps in association membership for traders as they seek to maximize their protection by drawing on different parts of their identity.

11 Some of the organizational structures can be found outside Lagos too, e.g., the overall South- western part of the country. !75 5.2 Iyalojas, Babalojas and Chairmen

Scholars are increasingly asking what the effect of dual-sex groups will have on market governance and “the extent to which women participate in the leadership of and exercise influence within such associations” (Lund and Skinner 1999: 33 in Lindell, 12). Observers are particularly focused on West Africa given the ‘long traditions’ of women in trading, and the fact that “men sometimes appear to be penetrating economic spheres and niches that used to be dominated by women” (Lindell, 2006: 16). Studies in other West African countries such as Benin have shown that women are indeed facing male encroachment and diminishing power as men create their own dual-sex associations to compete with the women lead associations (Prag, 2006). However, South-western Nigeria has institutionalized the structures in market governance. Yoruba women have had institutionalized power in ‘traditional’ forms of government through the title of Iyalode (Queen mother/female chief). This position granted the titleholder “access to all positions of power and authority within the state, exercising legislative, judicial and executive powers with the chiefs in their councils” (Awe, 2005: 196). Some refer to the Iyalode as “a lady of high rank, the first lady in a town or village” (Alli, 2014). The Iyalode’s main role is to be the spokesperson of women in traditional Yoruba politics. This history of institutionalizing titles is important in relation to contemporary market governance. As this is reflected in the hierarchal structure of the governing bodies of markets, which we saw in Chapter 1.

Iyalojas

In contemporary Lagos the Iyalode is rarely present in any of the markets. Instead it is the Iyaloja (mother of the market), that is in charge of the market associations which control marketplaces and thus that makes her the overall head of the market. The Iyaloja is the ‘chief executive’ of her market segment, and they all report to an Iyaoloja General, who oversees the entire market. These titleholders have to be women according to the ACMWAMN constitution and tradition. The Iyaloja presides over all of the associational meetings, as well as heads the discussions during engagements with local government. Its her task to “ensure that the interests of all members of the Association are protected against any external aggression” (ACMWAMN constitution, 2012). The Iyaloja generally has the title for life, unless she decides to resign or “indicate her intention to cease to hold office” (Ibid.). In cases where the Iyaloja is elderly an acting Iyaloja becomes appointed. The acting Iyaloja is nonetheless required to inform the ‘real’ Iyaloja about her activities by visiting the home

!76 of the Iyaloja and giving her briefings on the markets affairs. Although the Iyaloja is the ‘chief executive’ she is still expected to consult with the executive committee on major decisions.12

Figure 5.1 Market executive committee

The market executive committee described is on the local government level. This level of market governance is in charge of the following:

• Manage, control and oversee the general supervision, maintenance, co-ordination of activities in the market within the local government • Collect the annual dues/levies as may be necessary from the market • Implementation of the association policies • Disseminate information and mobilize members • Ensure a clean and sanitized environment and orderliness in the market • Allow any person subscribed to any satisfied condition precedent to being a member of the association to trade in the market • Foster peace, unity and understanding among the women and men trading in the market • Project and promote the interests of the association • Recommend to the president any deserving member for honorary appointments • Deliberate on matters affecting the interest of the entire members of the market

12 See figure 5.1 for overview of the executive committee. !77 Below this committee is the commodity committee which wields substantial influence over their specific sections.

Figure 5.2 Commodities sectional committee

However, the local government level of associations is connected to the bigger umbrella of ACMWAMN. The local government level discussions between traders and the leaders would generally follow this process:

However, centralization means that the Iyaloja cannot act independently on bigger issues that may need collective action. Instead, she has to attend the State-level associational meeting (held every !78 Tuesday) at the ACMWAMN headquarters in Alausa. Thus bigger issues follows this additional steps:

This means that individual Iyalojas [who are in charge of their own market segments] act independently on the local level administration of their markets, but that they are also part of a larger structure, overseen by an Iyaloja General. It is not mandatory to attend the meetings in Alausa. Many of the Iyalojas interviewed rarely attend the meetings. However, Iyalojas who aspire to be Iyaloja General are known to frequently attend meetings.

Madame Bello’s path to becoming Iyaloja in Dada Genla provides insights into how network facilitate rising through the ranks in markets. Her mother owned a store in Oshodi Market. She inherited this shop, but was only there part-time as her she worked as a sales agent in a travel agency. When business started to slow down for the agency, she decided to quit her job and go into full-time trading. Because she was literate she was approach by the market association in Oshodi do work as their secretary. She ended up working closely with the Iyaloja and learned how market administration and politics works from the top. She continued to sale textiles and travelled to other West African countries and up North to Kano for gini brocade. However, she still found it challenging to make ends meet while staying on Lagos’ ’mainland’. In 2013 her colleagues at the market association in Oshodi informed her that the Iyaloja at Igbogbo (the bigger community in which Agunfoye is located) were looking for an Iyaloja for the new Dada Genla market in Agunfoye. Madame Bello decided to take up the position as it would enable her to lower her living costs, given the peri-urban location of the market. Figure 5.1 and the overview of the executive committee shows that the Iyaloja is supposed to have the final word in a number of administrative matters. However, Iyaloja Bello has struggled to implement her decisions as the authority in the market because the community does not perceive her as autochonos. For instance, one of the traders did not participate in market sanitation as she is

!79 required to. The Iyaloja therefore locked her shop. When the trader showed up later during the day, to see the shop locked she became angry and started yelling at the Iyaloja, lamenting that the shop must be re-opened. Iyaloja Bello refused to remove the lock, and referred the trader to the Babaloja:

They say ’Iyaloja is soft’. I will show them — I will not open the shop! If she wants to complain she can go to the Babaloja. […] Because I’m an indigene in this community they will not receive what I say well when they’re unhappy. So then the Babaloja can settle it”.

(Iyaloja Bello, personal comm., 22 October, 2016)

Thus, apart from the ACMWAMN, contemporary market governance in the Lagos have influential male positions.

Babalojas

The title of Babaloja (father of the market) was introduced by the late Iyaloja General Abibatou Mogaji (Hon. Alli, personal comm., 18 September 2016). The role of the Babaloja is essentially to be the male counterpart of the Iyaloja, however, their authority in the market is not equal. Dr Yusuff explained the role of the Babaloja vis-á-vis the Iyaloja as follows:

“Women control everywhere in the market […] even [when] there’s a Babaloja he’s very silent […] Women are in control of power in the marketplace. Men have not taken over. Culturally women regard markets as a women’s place. So a man that says he’s a Babaloja, people don’t really look at that man as being serious or as somebody interfering with doing women’s job. Its a gender issue, you might have male traders but women are usually the heads”

(Dr Yusuff, personal comm., September 2016).

However, as Babaloja Alhaji Shokunbi explained it: “The Iyaloja is the Supreme. My job is to back her up” (personal comm., 26 October 2016). When speaking to traders they explained that of course there needs to be a Babaloja, because “men are also traders” (Vice Iyaloja, personal comm., 19 September 2016). This therefore suggests that markets are considered dual-sex despite the numerical advantage of women. The influx of male traders has therefore not only changed the composition of markets, but has also been met with the institutionalization of their presence in markets through their own title.

!80 In order to become Babaloja the candidate has to be elected by a 2/3 majority of the market executive committee. The candidate also has to have been active in the market for a minimum of 10 years in the older markets, or be part of the founding members of newly established markets. The acquiring of the title of Babaloja essentially follows the same procedure as that of the Iyaloja. The tasks which come with the title are clearly specified in the Constitution as the following:

• Act as second in command to the Iyaloja general of the local government and Babaloja of the market. Both shall preside over the executives or general meetings in the absence of the Iyaloja General or Iyaloja • Co-ordinate all the male activities of the association • Work with the Iyaloja and co-operate in performing duties required of her (Article 8 e i-vi) • Perform duties which the Iyaloja or the executive committee may ask of him

It is unclear what “male activities” entail. However, the main role of the Babaloja is seemingly that of conflict resolution. This seemingly relates to gender, as it became clear that men are expected to be able to handle physical alterecations. In all three markets, the Iyaloja referred traders to the Babaloja in case of conflict. Iyaloja Alhaja Lutifat Ojikutu explained this as being because “if people are rough he can deal with it” (personal comm., 9 October 2016). The Babaloja in Balogun responded that he has multiple daily visits from traders seeking his assistance in conflicts. He has a relatively big shop, and trading is his main occupation. This means that he is always present in markets. Due to the volume of traders he sometimes decides to send a committee member in his place. The Babaloja in Dada Genla also mainly deals with conflict resolution.

The Babaloja in Dada Genla is rarely present, as he is a herbalist by occupation. He is from the Dada Genla family and was chosen to represent the community since Iyaloja Madame Bello is a ‘non-indigene’ in the community. Iyaloja Bello refers traders that are unhappy with her decisions to him. Thus while scholars such as Dr Yusuff maintain that the Babaloja is not an important title, it is in the case of Dada Genla. While the Iyaloja is present in the market daily and carries out most of the tasks on her own, she has had to divulge power between herself and the Babaloja for fear that the community will otherwise reject her. If we consider the matrix of domination in relation to this it becomes clear that because she is othered in terms of ethnicity, she loses her privileged position.

The Babaloja in Ikosi Isheri passed away a couple of years ago, and has not yet been replaced. In the event of the passing of an Iyaloja there is generally a Vice-Iyaloja to take her place, but in this

!81 case no replacement has been installed. This is likely because of how the Babaloja is usually a background figure and not as crucial as the Iyaloja. Thus while some Babalojas are active in conflict resolution it seems as if most are generally inactive and do not compete with the Iyaloja for influence in the market. Moreover, there are hardly any men present during the state-level meetings in Alausa. A male title which acts without an Iyaloja is the Chairman.

Chairmen

The titles Iyaloja and Babaloja are Yoruba words for market leaders. Non-Yoruba led associations have for a long time had chairmen in their place. Chapter 4 discussed how mainly men from the Igbo and Hausa ethnic groups migrated in order to enter trading in the South-west. This is also reflected in associational structures. This section will use APG as an illustrative example of how the title works. Figure 5.2 presents an overview of the executive committee of the Hausa-led APG. As we can see there are some similarities between APG and ‘regular’ Yoruba associations in the composition of the executive committee. In addition to that, the association acts as a liaison between the local government and traders and also collects levies from traders:

“The local government in Ikosi Isheri owns the revenue generated by APG, however the association functions as an agent which collects the revenue for them. We are [also] the bridge between the local government and the people in the market. Whatever they want to do they write to us. If they want to do environmental sanitation or any other thing they meet us and call us, as we are stakeholders in the market. We relay [the information] to the people and explain to them what the local government wants to do” (APG financial secretary, personal comm., 14 December 2016).

While the financial secretary argued that the rules and regulations of APG are different from that of other associations, his example was conflict resolution:

“If you have any issue with somebody here we don’t allow you to take it out. We sort it out here for you. And for instance, if somebody owes you money, we make sure that we get the money from him or her”

(Ibid.).

These administrative duties of APG mirrors that of other associations. The biggest difference lies in the role of the Iyaloja: !82

“The Iyaloja is a traditional position. We have a good rapport with her […] Iyalojas have influence in the market, but she doesn’t have any influence over us” (Ibid.).

This means that the executive chairman only answers to the local government, who collects taxes from the association. As we have seen in this chapter Iyalojas normally wield authority because they are part of the executive committee. However, in this case the APG does not include her in their committee and thus they wield influence independently. The executive committee is 70% Northern and 30% Southern. Their independence is thus compounded by the function of their market segment, i.e., to be a depot for goods delivered from the Northern parts of the country. The association is lead by Hausa traders from the producing states, and therefore have networks which the Iyaloja is excluded from. While Cohen (1966) documented agitations between Hausa and Yoruba led traders in Ibadan, in this case there is a respectful rapport in which the both the Chairman and the Iyaloja acknowledge each other and attend the same stakeholder meetings held by the local government in Ikosi Isheri.

Figure 5.3 Overview of executive committee of Arewa Perishable Goods head office in Mile 12

!83 5.3 Associations

All markets in Lagos (including the APG) are governed through a system of associations on the basis of the product sold, which in Yoruba is referred to as an egbe (Smith & Luttrell, 1994: 324; Mba, 1995: 194.). This means that there are e.g., tomato sellers associations, children’s wear associations, spare-parts associations etc. Each of these associations fall under an overarching governing body which is headed by the titles we discussed in section 5.2. As previously mentioned, the overall market governance has mainly been under women’s control, which explains the many historical studies on market women’s political economy (Awe, 1973; Baker, 1974; Falola, 1994; Mba, 1982). During interviews, it was repeatedly answered that “markets are mixed, there are no associations for just women” (Vice Iyaloja, personal comm., 17 September 2016). Thus, while previous studies mainly focused on governance from a top-down approach by, e.g., seeking to identify particularly influential, women leaders and how they relate to male politicians. Less has been said looking at market governance from the view of the traders without official titles in the market and the changes in gender and ethnic composition. Before considering these changes, its necessary to understand what a market association does. Most associations require traders to register in order to officially be allowed to trade in their markets, and in specific sections. There are cases, such as farmers markets, which allow for less restricted access, but registration is expected of regular traders, i.e., those who sell in the market daily. According to Article 3 of the ACMWAMN constitution the procedure for application for membership requires the individual applying to write an application letter to the Iyaloja, which specifies personal details as well as the commodity the applicant wishes to trade. The applicant is also required to affix passport photographs to the application. The executive committee then decides whether the applicant will be admitted or rejected, and can in cases consult the commodity leader of which product the applicant wishes to trade. If admitted the new member is required to pay a membership fee — as well as any other fees that may be required for that market. Applicant most promise to “abide by the constitution of the Association and any rules for the time being in force in the Association”.13 Following the registration of the new trader, the individual is added to a registration book and “entitled to all the rights and privileges of members of the Association”.14 Traders who frequent markets without being registered are considered hawkers (i.e. people who solicit business).

13 Article 3 § 3.3.4

14 Article 3 § 3.8 !84 These are often the most marginalized in the market, and at risk of being expelled by both the market associations and the government, as hawking is fined in many places around Lagos. They, however, are not the focus in this study, but instead its the ones who fall under the associations that have been interviewed.15 Upon registration traders are given membership cards, which functions as an identification card in order to distinguish between those who have been given permission to sell and those who do so ‘unlawfully’. While this undoubtedly makes trading more difficult for those outside the associations, it is one of the ways that associations exert control. Moreover, there needs to be incentives for traders to join the associations in order for the market governance to function.

While the market social structure is very hierarchal, associations have open, voluntary meetings where all traders in the market are allowed to attend. Meetings are held once every three months. The discussions in these meetings are mainly to facilitate dialogue between the executive body and the traders. There are clear rules for how traders should behave in the marketplace in the ACMWAMN constitution. For instance, traders are not allowed to physically solicit costumers, i.e., pull customers into their stalls or shops. The traders also have the opportunity to present complaints or concerns. Any urgent announcements are announced immediately through the ringing of bells when specific assistants to the Iyaloja will walk around and make noise throughout the market. Traders are required to follow the opening hours set by the market association. The general market days are Monday - Saturday, with Thursday being closed in the morning for sanitation. Sanitation day is mandatory for all traders. They are in charge of cleaning the area around their shop or stall. Those who fail to comply will be issued warnings, and have their shops locked by the Iyaloja until they have paid a fine.The functioning of the associations is thus for the market leaders to have control over the market space, and to give their members a sense of stake in the functioning of the market by giving them an avenue to interact with the leaders apart from individual visits.

5.4 Overlapping associations

As previously discussed, market associations function as gate-keepers to the market. By registering in market associations, traders gain permission to trade. However, the importance of the market association to traders seems to vary according to the duration of time in the market. As Mabogunje (1970) argued, new migrants seek to adjust into a new locality by seeking out a “frame of reference more relevant to his needs in the city” (p. 8). Establishing oneself in a city, essentially becomes a

15 See Chapter three for a methodological discussion explaining the choice to omit certain traders. !85 quest to find interest groups, which benefits one the most. Market associations provide the most basic form of protection for its members through the right to trade — granted that they obey the rules imposed by the association. Therefore it is not surprising that many of the traders interviewed in this study reported that they either do not attend the association meetings at all, or only sporadically. Membership in market associations is seemingly considered a necessary first step to try to increase ones financial security through the right to trade. But become less important as individuals settle into the city and find other interest groups. The sphere of other associations is marked by a range of choices based on e.g., religion, occupation, and ethnicity, and not confined to economic empowerment. The various options lead to traders often belonging to multiple associations simultaneously as a way to gain access to assistance pertaining to their needs as they relate to different parts of their identity and interests. Another important factor is whether the trader wants to pursue any of the positions in the market association hierarchy or not. Barnes (1975) studied participation in voluntary associations in Lagos during the seventies. The associations that she examined were divided into: religious, primary16, work related, recreation and Esusu (credit and savings associations). The study focused mainly on Yoruba and Igbo migrants as she found Hausa-speaking migrants to “rarely join any but religious groups” (p. 75). However, what this study found 42 years later is that ethnicity-based associations are important to many Hausa-speaking migrants and residents. This, however, does not contradict her findings as it showed that the experience of belonging in the city had a significant impact on associational activity. In regards to Igbo migrants she found that:

“I[g]bo, who are a minority group in the city, cling more tenaciously to primary associations as their years in the city increase. As a group they have little representation in municipal government and, this being the case, their place in the community is less secure. Intermixed with these factors is a reluctance to remain permanently in the city, if failure of women to migrate in equal proportion to men is any indicator of residential stability” (Barnes, 1975: 75).

Igbo migrants to Lagos were, unlike their Yoruba equivalents faced with a challenge to integrate and gain political representation. The Igbo traders interviewed in this study who were either second- generation Lagosians or had lived in a city for at least a decade responded that they almost always

16 Home-town, and voluntary associations are part of the category of ’primary’. !86 attend the associational meetings. This is in contrast to Hausa traders, who are part of the market associations but rarely attend the meetings.

The Hausa-speaking traders interviewed for this study reinforced Barnes’ (1975) finding that there is a correlation between duration of residence in Lagos and participation in primary associations, which often are home-town oriented i.e., ethnic. The more recent migrants interviewed, had lived in Lagos between only a few months. None of them participate in associational meetings, but are members of the market associations. However, the traders who are already established in Lagos (with at least 5-7 years of residency) reported to be part of Arewa Gary Yawaye (an association for Hausa-speaking communities in Lagos) but also titleholders in the association as auditors and judges:

”Arewa Gariyawaye is an association which helps the youth. It teaches them their rights and helps them against the authorities. Many people have been arrested but they don’t know their rights so they need someone to teach them.”

(Dahiru, personal comm., 24 November 2016)

When asking Dahiru about the market association for the Saudi Eko section of Balogun he said that I need to go and see “the Yorubas”. While he distances himself from the market association according to ethnicity, he belongs to the main market association, has lived in Lagos for 14 years, has a medium-sized shop, and 2-3 apprentices. Thus he can no longer be considered a migrant, but a resident in Lagos — and with it comes a new set of challenges. He has fulfilled his membership requirement to trade in Saudi Eko, but is disinterested to pursue any positions in the market associations. The issues that he found the most important, as reflected in the excerpt above is that Hausa-speaking communities are safe from state abuse and that they are informed enough to become less marginalized. This indicates a desire to contribute to the integration in their new home. This is similar to the associations that Barnes found in the seventies. Moreover, she argued that:

“at the present time primary associations provide mutual support to co-members who wish to remain in touch with home communities. But it does this after they have weathered the initial storms of establishing themselves in the city. In that sense they have become associations, not for the weak, but for the comparatively strong” (p. 87).

Thus while minority groups are members of the main associations some seek out complementary associations in order to find groups which act in their interest according to parts of their identities that are not related to their occupation.

!87 5.5 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter has been to provide a brief overview of what the Iyaloja and the market associations and executive committees under her responsibility are tasked with. This was done with the purpose of illustrating how other associations and individuals may relate to her and her market association. It also sought to present the role of the Babaloja.

Market associations in the Southwest have for long been referred to as women’s domain but as we can see there are institutionalized male titles in the market. The Babaloja is supposed to be complementary to the Iyaloja and that suggests that there has been discussions on how to include men in the leadership given that there are higher numbers of male traders today than it was when the traditional form of Yoruba market governance and institutions were established. However, as we can see in cases such as Balogun the task for the Babaloja is seemingly connected to his gender as he is mainly tasked with solving conflicts, which then is a male responsibility in the marketplace. This raises questions as to whether the title is not symbolic, which Dr Yusuff claimed, but instead instrumental as it fills a purpose for the Iyaloja. In the case of Dada Genla, belonging to the community increased the importance of the Babaloja as people perceived him as more authoritative than Iyaloja Madame Bello. Thus factoring her specific matrix of identity in relation to her title shows that being Yoruba provided her with the initial foot into trading, and also facilitated her move to Agunfoye as the new Iyaloja. However, because ethnicity (and sense of community) is malleable, she was not perceived as someone who should have authority in the community.

Some studies (Solaja et al., 2013) have started to ask whether associations such as APG are having any affects on market social structures. The main purpose of the association is to engage in trading of various farm products, however as indicated by the name Arewa (North-ern in Hausa), the association is controlled by traders from the Northern regions of the country. Most of the products found there as well come from the North. They are thus not actively seeking to undermine the associational patterns of the Southwest, but rather trying to run their business. Also, their Chairmen attend the same stakeholder meetings at the local government office in Ikosi Isheri as the other Iyalojas under the Iyaloja General and maintain good relations with her. The point of divergence is related to how the Iyaloja General perceives the market to be under her sphere of influence (Chapter 4 on Wazobia), while this association see her position as symbolic.

!88 CHAPTER SIX

MARKET POLITICS

”we are dreaming of a new and beautiful Lagos which would be a reference point for best practices that you can find anywhere in the world”

— (Former) Lagos State Governor, Babatunde Fashola (2008)

6.1 Introduction

The All Peoples Congress (APC) administration lead by Babatunde Fashola ushered in an increased desire to “develop” Lagos. Fashola announced grand plans of beautifying Lagos, by seemingly targeting the so-called ‘informal sector’ with the introduction of the ‘Mega-city’ project. The state assembly discussed and decided to forcibly remove or outlaw illegal settlements, motorcycles as transportation (okadas), and demolished markets in order to replace them with new ’modern’ structures. The identification of the ‘informal sector’ as the source of the ‘unattractiveness’ of Lagos is rather ironic, as it has become oversaturated because of the state’s failure to provide other forms of employment. It must be noted that the use of the terms ‘Mega-city’ and ‘informal’ by the government is overly general and by definition wrong. A Megacity is a numerical rather than a developmental definition, and informality deals with the level of application government regulation exerts on workers rather than the modernity of their surroundings. Thus while some of the state’s critique of the sector is valid in that it is in many cases unsafe and unsanitary, the underlying issue is the fact that many of these activities take place without the state’s approval and will continue to do so unless there are viable alternatives. The latter situation reflects Lindell’s (2010) definition of the informal sector as being a sphere where the economic activities that take place “lie beyond or circumvent state regulation” (p. 5). However, as was discussed in Chapter 2, the Lagos State

!89 Government (LSG) recognizes market associations and collects taxes from them despite terming them as informal. Given this ambiguous relationship between the state and the markets, this chapter looks at the politics of governing markets.

Clark (1988) argued that the market traders and the state are in an ‘antagonistic’ relationship pointing to the fact that market leaders have the agency to ignore, circumvent and protest policies which they deem unfavorable. Simultaneously, others have highlighted the clientelist ties between politicians and market leaders, which affords both a certain degree of influence into each others spheres (Baker, 1974; Barnes, 1986; Falola, 1994). Baker (1974), for instance maintained that “no political party can afford to ignore the interests of the market women [because of] their collective potential strength, which could be marshaled for political protest, electoral victory, or material support” (p. 223-234). Mitlin (2004) argues that the interest from politicians stem from a view of traders as ‘vote banks’. The political support of market women was instrumental during the inception of the Iyaloja General title as it became a way for Macaulay’s NNDP to gain voters (Mba, 1982). Baker (1974) considered the women’s importance for politicians yet low advocacy to be indicative of market women’s ‘unassertive influence’ as they historically would strongly oppose policies by shutting down markets, but rarely initiated advocacy for policies in their interests. Similarly, Mabogunje (1961) referred to market women as being “politically quiet” (in Falola, 1995: 31). The antagonistic relationship which Clark (1988) refers to requires a certain degree of agency on the part of both actors. As previous studies indicate, market women have the potential to be influential political actors but rarely initiate movements of their own behalf. Considering the on- going APC led targeting of these markets it has become imperative to revisit the political leverage of market associations vis-à-vis the LSG.

This chapter is organized as follows: First, the state’s ambiguous relationship with markets will be discussed, both on a (Lagos) state level and on the local government level. Second, the ‘Mega-city’ project, relocations and demolitions will be discussed. Lastly, the chapter will discuss the political bargaining power of market associations in relation to the LSG.

6.2. The state versus the market

As Barnes (1974) reminds us “the health and viability of the [market] is largely dependent upon the tolerance of formal governing bodies which quite clearly control the means for permitting market !90 activities to persist” (p. 239). This brings to the fore the importance of localities. What are the specific set of conditions in Lagos that determine the political importance and leverage of market associations? Thus while the literature on urban governance in the ‘developing world’ has neglected city level political and policy contexts in favor of focusing on the national level (Devas, 2004: 5), it is necessary to distinguish between the national and state level form of governance as they vary greatly in Nigeria. On a national level we see that the government goes from “ignoring this sector as a whole, actively suppressing certain informal economic activities and actively promoting other specific sub- sectors of the informal economy” (Smith & Luttrell, 1994: 332). In 1984 during current President Muhammadu Buhari’s military rule and the ‘War Against Indiscipline’, Dugbe market in Ibadan was flagged as illegal, destroyed and replaced with commercial banks (ibid.). In 1987 the government announced a “National Open Apprenticeship Scheme”, as a way to support micro- enterprises, however, a study which assessed the program showed that it has not yielded the desired outcomes of lowered unemployment and formalizing the sector. Instead it showed that: there is a lack of funding for the program, that apprentices frequently drop out and that there are no certificates awarded after completing the program (Evawoma-Enuku & Mgbor 2005). The process of demolishing markets and replacing them with apprenticeship schemes suggests a desire to exert more government control over economic centres. While these actions took place during a military government, there are some similarities to the current modus operandi. At the state level, many question the state’s presence as the decision-making power as the low – and often times absent delivery of public services has led to widespread self-organization and self-governance within communities (Okome, 2013). The low level provision of public goods is what has led observers and inhabitants to regard Lagos as a city which ‘provides a hard life for many’ (Peil, 1991: 193). However, the LSG has indicated a renewed interest in ‘good governance’. While speaking on good governance, former governor Fashola said “the question to be asked is whether our budgets have delivered maximum social advantage when our people have no access to qualitative education, healthcare, housing or power supply, especially when compared with other oil producing nations” (tundefashola.com, 2009). Amis (2004) considers the destruction of livelihoods in the market sector as ‘bad governance’, while alluding to considering the creation, enhancement and sustaining of livelihoods as ‘good’ (p. 145). Thus the issue remains as to whether the desire to ensure improvement in service provision will yield any improvements in the market spaces as well. Traders are some of the most visible Lagosians, but as this chapter will show, seemingly not a priority for the LSG. While some argue that multiparty politics is considered the cause of the !91 interest in the trading sector by political actors (see Lindell, 2010), as it is seen as a way for them to garner support and votes, this relationship between democracy and seeking the support of market associations remains ambiguous in Lagos. Before discussing the contemporary relationship between the LSG and market associations further, a brief overview of Lagos’ political history helps illuminate the multi-layered aspects which together create the institutional framework in which market associations operate. A historical examination of the relationship between the state and the market sector in Lagos will show that on the one hand: political actors have indeed sought the support of market associations, but on the other hand, the various government bodies have sought to emphasis their control over market spaces — thus maintaining an ambiguous relationship.

During British colonial rule in the early 1900s “arbitrary fees, [...] interference with the production, distribution and pricing of cash crops such as palm oil and kernels” and market stall fees were introduced (Chuku, 1998: 60). There was a clear goal to increase revenue for the colonial government by taxing traders. In 1908 the British imposed a water rate tax without consulting the market leaders. During the same period the British had decided to oust Oba (king) Adeniji Adele II of Lagos. The Market Women’s Association was connected to the Oba’s palace as the wealthier market women were in the same circles. These two decisions lead the Market Women’s Association to call for a market closure, and led a march with nearly 15 000 participants to the government house (Mba, 1982). Thus while this was under colonial rule, which is essentially authoritarianism, women’s market associations decided to fight against the colonial government’s decisions, thus setting the tone for a lively participation of market women in early 1900s Lagos politics. However, there was nonetheless persistent competition between the colonial government and the market leaders for control over markets. Despite being met with opposition to their policies, the British decided to continue to interfere with market activities. In the late 1920s the colonial government decided to increase their control over the export business through a produce inspection legislation. The new law required traders to present all their products that are marked for export to produce inspectors. Traders considered this as as an “unjustified interference” as it decreased their autonomy over their business as the inspectors had the authority to rate the products and subsequently decide their value (Chuku, 1998). It is during this period that Herbert Macaulay and his party NNDP found interest in the market women’s association. Macaulay, who was educated decided to represent the women by writing letters to the colonial government on their behalf. He was an active proponent against colonialism and thus found legitimacy for his party by providing concessions to the women in exchange for membership in the NNDP (Mba, 1982). He was thus a key figure in increasing the !92 political voice of market women, and even after his death in 1946 other political parties sought the support of market women since they had become a force to be reckoned with. The 1950s were the the first time that women could vote, and is seen as the period in which the politicization of market women reached its pinnacle as ‘they formed an auxiliary wing in every major party in Lagos’, which ‘continued to be meaningful even after the imposition of military rule’ (Baker, 1974: 241). While little has been written on the relationship between market women and the state government immediately following independence in 1960, available material show that the military government in 1966 dissolved the local councils and replaced it with interim administrations, they ensured that ‘one out of twenty-five seats was to be reserved for market women’ (Baker, 1974: 240). Thus regardless of being under military rule, market women were seen as an important ally for the government. There was a short-lived democratically elected LSG government, in 1979 when Alhaji Lateef Jakande’s Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) came into power (Peil, 1991). However, he was jailed in 1983 during the Buhari led coup (Ibid.). Jakande had been supported by Madame Abibatu Mogaji, during her leadership of United Market Women’s Association. Deputy major E.A. Oluyele Bright was quoted to have said that “any person supported by the women must be successful at the polls”, as it was clear that any dominant party had the backing of the market women (Baker, 1974: 241). Thus, we can see that while the 1960s and 1970s were marked by military rule, there were no substantial changes in the modus operandi between the government and market associations. There was another brief period of democratic rule, when Sir Michael Otedola was governor from 1992 - 1993, however, Lagos has mainly been under military rule as both the 1980s and 1990s were also under military administrations. The country democratized in 1999 during the rule of General Olusegun Obasanjo. Following the advent of democracy, the rule over the country has been marked by bi-partisanship as power alternates between the APC and People’s Democratic Party (PDP). However, Lagos has been governed by the APC since 1999, when Asiwaju Bola Ahmed Tinubu came into power. As we can see the market leaderships in Lagos has always been linked to the political sphere. Military administrations who do not rely on votes for their legitimacy did seek support from market women, but this pattern still calls the widely held belief that multiparty democracy is behind political interest in markets into question. It is therefore important to consider how the embeddedness of market associations in the political sphere influence their operations. Local government levels of interactions between the government and market women’s associations illustrate how the institutional legacies imposed by British colonial rule remain in effect today and has created linkages which are hard for the women to circumvent. !93 LOCAL GOVERNMENT

As we saw in Chapter 5 market associations have “regulatory arrangements that operate independently of the state”, as shown in the overview of the Iyalojas responsibilities (Meagher, 2009: 7). However, market associations also fall under the authority of local governments. In 1979 the state and the local government in Lagos were essentially functioning as one body. The 1983 Jakande administration divided the two, and placed the rights to enforce rules on the local government (Local government officer, personal comm., 24 November 2016). A new constitution was issued in 1999 following democratization which made ‘the provision of basic services the responsibility of both local and state governments’ yet again, and since then there has been ‘no clear legal delineation between the relative roles of these two sub-national tiers of government’ (Lawanson, 2015: 221). However, there is a visible difference in the functions of the two as the state governments exert fiscal control, while local governments carry out the administrative responsibilities of the government (Ibid). This is similar to the colonial administration. The British colonial administration introduced a ‘Market Ordinance’ in Western Nigeria (today’s South-western states) and placed the authority over markets under the ‘Divisional Native Authorities’ (Sudarkasa, 1973). These authorities had the mandate to issue by-laws concerning the administration of markets. The Divisional Authority was replaced by Councils in 1954, which essentially function in a similar way to today’s local government’s which are defined according to territories or areas. The Councils introduced Market Adoptive By-laws in 1956 and 1959 and these are illustrative of how the local government seek to ‘control’ markets today:

1. Stipulate market days and the hours which a market is to be held 2. Erect or authorize the erection of stalls 3. Allot specific areas within the market for the sale of the various items 4. Authorize persons who may sell in the market 5. Prohibit intrusion in the market by specified persons of vehicles 6. Levy and collect fees from stall holders 7. Levy and collect tolls from commercial vehicles authorized to use the market 8. Make provisions for maintaining standards of sanitation in the market and for its general upkeep 9. Employ or appoint various officials to see that the laws are upheld. Persons guilty of certain offences which are stipulated in the by-laws are subject to arrest and may be fined upon conviction in the courts17

17 Source: Sudarkasa, 1973 !94 The government may have the de jure control over markets but the de facto authority remains in the hands of market associations:

“The local government works in consonance with the head of the markets. If local government wants to celebrate something [they] will not issue a directive directly to market women, they will call the head of the market and inform the woman. She will then pass the directives to other women and of course they do obey. So local government works directly with the head of the associations.”

(Dr. Yusuff, 7 September, 2016) This cooperation between the local government and the market leaders is confirmed by both parties. In relation to any issues in the market, both parties seek the support and approval of the other. We see that the de jure authority is with the local government as the “Iyalojas can come and complain about illegal construction in the market but they can’t demolish it on their own. They have to request it from us [local government]” (Local government officer, 24 November 2016). Whilst the de facto authority is reflected in the way that the local government and other authorities such as the state and the military have to cooperate with the Iyaloja in regulating and securing the market:

“We do security meetings every month. We have soldiers, police, immigration, customs, we all work together in the meetings. In order to ensure the security of the market we have 200 soldiers patrolling the market at night. They have offices in the market […] And immediately if I hear about anything happening in the market I will let government know.” (Iyaloja General Ahmed, November 2016)

As we can see, the cooperation between the associations and the government severely undermines the notion of ‘informality’ of these networks. They are recognized as the relevant authority despite the fact that the judicial authority is in the hands of the local government. This is likely to be because there has not been any substantial changes in the institutional legacies set in place by the colonial government. The current modus operandi is merely an extension of the Market Ordinance. Thus pre-colonial authority over markets was fully in the hands of market women. Today, it remains as their sphere of influence but they are required to work in tandem with the government because of being embedded within their institutions. Dr Yusuff argues that power between the two parties is equal:

“If somebody dies in the market it is not the local government that will say they should not open the market […] it is the head of the association. If the local government wants to impose something, !95 they will still need to cooperation of the head of the market […] so I think the power is divulged between the two. If [traders] revolt what happens? But that hasn't happened recently. I think there’s a limitation of power — they [market leaders] know the limitation of power. They can’t do that. [But] we’re in a democratic setting, so [local government] can’t just do anything. They need [associational] support too, so they get their support and cooperation from the market head.” (Dr Yusuff, personal comm., 7 September 2016) However, the associations are arguably not equal to the local government. As the by-laws show, the local government is in charge of collecting taxes and fees. The Lagos state government uses a blanket tax system, which means that they collect personal income tax and land use from traders. The local government collects yearly fees from traders. They first inform the Iyaloja that they are due to collect taxes through a verbal notification, and later visit all shops to determine the amount to pay. 72 hours later the bill is sent (local government officer, personal comm., 24 November 2016). A petty trader kiosk roughly pays N4000 per year, while bigger shops pay around N6500 (Ibid.). Table 6.1 below gives an overview of other costs that traders are expected to pay.

Table 6.1 Taxes that traders are required to pay according to government body

Tax/Levy Amount in 2016 Amount in euros

State MTCC (Per Annum): N5100/N10 000 (based 14 - 28 € Paid by every informal on status) worker from 18 years and above.

Local Government Lockup/Shop Permit N15 000 41 €

Lockup/Shop Permit N2500 7 € (attachment shops) Trade Permit N10 000 28 €

Radio/television N1500 - N2500 4 - 7 €

Extension N1500-N2000 (based on 4 - 6 € size of extension) Hawkersticker (per day) N100 > 1 €

Market Stall Seller (per N100 > 1 € day)

Source: BudgIT, 2017

In addition to these costs traders are also expected to pay a fee to the Lagos State Waste Management Authority [LAWMA]. “We pay LASMA once every month, else they lock the market” (Iyaloja Balogun, 17 September, 2016). However, traders are expected to clean the markets themselves every Thursday from 8.00 - 10.00 am which is the mandated sanitation day. This has !96 caused frustrations amongst traders as they find that the local government collects tax from them, but do not make provisions for them. The taxes on the commercial sector (including manufacturing, transport etc. and not only traders in markets) in Lagos contributes to 95% of the revenue of the local governments, whilst it is estimated that the fifty-two registered markets contribute up to N500 million, ca 12 percent of the revenue of the state as a whole (BudgIT, 2017: 23). This means that market traders are making significant contributions to the state’s revenue, while receiving small returns. Taxation has been a long-standing issue, and is what fuelled the demonstrations in the 1920s. Similarly in other parts of Nigeria, taxation has led to market closures and demonstrations (Eames, 1988). However, the most common reactions toward taxation and the local government range from ‘cynicism to indifference’ (Baker, 1974: 234). Therefore, “to the traders, the council is not a dispenser of amenities but a regulatory institution that limits, restricts, and taxes their activities […] Not surprisingly, the traders feel that their markets are controlled by the political party dominant in the council, rather than by the council itself” (Ibid.). Clark (1988) argues that “antagonism between traders and the state arises despite, and partly because of, substantial linkages and mutual dependence between specific groups of traders and agencies of the state” (p. 2). However, this relation is not visible in Lagos despite substantial linkages between market associations and political parties. The current governor Akinwumbi Ambode was endorsed by the association (see Figure 6.1). The APC has been in control of Lagos for 18 years, and two of the leaders of the Association for Lagos Market Women and Men have been directly related to the leadership of the party, but it has not yielded any substantially favorable policies for the associations members. What does this tell us about the role of processes of political change on the collective bargaining power of market associations? Networks are important for market traders and market elites alike as social capital gained through the right associations can lead to higher degrees of power by virtue of gaining access to people who yield influence. Given the direct linkages to the party the market leadership should be in a favorable position to make demands yet this is not visible. Similar patterns have been observed in e.g., Benin and Togo where market leaders seek out politicians and political offices (for themselves) as a way to ensure favorable trade policies for their businesses (Axelson & Sylvanus, 2010; Prag, 2013).

The APC and the Association for Market Women and Men in Lagos state has come to have a particular relationship. The second Iyaloja General was Abibatu Mogaji. She held the position until 2013 when she passed away. Madame Mogaji was an active participant in Lagos politics. During !97 the 1950s she supported AG and the former leader of the Western region, Obafemi Awolowo. In 1979 she supported UPN and the Jakande government. She is also the mother of Bola Tinubu, the first APC governor (and later Senator). While she has openly supported political parties, her long presence in the marketplace has afforded her a respected status amongst market women. Her relationship with the LSG did not yield any substantial opposition from other leaders. She is generally perceived as having been a good Iyaloja General. Following the passing of Mogaji, Folashade Tinubu-Ojo was installed as her successor. Tinubu-Ojo is the granddaughter of Mogaji and daughter of former governor Tinubu. There was much opposition to her selection as the new Iyaloja General, however few market leaders dared to be vocal about their disapproval for fear of repercussions (Anonymous, personal communication., September 2016). When asked about the role of her father, Tinubu-Ojo reportedly said "because I am the daughter of the National leader of APC doesn't mean that I must not represent my people well, I have to represent my people's opinion” (allafrica.com, 2016). There were no major demonstrations against APC policies during Madame Mogaji’s tenure. Similarly, there has been no collective actions against the relocation and demolition of markets under the current leadership. However, the disapproval of the current Iyaloja General are not solely based on her familial ties to the party, but rather her inexperience. However, the fact that she nonetheless got appointed Iyaloja General has lead people to believe that the APC has co-opted the association.

!98 Figure 6.1 Governor Akinwumbi Ambode at the Lagos market association HQ in Alausa 18

18 Source: http://akinwunmiambode.com/dev/tag/market-women-and-men/ !99 6.3 The ’Mega-city’ project

While the Nigerian economy predominately relies on oil as its main source of revenue, Lagos is host to the financial district and accrues revenue without oil. The revenue generated by Lagos accounts for an estimate of 25 percent of the national GDP and 65 percent of the country’s commercial activities (Ogunleye, 2016). Lagos has the country’s largest cluster of market traders, with fifty-two registered markets (BudgIT, 2017). However, analysts estimate that 68 percent of jobs in the state are in the informal sector, and that without it unemployment figures would be at 95 percent (Ibid). The state government has announced its plan to become Africa’s model ‘Mega-city’ — a city that is a “global, economic and financial hub that is safe, secure, functional and productive” by 2025 (Lagos State Government, 2012). Although a megacity is any city that has a population of over 10 million inhabitants, the Lagos State Government has determined to make this also synonymous with prosperity and effective governance. This ambitious goal will require major changes to the current structures of Lagos. Below is an overview of the state’s development plan and its four pillars of development:

Table 6.2 Objectives of the Lagos State Development Plan (LSDP):

Pillar 1: Economic Pillar 2: Infrastructure Pillar 3: Social Security Pillar 4: Sustainable Development Development and Development Environment

Prosperity, production Enabling economic Improving living A viable and sound and innovation growth, job creation, standards and safety of future for our development and Lagosians, properties grandchildren transformation and Businesses

Source: Ogunleye, 2016.

Considering the large numbers of individuals employed in the ‘semi-regulated’ sector, it is imperative that the LSDP plan carries them along in the development process. Pillar 2 and 3 are the ones that will have the most direct impact on markets.19 As we saw earlier, the NOAS did not yield the desired results. The system of apprenticeships within the markets as its carried out by traders themselves has been a way for new traders to gain easier access to markets as their ‘patron’ helps

19 Depending on whether the LSG decides to use Pillar 2 as a replacement for apprenticeship systems as was NOAS. !100 them go through the barriers that exist for new traders (see Chapter 4). The ‘mega-city’ project has already had major implications for some of the city’s markets. Economists such as Fafchamps (1997) argued that African markets have been considered ‘informal’ because “[they] do not conform to Western images of what markets should look like” (Fafchamps, 1997 in Lyon, 2003: 11) the aesthetics and structure of markets is a concern for the LSG. As we have seen, Fashola was outspoken on the need to ‘beautify’ Lagos. During his tenure, Yaba market was destroyed and later replaced with ‘Tejuoso Ultra-Modern Market’. Most traders could not afford the increased shop-rents, which lead to an unauthorised market sprawling up next to it. The government never took responsibility for the demolition, however, it is common for the LSG to demolish markets. Pillar 3 is supposed to target the needs of Lagosians and protect their properties and businesses. The role of market associations has been to protect the traders and their businesses. As we have seen in this chapter the Market Women’s Association was highly active in the early 1900s and contested state interventions which they deemed unjust against themselves and traders. However, as we will now see these movements have not been reignited in recent times despite open hostility from the state. Sabo market in Ikorodu was demolished during the night of May 3rd this year (see Figure 6.2), reportedly without notifying traders of the pending demolition. The Lagos State government has yet again claimed to not be responsible for the demolition and that it is unknown who is responsible (Vanguard.ng, 2017).20 Nonetheless, the sudden demolition of markets follows the Nigerian state’s precedent when it comes to markets and may further erode the already distrustful relationship between the state and the market traders.

In his review of Fafchamps’ extensive book on networks and institutions in Africa, Leonard (2006) concludes that “the question is no longer market versus state, but how to help the market. This work suggests an important role for the state not in replacing the market, but in enabling it. Changing the way African states see the market is the most important policy prescription of all” (p. 553). Critics of the mega-city project argue that its current trajectory will lead to “higher rates of socio-spatial inequalities and increased tensions between the government and her citizens” (Lawanson, 2015). State intervention and relocation of markets does not automatically have to lead to negative outcomes for traders, but the reason for either moving or demolishing markets must be informed by the needs of traders and happen with their consultation. The state’s interference in markets becomes

20 http://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/05/lasg-denies-involvement-demolition-sabo-market-ikorodu/ !101 a problem when it is motivated by a blind quest to modernize, which was seemingly the case of Tejuoso. However, it is likely that the Iyaloja in Sabo and Yaba were informed by the LSG (if they were responsible for the demolition). Mile 12 is the only market out of the markets featured in this study that has experienced such direct state intervention in its operation, as it was previously relocated. Mile 12 was moved from Iddo in Ikosi Isheri to its current location following a decision taken by the military government as the old location could not cater to the size of the number of traders. Neither the Iyaloja General or the market executives of the Arewa Perishable goods section had complaints about this. Both parties emphasized the need for space and how the old location was too cramped.

“Because the place [Iddo] is very full, nowhere to park trailer to drop the market. Thats why they bring us here. They talk to us, so we agree with them.”

(Iyaloja General, Alhaja Iyabo Ahmed, Ikosi Isheri, 2017)

The current location has booming business and is also filled to the brim with traders and produce. The current location is along the Lagos - Ikorodu highway, which makes it easy for trucks coming in and out with products to enter and drop products. The interviews with the market leaders coupled with the benefits of the new location therefore suggest that the relocation has been positive for the market. However, because of the booming business, the current administration was considering relocating the market in 2016 as it was causing too much traffic on the highway and subsequent security concerns. The Iyaloja General, Alhaja Iyabo Ahmed reportedly openly opposed the relocation:

“We don’t want to relocate from Lagos, it’s our main market for years past. Lagos is where the consumers are located so any relocation from Lagos will really not measure up to what we are getting in Lagos […] While, we are ready to comply with the relocation plan of the state government, we are pleading that the new site should not be too remote for us in order to have easy access to our customers, we are pleading with Governor Ambode.”21

The first relocation of Mile 12 was favorable to the traders and was thus supported by the market executives in the area. However, the more recent suggestion to relocate the market outside of Lagos would have a negative impact on business. This particular case ended up being settled through a stakeholder meeting, and as we saw in section 6.2 Iyaloja Ahmed works closely with the

21 http://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/03/mile-12-market-dont-want-relocate-women-market-leader- pleads-ambode/ !102 government in order to ensure smooth operations of the market. Thus we can see that the state has the authority to use violence to forcefully remove markets, but if it wants to ‘solve’ issues, it has to work together with market associations. This reflects what Clark (1988) referred to as a ‘interdependence’ as “neither can afford to ignore the other” (p. 2). The next section will therefore discuss power and agency.

Figure 6.2 Aftermath of the demolition of Sabo Market in Ikorodu

Source: Sahara reporters, 2017

!103 6.4 The issue of power

The wide body of literature on market women’s associations in Nigeria have centered on how associations such as theirs ”do not appear at first sight to be political [but] may also exercise political power and wield public authority” (Lund, 2007: 13-14). Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 2 several studies on market associations have focused on the ‘power’ of market women (Mabogunje, 1961; Barnes, 1986; Baker, 1974; Falola, 1995). Most of these studies used a rigid conceptualization of power. Strength is only visible in open confrontations between associations and the state. While Lund (2007) focuses on how ”non-political situations may reveal themselves to be active sites of political negotiation and mediation over the implementation of public goals or the distribution of public authority in which local and regional identities and power relations are reshaped and recast” (Ibid). In the case of market women’s association’s it has been their open challenge of the political which has politicized them. Thus, if we would use a similar definition of power, for instance, Latour’s (1984) definition of wielding power over others (or in this case mobilizing others) we could say that the relationship between the LSG and market associations is unequal in terms of power. The state has on numerous occasions decided to remove markets causing loss of livelihoods for traders. Despite this show of force, there has not been any major market-led protests in recent times. This is not to say that they necessarily should be a (political) authority, instead it is about highlighting the 'micro-political contestations that infuse such efforts to consolidate public authority within localities where there is a plurality of state and twilight institutions’ such as in cases of market relocations (Kyed, 2014: 6). At least, that is seemingly what propelled the many studies on this facet of market associations in Nigeria.

This chapter has focused much attention of local level bargaining between the government and Iyalojas as most of their interactions do not correspond with the overly confrontational or reactionary narrative depicted in much of the literature. Lukes (1974) defines power as something which exists in cases where there is no confrontation as well. Thus we are able to consider the cooperation and negotiation between Iyalojas across Lagos and the local governments as an indicator of individual Iyalojas and their associations as important stakeholders in local governance. Similarly, Falola (1995) highlighted the “almost daily occurrence to ignore the state and disregard laws that are considered stupid or injurious to their [market women’s] interests” as non- confrontational demonstrations of power (p. 32). Indeed, quietly rejecting policies is a silent act of resistance. It is precisely in their ability to ’ignore’ the state that has the source of antagonism !104 between the state and market associations they undermine the state’s legitimacy by circumventing policies. However, what seems to be the case in the three markets under study is that there is a respectful engagement between the government and the leaders. In the case of Mile 12 we saw that the market leadership had been informed by the government before the relocation to its current location, and during the proposed second relocation. It is therefore likely that other market leaders have also been informed before the state has carried out their projects. They key issue here lies in whether there has been a conversation, in which both actors hold equal bargaining power or whether the power balance was skewed in the favor of one actor. While we cannot determine this at the moment due to lack of material, what we can say is that power in this case is not found on the state level of market associations [with the Iyaloja General], but on the local level interactions between government and market associations [and their Iyaloja].

6.5 Conclusion

While it is assumed that multi-party democracies will increase the interest in market traders, in this case, the associations have been embedded in the political sphere throughout contemporary history. Despite the fact that Lagos has mostly been under military rule, politicians have sought to gain their favor through offering concession in exchange for their support. However, following democratization in 1999 the APC has managed to gain their endorsement without making any substantial concession. On the contrary, the consecutive APC governments have sought to follow their slogan of ”Itesiwaju eko lo je wa logun” (it is our duty to move Lagos forward), by becoming increasingly developmental. The government’s path towards development in many instances directly clash with the market associations as they seek to ’beautify’ Lagos. Market associations have been considered a powerful political actor because of their ability to rally behind causes or politicians and simultaneously oppose policies which they deem unfavorable. This ability led the political sphere to seek to include market associations under their banner. The question this raises is whether the particular legacy in Lagos has moved beyond mere linkages between the two to a state of co-option in which the ACMWAMN no longer acts as an institution that checks the power of the state. However, local level interactions between the associations and the state which show a positive outcome of network embeddedness and bargaining power as individual Iyalojas are seen as key stakeholders which the local government negotiates with. The purpose of this chapter has been to illustrate the nuances to market associations vis-a-vis

!105 the government by distinguishing between the state level association and the LSG, and individual Iyalojas and the local government.

!106 CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

7.1 Introduction

Markets in Southwest Nigeria have been studied for decades. Many of these studies took place in homogenous contexts. Cities like Lagos have been — and remain, predominately Yoruba, however traders and firms from other parts of the country, the continent and outside Africa are important actors in the marketplace. We are still trying to document and analyze how diversity is affecting markets and traders. What has been of particular focus in this study has been the relative position of indigenous women leaders vis-à-vis other actors in light of increased competition from male and non-Yoruba actors. The purpose of this study was to shed light on how aspects such as: market dynamics, market governance and market politics together help to explain how gender and ethnicity function in the marketplace. This chapter summarizes the main conclusions and discusses how the findings have been analyzed. Lastly, some suggestions for future research will be provided.

7.2 Findings

The following sections will summarize and discuss the findings in chapters 4-6, and give an overall conclusion on how the findings help explain the main research question.

MARKET DYNAMICS

Market entry is one way through which Fafchamps (2003) sought to discuss the role of networks and ethnicity. Similarly, this chapter examined the composition of markets in terms of gender and ethnicity and focused on market entry. It discussed how historically, there were gendered expectations on women to contribute but not engage in agriculture, which led unemployed Yoruba women into trading. The findings from Balogun showed that many of the Yoruba women shop- owners had entered into trading as a result of having mothers who were traders, as they had therefore inherited their shops. It also revealed that Yoruba women who are not traders by profession often started trading because they had relatives who could help them by giving them apprenticeships in their stores. For non-Yoruba traders, market entry was facilitated either through

!107 having enough capital to rent a store up front or through apprenticeships. Referrals and networks were less important in the former but were of key importance in the latter. Market entry in APG was found to be similar to that of Balogun, i.e., traders have to go through a referral process.

Dada Genla presents an interesting case in relation to market entry as it is still in its developing stages. The Iyaloja Madame Bello, had to seek out her brother’s help (who is a market executive committee member in a section of Mile 12) in order to get connected to the Chairman of APG. She then asked the Chairman to connect her to sellers that she could try to convince to relocate to her market. In the end she managed to get 10 Hausa traders to start selling at her market. Thus this is a case where the market is open for market entry for all ethnicities but still relied on referrals.

Fafchamps (2003) argued that ”network segmentation […] have allocation costs that affect firm entry and investment in a perverse manner. Thanks to the referral process, familiarity with a particular type of business tends to reproduce itself over time” (p. 450). This helps explain why many Yoruba women seek out markets such as Balogun, which is for textile, whilst markets such as APG are for agricultural products which Hausa traders have had a historical advantage. Cases such as Dada Genla show a move to bridge networks between ethnic groups in the quest to boost business.

MARKET GOVERNANCE

This chapter discussed how markets are administered in Lagos. The hierarchal structures presented are similar across the South-west of Nigeria and therefore provide an overview of the general workings of markets. What the findings in this chapter suggest is that the title of Iyaloja may afford the titleholder control over the daily operations of the market, but that the organizational structure requires her to consult with her executive committee to a greater extent than what previous literature suggested. Moreover, the title of Babaloja is a recent position afforded to male traders as a complementary position to the Iyaloja due to the high number of male traders. Findings suggest that the Babaloja’s role is mainly to deal with conflict resolution as it is perceived as a male responsibility.

This chapter also related the Yoruba forms of market associations to the Hausa led APG. As we have seen the APG does to a large extent operate without having to adhere to the Iyaloja in their !108 area. The APG perceive her as an important actor in the market but do not fall under her direct rule. However the Iyaloja General considers APG to be part of the markets under her jurisdiction. This has not generated any conflict, but their diverging perceptions are interesting. While it raises questions as to whether the Iyaloja position at times is merely symbolical, it does not suggest that Hausa firms have replaced or disrupted social structures which studies such as Solaja et al., (2013) alluded to. Hausa fatauci (long-distance trade) and their separate associations have existed in the South-west for a long time. In cases observed in the 60s and 70s it was confrontational between Hausa and Yoruba groups, however, this case indicates that the interaction between the two is cordial.

When it comes to associations, the responses from participants in this study suggest that overall market associations are compulsory as they afford them access to the market. The increased level of participation in associations outside the market in cases such as Dahiru show that ethnicity is a potentially important incentive to seek titles in the association. Dahiru is a member of the overall association for his section of Balogun, however, he decided to seek a title in an association outside the market, namely Arewa Gari Yawaye. His motivation for being active in the association is because he finds that Hausa people are in need of social services in Lagos, which the government does not provide. This corroborates the need to be intersectional in our analysis of how traders relate to associations in markets as it is not only factors within the market which determine their perceptions, but the overall locality is important as well.

MARKET POLITICS

This chapter discussed the role of politics in the market. It found that the long-standing relationships between market women and Lagos politicians are still maintained today, however the interests of both parties often diverge. The on-going (re)development of Lagos was presented as an indication of how there are potential challenges to the longevity of markets in their current form. The lack of a response from ACMWAMN is interesting given how Lagos market associations have been framed as particularly politically active (Mba, 1982). The findings thus suggest that we need to move away from the old narrative of market women’s associations as reactionary (Baker, 1974). While the overall interaction between ACMWAMN and the LSG indicate that past legacies do not correspond with the situation today, local level interactions tell us that there is a respectful interaction between government and associations. !109 This chapter showed that the Iyaloja is often a key stakeholder in local government meetings and that the two parties cooperate in order to govern the market. This way of ’sharing’ the authority between the local government and the associations stem from colonial restructuring which diminished the authority of market associations as the de jure authority was placed in the hands of municipalities. The Iyalojas in this study all considered themselves included in the political negotiations which determine the course of markets (as we saw in the case of Mile 12). Thus the purpose of this chapter has been to show how conflict and the initiation of policies should not be the only indicator of power, but that cooperation and inclusion is also a sign of power.

7.3 ANALYSIS

This study used a grounded theory approach for data collection and analysis, meaning that the data was being coded throughout the fieldwork. This choice of methodology stemmed from being conscientious about not relying on normative values but to seek to base conclusions on the interviewees own interpretation of their lived realities. Memoing was an important part of this process as it meant noting down how conclusions where being drawn as the research proceeded. The main results of this study are thus drawn from the perceptions of actors themselves. Since grounded theory emphasizes how the theoretical framework needs to be confirmed by empirical data, the process of constant analysis and abstraction from the data assisted in confirming whether e.g., networks was an appropriate concept. This approach is important in order to connect the theoretical with the methodology which guided the fieldwork that preceded this thesis. It was important that the analysis is ’grounded’ in how traders defined their context, so as not to force their narratives into pre-determined concepts which essentially would have negated their interpretive prerogative.

IMPACT OF CHOICES

Chapter 3 outlined the methodological choices that preceded (and informed) the fieldwork period. As previously mentioned, grounded theory was used. During initial field visits different kinds of traders were interviewed. Hawkers argued that it is easy to enter the market, and that anyone can come to the market and start selling. However, it was evident that they were in an unequal position to traders with shops, who could force them to leave if they blocked their shop and started ’poaching’ customers. They provide an interesting perspective and make up a large share of the

!110 traders in markets. However, because they do not have fixed spaces it would be difficult to visit them for follow-up questions. Thus, since the focus of this study had been the market women leaders and how they administer the market, hawkers were mainly excluded from the study. The choice to exclude hawkers is likely to have impacted the results of the study, at least in terms of discussing market entry for various groups, as they are part of the market albeit not formally recognized by associations.

7.4 Recommendations for future research

At the moment we see that being excluded from networks can have an impact on market entry as referrals are important. Future research should focus on understanding how traders without enough capital to acquire a shop or ’references’ i.e., someone who can help them through the initial referral process enters the market. Studies such as Sylvanus (2013) was illuminating in this regard, as it pertains to textile traders in Togo. Future studies can therefore examine similar issues in other trades — perhaps in cases where there are no external factor (such as the Chinese, in Sylvanus' study) which circumvent social norms and barriers for entry.

7.5 Conclusion

This thesis started out by discussing previous literature on market women’s associations and Yoruba market women, in particular. It was important to address this literature, not only as a way to give background information on the topic at hand but also in order to position the work in a wider debate. By looking at previous work on Yoruba market women it became clear that there has been a desire for scholars to prove their independence or ’power’ as it relates to the wielding of control in marketplaces. Women in leadership positions were therefore the focus in many studies. What this study has sought to do is to build on these existing discussions and link the historical to the contemporary. By essentially asking to which extent the older arguments hold true today. This study focused on the market associations ran by Yoruba women. It has provided insights into how market governance works under their control. However, beyond solely focusing on the women, this study wanted to understand their relationship with non-Yoruba and non-women actors. Previous studies on Yoruba women traders mostly mentioned the existence of other actors, but rarely provided any in-depth discussions of how groups relate to each other. The study, therefore also incorporated the perspective of the Hausa, male led Arewa Perishable Goods section in Mile 12 in order to provide

!111 the perspective of a group of traders which the literature has described as having a high degree of independence. However, apart from the perceptions of the leaderships of Yoruba and Hausa associations, this study wanted to uncover how market traders relate to and are affected by their ethnicity and gender. Fafchamps (2003) and his theoretical work on the functioning of market institutions in Africa was useful in uncovering the role of ethnicity. He assumed that network segmentation, i.e., visible ethnic concentrations in specific trades are likely to be the results of the interaction between social networks because of referral processes, which are important in trade. In other words, actors are not trying to segregate themselves on the basis of ethnicity, but rather, ethnicity has been a way for them to decrease potential risks and transaction costs. However, the seemingly segregated sections of markets are more interlinked than surface level will make it seem. His work had less to say about the role of gender in markets. This study has therefore tried to draw from a broad range of literature in its analysis of how gender and ethnicity functions in the market, and tried to supplement short-comings in one field with insights from another. This study has sought to contribute to the field of (African) women’s studies and on market traders.

!112 REFERENCES

Acker, J, Barry, K and Esseveld, J (1983) “Objectivity and Truth: Problems in Doing Feminist Research.”, Women’s Studies International Forum (Print). pp. 423 - 435

Adamu, M. (1978). The Hausa factor in West African history. Zaria (Nigeria: Ahmadu Bello University Press

Adisa, J. 1994. Urban violence in Lagos. In Urban Violence in Africa : Pilot Studies (South Africa, Côte-d’Ivoire, Nigeria). Institut français de recherche en Afrique. doi :10.4000/books.ifra. 789

Afonja, S. A. (1980). Current explanations of sex roles and inequality: A reconsideration. The Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, 22, 1, 85-108.

Agbola, T & Agunbiade, E.M (2009) in de Sherbiniin, A., A. Rahman, A. Barbieri, J.C. Fotso, and Y. Zhu (eds.). 2009. Urban Population-Environment, Dynamics in the Developing World: Case Studies and Lessons Learned. Paris: Committee for International Cooperation in National Research in Demography (CICRED)

Agbu, Osita. (2004). Ethnic militias and the threat to democracy in post-transition Nigeria. The Nordic Africa Institute, The Nordic Africa Institute

Ajisafe, (1926) Laws and Customs of the Toruba People, In: Afonja, (1980) Current explanations of sex roles and inequality: A reconsideration. The Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, 22, 1, 85-108

Ake, C. (1988). “Building on the Indigenous.” In: Nnameka, O. (2004) Nego-Feminism: Theorizing, Practicing, and Pruning Africa’s Way. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 29, 2, 357-385 akinwumbiambode.com (2015) Market Women and Men Endorse Ambode, Available: http:// akinwunmiambode.com/dev/tag/market-women-and-men/

Allafrica.com (2016), ’Nigeria: Buhari has abandoned market women, says Tinubu’s daughter’ [online] Available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201603110466.html [Accessed: 21 April, 2017]

Albert, I. O. (1997). Hausa political system in the diaspora: The Sarkin Hausawa institution in Ibadan, 1914-1993. African Notes, 21, 1-2

Alli, A Hon. (2014), Reception in Honor of Chief (Mrs) Bintu-Fatima Tinubu as the Iyalode of Lagos

Aluko, Y. A. (2015), Patriarchy and Property Rights among Yoruba Women in Nigeria. Feminist Economics. 21, 56-81

!113 Amis, P. (2004) ‘Regulating the informal sector: voice and bad governance’, in N. Devas (ed.), Urban Governance, Voice and Poverty in the Developing World, London: Earthscan

Arnfred, S., Adomako, A. A., & Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. (2010). African feminist politics of knowledge: Tensions, challenges, possibilities. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet

Axelson, L & Sylvanus, N (2010) Navigating Chinese textile networks: women traders in Accra and Lomé in Cheru, F and Obi C I.. The Rise of China and India in Africa: Challenges, Opportunities and Critical Interventions. London: Zed Books

Awe, B. (1974). ’The Iyalode in the traditional Yoruba political system’ in (ed.) Cornwall, A., (2005) Readings in gender in Africa. Bloomington, Indiana University Press

Bakare-Yusuf, B (2004), “Yorubas Don’t Do Gender: A Critical Review of Oyeronke Oyewumi’s The Invention of Women: Making an African Sense of Western Gender Discourses.” p. 61-81 in Arnfred, Signe. ed. African Gender Scholarship: Concepts, Methodologies and Paradigms. Dakar: CODESRIA.

Baker, Pauline, (1974), Urbanization and Political Change: The Politics of Lagos, 1917–67, Berkeley: University of California Press

Barnes, Sandra T., (1974). Beocming a Lagosian. PhD thesis. University of Wisconsin

— (1975). Voluntary associations in a metropolis: The case of Lagos, Nigeria. African Studies Review : the Journal of the African Studies Association, 18, 2, 75-87

— (1986). Patrons and Power: Creating a Political Community in Metropolitan Lagos, Manchester: Manchester University Press

Bender-Shelter, J (2015) ’Introduction’, in (ed.) Bender-Shelter, J, Gendering Ethnicity in African Women’s Lives, University of Wisconsin Press

Bestor, T. (2001) ‘Markets: anthropological aspects’ in N. Smelser (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Social and Behavioral Sciences. Amsterdam: Elsevier Pergamon, In Marfing, L & Thielf, A., (2013). The Impact of Chinese Business on Market Entry in Ghana and Senegal, Africa: The Journal of the International African Institute, Volume 83, No. 4, pp. 664 - 669

Boyce-Davies, C (2015). Gender/Class Intersections and African Women’s Rights. Meridians: Feminism, Race, Transnationalism, (1), 1.

Brautigam, D. (2003) ‘Close encounters: Chinese business networks as industrial catalysts in sub- Saharan Africa’, African Affairs, 102, 447–67 in Meagher, K. (2005). Social capital or analytical liability? Social networks and African informal economies. Global Networks. 5, 217-238

BudgIT. (2017). Lagos’ Informal Sector: Taxation & Contribution to the Economy. Heinrich Böll Stiftung.

!114 Charmaz, K. (2006). Constructing grounded theory: a practical guide through qualitative analysis. London, Sage Publications

Chiseri-Strater, E. (1996). Turning in upon ourselves: Positionality, subjectivity, and reflexivity in case study and ethnographic research. In P. Mortensen & G. E. Kirsch (Eds.), Ethics and responsibility in qualitative studies of literacy (pp. 115–133). Urbana, IL: NCTE.

Chuku, G. (1998). The Militancy of Nigerian Women Since the Colonial Period: Evolution And Transformation. Ufahamu: Journal of the African Activist Association. 26, 55-76

Clark, G (1988), ‘Introduction’, in (ed.) Clark, G. (1988). Traders versus the State: anthropological approaches to unofficial economies. Boulder, Westview Press.

— (2010). Gender fictions and gender tensions involving “traditional” Asante market women. African Studies Quarterly,11 (2-3), 43–66.

Cohen, A. (1965). The social organization of credit in a West African cattle market. Africa : Journal of the International African Institute, 35, 1, 8-20

— (1966). Politics of the Kola Trade: Some processes of tribal community formation among migrants in West African towns. Africa : Journal of the International African Institute, 36, 1, 18-36

— (1967), Stranger Communities: The Hausa', in, Awe, B., Lloyd, P. C., Mabogunje, A. L., & University of Ibadan. (eds.), The City of Ibadan. London: Cambridge University Press in association with the Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan

— (1974). Customs and politics in urban Africa: A study of Hausa migrants in Yoruba towns. London: Routledge and K. Paul.

Constitution of the Association of Commodity Market Women and Men of Nigeria. (2012). Amended Version.

Cordonnier, R. (1987) Femmes africaines et commerce. Les revendeuses de tissu de la ville de Lomé (Togo), Paris: L’Harmattan

Cornwall, A (2005). Introduction. in (ed.) Cornwall, A., Readings in gender in Africa. Bloomington, Indiana University Press

Crenshaw, K. (1991). Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color. Stanford Law Review, 43(6), 1241-1299. doi:10.2307/1229039

Denzer, L (1994) “Yoruba Women: A Histographical Study”, The International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 1-39

Devas, N (2004). Urban Governance, Voice, and Poverty in the Developing World, London: Earthscan Dosekun, S (2015) ”Hey, you stylized woman there” Qualitative Inquiry, Vol 21, Issue 5, pp. 436 - 444 !115 Eames, E (1988), “Why the women went to war: Women and Wealth in Ondo Town, Southwestern Nigeria”, pp. 81- 98 in (ed.) Clark, G. (1988). Traders versus the State: anthropological approaches to unofficial economies. Boulder, Westview Press.

Evans, A (2017), Twitter conversation June 3rd. [Available at: https://twitter.com/_alice_evans/ status/870959984493961217]

Ezumaho, N (2010). ”Doing Women’s Studies: Problems and Prospects for Researchers and Activists in Nigeria” in Arnfred, S., Adomako, A. A., & Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. (2010). African feminist politics of knowledge: Tensions, challenges, possibilities. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet

Evawoma-Enuku, U & Mgbor, M (2005). "The National Directorate of Employment's Open Apprenticeship Scheme in Nigeria: New wine in old wineskins?", Education + Training, Vol. 47 Issue: 4/5, pp.325-336, https://doi.org/10.1108/00400910510601904

Fafchamps, M. (1997), Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa. World Development. 25, 733-830 In: Lyon, F (2003).Trader associations and urban food systems in Ghana: institutionalist approaches to understanding urban collective action. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research. 27, 11-23

Fafchamps, M. (2003) Market institutions in Sub-saharan Africa: theory and evidence. MIT Press

Falola, T (1995), ‘Gender, Business and Space Control: Yoruba Market Women and Power’ in (eds.) Ekechi, F.K and House-Midamba, B, African Market Women and Economic Power: the Role of Women in African Economic Development, Conn. [Etc.]: Greenwood Press. 23-40

Farnworth, C.R. and Earl Colverson, K. (2015). A Gender-Transformative Extension and Advisory Facilitation System in Sub-Saharan Africa. Journal of Gender. Agriculture and Food Security Vol. 1, Issue 1, pp 20-39.

Fukuyama. F. (1995) Trust: the social virtues and the creation of prosperity, London: Hamish Hamilton, in Meagher, K. (2005). Social capital or analytical liability? Social networks and African informal economies. Global Networks. 5, 217-238

Gadjigo, Samba, Jason Silverman, Ousmane Sembène, Alain Sembène, and Ken Myhr. Sembène!, 2016.

Galletti, D (1956). Nigerian Cocoa Farmers, Oxford: Clarendon Press

Gugler, J., & Flanagan, W. G. (1978). Urbanization and social change in West Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Guyer, J. I. (1993) ‘Wealth in people and self-realization in Equatorial Africa’, Man 28 (2): 243–65 in Marfing, L & Thielf, A., (2013). The Impact of Chinese Business on Market Entry in Ghana and Senegal, Africa: The Journal of the International African Institute, Volume 83, No. 4, pp. 664 - 669

!116 Guyer, J. (2004). Marginal Gains. Monetary Transactions in Atlantic Africa. Chicago: University of Chicago Press in Marfing, L & Thielf, A., (2013). The Impact of Chinese Business on Market Entry in Ghana and Senegal, Africa: The Journal of the International African Institute, Volume 83, No. 4, pp. 664 - 669

Granovetter, M. (1983) ‘The strength of weak ties’, American Journal of Sociology 78 (6): 1360– 80.

Hart, K (1973), ‘Informal income op- portunities and urban employment in Ghana’, in Chen, Martha, Joann Vanek and James Heintz (2006) ‘Informality, gender and poverty: a global picture’ Economic and Political Weekly, 27 May, 2131–9.

Heilbrunn, J. R. 1993. “Social Origins of National Conferences in Benin and Togo.” Journal of Modern African Studies. 31 (2): 277–99

Hill-Collins, P (2009), Black Feminist Thought, New York, N.Y, London: Routledge

Johnson, C (1986), “Class and gender: A consideration of Yoruba Women during the Colonial Period” in (Eds.), Robertson, C. C., & Berger, I. Women and class in Africa. New York: Africana Pub. Co., pp. 237 – 255.

Joseph, R. A. (1987). Democracy and prebendal politics in Nigeria: the rise and fall of the Second Republic. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire], Cambridge University Press

Kirsch, G. (2005). Friendship, Friendliness, and Feminist Fieldwork. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society. 30, 2163- 2172

Lagos State government, “The Lagos Policy Review” (2012; Lagos State Ministry of Economic Planning and Budget)

Latour, B. (1984), The powers of association. The Sociological Review, 32: 264–280

Lawanson, T (2015). ”Governing Lagos in the Urban Century: the need for a paradigm shift” in Urban Planning Processes in Lagos: Policies, laws, planning instruments, strategies and actors of urban projects, urban development, and urban services in Africa’s largest city, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Nigeria

Lindell, I. (2010). Introduction : the changing politics of informality – collective organizing, alliances and scales of engagement. In I. Lindell (Ed.), Africa’s Informal Workers. Collective Agency, Alliances and Transnational Organizing in Urban Africa (p. 256). London: Zed Books

Long, N. (2001) Development Sociology : Actor Perspectives, In: Meagher, K. (2009) Culture, Agency and Power: Theoretical Reflections on Informal Economic Networks and Political Process. DIIS Working Paper (27), Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies.

!117 Lukes, S. (1974). Power: a radical view. London, Macmillan

Lund, C. (ed) (2007) Twilight Institutions: Public Authority and Local Politics in Africa. Oxford: Blackwell

Lund, F. and C. Skinner (1999) ‘Promoting the interests of women street traders: an analysis of street trader organiza- tions in South Africa’, In: I. Lindell (Ed.), Africa’s Informal Workers. Collective Agency, Alliances and Transnational Organizing in Urban Africa (p. 256). London: Zed Books

Lyon, F (2003). Trader associations and urban food systems in Ghana: institutionalist approaches to understanding urban collective action. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research. 27, 11-23

Mabogunje, A (1961) "The Market-Woman," Ibadan, no. 11 in Falola, T (1995), ‘Gender, Business and Space Control: Yoruba Market Women and Power’ in African Market Women and Economic Power: the Role of Women in African Economic Development, Ed. by Bessie House-Midamba and Felix K. Ekechi. - Westport, Conn. [Etc.] : Greenwood Press. 23-40

Mabogunje, A. (1970). Systems Approach to a Theory of Rural-Urban Migration. Geographical Analysis

Mama, A. (1997). “Defining Terms and Concepts for Ourselves”, in C. Pereira (ed.), Con- cepts and Methods for Gender and Women’s Studies in Nigeria. Report of a Workshop held at Kongo Conference Hotel, Zaria, 4th-8th November, 1996

— (2007). Is It Ethical to Study Africa? Preliminary Thoughts on Scholarship and Freedom. African Studies Review, Volume 50, Number 1, April 2007, pp. 1-26

Marfing, L & Thielf, A., (2013). The Impact of Chinese Business on Market Entry in Ghana and Senegal, Africa: The Journal of the International African Institute, Volume 83, No. 4, pp. 664 - 669

— (2014). Demystifying Chinese business strength in urban Senegal and Ghana: structural change and the performativity of rumours, Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue canadienne des études africaines, 48:3, 405-423

Marshall, G. A. (1965). Women, trade and the Yoruba family. Morningside Heights, N.Y.: Columbia University, in Mintz, S (1971), Men, Women and Trade. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 13: pp. 247- 268

Mba, N. E. (1982). Nigerian women mobilized: women's political activity in Southern Nigeria, 1900-1965. [Berkeley], Institute of International

McIntosh, M. K. (2010). Yoruba women, work, and social change. Ibadan: Bookcraft

Meagher, K (2009), Culture, Agency and Power: Theoretical Reflections on Informal Economic Networks and Political Process. DIIS Working Paper (27), Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies. !118 — (2010). Identity economics: social networks and the informal economy in Nigeria. African Issues. James Currey.

Mintz, S (1971). Men, Women and Trade. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 13: pp. 247- 268

Mitlin, D. (2004). ‘Civil society organizations: do they make a difference to urban pov- erty?’, in N. Devas (ed.), Urban Governance, Voice and Poverty in the Developing World, London: Earthscan

Nadvi, K. and Schmitz, H. (1994) Industrial Clusters in Less Developed Countries : Review of Experiences and Research Agenda, In: Meagher, K (2009). Culture, Agency and Power: Theoretical Reflections on Informal Economic Networks and Political Process. DIIS Working Paper (27), Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies.

Newkirk, T (1996), “Seduction and Betrayal in Qualitative Research.” In (eds.) Mortsensen, P., & Kirsch, G, Ethics and representation in qualitative studies of literacy. Urbana, Ill, National

Nnoli, O. (1976). Dynamics of ethnic politics in Nigeria Odù : Journal of Yoruba and Related Studies, 14, 3-25

Nordiska Afrika Insitutiet (2017). Her mission: to bring African books to a global audience. Available: http://nai.uu.se/news/articles/2017/06/07/144445/

Ogunleye, (2016) ’Making Lagos State the Preferred Hub of Investment’, Presentation. Ministry for Commerce, Industry and Cooperatives, June, 2016, Lagos, Nigeria

Okome, M.O. (2013). ’Introduction’ in (ed.) Okome, M.O, Contesting the Nigerian State: civil society and the contradictions of self-organization. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Olasupo, F.O (2013), ‘Women’s Associational Life Within Traditional Institutions in Yorùbá States’, in (ed.) Okome, M.O, Contesting the Nigerian State: civil society and the contradictions of selforganization.Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan

Osaghae, E. E. (1994). Trends of Migrant Political Organization in Nigeria: The Igbo in Kano. Institut français de recherche en Afrique. doi:10.4000/books.ifra.887

Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, O (2014). Industrialization Pathways to Human Development: Industrial Clusters, Institutions and Poverty in Nigeria. PhD thesis. Columbia University

Oyewùmí, O. (1997). The Invention of Women: Making an African Sense of Western Gender Discourse, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press

— (2002). Conceptualizing gender: the Eurocentric foundations of feminist concepts and the challenge of African epistemologies. Jenda: a Journal of Culture and African Women Studies, 2, 1.)

!119 Pailey, R.N (2016). Where is the African in African Studies? Available: http://africanarguments.org/ 2016/06/07/where-is-the-african-in-african-studies/

Peil, M. (1975). Interethnic contacts in Nigerian cities. Africa : Journal of the International African Institute, 45, 2, 107-122.

— (1991). Lagos: the city and it’s people. London : Belhaven Press

Pereira, C. (2002). Locating gender and women’s studies in Nigeria: What trajectories for the future? Revised version of paper presented at the 10th General Assembly of CODESRIA, Africa in the New Millennium, Kampala, Uganda, 8-12 December

Pillow, W. (2003). Confession, catharsis, or cure? Rethinking the uses of reflexivity as methodological power in qualitative research, International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education, 16:2, 175-196, DOI: 10.1080/0951839032000060635

Prag, E. (2010). ’Women leaders and the sense of power: clientelism and citizenship at the Dantokpa market in Cotonou, Benin’. In Lindell, I (Ed.), Africa’s Informal Workers. Collective Agency, Alliances and Transnational Organizing in Urban Africa (p. 256). London: Zed Books

— (2010). Entrepôt Politics. Political Struggles over the Dantokpa Marketplace in Cotonou, Benin. DIIS Working Paper (3), Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies

— (2013). Mama Benz in Trouble: Networks, the State, and Fashion Wars in the Beninese Textile Market. African Studies Review. 56, 101-121.

Rothchild, D. and Foley, M. (1988) African States and the Politics of Inclusive Coalitions, In Meagher, (2009) Culture, Agency and Power: Theoretical Reflections on Informal Economic Networks and Political Process. DIIS Working Paper (27), Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies.

Sahara reporters, (2017). ’VIDEO: Lagos State Govt demolishes Sabo market in IKORODU overnight #waragainstthepoor’. Available: https://twitter.com/SaharaReporters/status/ 860043600830365697/video/1

Smith, H. M., & Luttrell, M. E. (1994). Cartels in an "nth-best" world: the wholesale foodstuff trade in Ibadan, Nigeria. World Development. Pp. 223, 323-335

Solaja, O, Atolagbe, A and Soyewo, G. (2013). Hausa Firm Presence and Market Social Structure of Some Selected Grocery Markets in Ibadan and Lagos Metropolis, Research on Humanities and Social Sciences, Vol.3, No.20

Sudarkasa, N. (1973). Where women work. Yoruba women in the marketplace and in the home. Anthropological Papers 53. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan.

!120 Sylvanus, N. (2013). ‘Chinese Devils, The Global Market, and the Declining Power of Togo’s NanaBenzes’, African Studies Review, 56(1): pp. 65-80Sah tundefashola.com (2008). Lagos Must Be A Beautiful City. Retrived from: http:// www.tundefashola.com/archives/news/2008/01/31/20080131N01.html [Accessed: May 23, 2017]

— (2009). ‘Lagos Mega City: We Are Increasing Our Capacity To Respond To People’s Needs’ - Fashola Retrived from: http://www.tundefashola.com/archives/news/ 2009/07/08/20090708N01.html [Accessed: May 23, 2017] — (2009). Let’s Return To Awo’s Ideals For Good Governance - Fashola Retrived from: http:// www.tundefashola.com/archives/news/2009/01/29/20090129N11.html [Accessed: May 23, 2017]

Vanguard.ng (2016). Mile 12 Market: We don’t want to relocate, women market leader pleads with Ambode. Available: http://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/03/mile-12-market-dont-want-relocate- women-market-leader-pleads-ambode/ [Accessed: July 14, 2017]

— (2017). LASG denies involvement in demolition of Sabo Market in Ikorodu. Available: http:// www.vanguardngr.com/2017/05/lasg-denies-involvement-demolition-sabo-market-ikorodu/ [Accessed: July 14, 2017]

Yusuff, S (2013). The Dynamics of Strategic Entry and Motivations of Yoruba Female Textile Traders in The Balogun Market, Lagos State, Nigeria. Journal of Developmental Entrepreneurship., Vol. 18, No. 2

Uchendu, V.C (1970). ”The passing of Tribal Man: a West African Experience’, Journal of Asian and African Studies, V. 51-65.

Ukiwo, U. (2005). On the study of ethnicity in Nigeria. Crise, Working Paper, No 12

!121