The Concept of Tacit Knowledge – a Critique

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OUTLINES • No. 2 • 2002 3

Klaus Nielsen

The Concept of Tacit Knowledge – A Critique

Summary “We once asked chess champion of the Nether- This article questions the concept of tacit knowledge lands, Jan Donner, why women had never risen to as the basis for our conceptual understanding of prac- the highest levels in chess. Donner’s puzzling re- tice. The first part of the article is a critical introduc- ply was that women in chess lack intuition” tion to the concept of tacit knowledge. It is empha- (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 25). sized that this concept is situated in various academic practices and not defined and homogeneously but in This quotation leads to the following ques- accordance with issues and intentions significant for tions: Would it influence our understanding these practices. of learning and knowledge if we conceptual- The second part of the article outlines some consequences of conceptualizing practice as basically a ized what we do in practice on the basis of matter of tacit knowledge. It is argued that tacit concepts such as tacit knowledge and intu- knowledge should be seen in relation to the growth of itive expertise?1 Would it bring us new in- professions in modern society and to the need to legit- sights, or would the above quotation set the imate them. It is further claimed that as a legitimating scene for reductive prejudices regarding, for concept tacit knowledge may bring about various example, men and women? problems leading to a marginalization of specific ex- The main purpose of this article is to call periences, to social uniformity, to the reappearance of individualism and to the maintenance of a dualistic attention to our conceptual approach to prac- view of knowledge. tice. The notion of tacit knowledge is one way of conceptualizing practice based on as- sumptions about a specific kind of knowledge. Due to the key concept of tacit knowl- n recent years concepts of intuitive exper- edge, this will primarily be an epistemologi- tise and tacit knowledge have become in- cal approach to practice. Epistemology is Icreasingly important factors in discussions concerning knowledge and learning in practice. Apparently, new studies of learning 1 This article focuses specifically on the concept of tacit knowledge which is the conceptual basis for a number of and knowledge in practice have turned our other concepts within the area, among others Dreyfus and notions of knowledge and intuition upside Dreyfus’ (1986) concept of intuitive expertise. However, down. The following quotation is an excel- Dreyfus and Dreyfus reject the concept of tacit knowledge lent illustration of this: and prefer the concept of intuition (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 152). This distinction will be discussed later in the article. Outlines-2002-2.qxd 30-01-2003 11:38 Side 4

Klaus Nielsen: The Concept of Tacit Knowledge – A Critique 4 here understood as a specific way of portray- of epistemology, it is argued that social uni- ing the relationship between subject and formity, individualism and a dualistic view of world where this relationship is primarily knowledge can be seen as consequences of seen as a matter of the subject knowing the using the concept of tacit knowledge to ex- world. In this article I shall discuss the conse- plain professional practice. quences that emerge if we accept tacit knowledge as the conceptual foundation for our understanding of practice. Background of the concept The article is divided into three parts. In The following is a critical presentation of the the first part the concept of tacit knowledge is concept of tacit knowledge. Rather than giv- introduced, and in the two following parts I ing an abstract philosophical account of the outline different consequences of adopting concept, different reasons for introducing tacit knowledge as the basis of our conceptu- and using the concept of tacit knowledge al approach to practice. shall be outlined in order to situate it in dif- In the first part an account of Polanyi’s in- ferent academic contexts. By taking this ap- troduction of the concept of tacit knowledge proach, we come to realize that the concept is followed by an outline of approaches of tacit knowledge is by no means a homoge- which have reinterpreted the concept of tacit neous concept. On the contrary, it is defined knowledge in the last couple of decades. The in various ways depending on the context and work of Dreyfus and Dreyfus and different the kind of issues and problems dominating interpretations of Wittgenstein represent this this particular context. In fact, the concept approach in which especially the inexpress- has been used in various contexts, covering ible dimension of tacit knowledge is central. widely different and at times almost conflict- Finally, a more cognitive approach by Wag- ing matters. ner and Sternberg is introduced in which tacit Originally, the Hungarian philosopher Po- knowledge is related to a specific kind of lanyi introduced the concept of tacit knowl- practical intelligence. edge but, as we shall see below, in recent In the second part of the article it is argued years the concept has attained several mean- that tacit knowledge should be seen in rela- ings. First, I shall isolate Polanyi’s original tion to the rise of professions in modern soci- understanding of the concept of tacit knowl- ety and the need to legitimate these profes- edge as tradition-bound rules and then pre- sions. The new professions legitimate them- sent other understandings of it. selves by importing a scientific approach to knowledge and learning. In this context, tacit knowledge can be seen as a compromise be- Tacit Knowledge as Knowledge of tween remaining scientific, on the one hand, Tradition and developing a concept containing the spe- In 1958 Polanyi introduced the concept of cific and unique experiences of the partici- tacit knowledge in his work “Personal Knowl- pating professionals, on the other hand. edge” (Polanyi, 1994). One of Polanyi’s mo- The third part of the article claims that tac- tives for working with this concept was to it knowledge makes practice more inaccessi- make it function as a strategic concept. Po- ble to the participants. It is argued that pro- lanyi was a professor of chemistry and con- fessional practice may be mystified and be- cerned with the growing political influence come reified for the participants. More spe- on science. In that context he developed the cifically, by legitimating practice as a matter concept of tacit knowledge to ensure that sci- Outlines-2002-2.qxd 30-01-2003 11:38 Side 5

OUTLINES • No. 2 • 2002 5 ence would remain independent and not be through apprenticeship. In many ways, ap- governed by external interests (Carlgren, prenticeship becomes the paradigmatic illus- 1990c; cf. also Rolf, 1991). As I shall argue tration of learning precisely because tradition in this paper, it is a recurring feature in the is passed down through learning by doing, by history of the concept of tacit knowledge that submitting to authority and trusting the expe- it tends to transform power relations into rienced practitioner (Polanyi, 1994). The im- questions of knowledge and epistemology. portant point here is that Polanyi’s interpreta- According to Polanyi, the concept of per- tion of tacit knowledge is socially based on sonal knowledge is a combination of subjec- tradition and embedded in a number of im- tive experience and collective rules for action plicit rules which can, in principle and if nec- embedded in various traditions. For instance, essary, become explicit. in court the judge’s sentence is based on an expert opinion within the legal tradition of that particular area. This means that another Tacit Knowledge as an Inexpressible judge who experiences a similar situation Dimension of Practice and a similar case, will rule in nearly the In recent years Polanyi’s original concept of same way and reach the same result. It is still tacit knowledge has been reinterpreted; that a matter of the judge’s personal opinion is, tacit knowledge is now understood as which is based on how he or she applies the something which, in principle, is inexpress- various rules in practice. This opinion, or ible. This reinterpretation is particularly professional assessment, is the personal di- based on research from the research center on mension of the acts which the judge carries working life, “Arbeidslivscentrum”, in out in connection with his or her professional Stockholm on how the introduction of infor- duties. mation technology has influenced our under- On Polanyi’s account, the concept of tacit standing of knowledge and learning (cf. knowledge is a central characteristic of per- Göranzon, 1990). Here Polanyi’s concept of sonal knowledge emphasizing that it is partly tacit knowledge was reinterpreted in light of tacit. the introduction of new computer technolo- According to Polanyi, tacit knowledge al- gy. As mentioned earlier, one of Polanyi’s ways involves epistemology. He also sug- motives for adopting the concept of tacit gests that tacit knowledge is to be understood knowledge was to develop a strategic con- as a combination of concept and sense im- cept to safeguard scientific practice from ex- pression. An individual’s experiences are ternal political interference. A strategic based on his or her own activities and com- thinking also motivated the reinterpretation bined with concepts passed down by tradi- of the concept of tacit knowledge at Ar- tion. beidslivscentrum. One purpose here was to Tradition is passed down through the con- develop a conceptual tool to protect local cepts of language and by using language as a working communities against increased ra- tool in different situations. Language as such tionalization through the introduction of new has no directions for use, but tradition has. computer technology. Yet, this strategic use Tradition implies a number of tacit rules for of the concept of tacit knowledge again cre- how to use a language. Thus, language be- ates new problems due to the fact that ques- comes the place where tradition and individ- tions of power are transformed into matters ual experience meet (Rolf, 1991). According of recognition and knowledge (Carlgren, to Polanyi, tacit knowledge is acquired 1990c). These new problems will be ad- Outlines-2002-2.qxd 30-01-2003 11:38 Side 6

Klaus Nielsen: The Concept of Tacit Knowledge – A Critique 6 dressed in the third part of this article. What Tacit knowledge, then, describes how we ap- follows now is an account of the inexpres- ply our knowledge in practice, that is, how sibility version of tacit knowledge which was the rules are followed in the actual situation. primarily developed in the research at Ar- According to Johannessen’s interpretation of beidslivcentrum in Sweden. Wittgenstein, practice is basically tacit be- There are two versions of this inexpress- cause it is part of our way of living and can- ibility with regards to understanding tacit not substantiate its own foundation in a ver- knowledge. One version is related to bal discourse. Fundamentally, practice is Wittgenstein’s concept of practice and the based on something that is inexpressible or, other to Dreyfus and Dreyfus’ (1986) con- in Wittgenstein’s words, “practice speaks for cept of intuitive expertise. itself” (Johannessen, 1988a). Practice is characterized by aspects of inexpressibility, that is, some aspects of practice can, in prin- The Wittgensteinian Approach ciple, never be expressed linguistically. Polanyi’s concept of tacit knowledge has The major difference between Wittgen- been reinterpreted in light of Wittgenstein’s stein’s and Polanyi’s approaches is that, a- late philosophy. This Wittgenstein-inspired cording to the Wittgensteinian approach, reinterpretation was made by the Norwegian some elements of tacit knowledge can never philosopher Johannessen (1988a; 1988b). be made verbally explicit. Furthermore, ac- Johannessen bases his reinterpretation on cording to Polanyi’s approach to tacit knowl- von Wright’s interpretations of Wittgen- edge, rules for actions are central both in the stein’s work. Von Wright presents Wittgen- traditions and in the concept of tacit knowl- stein’s emphasis on practice as an argument edge. In the Wittgensteinian approach the di- in favor of a kind of pre-knowledge (Johan- mension of inexpressibility is central and a nessen, 1988a, p. 357). Basically, Johannes- matter of addressing the activities which go sen argues that Wittgenstein distinguishes beyond the linguistic rules and are based on between knowing linguistic rules and follow- life forms which speak for themselves. ing them. To follow linguistic rules is quite a different matter from knowing them. Ac- cording to Wittgenstein, the crux of the mat- The Approach by Dreyfus and Dreyfus ter is how we follow rules since this is how Dreyfus and Dreyfus are critical of Polanyi’s they are constituted and hence become mean- definition of tacit knowledge (Dreyfus & ingful. The problem is to know how to follow Dreyfus, 1986, p. 152). They find that tacit them in the actual situation. This calls for knowledge, as Polanyi defines it, pays too something more than rules. much attention to the mind as something that In other words, there is more to using a is operated by rules. Instead, they suggest language than merely knowing the abstract, that the concept of intuition is more precise linguistic rules. Wittgenstein characterizes and operative than the concept of tacit the rule-constituting actions as practice. To knowledge. This has led to that Dreyfus and follow a rule is practice, and when we follow Dreyfus’ concept of intuition is frequently a rule, we do not consciously interpret every used synonymously with the concept of tacit rule before applying it. Rather, our use of knowledge within the approach of inexpress- rules is defined by practice, that is, by the his- ibility (cf. Benner, 1984; Josefson, 1988a; torical context in which we follow them Göranzon, 1990). Dreyfus and Dreyfus’ un- (Johannessen, 1988b). derstanding of intuitive expertise is unfolded Outlines-2002-2.qxd 30-01-2003 11:38 Side 7

OUTLINES • No. 2 • 2002 7 in their model of skills. Their five-stage mod- of practical intelligence since neither tacit el of skill acquisition shows how the novice knowledge nor practical intelligence are ex- practitioner acts exclusively on the basis of pressed or taught directly and both are pri- the context-free rules that were acquired dur- marily learned in informal settings (Wagner ing his or her theoretical training. After hav- & Sternberg, 1985, p. 439). Practical intelli- ing experienced how patterns repeat them- gence is a different concept of intelligence selves in practical situations, the practitioner than the predominant, academic and formally will then develop from being an experienced oriented concept of intelligence. Based on a novice into a competent practitioner and will series of experiments on critical events, finally become an expert. An expert is a prac- Wagner and Sternberg (1986) attempted to titioner who primarily acts on the basis of in- prove the existence of tacit knowledge. Here tuition (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986). The tran- tacit knowledge, or practical intelligence, sition from acting on the basis of theoretical refers to an implicit concept of experience rules to acting on the basis of intuition is a operationalized in the following themes: to consequence of how the person in question be able to manage one’s career, how one opti- becomes emotionally involved in practice. mizes one’s reputation and how one succeeds Thus, Dreyfus and Dreyfus describe how the in “selling” one’s projects to one’s superiors. individual practitioner, because of his or her In these experiments, selected people were own actions and experiences from a number given a critical description of an event within of similar situations, will gradually become their professional area and then asked to an- aware of these similarities and thereby able swer some questions. Two groups were se- to predict how situations develop. In that lected: a group of academic psychologists way, the practitioner accumulates knowledge and a group of managing directors. Both of which he or she is not conscious. groups were divided into subgroups: a group As mentioned above, Dreyfus and Drey- of so-called experts (the experienced people) fus replace the concept of tacit knowledge by and a group of so-called novices (the newly the concept of intuition. In other words, they educated). Naturally, the researchers expect- do not recognize tacit knowledge as a type of ed the experts to possess a large amount of knowledge but reserve the concept of knowl- professional tacit knowledge and the novices edge for a relatively narrow concept of rules. to possess only a small amount. The results Furthermore, Dreyfus and Dreyfus transform of these experiments showed that apparently the concept of tacit knowledge into a concept there is a substantial difference between the of intuition as a sense belonging to the indi- tacit knowledge of experts and novices with- vidual, hence, abandoning the social perspec- in different areas. In every respect it turned tive implied in different ways by Polanyi and out that the experts were better at managing Wittgenstein. their careers – a fact which, according to Wagner and Sternberg, proves the existence of tacit knowledge. Tacit Knowledge as Practical Intelligence Inspired by intelligence research, Wagner Summary and Sternberg (1985; 1986) and Wagner There are many different ways of under- (1987) use the concept of tacit knowledge as standing the concept of tacit knowledge. practical intelligence. They find the tacit as- Three different ways were presented above: pect of knowing to be a central characteristic tacit knowledge as (1) embedded in tradition, Outlines-2002-2.qxd 30-01-2003 11:38 Side 8

Klaus Nielsen: The Concept of Tacit Knowledge – A Critique 8 (2) an inexpressible dimension of practice fers from these views. I consider tacit knowl- and (3) an aspect of practical intelligence. edge, like any other circulating artifact, to be Furthermore, one might argue that these vari- determined by special, historical and societal ous definitions of tacit knowledge are mutu- conditions. There are certain reasons why the ally exclusive. Tacit knowledge is both de- concept has become increasingly popular, picted as a kind of knowledge which is rule why it has been applied by certain groups, governed (the Polanyi-tradition) and as why it is distributed in different contexts, and something which is beyond rules (the Witt- so forth. Thus, the concept of tacit knowl- gensteinian tradition). It is presented both as edge cannot merely be considered a concept a personal experience embedded in tradition that describes something out there “in real (the Polanyi tradition) and as an individual life”. It must be seen as a concept that is cre- ability (Dreyfus and Dreyfus’ interpretation ated, circulated and applied in relation to a of intuition). Finally, tacit knowledge is de- number of different interests. Whereas the picted both as an intuition that lies beyond presentation and reading of a concept is tradi- any conscious reflection (Dreyfus and tionally separated from the effect it may have Dreyfus’ interpretation) and as an experience on a broader societal context, my presenta- based non-verbal intelligence of promoting tion postulates that it is not possible to sepa- one’s career (Wagner and Sternberg’s sug- rate the understanding of a concept from its gestion). actual use, effect and consequences on soci- Besides introducing the concept of tacit etal practice. knowledge, the first part of this article emphasizes that the mutually exclusive and non- Professions and technical coherent way of using the concept does not merely serve academic interests. The defini- rationality tion and circulation of the concept of tacit In order to understand the circulation and dis- knowledge can be understood in relation to tribution of the concept of tacit knowledge, fulfilling various motives in different set- one must understand the development of new tings. By situating the definition and use of professions in connection with the establish- the concept, it is stressed that concepts are ment of the modern welfare state. In 1960 not only a way of representing the world, but large parts of the population in the Western also a way of influencing and changing it. world were occupied in the primary produc- This line of thinking will be pursued in the tion (the extraction of raw material – farm- second and third part of the article in which a ing, mining, fishing industry, etc.) or in the number of consequences of using the concept secondary production (the manufacturing of of tacit knowledge will be outlined. goods). In the future, the majority of the pop- How, then, is a concept to be understood? ulation will be occupied within the service The traditional way of understanding a con- sector – the new professions (Fjord Jensen, cept would be to follow the author’s presen- 1987). This implies an expansion in the num- tation, his or her more or less consistent use ber of people employed in the service indus- of it, the extent of its documentation, and so try within the educational sector and the na- forth. Or one might look at it critically, at- tional health services (e.g., doctors, nurses, tempt to falsify it, find inconsistencies in the educationists, teachers, etc.). In the total la- author’s use of it, and so forth. bor force the number of professionals in- My critical way of reading and compre- creased from 4% in 1900 to 8% in 1950 and hending the concept of tacit knowledge dif- to 13% in 1966 (Schön, 1983, p. 18). Num- Outlines-2002-2.qxd 30-01-2003 11:38 Side 9

OUTLINES • No. 2 • 2002 9 bers from the expanding profession of psy- the concrete conduct of professional practice, chology in Denmark illustrate precisely this and it creates a distinction between education development. Around 1974 approximately and work practice within the profession. 2,500 psychologists were organized while to- Another consequence involves our under- day the figure has increased to nearly 7,000.2 standing of learning. Learning is basically The new professions legitimate them- seen as a transmission of knowledge from selves with science claiming that by applying someone who already knows to someone scientific theories and methods practitioners who does not know. Learning becomes a are able to solve the problems they encounter technical question related to finding the most in the practice of their work. The scientific efficient ways of making the transmission of nature of the knowledge and theory that are knowledge function (cf. Dreier, 2002). focused on here originates from positivism The third, and possibly most important, (Schön, 1983, p. 29). That is, knowledge is consequence is that in the post-industrial so- presented as an object available for users in ciety technical rationality appears to be legit- relation to any specific situation. The pre- imating a number of dominating institutions dominant knowledge and learning model of and professions (cf. Wackerhausen, 1992). the new professions can, in short, be charac- Today the need to legitimate one’s actions in terized as technical rationality which consists relation to a scientific codex plays an impor- in an instrumental solution to a well-defined tant role in almost all modern institutions (cf. problem that is laid down by scientific Molander, 1990). Knowledge is no longer le- knowledge and theory (Schön, 1983). Thus, gitimated in relation to its emancipating or technical rationality is regarded as exempt educative character; on the contrary, knowl- from subjective experiences, appearing as edge has to increase the performance of so- objectified in already existing procedures cial systems. Indeed, it must possess the and formalities which are at people’s dispos- characteristic of problem solving implied by al in the actual situation. In other words, this the core definition of technical rationality. understanding of knowledge does not focus Knowledge is merely seen as valid when it on the practitioner’s actions and experiences can increase the efficiency of the system in the actual situation; on the contrary, it fo- (Lyotard, 1991). cuses on the importance of following pre- A central issue for the different profes- given directions of how to do things in prac- sions that appeared in the wake of the mod- tice. ern welfare state is that they face many intri- This understanding of knowledge has dif- cate problems which technical rationality can ferent consequences. no longer solve. The problems which the pro- One consequence of technical rationality fessional practitioner faces require another is that the meaning of context, experience set of themes than the one provided by tech- and action is neglected in the educational nical rationality. Hence, the new professions context and that the practitioners’ experi- encounter a number of dilemmas. On the one ences become unnecessary. This way of de- hand, in order not to lose prestige the profes- picting knowledge is dominant and lies at the sions must define themselves in relation to heart of a number of educational institutions’ the scientific discourse, and only those pro- conception of knowledge. It will disregard fessions that define themselves as scientific are recognized. On the other hand, technical 2 It is no coincidence that the presenters of tacit know- rationality is apparently not very efficient in ledge often conduct their research in new professions. relation to the particular problems the practi- Outlines-2002-2.qxd 30-01-2003 11:38 Side 10

Klaus Nielsen: The Concept of Tacit Knowledge – A Critique 10 tioners are confronted with (Schön, 1983). that addresses the concept of tacit knowledge Because of this dilemma, a need is created tends to focus on this issue. In connection for a concept that is able to contain the expe- with research on how the introduction of new riences of professional practitioners and at technology influences the workplace, one of the same time be included and legitimated by the pioneers in the re-launch of the concept of scientific discourses. As mentioned above, tacit knowledge, Göranzon, writes that, the growing interest in the concept of tacit “close cooperation with philosophers has knowledge is based on these dilemmas. been of great importance” (Göranzon, 1983, p. 8, my translation). In other words, in order The consequences of tacit to legitimate the specific (tacit) knowledge of the professional practitioners, science must knowledge in practice legitimate it as valuable in an epistemologi- Thus, tacit knowledge can be considered a cal sense. Göranzon suggests that profession- conglomerate or a compromise of the two al practitioners seem to be in possession of a tendencies through which the professions practical intellect. The aim is to conceptual- seem to develop. On the one hand, the pro- ize practice in new ways by means of the fessions require scientific legitimacy. On the concept of tacit knowledge and similar con- other hand, the professions need to identify cepts, thus, protecting the specific knowl- and define practice in accordance with the edge existing in certain work communities. actual experiences of the members of the pro- The concept of tacit knowledge is well suited fession. However, as I shall argue below, the for this purpose. Most research on tacit concept of tacit knowledge does not make knowledge points to the fact that the concept professional practice more accessible to the is difficult to define, let alone identify empir- participants. On the contrary, by legitimating ically, and several authors imply that the use practice as an epistemological matter, profes- of the concept of tacit knowledge is embed- sional practice becomes mysterious and rei- ded in strategic considerations. Molander fied and, consequently, more inaccessible to emphasizes that the concept is difficult to de- the participants. I shall argue that the use of fine, but by using it one will contribute to an tacit knowledge will lead to a marginaliza- increase in “social and political status” of the tion of the participants’ experiences, to social actors (1990, p. 108). uniformity, individualism and a dualistic By returning to the historical analyses that view of knowledge. seem to legitimate tacit knowledge, these authors often focus on the threat that the computerization of society presents to local work Tacit Knowledge and Marginalization communities. Janik’s formulation makes this of Experiences very clear: By introducing tacit knowledge as a legitimating foundation for professional practice, I Tacit knowledge is intimately connected to the argue that central experiences will be mar- kind of qualitative differentiation that exists between products of human experience and prod- ginalized or neglected. Issues of politics, ucts of machine efficiency (Janik, 1989, p. 10, my ethics and values will be marginalized in fa- translation). vor of discussions about knowing the world. As mentioned above, the central tendency Here Janik emphasizes that tacit knowledge for the new professions is to seek legitimacy defends the kind of knowledge which is relat- in the scientific environment. Most research ed to human experience and which is defined Outlines-2002-2.qxd 30-01-2003 11:38 Side 11

OUTLINES • No. 2 • 2002 11 in contrast to the computerization of this terests of a number of different professions, knowledge. and we have seen how it originates from a The problem with conceptualizing work critique of the general trend to reify knowl- practice as a question of different ways of un- edge. In the following, I shall argue that the derstanding knowledge will result in that cer- concept of tacit knowledge must necessarily tain problems become conspicuous while function as an unclear, yet central concept for other problems are not considered at all. In members of the work community and profes- other words, this way of conceptualizing a sion. work practice as an epistemological problem Tacit knowledge can be considered a con- implies that some problems appear to be cen- cept which apparently creates a certain kind tral while others are neglected. The fact that of coherence within the profession or the some tasks change in connection with the work community, not because of its clarity or computerization of workplaces will become illustrative power but because it holds the in- an epistemological issue between tacit and expressible factor that binds the members to- explicit knowledge. Only issues that fall gether in a status of obscurity. Tacit knowl- within this area are acknowledged. Other as- edge stands as a concept of the inexpressible pects of the issue disappear or are neglected. factor or as a category that does not identify As an illustration of this, we may mention the anything, but which is of value because it research project at Arbeidslivscentrum called states that the members are bound to each PASS. PASS, i.e., perspektiv på datasyste- other by a shared accumulation of knowl- mutveckling (perspective on data system de- edge. The heterogeneity and division of labor velopment), is a research project which led to of the social field of action in relation to spe- the development of many of the different cific tasks are transformed into a homoge- meanings of the concept of tacit knowledge neous accumulation of knowledge. In order (Göranzon, 1983). For instance, in the inter- to clarify these themes, we may draw on views from this research project many of the Ryle’s concept of category-mistake. interviewees assert that the installment of From Ryle’s perspective, the concept of computers will lead to increased surveil- tacit knowledge can be considered a catego- lance, central control, isolation of the indi- ry-mistake. A category-mistake denotes that vidual employee, unemployment, and so the description of actual characteristics of forth (cf. Göranzon, 1983, p. 216). But these things, events or people may be confused issues are not emphasized in connection with with the general category for this behavior the discourse on tacit knowledge. The result (Ryle, 1976). The category-mistake may of placing issues of power in an epistemolog- cause a double-world thinking.3 Ryle used ical framework is that some aspects disap- the concept of category-mistake to point out pear while others emerge. All questions con- that Descartes’ differentiation between concerning moral, ethics and politics disappear ceptual matter (res cogitans) and physical in favor of discussions of new ways of know- matter (res extensa) is a category-mistake. In ing the world. connection with this category-mistake, phi-

Tacit Knowledge Creates Social 3 Double-world thinking may be defined as a dogma Uniformity which maintains that both body and mind exist; that both physical and mental processes occur; that there are both We have now seen that the concept of tacit mechanical causes of corporeal movements and mental knowledge is also intended to promote the in- causes of corporeal movements (Ryle, 1976, p. 23). Outlines-2002-2.qxd 30-01-2003 11:38 Side 12

Klaus Nielsen: The Concept of Tacit Knowledge – A Critique 12 losophers have been of the opinion that a those possible conflicts and oppositions at a form of conceptual matter actually did exists, distance which might actually transform and but in reality different categories were con- change the profession or the work communi- fused linguistically. An action-oriented as- ty by means of critical dialogue. pect of a practice was mystified and turned into a non-specific object. The same argument can be made in rela- The Reappearance of Individualism tion to tacit knowledge. We may look at how As mentioned above, the concept of tacit the professional practitioner performs a num- knowledge implicitly served as a glue for sci- ber of qualified actions, and we may identify entific communities of practice. I shall argue these actions as expressions of tacit knowl- below that the concept of tacit knowledge edge. However, the very moment we find creates the illusion that work communities tacit knowledge as an actually existing kind are unified by a homogeneous core of knowl- of knowledge, we make a category-mistake edge that is generally agreed upon, thereby by assuming that tacit knowledge really ex- distracting attention from the fact that prac- ists. The concept of tacit knowledge will be- tice is constituted by a number of social posi- come the new ghost in the machine. tions that are defined in relation as well as in Ryle’s implication that the categorical contrast to each other. The concept of tacit confusion is a mistake, is, however, not nec- knowledge distracts attention from the fact essarily correct in this casd. The categorical that conflicts and oppositions are the dynam- confusions may serve a purpose. The concept ic reasons for development and change and of tacit knowledge actually seems to have a leads to a focus on the abilities and capacities unifying function as an indubitable element of the individual. for the members of the profession. Further- It is, therefore, in line with this thinking more, tacit knowledge hinders non-members that the concept of tacit knowledge seems to from getting access to take over vital work re-establish an individualistic approach to assignments and thereby gain influence. It is professional practice.4 This return to individ- no coincidence that the first to circulate the ualism must have its background in internal concept of tacit knowledge was Kuhn (Kuhn, rivalry and power struggles among profes- 1970, p. 43-45). According to Kuhn, tacit sions. It is not a matter of professions func- knowledge covers precisely the common tionally dividing the various work fields be- rules that create the implicit basis for the par- tween themselves but of rivaling professions adigms which define the scientific standards. struggling to define and delimit attractive Contrary to Kuhn, the concept of tacit knowl- work fields in relation to the interests of their edge offers no possibility for establishing an profession. One example may be the ongoing internal, critical dialogue that may renew and conflict between teachers and educationists change the profession from within, so to in Denmark as to who should be the key fig- speak. There is very little chance that the pro- ures in connection with the introductory peri- fessions themselves can establish changes, ods of school attendance for small children. shifts in paradigms or carry out other radical changes based on the concept of tacit knowl- 4 Here tacit knowledge is, of course, understood as edge. In this sense, the concept of tacit a dimension of inexpressibility, intuition or practical knowledge is preservative in relation to al- intelligence while, according to Polanyi’s understan- ready established forms of practice. The con- ding of tacit knowledge, traditions, that is, collective cept of tacit knowledge will, hence, keep historical actions, are central. Outlines-2002-2.qxd 30-01-2003 11:38 Side 13

OUTLINES • No. 2 • 2002 13 A similar professional conflict may be found members of another profession, the doctors. within the national health services where In reality, the practitioner acts on the basis of doctors, nurses and assistant nurses try to his or her specific social position which pro- dominate different work assignments. vides the person with power and incon- In connection with these rivalries, the con- testable authority. The infallible diagnosis cept of tacit knowledge plays an important may just as well be due to the fact that the role. It is no mere coincidence that the pro- nurse is positioned in an institutional com- fession of nursing, in a squeeze between doc- munity in which she has the power of classi- tors and assistant nurses, found the concept fication and in which no other member of the useful (cf. e.g. Josefson, 1988a; Benner, community can question this classification. 1984). The concept of tacit knowledge dis- In other words, it is difficult to distinguish places the focus on social position and pow- between the classification of the patient and er-oriented relations to link actions and their the stigmatizing exertion of power. The intro- legitimacy to the tacit knowledge of the indi- duction of tacit knowledge into practice, vidual professional, hence focusing away thus, contributes to shifting the focus towards from social interaction, oppositions and pow- the capacities of an ahistorical individual and er struggles towards the capacities of the in- away from a socially situated, relational un- dividual. The individual is, in other words, derstanding of knowledge and the individual. de-contextualized. Tacit knowledge de-contextualizes the differ- The individual practitioner has gained a ent positions within the profession. prescriptive right to tacit knowledge expressed by intuition and feelings as legitimate grounds for action. Tacit knowledge is Dualism Maintained to define the reputation and social status of The concept of tacit knowledge maintains the individual while other aspects are left out. rather than transcends the dualistic perspec- The following example shows how tacit tive on knowledge. As mentioned above, tac- knowledge may appear as a personal capaci- it knowledge has been defined as an alterna- ty and not be related to a certain social status. tive to technical rationality within the episte- The example is from Benner’s studies of the mological paradigm. The traditional way of development of nurses from novices to ex- dividing intuition and tacit knowledge from perts, and it shows the expert nurse’s capacity scientific rationality has been to present this in connection with the work of diagnosing as a division between an unclear, mythical mental illness in patients. Benner’s studies of and magical line of thought, on the one hand, the development of nurses is the empirical and a systematic, scientific line of thought, basis for the skill model on intuitive expertise on the other hand (cf. Lave, 1988). This dual- by Dreyfus and Dreyfus. Benner writes: ism is captured in contrasting the concept of tacit knowledge with technical rationality, “When I tell a doctor: the patient is psychotic, I and it is repeated in many of the stories relat- do not know how to legitimize it? But I am never ed to the concept of tacit knowledge, for in- wrong. Because I am extremely familiar with psychoses. And I know it so well that I know what stance, in Josefson’s presentation of the intu- it is, and I trust that” (Benner, 1984, p. 32). itive and tacit actions of the expert nurse (Josefson, 1988b). This example illustrates how, based on tacit Josefson presents an example in which a knowledge, the practitioner’s action is legiti- nurse with thirty years of professional expe- mated as professional intuition in relation to rience – mainly with post-surgery patients – Outlines-2002-2.qxd 30-01-2003 11:38 Side 14

Klaus Nielsen: The Concept of Tacit Knowledge – A Critique 14 met a patient who said that he was fine and 1968). The implicit assumption of this notion okay after his operation. This statement was is that we must clearly realize that this objec- supported by objective, observable indica- tive world is present in all our actions. When tions. Yet, the nurse felt that something was that turns out not to be the case, the concept wrong. She sent for a young doctor who did of tacit knowledge is invented. Polanyi ex- not find anything wrong and blamed the emplifies tacit knowledge with the well- nurse for having sent for him for no reason. known observation that one can ride a bike However, the patient then died during the without actually knowing what one does and night. The nurse had noticed that something yet continue riding it. The illustration of the was out of the ordinary but could not explain bike ride supports the thought that we must how she had arrived at this conclusion. apparently not be completely aware of the al- Josefson’s example illustrates how the ready existing world and anything we do in medical, systematic, scientific line of thought it, and if that is not the case the auxiliary hy- fails while intuition dominates. The story pothesis of “tacit knowledge” must be intro- shows that it is a matter of two basic kinds of duced. The rational line of thought constructs knowledge in opposition to each other. The tacit knowledge as a convenient auxiliary hy- same dualism can be found in the five-stage pothesis. If, alternatively, we consider the model of learning developed by Dreyfus and world from the perspective of the actor in a Dreyfus (1986). Their model also clearly dis- social context, it is possible to maintain that – tinguishes between the types of knowledge due to the fact that we exist in time and space that are related to context-free rules, on the as well as in a social world – actions must be one hand, and intuitive pattern recognition, considered unfinished business. Our partici- on the other hand. pation will hence always include an unclear In this respect, the values have simply dimension. This dimension is, however, not been turned upside down. The Western, sys- to be considered a type of knowledge. On the tematic rationality (“the doctor”) is not asso- contrary, it is an implicit consequence of the ciated with positive values. On the contrary, fact that our existence is constantly modified the local cultures (the “primitive” people) by our participation in a social world. and professional practitioners (“the nurse”) now possess and define the positive values. The dualism between rationality and magic Summary and new questions still exists, only with a different set of value In this article I have taken a critical stand on poles. Whereas technical rationality is a per- the concept of tacit knowledge in discussions verted version of the Western thought of the of professional practice. As a point of depar- enlightenment, one may consider the concept ture I raised the question, what would be the of tacit knowledge to be a caricature of the consequences of approaching practice as an ideal knowledge of romanticism. epistemological matter rather than in terms The problem with this clear-cut dualism of activity. I outlined three different ways of between the two types of knowledge is that it conceptualizing tacit knowledge, namely: implies a particular understanding of the so- tacit knowledge as tradition, as an inexpress- cial world. This dualistic understanding im- ible dimension of practice and, finally, as a plies that an already objective world exists, kind of intelligence. And I argued that these independent of human actions or beings. definitions of tacit knowledge are not ho- That has been termed the ‘prejudice of an ob- mogenous but mutually exclusive. jective world’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1981; Kvale, Furthermore, I looked critically at tacit Outlines-2002-2.qxd 30-01-2003 11:38 Side 15

OUTLINES • No. 2 • 2002 15 knowledge by relating it to the growth of pro- again, that is, described as it progresses in so- fessions in modern society. It was argued that cial activities with tools. We need to ask criti- tacit knowledge could be seen as a compro- cally what is gained by conceptualizing prac- mise between legitimating the professions in tice as tacit. Rather than placing particular accordance with scientific standards and of- activities into categories of knowledge, we fering a concept about the specific experi- need to describe in detail what happens in so- ences of professional practitioners. However, cial situations. The concept of tacit knowl- this way of conceptualizing practice from an edge actually does address the notion of epistemological perspective gave rise to new habits directly or indirectly. But we need to questions and contained a number of impor- approach habits as more than efficient rou- tant problems. tines. An understanding of social habits calls As argued above, the new professions for historical analyses of the bodily nature of must find ways of legitimating themselves. social practice. Furthermore, we ought to ask Using the concept of tacit knowledge for this critically for whom specific kinds of knowl- purpose tends to turn it into a black box edge are tacit? Is it for the observer – the sci- which makes practice mysterious and inac- entist –, for the practitioner or for the client? cessible. However, we should also take into And finally, we need to ask whose knowl- account which phenomena the concept of edge is tacit in a social practice? Here we tacit knowledge is pointing at. Social practice need to focus on social positions and on how consists of a mixture of social habits, histori- knowledge is used to maintain social posi- cally grounded modes of actions, knowledge tions and privileges. I shall end this article distributed in work practices and tools. with Erwin Straus’ words about the uncon- Although a large part of one’s participation in scious, now slightly changed to cover the a social practice is not articulated verbally, concept of tacit knowledge: “The tacit that does not entail that this kind of participa- knowledge of the practitioner is more often tion is founded on tacit knowledge. Rather than not the verbal and explicit theories of the than placing habitual, collective elements of social scientist” (freely interpreted from actions and tool-mediated participation in the Straus, 1958, p. 151). category of tacit knowledge, it seems more appropriate to categorize and describe these activities concretely as they take place in References practice. Benner, P. (1984). From Novice to Expert: Ex- As an alternative to using the concept of cellence and Power in Clinical Nursing Prac- tacit knowledge I argue for the necessity of tice. New York: Addison and Wesley. not letting the concrete practice out of sight Bohlin, H. (1989). Datorisering och tyst kun- when a practice is legitimated. Rather than skap. Dialoger, nr. 10, 18-27. transforming practice into categories of Carlgren, I. (1990a). Den svårformulerade yrkes- knowledge, it is important to describe and re- kunskapen. Nordisk Pedagogik, Vol. 10 (3), late to the ongoing practice as it unfolds in all 97-98. its diversity. In other words, we need to ac- Carlgren, I. (1990b). Tyst kunskap och frågan om count for the collective nature of activities in praktikerens forandring. Nordisk Pedagogik, practice rather than to focus on different cate- Vol. 10 (3), 167-172. gories of knowledge. Rhetorically speaking, Carlgren, I. (1990c). Vem talar om tyst kunskap – one could state that knowledge needs to be och varför? Interview med Aant Elzinga. moved from the head and placed in the world Nordisk Pedagogik, Vol. 10 (3), 115-119. Outlines-2002-2.qxd 30-01-2003 11:38 Side 16

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