09/2012 Vol. 3, no. 4 ❖ 3, no. Vol. PRISM A JOURNAL OF THE CENTER FOR COMPLEX OPERATIONS THE CENTER FOR OF A JOURNAL
PRISM Vol. 3, no. 4 ❖09/2012 www.ndu.edu PRISM ABOUT CENTER FOR COMPLEX OPERATIONS (CCO) CCO WAS ESTABLISHED TO: ■■ Serve as an information clearinghouse and knowledge manager PRISM is published by the National Defense University Press for the Center for Complex Enhancing the U.S. Government’s Ability to Operations. PRISM is a security studies journal chartered to inform members of U.S. Federal for complex operations training and education, acting as a central Editor Prepare for Complex Operations Michael Miklaucic agencies, allies, and other partners on complex and integrated national security operations; repository for information on areas such as training and curricula, reconstruction and nation-building; relevant policy and strategy; lessons learned; and training and education provider institutions, complex operations CCO, a center within the Institute for National Strategic Studies developments in training and education to transform America’s security and development events, and subject matter experts Managing Editor at National Defense University, links U.S. Government education apparatus to meet tomorrow’s challenges better while promoting freedom today. Dr. Jeffrey D. Smotherman and training institutions, including related centers of excellence, ■■ Develop a complex operations training and education community of lessons learned programs, and academia, to foster unity of effort practice to catalyze innovation and development of new knowledge, in reconstruction and stability operations, counterinsurgency, and connect members for networking, share existing knowledge, and Copy Editors cultivate foundations of trust and habits of collaboration across the Dr. John J. Church COMMUNICATIONS irregular warfare—collectively called “complex operations.” The Department of Defense, with support from the State Department community Calvin B. Kelley and U.S. Agency for International Development, established CCO as Constructive comments and contributions are important to us. Direct ■■ Serve as a feedback and information conduit to the Office of the George C. Maerz an innovative interagency partnership. communications to the link on the NDU Press Web site (www.ndu.edu/press) or Secretary of Defense and broader U.S. Government policy leader- write to: ship to support guidance and problem-solving across the commu- Internet Publications Editor nity of practice Joanna E. Seich Editor, PRISM ■■ Enable more effective networking, coordination, and synchroniza- National Defense University Press tion to support the preparation of Department of Defense and Editorial Assistant 260 Fifth Avenue (Building 64, Room 3605) Miranda Taylor Fort Lesley J. McNair other U.S. Government personnel for complex operations Washington, DC 20319 ■■ Support lessons learned processes and best practices compilation in the area of complex operations Director, NDU Press Telephone: Frank G. Hoffman (202) 685-3442 ■■ Identify education and training gaps in the Department of Defense FAX: and other Federal departments and agencies and facilitate efforts Advisory Board (202) 685-3581 to fill those gaps. Dr. Gordon Adams Email: [email protected] Dr. Pauline H. Baker PRISM online: www.ndu.edu/press Ambassador Rick Barton Dr. Joseph J. Collins (ex officio) CONTRIBUTIONS Visit the CCO Web site at: http://ccoportal.org Ambassador James F. Dobbins Ambassador John E. Herbst (ex officio) PRISM welcomes submission of scholarly, independent research from security policymakers Dr. David Kilcullen and shapers, security analysts, academic specialists, and civilians from the United Ambassador Jacques Paul Klein States and abroad. Submit articles for consideration to the address above or by email to Dr. Roger B. Myerson [email protected] with “Attention Submissions Editor” in the subject line. For further Dr. Moisés Naím information, see the guidelines on the NDU Press Web site at www.ndu.edu/press. MG William L. Nash, USA (Ret.) Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering NDU Press is the National Defense University’s cross-component, professional military and Dr. William Reno academic publishing house. It publishes books, policy briefs, occasional papers, monographs, Dr. James A. Schear and special reports on national security strategy, defense policy, national military strategy, Dr. Joanna Spear regional security affairs, and global strategic problems. Dr. Ruth Wedgwood This is the authoritative, official U.S. Department of Defense edition of PRISM. Any copy- righted portions of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted without permission of the copyright proprietors. PRISM should be acknowledged whenever material is quoted from or based on its content.
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13 3 Features 149 146 Book R 137 I 117 l 109 91 77 55 39 23
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Peaceful protest in Binnish, Syria, June 2012
2 | Features Ibn DimashqPRI SShaamM 3,News no Network. 4 Post-Asad Syria
By Daniel serwer
he situation in Syria has gone from bad to worse. United Nations (UN) observers have been unable to do more than report on numerous violations of the UN Security Council T (UNSC)–sponsored ceasefire as well as atrocities committed against civilians. The authori- ties restrict their movements, threaten their security, and interfere with their communications. The Syrian government continues to use artillery, helicopter gunships, and paramilitary shabiha (loosely translated as “thugs”) against peaceful protesters as well as armed insurgents. The Free Syrian Army and other insurgent forces control at least some territory and are attacking Syrian security forces and installations.1 Unknown assailants have committed a series of bombings against government offices and assassinated senior defense figures. Arms are flowing to the gov- ernment from Russia while Saudi Arabia and Qatar are supplying the Free Syrian Army. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s plan looks doomed, but it is still not too early to begin thinking about what Syria is going to look like postwar, assuming Bashar al-Asad eventually falls and a transition toward democracy begins. A year or two of lead time is not too early to begin planning. How the transition occurs will depend a good deal on the particular circumstances in which it takes place. An opposition military victory, a palace coup, and a negotiated turnover of power would look dramatically different, especially in the initial stages. This path dependency should not prevent analysis of the ultimate objectives and issues that will likely arise in trying to reach them. Working backward from the endstate eliminates some of the complexity associated with path dependency and allows a more farsighted and strategic approach to issues that are too often reduced to sequencing or other tactical details that cannot necessarily be decided in advance. Unification of the Syrian opposition around a clear set of democratic transition goals and the organization needed to achieve them could provide the kind of cohesion that has been sorely lacking so far.2 Once the goals are determined, some division of labor is appropriate. It would be particularly useful for expatriates to focus on longer term transition, as the opposition inside Syria will have difficulty focusing on anything more than tomorrow’s most urgent security and humanitarian requirements. This division of labor was at least partially productive in Libya,
Daniel Serwer is a Professor at The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a Scholar at the Middle East Institute (MEI). MEI intern Gregor Nazarian read a draft of this article and contributed to it.
PRISM 3, no. 4 Features | 3 serwer
where the Stabilization Team worked abroad political upheavals.6 Its transition is likely to even while the fight against the Muammar be no easier than those in Tunisia, Libya, Qadhafi regime continued. Expatriates will Egypt, and Yemen. It may be a good deal also have an advantage in dealing with the more difficult. international community, if only because Every postwar situation is unique. communication with the multination “Friends Context matters. Syrians, not foreigners, of the Syrian People,” as well as international should make the key decisions. The Syrian organizations, will be easier for those located National Council, in a statement that has not abroad. The expatriate Future of Iraq project, generated dissent and appears to represent which the U.S. State Department conducted in consensus, has laid out a broad goal for the advance of the Iraq invasion, might have been transition in its National Covenant for a New useful had the Pentagon been more receptive. Syria: “Syria is a civil, democratic, pluralis- But ultimately, people who have lived under tic, independent and free state. As a sover- the Asad regime will want to determine the eign country, it will determine its own future country’s transition path. based only on the collective will of its people. Mine is not the first effort to consider Sovereignty will belong in its entirety only to future scenarios in Syria, nor will it be the the Syrian people who will exercise it through last. I focus here on the situation inside Syria. democracy.”7 Within this overall objective, Patrick Clawson has considered the regional it is instructive to explore some of the main implications of a democratic transition and issues—using a framework that spans these other scenarios.3 Others have worried about endstates—for a successful democratic revo- the divided opposition—whether it can lead lution: a transition and if so, to what.4 They have also outlined immediate steps to begin to ■■ safe and secure environment establish security, rule of law, democracy, and ■■ rule of law transitional justice.5 The focus in this article ■■ stable governance is on longer term objectives associated with a transition to democracy and the medium- ■■ sustainable economy term measures (the next 1–3 years) needed to ■■ social well-being.8 achieve them. As we know from Iraq and Afghanistan, Safe and Secure Environment postwar failures can absorb resources and shape outcomes as much as wartime events. This is job number one in many postwar envi- We are seeing that happen also in Libya, ronments and will certainly be the top priority where wartime militias are refusing to dis- in Syria. No matter how the war ends, there arm or put themselves under central com- will be several armed forces in the country: mand, weakening the new government the Syrian army, the shabiha (armed but not and slowing—perhaps even derailing—the uniformed regime paramilitaries), the vari- transition to democracy. Syria has a diverse ous internal security services, the police, and population and displays many of the warning the disparate units of the resistance, usually signs associated with mass atrocity following but not always going by the appellation Free
4 | Features PRISM 3, no. 4 post-asad syria
Syrian Army.9 A stay-behind operation, such thought to be mainly chemical weapons, as the one conducted by Saddam Hussein’s Syria’s WMDs are likely also to include nuclear Fedayeen in Iraq, is likely and would proba- and biological material. Special arrange- bly have Iranian support. The mainly Alawite ments will need to be made to ensure that shabiha would be the likely vector for a post- this material does not get into black market war insurgency. circulation.10 Of additional concern to both If serious post-Asad slaughter is to be the Americans and Syria’s neighbors will be avoided, the pro- and anti-regime forces will other sensitive weapons such as MANPADs have to be kept separate, at least for a time. (man-portable air defense systems), antitank They will then have to be at least partly dis- missiles, and heavy machineguns. We are fac- armed, demobilized, and reintegrated—with ing problems with the circulation of arms of some of them going into a new army, some these sorts from Libya in the Sahel and else- into other security forces, and some into where. Syria will be no less problematic. Its civilian life, including prosecution of human neighbors—especially Iraq and Turkey—will rights abusers. It is difficult to see how sepa- want the postwar regime to ensure that these ration of various forces can be accomplished arms do not get into the hands of their own without a substantial peacekeeping force, one domestic insurgents (mainly Sunnis in Iraq that would assist the transition administra- tion not only in disarming, demobilizing, and only once a safe and secure environment is reintegrating but also in reforming the secu- established under new and less abusive security rity forces—that is, security sector reform. This forces can the new authorities hope to disarm will be a multiyear effort leading eventually the general population to restoration of the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. Postwar environments often require and Kurds in Turkey). Israel will also have rea- police forces with more substantial firepower son to be concerned. Weapons collection in and manpower than are normally available the aftermath of war is always difficult. Young to police on the beat in peacetime situa- men do not give up their arms readily. Only tions. These “constabulary” or “gendarmerie” once a safe and secure environment is estab- forces, which are trained and equipped to act lished under new and less abusive security in “formed” police units of about 100 para- forces can the new authorities hope to disarm militaries, will likely have to be supplied the general population. internationally at first. Their roles may include Rule of Law prevention of rioting and ethnic cleansing, confrontation with armed militias or spoilers, Syria has police, prosecutors, judiciary, and protection of vital infrastructure, and other prisons, but they have been subservient to an internal security functions where enhanced autocratic and abusive regime for the past 40 capabilities are needed. years. The legal frameworks under which they One particular problem will preoccupy have operated since the mid-1960s, which the Americans: dealing with Syria’s weap- include “exceptional” laws and courts oper- ons of mass destruction (WMDs). Although ating outside the constitutional framework,
PRISM 3, no. 4 Features | 5 serwer
will have to be dismantled.11 The personnel The question of compensation for vic- will need to be vetted by a transition regime, tims of the regime, including for misappro- the worst human rights abusers weeded out, priated property as well as human rights and new people trained to take their places. violations, will need to be decided in due Police are especially problematic in postwar course. There are many different precedents. situations; it is impossible to do without It is easy for expectations to grow inordi- them, but at least some of them are likely to nately. Their disappointment can be a serious be deeply implicated in abusing the popula- political problem, so deciding on principles tion. Whether to vet and retrain, or start a and a process that is clear and understand- new police force from scratch, is an impor- able is important, even if early compensation tant decision. Establishment of a judiciary or restoration of property is impossible. It that is independent of executive and legisla- will likely take years and even decades before tive power as well as impartial in applying law all the claims and counterclaims are defini- based on respect for human rights will be a tively settled. major responsibility during the transition to Notably, the question of shariah, which democracy.12 has arisen in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, is Treatment of former regime persons not even mentioned in a 2007 review of is an important issue, especially if many political Islam in Syria.14 Nor does it appear share a distinct minority ethnic or sectar- in the National Covenant for a New Syria.15 ian background. Big shots are particularly Nevertheless, for many Islamists—and in problematic. Will they be tried in Syria, as particular for the Muslim Brotherhood that is was done in Iraq, or will they be transferred said to strongly influence the Syrian National to the International Criminal Court (ICC) Council—rule of law necessarily entails in The Hague? Most countries prefer to try implementation of some form of Islamic jus- their own people, especially those who want tice, or justice based on Islamic principles.16 to apply the death penalty, an option that Precisely what this means has varied widely is not available at the ICC. Ensuring trans- in different countries and under different parent and fair treatment of Alawites will be regimes, but the issue will likely arise, along especially challenging, since they provided with the status of women. The questions of mainstays of the Asad regime, even if some shariah and the status of women are par- have joined the revolution. Some Druze and ticularly problematic in a multiconfessional Christians will also be suspect. Not everyone society such as Syria where significant por- will want to distinguish between those who tions of the population may not view sha- benefited from the regime and those who riah—whatever its specific meaning—as part did not. As the Public International Law and of their cultural tradition. Policy Group notes, establishing clear crite- Stable Governance ria for who will be prosecuted and how, even before the fall of the regime, could be help- Syria, unlike Libya, has fully developed state ful in gaining support from those who are institutions that will in principle be at the trying to decide now whether to support the disposal of whoever takes over. State ser- opposition.13 vices, which in Syria include water, electricity,
6 | Features PRISM 3, no. 4 post-asad syria
education, health, and food subsidies among supposedly elected in May 2012 is a sham— other things, will presumably continue their as well as new officials at the provincial and operations as best they can until decisions are local levels. The covenant does not establish made otherwise. But an autocratic state such as the order and timing of these essential steps.18 Syria is unused to the demands for openness, The order is important, as is transparency and responsiveness, and efficiency that will quickly breadth of participation. Best practice nowa- arise. Government employees may be even days calls for a broad consultative or represen- more sullen and resistant than usual. Keeping tative process in preparing the constitution expectations down and performance of state and electoral laws.19 Achieving this can be institutions up is vital. difficult in postwar conditions. Temporary While some may hope that the Syrian arrangements may be required, allowing time army will push Asad out and guide the tran- for a more deliberative process. sition, Egypt illustrates how problematic military control of a political revolution can local before national elections provide a way be.17 The Syrian army will have substantial to test the electoral mechanism and see who is interests of its own to protect, including eco- beginning to emerge politically nomic interests and impunity for acts com- mitted under the Asad regime. If it takes over, it cannot be relied on to move in a demo- The Syrian revolution has generated a cratic direction, or to do so with conviction. remarkable array of local revolutionary coun- Even more than in Egypt, the Syrian army cils and coordination committees. It would be has acted as an instrument of the autocracy, wise to consider building local governance on committing many of the worst abuses. Anti- their initiative, empowering them to organize regime Syrians would see an army takeover elections and begin the reconstruction of gover- as a change in window dressing, from which nance from the grassroots up rather than from the networks that supported the Asads would Damascus down. Local before national elec- continue to benefit. tions provide a way to test the electoral mech- A civilian-led transition in a country anism and see who is beginning to emerge wracked by war is no panacea either, as we politically. In addition, local elections are more have seen in Libya where the nominal civil- often fought on issues and personalities rather ian leaders have often played second fiddle to than identity or ideology. In a society likely to revolutionary militias. But let us assume that be plagued by sectarian and ethnic division, the Syrian National Council, or maybe some focusing initially on local issues would provide umbrella organization that encompasses it, an opportunity to build political parties driven becomes the de facto governing authority more by economic and social needs than by in the aftermath of Asad’s exit. Whoever it ideological and sectarian wants. is will need to lay out a process quickly for Sustainable Economy revising or replacing the constitution (the latest one supposedly approved in a referen- Syria has big problems in this department, dum on February 26, 2012), electing a new largely due to excessive state involvement in a president and a serious parliament—the one less-than-thriving economy.20 Oil production
PRISM 3, no. 4 Features | 7 serwer
is declining and likely will continue in that While there may be some frozen assets direction even with foreign help. Some finan- that can be repatriated quickly, Syria will likely cial assets are frozen abroad and can be repa- face a much more difficult financial situation triated, but that process is often slow. While than oil-rich Libya—one more like Egypt and the stock of public debt is not large, the bud- Tunisia. Quick international action to make get deficit is high and rising, as is inflation. resources available to Syria will be vital. The Credit has dried up. Foreign currency reserves Syrian National Council has initiated planning have been plummeting. The currency is col- for a “Marshall Syrian Recovery Plan” through lapsing. Income disparities have been widen- the Working Group on Economic Recovery ing, and the poor have tended to support the and Development, a Friends of the Syrian revolution. Half the population is younger People group that is expected to provide funds than 25. Unemployment is dramatically high to rebuild Syria.22 Anticipated initial needs (likely 20–30 percent). amount to $11.5 billion to stop the currency Any transition regime will be broke and from collapsing and to pay public sector work- face difficult economic issues: whether to ers’ salaries.23 continue subsidies (in particular to food and Social Well-being fuel), whether to keep the Syrian pound or replace it with a new currency, whether to try There will be massive requirements for imme- to slow inflation, what to do about foreign diate humanitarian assistance in Homs, Hama, debt, and how to reverse the privatizations Idlib, and other population centers the Syrian and other economic privileges granted to army has been attacking for the better part of a regime cronies that have aroused enormous year. Food, shelter, and medical assistance are popular resentment. All this will need to be the obvious priorities. In addition, Syria harbored approxi- Syria will have to design accountability and mately 1 million refugees from Iraq, more reconciliation mechanisms that satisfy some of than 400,000 Palestinians, and more than the craving for justice without preventing the 300,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) government and society from moving forward even before last year’s fighting (many from Golan).24 The number of IDPs will now be much higher, and several hundred thou- decided with the general population clam- sand Syrians are currently refugees in Turkey, oring for jobs and continued state support. Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq. Disentangling the networks that bind elite Sectarian and ethnic tensions will be evi- business actors to state officials through ill- dent quickly. Alawites will be at immediate risk gotten wealth will be difficult. Even outside as will Druze and Christians who have bene- the inner circle of the regime, the economy is fited from regime privileges. Kurds are unlikely dominated by businessmen, many of whom to be resented as they have suffered discrimina- have so far refused to join or support the tion and worse under the Asad regime, but it opposition. This will not be forgotten and is not clear to what extent they will lend sup- will fuel a great deal of resentment that could port to any transition, which Arabs will neces- make economic stability difficult to attain.21 sarily dominate. The Syrian National Council
8 | Features PRISM 3, no. 4 post-asad syria
recently elected a Kurd as its leader, but the society. While Syrians should lead, it is clear Syrian Kurdish National Council remains sep- that a good deal of outside assistance will arate, at least for now. Ensuring Kurdish and be required: financial, economic, technical, other minority representation in the transition operational, military, and legal. It is hard to is vital to overcoming the fears, resistance, and picture all this being managed without a sub- centrifugal forces to which it will give rise. stantial foreign presence, including peacekeep- Looking longer term, Syria will have to ing forces to relieve the new authorities of the decide how to deal with the legacy of the burden of maintaining a safe and secure envi- Asad regime, and in particular it must design ronment while they focus on the many other accountability and reconciliation mechanisms matters requiring urgent attention. Planning that satisfy at least some of the craving for jus- may have begun for a UN/Arab League force, tice without preventing the government and which would be the logical follow-on from society from moving forward. Egypt has not Kofi Annan’s UN/Arab League mediation effort. been successful at this, and the process has not Syria is a big country of over 22 mil- even begun in Libya. lion people, albeit not as populous as Iraq or Afghanistan. Any serious international peace- Bottom Line keeping/building effort would still require, This catalogue only scratches the surface even with permissive conditions, on the order in describing the problems that will arise of 50,000 troops and police. A significant in a post-Asad transition to a more open portion might be Syrian, provided units can U.S. Air Force (H.H. Deffner) Air Force U.S.
Syrian soldier aims Chinese AK-47 assault rifle and wears Soviet NBC warfare mask during Operation Desert Shield
PRISM 3, no. 4 Features | 9 serwer
be found that did not participate actively in understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Syrias_Armed_ Asad’s repression. The international actors Opposition.pdf>. 2 Elizabeth O’Bagy, Syria’s Political Opposition, will not be easy to find and, of course, the Middle East Security Report 4 (Washington, DC: transition authorities will need to invite them Institute for the Study of War, April 2012), available in.25 This will be over and above a substantial at
10 | Features PRISM 3, no. 4 post-asad syria
10 Andrew Exum, “What the Hell Should We Do
PRISM 3, no. 4 Features | 11 Intelligence officer from PRT Zabul listens to villagers from Khleqdad Khan, Afghanistan
U.S. Air Force (Brian Ferguson) “Left of Bang” The Value of Sociocultural Analysis in Today’s Environment
BY MICHAEL T. FLYNN, JAMES SISCO, AND DAVID C. ELLIS
ard lessons learned during counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, counterterrorist operations across continents, and the Arab Spring all contributed to Ha growing recognition within the Intelligence Community (IC)1 of the importance of understanding the “human terrain” of operating environments. The Department of Defense (DOD), its Service branches and combatant commands, and the broader IC responded to the demand for sociocultural analysis (SCA) by creating organizations such as the Defense Intelligence Socio-Cultural Capabilities Council, Human Terrain System, and U.S. Central Command’s Human Terrain Analysis Branch, among others. For large bureaucracies, DOD and the IC reacted agilely to the requirement, but the robust SCA capabilities generated across the government over the last decade were largely operationally and tactically organized, resourced, and focused. What remains is for the IC to formulate a strategic understanding of SCA and establish a paradigm for incorporating it into the intelligence process. Simply stated, the lesson of the last decade is that failing to understand the human dimen- sion of conflict is too costly in lives, resources, and political will for the Nation to bear. Once a conflict commences, it is already too late to begin the process of learning about the population and its politics. The optimal condition is for our leaders to have the ability to influence bud- ding conflicts “left of bang,” that is,before tensions turn violent. Left of bang, policy options are more numerous, costs of engagement are lower, and information flows more freely to more actors. After bang, options decrease markedly, the policy costs rise rapidly, and information
Lieutenant General Michael T. Flynn, USA, is Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and Commander of the Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. Lieutenant Commander James Sisco, USN, is an Intelligence Officer currently serving in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Dr. David C. Ellis joined U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in 2009 as a Human Terrain Analyst and is the lead for USSOCOM’s Socio- Cultural Awareness Section.
PRISM 3, no. 4 FEATURES | 13 Flynn, sisco, and ellis
becomes scarce and expensive. More than influence left of bang. As a first step toward ever, military, intelligence, and diplomatic building a population-centric social radar, this professionals recognize this reality. article explains why integrating SCA remains A tremendous opportunity now exists for counterintuitive to the IC, describes how social the Intelligence Community to build upon its amplifiers compound the difficulty, offers a world-class analytical foundation. Complex framework for inexpensively and proactively social phenomena such as population growth capturing sociocultural information, and sug- and demographic change, economic globaliza- gests a paradigm for converting sociocultural tion, and the information and communication information into intelligence production. revolutions demand even greater attention. Old Structure, New Threats Unfortunately, the IC struggles to integrate sociocultural analysis into traditional collec- That we are largely uninformed about popu- tion and analysis because its structures remain lations and ill-prepared to understand them rooted in the state-centric context of the Cold is a natural consequence of the IC being built upon the edifice of Cold War politics. the lesson of the last decade is that failing Much of the IC was established to detect, to understand the human dimension of understand, and maneuver against adver- conflict is too costly in lives, resources, and saries’ actions and intentions by employing political will for the Nation to bear all methods of national influence, includ- ing military assets, economic strength, and diplomatic skill. Sovereignty as a core prin- War. The evolving nexus of threats among ter- ciple of international order meant that states rorist groups, transnational criminal organiza- would not generally concern themselves tions (TCOs), cyber-criminals, humanitarian with how other governments managed crises, and pandemics is merely symptomatic their populations.2 Yet in many parts of the of the need to reconceptualize the way popula- world, weakening or eroded state sovereignty tions, political systems, and geography inter- enables many of the above threats against sect. A new concept should seek to explain our national interests to grow. Under condi- how populations understand their reality, why tions of meaningful sovereign state author- they choose either to support or resist their ity, these issues are manageable. However, governments, how they organize themselves failed and failing states create circumstances socially and politically, and why and how their whereby aggrieved populations and nonstate beliefs transform over time. actors can assert themselves in ways that are In contrast to the IC’s typical state-centric not easily comprehensible to the IC. To frame analysis, which seeks to determine how states the challenge ahead, the Failed States Index can or do impose stability, the IC must develop asserts that approximately 20 percent of the a sensory capability to better detect the precur- world’s states are now considered to be failed sors to political change, a “social radar” with a states or are at severe risk of failing.3 level of granularity, understanding, and con- While our current intelligence architec- fidence that enables policy leaders to make ture proved successful in the context of the informed decisions that maximize national Cold War, it has been much less successful in
14 | Features PRISM 3, no. 4 “left of bang”
the world of weak and failed states unleashed are now taking advantage of popular discon- by the collapse of governments whose sur- tent with governments and asserting military vival was, ironically, predicated upon the dominance over valuable tracts of territory, largesse provided by the United States and often at the expense of the population itself.6 Soviet Union. In a recent Center for Strategic When amplified by social tensions (discussed and International Studies report, Anthony below), populations as subnational actors can Cordesman and Nicholas Yarosh reinforce have greater political influence than in the this point: past, with many of them threatening or rais- ing the costs of maintaining the international countries, intelligence experts, mem- political and economic order. bers of international institutions, NGOs [nongovernmental organizations], and the state-centric “order” the West enjoyed during area experts need to do a far better job the Cold War is in today’s world assessed by of developing basic data on the causes of many populations to be illegitimate and instability. . . . Far better data are needed worth their sacrifice to change in key areas like unemployment and underemployment, income distribution, the efficiency of the state sector, barriers Amplifiers and Accelerators to growth and economic development, the size and function [of] security forces and Population Growth. Global population has police, and quality of governance.4 doubled since the early 1950s, predominantly Equating sovereign authority with sta- in parts of the world where institutions of bility is no longer analytically appropriate. state are least able to create the conditions As Cordesman and Yarosh indicate, today’s for social order and stability. Despite a trend conflicts are more about ideas and gover- toward slower rates of population growth on nance than they are about invasion by a for- the global scale, through 2050 more than 95 eign government. percent of future world population growth The state-centric “order” the West will occur in developing nations. By 2050, enjoyed during the Cold War is in today’s the populations in some of the world’s least world assessed by many populations to developed countries—many of which are be illegitimate and worth their sacrifice to experiencing or recently emerging from con- change. Many states formed after World flict—will be at least double their current War II and during the 1960s era of decolo- size including Afghanistan, the Democratic nization are dissolving or losing functional Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Liberia, Niger, sovereignty because their regimes have been Somalia, and Uganda. These countries are unwilling or unable to govern legitimately also home to some of the world’s poorest on behalf of many—or even most—of their and youngest populations, where continued people. Their populations are organizing in high rates of population growth have created social movements or around insurgencies a large youth bulge.7 to change their circumstances.5 Even worse, These disenfranchised youths struggle for narco-traffickers and other resource warlords limited resources, employment opportunities,
PRISM 3, no. 4 Features | 15 Flynn, sisco, and ellis
sense of belonging, and upward mobility in inequality within nations, environmental their communities, tribes, and villages. In degradation, the income gap between devel- many cases, the very states of which they are oped and developing nations, and fears of “citizens” proactively deny them opportu- cultural decay. The increasingly competitive nity.8 With limited options, the allure of quick and interconnected world raises the poten- wealth associated with illicit activities and the tial for conflicts and crises to escalate in mul- sense of purpose preached by radical move- tiple domains.12 Ethnic, racial, and religious ments are sufficient to mobilize enough of stratifications correlated with differences them to threaten many states’ integrity. in opportunity and wealth often reinforce Even important demographic changes existing tensions within countries, creating within allied nations should be of interest fertile ground for exploitation by nonstate to the IC. For example, significant aging in actors such as TCOs and extremist groups. Europe in concert with growing Muslim pop- Individuals no longer accept the status quo ulations could alter the economic capacity or from their governments and are demanding political calculus of governments to support a better way of life for themselves, their fami- the United States in foreign affairs. On the lies, and communities, especially when they other hand, corresponding aging trends in know alternatives exist. China might prohibit future military adven- The Communication Revolution. The turism due to the high costs associated with explosion in communications technology, an expansive welfare state.9 Whether driven social media in particular, has dramatically by youth bulges, deprivation, or aging, demo- increased a population’s ability to organize graphic changes now matter more analytically and communicate. Whereas state govern- than they have in the past. ments could effectively limit association and Economic Globalization. Globalization information exchange in the past, the mod- entails the qualitative and quantitative increase ern Internet and cell phone coverage make in the scope and intensity of “interactions and this objective more difficult. For example, as interdependencies among peoples and coun- of December 2011, there were over 2.1 billion tries of the world.”10 The progressive erosion Internet users with 3 billion email addresses, of barriers to trade—whether based on policy, 152 million blog sites, and 276 million Web geography, or transportation—has enabled a sites with 45 percent of users under the age rapid expansion of trade and contact among of 25. Facebook has more than 800 million previously distant populations. Economic glo- active users who log in 175 million times every balization has resulted in an incredible degree 24 hours, 65 million through mobile devices, of prosperity and rising incomes at an unprec- sharing over 30 billion pieces of content each edented rate for those able to participate.11 month. Traditional closed societies around the The BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and world are also beginning to use these media China) demonstrate the amazing advances that to rapidly disseminate information. In China, accrue with freer markets, substantive technol- Wiebo—a micro-blogging Web site equivalent ogy transfers, and low policy barriers to trade. to Twitter—has more than 250 million users, However, economic globalization also most of whom are educated and white col- amplifies vexing challenges such as income lar, and it is becoming a major influence in
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Chinese society. Grassroots social movements, small part of the type of sociocultural analysis as evidenced during the Arab Spring, are using available to the IC, but it can be an insightful these capabilities to organize demonstrations, component if properly utilized. spread messages to large audiences, and even overthrow governments. what social media do provide populations is While the sociocultural and research com- a virtual organizing capability in the face of munity has been interested in social media and physical repression by regimes how to leverage it for intelligence purposes for years, the Iranian Green Revolution and Arab Spring have given rise to a new fascination Integrating SCA within the Conflict with it. However, the use of social media was Continuum incidental, not causal, to these popular upris- ings. Discontent existed before the explosion To proactively build a social radar capable of of social media and was identifiable and mea- sensing important impacts on populations sureable even in social media’s absence. What and political systems like the ones above, it social media do provide populations is a vir- is first necessary to conceptualize how the IC tual organizing capability in the face of physi- can come to know them, particularly in the cal repression by regimes. Unfortunately, there coming era of constrained budgets. Unlike is a tendency to view the geospatial depiction state-centric analysis that is often reduced to of Facebook and Twitter feeds or ethno-reli- quantitative metrics, such as gross domestic gious human terrain maps to be the sum total product or mechanized infantry battalions, of sociocultural analysis. In fact, this is but a SCA requires deep, qualitative understanding U.S. Marine Forces Africa Marine Forces U.S.
Members of Royal Moroccan Army conduct terrain analysis during intelligence staff training as part of exercise African Lion 2010
PRISM 3, no. 4 Features | 17 Flynn, sisco, and ellis
about populations. Though such a task seems political decisionmakers of possible uprisings daunting at first, the conflict continuum in the or conflicts so they can avoid them. At this figure illustrates how the IC can inexpensively stage in the conflict continuum, deeper socio- and proactively integrate SCA with traditional cultural understanding results in a broader collection and analysis. range of policy options available to the nation Prior to conflict, or left of bang, the IC and its allies to prevent conflict. has a great deal of access to various informa- As tensions rise and move toward conflict, tion sources. The universe of information the potential for violence increases the risk and sources includes partner nations, academia, cost of available responses while constrain- private-sector companies, and social media, ing policy options and access to information. all of which often enjoy unfettered access By conducting SCA in Phase 0 and having a to the population and generate information baseline, the IC will be able to inform mili- about it as a normal activity. These informa- tary planners of potential threats and recom- tion sources can provide a wealth of informa- mend sound policy options consistent with tion, enabling analysts to develop baseline the population’s worldview and attitudes. Such assessments of populations, cultures, behav- an approach puts policy and national interests iors, and social narratives. more in line with the needs of the population When SCA methodologies and techniques to generate common achievable outcomes. are applied, strategic indications and warning This can prevent poor decisions based on can be derived from deviations in the base- a lack of information and understanding of line. These deviations can inform military and social dynamics.
Figure. The Conflict Continuum
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As conflict concludes, reconstituting a resulting in significant errors. The IC can orga- sustainable, legitimate polity becomes more nize its resources and processes to ingest SCA likely if the new institutions of state reflect into intelligence with the right framework. the values, norms, and organizing principles Integrating SCA through RSI of the population. In addition, reduced vio- lence results in greater access to the popula- The Intelligence Community has the oppor- tion through NGOs and humanitarian efforts. tunity to meet growing demands for socio- This will allow the IC to reestablish baseline cultural analysis, but requires a paradigm understandings of the population in the new describing how to resource this capability and context. This reestablished baseline allows explaining its value to foreign and military the IC to develop realistic recommendations policy. This article asserts that today’s threat informing actions to include forming a govern- environment, in which subnational actors and ment, humanitarian assistance, reconstruction complex social trends persistently undermine efforts, infrastructure development, reintegra- the state system, requires addressing budding tion and reconciliation programs, and estab- conflicts before they turn violent. Doing so lishing military and police forces. These initia- will allow the United States to better respond tives are extraordinarily complex, so the more with a wider range of policy options at lower data and knowledge that are available before cost. The conflict continuum is offered to con- a conflict, the more likely the right questions ceptualize the value of conducting SCA before and interests will be addressed after it. U.S. Special Operations Command knowledge about populations has a long shelf (USSOCOM) Commander Admiral William life given that cultures, norms, and values H. McRaven, whose forces must be culturally change only gradually attuned in the fight against extremists, recently stated, “Clearly, we need to continue to improve our understanding and respect for other cul- crises manifest. Additionally, the reconnais- tures, improve our language capability and sance, surveillance, and intelligence (RSI) cultivate our ability to build relationships.”13 framework is suggested to integrate whole of Hard lessons over the past decade demonstrate nation resources for understanding threats the costs associated with building govern- to populations, their states, and national ment institutions that fail to coincide with and interests.15 RSI is a paradigm codeveloped by take into account the population’s ontology USSOCOM’s Matthew Puls and U.S. Army (worldview, identity, norms, and narratives). Training and Doctrine Command G2’s Dr. As Admiral McRaven notes, “Enduring suc- Kira Hutchinson for incorporating existing cess is achieved by proper application of indi- sociocultural analysis resources into the intel- rect operations, with an emphasis in building ligence process.16 In contrast to intelligence, partner-nation capacity and mitigating the con- surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), which ditions that make populations susceptible to is generally perishable (find, fix, finish), RSI extremist ideologies.”14 But discovering when, suggests that a long-term research perspective where, how, and why to apply that influence is necessary for learning about populations cannot occur in the midst of conflict without (understand, analyze, engage). Populations
PRISM 3, no. 4 Features | 19 Flynn, sisco, and ellis
are, under normal conditions, easily discover- 0 environments. Social scientists will be par- able and available, so national, international, ticularly important given their innate desire allied, and private-sector resources can come and skill sets. The IC will have to employ its to know them at relatively low cost. Moreover, own professionals in order to ask the right knowledge about populations has a long shelf questions and translate the professional jar- life given that cultures, norms, and values gon into digestible intelligence. change only gradually. The RSI paradigm provides the IC with a In the notional RSI process, the recon- means of conceptualizing how to efficiently naissance phase is dedicated to understand- integrate population-centric information into ing the world as seen, experienced, valued, the intelligence process. It also suggests the and practiced by the population. Long-term types of personnel and relationships that will reconnaissance allows a sense of what is “nor- need to be cultivated to address new threats. mal” to be assessed for a population. During With a deeper understanding about popula- the surveillance phase, changes in the baseline tions, the IC will be able during the surveil- can be detected through a multitude of social lance and intelligence phases to more accu- science methods. When the changes are deter- rately analyze how contemporary threats will mined to merit further attention, intelligence likely impact populations and identify means activity can begin to clarify what the changes for counteracting them when they are poten- indicate, determine whether a threat appears tially harmful. But the process begins with a likely, and suggest how national assets might robust reconnaissance capability before threats shape events. manifest themselves. Conclusion sociocultural analysis is now an indispensable component of intelligence, and the Intelligence Sociocultural analysis is now an indispens- Community can improve upon its already able component of intelligence, and the impressive gains Intelligence Community can improve upon its already impressive gains. The qualified character of sovereignty in many countries is As the conflict continuum illustrates, rendering the IC’s traditional mechanisms and the lowest costs and greatest opportunities processes for developing information on pop- associated with generating knowledge about ulations and nonstate actors inadequate. The populations occur well before conflict or ten- task ahead, therefore, is to develop the social sions rise. The reconnaissance phase fits per- radar to warn policymakers of and inform fectly with this perspective, but it requires them how to keep potential crises left of bang. integrating professional population research- Due to looming budget constraints, some ers into the information-collection process. in the IC believe it is time to focus on core Using nontraditional collections and analy- competencies, while others believe it is time sis avenues such as academia, polling, cen- for a paradigm shift to effectively address the sus data, and international marketing firms, complexities of globalization. These perspec- it is possible to generate the baseline under- tives are not mutually exclusive; rather, the standing of a population, especially in Phase objective is to integrate those scholarly and
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investigative assets with the right expertise and in the New Millennium (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice skill sets into the overall intelligence process in Hall, 2002), 131–136. 3 “The Failed States Index 2011,” Foreign order to understand cultures and populations. Policy, available at
PRISM 3, no. 4 Features | 21 Civilians lead Afghan National Security Forces and ISAF to IED cache
ISAF Media Evolved Irregular Threats
By Ben FitzGerald and Pia Wanek
lmost every aspect of national security is colored by uncertainty. While it would be arro- gant to consider that this moment in history carries more uncertainty than others, we A presently find ourselves facing a multiplicity of uncertainties that pull us simultaneously in different directions. Drawdown in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with the future implications of those conflicts, the ongoing events of the Arab Spring, the rise and increased assertiveness of near-peer competitors, a variety of nonstate actors with increasingly sophisticated capabil- ity, and economic crises in Europe create additional contingencies that require our attention. Simultaneously, economic uncertainty at home limits our means, requiring prioritization and the acceptance of additional risk. Analysis of trends in the operating environment and among threat groups affords national security professionals an opportunity to think more broadly in a step back from specific contin- gencies. A broader analysis can inform capability decisions in an effort to build a force capable of appropriately addressing as wide a range of contingencies as possible. The U.S. national security community is traditionally most comfortable preparing for threats emanating from near-peer competitors. This is both appropriate and important to maintain given the capability of these actors. However, a singular focus on these potential threats may leave us open to surprise from seemingly low-level threats, stymieing our ability to project power and achieve national security objectives. This article investigates the significance of a specific aspect of the future operating environment—the urban, littoral environment—and the most likely adversar- ies operating therein—advanced nonstate actors posing evolved, irregular threats.1
Ben FitzGerald is the Managing Director of Noetic Corporation. He has provided strategic advice to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Marine Corps, United Nations, and Australian Department of Defence. Pia Wanek is a Senior Consultant with the Noetic Corporation. She has worked in international humanitarian assistance and civil-military affairs for the U.S. Agency for International Development and World Vision.
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The Future Urban, Littoral Operating 468. Although the overall rates of urban growth Environment have slowed in recent years—and not all of the Five broad trends suggest a need to focus on world’s cities or 23 megacities are increasing in the urban, littoral environment. These trends numbers—it is the scope and size of the current are not exhaustive and are among many that change among the world’s growing population can be expected to enable and shape the centers, including both middle-size cities with future environment. While no single trend populations ranging from 500,000 to 10 mil- will dominate the global future, all of them lion and smaller cities with populations under have mutually reinforcing characteristics and 500,000 (where over half of population growth will influence the capabilities, priorities, and actually takes place), that continue to fuel this behavior of nonstate actors in a way that mark- trend.3 Consequently, most urban spaces exist edly reshapes the future conflict environment. in the littorals, where over three-quarters of the This article focuses on a particular threat type, world population resides and in which nearly nonstate and substate groups, and therefore all of the marketplaces and transit hubs for does not address many other threats facing the international trade exist.4 global future operating environment. With migration to urban centers along Trend 1: Rapid Urbanization in the Littoral. the coasts also on the rise, urban planners are Global urban environments and the popula- continually challenged by the risks associated tions they support are expanding rapidly with overloaded infrastructure, the impact of against the backdrop of global interconnect- climate change, environmental degradation, edness. In 1800, only 3 percent of the world’s and resource scarcity. As people move to popu- population lived in cities. By 1900, the figure lation centers, many are forced into poor areas, had increased to 13 percent, and by 2000, it was comprised of urban slums or shantytowns, 47 percent. As of April 2008, for the first time in where governance and the rule of law are weak. While smaller urban centers may gain where political systems are weak or from the growing worldwide trend of political oppressive, population growth and and administrative decentralization in which urbanization will foster instability, and national governments are devolving some of nonstate and substate actors will emerge to their powers to local governments, large urban challenge the state’s monopoly on violence centers most likely will not. Sprawling slums such as those in Karachi, Dhaka, Cairo, and Lagos and the conditions they breed may over- history, more than 50 percent of humans on the load the systems, helping fuel the vicious cycle planet live in cities, which is where over half the of disease, poverty, criminality, and political world’s gross domestic product is generated.2 unrest. Where political systems are weak or By 2030, nearly 60 percent of the world’s esti- oppressive, the combination of population mated 8.3 billion inhabitants will live in cities growth and urbanization will foster instability, or expanding megacities (those with popula- and nonstate and substate actors will emerge tions over 10 million) mostly in the developing to challenge the state’s monopoly on violence. world. In 1950, there were 83 cities with popu- As the features of the world become lations over one million. By 2007, there were more intertwined, the cascading effect of a
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crisis stemming from one of the world’s most through migrant labor and mobility, it can populated cities would be all too amenable also prompt violent nationalist backlashes. to exploitation by local actors, all of whom At the same time, migration has become an are seeking to manipulate local grievances as important component of population growth a way to tilt the status quo in their favor. In in countries in Western Europe as well as in the developing world, weak governments can- the United States and Canada where birthrates not maintain the rule of law or provide the have declined. But whether legal, illegal, or services, infrastructure, and social provisions forced, migration from developing to devel- necessary to prevent or mitigate instability, oped countries is likely to increase, potentially nor can they create the conditions necessary to aggravating governance problems and social foster and stimulate private-sector job growth. tensions. This may lead to the fragmentation While foreign direct investment may present and destabilization of communities and pos- opportunities for growth, it may also act as a sibly states as global networks of ethnic com- destabilizing factor when focused on exploit- munities, or diasporas—linked together by ative or extractive industries. In cases where information technology and shared heritage, weak governance persists and nonstate actors language, and religion—play a larger role in can outgun, co-opt, or corrupt local security international conflict and cooperation. forces, intrastate conflict may erupt and cause Trend 3: Globalized Diasporas. Diasporas widespread human suffering, prompting the are ethnic communities whose members have U.S. military to consider initiating a range of left a city or region for economic, safety, or humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and political reasons and have settled in another stabilization and reconstruction tasks along- city or region. Despite diminished physical side kinetic military operations. Because global ties, most migrants take with them the cul- societies increasingly live in littoral, networked tural aspects of their ancestral territory. The slum-cities, and warfare is in itself a social ties between groups remain strong as dispersed activity, future conflict is likely to include a populations seek out current information as substantial proportion of military operations a way to stay connected to their homelands. in such terrain. Such nostalgia creates a demand for cultural Trend 2: Cross-border Migration. The mass products and information sources that main- movement of people from rural to urban lit- tain and celebrate the links between the dias- toral spaces is only one side of the migration pora and its homeland. Resettled communi- equation. The other side involves the move- ties use modern communications technologies ment of individuals from poor countries and such as the Internet, mobile telecommunica- regions to wealthier ones and from violent and tions platforms, and the global media to close unstable countries to more stable ones. the distance between homeland and host As evidenced by Western Europe’s nation. attempts to integrate its growing Muslim The global spread of the Internet and immigrant population, these migration pat- social media affords these groups a rapid terns sometimes upset the status quo of devel- and reliable link to their home communities. oped countries. While such migration often Barely a decade ago, these linkages were slow brings economic dynamism to the host nation and scarce, supported primarily by expensive
PRISM 3, no. 4 Features | 25 Fitzgerald and wanek
international landline phone calls, periodic ■■ violence committed against host-nation and unreliable global postal services, news- installations, institutions, and populations papers, and the then fledgling and mostly by diaspora-based or -supported militant inaccessible Internet. While governments try groups. to maintain control over human movement and information flows within and across their Trend 4: Interconnectedness. The wide- borders, little can be done to prevent the spread availability and integration of facilitation and strengthening of connections advanced communications technologies are once a diaspora has settled. Thus, host-nation exponentially accelerating the pace of glo- governments are finding it increasingly diffi- balization. According to the International cult to encourage assimilation in the face of Telecommunication Union, by the end of 2010, tech-driven bottom-up globalization. Due to about 90 percent of the world population, technology innovation and access, homeland including 80 percent of the population living politics can quickly become flashpoints for in rural areas, had access to mobile networks. politically active militant diasporas engaged With an estimated 5.3 billion mobile cellular in a wide range of legal or illegal activities. subscriptions worldwide, nearly 80 percent of the global population is connected via mobile host-nation governments are finding it phone. In fact, the mobile market is reaching increasingly difficult to encourage saturation levels in developed countries, with assimilation in the face of tech-driven more subscriptions than people reported at bottom-up globalization the end of 2010. Meanwhile, the developing world increased its share of mobile subscrip- tions from roughly half to nearly three-fourths Diaspora political activity in a new home- of the population between 2005 and 2010. land may fall into the following categories: As developed and developing countries have moved from 2G to 3G platforms—and increas- ■■ virtual or physical political mobiliza- ingly to 4G wireless platforms—short message tion, recruitment, and fundraising within service (SMS), a text messaging service com- the diaspora by nonmilitant members ponent of phone, Web, and mobile commu- ■■ advocacy and lobbying efforts targeted nication systems, has become the most widely at host-nation and/or other national govern- used data application in the world. Between ments and international organizations 2007 and 2010, the number of SMSs sent glob- ally tripled from an estimated 1.8 trillion to ■■ criminal fundraising/activity to raise 6.1 trillion, meaning that close to 200,000 text money for an organization or cause messages are transmitted within and across ■■ physical intimidation of members of an societies every second. In addition to mobile ethnic community in a host nation connectivity, the number of Internet users has ■■ acts of terrorism executed against a doubled recently. Today, an estimated two bil- homeland or nonhomeland third country, lion unique users access the Web annually, and but planned, organized, or supported by growing demand for higher speed connections diaspora militant groups in a host nation is increasing at a much faster rate than it can be
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supplied.5 Whether through smart phones or disasters in unfamiliar forms and unfamiliar cloud computing, rapid communication from disasters in forms not yet imagined. one end of the globe to the other is no longer a Trend 5: Ubiquitous Media. The targeted luxury available only to highly developed states use of social and new media presents both and societies. threats and opportunities for state and non- In the future, virtually everyone will be state actors. Illustrative of this point is the connected via the Internet, mobile telecom- 2011 military action in Libya between the munications platforms, hand-held comput- rebels backed by the North Atlantic Treaty ing devices, and global media. This growth in Organization and Muammar Qadhafi’s secu- connectivity is allowing like-minded individ- rity forces. During the conflict, both sides uals, organizations, and societies to connect repeatedly distorted the facts in what could regardless of the physical distance and politi- be perceived as either weak attempts at disin- cal barriers that separate them. Globalization formation or desperate attempts at self-decep- is doing much more, however, than just flat- tion.7 The difference now as compared to the tening the world by eliminating restrictions initial stage of the information revolution is on the flow of ideas and information within the speed, reach, and scope of communica- and across societies. It is also creating tightly interconnected networks of infrastructures globalization is creating tightly interconnected and markets that are transforming economies, networks of infrastructures and markets that businesses, and the daily lives of billions of are transforming economies, businesses, and people. The interaction of globalization and the daily lives of billions of people communication technology diffusion will impact warfare’s diversity as emerging threat groups learn to exploit the world’s exploding tion platforms. While cell phones and email social and economic cohesion. In some cases, reach hundreds of people in a day, Twitter, borders that were formerly defined by poli- Facebook, and the journalists who use these tics will be increasingly fragmented by newer media can reach thousands who, in turn, can concepts including economic pacts such as reach tens or hundreds of thousands more. the BRIC nations (Brazil, Russia, India, and The use of social and international media to China) or the Organization of the Petroleum influence local and global civilian populations Exporting Countries, and by others with is changing relationship dynamics between ancient ties based on history, ethnicity, reli- states and their citizenry as well as the accept- gion, language, and culture.6 In the future stra- able norms of conflict. tegic environment, interconnected societies, In the future strategic environment, armed economies, and critical infrastructure will pres- nonstate actors may use social and new media ent themselves as targets of opportunity prone in different ways to achieve strategic, opera- to shocks and disruptions through attacks on tional, and tactical ends. These include but are flows of capital, energy, commerce, and com- not limited to: munications. Such global interconnectedness will bring together opportunities and vulner- ■■ organizing and inciting political and abilities in creative ways to produce familiar social activism
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■■ mining for open-source information on personnel who will inevitably find themselves potential targets in situations they have not been trained or equipped for. The threats emanating from these ■■ promoting positive self-images while portraying the opposition in a negative light urban centers use this terrain as the source of their power, a capability generator, and a force ■■ reporting on foreign military operations multiplier. Seeking to influence their behavior as they are conducted will require an ability to influence their envi- ■■ shaping the narrative or perception of a ronment. military operation/conflict The Threat ■■ applying pressure on local and foreign governments. During the course of the past two decades, nonstate or substate actors have developed Ignoring this problem to focus purely on highly effective capability along a spectrum near-peer threats—or seeking to state as a mat- of competitive control from coercive (com- ter of policy or as a tenet of planning that we bat capabilities) through administrative (gov- will not fight in urban terrain—is unrealistic, as ernance and social service capabilities) into evidenced in recent operations. Furthermore, it persuasive means (political and propaganda limits our ability to project power in the future. capabilities).8 Competitive control theory is And it does a significant disservice to military depicted in the figure. Figure. Competitive Control Theory
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For the purposes of this analysis, Hizballah able to further augment their capability with provides an excellent case study as a group that support from state sponsors. has proven successful along the full-capabil- The Future Threat ities spectrum. In addition to Hizballah, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and Thinking through a hypothetical scenario can Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) (focusing mostly on be beneficial in order to understand the poten- LeT’s November 2008 Mumbai attacks) operate tial actions and capabilities of threat groups along different, narrower swaths of the spec- and the ways in which they will interact with trum, and serve to deepen a baseline capabili- their operating environment.9 ties analysis. LeT in particular is a group rec- Consider a large port city in Southeast Asia ognized as highly successful in the combat (or in 2025. A major shipping hub, this city also coercive) domain, but when engaging in expe- has a successful semiconductor and electron- ditionary operations, such as those in Mumbai, ics industry and burgeoning light manufactur- it is brittle and vulnerable to tactics and capa- ing. It is home to many expatriates, including bilities outside its decidedly kinetic comfort Americans, working for international corpo- zone. These groups are notable not only for rations. Despite strength in some economic their ability to innovate and shape-shift rap- sectors, development has been uneven with idly to changing conditions on the battlefield, one ethnic group dominating the political but also for their ability to move, operate, and scene and deriving the majority of economic breed among local and global communities, benefit. With the impact of two civil wars still fading into and out of complex physical and human terrain while employing various politi- a baseline knowledge and analysis of cal, ideological, economic, diplomatic, and established irregular groups can inform military means in pursuit of their objectives. analysis on how similar groups might A baseline knowledge and analysis of the operate in the future capabilities (including vulnerabilities and requirements) and centers of gravity of these established, lethal, irregular groups, general- in the memory of older citizens, a domestic ized into how they operate in the current envi- nonstate actor now serves the interests of the ronment, can inform analysis on how similar city’s second largest ethnic group, which is not groups might operate in the future. feeling the economic largesse that the elites are If so much capability is available today, enjoying. This large substate threat group, given what will such groups be capable of by 2025? the fictitious name Dardallah in this scenario, Given the current success of developing capa- has matured from its anarchic beginnings as a bility across a spectrum of control, irregu- formidable and creative guerrilla organization lar threat groups are likely to continue with and possesses significant capabilities across the this approach. With broader trends of tech- spectrum of control, a summary of which is nological advancement in the commercial shown below. sphere, some groups can be expected to inject advanced technology in specific areas to mul- Coercive (Combat) tiply their effectiveness. Other groups will be ■■ elite commandos at sea and on land
PRISM 3, no. 4 Features | 29 Fitzgerald and wanek
■■ artillery and indirect fire capability (pre- heavily on the support of a third-country state cision-guided munitions) sponsor. This small but lethal group, given the
■■ mines and improvised explosive devices fictitious name Jovani Brigade, successfully (IEDs) executes a spectacular attack, assassinating the nation’s president. The resulting turmoil within ■■ drones, semi-autonomous systems, min- the state’s security forces calls into question the iaturization, and artificial intelligence ability of the weak government to maintain ■■ rapid hardware/software generation and security and retain its slim grip on authority. regeneration Such an attack is well within the group’s capa-
■■ autonomous targeting/intelligence, sur- bility, as outlined below in a list of their capa- veillance, and reconnaissance/command bilities across the spectrum of control. and control Coercive (Combat) ■■ access to remote support virtual and ■■ superior adaptability, rapid prototype physical networks. fielding, and reverse engineering Administrative (Governance/Social Services) ■■ spectacular attacks (without mitigation ■■ knowledge and capacity to conduct eco- by social or value constraints) nomic warfare ■■ excellent expeditionary maritime capa- ■■ multiple, legitimate businesses, includ- bilities ing those that operate the city port ■■ training and resources from a state-level ■■ social service delivery, charity, and entre- sponsor preneurial organizations ■■ sophisticated time-delayed explosives ■■ distinct, mutually beneficial relationships ■■ exceptional innovative capacity. with business and banking communities
■■ parallel law enforcement and legal sys- tem to maintain law and order. Administrative (Governance/Social Services) ■■ extensive human intelligence network of Persuasive (Political/Propaganda) informants, indoctrinated and proliferated ■■ mobile communications/information via religious/education establishments networks and platforms ■■ deliberate capitalization on weak host- ■■ false flag operations and information nation state services provided for ethnic, exploitation cultural, and religious kin, and offer alter- ■■ use of social and conventional media to natives. control and manipulate narratives Persuasive (Political/Propaganda) ■■ established relations with diaspora. ■■ false flag operations and information exploitation Within this complex context, a separate nonstate actor seeks to create instability in order ■■ use of social and conventional media to to achieve its own political objectives, drawing control and manipulate narratives
30 | Features PRISM 3, no. 4 Evolved irregular threats
■■ “suicide through fighting,” leading to Despite losing over half its force in the widespread lethality assassination operation, the Jovani Brigade
■■ terrorist motivation—ability to invoke has been able to regroup and has been fur- fear in target population and undermine ther tasked by its state sponsor to stay in place, confidence in security forces’ response. reconstitute, and plan follow-on operations aimed at further destabilizing the situation. With the rapid deterioration of secu- The ultimate objective is to force an extended rity following the assassination, the U.S. closure of the port, cutting off international Ambassador requests a noncombatant evacu- trade, and crippling the local economy. Attacks ation operation (NEO) to evacuate American that embarrass the United States are a major citizens and select host- and third-country secondary objective. nationals. An Amphibious Readiness Group/ Although some tension exists between the Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG/MEU) is security arm of the local group and U.S. forces, tasked and responds. In addition to the evac- the NEO progresses well. U.S. forces estab- uation mission, the ARG/MEU commander lish assembly areas at appropriate locations is cautioned to avoid becoming embroiled throughout the city, operating in a distributed in local security matters and to avoid esca- manner to process individuals and provide lating the conflict. Despite concerns about safe passage out of the country. Things change antiaccess/area-denial threats, the ARG/ dramatically when video emerges online that MEU receives unopposed access to the city’s port. Commanders are aware of the complex commanders do not have the means to rapidly dynamic that they are entering but do not have vet the individuals they must work with to the means to rapidly vet the individuals they achieve the mission must work with to achieve the mission. In the initial phase of the operation, U.S. forces work with both government forces and is quickly picked up by mainstream inter- representatives of the Dardallah, the well- national media showing U.S. forces raiding established domestic nonstate actor that is a home and allegedly massacring unarmed providing security across most of the north- women and children. This is combined with ern parts of the city. While awkward and tense credible reports that U.S. forces have occupied given the thinly veiled contempt these armed a girls’ school and are mistreating the students, groups have for each other, this approach who are primarily from Dardallah communi- is initially acceptable since neither group ties. It will emerge some days later that this involved wants to engage in a major conflict, footage was created and subtly distributed by particularly since the city is still in turmoil fol- the Jovani Brigade and has no basis in fact. lowing the assassination, whose perpetrators, An angry mob descends on the girls’ the Jovani Brigade, are still at large. Dardallah school, which is being used as an assembly is deriving considerable prestige and revenue area by a platoon of U.S. forces. Dardallah’s from their association with U.S. forces, so it is armed forces feel compelled to raid the school willing to allow them access to their “territory” to protect the girls, who are allegedly being in the northern part of the city. abused, and to maintain their credibility in
PRISM 3, no. 4 Features | 31 Fitzgerald and wanek
the face of the agitated mob. The situation Additionally, enemy groups are at times oper- quickly deteriorates. ating in local security force uniforms and A quick reaction force is dispatched to vehicles and may even be members of the provide support to the isolated platoon. local security forces. U.S. commanders on However, this force comes under frequent the ground are compelled to make an ongo- attack from remotely triggered IEDs previ- ing series of unpalatable decisions. If desired, ously emplaced by the Jovani Brigade and they can bring sufficient firepower to bear to supported by an observer drone. The iso- address almost any given threat. However, that lated platoon is able to maintain its perim- further escalates a conflict the United States eter but comes under sustained, accurate does not want to be involved in. At the same indirect fire from precision munitions. Air time, the safety of American citizens and mili- support is turned back by these fires and by tary personnel is paramount and significant swarms of different unmanned aerial vehicles losses will likely trigger a major troop deploy- (UAVs) with indeterminate capability. The ment that places the United States at risk of port is closed, and while attempts at attack- becoming responsible for ongoing stabiliza- ing and boarding U.S. vessels in port are eas- tion operations. ily repelled, accurate rocket fire, UAVs, and Implications attacks from small boats force the sea base farther offshore, degrading the U.S. ability to A variety of hypothetical strategic and oper- provide meaningful support to forces ashore. ational approaches could be employed Local government security forces attempt to resolve this hypothetical conundrum. to support the U.S. forces but are ineffectual. However, the ultimate purpose here is to better Scott Randall Scott
Slum in Dhaka, Bangladesh
32 | Features PRISM 3, no. 4 Evolved irregular threats
understand the future operating environment, further allow potential enemy groups to develop enemy capability, and the implications for U.S. capability. The current adaptation competition forces. Several implications and observations around IEDs is the most obvious example of derived from this analysis are listed below. As this dynamic and its implications in both com- with the majority of futures-based analysis, bat effect and cost asymmetry. Existing evidence many of these phenomena can already be seen of groups such as Hizballah and LTTE develop- in today’s world but will grow in frequency, ing or adapting drone capability, submarines, significance, and impact over time. They range armor, and the ability to hack satellites indicates from the philosophical to the practical and the probability of an even more heavily con- cannot easily be considered in a single frame- tested capability battle in the future. In a stra- work or context. tegic sense, evolving technology trends suggest What Is the Battlespace? Globally distrib- uted and highly connected national and ethnic globally distributed and highly connected groups are forcing changes to current thinking national and ethnic groups are forcing changes on what defines the battlespace. Tactical kinetic to current thinking on what defines the action is readily understood, but a number battlespace of other factors remain in a gray area, con- sidered by some to be part of the battlespace and by others to be off limits in terms of deci- that military innovation is increasingly lagging sive action. There are multifaceted challenges behind commercial investment and develop- involved when evaluating where an enemy ment.10 What this means in a practical sense for group’s funding is coming from, or countering current and future irregular threat groups is that the information operations of a threat group, technologies currently exist or are being devel- or when a group’s leadership is based (or spon- oped in the open-access space that will empower sored) in one or more third countries leading them in ways that were unavailable, and indeed to remote command and control. Attempts to unimaginable, to even large state actors a gen- disrupt logistical lines, upset port operations, eration ago. Unencumbered by large bureau- or provoke protests in countries that host large cracies and with an imperative to adapt or face diaspora populations would have a direct annihilation, irregular threat groups will likely impact on the battlespace. Nonstate and sub- continue to out-adapt government forces. state actors will continue to take advantage of Information (as the Locus of) Operations. these seams, which take the concept of a non- Increased connectedness and sophisticated contiguous battlespace and expand it around information technology do not equal situ- the globe. It remains to be seen whether exist- ational awareness. In a complex and noncon- ing definitions of theater, strategic, and tactical tiguous battlespace, the importance of infor- battlespace will remain sufficiently meaning- mation operations increases even beyond ful to allow military professionals to effectively the significance realized in the past 10 years. untangle the multiple “fronts” in enemy action Information objectives will be the nucleus and frame appropriate responses. of operations and specific actions. False flag Adaptive Enemy Capability Development. operations, information manipulation, and Increasingly sophisticated technology will the intentional spread of misinformation will
PRISM 3, no. 4 Features | 33 Fitzgerald and wanek
form the core of a persistent battle that goes In some cases, technology employed as part beyond social media, contested narratives, and of a blue force operation may be utilized by perception to include the commencement or threat groups. This will deter or make impos- cessation of kinetic activity based purely on sible jamming activity from a technologically activity undertaken in the information space. superior government force. Success in the physical world will not translate The Impossibility of Situational Awareness. into overall victory if not supported by success- Given the complexity of the human, physical, ful information operations. and informational terrain, requirements for Critical Infrastructure. Nonstate and situational awareness will grow to become substate actors will continue to seek to cre- even more demanding. Situational aware- ate niche critical infrastructure of their own ness includes an understanding of the threat (for example, fiber optic networks and radio as well as the political, social, and physical relays) that serve legitimate public needs and elements of the environment. This requires enable clandestine activity. Established sub- the ability to understand relationships across state groups have demonstrated the ability a diaspora community, state sponsors, and to create charitable and/or entrepreneurial regional tensions, and the implications of organizations that are used to raise funds those in the tactical battlespace. This is in addition to the extant and growing require- given the complexity of the human, physical, ment to be able to understand and navigate and informational terrain, requirements for the geographic, cultural, and language reali- situational awareness will grow to become ties of the tactical battlespace. The urban, lit- even more demanding toral operating environment is too complex to track all of these elements simultaneously and continuously and would present instant infor- via licit means and to inculcate populations mation overload to almost any existing staff. to their cause by augmenting or replacing Recent conflicts have reiterated that, par- the insufficient services of a host nation. In ticularly in the first hours and days, it is nearly a sobering trend, the global illicit economy impossible to accurately separate good local has continued to deepen and expand in reach partners from bad ones when rapidly deploy- and effectiveness, leading to a twisted web of ing U.S. forces into an environment marked transnational criminal organizations and ter- by complexity in many overlapping domains. rorist groups working together along multiple A frequent and urgent need is to provide for- pathways. ward-deployed military units with support Technology “Hugging.” Nonstate and sub- from virtual teams of intelligence analysts state actors will seek to protect their technol- who would be able to process separate streams ogy base via technology “hugging,” that is, of open-source and traditional intelligence, by piggybacking on broadly available public thereby rapidly delivering a combined and assets. This may be in the form of capitaliz- more comprehensive intelligence product to ing on the public Internet or freely available military commanders. All efforts to increase government assets, global positioning sys- the situational awareness of deployed forces tem (GPS), or mobile technology platforms. while simultaneously creating a force that
34 | Features PRISM 3, no. 4 Evolved irregular threats
can succeed without ever truly achieving situ- strikes on a sea base were deemed unlikely ational awareness must continue. to succeed, but the ability to push assets far- Flexible Expeditionary Contracting. One ther offshore, thereby impacting frequency mechanism to rapidly develop situational and time on target for sea-based support, was awareness is to hire vetted local expertise, deemed exceptionally simple. This allowed such as through embassies or other trusted enemy forces to isolate U.S. forces and deny sources. Current contracting approaches and them access to combat support and combined mechanisms lack both the flexibility and rigor arms in an attempt to create overmatch. to appropriately support deployed forces oper- Operationally, this approach left U.S. ating against irregular forces in an urban, lit- forces on the horns of a dilemma. On one toral environment. Future forces will require side, U.S. forces would sustain significant a range of innovative approaches to rapidly casualties, allowing enemy forces to claim acquire materials, knowledge, and vetted “victory” or forcing a potential large-scale personnel in distant environments in order deployment of forces and, conceivably, a long- to accomplish missions on short notice, cost term commitment. The alternative would effectively, and with a small footprint. To sup- be for U.S. forces to apply significant lethal port future warfighter needs, this contracting force leading to civilian casualties and inter- capability should include the ability to hire national condemnation. This ultimately led both providers of security services, such as to a desire to develop concepts allowing for a armed personnel to protect private property, fighting withdrawal that protected U.S. inter- assets, and individuals, and service contrac- ests, supported operational objectives, and tors who handle duties other than security, denied the enemy a propaganda victory. The such as logistics, transport, linguistics, con- presence of a few thousand American citizens struction, and some intelligence analysis. and other civilian noncombatants requiring Any such solution would, of course, protection and evacuation placed U.S. forces require improvements in situational aware- in a sobering quandary of trying to quickly ness and rapid analysis as well as strong determine acceptable ways to “fight their way oversight to guard against abuse by friendly out” among an increasing number of agitated or enemy forces and to understand the sec- local civilians in a security environment that ond- and third-order effects of contracting was rapidly deteriorating. with given groups. Thinking About Nonlethal Weapons. A Joint Forcible Exit. Antiaccess/area-denial sophisticated and highly lethal adversary oper- capabilities are of increasing concern for U.S. ating within a densely populated urban envi- forces. Working through our hypothetical sce- ronment points to a need for an advanced suite nario, enemy groups did not employ these of nonlethal capability. Because most future capabilities for large-scale denial activities. military operations will be conducted under the Rather, U.S. forces were allowed to freely enter constant spotlight of local and global opinion, the area of operations. When kinetic opera- U.S. warfighters will be expected to integrate tions commenced, these capabilities were used and apply a wide range of lethal and nonlethal to deny U.S. forces access to tactical airspace capabilities in order to avoid civilian casualties and severely limit ground mobility. Effective and damage to the urban infrastructure.
PRISM 3, no. 4 Features | 35 Fitzgerald and wanek
Current nonlethal capability focuses on loop of tactical lessons learned, concept devel- the ability to actively change the behavior of opment, experimentation, and training to a single individual or small group. There are motivate U.S. adaptation to new threats dur- few options for passive systems or capability to ing a single deployment. address larger groups. Most importantly, there Third, the Department of Defense can is the paucity of operationally meaningful con- take advantage of new and continued part- cepts of operation to support current or future nerships and collaborative exercises with sci- investments in nonlethal technical solutions. entists, engineers, and industry to encourage and accelerate the emergence of commercial Counterproliferation technologies that simultaneously meet defense Given future enemies’ likely ability to needs. Although the U.S. military is likely to undertake adaptive capability development, maintain its technical and tactical dominance U.S. forces will require a sophisticated in the emerging and future strategic environ- tiered mitigation approach in responding to ment, the use of increasingly accessible, mul- these capabilities. Three related categories tipurpose, and lethal technologies by non- of effort described below extend the idea of state actors will give an entirely new meaning counterproliferation from its traditional focus to “plug and play,” leading to greater tactical on weapons of mass destruction. proficiency for the enemy. First, from a counterproliferation perspec- Without deliberate acknowledgment of tive, there is acceptance that little can be done the importance of all three of these tracks, particularly with an eye to emerging capabili- the number and range of future threat ties that impact the governance and informa- permutations should be expected to be highly tional spheres, the gap between how “red” varied and increasingly lethal adapts as compared to “blue” can be expected to widen. Conclusion to prevent the spread of advanced multi-use technologies such as GPS and various com- When future conflict occurs, it is highly munication encryption devices. However, with unlikely that it will look like either the “con- technology increasingly being produced not ventional” conflicts of the 20th century or only by individual states and companies but recent counterinsurgency conflicts. Whatever also by combinations of actors and organiza- the realities of evolved irregular threats and tions, the U.S. Government can improve its urban littoral combat in 2025, the historical ability to target or exploit illicit cooperative antecedents of that reality will be visible in arrangements and pathways through multiple the circumstances of today. capability pathway interdiction. Given the present rate of technological Second, mitigation requires the United change and shifting geopolitical power, the States to maintain its competitive advantage number and range of future threat permuta- in employing combined arms across multiple tions should be expected to be highly varied domains in the urban littoral battlespace. In and increasingly lethal. The United States this sense, mitigation includes a continuous cannot afford to optimize for one-threat
36 | Features PRISM 3, no. 4 Evolved irregular threats
profile. Threats from near-peer competitors, intellectual guidance of Dr. David Kilcullen. The article for example, cannot be ignored or become the is based on an internal report, authored by Kyle Flynn of Noetic, as well as the experience of the authors in sole focus of national security professionals. developing and running the project. Serious attention and investment must also 2 “Urban World: Mapping the Economic Power of be given to the evolving capability of irregular Cities,” McKinsey Global Institute, March 2011. 3 threats and their most likely operating envi- United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “World Urbanization Prospects: The 2009 ronment, the urban littoral. Impending fis- Revision,” available at
1 This article is based on the findings of an Office of the Secretary of Defense–funded project under the stewardship of Colonel Patrick Kelleher, USMC, on behalf of the Rapid Reaction Technology Office. The project was undertaken by Noetic Corporation, with the
PRISM 3, no. 4 Features | 37 Afghan National Police cheer for commander after training in Kabul during heavy snow
U.S. Army (Lester B. Colley) Challenges of Developing Host Nation Police Capacity
By James K. Wither
tability operations embrace a wide range of civil-military missions in fragile or conflict- affected states, and they range from traditional peacekeeping to combat with well-armed Sinsurgents or criminal elements. Often different activities, including combat, policing, humanitarian assistance, and reconstruction, occur concurrently in the theater of operations. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has described these operations as:
military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitar- ian relief.1
Establishing the rule of law is a key strategic objective of stability operations. In states plagued by conflict or where the government is discredited or lacking, the maintenance of law and order may fall to foreign military and police intervention forces. These contingents must impose and maintain order in the absence of the effective national and local police forces that would perform this task in stable, functioning states. They must also train and mentor indigenous police forces to enable the transition from conflict to normalcy that will allow foreign forces to withdraw. Military forces are often essential to create the initial security conditions that allow the civil- ian components of a stability operation to build a durable peace. However, armed forces are not intrinsically suited to police work. Soldiers are trained to apply lethal force in war. Military force can have a deterrent effect on militias and criminal gangs, but the deployment of soldiers in a law enforcement role sometimes leads to excessive violence, which invariably alienates the local population and provokes armed resistance. Some militaries can and do perform effectively in a policing role, but their efforts are ultimately intended to buy time for the development of host nation police capabilities. As the latest British counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine acknowl- edges, “where armed forces have to act to support the civil authority they should transfer such
James K. Wither is Professor of National Security Studies at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. He is a retired British Army Officer and former Researcher in 20th Century Warfare at the Imperial War Museum, London.
PRISM 3, no. 4 Features | 39 Wither
security responsibilities to the civil police as soon This article addresses the challenges of as conditions allow. Any sense of permanent policing UN and coalition stability opera- presence by allies or partners is likely to be tions and assesses efforts to achieve host exploited by insurgents and critics from home nation police primacy, defined as a situation and abroad.”2 where indigenous police forces have the main In a postconflict situation, effective polic- responsibility for internal security and main- ing helps to keep violence at a manageable tenance of the rule of law. It offers a broad level and can build public confidence in the perspective by identifying and discussing stabilization process so large-scale military reoccurring problems that have beset polic- force does not have to be employed. It is not ing operations and assessing national and surprising, therefore, that the number of police international efforts to make better use of deployed in United Nations (UN) peace sup- foreign and host nation police assets. It rec- port operations has increased dramatically ognizes that reform and reconstruction of the judiciary, justice department, and penal armed forces are not intrinsically system are also essential to establish and suited to police work maintain the rule of law, but a discussion of these functions is beyond the scope of this article. since the end of the Cold War. UN policing Police Roles in Stability Operations roles in the early 1990s were limited to moni- toring, observing, and reporting on indigenous The division of tasks between police and mili- police services, but in the last 15 years, polic- tary forces and the composition and role of ing operations have become increasingly com- police forces vary according to mission-specific plex with the requirement to undertake exec- factors, such as the mission mandate, threat utive policing functions and often the major environment, condition of indigenous secu- reform of local police services. rity institutions, and availability of foreign Despite the increase in activity, build- manpower and expertise. On major stabiliza- ing the capacity of indigenous police has tion missions, police operate alongside mili- often proved problematic. In Afghanistan, tary forces, ideally establishing an effective for instance, rapid expansion, inadequate functional relationship while maintaining a training, and insufficient resources created separate operational profile. Depending on an Afghan National Police (ANP) that lacked the nature of the operation, foreign deployed capability, legitimacy, and integrity and was police may perform tasks that include: plagued by problems of corruption, high desertion rates, illiteracy, and drug abuse.3 ■■ advice to host nation police services Although the East Timor operation (1994– ■■ training and mentoring to build local 2004) is regarded overall as a UN success police capacity story, the police capacity-building program has been described as hampered by “slipshod ■■ executive law enforcement functions planning, squandered opportunities and such as public order, riot control, criminal unimaginative leadership.”4 investigations, and intelligence-gathering
40 | Features PRISM 3, no. 4 Challenges of developing police capacity
■■ establishment of new host nation police compensate for these deficiencies and pro- services vide valuable human intelligence. The use of
■■ support to military forces against terror- indigenous police to arrest violent elements ists and insurgents. seeking to disrupt the stabilization process can reinforce the criminal nature of these Law enforcement is the most important activities, while the employment of soldiers in function of the civil police, but this function this capacity may reinforce a local perception represents a particular challenge during sta- that acts of violence are legitimate resistance bility operations. Postconflict situations are against foreign occupation. Unfortunately, in often chaotic, and the presence of insurgents many fragile states, police quality is poor and and armed criminal gangs can cause foreign officers are unpopular with the people they and indigenous police forces to be diverted are supposed to serve. A survey conducted in to address high-end threats, thereby limiting Iraq in 2006 found that 75 percent of Iraqis their effectiveness in dealing with basic crime did not trust the police enough to tip them prevention and law enforcement at a local off to insurgent activity.6 Local police may level. Population control and protection are have to be judiciously recruited, trained, and important police functions during all stability monitored by foreign law enforcement offi- operations. These tasks require a high level of cers before they can operate independently. skill and robustness as they can include public Patience and perseverance, as well as a broader order management tasks such as riot control, political will to stay the course, are essential. maintenance of checkpoints, and enforce- A premature attempt to establish host nation ment of curfews. Formed units of paramilitary police, such as the Italian Carabinieri, are nor- local police may have to be judiciously mally better suited for these roles than soldiers recruited, trained, and monitored by foreign law because the former are trained to deal with enforcement officers before they can operate public order issues and the discrete applica- independently tion of force. For example, during the Albanian riots against Serbs in Kosovo in March 2004, the response by Kosovo Force soldiers proved police primacy can jeopardize wider progress woefully inadequate; most national military toward security and normalcy. In summer contingents were not trained, equipped, or 2005, for example, the British army prema- mandated to deal with civil disorder.5 turely handed over responsibility for urban Police also have a crucial role in intel- security in Maysan Province to the Iraqi ligence-gathering. The role of intelligence police. The number, training, and motivation in the context of stability operations ranges of the police were inadequate, and the force from an awareness of local problems with could not maintain civil order. The resulting essential services, governance, and crime to security vacuum assisted the growth of Mahdi information about insurgents and their sup- army militias with links to Iran.7 port networks. Foreign deployed police often The UN Department for Peacekeeping lack local knowledge, cultural awareness, Operations (DPKO) has long stressed the and language skills. Host nation police can need for “democratic policing,” recognizing
PRISM 3, no. 4 Features | 41 Wither
that a responsive and accountable local police and trained by DynCorp International and force defending basic human rights is essen- under contract from the State Department, tial for a successful transition to long-term had arrived in theater. Moreover, the main and sustainable security.8 Building such an U.S. coalition partner, the United Kingdom indigenous police capacity requires special (UK), had not included professional police training for police officers seconded by donor in its postconflict planning. Consequently, countries as it involves skills outside normal British training efforts remained inadequately police work including mentoring, advising, staffed and resourced, and the hastily trained training, and consulting. The United Nations local police in southern Iraq remained weak and other international institutions struggle to and corrupt. The UN Kosovo operation in recruit sufficient police officers with appropri- 1999 also included a robust police mandate ate skills for this vital work, and many do not with executive authority to conduct investiga- receive appropriate or effective predeployment tions, make arrests, and mentor a new Kosovo training.9 police service, but the slow pace of recruitment and deployment of UN police allowed ethnic Reoccurring Policing Problems Albanians to carry out reprisals against eth- Common policing problems have blighted nic Serbs and for organized criminal gangs to successive stability operations. Often, foreign become established.11 police do not deploy in sufficient numbers Unfortunately, experienced and deploy- or early enough to prevent a rise in criminal able police are in short supply, and the pro- activity and public disorder in the host coun- cess of police mobilization takes much longer try. Efforts to train and mentor host nation than the deployment of a comparable number police forces tend to be insufficiently tailored of military personnel. In contrast to military to local requirements. They sometimes empha- units, police personnel in developed coun- size rapid throughput to get boots on the tries are employed in law enforcement duties ground rather than an investment in long-term in peacetime, and foreign deployment leads quality policing. Capacity-building programs to vacant positions in domestic police forces. for indigenous police forces are also often During a conference in 2000, European Union obstructed by poor coordination among the (EU) members established a Headline Goal plethora of national and international agen- of 5,000 police for stability operations. This cies involved. included a rapid reaction force of 1,000 that Planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom would be deployable within 30 days. Despite made no provision for an international police these commitments, it proved difficult to find force, not least because senior U.S. officials just 650 police to deploy on EU police mis- assumed that Iraqi state institutions would sions to Bosnia and Macedonia in 2003.12 remain largely intact. In May 2003, the U.S. Similar tardiness has characterized contribu- Department of Justice belatedly called for tions to the European Police Mission (EUPOL) the deployment of 6,600 international police in Afghanistan since 2007. advisors and 2,500 paramilitary police to help Some major countries such as the United coalition forces maintain order.10 By June States and United Kingdom have no national 2004, fewer than 300 police advisors, recruited police force. Therefore, the deployment of
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serving officers requires the consent of state police training, Germany established a police or local political and police authorities, suit- academy in 2002 to provide university-level able available volunteers, and their selection training for senior police officers and a shorter and training for missions in a more danger- program for noncommissioned officers. These ous than normal policing environment. In the programs, although of high quality, were based United Kingdom, the provision of police sup- on a European model for professional police port depends on the agreement of chief con- training that was unrealistic given the size of stables from up to 53 separate police authori- Afghanistan and the security situation there.14 ties. The United States has over 17,000 state Attempts by the U.S. State Department to cre- and local agencies, as well as 9 major Federal ate a Western-style police force in Iraq in 2003 law enforcement agencies. Funding for each were similarly bedeviled by the total absence mission has to be approved by Congress, after of a normal professional police culture in which the State Department contracts corpo- the Iraqi police service (IPS). Authors David rations such as DynCorp to recruit, deploy, Bayley and Robert Perito aptly summarized the and manage police officers. The United States generic problem: “in mission after mission . . . has an additional constraint: the Foreign training programs have been put in place like Assistance Act of 1974 restricts expenditure on canned food that is assumed to be universally assistance to foreign police forces. During the nourishing. In complex environments, how- UN mission to Somalia (1992–1995), it took ever, one size doesn’t fit all.”15 6 months for the State Department to obtain funding from Congress and the necessary the training process for local police forces has Presidential waiver under Section 660 of the often been rushed on the assumption that large act to allow a new Somali national police force numbers of hastily trained recruits would prove to be trained. By the time personnel from the sufficient International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program deployed, the situation in Somalia had deteriorated to such an extent A tendency to emphasize the quantity that their program had to be abandoned. rather than the quality of indigenous police The training of host nation police rarely has exacerbated the situation. Adequate num- stems from an effective in-country train- bers are important to impose and enforce ing needs analysis. Therefore, standardized security, but police forces must also be trained (Western) training models are imposed with- to behave in a manner that gains the confi- out sufficient regard for local circumstances. dence of the population and reinforces gov- This criticism is endorsed by Ann Phillips, ernment legitimacy. The training process for former director of the Marshall Center’s pro- local police forces has often been rushed on gram in Security, Stability, Transition and the assumption that large numbers of hastily Reconstruction. She laments the continued trained recruits would prove sufficient regard- tendency to focus on technical law enforce- less of local law enforcement conditions, cul- ment skills rather than basic governance issues ture, and history. In Afghanistan, for instance, when training and mentoring indigenous basic police training was cut from 8 to 6 weeks police services.13 As lead nation for Afghan in order to get police numbers on the ground
PRISM 3, no. 4 Features | 43 Wither
to support COIN efforts.16 Poor training has are the first individuals targeted by peace certainly contributed to high ANP attrition “spoilers.” Dennis Keller of the U.S. Army rates. Similar problems arose in Iraq. In late War College criticizes police training policy 2003, the U.S. Government ordered military because of a general failure to distinguish commanders to institute a mass hiring pro- between the need for both “stability policing,” gram for the IPS with slogans such as “30,000 which necessitates a force with paramilitary in 30 days.” This initiative helped to resolve capabilities, and “community-based policing,” some short-term Iraqi employment prob- which requires police officers with peacetime lems but did nothing to ensure the develop- law enforcement skills. For Keller, decisions ment of an effective police service. A Justice on the timing and manner of the transition Department basic training program based at from one form of policing to the other are of the International Police Training Center in critical importance.20 Lieutenant General James Amman, Jordan, churned out up to 2,500 Dubik, USA (Ret.), who commanded Multi- new IPS officers each month, but these large National Security and Transition Command– numbers could not be adequately managed, Iraq in 2007, has argued that host nation para- equipped, or supported once back in Iraq.17 military police forces should be established Hasty recruitment and training also pre- first to allow local police a “protective space” vent an adequate vetting process. According free from intimidation and violence in order to Jean-Marie Guéhenno, former UN Under- to begin the law enforcement transformation Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, process.21 a rigorous recruitment and vetting process pro- Creating effective police forces takes sus- vides the most important means of disman- tained effort over an extended period. Experts tling abusive and corrupt networks within the estimate that it can take 5 years to create a new security forces.18 In contrast to the situation law enforcement organization from scratch.22 in Iraq and Afghanistan, the vetting of all law Writing in 2009, one independent analyst enforcement personnel in the country by UN from West Point stated that it would take “a mission staff provided a foundation for suc- decade to create an Afghan Police Force with cessful police reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina adequate integrity to operate at village level in between 1999 and 2002. a competent manner.”23 These timelines are The poor quality of host nation police undoubtedly challenging for an international recruits can present additional challenges. This community that is impatient to see results and has been marked in Iraq and Afghanistan but often reluctant to engage in protracted civilian is by no means unique to these campaigns. In capacity-building in fragile states. Kosovo, even with modest requirements for The large number of national and interna- police recruits, 80 percent of initial applicants tional law enforcement organizations involved apparently failed to meet minimum stan- in stability operations can also hinder effective dards.19 Low pay can be a disincentive, but police capacity-building. Foreign police forces the intrinsic vulnerability of local police also may include military police, formed police and deters recruits. As security force first respond- paramilitary units, individual police special- ers and a visible manifestation of the new ists, and specialized units, including border, regime, local police and often their families counternarcotics, and antiterrorist teams.
44 | Features PRISM 3, no. 4 Challenges of developing police capacity
Since 1999, the United Nations has provided (IPTF) that deployed to assist Bosnian law Formed Police Units (FPUs) of around 120 enforcement agencies in 1995 had an initial personnel that can perform the full range mandate limited to monitoring, mentoring, of police functions. In 2006, these were and training. The unarmed IPTF could only supplemented by a Standing Police Capacity operate with the cooperation and consent of (SPC) to try to bridge the police deployment the Bosnian police and was in no position gap already mentioned. The North Atlantic to deal with continuing interethnic unrest.25 Treaty Organization (NATO) has introduced In Afghanistan, the problem has been com- Multinational Specialized Units (MSUs) pounded by contradictory concepts of polic- of 250 to 600 personnel to perform public ing. The U.S.-led NATO Training Mission– order duties, while the European Union has Afghanistan (NTM-A) has focused on the created Integrated Police Units that can pro- rapid training of large numbers of recruits to vide the full spectrum of law and order func- provide a basic COIN force, while EUPOL and tions. Outside of EU frameworks, several some bilateral efforts have sought to build a European states with national paramilitary professional, community-based police force police forces formed a separate European over the longer term. The lack of coordination Gendarmerie Force in September 2004. The among foreign police assistance programs is African Union and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe also deploy in policing and civil justice, national systems, police on stability missions, although the lat- structures, legal frameworks, and practices tend ter’s role is restricted to monitoring and train- to differ more than in the military sphere ing duties. This proliferation of agencies has unfortunately contributed to a duplication of effort, inconsistency in approach, and a described by Thomas Wingfield as the “main less-than-optimal use of scarce resources. The weakness” in efforts to build Afghan police World Development Report 2011 summarized capacity. He claims that there was little or no the broader problem: “Internal international coordination among NATO Allies or between agency processes are too slow, too fragmented, U.S. agencies and nongovernmental organi- too reliant on parallel systems, and too quick zations engaged in law enforcement during to exit, and there are significant divisions his time in theater.26 Wingfield’s observa- among international actors.”24 tions are supported by a recent British par- Like military contingents, police units liamentary report that condemns the lack of deploy with different doctrines, operating consensus between both international insti- procedures, and national caveats. In polic- tutions and individual countries regarding ing and civil justice, however, national sys- their respective approaches to police capac- tems, structures, legal frameworks, and prac- ity-building.27 Fortunately, an agreement in tices tend to differ more than in the military February 2011 among the Afghan Ministry sphere. Disagreements between donor coun- of Interior, NTM-A, EUPOL, and the German tries can lead to weak and unsustainable Police Program Team has belatedly led to a mandates for international police assets. standardized method of instruction for all The UN International Police Task Force ANP training.28
PRISM 3, no. 4 Features | 45 Wither
Tension can occur between deployed mili- play a lead role in such circumstances. In Iraq, tary and police forces because of different orga- thousands of U.S. Army MPs conducted a full nizational cultures and operating procedures, range of policing and penal tasks. After 2006, but more general interagency differences can MPs, together with international police liai- create incoherent national approaches to build- son officers and interpreters, formed Police ing indigenous police capacity. The United Transition Teams that were embedded with States has particular problems with interagency the IPS throughout Iraq. Some analysts favor coordination as the Departments of Justice, MPs taking the lead in providing dedicated State, Treasury, Transportation, and Defense are police forces for stability operations. Matthew Modarelli, an Office of Special Investigations relatively small numbers of highly trained agent, advocates the use of formed units of police officers prove more effective than MPs to help promote “police protocols” in larger numbers of semi-trained police all forces, foreign and local, deployed during rushed into service COIN operations.31 A study by the German institute Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in 2010 also recommended an enhanced role for all involved in some aspect of foreign police German MPs, advocating the expansion of the training. There is no central coordination of Feldjäger into a gendarmerie force capable of separate assistance programs and no agency taking the lead in law enforcement and indige- has the lead role. As a result, programs are fre- nous police training during the most challeng- quently disconnected, while training tends to ing stabilization missions.32 MPs will probably be duplicated and is sometimes inappropriate continue to undertake major training and for a particular country. Lieutenant General mentoring roles in future large-scale stabil- Peter Chiarelli, USA (Ret.), former commander ity operations. However, as MPs have impor- of Multi-National Corps–Iraq, has gone as far tant functions in the full spectrum of military as describing the interagency process on stabil- operations, there appears to be little general ity operations as “broken for our lifetime.”29 support for proposals such as Modarelli’s. MPs are soldiers and therefore lack the specialized Developing Police Capacity expertise of civilian law enforcement agencies. The reluctance to use the military in a polic- On their own, they cannot offer more than a ing role is understandable, but for countries temporary solution to local police capacity- that lack formed paramilitary police units, building needs. there is no real alternative to using soldiers Decades of experience of stability opera- to provide basic law enforcement, at least in tions reinforce the importance of well-trained, the early stages of a stability operation. Based well-led indigenous police forces and indicate on recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, that relatively small numbers of highly trained current British doctrine acknowledges that police officers prove more effective than larger military commanders are likely to be drawn numbers of semi-trained police rushed into into policing and internal security matters service. The development of effective police and will have to take the lead in basic police takes time and resources and, as noted above, training.30 Military police (MPs) will naturally adequate security measures that provide a
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protected space for the development of new or soldiers and 50 percent less costly than indi- reformed law enforcement agencies. Security vidual UN police.33 Arguably, they provide the can be delivered by deployed foreign military best means of managing the crucial transition forces, but their limitations in a law enforce- from armed conflict to peace and stability. The ment role have led to a growing demand for SPU concept has been described as follows: what are generically referred to as Stability “Stability Police are robust and armed police Police Units (SPUs). These units, with para- units that are capable of performing special- military capabilities, can deal with public ized law enforcement and public order func- order problems, tackle violent criminals, and tions that require disciplined group action. assist and strengthen local “high-end” police They are trained in and have the capacity for forces. An Italian Carabinieri unit, for example, the appropriate use of less-than-lethal as well played a key role in the training and leader- as lethal force.”34 ship development of the new paramilitary Iraq Efforts have been made to establish a National Police in 2007. As formed units, SPUs consensus on the roles, missions, and stan- can deploy more rapidly into more dangerous dards required of SPUs, as well as the appro- environments than individual police. SPUs priate relationship with deployed military have also proved cost effective, being more forces and other operational enablers. Since employable in public order situations than its establishment in 2005 under G8 auspices, Norway UN
UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti rebuilds and reforms National Police
PRISM 3, no. 4 Features | 47 Wither
the Center of Excellence for Stability Police and gendarmerie units made up less than Units (COESPU) in Italy has led in training 10 percent of the total international police and developing SPU capabilities, especially force. Countries with the most professional for conflict-prone African states. By 2010, the paramilitary police forces, such as France’s COESPU had trained around 3,000 stability Gendarmerie Nationale, are not normally police and deployed mobile assistance teams leading contributors to UN FPUs. According to provide additional advisory and technical to Lieutenant Colonel Tibor Kozma of the assistance to COESPU graduates. DPKO Police Division, major donor nations Since the UN deployed FPUs for the first such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, and time in 1999 in Kosovo, the number deployed Ghana often deploy police contingents that has grown to over 60 in 2010, comprising more lack appropriate training, experience, or than 6,000 police officers. The DPKO has also expertise in either direct law enforcement or developed detailed policy guidance to assist training and mentoring roles.36 Other poten- countries contributing FPUs to UN missions. tial SPU-contributing countries, particularly These instructions cover command and con- from Africa, lack the financial resources to trol and operational procedures. The instruc- equip units to UN standards. tions place emphasis on crucial issues such SPUs have become an essential partner as the use of force and the norms and values alongside military contingents and individual that underpin the UN approach to policing.35 international police advisors. In the United Nevertheless, the harmonization and accom- States, which lacks a national paramilitary modation of different policing models and police force, this has sparked significant debate cultures are a broader problem for both the about the desirability of establishing a con- United Nations and other international insti- stabulary force capable of undertaking high- tutions and can only be resolved over time by end police tasks.37 A 2009 RAND study rec- the continued development of common stan- ommended an American Stability Police Force dards and doctrine. formed within the U.S. Marshals Service that SPUs/FPUs and equivalent units do could deploy a battalion-sized unit within 30 address public order problems, but they do days. Predictably, the RAND report acknowl- not deal with routine law and order functions edged that any proposal to create a U.S. para- and, therefore, do not represent a compre- military police force would run into resis- hensive solution to the objective of achiev- tance from entrenched bureaucracies in the ing police primacy. Capacity-building is not Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, one of the UN FPU core tasks, and although and State.38 some units might be able to assist with train- Much of the civilian police effort in sta- ing programs on a case by case basis, such bility operations, especially regarding train- work is normally restricted to public order ing and mentoring of indigenous community management tasks. Domestic police commit- police forces, will remain the responsibility of ments mean that high-quality paramilitary individual police advisors who are normally police forces will only ever be available in retired civilian police officers or serving officers limited numbers. In the Bosnia and Kosovo who have taken a leave of absence from their operations, NATO MSUs led by Carabinieri local forces. These individuals are normally
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loaned or seconded to the United Nations noted earlier, the standing UN SPC enables and other international security institutions police assets to be deployed rapidly in a crisis by national governments. The United States to assess the operational police requirement. contracts the process out to the private sector. This helped establish the UN police compo- Companies, typically DynCorp or Civilian nent on operations in Chad (2007) and Haiti Police International LLC, are responsible for (2010), but as the SPC numbers no more than the recruitment, predeployment training, 50 senior officers, it is no more than a mod- and management of deployed police officers. est enhancement to UN capabilities. The EU’s Concerns about accountability and political Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, sensitivities have generally prevented European introduced in 2007 with a mandate to plan, states from adopting this approach. However, conduct, and support EU peacekeeping mis- governments have attempted to increase the sions, is an equally modest improvement that pool of competent police and other criminal has unfortunately not helped to recruit sat- justice personnel available for stability opera- isfactory numbers of police advisors for the tions. Countries with paramilitary police forces EUPOL mission in Afghanistan. have added new stability roles to standing national capacities. countries with paramilitary police forces In 2004, Australia established an have added new stability roles to standing International Deployment Group (IDG) national capacities within its Federal Police for use in regional sta- bility operations. Unlike most other countries, the IDG also provides robust predeployment A recent report by the Stimson Center training that includes enabling skills such as recommended three new capacities for the teaching, advising, coaching, and community United Nations: a Standing UN Rule of Law development.39 After a poor showing in Iraq, Capacity of 400 experts to plan, deploy, and the United Kingdom has also taken a number lead new missions; a standby UN Police of measures to improve its ability to deploy Reserve of 16,200 officers; and a Police, police overseas. A UK doctrine for policing Justice, and Corrections Senior Leadership peace support operations was released in Reserve to provide short-notice, deployable 2007, and the UK national security strategy in senior police and rule of law experts.41 The 2008 mandated the creation of a 1,000-strong authors claim that their proposal would Civilian Stabilisation Capacity unit. This devel- greatly increase cost-effectiveness by creating opment included a pool of 500 police officers, timely, deployable UN policing assets at mod- which theoretically allowed up to 150 officers est extra cost. Such initiatives are entirely in to be deployed on a single mission. keeping with the need to address the growing International security institutions still demand for international police. Regrettably, struggle to provide adequate numbers of well- donor countries have shown little interest in trained police in a timely fashion. Progress to increasing UN funding, while the peacekeep- implement national pools of on-call police ing training budget has been cut as the main officers recommended by the Brahimi Report financial contributor countries seek to rein in of 2000 has been slow and inconsistent.40 As government spending.
PRISM 3, no. 4 Features | 49 Wither
Despite the prevailing pessimism, it is officers, but it has provided those ANP units worth stressing that there are examples of trained so far with the necessary survival skills effective police capacity-building programs, for local police operations during an ongoing which illustrate best practice and demon- insurgency. strate that national and international security Both of these cases illustrate the need to institutions can learn from past mistakes. The provide a secure environment long enough reform of the Haiti National Police (HNP) to allow a rigorous indigenous police train- since 2004 has been generally successful, even ing and reform program. In Haiti’s case, allowing for the severe setback caused by the police capacity-building has undoubtedly earthquake in 2010.42 A number of factors have been helped by a supportive government, a helped this process. First, police reform was comparatively benign security environment, viewed as a political rather than just a tech- and the fact that the police development pro- nical process by Haiti’s leaders. Second, the cess has been part of broader security sector foreign military and police presence provided and governance reform. Stability operations by the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti cre- in small states also allow a relatively high ated a level of security that permitted a thor- ratio of international police to population. oughly professional police recruit training This facilitates the establishment of security, program. The HNP has become professional, which is a major reason why the measures introduced vetting, taken action against police used to stabilize Kosovo and Bosnia proved abuses, and introduced women into the force, difficult to replicate in Iraq and Afghanistan while effective financial support and regula- with their much larger physical size and pop- tion has ensured regular salaries and raised ulations. officer morale. As a result, the police service Future Developments was transformed from being the least to the most trusted state institution in Haiti in just Despite gradual improvements in the capabil- 5 years.43 Since 2008, the U.S.-led Focused ity of police missions, the international com- District Development (FDD) initiative has pro- munity is likely to continue to struggle to field vided arguably the first effective and compre- effective police forces in sufficient numbers in hensive police training and support package in a timely fashion during major crises. Military Afghanistan.44 FDD combines a mixture of for- forces, supplemented by SPUs, will have to mal training for ANP units in regional centers lead in establishing initial law and order in with followup support by a Police Mentoring most postconflict environments, while the Team consisting of civilian police advisors, development of indigenous police capacity military police, and interpreters. The complete will still largely depend on a mix of rerolled 10-month FDD cycle consists of assessment, MPs, individual civilian police advisors, formal training, and a post-training support and private contractors provided by various program. While ANP units are in training, national and international institutions and police work in the district is covered by well- agencies. Not surprisingly, the most successful trained paramilitary Afghan National Civilian interventions are likely to be in small states Order Police. The FDD curriculum is essen- with manageable security problems and mod- tially paramilitary and is taught by military est capacity-building needs.
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“Manageable” and “modest” may well strengthen regional counterterrorism capa- characterize the future of stability operations. bilities through military and law enforcement Major campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan improvement programs along with initiatives have proved to be difficult, protracted, expen- to promote democratic governance. Rather sive, and politically damaging for the United than a substantial foreign police and military States and its allies. Painful recent experience, presence, more stress will have to be placed combined with the financial fallout from the earlier on the local ownership of security. In worst economic crisis since the 1930s, has practical terms, according to Laurie Nathan, significantly reduced the appetite of Western a specialist in security sector reform, it means governments for large-scale military interven- “the reform of security policies, institutions tion.45 Yet the need for assistance to fragile and activities in a given country must be and conflict-prone states is unlikely to dimin- designed, managed and implemented by local ish. According to the World Development actors rather than external actors.”47 As noted Report 2011, one and a half billion people at the beginning of this article, local owner- live in areas affected by “fragility, conflict, ship of security has long been recognized as or large-scale organized criminal violence.”46 an essential element in a sustainable peace Nevertheless, future stability operations are process and a prerequisite for a successful exit likely to emphasize lower costs and less inten- strategy for deployed foreign security forces. sive and intrusive interventions focused on a Early local ownership may force Western limited number of key issues such as the rule states to be more modest about the results they can expect from police capacity-build- military forces, supplemented by SPUs, will ing efforts, especially in societies with high have to lead in establishing initial law and levels of illiteracy and corruption. Shaping order in most postconflict environments indigenous police culture will prove a signifi- cant long-term challenge in these environ- ments and will best be addressed by embed- ded police advisors with an understanding of law, the security sector, and civil adminis- of local customs and values. With a more tration. A lighter footprint in future stabiliza- limited foreign presence on stability opera- tion missions will place greater emphasis on tions, police advisors may have to accept partnerships with indigenous security forces. basic standards of competence and behavior, The mentorship and training of indigenous although the success of a capacity-building police forces will be a critical element of these mission will still depend on officers being missions, not least to address the threat pre- perceived by the local population as legiti- sented by the growing nexus between terrorist mate and accountable. Normative standards and criminal enterprises. of behavior will likely remain more impor- The U.S. State Department–directed tant in this context than technical policing Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership skills, and assistance may best be directed provides an example of such a capacity- toward those states where there is already a building approach. Since 2005, several U.S. strong political commitment to police reform departments and agencies have cooperated to and development.
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Conclusions international staffs have worked hard to Policing needs on stability operations will improve policing issues over the last 20 years, vary. Universal “lessons,” or more danger- their efforts remain a work in progress. PRISM ously, “templates,” must be applied with caution. Nevertheless, the experience of numerous police missions has demonstrated Notes a need for both paramilitary police units to work with military forces to establish law and 1 Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05, order and police advisors and trainers able “Stability Operations,” September 16, 2009, para. 3. 2 Ministry of Defence, British Army Field Manual, to develop local community-based police vol. 1, part 10, Countering Insurgency, Army Code assets to sustain a durable peace. A safe and 71876, October 2009, 1–25. Emphasis added. secure environment must be established early 3 Robert M. Perito, Afghanistan’s Police: The Weak on to prevent the loss of popular support for Link in Security Sector Reform, Special Report 227 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, the stabilization process, but the training of August 2010). indigenous police should not be rushed sim- 4 Ludovic Hood, “Security Sector Reform in East ply to supply boots on the ground. Quality Timor 1999–2004,” International Peacekeeping 13, no. training, mentorship, and support will remain 1 (March 2006), 61. 5 See Human Rights Watch, Failure to Protect: Anti- prerequisites for success, whether police are Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004, July 25, 2004. prepared for high-end tasks or for traditional 6 Michael Moss, “How Iraqi Police Reform Became law enforcement duties. Experience suggests Casualty of War,” The New York Times, May 22, 2006. 7 UK Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40, Security and that police officers rather than the military Stabilisation: The Military Contribution, November 2009, should take the lead in the development of 6–14. indigenous police, although the latter may 8 United Nations, Handbook on United Nations well remain essential to establish the secure Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, December 2003, 85 space in which local police can receive the 9 See, for example, William Durch and Madeline longer term training and support they need. England, eds., Enhancing United Nations Capacity The provision of effective policing for to Support Post-Conflict Policing and the Rule of Law stability operations will continue to chal- (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, August 2010), 45–47. lenge the international community, although 10 Hilary Synott, Bad Days in Basra (London: I.B. the achievement of host nation police pri- Tauris, 2008), 185. 11 macy will remain as critical as ever to the Robert M. Perito, U.S. Police in Peace and Stability Operations, Special Report 191 (Washington, successful transition from internal conflict DC: United States Institute of Peace, August 2007), 8–9. to sustainable peace. The problems discussed 12 Peter Viggo Jakobsen, “The ESDP and Civilian herein defy easy solutions. Even in long- Rapid Reaction: Adding Value Is Harder than Expected,” established international institutions such European Security 15, no. 3 (September 2006), 308–309. 13 Ann Phillips, interviewed by author, July 2010. as the United Nations and NATO, different 14 Perito, Afghanistan’s Police, 3–4. perceptions of national interests, domestic 15 David H. Bayley and Robert M. Perito, The Police political constraints, and bureaucratic iner- in War: Fighting Insurgency, Terrorism, and Violent Crime tia continue to have a negative impact on (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2010), 3. 16 House of Lords, European Union Committee, the policing dimension of stability opera- The EU’s Afghan Police Mission, HL Paper 87, February tions. Consequently, although national and 16, 2011, para. 51.
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17 Robert K. Byrd, “Foreign Police Development: Contemporary Peace,” United States Institute of Peace, The Third Time’s the Charm,” unpublished paper, U.S. 2006. Army War College, February 2010, 6–8; Bayley and 34 Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units, Perito, 13. “The Future Roles for Stability Police Units Workshop,” 18 World Bank, World Development Report 2011: Washington, DC, April 4–5, 2005, 3. Conflict, Security, and Development (Washington, DC: 35 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping World Bank, June 2011), 151. Operations (UN DPKO), Formed Police Units in United 19 Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF), Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Ref. 2009.32, Effective 8th International Berlin Workshop: International and Date: March 1, 2010. Local Policing in Peace Operations, August 2007, 53. 36 Tibor Kozma, interviewed by author, November 20 Dennis E. Keller, U.S. Military Forces and Police 2010. Assistance in Stability Operations: The Least-Worst Option 37 See, for example, Rachel Bronson, “When Soldiers to Fill the U.S. Capacity Gap (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Become Cops,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 6 (November/ Strategic Studies Institute, August 2010), 21–25. December 2002), 122–127; Robert M. Perito, Where Is 21 James M. Dubik, Creating Peace and Law the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America’s Search for Enforcement Systems (Washington DC: Institute for the Postconflict Security Forces (Washington, DC: United States Study of War, October 2010), 7. Institute of Peace Press, 2004). 22 See, for example, Perito, U.S. Police in Peace and 38 Terence E. Kelly et al., A Stability Police Force for Stability Operations, 11. the United States: Justification and Options for Creating 23 Barry R. McCaffrey, unpublished after action U.S. Capabilities (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, May 2009). visit report for Department of Social Sciences, U.S. 39 Bayley and Perito, 123. Military Academy, December 5, 2009, 6. 40 United Nations General Assembly and Security 24 World Bank, 23. Council, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace 25 Perito, U.S. Police in Peace and Stability Operations, Operations, A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 21, 2000. 7–8. paras. 122–125. States have shown greater readiness to 26 Thomas Wingfield, interviewed by author, deploy FPU, not least because the donor state is reim- August 2010. Wingfield was civilian rule of law advisor bursed by the UN for personnel in these units. No such to General Stanley McChrystal’s COIN Advisory and individual compensation arrangements are in place for Assistance Team in Afghanistan from October 2009 to individual police. February 2010. 41 Durch and England, 59–73. 27 House of Lords, 14–15. See also William B. 42 See UN DPKO reports, available at
PRISM 3, no. 4 Features | 53 The whole power of the United States, to manifest itself, depends on the power to move ships and aircraft across the sea. Their mighty power is restricted; it is restricted by the very oceans which have protected them; the oceans which were their shield, have now become both threatening and a bar, a prison house through which they must struggle to bring armies, fleets, and air forces to bear upon the common problems we have to face.1
—Winston Churchill, 1942 Logistics Islands The Global Supply Archipelago and the Topologics of Defense
By Pierre Bélanger and Alexander Scott Arroyo
or the Department of Defense (DOD), the most important difference between Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in Iraq and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan is nei- ther cultural nor political, but logistical. Admiral Mike Mullen, former Chairman of the F 2 Joint Chiefs of Staff, summed up the difference with terse precision: “We don’t have a Kuwait.” Lacking a secure staging ground adjacent to the theater of operations exponentially complicates getting materiel3 to and from forward operating bases (FOBs) and combat outposts (COPs), in turn requiring a longer and more complex logistical supply chain. Landlocked among non– International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) states, unstable allies (Pakistan and China to the east, Kyrgystan and Uzbekistan to the north), and regional “rogue states” (Iran), Afghanistan is, for logistical operations, a desert island. Afghanistan’s Atoll
The key logistical hubs of Kandahar and Bagram are laboriously accessible via three costly, infrastructurally underdeveloped, dangerous, and inefficient routes: from the Arabian Sea via the port of Karachi, Pakistan; from the Baltic and Caspian regions via the transnational, het- erostructural Northern Distribution Network; and by airlift via support facilities in the Indian and Pacific oceans or bases as far afield as Fort Blair, Washington. The infrastructural network undergirding OEF logistical operations via sea, land, and air demarcates an adaptive manifold
Pierre Bélanger is Associate Professor of Urbanism, Landscape, and Ecology, and Coordinator of the Postgraduate Studies Program at Harvard University’s Graduate School of Design. Alexander Scott Arroyo is a Graduate Student in the Masters of Landscape Architecture Program at Harvard University’s Graduate School of Design. This article is part of a book that explores the global footprint of the U.S. Department of Defense as a result of fin-de-siècle force protection and power projection examining the spatial infrastructure of sites, networks, and geographies required to carry out foreign policies during an era where ecology and energy have become matters of national security.
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that migrates its geometries in real time with Development Bank—shows the logistical oper- geopolitical forces. To track those logistical ations and networks deployed through OEF to networks, then, is to diagram the skeletal be endemic to those processes of infrastruc- forms onto which urban generative processes tural development that would reconnect the may be grafted; the lasting legacy of ISAF in old Silk Road from China to the European Afghanistan must therefore be equally read as Union—this time, however, with iron links. a project of construction—in the form of infra- While logistical acquisitions are managed structural development and urbanization—in by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), logisti- addition to any human, infrastructural, and cal operations in the field are predominantly environmental destruction caused directly or coordinated by USTRANSCOM. On average, the indirectly by combat operations. Indeed, the command oversees almost 2,000 air missions ubiquitous invocation of a “New Silk Road” as and 10,000 ground shipments per week, with 25 overcode for regional infrastructural strategy— container ships providing active logistical sup- ranging from General David Petraeus and his port. From October 2009 through September chief liaison between U.S. Transportation 2010 alone, USTRANSCOM flew 37,304 airlift Command (USTRANSCOM) and U.S. Central missions carrying over 2 million passengers and Command (USCENTCOM) to spokespersons 852,141 tons of cargo; aerially refueled 13,504 for the Royal Bank of Scotland and the Asian aircraft with 338,856,200 pounds of fuel on 11,859 distinct sorties; and moved nearly 25 Figure 1. Staging Grounds and Theaters million tons of cargo in coordinated sea-land of Operations operations. DLA and USTRANSCOM and their civilian partners are responsible for the largest, most widespread, and most diverse sustained logistics operation in history.4 USTRANSCOM is divided into three oper- ating groups or “component commands” cor- responding to the three infrastructural strata exploited for logistics operations: Military Sealift Command (MSC), managed by the Navy; Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), managed by the Army; and Air Mobility Command (AMC), managed by the Air Force. While much attention is paid to the familiar iconography of the parachut- ing crate or the airdrop or the long tail of the fuel-truck convoy, the vast majority of mate- riel is transported beyond public purview via Geographic locations and key strategic positions of Diego Garcia and Guam amid growing, complex both chartered and military container ships regions of the Indian Ocean and Pacific Rim under the aegis of MSC. According to the USTRANSCOM 2011 Strategic Plan: Map Diagram: OPSYS/Landscape Infrastructure Lab 2012
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More than 90 percent of all equipment MSC accounts for itself in terms of continents and supplies needed to sustain US military and water bodies such that to transport its forces is carried by sea. Since the start of cargo, the MSC must quite literally move vol- operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, MSC umes on the scale of mountains and square ships have delivered nearly 110 million footage on the scale of islands. square feet of combat cargo, enough to fill The first MSC-led logistical foray of OEF a supply train stretching from New York was, in fact, launched from Diego Garcia, an City to Los Angeles. MSC ships have also island 1,800 nautical miles from the African delivered more than 15 billion gallons of coast, 1,200 nautical miles from the south- fuel—enough to fill a lake 1 mile in diam- ern tip of India, and the largest island of the eter and 95 feet deep. Chagos Archipelago, British Indian Ocean Territory. Along with Guam, Diego Garcia is Neither metric nor imperial but geo- the most strategically important island base graphic, the amount of materiel moved by providing logistical support for USCENTCOM (cont. on page 60) Figure 2. Prepositioning
The banal yet essential work of the Seabees (Construction Batallion Squadrons) at work on marine platforms, port engineering, road construction, and airport infrastructure
From top left to bottom right: (1) U.S. Navy (Elizabeth Merriam), (2) U.S. Navy (Bryan Niegel), (3) U.S. Navy (Joseph Krypel), (4) U.S. Air Force (Shawn Weismiller), (5) U.S. Air Force (Jarvie Z. Wallace), (6) U.S. Navy (Ace Rheaume), (7) U.S. Air Force (Robert S. Grainger), (8) U.S. Navy (Ernesto Hernandez Fonte), (9) U.S. Navy (John P. Curtis)
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Figure 3. Military Mobilization
Diego Garcia as a link in the iron chain of command and responsibility for the U.S. Central Command remote theater of operations involving the Department of Defense, U.S. Transportation Command, Defense Logistics Agency, U.S. Air Force Air Mobility Command, U.S. Navy Military Sealift Command, U.S. Army Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, and U.S. Navy Military Sealift Command Office Diego Garcia.
DOD
Figure 4. The Fuel Chain
The extents, exchanges, endpoints, and hemispheres of fuel distribution across the U.S. Central Command inventory of fuel farms, tankers, convoys, bunkers, and bases
From top left to bottom right: (1) U.S. Air Force (Samuel Rogers), (2) U.S. Air Force, (3) U.S. Navy (Eddie Harrison), (4) U.S. Army (Steven P. Haggerty), (5) U.S. Navy, (6) ISAF Public Affairs (Russell Gilchrest), (7) U.S. Army (Ryan Matson), (8) U.S. Air Force (S.C. Felde), (9) U.S. Army (Tierney P. Wilson), (10) Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (Jon Rasmussen), (11) U.S. Marine Corps (M. Trent Lowry), (12) U.S. Air Force (Bradley A. Lail)
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Figure 5A. Logistical Fleet
The relative size and distribution of the worldwide fleet of 116 noncombatant, civilian-crewed ships and 50 other standby ships operated by the U.S. Navy Military Sealift Command.
OPSYS/Landscape Infrastructure Lab 2012, adapted from U.S. Navy Military Sealift Command data Figure 5B. Fleet of Logistics
Chain links of military and civilian ships carrying over 90 percent of military cargo and supply via oceanic infrastructure toward land-based military facilities
From top left to bottom right: (1) U.S. Navy, (2) U.S. Navy (Brian Caracci), (3) U.S. Navy (Eric L. Beauregard), (4) U.S. Navy, (5) U.S. Navy (PH2 Frazier), (6) U.S. Navy, (7) U.S. Navy
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Figure 6. From Coral to Cargo
The typologies and topologies of the 10 classes of supply channeled via Diego Garcia by the U.S. Navy Military Sealift Command OPSYS/Landscape Infrastructure Lab 2012, adapted using source information from Joint Publication 4-09, Distribution Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, February 5, 2010), C-11.
(cont. from page 57) operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, and shallow lagoon. The atoll, simply put, is an Pakistan, and U.S. Africa Command opera- island emptied of its geologic content. It is tions in Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, and Libya. appropriate, then, that its interior has been In addition to its strategically desirable geo- filled with a history of logistical operations. graphic location, Diego Garcia was selected, From British slave galleons collecting coconut after extensive review of Indian Ocean sites oil and harvesting sea cucumbers in the 1790s, (specifically the British Indian Ocean Territory) steamers restocking coal supplies in the 1880s, during the 1960s by U.S. Navy surveyors, for German commercial raiding ships seeking its geomorphological type: the atoll. Formed shelter during World War I, or the operation by the fringing growth of hermatypic (reef- of Great Britain’s Advanced Flying Boat base building) corals around the rim of a subsided during World War II, Diego Garcia has served volcano, the atoll consists of a thin, supra- as a logistical lily pad for centuries prior to marine strip of eroded geologic and animal its adoption by the U.S. Navy as a keystone material encircling its collapsed submarine of its “Strategic Island Concept”—maximally interior, creating a ring of dry land around a isolated yet maximally connected—developed
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Figure 7. Logistical Lily Pad
Aerial view of Diego Garcia and the classic, ring-shaped reef morphology of mid-ocean atolls that naturally harbors shallow and protected lagoon interiors for easy navigation and berthing Image Science and Analysis Laboratory–NASA Johnson Space Center, Image STS038-86-104, 07-28-2012 03:53:33
during the first years of the Cold War to for- or expansion of capacity, requiring major malize and expand on Dwight Eisenhower’s investment in new facilities and infrastructure; “leapfrog” bases scattered throughout the vol- accordingly, the combat engineers responsible canic islands of the Pacific. for such work, predominantly drawn from the Indefinitely leased to the U.S. military Naval Construction Force, were reallocated to under a bilateral agreement between the British sites emerging out of the post-Vietnam wave of and U.S. governments—an agreement notable military-infrastructural projects. Spearheaded for its controversial exclusion of the 1,500 by U.S. Naval Mobile Construction Battalions, Chagos islanders that had occupied the island better known as “Seabees,” Diego Garcia began for centuries prior to its lease—Diego Garcia its $1 billion transformation in a manner well began its most recent round of infrastructural suited to the history of its militarized future: and logistical metamorphosis as early as 1971.5 dynamiting deep-draft access channels into Following the evacuation of armed forces from the lagoon and blasting out tracts of coral Vietnam, sites in Okinawa, Japan, and Diego reef for use as paving aggregate for the air- Garcia were slated for significant introduction field and fill for harbor breakwaters.6 By 1983,
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the Seabees, along with private contracting runways and parking aprons, 29 kilometers of firms specializing in underwater explosives asphalt road, antenna fields and support facili- and harbor dredging, had blasted 4.5 million ties” over 40 acres of internationally imported cubic meters of coral fill for infrastructural landmass. Incrementally turned over to U.S.- projects, including expansions of the runway, and UK-based contractors, including then wharf, and piers and for the accommodation Brown & Root, a Halliburton subsidiary, the and anchorage of a full carrier-force fleet in process by which Diego Garcia has been devel- the lagoon.7 When locally sourced coral fill oped results in a base “more reminiscent of the proved insufficient to meet construction mate- Florida Keys than of the Indian Ocean, with all rial demands, the Navy sourced over 150,000 the facilities of a small American town.”8 tons of cement and complementary quantities Despite Diego Garcia’s recent anthro- of sand and crushed limestone from contrac- geomorphic history, its terrestrial episodes tors in Singapore and Malaysia, resulting in are only significant insofar as they are con- a land-filling operation comprising “115,000 textualized by the fluid systems in which it is cubic meters of concrete poured for airport grounded: water and fuel. Indeed, though the
Figure 8A. Territories of Deployment
Extents and overlaps of U.S. tenancy on Diego Garcia’s atoll, nested within the Marine Protected Area of the Chagos Archipelago and Exclusive Economic Zone of the British Indian Ocean Territory, whose boundaries were respectively drawn in 1971, 1965, and 2010.
Map: OPSYS/Landscape Infrastructure Lab 2012, with source information from Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook, U.S. Navy Naval Support Facility Diego Garcia Integrated Natural Resources Management Plan (2005), U.S. Navy Marine Biological Survey, July/August 2004.
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coral reefs that compose the atoll trace a 174 (“organic”) and chartered civilian vessels capa- square kilometer footprint, only 27 square ble of distributing half a million tons of cargo kilometers of that area protrude above water. to combat theaters in the Indian Ocean and The remainder is submarine reef and lagoon. Arabian Sea. The atoll’s lost geological mat- Totaling approximately 125 square kilometers, ter has thus been replaced by the lethal and the lagoon accommodates an area twice the nonlethal cargoes of MSPRON TWO, including size of Manhattan. And while the island only Sikorsky Blackhawk helicopters, M-1 Abrams hosts a total resident population of about 360 tanks, High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled military personnel, the atoll’s interior and sur- Vehicles, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected rounding waters—since 2010, protected from vehicles, Stryker Medium Tactical Vehicles, encroachment through inclusion in the largest M4 Carbines, Depleted Uranium 30mm muni- marine reserve on the planet at 250,000 square tions, JP-8 jet fuel for engines in jets and tanks, miles—harbor U.S. Marine Pre-positioning medical supplies, and high-security prisoners Squadron Two (MPSRON TWO), a dynami- captured during war on terror operations. In cally composed fleet of dedicated military addition, the terrestrial minority of the atoll
Figure 8B. Strata of Deployment
Layers of lagunal infrastructures and logistical land uses of the U.S. Department of Defense on Diego Garcia
Map: OPSYS/Landscape Infrastructure Lab 2012, with source information from Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook, U.S. Navy Naval Support Facility Diego Garcia Integrated Natural Resources Management Plan (2005), U.S. Navy Marine Biological Survey, July/August 2004.
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Figure 9. Islands of Influence: DG and DC
Comparative size of the Diego Garcia atoll with the Capital Region of Washington, DC OPSYS/Landscape Infrastructure Lab 2012, with source information from Federal Aviation Administration
hosts a 12,000-foot runway sufficient for land- between 12 and 15 hours over 5,500 miles, ing a NASA Space Shuttle but most regularly requiring accompaniment by KC-10s (356,000 used by B-1B, B-2, and B-52H Stratofortress pounds total fuel capacity, 4,400 mile range long-range bombers, C-5 Galaxy troop trans- fully loaded), or KC-135s (200,000 pounds porters, KC-10 Extender air-to-air tankers, and total fuel capacity, 1,500 mile range fully KC-135 Stratotankers. loaded). In addition to the dry lethal and non- In fact, while supplies for ground opera- lethal cargo filling the atoll’s aqueous interior, tions were being readied for sealift to Karachi, then, the demand for fuel proves paramount, Pakistan, B-1B and B-52H bombers flew the filling Diego Garcia’s lagoon with a lake of first combat sorties into Afghanistan. The fuel. B-52H, with its eight jet engines, consumes The demand for fuel is only increasing. about 3,334 gallons per hour without after- Given the characteristics of contemporary burners. Though it carries 312,197 pounds conflict—typified by decentralized, asymmet- (47,975 gallons) of fuel, the B-52H requires ric warfare, rapid deployment to climatically aerial refueling for any long-range mission that diverse, geographically remote combat theaters could exceed its maximum ceiling of 14 hours across the globe, and multiple, small, forward- of flight; for sorties into Afghanistan—over deployed expeditionary forces in infrastructur- 2,750 miles from Diego Garcia—bombers flew ally deficient conditions—both combat and
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logistical operations have become increasingly totals a mere 6 percent.14 By simple subtrac- reliant on airlift of fuel and sensitive military tion, more than 75 percent of the fuel is used cargo from sealift and surface distribution for transporting and conveying it prior to terminals into locations inaccessible or inse- arrival at its final destination. Once the fuel cure by road. In 2010 alone, airlift increased arrives at a FOB, as much as 80 percent may by a third.9 Longer distances and flight hours, be allocated for facility rather than vehicular heavier payloads, energy-intensive computer use, affirming that the vast quantities of fuel technologies, and the ubiquity of intelligence, consumed are burned in between “tooth”— surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support in-theater facility—and the tip of the “tail”— operations integral to the security of airlift sor- CONUS (continental United States)–based ties—only combat helicopters find themselves point of distribution.15 In short, logistical targeted more than airlift aircraft—make airlift operations prove the greatest consumer of the 10 times as expensive as surface distribution very resource they supply; fuel demands only and spiral into an ever-lengthening logistical more and more fuel. tail that coils over the globe. Iron Chain on the Silk Road It is no surprise then, that in addition to holding court as the largest landowner If such statistics convey the financial and worldwide, DOD is also the largest single material magnitude of military fuel con- consumer of petroleum, burning through sumption in Afghanistan, they fail to track at least 5 billion barrels in 2010 (excluding the complexity of the supply chain that between 100,000 and 250,000 private-sec- would properly anatomize the logistical tor security and logistical contractors).10 By body between tooth and tail. In June 2011, the end of 2010, convoys were delivering 40 for instance, it was reported that the U.S. million barrels a month to roughly 94,000 military spends $20.2 billion annually troops in Afghanistan, consuming more oil on air conditioning for troops in Iraq and per month—by several million barrels—than Afghanistan.16 More than the entire annual Indonesia, a country of 230 million people.11 budget for NASA, one and a half times While munitions once dominated supplies that of the Department of Transportation, delivered to a combat theater, fuel now makes and more than double the budget for the up 80 percent of those supplies.12 Moreover, Environmental Protection Agency, the figure though a fraction of that fuel is delivered to exceeds the entire energy acquisitions bud- bombers, fighters, helicopters, and tanks for get of the DLA ($15 billion, of which $13.2 which fuel economy is best measured in gal- billion is spent on petroleum-based fuel).17 lons-per-minute, of the top 10 least fuel-effi- DOD spokespersons have cited this incon- cient vehicles used by the Army, only 2, the gruity as proof of the falsehood of the assess- M-1 Abrams Tank and the Apache helicopter, ment; however, the methodology by which are combat vehicles with the rest providing one arrives at such an extraordinary figure logistical support.13 The Air Force, consumer better captures the movement of fuel through of the majority of DOD fuel, expends over 85 its DOD life cycle, from initial deployment to percent of its annual fuel budget to deliver consumption, than does a mere budget total. fuel; of that annual budget, fuel delivered As Brigadier General Steven Anderson, USA
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(Ret.), chief logistician to General Petraeus for International Development funds to during his command of OIF, explains, such a Afghanistan were spent on roads—a quarter of figure represents the “Fully Burdened Cost of all funds and more than twice the funds spent Fuel” (FBCF), a DOD-adopted concept denot- on the second most costly category, power.20 ing “the commodity price plus the total life- The economic opportunity to be gained from cycle cost of all people and assets required to an extensive, defensible, reliable transporta- move and protect fuel from the point of sale tion infrastructure, shocked into development to the end user.”18 FBCF incorporates into cal- by ISAF logistical operations, is not lost on culations costs associated with armed convoy potential investors. According to the Center protection, aerial ISR operations, command for Strategic and International Studies, linking and control to coordinate the dynamic net- transportation routes through Afghanistan to work of terrestrial and airborne security, ISR, extant Eastern and Western routes would pave and transportation forces, medical evacua- a New Silk Road: tion support, and most importantly the con- struction of transportation infrastructure. ■■ An overland route running from (This figure does not, however, include costs Lianyungang, China, to Rotterdam via of hiring local trucking contractors, which Xinjiang and Central Asia would reduce compose over 90 percent of convoy opera- the time to transport goods from China tors, or the significant costs incurred due to Europe from 20–40 days to 11 days and to local microeconomic and micropolitical lower costs from $167 to $111 per ton. conditions such as corruption and pilferage.) ■■ If basic improvements were made to the No wonder, then, that during a recent confer- transport infrastructure connecting Central ence discussing the metrics and applications Asia to Afghanistan, the Asian Development of FBCF, another geographically scaled ref- Bank (ADB) predicts overall trade would erent provided a graphic placeholder for the increase by up to $12 billion, a growth of concept as such: the iceberg.19 80 percent. If the FBCF is an iceberg, the comprehen- ■■ A separate estimate by the ADB found sive tooth-to-tail military logistical spectrum that the completion of new roads would constitutes the glacier from which it has been boost total trade among Afghanistan’s neigh- calved. The moraine of the military logistical bors by 160 percent and increase the transit glacier is infrastructure. Since 2001, DOD has trade through Afghanistan by 113 percent. spent in excess of $2.5 billion on the “Ring The study also found that these roads would Road,” a 1,925-mile stretch of asphalt linking raise Afghanistan’s exports by 14 percent or Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, and Andkhoy. In 2011, $5.8 billion and increase imports by 16 per- DOD created the Afghanistan Infrastructure cent or $6.7 billion.21 Fund, allocating an initial $400 million for turning “goat paths” into a national network These advantages are not lost on insur- of highways, adding another $475 million in gents, who recognize that larger fuel con- 2012. In addition, nonmilitary funds directly voys and infrastructure construction make support military logistical operations: from easy targets—from 2003 to 2007, the Army 2002 to 2009, nearly $2 billion in U.S. Agency recorded over 3,000 personnel and contractor
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casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan resulting 75 percent of nonlethal, nonsensitive cargo from attacks on fuel and water convoys, and through the Northern Distribution Network in 2010 alone, more than 1,100 convoys were (NDN), an alternative, heterostructural system attacked.22 On average, 1 of every 24 convoys scattered through the Caucasus. experiences casualties.23 Many of these attacks Topologics of Defense exploited USTRANSCOM reliance on trans- portation of cargo along the Pakistan Ground That infrastructure facilitates and follows mili- Line of Communication (PGLOC), a set of tary presence as both generator and residuum treacherous highway routes from Karachi to of logistical operations is as old as war; what Kabul and Bagram Air Base via Torman Gate, is unprecedented, however, is the flexibility, Khyber Pass, or to Kandahar via Chaman Gate, speed, and magnitude with which that infra- Chaman border crossing. As a result, since structural transformation may be effected. 2005, USTRANSCOM has sought rail and Sharon Burke, newly appointed Assistant road alternatives to PGLOC, aiming to reroute Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy
Figure 10. The New Silk Road
The circulation infrastructure of ports, bases, and highways that weaves lines of communication and modes of transportation across the Northern Distribution Network, AFPAK theater of operations, and Afghanistan’s new Ring Road, forming the bones of a skeletal link between Asia and Europe
OPSYS/Landscape Infrastructure Lab 2012, with source information from U.S. Army Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
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Plans and Programs—DOD’s first dedicated “fourth-generation warfare” or network-cen- energy policy office—notes that though the tric warfare playbook: continuously cycling importance of logistical operations is not ISR and unmanned aircraft system opera- new, “the amount of energy [DOD] consumes tions, clandestine special forces strikes, use is new, down to the individual soldier, sailor, of private security contractors, cyberwarfare, airman and Marine.”24 These novel energy and so on. Indeed, the most advanced tech- demands materialize in both the flexible and niques and tools fetishized in popular culture, rigid infrastructures—typified by MSPRON those unthinkably sophisticated weapons and TWO and Diego Garcia on the one hand, intelligence systems that give their wielders and the NDN on the other—and define the an insuperable advantage, are in thrall to the expeditionary built environment for the gen- unremarkable ubiquity of fuel. Strategically eration of warfare where defense, according to located bases such as Diego Garcia create a USTRANSCOM Strategy 2011 global constellation of supply depots, con- veyance chains, and fuel farms, fulfilling the is characterized by numerous smaller, for- Cold War–era Strategic Islands Concept; in ward deployed forces operating around the addition to its three Maritime Pre-positioning globe. In many of the geographic areas Squadrons based in the Mediterranean Sea and likely to experience future US involvement, the Pacific, Indian, and Atlantic oceans, the the critical infrastructure will be austere— Navy maintains 66 floating storage “defense lacking air and sea ports, and having few fuel support points” that, when daisy-chained roads. At the same time, these areas will together with intratheater, intertheater, and have limited or compromised water, elec- extratheater surficial (SDDC) and stratospheric trical, and sewer services—directly affect- (AMC) logistical networks, begin to constel- ing the American and coalition means to late a globally distributed, locally deployable, respond with humanitarian aid or sustain dynamically constituted system of logistical deployed military forces. . . . These impli- islands. Hard-infrastructural artifacts such as cations for infrastructure will include a Afghanistan’s Ring Road register, codify, and heightened requirement to integrate the crystallize these fluid systems. Each tactic of needs of functional combatant commands connectivity short-circuits the geographic and (such as USTRANSCOM) with those of temporal constraints imposed by a petroleum- geographic combatant commands. The based supply chain—a fuel shed—predomi- challenge will be to leverage existing infra- nantly oriented toward delivering the very structure and partner internationally to product by which it is powered. achieve the greatest possible power projec- As the unit concept in the global supply tion capability. archipelago, for contemporary discourse on The trope of the island returns here “power projection” via logistics, the island in terms of infrastructure: combat theaters has thus shifted from a concept inhering in become increasingly “islandized” into an geographic and topographic advantage to a archipelago of fragmented geographies concept inhering in topological advantage; brought into synchronicity and proximity thus, as argued by Paul Virilio, “If, as Lenin by a catalogue of techniques drawn from the claimed, ‘strategy means choosing which
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Figure 11. Stoppages/Blockages
When ground lines of communication are shut down, idle fuel tankers and supply convoys such as this one— marooned in Karachi, Pakistan, en route to the Chaman or Tormand border gates—cost $100 million in monthly losses, as they provide 30 percent of NATO’s supplies to Afghanistan
ASIF HASSAN/AFP/Getty Images 2012
points we apply force to,’ we must admit that granted, particularly in recent decades—it now these ‘points’, today, are no longer geostrate- functions in a network of linked sites that, gic strongpoints, since from any given spot we through their interconnectivity, manufactur- can now reach any other, no matter where it ing bases and theaters of deployment, project might be . . . geographic localization seems to and sustain a topologics of force. have definitively lost its strategic value, and, Logistics simultaneously designates inversely, that this same value is attributed to the form and content, process and product, the delocalization of the vector, of a vector in medium and mathematics of maintaining permanent movement.”25 That is, where the the integrity of topological relations between island once supplied geographic advantage heterogeneously programmed, mobile, and through a literal topographic superiority— mutable nodes. Fragmentation and stria- indeed, in its most simple capacity, the island tion become the very media of radical fluid- proved useful precisely insofar as it remained ity. This shift from valuation of the island above sea level, a condition not to be taken for as static proximity embedded in an absolute
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geography to a topological unit enmeshed to longitudinal and latitudinal minutes—log- in a relational, networked geometry of forces ics that engender its capacity for totalization. and flows reflects the historical adaptation of The topologics of force are omnipresent as a military theory—arguably the avant-garde of logistical notion of displacement rather than spatial thought—to novel modes of spatial distance, of exchanges instead of settlements, production and a paradigm of poststructural- that constitute “the realization of the absolute, ist geography. Corresponding with the military uninterrupted, circular voyage, since it involves hijacking of the discipline of geography dur- neither departure nor arrival”27 but intermi- ing the interwar period, it is no coincidence nable delivery. that the emergence of the topological concept By rediagramming logistical operations as of the island emerges during the long post– a topological technology of force projection, World War II moment during which the work the island as strategic concept finds clearest of Norbert Weiner and others on cybernetic iteration in the contemporary discourse of theory, broadly adopted by military thinkers “sea-basing.” Building on the massive mari- across the Armed Forces (in particular, by the time logistical apparatus developed for World influential Air Force colonel–turned Pentagon War II “transoceanic” operations following consultant and organizational theory exponent the collapse of global communism, naval John Boyd), came to prominence. strategists immediately recognized the need And while the work of cybernetics is to reconfigure a fleet designed for large-scale ubiquitously discernible in what is likely the naval warfare to a force capable of policing single most recognizable network of all, the the world’s oceans—and through its oceans, Internet, the transformation of the concept its economies. That over 90 percent of mili- of logistics islands is more difficult to track tary logistical operations are maritime-based or identify.26 Yet the simultaneous develop- mirrors the function of the ocean as the set ment of cybernetic theory and the island as of predominant operational surfaces through topological concept for military logistics its varied strata on which economic and geo- must be read as the most intimate of rela- political relations of power are inscribed and tions; indeed, it is precisely the addition of an its transformations are performed, from sub- informational stratum woven into the topo- marine fiber optic systems to high-orbit sat- logics of force projection that allows for the ellite networks. These operations, relations, unprecedented flexibility, precision, and coor- and transformations are evidenced in the dination of logistical operations, from Maersk ledgers of container ship captains and crews, and FedEx to USTRANSCOM, and yields the employed by MSC to command and crew the exponential growth of production and distri- prepositioning fleet as Civilian Mariners or bution of such operations after the opening “CIVMARS”: at least 77 percent of interna- of global markets following, first, World War tional trade moves via container ship, with II, and second, the Cold War. Indeed, reading the global fleet projected to grow by 9.5 per- the topologics of force as an open, logistical cent by the end of 2012, delivering roughly system renders its operations in both fragmen- 650 million cubic meters of cargo.28 Perhaps tary spatial—islandization—and temporal— more importantly, more than three-quarters from second-based scheduling coordination of this daily maritime traffic, including half of
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petroleum and crude oil imports and exports, the sea which drives the enemy’s flag from is squeezed through a handful of manufac- it, or allows it to appear only as a fugi- tured and highly maintained waterways sur- tive, and which, by controlling the great veilled and managed by military engineers common, closes the highways by which such as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers commerce moves to and from the enemy’s (USACE) and security forces such as the Coast shores.32 Guard.29 Triangulated through these critical waterways, soft techniques of “antiaccess” and On the one hand, the contested geopoliti- “area denial” (together known as the strategy cal conditions to which Mahan was respond- of A2/AD30) project a maritime presence into ing, consisting of a handful of maritime super- terrestrial territories via an amphibious inter- powers, no longer obtain: the United States face: Sea Services battle fleet displaces roughly the same amount of water, carries more firepower, Our ability to command the seas in and operates more than 2.5 times more avia- areas where we anticipate future opera- tion sea bases than the rest of the world’s tions allows us to resize our naval forces navies combined.33 On the other hand, the and to concentrate more on capabilities notion of the oceans as the “great common” required in the complex operating envi- is perhaps more important than ever: as glo- ronment of the “littoral” or coastlines of balized economies depend increasingly on the earth. . . . As a result . . . we must import of basic foodstuffs and goods, marine structure a fundamentally different naval resources, ecologies, economies, and infra- force to respond to strategic demands, and structure rapidly displace terrestrial systems as that new force must be sufficiently flexible the most critical territories of strategic impor- and powerful to satisfy enduring national tance, and so demand an attendant militari- security requirements.31 zation of the ocean at unprecedented scope Emphasizing sea superiority as a means to and scale. Nor does the ocean’s surface serve economic dominance, while not new (indeed, as the primary medium for paired projections the Coast Guard, as the first naval force estab- of privatization and militarization: subma- lished by the Continental Army in 1776, was rine and air space are striated with zones of conceived as protection and power for mer- exclusion and defense to “protect the passage cantile operations up and down the colonies’ of nuclear submarines, sea-launched missiles, Atlantic coast), returned strategic maritime pri- and maritime surveillance systems under- orities to the historical condition recorded by girded by thirty thousand miles of submarine the very figure responsible for transforming the cables.”34 The infrastructural legacies of terres- U.S. Navy into a global power during the late trial logistics, in the form of highways, roads, 19th century, Alfred Thayer Mahan: and rails, while easily identifiable as physical artifacts, are of lesser strategic impact than the It is not the taking of individual ships or fluid, submerged, and littoral infrastructural convoys, be they few or many, that strikes legacies of maritime logistics: dredged chan- down the money power of a nation; it is nels, multi-lock canals, ports, dams, levees, the possession of that overbearing power on ever-larger container ships, increasing marine
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traffic, exclusive economic zones, engineered other hand, the concept of logistics islands estuaries, marine ecosystem protection buffer takes the sea-as-base, the very substratum of zones, and new trade routes and territories of force projection and full-spectrum dominance. resource extraction opened up by global cli- The sea, as both thickened medium and fluid- mate change inscribe the ocean and its depths ity, becomes a “vast logistical camp.”39 with the vectors of power. Furthermore, the In another sense, with the recent shut- interweaving of maritime and terrestrial infra- down of NASA’s Space Shuttle program in structures through the ocean is evidenced by 2011, the concept of sea-basing allows for a the jurisdictional regimes of the U.S. military’s return of the logistics island concept to its construction forces: USACE is affiliated with constitutive and material content—a rappel the most terrestrial force and manages the à l’ordre to bring the island back to Earth, as planning, design, construction, and main- it were. As a purely topological concept, the tenance of waterways and floodplains; the island runs the risk of chorusing “a natural- Seabees are affiliated with the most clearly izing discourse of fluid, trans-oceanic routes” marine force and perform the vast majority originating in 19th-century American literature of base-building, road-laying, and other ter- and culture—“precisely when the United States restrial infrastructural projects both in-theater became a global naval power,”40 recapitulated and in non-U.S. territory. Thus: many times over by naval theorists and finance capitalists alike. Indeed, the discourse of fluid- In a very real sense the sea is now the base ity is the native tongue of that Utopian vision from which the Navy operates in carrying of emancipated capital unfettered by regula- out its offensive activities against the land. tion and governance. The false freedoms of flu- Carrier [navigation] is sea-based avia- idity, particularly in the context of the sea, are tion; the Fleet Marine Force is a sea based well-tracked through spatial thought: as we are ground force; the guns and guided missiles reminded, the apparently “smooth space” of of the fleet are sea based artillery. . . . The the oceanic surface is “not only the archetype base of the United States Navy should be of all smooth spaces but the first to undergo conceived of as including . . . the seas of a gradual striation gridding in one place, then the world right up to within a few miles of another, on this side and that . . . a dimen- the enemy’s shores.35 sionality that subordinated directionality . . . The concept of sea-basing is constituted [where] the striation of the desert, the air, the by a double entendre for which the base is stratosphere” entrenches itself in a “vertical at once a sea and the sea as such. To expand coastline.”41 Moving between the smoothness the capacity and extent of sea basing through that exceeds the grids of governance and the advanced, diversely scaled and equipped striations operations of governance inscribe prepositioning fleets, Mobile Offshore Bases,36 through its fluidities, the “sea, then the air and Mobile Landing Platforms,37 Sea-Based Radar the stratosphere, become smooth spaces again, stations,38 and other mobile logistics islands, but . . . for the purpose of controlling striated then, is to deploy bases-at-sea, bringing the space more completely.”42 What then can the role of terrestrial bases in foreign territory into constitutive content of the logistics island tell an era of destabilized strategic status; on the us about these operations of governance and
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Figure 12. Oceanic Urbanization
Reorganizing the world Trans-Atlantic projection forwarded by the Central Intelligence Agency since World War II, this map privileges the regions of the Indian and Pacific oceans—where nearly two-thirds of the world’s population live in the crossflow and crossfire of pipelines and politics, boundaries and buffers—as the new field of urban focus
OPSYS/Landscape Infrastructure Lab 2012, with source information from United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, INOGATE, GAZPROM, TeleGeography, United Nations Environmental Programme, NATO
modulations of mechanisms of marine con- The concept of the logistics islands thus trol? As the logic of the logistics island and reconfigures the Strategic Islands Concept for its broader landscape of defense, a topologics the topological age and becomes the most crit- of force is still, after all, a material and geo- ical, diffuse, and powerful mode of military graphic system; and as with any system prone spatial production and management: maxi- to entropy, a topologics of force and power mum protection to localized nodes of power projection has its externalities—conceptual, for the bases-at-sea, and maximum connec- material, and ecological. tivity for soft techniques of modulation and
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control through ubiquity of the sea-as-base. At 5 David Vine, Island of Shame: The Secret History different scales, from the personal to the plan- of the U.S. Military Base on Diego Garcia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 61. etary, nation-states, regions, cities, and even 6 See Peter H. Sand, “Diego Garcia: British- identities may operate as islands. Recalling American Legal Black Hole in the Indian Ocean?” Churchill’s words, then, the continental Journal of Environmental Law 21, no.1 (2009). 7 United States is the epitome of the base-at-sea, General Accounting Office (GAO), “Further Improvements Needed in Navy’s Oversight and the inversion of aqua nullius; the only means Management of Contracting For Facilities Construction to avoid the fulfillment of his prison-house On Diego Garcia,” in Report to the Secretary of Defense, prophecy is the exploitation of the connective GAO/NSIAD-84-62 (Washington, DC: GAO, May 23, medium of the geographic itself capable of 1984), 46 (appendix I) and 50 (appendix II). 8 Sand, 121. conducting force to local expressions of power 9 Carlos Rojas, “Supplies from the Sky,” Army across the depth of the ocean and extents of Sustainment (July–August 2011). 10 the atmosphere—the militarized mediums of Department of Defense (DOD) Report, “Contractor Support of U.S. Operations in the the globe that are the heavy waters and thick USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility, Iraq, and air of the world. PRISM Afghanistan,” July 2011; and Jeremy Scahill, “Obama has 250,000 Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan,” Rebel Reports, June 1, 2009. Research for this article was made possible 11 Federal News Service, “Defense Department with funding from the Harvard Graduate School Briefing with William Lynn, Deputy Secretary of of Design, Harvard Milton Fund, and Boston Defense; Sharon Burke, Assistant Secretary of Defense Society of Architects. The authors would like for Operational Energy Plans and Programs,” DOD Briefing, June 14, 2011; Louis Peck, “New Mission to thank Alexandra Gauzza, Sara Jacobs, John for U.S. Military: Breaking Its Dependence on Oil— Davis, and Christina Milos for reconnaissance Interview with Sharon Burke, Assistant Secretary of work that contributed to this research. Defense for Operational Energy Plans and Programs,” Yale 360 Environment Interview, December 8, 2010, avail- able at
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Operational Energy Strategy (Washington, DC: DOD, 37 “The U.S. Navy’s Mobile Landing Platform 2011), 4. Ships (MLP),” Defense Industry Daily, January 26, 2012, 18 Chris DiPetto, “DoD Energy Demand: available at
PRISM 3, no. 4 Features | 75 South Sudanese soldier mans machinegun while escorting convoy of returnees from North Sudan to Abyei
ENOUGH Project The Stabilization Dilemma
By Greg Mills
anette is pleased to have a job at the Hotel Ivoire, the somewhat bizarre, Israeli-designed 1970s grand statement located in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire. This elegant woman in her 40s Ntravels 15 kilometers from her home every night, a journey that daily soaks up $6 of her $240 monthly salary. But she is grateful to have a job, especially since her husband is paralyzed from the neck down, the result of an industrial accident. And things are looking up. The hotel is being renovated, occupancy is climbing, and the giant pool surrounding the entire resort has been freshly painted and is once more full of water.1 Côte d’Ivoire is slowly getting back on its feet after a devastating civil war. In the longer term, Nanette’s prosperity—like that of her 21 million countrymen and women—is linked to the things she cannot see and, in a fragile democracy, has little power over: the effectiveness of the process of political reconciliation, economic growth, and the governance necessary to ensure that the growth is spread beyond a tiny elite, and, above all, the maintenance of peace. The role of outside powers in this transition is limited, and they have to learn, first, to do no harm and, second, to link private sector–led growth better with donor interests and flows. While economics often serve to compound political difficulties, the economic challenge is, overall, profoundly political. This realization has given rise to a global peace-building template usually involving a political agreement facilitated externally and backed by foreign guarantees. This is followed by elections and the advent of representative government; disarmament, demo- bilization, and reintegration (DDR) of armed combatants; and collecting weaponry, delivering humanitarian assistance, reinstating the traditional drivers of growth (in postconflict countries these are often agriculture, mining, and remittances); restoring infrastructure; and reducing or eliminating inherited debt. In this process, there are inevitable tensions. For example, should the focus be on creating the conditions for stability rather than putting the long-term building blocks in place for development?
Dr. Greg Mills is Director of the Johannesburg-based Brenthurst Foundation. The author extends grateful appreciation to Anthony Arnott for the preparation of the aid/military expenditure table in this article and to Leila Jack for assistance with various facts.
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Afghanistan illustrates these dilemmas. As and grape industry in the south put it, “They one U.S. Marine general put it in International [AVIPA] have not understood what works in Security Assistance Force (ISAF) headquarters terms of crops, and what is needed after har- in Kabul in 2010, the “military is inherently vesting.”5 corrosive to development, but necessary too. Similar tensions include spending on the It’s a bit like treating cancer with chemother- military (such as in South Sudan, consuming apy. You try and kill the disease—the insur- as much as half of its $2.5 billion budget) gent—before the patient—Afghanistan.”2 There rather than on longer term governance and is a danger, for example, that humanitarian job creation or on short-term humanitarian assistance would undermine Afghan farmers assistance (often the delivery of food) rather by deflating prices or yield increases through than development. Should external agents massive, sudden extension schemes that would backstop local partners or, in the process of not only be unsustainable but also not be fol- maturation, risk their failure? Similarly, in an lowed up by the creation of markets in which effort to maintain political stability and buy- to sell such goods. By 2010, more than 37,500 in, what is the balance between reinforcing southern Afghan farmers had benefited from powerbrokers (that is, warlords) in a top-down the Food Zone alternative livelihoods scheme, governance engagement and addressing bot- along with a further 50,000 farmers reached tom-up governance concerns? These relate to under the U.S.-funded AVIPA (Afghanistan other tensions: between justice and the imper- ative for reconciliation, such as is necessary in tensions include spending on the military Côte d’Ivoire today; opening up space for the rather than on longer term governance and private sector versus rent-seeking by the elites; job creation or on short-term humanitarian urban versus rural spending; and dealing with assistance rather than development meeting short-term expectations versus long- term economic drivers (that is, consumption versus productive investment). Finally, much Vouchers for Increased Productive Agriculture) of the economic growth to be generated in seed and extension project.3 While the liveli- the short term is through the informal sector, hood programs such as Food Zone and AVIPA though the challenge overall is growing this offered a carrot of institutionalized governance in a manner so it can be regulated and taxed. to the rural areas—bringing Kabul into con- Such tensions can be distilled down to tact with rural people often for the first time— three central questions: Should we balance they were missing the development aspects the powerbroker versus good governance of postharvest handling, beneficiation, mar- imperative and if so, how? How can we get keting, and sales so crucial to establishing a the politics right—or better? How can foreign value chain. As an agriculture ministry official interventions best assist private sector growth? in Kabul put it, “[the Food Zone and AVIPA] The Ivorian Illustration are absolutely not sustainable. At some point things will have to give. . . . [AVIPA] is run by At first glance, Côte d’Ivoire seems to have a bunch of beltway bandits.”4 Or as another much that Africa lacks. Skyscrapers and out- with extensive experience in the pomegranate wardly classy hotels perch on Abidjan’s
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business center “Plateau” above a beautiful percent. Gross domestic product (GDP) per lagoon. There is even a custom-made capital capita growth averaged over 80 percent in the at Yamoussoukro, manufactured in the style of 1960s and an extraordinary 360 percent the Canberra or Brasilia, including a near-replica following decade. The focus on farming meant of St. Peter’s Basilica in Vatican City, which was that these benefits were comparatively wide- built at a cost of $400 million in the 1980s. spread, with much of the gain falling into the A French colony from 1893, Côte d’Ivoire hands of small holders. Literacy also doubled was a constituent unit of the Federation of to 60 percent during this period, while virtu- French West Africa until December 1958. ally every town was reached by roads and elec- Then it became an autonomous republic tricity. Not for nothing was Abidjan labeled while remaining within the French commu- the “Paris of West Africa,” a cosmopolitan hub nity. Independence followed on August 7, of commerce, people, and nightlife. 1960, when Felix Houphouet-Boigny, the son But the collapse was sudden. A decline in of a wealthy chief, assumed the presidency. the price of cocoa coupled with the burden of Houphouet-Boigny inherited an economy excessive state spending saw per capita GDP geared toward the export of cocoa, coffee, fall from $1,300 in 1970 to $700 by 1992. and palm oil (contributing 40 percent of the This was compounded by expectations that region’s entire exports) and dominated by a Houphouet-Boigny would step down on the sizable population of French settlers, number- 25th anniversary of his rule. When he did not, ing some 50,000 at their peak in the 1970s instead of reinvesting in the economy, busi- (part of a total population of 7 million). The nesspeople maintained a wait-and-see atti- new president promoted agriculture, stimu- tude. “There is not a single major building lating production with high prices. By the in Abidjan or bit of infrastructure built after 1970s, Côte d’Ivoire became the world’s third 1985, aside from a half-completed mosque,” largest coffee producer (behind only Brazil states business leader and politician Jean-Louis and Colombia) and the leading producer of Billion. Moreover, a culture of corruption had cocoa, which by 2012, despite industry prob- begun to develop. The private stabilization lems, still supplies more than 40 percent of fund for cocoa established with liberalization world demand and 20 percent of govern- in the 1990s was empty—raided with impu- ment revenue. The country was also Africa’s nity by the administrative elite. largest producer of pineapples and palm oil, It was a double-blow with political change and measured only second to Nigeria in the paralleling economic stress. GDP tumbled as region in many respects. “With nearly 7,000 the country’s external debt trebled. The govern- kilometers of paved roads,” reminds Minister ment’s response was to call in the International of Commerce Dagobert Banzio, “even today Monetary Fund, slash government spending we possess one-third of the region’s highways.” and its bureaucracy, and send home a third French domination and Houphouet- of the expensive French advisors. This reac- Boigny’s firm hand were tolerated in an envi- tion did little to help, especially as it included ronment where for 20 years following inde- cutting cocoa prices to farmers by half in pendence in 1960, the country maintained 1989. Little wonder that Houphouet-Boigny an annual economic growth rate of over 10 only got 85 percent of the 1990 election vote,
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opened to parties other than the ruling Parti In part this was caused by the cul- Démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire (Democratic ture inculcated by Houphouet-Boigny. As a Party of Côte d’Ivoire [PDCI]) for the first time, Wharton School–educated Ivorian business compared to the usual 99.9 percent. consultant put it, “The country had a well- educated elite but not an entrepreneurial elite. the government’s response was to call As a result, they were dependent on hand-outs, in the International Monetary Fund, not on making money for themselves.” slash government spending and its Lacking Houphouet-Boigny’s national bureaucracy, and send home a third of appeal, it was too easy for those leaders who the expensive French advisors followed to play the identity card—xenopho- bia was encouraged by a combination of eco- nomic difficulties, youth frustration, and the In January 1994, the 50-percent devalu- widespread regional immigration encouraged ation of the CFA franc (the regional currency by Houphouet-Boigny even during the best of used in 14 countries, 12 former French col- times. Today perhaps as many as 40 percent onies, and Equatorial Guinea and Guinea- of the Ivorian population can trace their ori- Bissau), whose value was underwritten by the gins to elsewhere in the region, with citizens French government (hence making exports of neighboring Burkina Faso, Guinea, Ghana, costly and imports cheap), led to a jump in Liberia, and Mali being the most prominent. inflation and further instability even though it Houphouet-Boigny’s handpicked succes- ultimately improved export prospects. sor, Speaker of the Parliament Henri Konoan- Although the economy partly righted Befie, was forced out in late 1999 by a military itself, the situation overall worsened with coup led by General Robert Guei. In October the political chaos that followed Houphouet- 2000, a presidential election marked by vio- Boigny’s death in 1993. According to lence saw Laurent Gbagbo come to power. Amadou Gon Coulibaly, the Minister of Ouattara was disqualified from running State for current President Alassane Ouattara, because of his alleged Burkinabé national- Houphouet-Boigny’s personality had helped ity, which was perhaps inevitable yet unprec- to mask weaknesses already evident in his edented in a country with 60 constituent administration: ethnic groups. Violent protests culminated in an armed uprising in September 2002, when troops mutinied and launched attacks in sev- In a single-party state, transparency was eral cities, prompting France to deploy troops not the best one can have. The press did to stop the rebel advance. not play a positive role either, and while When Guei was killed (some say assas- the private sector was important, actually it sinated), Ouattara took refuge in the French was the government on which the economy embassy and Gbagbo returned home to nego- depended. It was very difficult for the state tiate an accord resulting in that African speci- to maintain an acceptable level of manage- ality in which no one can admit defeat. Amid ment and efficiency. ongoing violence, Gbagbo’s original mandate as president, which expired on October 30,
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2005, was extended, with elections finally countries that sent delegations to learn from being held in November 2010. Côte d’Ivoire’s economic success. At the time, With both Gbagbo and Ouattara claim- South Korea had just one bridge over the Han ing fraud and victory, and both staging inau- River in Seoul and there were two in Abidjan. gurations, the United Nations (UN) certified Today the respective numbers, says Jean-Louis Ouattara as the victor. This led to a further cri- Billion, are 27 and still 2. Much the same can sis and violence as pro-Ouattara forces seized be said for the University of Abidjan, which control of most of the country, with Gbagbo was built to accommodate 6,000 students in finally evicted from his hideout in Abidjan in the 1970s and today hosts 70,000. Illiteracy April 2011, by UN forces and external support, has increased to 60 percent of the popula- notably a French battalion. With civilian casu- tion according to the government, inverting alties estimated at around 3,000 and looting Houphouet-Boigny’s achievement. “Such cir- of factories, ministries, and homes widespread cumstances can only make the youth violent,” in the last 2 weeks of the unrest, many busi- Billion notes. Ouattara’s first prime minister, nesspeople fled the region. The trauma of the Guillaume Soro, is a rebel leader grounded in violence was palpable and remains so now. the hard school of student politics. In the absence of economic growth, and Chief of the Cabinet Brahima Toure, without any great ideological differences, who trained as an aviation engineer at the it was too easy for political rivals to play to Massachusetts Institute of Technology, notes the politics of identity. The election showed that Ivoirians are poorer today than they were that just under half of the population sees the in 1965. The government states that getting Christian southern Gbagbo as their man; the out of this situation will require focusing first others prefer the Muslim northerner Ouattara. on reinvigorating cocoa production, which still These crude stereotypes perpetuate with the accounts for 12 percent of GDP and $5 billion choice of international partners: for exam- in export income and provides for more than ple, Ouattara is portrayed by opponents as 4 million Ivoirians in farming households. A Paris’s guy. The cost of this, and the perni- second economic imperative is the need to cious accompanying political-economy based diversify into mining and energy, the latter on narrow personal agendas, is evident not into hydrocarbons and expanding hydropower. only in the record of stability but also in the All this demands more spending on new reality (or lack thereof) of development since infrastructure including roads and housing, the 1990s. As one businessman put it, “I esti- along with health and education. But any mate that 20 percent followed Gbagbo for reform process worthy of the name would also political reasons; the other 30 percent just fol- have to recognize the existence of various econ- lowed the cash.” Côte d’Ivoire ranked 154/182 omies. The first is the formal sector (today fewer on Transparency International’s Corruption than a “few hundred companies,” states one for- Perception Index, for example.6 eign businessman present for 35 years), which is Instead of maintaining its place as an heavily taxed (paying a combination of 18 per- African and global success, Côte d’Ivoire cent value-added tax, punitive customs duties, quickly lost ground. In the 1960s, Malaysia and 35 percent company tax, and electricity rates South Korea were among the Southeast Asian “two to three times the European average”).
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A second is the Lebanese economy, “com- On paper, the focus of the UN mission prising officially 100,000 people . . . many of is to build and consolidate peace, with the [this economy’s members] . . . do not pay tax emphasis on, first, keeping violence down, cer- and operate on a cash-only basis, though they tifying the election, instituting DDR and secu- are important employers.” Lebanese entrepre- rity sector reform processes (thereby ensuring neurs scooped up many former French busi- civilian control of the military), and deploying nesses at bargain prices when the violence $120 million annually through the gamut of 16 various UN agencies—all this to achieve, in the formal sector is heavily taxed (paying a the words of its own staff, “poverty alleviation, combination of 18 percent value-added tax, governance reform and sustainable develop- punitive customs duties, 35 percent company ment.” In practice, however, given the limits tax, and electricity rates “two to three times of its budget, the realization that “the govern- the European average”) ment faces a multifaceted package of simul- taneous emergencies” and the need to keep the peace process on track to benefit from $6 erupted in the early 2000s. The goal of the billion in aid relief under the Highly-Indebted government is to broaden the base of the econ- Poor Countries (HIPC) process, has been to omy beyond French and Lebanese interests. To ensure that “Côte d’Ivoire gets to HIPC [the do that, however, it will need to open to other decision point was June 2012] without fall- investors and incorporate the informal econ- ing over.” (Côte d’Ivoire receives nearly $1 omy in which the bulk of Ivoirians subsist. billion in aid currently apart from the cost Government plans scarcely acknowledge such of the UN military component and the $500 differences, though there is a general aware- million spent on the 2010 election.) “While ness that employment has to be driven by the Ouattara’s rule represents a deal between [for- private sector and that growth in the cocoa sec- mer President Henri Konan Bédié’s] PDCI and tor will, in reaching so many families, rapidly his RDR [Rassemblement des Républicains], he alter the fortunes of a large number of people. has to recognise,” says a UN official, “that the At the start of 2012, the government’s rebels put him there.” ideas were being formulated into a national This is no small task given the presence plan, picking up on Houphouet-Boigny’s of various armed groups within the govern- planning preferences starting in 5-year cycles ment—the rebel Force Nouvelles and once- in 1965. Dagobert Banzio sums up the phi- government FDS (Gbango’s melange of the losophy behind the government’s thinking: police, gendarmerie, and military following “We need peace, national reconciliation, and the civil war) now grouped roughly 50/50 by development.” Ouattara’s government into a 40,000-strong Today, Côte d’Ivoire has the second-largest army known as the FRCI (Republican Forces UN peacekeeping mission in Africa—United of Côte d’Ivoire), and 20-odd other militias7— Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire—(behind along with UN and French foreign forces. The the Congo), with 14,000 civilian, policing, and UN’s postelection role has included joint military personnel at a cost of $650 million in patrolling, police mentoring, border patrols, 2011–2012. and the pursuit of a humanitarian agenda
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especially among the half million or so inter- then why did Gbagbo go completely around nally displaced persons (IDPs). it in striking a peace deal in the form of the By the admission of its own staff, how- Ouagadougou Peace Agreement in 2007?” ever, the impact of the UN mission has been This illustrates a pattern of international marginal aside from its positive role around engagement across Africa and other trouble- the election and its certification. Its ability to spots and highlights the tensions inherent in keep the peace from 2003 to 2010 speaks for pursuing stability versus longer term develop- itself, while the results of its postconflict role ment. in resettling IDPs and the military integra- Instituting Good Governance tion process have been underwhelming. The reasons include the language problem with Such tensions are especially the case where Bangladeshi, Jordanian, and Pakistani soldiers, societies operate on personal ties rather than comprising more than 50 percent of the inter- according to rule and law, and where power- national force, and the remainder of the UN brokers are given (or have) the authority to cut contingent which, like the population, speaks the spoils, gaining access to resources for plun- French. Rumors also abound of black market der. For outsiders, there is a temptation that activities during the mission in car, food, and working through and with warlords offers an fuel smuggling. “One has to ask,” says a sen- attractive means of “getting things done.” But ior official, “whether $500 million per year on this system is unstable and can lead to exclu- average since 2003 is money well spent. If the sion, resentment, violence, and support for ter- UN mission was successful and influential, rorism. Moreover, economic development by
Figure. The Stabilization Dilemma
Need for Foreign Effect Local Ownership
Visibility of Delivery and Evident Metrics Inner Stuffings
Local Partners Who Get Things Done Working with Democrats and Good Guys
Bolster Security and Military Demilitarization and Empower Civilians
Parachuted Foreign Understanding Knowledge of Local Systems, Culture, and Ethics
Elite Consumption Productive Investment
Pick Local Winners Open Competition
Economic Growth Taxable Formal Sector Growth
Stabilization Development
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definition requires inclusiveness. Also, in such eased by maintaining good relations a system, there are few rules for succession. with other (and especially neighbouring) Changing this system requires instead the states, and with non-state actors and creation of a country based on meritocratic international institutions. This all imposes lines, where competitiveness rather than redis- the need for a massive and deliberate tribution and patronage defines the political process of adjustment that the legacy of a economy. This demands the promotion of liter- liberation movement is extremely ill-suited acy and communications within the state—the to provide [emphasis added].8 circulation of ideas being imperative to devel- opment—and delinking the economy from the This demands a fundamental shift in men- commanders. One way to do this is to disperse talities, systems, and attitudes, and a change militia throughout new security forces, ensur- in focus from liberation to governance, from ing that they do not live and operate in their victory to compromise, and from a them-and- us mentality to inclusivity. There is the omni- for outsiders, there is a temptation that present postliberation challenge of separating working through and with warlords offers an party and state (unpicking what is known attractive means of “getting things done.” as a “partystatal”). Similarly, relations with neighbors have to change from a war footing and “where you stood in the war” to friendly old networks, making them more reliable on relations aimed at efficiency and mutual ben- public support than lootable resources. This efit. Similarly, with the advent of government has to parallel the regulation of such resources, power, the relations between top and bot- from poppies to timber to gold and diamonds. tom inevitably change from leaders and fol- lowers to rulers and the governed. There is a Getting the Politics Right (or Better) repeated lesson for these processes: elections When a liberation movement takes over by do not mean democracy, and the latter is a force or at the polls, the country’s politics are process related to attitudes and institutions especially traumatic in the transition from a much more than a single event. Disarmament liberation movement to a government. As is essential, but retained armament is often Christopher Clapham has noted: politically justified against the need for secu- rity even though running an army does not Governing a state . . . is not like conducting translate into the skills necessary to run a gov- a war. It calls for an inclusive rather than ernment. Finally and most importantly, there an exclusive approach to those whom you is a need to guard against confusing liberation govern. It requires openness towards the myths with government realities. difficult choices that confront you, and a The Economy constant search for acceptable compromises between alternative policies, and between The economy, while probably the least perfect different groups and interests within the aspect of peace-building, is the most impor- community of the governed. Governance tant given the roots of economic and develop- within a globalised world is . . . greatly mental marginalization, political exclusion,
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and poverty that often lie behind violence, Development official in Kabul. “There is too upheaval, and dramatic political change. The much money. It is so gross in its volume key challenges here are that learning and rep- that the effort is mostly to disperse it rather licating the circumstances and processes of than disperse it in a wise, sustainable way.”9 economic growth are difficult—and resolve is Moreover, jobs created by donors are normally often lacking. in services, most notably construction. This However, we know that stability and pre- makes sustainability problematic when the dictability of policy and regulatory environ- ment are important, especially in attracting the scale of the failure and waste is staggering local and foreign investment, and that the latter even among hardened aid workers usually follows the former. There is also a need to open competition despite the cost to local interests, as well as the need to reduce costs and geyser of donor funding is inevitably capped. improve access to finance, markets, and basic Or as Lieutenant General Nicholas “Nick” services, notably roads and electricity. Carter, a senior British army officer who com- Aid projects have a generally patchy record mandeered the combined forces, including in this regard for all the reasons given earlier, British forces, in Southern Afghanistan, replied notably the tension between the need to get in 2010 to the question “Do you think that you things done (and be seen getting things done) got good value for the amount of aid expendi- to ensure short-term stability and the need to ture in Afghanistan?” institute longer term drivers of growth and prosperity. In 2010, the international com- Unquestionably not. I am in no doubt munity was spending more than $100 bil- that one of the things [is] that we need lion on in-kind military and other assistance to be more careful and be more circum- annually in Afghanistan. This included more spect in how we spend our resources in than $10 billion in development aid annually, these environments. We went in there not amounting to $333 per Afghan man, woman, necessarily understanding who our Afghan and child. In some areas, such as the southern agents were in terms of how we spent our provinces, this concentration was much higher. money. Many of our contracting processes Yet given the lack of development impact— and the way in which aid was distributed as measured by the existence of an economy has undoubtedly fuelled elements of the outside that supported by donor money—it insurgency because it has been done in a may have been better (and considerably more divisive way. Now that’s not to criticize efficient) if the international community had the people who have spent the money; it’s simply bombed the country with bundles of simply that our understanding has evolved money. This picture is replicated across a range over a 5- to 10-year period and the con- of postconflict settings, as illustrated above. sequence of that understanding is that I The scale of the failure and waste is stag- think we now understand that this is about gering even among hardened aid workers. “Aid spending money in [a] way that connects expenditure in Afghanistan is highly distribu- Afghan governance with its population and tive,” said one U.S. Agency for International is about trying to encourage opportunity for
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all of the population and not just one or is a case in point. The United Kingdom has two rich and powerful families.10 lavished diplomatic attention and military and development support for a decade but Just as the “problem” of Afghanistan is has taken baby steps regarding local progress little different—though on a bigger, more in governance and development. lucrative scale—from stabilization situations This is not surprising. Aid has also—even elsewhere, the challenge thus facing the inter- in conditions of relative peace—proven an national community is much the same as the ineffective means of delivering development. challenges it has attempted to remedy else- At best, as in Vietnam and Singapore, aid has where. Where there has been success—Liberia been used to provide infrastructure, freeing is a good example—there is a willing if not up other government money for investment always efficient local partner. Where an elected in productive sectors. The ratio of foreign local partner is not effective, then little can be aid to local expenditure remains pathetic. In done to improve matters apart from provid- Africa, this has been lower than 10 percent ing an external security guarantee, constant at times and averages around 50 percent. In urging, embedding external support in gov- Somaliland, given multiple channels through ernment, and maintaining hope. Sierra Leone nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), Terrie Schweitzer Terrie
Truck in border town of Sampa as part of UN presence in Côte d’Ivoire
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this ratio is less than 20 percent according to two necessities, though there is a poor record government ministers there.11 Private sector in this regard. There is good preparation, good investment and capacity has so far consist- supervision, receptive and responsible local ently proven the most efficient and sustain- authorities, and overlapping priorities that able route to development, including in the complement spending. It follows that aid pol- donor nations themselves. icies intent on the promotion of the private There is a more insidious problem. Donor sector should prioritize three issues: address and other forms of external support not only the most severe constraints to private sector disincentivize normal entrepreneurial activity growth, match the host government’s priori- (there is an aid “mothership” happily distrib- ties, and target sectors and subsectors with uting largesse sufficient for the elite) and dis- proven track records. Or, as Minister of State tort key economic factors such as overvaluing Coulibaly says about Côte d’Ivoire, help invest the currency through large donor inflows, but in public services such as health, transporta- also offer local politicians convenient means to tion, and education and in new job-intensive externalize their choices, problems, and failures. employment areas including agriculture. In Combined with a pathological tendency essence, no rocket science is required. “to examine” rather than “to do,” attempts to Baking Fresh Cakes create jobs in postconflict countries follow a pattern. An idea is followed by a scoping study; Improving the success of postconflict peace- this is normally backed up by a consultative building missions is thus somewhat like process. Next an evaluation process produces a making a cake. You need the right ingredi- commission to conduct field work, which then ents, a decent recipe, appropriate tools, and, delivers a detailed report “workshopped” along more than anything, a top-class chef to mix the way by various representative constituents the ingredients together, stir, and bake to and appraised by peer reviewers in “deep-dive perfection. longitudinal” processes. Moreover, the prod- A huge amount of money has been spent uct has to be matched by a business plan that, on postconflict operations since the end of the usually after a period involving at least one Cold War: more than $120 billion in Africa turnover of donor staff, is condemned to a alone, over $500 billion in Afghanistan, and dusty existence on a shelf, forgotten when the $3.7 trillion in Iraq. The security—or stabi- idea is revived later and the process is started lization—aspect of such missions follows a over again. The traditional route of an entre- well-trodden path: a ceasefire (or military vic- preneur with a good idea who borrows money tory), a political settlement that is often the and starts a business is lost in the focus on easy outcome of international facilitation and local money, where talents are diverted to tapping negotiations, elections followed sometimes soft donor money. The businessman is seldom by a unity government, and the DDR of for- anywhere near this process. This results, too, mer combatants. All this does not, of course, in good ideas becoming international NGO occur in an economic vacuum, which explains causes rather than business cases. why foreign and local “chefs” attempt to work Where aid-driven projects are likely to be together using donor money to get things up more successful, there is a need to link these and running.
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The economic dimension to peace-build- It also provides a key source of income for ing is crucial because poor socioeconomic Islamic militias such as al-Shabaab. conditions, unemployment, and exclusion Such a “charcoal rate of growth” offers are often the reasons for conflict in the first little—actually zero—prospect for long-term instance. There is thus a need not only to rein- national development. At best it will make a state traditional economic drivers (usually few individuals richer and enable a few subna- mineral and agriculture commodities) along tional communities to survive. It is obviously with improving basic infrastructure and ser- a lousy formula for widespread economic vices, but also to devise and create a new eco- growth and prosperity. nomic model that offers the opportunity for Fixing such economies is difficult. As with more inclusive growth. Zimbabwe, not only does economic improve- ment demand straightening out the macro- The very people who take over often economic situation, an often delicate task perpetuate the predatory system that led to given the vested interests some have in keep- collapse in the first instance ing things in these places as unstable as they mostly are, but it also requires giving the locals a stake in change, even though they might And here rests the key dilemma. The very not have the capacity to carry out this change people who take over often perpetuate the themselves. It means fixing these economies in predatory system that led to collapse in the the very state structures that gave rise to these first instance. They are interested in the trans- crises in the first instance. Changing local poli- actional aspect of investment where they can tics from being predatory to productive addi- make money rather than in the development tionally requires donors getting tougher in value of the inflows. The Democratic Republic changing the incentive structure. All this has to of the Congo comes to mind, while there is be managed in an environment where, in the little difference in this regard between the wake of Afghanistan and Iraq combined with Belgians, Mobutu, and the two Kabilas. the global economic crisis, there is a reduced Somalia is probably the best—or worst— supply of the necessary money, people, and example of this sort of extractive political- time. economy. Along the southern coast today, The future of peace-building thus looks especially around Kismayo and Brava, are increasingly local because that is both a large stocks of charcoal for export to the Gulf cheaper option and peace should matter most states. Charcoal, made largely from acacia trees to the regions in which these conflicts occur. in that region, is the epitome of a low-value, Briefly, Africa should expect, à la Somalia and low-calorific, environmentally unsustainable, Darfur, to do more alone and get better at it, low-value-addition, rent-seeking, and low- including the economic dimension. technology commodity. Yet faced with few A focus on the fundamentals is necessary options, production of charcoal has steadily in those countries emerging from periods of increased (for example, from 110,000 metric conflict: Côte d’Ivoire, Zimbabwe, Liberia, tons in 2000 to 150,000 metric tons 5 years Sierra Leone, Congo, Burundi, Somalia and later, with less than 15 percent for local use). Somaliland, and Afghanistan, for example.
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The establishment of national peace through 6 Simon Rogers and Claire Provost, “Corruption negotiated agreements, reconciliation pro- Index 2011 from Transparency International: Find Out How Countries Compare,” The Guardian, December cesses, and elections in these environments 1, 2011, available at
Notes
1 This article is, in part, based on interviews con- ducted in Côte d’Ivoire during February 2012 and in Afghanistan in 2010 while the author was deployed with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kandahar, Helmand, and Kabul. 2 Interview, ISAF Headquarters, Kabul, May 1, 2010. 3 According to the Ministry of Agriculture in Kabul, international funding to its sector in 2010 alone was over $2 billion, with the U.S. Agency for International Development ($789 million), U.S. Department of Agriculture ($151 million), and the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (£50 mil- lion) as the main donors. 4 Interview, Kabul, May 1, 2010. 5 Discussion, May 3, 2010.
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expertinfantry.com Political-Military Lessons from U.S. Operations in Vietnam and Afghanistan
By Michael J. Williams
sing history to understand the present can be a useful tool, but it is also a limited one.1 Historical cases are not identical to contemporary ones, and there is a danger of con- Uflating challenges in such a manner that, rather than illuminating a present challenge, history obfuscates it. This problem tends to be evident in the inaccurate use of analogies by policymakers, commentators, and analysts. Such may be the case in the contemporary American debate over the state of U.S. engagement in Afghanistan. Since President Barack Obama came to office in 2009 and deployed an additional 60,000 troops to Afghanistan in the first year of his administration, the debate over continued U.S. involvement has been dogged by analogies to Vietnam. But it is not readily apparent that Vietnam is an appropriate analogy for understanding the current challenge the United States faces in Afghanistan. Analysis through analogy tends to be of limited use. As Yuen Foog Khong argued in his land- mark Analogies at War, “More often than not, decision-makers invoke inappropriate analogues that not only fail to illuminate the new situation but also mislead by emphasizing superficial and irrelevant parallels.”2 Analogies can help at an early stage, but at some point they become destructive, as Rand Spiro’s study indicates: “Simple analogies help novices gain a preliminary grasp of difficult, complex concepts but may later become serious impediments to fuller, more correct understandings.”3 Khong argues that it was such analogical reasoning that failed to deter the United States from entering Vietnam. In his study of the supposed rationale for the Vietnam War, the French experience in Indo-China and the American experience in the stalemate of the Korean War should have compelled Washington not to become militarily involved. But the use of analogical reasoning based on the appeasement of Nazi Germany at the Munich Conference led to a different policy.4 Such reasoning currently dominates much of the discussion related to Vietnam War–Afghanistan War comparisons. The vast majority of op-eds and short “analytical” pieces that look at the Vietnam-Afghanistan comparison cite a variety of reasons why Vietnam is not
Dr. Michael J. Williams is a Visiting Professor of Government at Wesleyan University.
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Afghanistan or why Vietnam is Afghanistan, often fail to appreciate the strategic context in but both sets of analyses fall under the rubric which the mechanics of the COIN campaign of “simplified comparative analogy” render- took place. These studies are overwhelmingly ing them useless in terms of understanding the tactical in nature rather than strategic in out- evolution of the conflict and lessons to learn. look. The success of a COIN campaign is as They retain potent political power, however. much about how the political-military lead- One can read most anything one desires ership views a conflict and pilots the strate- in the “Afghanistan is Vietnam” analogy. Does gic level as how the first lieutenant conducts it mean that U.S. military leadership today is COIN in theater. In fact, one could argue quite fighting the wrong war like General William convincingly that the first lieutenant has no Westmoreland did in Vietnam? Does it mean chance of success if the political-military lead- that U.S. soldiers today are drugged out of ership sets him up to fail. their minds and fragging officers as they did in Vietnam? Does it mean that Afghanistan is labeling Afghanistan as being the same as the unwinnable because of insurgent sanctuaries war in Vietnam deserves more investigation in Pakistan, similar to Communist safe havens to distill lessons from the two conflicts that in Cambodia or Laos? Does it mean that the policymakers can learn from war is being won on the ground but is domes- tically unsustainable back in the United States and on North Atlantic Treaty Organization This article is therefore concerned with (NATO) home fronts? The fact of the mat- the political-military interface and the resul- ter is that labeling Afghanistan as being the tant strategy (or lack thereof) that animates same as the war in Vietnam is a potent charge U.S. foreign policy rather than the mechan- that deserves more investigation—not only to ics of COIN. The mechanics of COIN are not determine the validity of the comparison, but the sole determinate of success. Indeed, as we also to distill some lessons from the two con- have seen in Iraq, it is possible to secure mili- flicts that political-military policymakers can tary success as General David Petraeus did with learn from. the 2006 surge while still seemingly failing to This article is not specifically concerned achieve strategic success, a fact apparent in with counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. the daily press.5 Only time will tell if political An impressive COIN literature has developed stability takes root in Iraq, which would then over the last 50 years, and in the last decade validate the entire U.S. approach to the second alone, the number of writings on COIN has half of the Iraq War. skyrocketed. The vast majority of these stud- This article, which is part of a larger ies, however, are micro-level analyses—they study of how political-military leadership in are rightfully concerned with the mechanics the United States wages war, illustrates that of COIN campaigns, but this means there is a Afghanistan is most certainly not Vietnam in gap in our macro-level understanding of such terms of how the campaign was conducted. conflicts. Thus, when such studies posit a pro- The two cases are also highly distinct in terms COIN argument along the lines of “the British of ideological composition, terrain, and enemy won their counterinsurgency in Malaya,” they command and control—to name but a few
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examples. However, this comparative analy- substantive mistakes. In both cases, there was sis indicates that, while they have undertaken more of a slide toward full-scale interven- numerous positive nation-building projects tion than a deliberate choice. In Vietnam, the over the last decade, the United States and United States saw regional/local issues against NATO will accomplish little lasting strategic the relief of a wider global conflict.7 The effect as a result of the 11-year campaign in Lyndon Johnson administration did not con- Afghanistan. Allies and the United States are sider how prior U.S. involvement to support in a rush for the exits.6 the French colonial administration would eas- Whether the United States and its NATO ily lend itself to coloring by the Communists Allies manage to stave off a downward spiral of as an imperial American war against the chaos in Afghanistan as they draw down forces Vietnamese people. Senator Mike Mansfield remains to be seen. The similarity in outcome was one of many who warned the Johnson is not because contemporary policymakers administration of that danger.8 Such a devel- made the same mistakes they did in Vietnam. opment would inordinately increase opposi- While some similar errors were committed, the tion to U.S. forces, which would intensify as U.S. military in particular learned much from the war continued. A failure to distinguish the Vietnam, which is reflected in operations in Communist-nationalist movement in Vietnam Afghanistan. The latter operations are signifi- from the wider context of the Cold War would cantly different. In that regard, the analogical result in a terrible strategic mistake. comparison is faulty. But while the military The civilians in the Johnson administra- learned relatively well, it has not resulted in tion, however, did not slide the United States strategic success. It is apparent from a histori- into war alone. Indeed, the civilian policy- cal reading of the two conflicts that the sum of makers favored the use of airpower without a the politico-military challenges are such that fighting force on the ground to compel North strategic outcome of U.S. and NATO involve- Vietnam to stop supporting a Communist ment in Afghanistan will be similar to that in insurgency in South Vietnam. As a State Vietnam. There is an exceedingly high prob- Department cable dated January 6, 1965, ability that there will be little positive and last- reported, there were “a large number of instal- ing strategic effect. If the United States is lucky, lations in which we have important US inter- Afghanistan may end up like Lebanon. ests. They total 16 important airfields, 9 com- munications facilities, one large [petroleum, Lesson One: Clearly Defined Goals and Strategy Are Necessary oil, and lubricants] storage area and 289 sepa- rate installations where US personnel work or American policy written in the 1950s and live. Any one of these is conceivably vulnerable 1960s was made in the context of the Cold to attack.”9 General Westmoreland requested War struggle between the United States and 75,000 U.S. personnel in this telegram, noting Soviet Union. The decision to intervene in that the large airfields alone required “up to six Afghanistan in 2001 was taken at the peak of battalions of US ground forces.”10 America’s unipolar moment in 2001. While Never happy with the civilian’s belief the context and historical periods are differ- in the efficacy of limited war, John Lewis ent, the United States made many of the same Gaddis posits that the military argued for
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this “entering wedge” to secure a future State Colin Powell argued that for the impend- Presidential mandate for a combat operation ing mission in Afghanistan, “It is not the goal on the ground. The plan worked. In April at the outset to change the regime but to get 1965, President Johnson approved a combat the regime to do the right thing. We hit al role for U.S. forces to secure installations. Qaeda targets because they were used for ter- McGeorge Bundy authorized two brigades rorism in the past. . . . We’ll sneak up on the (approximately 3,500 troops) to guard Da Taliban issue.”15 Recalling other interventions, Nang. By the end of 1967, there were 486,000 including Vietnam, there was a hesitancy to U.S. troops in Vietnam. Westmoreland would put boots on the ground. Secretary of Defense pursue a strategy of search and kill against Donald Rumsfeld noted, though, that such an the Communists, which Andrew Krepinevich action sent a message: “Boots on the ground notes “was nothing more than a natural out- has a value in and of itself, it gives a different growth of [the U.S. Army’s] organization recipe image of the United States. We’re not invading; for success—playing to America’s strong suits, we’re not going to stay. But we need to start material abundance and technological superi- creating an environment in which Afghanistan ority, and the nation’s profound abhorrence of becomes inhospitable to al Qaeda and the U.S. casualties.”11 Taliban.”16 Therefore, when NATO became In 2001, the George W. Bush administra- involved in Afghanistan as a way to provide an tion committed a similar sin, confusing/con- “exit” from the impending U.S.-led invasion flating the weakness of Afghanistan in civil of Iraq in 2003, the United States was dragged war and the subsequent rise of the Taliban back into a war that the Bush administration (which had been inadvertently fomented by believed it had completed and walked away the United States) with a radical, globalized from. A critical error in both Vietnam and terrorist network.12 That led the administra- Afghanistan was strategic and ethnocentric tion to aim its efforts elsewhere rather than myopia. Perhaps this was unavoidable and is concentrating on getting Afghanistan right only readily identifiable in retrospect; however, and addressing the regional and local issues in both cases, there were countless warnings that enabled the rise of the Taliban and the not to simplify the problem. manipulation of Afghanistan by Pakistan. The failure to develop clear strategic The strategy that the United States would goals would put the cart before the horse in implement as a result of this calculation and both Vietnam and Afghanistan. As the United subsequent policy laid the groundwork for States was slowly dragged into Vietnam, the the outbreak of the insurgency in 2006.13 Johnson administration and its military lead- Although a clear decision was made to attack ers believed that it could achieve its strate- Afghanistan in October 2001, the Bush admin- gic objective through the use of technology. istration had no postconflict plans to develop Civilians thought that coercive airpower would the strategic situation to American advantage. save American lives and enable Washington to Washington had repeatedly tried to apprehend pressure the North Vietnamese economically. Osama bin Laden since the 1990s, and the There was a robust belief among civilian poli- main goal was to dismantle al Qaeda.14 At one cymakers in the Johnson administration that of the early principals meetings, Secretary of technology could get the job done at low risk.
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Policymakers believed that not using an inva- and Iraq as war plans and decisions based on sion force posed less of a risk in provoking a flawed visions of war confronted reality.” Thus, full-on response from the Soviets or Chinese. contrary to some arguments that the war was While the military leadership and the a success, the Afghan model did little other organizational culture of the Army thought than push the Taliban over the border into an airpower strategy was faulty, they also Pakistan. The Bush administration, similar to thought technology gave the United States the Johnson administration, forced its oppo- the upper hand against a ragtag Third World nent off the conventional field of battle and military force.17 A similar strategic error was into the margins of guerrilla warfare. Both made in Afghanistan. The Bush administra- the Taliban and the Viet Cong along with the tion, in the grips of the Rumsfeld revolution North Vietnamese army began to conduct at the Pentagon, believed the United States irregular warfare against U.S. forces. Again, could do more with less. Technology would the character of the two wars is different, but enable the United States to fight the conflict the nature of the U.S. mistake was the same. in a “revolutionary” manner. Some observers The Bush administration, like the Johnson went so far as to argue that the new “Afghan administration 40 years earlier, believed it model” of war enabled the United States to could win a war with little economic, man- power, and materiel cost because of the supe- a critical error in both Vietnam and riority of American technology. Instead, both Afghanistan was strategic and administrations simply forced their opponents ethnocentric myopia to fight in a different fashion that reduced and nearly eliminated the conventional superiority of American forces following initial combat leverage coercive diplomacy more because it operations. required fewer American troops to facilitate Many of those who decry the compari- the transition to stability and democracy.18 The son of Vietnam and Afghanistan argue that result was a plan to deliver a crushing blow to Westmoreland never understood the nature the Taliban through the use of airpower and of the war he was fighting. This is the argu- conventional ground forces. ment presented by the “counterinsurgency The empirics of the campaign illustrate school” of the Vietnam war, embody- that, to the contrary, the U.S.-led war was not ing thinkers such as Andrew Krepinevich, novel, as Steven Biddle has argued. While the Guenter Lewy, Lewis Sorley, and John Nagl, technological edge of American forces was who criticize Westmoreland for instituting a impressive and provided an advantage, in the purely “search and destroy” approach to the end the campaign was a “surprisingly orthodox war.20 A revisionist argument by historians air-ground theatre campaign where heavy fire such as John Carland, Dale Andrade, Andrew support decided a contest between two land Birtle, and Mark Moyar counter this position forces.”19 H.R. McMaster reinforced this assess- by stating that the threat posed by the main ment with his assertion that the Pentagon’s units of the North Vietnamese army required “self-delusion about the character of future Westmoreland to conduct a conventional conflict weakened US efforts in Afghanistan campaign.21 In the revisionist argument,
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Westmoreland fought a semi-counterinsur- Vietnamese forces were failing to protect vil- gency campaign fused with a conventional lagers. To prevent the coercion of villagers by search and destroy mission against North insurgents (and to stop villages from willingly Vietnamese army forces in South Vietnam. offering support), the military initiated the These arguments seem weak, however, Combined Action Program (CAP) in 1965. when one considers that by 1967, conven- Although the program was a success, in the tional North Vietnamese soldiers numbered words of Max Boot, it was “a sideshow.” only 55,000 whereas there were 245,000 Casualties among U.S. forces in CAP were irregular combatants in South Vietnam.22 50 percent lower than in the conventional Westmoreland’s “small war” was led by an forces, and British COIN expert Sir Robert array of U.S. agencies including the Central Thompson proclaimed it “the best idea I have Intelligence Agency (CIA), U.S. Agency seen in Vietnam, and it worked superbly.”23 for International Development, and U.S. Unfortunately, Westmoreland never allocated Information Agency. They were eventually more than 2,500 troops to the operation. He unified into what the Johnson administra- wrote, “I simply had not enough numbers tion would call Civil Operations and Rural to put a squad of Americans in every vil- Development Support (CORDS), which lage, only in those not yet pacified.” But as would become a joint civil-military program Boot notes, putting a squad in every hamlet led by Robert Komer. Security was required to “would have required no more than 167,000 facilitate development, and indigenous South troops—a fraction of the 540,000 eventually U.S. Army (Justin P. Morelli) P. (Justin Army U.S.
Afghan checkpoint at Pakistan border, Paktika Province
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deployed.”24 Westmoreland talked the talk placed in Vietnam. This is a clear and marked of COIN, but he fought the war of U.S. mili- difference between the approaches. tary convention. American forces in Vietnam But whereas Westmoreland had enough fought the wrong war. If one looks to interna- forces to put a squad in every village and to tional relations theory for a general explana- conduct a proper COIN campaign if he wanted tion of why the weak win wars, Ivan Arreguin- to, the International Security Assistance Force Toft’s work is an obvious place to start.25 The (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan has been woe- war in Vietnam was lost, he argues, because in fully understaffed from the day it began.28 As his typology, there are two types of strategies: President George W. Bush’s spokesman Ari direct strategies where the opponent’s ability Fleischer stated at the beginning of American to wage war is attacked, and indirect strategies operations in Afghanistan: where the will to wage war is attacked. The The President’s position is unchanged United States used a direct approach against about the use of the United States combat an adversary using an indirect approach and forces. The President continues to believe therefore lost. the purpose of the military is to be used to Commanders in Afghanistan have been fight and win wars, and not to engage in far more adept in identifying the type of war peacekeeping of that nature. Having said being fought even if their analyses were slow that, the United States is committed to the to respond to events. The organizational long-term of Afghanistan, including its culture of the U.S. Army favored a return to security and its safety. That’s one of the clear-cut wars as embodied in the Powell- reasons that the United States is provid- Weinberger Doctrine that dominated policy ing the amount of aid—funding aid we are until the mid-1990s.26 Moving away from this giving to Afghanistan, the training aid that mentality was difficult, and the Army adapted we’re providing to Afghanistan.29 slowly following the initial military opera- tions in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), The Bush administration had gone with but it did adapt in a manner dissimilar to the the light footprint strategy, but over time the Vietnam experience. At the outset, NATO mission morphed from ousting the Taliban thought the mission in Afghanistan was state- and hunting down terrorists to something building while the United States was focused akin to nation-building. But the lack of on Operation Enduring Freedom, a terrorist resources made this mission nearly impos- hunting campaign. By 2006, it was evident sible. Afghanistan received the least financial that a different approach was needed.27 U.S. and military assistance of any postcombat and NATO forces worked to provide the same operation since World War II, exactly as it type of development as the CORDS program, had after the end of the CIA’s work with the and they ran into the same challenge of pro- mujahideen in 1989. In his accounting of how viding security to the local population. The the insurgency developed, RAND’s Seth Jones vast majority of U.S. and NATO forces placed illustrated the comparative barrenness of U.S. in Afghanistan were significantly more sophis- engagement well. ticated in terms of people-centric COIN war In U.S.-occupied Germany following as opposed to the vast majority of the forces World War II, Jones notes that there were
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89.3 U.S. soldiers per 1,000 German sol- airpower, which wrought civilian casualties. diers. In the 1990s, there were 17.5 troops NATO air strikes accidentally killed far more per 1,000 inhabitants in Bosnia and 19.3 per people than Taliban bombings of bazaars. thousand in Kosovo. In East Timor, the ratio Thus they did not help the international was 9.6 to 1,000. In Afghanistan, there were forces to win over the population. Being no only 1.6 troops per 1,000 Afghans. The inva- fans of the Taliban, the people chose to sit on sion of Iraq in 2003 with 150,000 soldiers the fence. U.S. military leadership decided in (202 Iraqis per American) diverted valuable 2008–2009 that more troops were required U.S. and European resources with disastrous to get the job done, but that followed on the consequences. Thus, even if it wanted to, ISAF heels of 8 years of near stagnation, and the was poorly placed to conduct COIN opera- numbers of troops eventually allocated meant tions. Initial European deployments were far they could still not adequately conduct the too small to adequately secure the population COIN operation they believed was necessary in what was still a hostile operating environ- to win the fight for “hearts and minds.”32 ment. Commanders allowed themselves to Despite having recently rewritten the be strung out across the countryside in a vain COIN manual that specified one counterin- effort to protect everything, thereby protecting surgent per 40–50 people, the U.S. number nothing and opening them up to a series of was far below the ratio that stipulated a force prolonged campaigns to hold on to insignifi- nearer to 500,000. That begs one to ask why cant villages such as the British did in Musa write a manual only to ignore it. The military Qala. In 2006, the situation was so bad that was clearly making do with what forces it was being allocated, but given the political impos- ISAF commanders allowed themselves to be sibility of committing a properly sized force, strung out across the countryside in a vain would it not have been best to pursue a dif- effort to protect everything, thereby ferent strategy rather than the same strategy protecting nothing poorly resourced? Complicating matters, U.S. military leadership advocated for the surge strategy in Afghanistan without consider- Taliban forces actually attacked Canadian and ing the wider geopolitical picture involving European forces in a conventional manner.30 Pakistan and India. The argument for COIN The Taliban/al Qaeda forces were destroyed, in Afghanistan took place within a strategic but NATO forces were essentially pinned down. bubble, one the Obama administration also As the NATO ISAF Commander General David seemingly chose not to address. The new strat- Richards noted in his testimony to the British egy approved by President Obama was contin- Defence Select Committee in 2007, choosing gent on Pakistan taking proactive measures to fight a pitched battle against NATO was the against the Taliban, but in Pakistan’s opinion, best thing the Taliban could have done as it that would have undermined its international allowed the Alliance to concentrate manpower security. Thus, the U.S. strategy was paradoxi- and firepower on the Taliban forces.31 cal. No matter how appropriate the military To overcome limited numbers of troops, model of the conflict (COIN) might be, the the United States and NATO relied on strategic outcome may be very different than
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expected because of external, rather than of the country. Victory for the Taliban, like internal factors. the Communists in Vietnam, is not a mat- General Westmoreland chose not to ter of winning any battles against the United wage a small war against the Communists; States; instead, the goal is to wear the oppo- instead, he waged a large conventional war. nent down. Therefore, the difference in scale Even though he had enough forces to attempt between the two conflicts and the scale of a COIN operation, that was never his opera- the forces fighting the United States is irrel- tional priority. In Afghanistan, the strategy, evant. So as long as the Taliban can continue first off, has never been as settled as it was in to harangue U.S. and NATO forces, they can Vietnam. Westmoreland appraised the situa- achieve their attritional objective to wear down tion, instituted a plan, and stuck with it. In the will to fight in the United States. Afghanistan, commanders have rotated in and out every few months, and the strategy, while victory for the Taliban, like the Communists in being supposedly population-centric since at Vietnam, is not a matter of winning any battles least 2006, has meandered depending on the against the United States; instead, the goal is personal view of the commander at the time. to wear the opponent down For example, the period under British General David Richards was regarded as a high point of a people-centric approach despite too few Lesson Two: External Safe Havens resources, while his successor, U.S. General Cannot Be Tolerated Dan McNeill, focused more on the use of air- The objective of guerrilla forces is to win con- power to attack the Taliban, moving ISAF away trol of the population, but in Vietnam and in from a successful COIN strategy. Afghanistan there is the added aspect of using Despite differences in approaches to irregular warfare to wear down the will of the conflict, the nature of the problem was the United States to fight the war.T his abil- the same: the United States failed to win the ity to outlast the enemy is greatly enhanced hearts and minds of the population enough to in conflicts where the insurgents have access decisively affect the outcome of the war. Some to external refuge. In the Vietnam War, North have noted that the Afghan insurgency is not Vietnamese Army Commander General Vo a broad-based insurgency. This is true. But the Nguyen Giap counted on the fact that U.S. Communist insurgency was not initially broad forces would not pursue him into North based at all: the north fomented it with north- Vietnam—and that they would not pursue ern transplants to the south. Furthermore, for or bomb his forces in staging areas outside the strategic outcome, it does not matter if the of Vietnam. Giap made extensive use of Laos population does not endorse the Taliban as and Cambodia to evade U.S. forces, which much as it matters that they are onside with prompted the United States to become covertly NATO/U.S. forces. In Afghanistan, much of involved in these countries.33 The Parrot’s Beak the population has chosen to sit on the fence and the Fishhook in Cambodia provided Giap rather than root out the Taliban because NATO with staging areas only 30 miles from Saigon.34 and American forces have been unable to pro- He was able to build up supplies and mass vide enough security in the most volatile part his forces and move them in and out of the
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conflict zone with near impunity. Once out- Nixon shifted the American strategy in 1972 side of South Vietnam, he knew his supplies, to include bombing of Cambodia and Laos. logistics, and regular and irregular fighters Nixon’s strategy would prove more success- were safe. ful; in March 1972, the Communists transi- In Laos, the Communists made extensive tioned from phase II to phase III of a guerrilla use of a network of trails that became known war—that is, they went conventional. Because as the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Stretching from North Vietnamese forces began with conven- North Vietnam through Laos and on into tional operations, they were logistically more South Vietnam, the route provided Giap with vulnerable. The Communists needed more an unparalleled advantage in his campaign equipment and munitions, and the inelastic against the U.S. forces. He also benefited from nature of the conventional campaign meant a largely untouched homeland.35 Although the that shortages in the supply chain could be United States was bombing North Vietnam exploited.36 As such Nixon, through airpower in an attempt to coerce the Communists to and the use of conventional forces, was able to the negotiating table, it was pursuing a strat- stalemate the Communists and compel them egy that slowly ratcheted up the pressure on to the Paris peace talks. the North. The United States did not blan- In Afghanistan, U.S. forces faced a simi- ket bomb the North or attack the industrial lar challenge to the one they needed to con- centers there. The bombing did little to ham- front in Vietnam. The border between Pakistan per Giap’s largely irregular forces in any way. and Afghanistan runs approximately 1,640 Without U.S. forces on the ground in North inhospitable miles.37 This rugged landscape Vietnam, Giap was mostly free to move about is home to a diverse number of ethnicities, as he wished. the largest composition of which is Pashtun. Even if the bombing of North Vietnam Incidentally, it is the Pashtuns living north of had been more intense, Robert Pape notes the border in Afghanistan who offer the most that it most likely would not have done much resistance to NATO and U.S. forces. Large por- to hinder the Communist war effort. The tions of the Pashtuns south of the border in Communist forces in South Vietnam were Pakistan live in what is known as the Federally extracting large amounts of resources from Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). This portion the South and did not rely on supplies from of Pakistan is loosely governed by Islamabad Hanoi. Meanwhile, American forces pursed a and has historically been considered a rather conventional strategy based on the destruction ungovernable part of the country. The prec- of enemy forces while the Communists waged edent for FATA stretches back to British colo- guerrilla warfare to gain control over the popu- nialism when Victorian imperialists decided lation. Air interdiction is aimed at knocking that the Pashtun tribes were far too ungov- out the capacity of the enemy to fight, but the ernable to attempt to directly rule the region. Communists did not rely heavily on resources Following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in from the North, and Giap also benefited 2001 and subsequent defeat of the Taliban, from his sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos. many of the guerrillas took shelter in the FATA. The Communist forces were never put on the A cable from the U.S. Embassy dated defensive by the American war until Richard November 13, 2002, noted that U.S. firepower
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had pushed the Taliban, al Qaeda, and foreign be an asset against India and other regional fighters over the border. It also noted that concerns. As a U.S. Intelligence Information while Pakistan and the United States agreed Report from October 1996 details, “Pakistan’s on the endstate, they did not agree on the ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence] is heavily means and that Pakistan was focused on the involved in Afghanistan.”39 Islamabad conse- “long term.” In the FATA, Pakistan would need quently provided material and additional sup- to gain “firepower superiority” over the local port to the Taliban. It also used commodities tribes before effective operations could be con- such as wheat and the fuel trade in attempts ducted. There was, following the U.S. assault to control the Taliban.40 A recent leaked on Afghanistan, a “window of opportunity” for NATO report based on 27,000 interviews the Pakistani military to work with the tribal leaders to apprehend Taliban.38 But this win- the Taliban receives direct support from elements dow was small if it ever existed. The Pakistan of the government, military, and intelligence military lost hundreds of troops between 2004 service in Pakistan and 2007 as it attempted to control the region before President Pervez Musharraf decided to pursue “peace deals” with the tribes. This with 4,000 Taliban, al Qaeda, and other for- ungovernable space in Pakistan coupled with eign fighters details official support for insur- an open border means that Taliban and al gents from Pakistan. For example, the report Qaeda insurgents can move easily in and out notes, “Senior Taliban representatives, such as of Afghanistan. U.S. forces have been using Nasiruddin Haqqani, maintain residences in drones to target al Qaeda and Taliban lead- the immediate vicinity of ISI headquarters in ership in Pakistan against the wishes of the Islamabad.” One detainee perhaps put it best: Pakistani government, but targeted assassina- “The Taliban are not Islam. The Taliban are tions cannot dissolve the insurgent network in Islamabad.”41 Pakistan that supports the insurgency against The problem for the United States is that U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan. no matter how well crafted a COIN strategy To make matters worse, the Taliban does is, unless the United States can stop Pakistani not just benefit from an ungovernable space assistance, the campaign will fail. Two factors in Pakistan; it also receives direct support work against U.S. interests in this regard. First, from elements of the government, military, the Taliban is an indigenous Afghan entity. and intelligence service in Pakistan. It is dif- For better or worse, it is part of Afghanistan, ficult to determine to what extent the Taliban and it seems dubious that the United States is officially supported by Islamabad, but it is can eradicate it any more than the British an open secret that such cooperation exists. could eradicate the Irish Republican Army. This has been the case since the early 1990s Of course, unlike the British, the United when Islamabad began supporting the Taliban States does not consider Afghanistan part of as the group in Afghanistan that Pakistan felt the Nation, and thus this war is ultimately a it could “control.” With a civil war raging peripheral rather than central interest in the in Afghanistan, Pakistan wanted to ensure minds of Americans, making it difficult for a friendly government in Kabul that would the United States to wear down the Taliban
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to negotiations. Second, a strong Afghanistan Afghans want a government that performs with a sound military is Pakistan’s night- traditional administrative functions, such as mare—particularly if India is involved in resolving disputes, in a just fashion. If some- Afghanistan. Pakistan has no interest in being one violates their irrigation rights, they want surrounded by “hostile” states and thus works the authorities to exact the standard fine of 31 to utilize the Taliban as a strategic lever of pounds of wheat. If a thief takes one of their Pakistani interests in Afghanistan. Although goats, they expect that the culprit will be found this fact was widely discussed by military and and compelled to transfer five of his goats to civilian officials during the Obama administra- the victim. In such administrative matters, the tion review, the military still disregarded this Taliban’s shadow governments have gener- absolute strategic fact when pushing its COIN ally proven more energetic and impartial than strategy upon the President. Although civilians Hamid Karzai’s government.42 were cognizant of the wider strategy situation, Corruption in Afghanistan is problem- the President found himself in a difficult posi- atic when it means the denial of justice to the tion domestically. Having solicited the “expert people resulting in a collapse of government advice” of the military, it was then nearly legitimacy. The rampant corruption there is impossible to overrule the military without reminiscent of the corruption within South a negative domestic political blowback. The Vietnam that undermined U.S. efforts 50 years result was a hybrid strategy that assented to ago. Much like modern day Afghanistan, the additional troops but confined the deploy- leadership of South Vietnam was to a large ment to a specific timeline. This policy was extent corrupt and delegitimized in the eyes the result of the policy process and political of the people, a process that we further rein- realities; it was not necessarily the best strategy. forced by an inappropriate military strategy in Vietnam. The legitimacy crisis in Afghanistan Lesson Three: Corruption and Legitimacy Matter is actually worse than it was in South Vietnam although, in both cases, corruption weakened Perhaps one of the most frustrating aspects of support for the governments supported by the U.S. and NATO efforts in Afghanistan is that United States. To remain in power, Nguyen they are all ostensibly to support the govern- Van Thieu relied on a military junta that was ment of Afghanistan to win the will of the distanced from the people. Thieu, like Karzai, people. But the Afghan central government was more concerned with his own interests is riddled with corruption, and corruption is than the national interest. As the Americans essentially a way of life across the country. The pumped in supplies to the CORDS program— United States attempted to instill legitimacy bulldozers, fire engines, concrete, tin, surgical in Afghanistan through elections, but as Mark instruments, foodstuffs—an estimated 25 per- Moyar has written, what one does with power cent went “missing” into the black market.43 is more important than how one acquires it. Although Thieu was never directly linked to In Afghanistan, the government has often not any corruption racket himself, his adminis- done as much for the people, or at least is tration presided over governmental rackets in not perceived to have done as much, as the prostitution, extortion, and drug-trafficking to shadow Taliban government. name but a few. As one U.S. advisor explained,
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“We had to make sure that the [Army of the It is not just elements of the government Republic of Vietnam was not] alienating the that are corrupt; it goes all the way to the top. local population by stealing their food.”44 As former Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Endemic corruption and legitimate gover- Eikenberry wrote in an October 2009 cable, nance in Afghanistan are highly problematic “The meeting with [Ahmed Wali Karzai] given that the strategy advocated by General highlights one of our major challenges in Petraeus is based on winning the hearts and Afghanistan: how to fight corruption and con- minds of the people, which is difficult at best nect the people to their government, when when these people do not trust their “elected” the key government officials are themselves government. While much of the problem in corrupt.” Reporting on the cables, the New establishing legitimate government can be York Times reported, “President Hamid Karzai put on the leaders, the lack of a coherent ISAF and his attorney general ‘allowed dangerous individuals to go free or re-enter the battle- the legitimacy crisis in Afghanistan is field without ever facing an Afghan court.’ The actually worse than it was in South Vietnam embassy was particularly concerned that Mr. Karzai pardoned five border police officers caught with 124 kilograms (about 273 pounds) strategy that was well resourced has damaged of heroin and intervened in a drug case involv- efforts to provide an alternative to the harsh ing the son of a wealthy supporter.”47 justice of the Taliban. The legitimacy problem One can hardly expect a president who has been an issue in Afghanistan for nearly was elected to office in a rigged election to three decades, although the challenges and var- worry about corruption in his country. In ied ways of establishing legitimate governance the 2009 elections, ballot-box stuffing and in this region go back centuries.45 Although a intimidation were rife. The United Nations– central goal of the ISAF state-building enter- approved Electoral Complaints Commission prise was to build a legitimate government, discredited so many votes that incumbent little has changed. An International Crisis Karzai fell below 50 percent to avoid a run- Group report from June 2011 noted, “Nearly a off election.48 Karzai’s family also abused decade after the U.S.-led military intervention, the position of the president to forge lucra- little has been done to challenge the perverse tive relationships and procure powerful posi- incentives of continued conflict in Afghanistan tions in the government.49 Karzai actively . . . the economy as a result is increasingly appointed family members to such positions dominated by a criminal oligarchy of politi- to create an oligarchy of powerful families. cally connected businessmen.” A 2010 report For example, the husband of a Karzai woman from the International Crisis Group on the was appointed a senior foreign affairs advisor state of the Afghan judiciary bluntly opined, to the president despite having previously only “Afghanistan’s justice system is in a cata- worked in retail shops in Leesburg, Virginia. strophic state of repair” and that despite nearly The New York Times went on to report that “At a decade of international efforts, the majority least six Karzai relatives, including one who of Afghans have little to no access to the judi- just ran for Parliament, operate or are linked ciary, which is full of endemic corruption.46 to contracting businesses that collect millions
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of dollars annually from the American gov- Afghanistan Is Not Vietnam (But the Outcome May Be the Same) ernment.” Like Karzai, South Vietnam’s Thieu promoted family and friends. Thieu did not This comparative review of American involve- want a cut of the action, but rather demanded ment in Vietnam and Afghanistan illustrates favors down the road. One of the most scan- that the character of the conflict and chal- dalous rackets, reported by Jacques Leslie of lenges the United States faced in Vietnam are the Los Angeles Times, involved the sale of scrap different on the surface from those it faces metal (all of which was legally owned by the in Afghanistan. The nature of the challenges, United States) to Japan by South Vietnamese however, is nearly identical. In both cases, generals.50 A State Department cable from policymakers misidentified the basic nature Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker highlights of the conflict they were entering. In Vietnam, concern over endemic corruption in South American policymakers failed to mark a divi- Vietnam and the effect it might have on U.S. sion between central and peripheral interests operations.51 as George Kennan argued they should dur- The situation in Afghanistan remains ing his time as Director of Policy Planning at conflicted, and to speak of a broad-based the State Department. Much the same could insurgency would be incorrect. The insur- be argued in the case of Afghanistan. In both gency is largely isolated to the south and east cases, policymakers never adequately matched of the country and is primarily supported by resources to achievable goals with a work- Pashtuns. But the United States has done lit- able strategy. In both cases, the military was tle to help itself over time. The U.S. strategy forced to determine the best way to fight its employed in 2001 helped to pave the way for opponent. In Vietnam, General Westmoreland corruption to take root. To be fair, it would simply fought the wrong war. In Afghanistan, have been impossible to avoid corruption to the U.S. military and NATO Allies have largely some extent, but the U.S. reliance on war- fought the right war at least since 2006 but lords to topple the Taliban ensconced the very never possessed enough troops and materiel people who destroyed Afghanistan in the civil to implement the strategy properly, thereby war of the 1990s back into positions of power. This problem was highlighted in a Time mag- the majority of the Afghan population has azine article where an Afghan official noted chosen to sit on the fence to wait out the that seeking justice in Afghanistan today is war rather than risk openly supporting the “like going to the wolves for help, when the Americans wolves have stolen your sheep.”52 As a result, the majority of the population has chosen to sit on the fence to wait out the war rather than greatly reducing the chances it would suc- risk openly supporting the Americans. The ceed. In both Vietnam and Afghanistan, U.S. Taliban consequently win when the populace policymakers needed to redress the role of fails to support the government, and as percep- external actors to the conflict. In Vietnam, tions of government corruption become more the United States redressed this issue in 1972 obvious there is little reason for them to sup- when it began bombing Cambodia and Laos, port the central government.53 which effectively damaged the ability of
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the Communists to wage the conventional improved this version. I am also thankful to war they attempted starting in 1972. In the editor of PRISM for his useful editorial Afghanistan, the United States has actively suggestions. targeted insurgent leaders hiding in Pakistan since 2008 through the use of drones, but a Notes Janus-faced ally and an impenetrable border area have enabled insurgents to largely elude 1 See Andrew J. Bacevich, The New American U.S. and NATO capture and/or destruction. Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War (Oxford: Moreover, both the bombings of Cambodia Oxford University Press, 2005), for one of the best cri- tiques on how history has been abused in the United and Laos, as well as the drone strikes in States. Pakistan, have had a blowback effect on the 2 Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, operation. Munich, Dien Bien Phu and the Vietnam Decision of 1965 Finally and perhaps most worryingly, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 12. 3 Rand Spiro et al., “Multiple Analogies for the United States was fighting a war to win Complex Concepts: Antidotes for Analogy-induced the hearts and minds of the people in both Misconception in Advanced Knowledge Acquisition,” in Afghanistan and Vietnam for governments Similarity and Analogical Reasoning, ed. Stella Vosniadou that were corrupt and not seen as legitimate and Andrew Ortony, 498–531 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). in the eyes of many inhabitants. This perceived 4 Bacevich also makes this argument in his 2012 lack of legitimacy was worsened by an inap- George C. Marshall Lecture of the American Historical propriate strategy in Vietnam and an ineffec- Association, “The Revisionist Imperative: Rethinking Twentieth Century Wars,” available at
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11 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965 (Cambridge: Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, Cambridge University Press, 2006), 335–336. 1986), 196. 22 Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power: The 12 Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Behind the Curve: American Bombing of North Vietnam (Lincoln, NE: Bison Globalization and International Terrorism,” Books, 2006), 184. International Security 27, no. 3 (Winter 2002/2003), 23 Cited in Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: 30–58. Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (New York: 13 Seth Jones, “The Rise of Afghanistan’s Basic Books, 2002), 307. Insurgency, State Failure and Jihad,” International 24 Ibid. Security 32, no. 4 (Spring 2008), 7–40. 25 Ivan Arreguin-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars: 14 U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable 07510, A Theory of Asymmetric War,” International Security 26, “Pakistan: Ambassador Raises bin Laden with Foreign no. 1 (2001), 105–106. Secretary Shamshad Ahmed,” October 6, 1998, Secret, 2 26 Bacevich, The New American Militarism, 9–33. pp. [Excised]; U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable 07841, 27 Mihai Carp, “Building Stability in Afghanistan,” “Osama bin Ladin: Coordinating our Efforts and NATO Review (Spring 2006); Sean Kay and Sahar Kahn, Sharpening our Message on bin Ladin,” October 19, “NATO and Counter-Insurgency: Strategic Liability or 1998, Secret, 7 pp. [Excised]; U.S. Department of State, Tactical Asset,” Contemporary Security Policy 28, no. 1 Cable 220495, “Osama bin Laden: Taliban Spokesman (2007), 163–181. Seeks New Proposal for Resolving bin Laden Problem,” 28 House of Commons Defence Committee, “UK November 28, 1998, Secret, 10 pp. [Excised]. Operations in Afghanistan,” 13th Report of Session, 15 Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon 2006–2007. & Schuster, 2002), 123–124. 29 Ari Fleischer, White House press brief- 16 Ibid., 124. ing, February 25, 2002, available at 106 | Features PRISM 3, no. 4 lessons from vietnam and afghanistan gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB343/osama_bin_ laden_file12.pdf>. 39 Department of State, Intelligence Information Report, October 22, 1996, available at PRISM 3, no. 4 Features | 107 U.S. Navy F/A-18F Super Hornet receives fuel from aerial refueling drone of Air Force KC-10 Extender over Afghanistan U.S. Air Force (Jason Robertson) What Is Wrong with the American Way of War? By Antulio J. Echevarria II ur understanding of the American way of war begins in 1973 with the publication of historian Russell Weigley’s classic work, The American Way of War: A History of U.S. OMilitary Strategy and Policy.1 Weigley maintained that after the Civil War, American military strategy essentially narrowed from the practice of two types, annihilation and attrition, to one, annihilation. As the United States experienced a “rapid rise from poverty of resources to plenty,” he argued, so too the American way of war tended to opt for strategies of annihilation, largely because it could.2 As a consequence, however, the further evolution of strategies of attri- tion was cut short, and American military strategy became unidimensional, or imbalanced. That, according to Weigley, was part of the problem with the Vietnam conflict. The other part of the problem, in his view, was that the era of using military force rationally to achieve the aims of policy was nearing its end. Between 1973 and 1999, fewer than one dozen pieces were published on the American way of war, and many of them were simply reviews of Weigley’s book. From 2000 to 2012, however, the number of articles and books concerning the American style of war tripled. One of the reasons for this increase is that the agenda associated with the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s related transformation program drew attention once again to Weigley’s American Way of War. Between 2000 and 2003, both the old and new American ways of war became popular topics among defense policymakers and scholars.3 Research into one way of war inevitably drew attention to the other.4 Although much of the literature in this period mischaracterized Weigley’s thesis, the idea that there had been a traditional way of war became the foil against which the “new” style was defined.5 After 2004, as the war in Iraq transformed from rapid and decisive to prolonged and ambig- uous, the literature on the American way of war became preoccupied with identifying what had gone wrong. Many experts were convinced that something, or several things, had indeed Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II is Director of Research for the U.S. Army War College. He is the author of Clausewitz and Contemporary War (Oxford University Press, 2007), Imagining Future War (Praeger Securities International, 2007), and After Clausewitz (University Press of Kansas, 2001), and has also published extensively on military history and theory and strategic thinking. PRISM 3, no. 4 Features | 109 echevarria failed, but it was not clear whether the failure One thing this debate clearly tells us, belonged to the new American way of war or albeit inadvertently, is that an RMA was pre- was deeply rooted in the U.S. approach to war cisely the wrong approach to take in trans- more generally. forming the U.S. military after the Cold War. Revolutions are not open-minded affairs in as the war in Iraq transformed from rapid search of optimal solutions. For revolution- and decisive to prolonged and ambiguous,the aries, the best solutions are already known: literature on the American way of war became no testing is necessary. As with the French or preoccupied with identifying what had Russian examples, revolutions rely on faith gone wrong and conviction, not logic and skepticism. Revolutions succeed by putting people with the “right” ideas into positions of power and It Was the RMA influence. That inevitably means marginaliz- There were two basic answers to this ques- ing opposing ideas and suppressing contrary tion. The first pointed to the U.S. military’s evidence. In that sense the RMA was a capital transformation as the crux of the issue, but it success. was divided. Some scholars held that trans- Ironically, that very success also under- formation had gone too far, while others felt mined the revolution from the start. The it had not gone far enough. The first group degree of certainty that revolutionaries must argued that transformation had proceeded possess was quite unsuitable for the unfold- too quickly: it had involved only a limited set ing security environment, which most schol- of capabilities, concentrated on only a nar- ars and U.S. defense documents described as row segment of the operational spectrum, likely to be more “uncertain, ambiguous, vola- and ignored war’s nature, in particular the tile, and complex” than ever before.9 What one elements of chance and uncertainty.6 The sec- ought to have in such an era, logic suggests, is ond view countered that the real problem was an open-ended approach, one that entertains that transformation had not gone far enough and tests a variety of ideas and develops hedg- because Service cultures had resisted it, pre- ing actions in the event that initial assump- ferring to shape new technology according to tions prove false. The elements of chance and their own traditions and preferences rather uncertainty, in other words, are equally power- than maximizing the revolutionary potential ful in environments outside war. such technologies afforded.7 To be sure, the On the contrary, military revolutions— story of the transformation of the U.S. mili- whether that of Gustavus Adolphus or another tary took place over three decades, not three (to be sure, those that qualify as genuine rev- years. Still, Secretary Rumsfeld’s idea of trans- olutions are few)—can rarely afford such an formation was, at root, about developing fun- approach. They have to get ahead of the com- damentally “new ways of thinking” that would petition and take advantage of an edge, which permit employing evolutionary capabilities in is invariably only temporal in nature. They revolutionary ways.8 Thus, the push in the late typically have only one overriding strategic 1990s and early 2000s was to realize the RMA rationale, and it is usually strategic expansion. in the form of new concepts. Under an RMA, the military arm is revamped 110 | Features PRISM 3, no. 4 the american way of war to become an offensive weapon. Rarely is such communication devices, computer technolo- an effort undertaken for purely defensive pur- gies, ballistic missiles, radar, optically guided poses. This was true for Gustavus as well as for anti-vehicle missiles, landmines, parachutes, the vaunted German blitzkrieg (which many artillery, robotics, and drones. Certainly the might well argue was not a military revolution U.S. military today has thousands of ground at all). The latter case was the model most fre- robotics and aerial drones in its inventory, but quently mentioned in RMA literature. Despite the numbers owned by the rest of the North historical narratives about decisive battles Atlantic Treaty Organization countries and of encirclement, the blitzkrieg was actually various other federal organizations are not far about avoiding static, or position warfare, a behind. Drones are clearly a controversial form Stellungskrieg, by breaking through an oppo- of standoff technology—but so are improvised nent’s lines and keeping relentless pressure explosive devices and vehicle-borne impro- on him to prevent a reestablishment of those vised explosive devices. Arguably, the chief dif- lines. It had little to do with German navy or ference between them lies only in their degrees air force ability to conduct long-range strate- of sophistication. What is more, all contem- gic bombing. And it broke down in theaters porary Western militaries seem to be highly where opponents could trade space for time. sensitive to casualties, which incidentally does The point is that it was as narrowly focused not square well with the first characteristic, and operationally aggressive as RMA advocates that of being apolitical. Political control may wanted the new American way of war to be, not be absolute, but it can extend to individ- though they looked to the air arm more than ual patrols and combat actions—something to ground forces to be decisive. Ultimately, Clausewitz could not have imagined. both ways of war were called upon to accom- plish too much. political control may not be absolute, but it It Was Systemic can extend to individual patrols and combat actions—something Clausewitz could not have The second basic answer as to what went imagined wrong with the American way of war casts the net much wider and tries to identify systemic causes. The most frequent criticisms in this Indeed, the first and second characteris- regard maintain that the American approach to tics deserve a closer look. The first goes hand- war tends to be apolitical, astrategic, techno- in-hand with another popular argument: that centric, and highly sensitive to casualties.10 Americans have historically failed to appreci- European styles of warfare, one would have ate the importance of Clausewitz’s observation to admit, also would reflect many of these that “war is the mere continuation of policy traits. Western militaries have been known to by other means.”11 This observation has been disregard political aims and to substitute mili- taken to mean many things, but none of them tary strategy for other forms. They have also should be that the continuation of policy by been techno-centric since at least the indus- “other” means is necessarily easy. While policy trial revolution by employing warships, forti- may appear simple on paper, its extension by fications, armored vehicles, aircraft, electronic other means is bound to meet stiff resistance PRISM 3, no. 4 Features | 111 echevarria Air Expeditionary Wing Epley) (Jason Air Expeditionary nd 332 MQ-9 waits out sandstorm at Joint Base Balad, Iraq or certainly considerable friction. It is worth shows that it was largely because of politics noting that, while Clausewitz got much right that American policy initially tried too hard to in On War, there is at least one matter on keep the war it wanted rather than winning the which he was so egregiously simplistic as to be war it had. History, in fact, suggests that the almost wrong—his reduction of policy to “the American way of war has never been apolitical. representative of all interests of the commu- One may disagree with what American policy nity.”12 In fact, it is almost never that. Whereas has been over the years, or what it was at the Clausewitz saw policy as unifying and recon- beginning of the millennium, but it clearly ciling, it is just as often divisive and antagoniz- influenced the conduct of operations in Iraq ing. Even when policy is embodied in a single and Afghanistan throughout every stage. What head of state, as it was in Clausewitz’s day, it American policy wanted to achieve initially in is still frequently and fiercely contested by the Iraq and Afghanistan was simply too much to interests of other classes and institutions. expect solely from any way of war, particularly one that was in many respects still evolving It Was the Expectations of Policy from a way of battle. A review of the literature regarding the key The contentious nature of U.S. politics political decisions concerning the war in Iraq eventually forced American policy to temper 11 2 | Features PRISM 3, no. 4 the american way of war its aims and bring them more in line with the problem is half the solution. However, opti- what could actually be achieved. This dialecti- mism is not necessarily justified just yet. Half cal pattern is not so different from what some a solution is ultimately just as useful as none. scholars have described as the American way Under today’s conditions of austerity, it is not of strategy.13 In their view, this way has been clear that there will be enough resources to carry historically balanced, albeit not without some through to a full reform. failures, between the “legitimacy politics” of All told, systemic causes are seductively international liberalism and the “power poli- convenient. Yet, as far as what is wrong tics” of realism.14 Inconsistencies in American with the American way of war, none of the foreign policy and strategy are thus explained, answers that point to deep-seated flaws seems perhaps too easily, by understanding the com- persuasive. The alleged roots are too shal- peting tensions created by upholding the val- low and the counterexamples are too many. ues of self-determination and nonintervention Instead, the more likely answer is that what on the one hand, and addressing the threats was wrong with the American way of war was posed by imperial powers or anarchy on the about the same as what was wrong with any other. It is thus more accurate to say that the other: policy aims and physical capabilities American way of war is not so much astrategic were initially misaligned, and it took time to as it is contradictory, reflecting the tensions inherent in American politics.15 With regard the American way of war has fared rather better to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the dialec- historically, and certainly no worse, than its tical tensions resulted in a strategic correction. British, French, and German counterparts To be sure, Americans have not always been so fortunate, but the fact that the tensions are there at all suggests that a strategy, even a poor expand the capabilities and revise the aims. one, is there too. Tactically, operationally, and even strategically In one important respect, however, the the American way of war has fared rather bet- above criticisms are entirely correct. The new ter historically, and certainly no worse, than American way of war did show a marked ten- its British, French, and German counterparts. dency to focus on the act of fighting more than Even in its most recent and most challenging on its follow-through, what is now commonly conflicts, it eventually proved itself capable referred to as war’s aftermath. There were clearly and adaptive, although whether the adapta- plans drawn up for Phase 4, but the plan that tions were altogether timely enough is another was chosen was one that fit the politics of the matter.16 Although there are critical issues still day rather than the practical situation. That to be addressed and fixed, the real culprit type of failure is not uniquely American, nor is seems to be that expectations were too many it historically unique. War’s aftermath is also far and too high. They rose all the more sharply from being a military issue alone. Fortunately, with turn-of-the-millennium rhetoric about there are some positive signs with recent talk of what the “new” American way of war was and reforming the interagency process and of institu- what it could do, a rhetoric that, after 9/11, tionalizing a “whole of government” approach. was matched with a political will that was The rhetoric is encouraging since identifying impatient to act. PRISM 3, no. 4 Features | 11 3 echevarria Paradoxically, we can know a way of 5 Arthur K. Cebrowski and Thomas P.M. Barnett, war only historically—by what it has done. “The American Way of War,” Transformation Trends, January 13, 2003; Victor Davis Hanson, “The American Unfortunately, historical knowledge tells us Way of War,” National Review 55, no. 7 (April 21, little about what that way of war will be in 2003), 10; Dick Cheney, “A New American Way of the years ahead. After more than 10 years War,” speech to the Heritage Foundation, May 1, 2003; of conflict, we now know better what the Richard B. Myers, “The New American Way of War,” Military Technology 27, no. 6 (June 2003), 64–74, and new American way of war was. Yet the force “The New American Way of War: Keeping the Legacy reductions under way in the United States Alive,” speech at the Navy League Air Space Exposition, are already changing that style of fighting in Washington, DC, April 16, 2003; William B. Scott, “New Way of War: Strategies Based on ‘Annihilation important ways, creating a different set of and Attrition’ Are Relegated to History,” Aviation Week shortcomings than those we had to overcome & Space Technology 158, no. 19 (May 12, 2003), 38–39; just recently. By the next conflict there will be Arthur Cebrowski, speech to the Heritage Foundation, a newer American way of war, but the need to May 13, 2003, reprinted in Transformation Trends, May 27, 2003; “Champion of ‘A New American Way of align, and realign, policy aims and real capa- War,’” Sea Power 46, no. 6 (June 2003), 15–16; and bilities is the one continuity that will require Donald H. Rumsfeld and Tommy R. Franks, “Summary constant attention. PRISM of Lessons Learned in OIF,” prepared testimony for the Senate Armed Services Committee, July 9, 2003. 6 Frederick Kagan, Finding the Target: The Transformation of American Military Policy (New York: Notes Encounter, 2006); Grant T. Hammond, “The U.S. Air Force and the American Way of War,” in Rethinking 1 Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A the Principles of War, ed. Anthony D. McIvor, 109–126 History of U.S. Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington: (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005). 7 Indiana University Press, 1973). Max Boot, “The Struggle to Transform the 2 Ibid., 36. Military,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 2 (March/April 3 Michael Ignatieff, “The New American Way of 2005), 103–118; Richard Lock-Pullen, “The U.S. Way War,” New York Times Review of Books, July 20, 2000, sur- of War and the ‘War on Terror,’” Politics & Policy 34, veyed new contributions to the existing literature. See no. 2 (2006), 374–399; Robert R. Tomes, U.S. Defense also Eliot A. Cohen, “Kosovo and the New American Strategy from Vietnam to Operation Iraqi Freedom: Military Way of War,” in War Over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy Innovation and the New American Way of War, 1973– in a Global Age, ed. Andrew J. Bacevich and Eliot A. 2003 (London: Routledge, 2007); Thomas Mahnken, Cohen, 38–62 (New York: Columbia University, 2001); Technology and the American Way of War Since 1945 Stephen Biddle, “The New Way of War? Debating the (New York: Columbia, 2008); John Arquilla, Worst Kosovo Model,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 3 (May/June Enemy: The Reluctant Transformation of the American 2002), 138–144; Max Boot, “Everything You Think Military (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2008). 8 You Know about the American Way of War Is Wrong,” Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Transforming the Foreign Policy Research Institute e-notes, September 12, Military,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 3 (May/June 2002), 2002; and Max Boot, Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars 20–32, 21. 9 and the Rise of American Power (New York: Basic Books, John J. Mearsheimer, “Why We Will Soon Miss 2002). the Cold War,” The Atlantic Monthly 266, no. 2 (August 4 Compare John Grenier, The First Way of War: 1990), 35–50. 10 American War Making on the Frontier, 1607–1814 Colin S. Gray, Irregular Enemies and the Essence of (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); and Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt? (Carlisle Wayne E. Lee, Barbarians and Brothers: Anglo-American Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), 30–49; Warfare, 1500–1865 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Anthony D. McIvor, ed. “The American Way of War: 2011), 2–3. Both make references to the contemporary Critique and Implications,” Rethinking the Principles of American way of war. War (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 13–40, 11 4 | Features PRISM 3, no. 4 the american way of war which listed 12 characteristics; Benjamin Buley, The New American Way of War: Military Culture and the Political Utility of Force (London: Routledge, 2008); Isaiah Wilson, Thinking Beyond War: Civil-Military Relations and Why America Fails to Win the Peace (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Reuben E. Brigety II, Ethics, Technology and the American Way of War: Cruise Missiles and U.S. Security Policy (London: Routledge, 2007); and Martin Shaw, The New Western Way of War: Risk-Transfer War and Its Crisis in Iraq (Cambridge: Polity, 2005). 11 Wilson, xiv. 12 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University, 1976), 607. For slightly different word- ing in the German edition, see Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, ed. Werner Hahlweg, 19th ed. (Bonn: Ferd. Dümmler, 1980), 993. To be fair, this was merely short- hand to avoid a lengthy discussion of policy that would surely have required another book. 13 Michael Lind, The American Way of Strategy: U.S. Foreign Policy and the American Way of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 14 Ibid., 23. 15 A similar case is made in Dominic Tierney, How We Fight: Crusades, Quagmires, and the American Way of War (New York: Little, Brown, 2010). 16 James A. Russell, Innovation, Transformation, and War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq 2005–2007 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010); and Chad Serena, A Revolution in Military Adaptation (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011). PRISM 3, no. 4 Features | 11 5 U.S. Navy hospital corpsman assists dehydrated patient during medical civil action project in Philippines DOD (William H. Ramsey) Operation Enduring Freedom—Philippines Civilian Harm and the Indirect Approach By Geoffrey Lambert, Larry Lewis, and Sarah Sewall his study examines the military support provided by U.S. Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines (JSOTF-P) to Philippine military operations. Building upon the 2010 T Joint Civilian Casualty Study—the first comprehensive examination of U.S. prevention and mitigation of civilian casualties based on U.S. operations in Afghanistan—this current effort aimed to assess civilian casualties in the different context of indirect U.S. operations. We found that the evolution of Philippine civilian and military strategy since the mid 2000s has reduced the occurrence and salience of civilian casualty issues during combat operations. Additionally, the study revealed many related best practices in JSOTF-P and Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines (OEF-P) more broadly, and provided insights into the possible future evolution of the mission and wider implications for foreign internal defense (FID) in the 21st century. This article provides a historical background of the insurgency and the evolution of the JSOTF-P mission and its impact. The next section describes a change in the nature of Philippine operations, followed by best practices, limitations, and a discussion of the issue of civilian casualties and broader violence against civilians in the Philippines. Finally, the article looks at overall implications for the U.S. Government in the future. Major General Geoffrey Lambert, USA (Ret.), is a Consultant at CACI International, Inc. Dr. Larry Lewis is a Senior Research Analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses and Current Field Representative to the Joint Staff J7, Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis Division. Dr. Sarah Sewall teaches at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government and is the 2012 Minerva Chair at the U.S. Naval War College. PRISM 3, no. 4 lessons learned | 11 7 lambert, lewis, and sewall Given its narrow mission, JSOTF-P has lasted 85 years, making it the longest lasting been highly successful—particularly consider- such movement in the history of the coun- ing its relatively small size and low cost. This try) and were never completely subjugated to success has been driven both by effective U.S. Spanish rule. After the Spanish-American War, military support at the tactical and operational these same southern islanders resisted the U.S. levels and by decisions and events outside of claim to the Philippines, leading to the Moro U.S. control. Key questions are whether the Rebellion, which constituted a southern front partnership has been able to achieve maxi- of the Philippine-American War.1 mum strategic impact and what it teaches After the establishment of the Philippine about the need to expand the flexibility and government in 1946, Moro elements in integration of U.S. responses to buttress weak the southern islands complained about states and combat regional instability. neglect and discrimination on the part of the Philippine government. General resentment A History of Insurgency in the Philippines crystallized into armed opposition when doz- ens of Moro Armed Forces of the Philippines The history of the Philippines is marked with (AFP) recruits were killed by other soldiers active resistance to standing governments. during their training in early 1968, followed These resistance movements can be roughly by a government coverup. This event was divided into two camps: insurgencies rooted the impetus for the formation of the Moro in religion (specifically, Islam) and those stem- National Liberation Front (MNLF), which took ming from political ideology (communism). up arms against the government in 1970. Peace At the same time, the persistence of these talks were held in 1976 after significant losses insurgencies spans ideology, stemming from on both sides, which led to a general stand- underlying factors that fuel discontent within down of operations amid the government’s insurgents and much of the population alike: agreement to give Moro areas more autonomy. widespread poverty, systemic corruption, ties A few years later, more conservative elements to criminal interests, and weak governance created a splinter group, the Moro Islamic over the roughly 7,000 islands that comprise Liberation Front (MILF). the Philippine archipelago. Islamic Insurgencies. Religious insurgency religious insurgency groups in the Philippines groups in the Philippines are rooted in exter- are rooted in external influences that arose nal influences that arose five centuries ago. five centuries ago Over time, Islamic beliefs had been largely embraced by many of the islands. In 1521, Ferdinand Magellan claimed the Philippine President Corazon Aquino negotiated with islands for Spain (hence the name of the MNLF leadership after President Ferdinand islands, after King Philip II of Spain), bring- Marcos stepped down in 1986; these discus- ing both a Western and Catholic influence to sions resulted in the establishment of the much of the Philippines. However, the people Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao in of the southern islands resisted this influence 1989, which created autonomy for districts (including the Dagohoy Rebellion, which with significant Muslim populations in the 11 8 | lessons learned PRISM 3, no. 4 operation enduring freedom—philippines southern islands while preserving the territo- It was strongest on the island of Luzon but had rial integrity of the Philippines overall. MNLF presence in other areas. After the Philippines reached a comprehensive peace agreement was established as a sovereign state in 1946 with the government in 1996. Key aspects of with leadership that opposed Marxist posi- this agreement included promises to provide tions, the Hukbalahap movement (and its farmland for enemy fighters, government members, the Huk) resisted the newly estab- resources for southern areas, and integration of lished government. The Huk were aided in MNLF fighters into the army.2 The U.S. Agency their efforts by significant operational expe- for International Development (USAID) rein- rience gained during their opposition to the forced this initiative through focused develop- Japanese occupation. Early Philippine efforts ment initiatives in the southern Philippines, to oppose the “Huk Rebellion” were largely such as the Livelihood Enhancement and Peace heavy-handed, and they mostly increased the project.3 This move appeased the MNLF but not population’s sympathy toward the movement, the MILF, and the latter continued active resis- doubling the size of the insurgency. tance against the government. The MILF and In the early 1950s, the Philippine military Philippine government have engaged in several began to employ a more discriminatory use peace negotiations since 2005. of force and adopt unconventional warfare Another Islamic orgnanization, the Abu methods. Guidance provided to the Philippine Sayyaf Group (ASG), was created in 1990 as forces was first “to act as an ambassador of elements of the resistance to Soviet occupation good will from the government to the people; in Afghanistan returned to the Philippines and second, to kill or capture Huk.”4 Philippine joined forces with radical elements of largely forces were instructed to appear as unthreat- nascent resistance groups. The ASG held the ening as possible to the population and were goal of establishing an Islamic state within the supplied with candy and gum to give to chil- Philippines and used bombings coupled with dren in order to recraft their image as friendly extortion and kidnappings (to raise needed to the people. Philippine Army Chief Ramon funds) to meet its ends. The Philippine govern- Magsaysay also took a personal role in investi- ment regards the ASG as a terrorist group, not gating and court-martialing troops accused of a political group to be bargained with. mistreating civilians. This resulted in improved Both the MILF and ASG have been aided professionalism of the force and an enhanced operationally via training, funding, and opera- reputation among the population. Meanwhile, tional assistance by cooperating with interna- the Huk insurgency adopted practices that tional terrorist organizations such as Jemaah alienated the civilian population, and they lost Islamiyah (JI) and al Qaeda. their support base as a result. Combined with Communist Insurgencies. Communist a surge in military forces in the early 1950s resistance groups have also challenged the and a program for reintegration and land government since the country’s inception as grants for surrendering Huk members, these a sovereign nation. During World War II, an factors led to the Huk force negotiating for underground communist movement created peace in 1954. in 1932 began a resistance movement to the Communist insurgents continued to Japanese occupation, known as Hukbalahap. exist at low levels through 1968, when the PRISM 3, no. 4 lessons learned | 11 9 lambert, lewis, and sewall movement divided into pro-Soviet and pro- President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo asking Maoist groups, mirroring an overall tension U.S. Pacific Command for assistance with ASG in communist ideologies espoused by the terror threats. The command responded by Soviet Union and China, respectively. While having Special Operations Command, Pacific the pro-Soviet group adopted an engagement (SOCPAC) conduct counterterrorism train- strategy with the Philippine government, the ing for a Philippine Light Reaction Company Maoist group, known as the Communist Party (LRC) between March and July 2001. of the Philippines, took on active resistance In May 2001, another ASG operation took to the government through its armed group, 20 hostages from the Philippine resort island of the New People’s Army. This group had the Palawan. Three of the hostages were American, broadest presence of all insurgent groups in including one who was beheaded a few days the Philippines, an active decision based on later. This incident intensified U.S. support to a lesson from the Huk Rebellion—that local Philippine counterterrorism operations, with resistance movements can be more easily iso- SOCPAC providing intelligence assistance in lated and defeated. After 20 years of insurgent addition to training the LRC. SOCPAC had activity, events in 1986, including the People’s planned a terrorist coordination and assis- Revolution and the stepping down of President tance visit to help determine the capabilities Marcos, removed a number of grievances held and limitations of the AFP and inform future by the general population, and the group lost support. The visit occurred in October 2001, in much of its support from the population. the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, which raised More recently, their activities have narrowed the relative importance of the issue of terrorism to extortion and shadow governance. for the United States. In November 2001, in the aftermath of that visit, Philippine President Abu Sayyaf Terror Campaign and U.S. Response Arroyo and President George W. Bush agreed to a plan of action to improve the ability of the In 1998, ASG leadership changed to Khadifi Philippines to combat terror. The United States Janjalani,5 who took the group in a new direc- would provide the Philippines with military tion: kidnapping and demanding ransoms assistance and economic aid, and U.S. forces to finance operations and gain a platform to would deploy to the Philippines to “advise emphasize its demands for a separate Islamic and assist” the AFP. These initiatives became state. The year 2000 marked a series of opera- Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines, the tions reflecting this new approach. For exam- second OEF mission addressing terrorist threats ple, in March 2000, ASG kidnapped over 50 to the United States.6 students and teachers from two schools in JSOTF-P Mission and Impact Basilan. Four were killed before the group was released. The following month, ASG kidnapped Prior to 9/11, Admiral Dennis Blair, com- 21 people from a neighboring Malaysian resort mander of U.S. Pacific Command, funded the island, Sipadan. Libya served as mediator and training of Philippine LRCs in order to improve eventually paid a ransom of over $20 million the host nation’s capability to address its inter- for their release. These and similar events in nal insurgent threats. The training mission the southern Philippines led to Philippine was assigned to 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces 120 | lessons learned PRISM 3, no. 4 operation enduring freedom—philippines Group (Airborne). The LRC project served to rapidly deployable task force for responding build personal relationships that would assist to contingencies. In July 2002, JSOTF-P was in partnerships that arose after September 2001. established to replace JTF 510. After 9/11, initial U.S. planning for coun- Special operations forces (SOF) trainers terterrorism operations on Basilan Island built ranges and taught basic rifle marksman- included a course of action for a maritime ship and platoon- and company-base defense joint task force (JTF) to conduct U.S. combat and maneuver. The host nation provided operations on the island. This plan was dis- 30,000 new rifles and 1 million rounds of carded quickly when it became apparent that ammunition to support the training. The result the Philippine constitution forbade direct uni- was small units that could engage targets and lateral operations by other nations within the conduct maneuver with confidence. country. Therefore, an indirect/FID approach had to be developed. a course of action for a maritime JTF was When SOCPAC was given the preliminary discarded when it became apparent that the counterterrorism mission, it first assessed the Philippine constitution forbade direct unilateral situation on Basilan to gain understanding of operations by other nations within the country the environment. This assessment revealed that the AFP did not view the population as the cen- ter of gravity, abuses were not uncommon, and As tactical forces became more proficient corruption was endemic. In addition, AFP tac- through JSOTF-P efforts, SOF trainers began to tics were based on maneuver of battalion-sized shift to the professionalization of higher level forces that were often unable to find and close headquarters. Once joint goals for training and with terrorists on the island. Complicating fac- equipping targeted AFP units were met, sub- tors were the AFP’s lack of maintenance capa- sequent assessments resulted in downsizing bility, mobility, functioning weapons, and JSOTF-P and a change in mission to “advise training ammunition, as well as weaknesses in and assist,” with a prohibition on military platoon and company maneuver. training. Operations were extended beyond The initial intent of U.S. OEF-P forces Basilan Island to Jolo, Mindanao, and other was to train and equip AFP on Basilan, areas of concern. After this change, JSOTF-P focusing specifically on increasing AFP tac- shifted to operating primarily at higher ech- tical proficiency against terror elements of elons, with advisors located at the brigade and concern to the United Sates (such as JI and higher levels and additional liaison coordina- ASG). Restrictions on foreign military forces’ tion elements at other critical locations. use of force (except in self-defense) kept U.S. The vast Philippine archipelago compli- forces from a “trigger-puller” role, and, in cated Philippine security force efforts to main- deference to this restriction, guidance was tain presence and eliminate terrorist sanctu- given that U.S. troops had to be at least “one aries. JSOTF-P capabilities assisted Philippine hill” removed from locations where contact efforts to provide security in the southern with the enemy could be anticipated. In islands. The JSOTF-P focus transitioned from January 2001, initial forces deployed under supporting the tactical edge of AFP counterter- the command of the SOCPAC JTF 510, a rorism operations to a more operational-level PRISM 3, no. 4 lessons learned | 121 lambert, lewis, and sewall focus, helping units to structure balanced cam- procedure that has considered the population paigns in their local areas. and minimized civilian harm. JSOTF-P provided support, such as fus- Prior AFP Approach: Scouring and Civilian ing intelligence and developing targeting Casualties. In the early 2000s, Philippine secu- approaches, to specific counterterrorism opera- rity forces (both AFP and Philippine National tions. It also provided mentoring in areas that Police [PNP]) faced a series of high profile ASG aided the AFP in separating terrorists from operations in addition to continuing pressure the population, such as civil-military opera- from the New People’s Army, MNLF, and MILF. tions,7 public affairs, and Military Information Similar to the early days of the Huk Rebellion Support to Operations. JSOTF-P also contrib- in the late 1940s, Philippine forces were seen as uted enabling capabilities in support of AFP heavy handed in their response, causing signifi- high-value individual operations, including cant numbers of civilian casualties and exten- full motion video from Scan Eagle and video- sive damage to property.9 One factor was their equipped low-signature aircraft. indiscriminate approach to operations, engag- ing all individuals in areas where the enemy recent U.S. military assessments state that the operated and considering civilians as the enemy major counterterrorism campaign objectives of or enemy supporters. Forces were rewarded for OEF-P have been accomplished that because a metric for success was the body count from each operation.10 Forces also used imprecise methods of engagement, such as The consensus between the U.S. and unguided air munitions, unobserved artillery, Philippine governments is that OEF-P has been and naval gunfire to soften targets.11 successful, as terrorist groups in the southern At the same time, Philippine security Philippines since 2001 are isolated in smaller forces tended to be ineffective because of poor and smaller geographical areas, have increas- operational security. As a result, the enemy ingly ineffective and uncoordinated leadership, could evade AFP operations or prepare an are unable to effectively recruit personnel and ambush for the AFP, causing large numbers of move them into the Philippines, are unable to friendly casualties.12 garner significant financial support, and are New Approach: Restraint and Considering unable to conduct significant operations. The the Population. By the end of the decade, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review points out Philippine forces, particularly the AFP, had OEF-P as a successful model for operations developed a different approach to dealing that is applicable to operational environments with terrorist groups. The AFP moved from beyond the Philippines.8 indiscriminate operations to giving signifi- cant consideration to the general population, Evolution of the AFP Approach and Accounting for Civilian Harm including civilian casualties, property dam- age, human rights, civil-military operations, A key component of the success against terror- and the welfare of displaced persons.13 This ist groups in the Philippines in the past decade change of approach was illustrated in 2008 appears to be the AFP transition from employ- when MILF resorted to kinetic operations ing a brute-force approach to a highly focused after a Supreme Court ruling that threw out 122 | lessons learned PRISM 3, no. 4 operation enduring freedom—philippines the proposed terms of a negotiated peace and performing civil-military operations. The accord. The AFP responded with restraint and “20 percent” activities were mainly conducted consideration of the population, establishing by specialized units, specifically Joint Special camps for displaced persons and providing Operations Groups (JSOGs), which special- food and water. The response from the popu- ized in direct action operations and targeting, lation was positive, and the AFP was seen as and Philippine National Police–Special Action protectors of the population, building trust Force (PNP-SAF), a police element dedicated that aided their overall campaign. One mem- to warrant-based captures of high-profile indi- ber of the U.S. Embassy team described this viduals.16 The use of these specialized, highly transformation, stating, “They were seen as trained elements for targeting helped to com- the savior of the people—it was a watershed bat operational security problems and spared moment for them.”14 That reinforced the value garrison forces from the fallout resulting from of the population-centric approach they had direct action operations.17 recently adopted. This and other instances Civil-military operations. Following the gradually showed the AFP that, as one officer early example of U.S. forces in Basilan in noted, “Constraint is a weapons system”15 that 2002,18 the AFP largely embraced the use of can be effective in countering terrorist groups. civil-military operations, providing services to Elements of the new approach are described the population overall and specifically flood- below. ing areas affected by kinetic operations with An 80/20 approach. The AFP changed its aid to win the support of the population and approach to focus on the population through maintain freedom of action.19 Because the the use of civil-military operations geared employment of civil-military operations cre- toward improving the relationship between ated greater contact with the population, the the AFP and the population, winning civilian AFP could better understand the local environ- support for the AFP and Philippine govern- ment and know which areas were permissive ment, and discouraging support for terrorist or nonpermissive. groups. Civil-military operations were seen as The AFP’s use of civil-military operations so valuable that the AFP established an 80/20 tended to sway the population as well as aid approach, where 80 percent of AFP activities in counterterrorism operations. For example, were to consist of civil-military operations and in Cotabato City, one local stated that the 20 percent were to be targeting/combat opera- AFP “used to come in with guns, missiles, and tions. The shift began in April 2007 under AFP heavy weapons. Now, they are messengers of Chief of Staff General Hermogenes Esperon, peace and building our schools.”20 Similarly, Jr., who indicated that the military would in Basilan, the use of civil-military operations abandon its previous procedure, focused on helped to communicate the message that the kinetic operations, and instead would concen- AFP was opposing only the ASG, with the trate on civil-military operations. goal of protecting the population.21 Activities Under this new approach, battlespace included providing food, water, and shelter for owners would conduct the population-centric displaced individuals and humanitarian assis- activities (the “80 percent”): protecting the tance during natural disasters. These activities population, gathering human intelligence, served to separate JI/ASG terror elements from PRISM 3, no. 4 lessons learned | 123 lambert, lewis, and sewall the population.22 In one example, an individ- engage their intended targets, they chose not ual in Jolo was so impressed by local AFP care to engage due to collateral damage concerns: of the population that he provided the tip that “We will get them another day.”26 led to Abu Solaiman in 2007, a key high-value Currently, therefore, AFP conduct of individual in the southern Philippines. When focused operations is centered on consider- the AFP formalized this method in 2007, ation of civilian casualties and protecting the Khaled Musa, the deputy chairman of the population.27 This consideration even includes MILF committee on information, commented a medical evacuation response: if civilian casu- that the AFP’s use of civil-military operations alties occur, the AFP will take those casualties was “more lethal than brute force” to the orga- to a military hospital to receive medical care. nization, and noted that a similar approach The AFP reported giving civilians a higher evac- to MNLF led to a mass surrender of insurgent uation priority than its own forces to empha- fighters in the 1996 peace agreement with the size AFP concern for the civilian population.28 government.23 Focused operations. Specialized elements of the forces displayed tactical patience, where, the army and police conducted a large num- despite having the opportunity to engage their ber of targeting operations comprising the 20 intended targets, they chose not to engage percent of the Philippine 80/20 approach. due to collateral damage concerns These operations were highly focused, aimed at capturing or killing the intended target with a minimum of civilian casualties or damage. Philippine leadership: A forcing function This process began with solid and complete for new approach. Philippine forces discussed intelligence. JSOG tended to develop its own how their changed focus toward the popula- intelligence for its operations, though it did tion and avoidance of civilian casualties and at times rely on intelligence from the United human rights was driven by senior leaders in States to verify what it had.24 PNP-SAF required the government. They ascribed prior heavy- intelligence and information adequate for handed practices to the legacy of the Marcos obtaining a warrant before they could oper- dictatorship and a lack of appreciation for how ate.25 Both groups stated that they were careful counterproductive these practices were. A piv- about intelligence they gave to ground com- otal year for this change in focus was 2007, manders to ensure it was reliable. On AFP when General Esperon emphasized civil-mil- direct action missions, the forces took great itary operations in AFP operations. President pains to obtain accurate positive identification Arroyo and the rest of the government rein- of the target during the operation and chose forced this change in direction by establishing precise means of engagement with a low risk the National Development Support Command of civilian casualties. They did not engage oth- and putting human rights into laws govern- ers on the objective even if they had weapons, ing Philippine counterterrorism operations.29 unless the force was compromised and they Other senior AFP leadership promoting this needed to engage those individuals in self- new approach included Lieutenant General defense. They also displayed tactical patience, Raymundo Ferrer and General Alexander Yano. where, despite having the opportunity to Leaders we spoke to noted that the Arroyo 124 | lessons learned PRISM 3, no. 4 operation enduring freedom—philippines government’s emphasis on a negotiated solu- leaders in their counterterrorism campaign. tion also represented an important turning So, while the changes in the AFP approach point. The momentum appears to be continu- to more carefully conform to human rights ing in the new Internal Peace and Security Plan considerations and reduce civilian casualties issued by the Aquino government on January was a Philippine-led transformation, JSOTF-P 1, 2011, which recasts the ongoing counterter- probably provided tools that helped the AFP rorism campaign as “winning the peace.” It achieve those changes. focuses on an integrated interagency approach, Limiting second-order effects: Civilian casual- nonkinetic aspects of the campaign, and trust- ties and political primacy. The Philippine security building in support of a negotiation process. forces face a number of challenges that affect One senior leader concern also traced their ability to maintain security and neutral- the new approach to policies and laws that ize terrorist elements. Specialized units of the affected rank and promotion decisions. For AFP tended to capture and kill the majority example, the AFP “relieves commanders a of the targets. Because the specialized units33 lot more than we [the U.S. military] do” for were better resourced and trained to support human rights concerns and civilian casualty their missions so they could operate in confi- incidents.30 Philippine law now allows individ- dence, the two main concerns of these units uals to charge AFP and PNP forces with human appeared to be mission success and avoiding rights violations, such as civilian casualties and civilian casualties. AFP concerns about not violating the rights of detainees.31 A charge of only potential civilian casualties but also a human rights violation is forwarded to the any form of cost or blowback from an opera- appropriate army or police office (for example, tion appeared to be a constraining factor in the human rights office for the AFP) and an the AFP approach to offensive operations. unresolved charge can prevent promotion of As noted earlier, the AFP had come to see officers accused of violations.32 Consequently, civilian casualties through a domestic rather commanders and forces are aware of civilian than international legal lens. This meant that casualties and how detainees are treated in instead of a proportionality assessment of the their commands. potential risks of civilian casualties, they were The change in mindset, while driven effectively defaulting to a zero-casualty goal. by Philippine leadership from above, was This was reinforced by their keen perception likely enabled in part by U.S. military efforts. that their careers were vulnerable to abuse JSOTF-P “advise and assist” efforts helped to allegations. professionalize the AFP and improve profi- Additionally, the AFP was highly sensi- ciency and professionalism, enabling both the tive to the government’s desire for a political more effective use of civil-military operations settlement with insurgent (instead of terrorist) and the conduct of focused operations with groups. The AFP thus sought to avoid alienat- minimized collateral damage. International ing potential negotiating partners or otherwise Military Education and Training efforts also prejudicing the political process. The effect of exposed AFP officers to U.S. doctrine and tac- these political priorities allowed terrorist sanc- tics, techniques, and procedures that aided in tuaries to exist, since the JI group enjoyed pro- operationalizing the intent of the Philippine tection from an insurgent group (the MILF). PRISM 3, no. 4 lessons learned | 125 lambert, lewis, and sewall Nonetheless, most observers argued that JI this article, but a wide range of reports and was actually contained within this “sanctuary.” reporting suggests that corruption and a lack Political concerns also appeared to constrain of effective ministry capability remain major military operations in specific geographic areas impediments to sustainable progress in field or times. One of the roles of U.S. intelligence operations. International Crime Investigative support was to provide reassurance regarding Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), a U.S. the likely success and limited second-order Department of Justice training program for effects of raids. improving Philippine police effectiveness, is In one sense, this evolution of the AFP’s one solution for addressing this key shortfall. attitude represented a victory for civil-mili- However, the program has a tactical focus tary relations, respect for human rights, and only, so institutional shortcomings were not long-term effectiveness and internal trust of being addressed in U.S. efforts. While the military institutions.34 However, it also had overall Philippine goal is to move the coun- accompanying near-term effects that rein- terterrorism mission to law enforcement forced “the speed of sovereignty” and the agencies, this goal is undermined by a police political, vice technical, limits on military force that often lacks the capacity for that operations. While American partners some- mission, with the exception of the PNP-SAF. times found this frustrating considering The next two sections contain the study swiftly fulfilling the JSOTF-P counterterror- team’s observations of best practices exhib- ism mission, they fully accepted the need to ited in OEF-P. The best practices include allow the Philippine government and AFP to conduct operations as those actors deemed one of the major advances in Philippine appropriate. Though difficult for some ini- thinking was the need to integrate police into tially, this acceptance reflected the broad and counterterrorism operations sophisticated understanding of the indirect approach evident in JSOTF-P. Shifting counterterrorism to law enforcement. approaches by JSOTF-P, the Country Team One of the major advances in Philippine in the U.S. Embassy, and Philippine forces, thinking was the need to integrate police into as well as observations concerning key con- counterterrorism operations, both to expand straints that limited the benefits and sustain- capacity to handle terrorists “downstream” ability of the overall OEF-P effort. and to reinforce the notion that this is a crim- Best Practices inal law enforcement effort. The ANP also noted that this minimized the potential for Creation of Precision Units. With U.S. assis- false claims of mistreatment of civilians. tance, the Philippines created and improved However, both the PNP and Philippines upon several specialized precision units that criminal justice system in general are weak, have additional training and higher levels of limiting the effectiveness of this shift in technology and resourcing than other host approach.35 Examination of the profession- nation security forces: the Philippine JSOG, alism and capacity of Philippine adminis- the Light Reaction Company, and the PNP-SAF. trative institutions is beyond the scope of Operating with JSOTF-P advice and assistance, 126 | lessons learned PRISM 3, no. 4 operation enduring freedom—philippines these units allow the Philippines to be more This move enables the AFP commitment to surgical in the execution of combat operations, a larger role for civil-military operations in improving effectiveness against terrorist ele- its overall approach, a role that JSOTF-P has ments while lessening civilian casualties and encouraged. The population views these units human rights abuses. favorably since they demonstrate the govern- Full Integration across U.S. Embassy ment’s will to improve the lives of its citizens, Country Team: Mindanao Working Group. The and the resulting operations have aided the Country Team/JSOTF-P relationship has effectiveness of counterterrorism operations. improved significantly over the past year due Corruption does, however, remain an issue. to concerted attention. Weekly Country Team Replacing Search-and-Destroy Tactics with meetings and JSOTF-P’s full-time liaison in Focused Operations. The Philippine approach the Embassy have been helpful in integrating to combating terror and insurgency has moved JSOTF-P efforts into the overall Country Team from counterproductive search-and-destroy tac- plan. JSOTF-P elements working with the tics to focused targeting operations. Focused Deputy Chief of Mission crafted the Embassy’s operations are characterized as having clearly Mindanao Work Group, which by mid-2011 articulated objectives, detailed planning and was essentially a steering group effort for the rehearsal, robust intelligence on both the target Country Team’s initiatives in the southern and the immediate environment, and the abil- Philippines. The JSOTF-P commander stated ity of ground commanders to abort operations that such an integrated effort was essential for when there are concerns of civilian casualties. a comprehensive approach to addressing U.S. Partnered Control of Technology. U.S.- counterterrorism goals in the Philippines. Philippine combined/joint fusion cells facili- Robust Liaison. JSOTF-P liaison activities tate partnered use of U.S. weapon systems range well beyond a narrow U.S. counterterror- technology to enable host nation operations ism focus, reaching broadly into host nation and give them capability they otherwise lack. combat units, civic actions, police, and other Partnered control of precision weaponry locations, reflecting a deliberate effort to pur- equals partnered accountability and respon- sue an indirect approach. Resultant relation- sibility while allowing host nation use of ships with key influencers provide for optimal advanced capabilities to maximize mission exchange of information, strengthened under- effectiveness. standing of terrorist and insurgent operations, Combining Direct and Indirect Approaches greater acceptance of U.S. presence, and oppor- to Counterinsurgency. The Philippine politi- tunities for synergy and force multipliers in cal, military, and police leadership agree support of shared goals. that the previous heavy-handed strategy for Activation of a National Civic Action prosecuting the 40-year war against multiple Command. The AFP established a National simultaneous insurgencies, characterized by Development Support Command, which human rights violations and civilian casual- includes forces such as civil affairs, medical, ties, has failed. The Philippines has adopted a engineer, and other units charged with the old new approach that combines direct and indi- U.S. doctrinal mission of civic action as part rect methods in concert to combat terrorism. of internal defense and development strategy. It uses a division of labor to blunt terrorism PRISM 3, no. 4 lessons learned | 127 lambert, lewis, and sewall while fostering national reconciliation. While this office was helpful to individuals who had precision security force units will focus on crit- been falsely accused of such violations. This ical kinetic direct action operations, the bat- overall approach appears to clearly fix personal tlespace owners in the AFP and locally based responsibility for conduct and avoidance of PNP will carry 80 percent of the load by con- human rights violations, facilitating a change ducting security operations, civic action, and in mindset of host nation forces in ways that intelligence-gathering to separate the people have helped the population welcome their pres- from the terrorists. ence and activities, leading to improved success Strategic Tempo and Tactical Patience. in counterterrorism operations. Philippine counterterrorism operations are Low Visibility Dispersion. Having widely conducted in the context of an internal 40-year dispersed JSOTF-P air operations, command conflict. There is no timetable for Philippine and control, and liaison coordination ele- forces to withdraw—unlike U.S. forces in Iraq ments enhance force protection by lowering and Afghanistan—since they stand on national visibility of U.S. presence. Living in safe areas sovereign territory. Civilian casualties and on host nation bases also reduces force sig- human rights are key concerns that can out- nature and the likelihood of adversary attack. weigh temporary military gains from specific Attention to Internally Displaced Persons. operations. Therefore, Philippine forces have IDPs have been a significant problem through- learned the benefits of tactical patience—if nec- out the Philippines’ troubled past in light of essary, many targets can wait for opportunities its history of internal conflicts and natural when they can be actioned and these key con- disasters. IDPs are now considered in military cerns can be avoided. JSOTF-P advisors have and police operational planning. Capabilities learned to adjust their tempo to avoid stressing of military, police, and governmental social host nation sovereignty, governance, and trust. welfare agencies can be integrated to mitigate Host Nation Human Rights Officers and IDPs caused by military operations or natu- Training. The Philippine security forces require ral disasters. Such aid helps to influence the that an officer in each battalion serves as a population and improve relationships between human rights officer, usually as an extra duty. civilians and security forces. In contrast, fail- The officers train the units on human rights ure to consider and factor in considerations for policy and ensure that human rights are a con- IDPs in operations in Afghanistan harmed the sideration during operations. Any citizen may relationship with the population and provided accuse a member of the police or armed forces material for enemy information operations. of a human rights violation. Those accused have Key Constraints their careers flagged until the matter is resolved in civilian court. The Armed Forces Joint Staff Indirect Operations Equal No Use of Force has a human rights office on it, and human from the United States. A key aspect of plan- rights training is part of the AFP National Police ning by the United States for operations in the academy’s curriculum. The AFP human rights Philippines was the prohibition against the office was established as a single point of con- United States using force in offensive opera- tact for concerns about violations by the AFP. tions. Therefore, an indirect/FID approach was Soldiers met by the study team mentioned that developed to accomplish the U.S. objectives 128 | lessons learned PRISM 3, no. 4 operation enduring freedom—philippines by, with, and through the Philippine secu- local leaders. JSOTF-P lacked such a mecha- rity forces. What might have initially been nism, however. Another lost opportunity was perceived by the U.S. military as a constraint JSOTF-P inability to travel with AFP leaders on resulted in an operational strategy that military aircraft without prior coordination helped the AFP avoid fueling the decade-long and U.S. military four-star approval. JSOTF-P Philippine insurgency. Nonetheless, there stated that the inability to host AFP leaders in were several other constraints that limited certain occasions precluded taking advantage the benefits and sustainability of the indirect of opportunities for influence. Overall, mili- approach in the Philippines. tary forces require flexibility to apply resources Limited Authorities/Capabilities/Resources for the Indirect Approach. Some limitations the lack of an agile mechanism to get hindered JSOTF-P ability to influence the needed resources for influence operations host nation. U.S. forces did not have all of the led to missed opportunities resources they believed they needed to build influence and relationships with Philippine forces and government elements. For exam- in unconventional ways to empower the indi- ple, the need for a low level of discretion- rect approach. Thus, the lack of an agile mech- ary funding was an early lesson in Iraq and anism to get needed resources for influence Afghanistan, which has been addressed by operations led to missed opportunities. providing military forces with Commander’s Efforts Did Not Feature Institutional Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds Reform (Sustainability). The later phase of to aid them in influencing the population and OEF-P was an advise-and-assist mission in DOD (Michael J. Carden) J. (Michael DOD U.S. Soldier serving in Operation Junior Heroes in Philippines looks at children’s book teaching IED awareness PRISM 3, no. 4 lessons learned | 129 lambert, lewis, and sewall support of Philippine counterterrorism opera- Afghanistan have many examples of senior tions and was not geared toward improving leaders actively establishing and maintaining institutional capability. For example, JSOTF-P these relationships. was not authorized to conduct training. While Even with an integrated U.S. Country there were ways to work around this restric- Team effort in 2011, many of those inter- tion, the study team sensed that this limi- viewed expressed a lack of understanding or tation was frustrating to some elements in appreciation of a common plan or coordi- JSOTF-P because their impact was limited to nated approach within the team. It was not the forces with whom they could work directly. clear whether a more conscious counterter- Authorization to include training in their rorism approach could be agreed upon across mandate, even without additional resources, the U.S. Government or would be accepted might have allowed them to create greater syn- by the Philippine government. Nonetheless, ergies and expand their impact. For example, from the JSOTF-P perspective, it would be a they wished to use available resources to tie welcome development. For example, despite together advise/assist topics for inclusion in USAID priorities having a strong focus on the curricula for AFP schoolhouses, which would southern Philippines, the agency dedicated have helped make their advising mission more $400 million to work in Mindanao, which sustainable and increased the impact of U.S. was 60 percent of the total USAID investment. efforts. This challenge is one example of the JSOTF-P members noted that it was hard to see inherent stovepipes created by limited author- any impact from that development. Military ities granted in Title 10 (for example, opera- officials perceived development work as con- tional advise and assist) and Title 22 (security ducted to “better the lives of people in the assistance) missions. Philippines” instead of “make development Inconsistent Interagency Teaming. Ideally, work [to] reinforce [U.S.] interests.” OEF-P would be an integrated interagency Another example is justice system reform. effort, pulling in different aspects of national This appeared critical to military actors since power to best effect. Different phases of the process to prosecute terrorists was lengthy OEF-P have featured such interagency inte- and sometimes ineffective. To improve this gration. At the same time, this integration has process, JSOTF-P pursued a team effort with been inconsistent, pointing out the ad hoc the Department of Justice’s ICITAP program. and personality-dependent nature of inter- But the ICITAP program appeared to be a agency teaming. Integration was reported by poor fit to the challenges in the Philippines. both military and Department of State ele- ICITAP trains police skills, but without a ments to be strong between 2002 and 2007. higher level program to reform police leader- During this time, different elements of the ship accompanied by addressing pay issues, U.S. Country Team would meet weekly to training basic skills to police forces can sim- focus and synchronize effects in Mindanao. ply help make a corrupt force more efficient Such strong integration appeared to emerge in its corruption. Importantly, this situation again in 2010 and 2011. While it is not clear has changed in the past few months because why interagency teaming was not as strong in of the work of the Mindanao Working Group the years between these two periods, Iraq and within the U.S. Embassy, which started to 130 | lessons learned PRISM 3, no. 4 operation enduring freedom—philippines move U.S. efforts back toward an enterprise temporary solution to a problem that will approach with increased unity of effort. likely reemerge. These considerations point to the fact One corollary to this is that U.S. military that, for all its successes, OEF-P was not forces require resources that are unconven- designed to be sustainable. There is no com- tional yet appropriate to the use of the indirect ponent of OEF-P that is chartered to fold key approach and influence operations in the name components of the advise-and-assist mission of national security. These can include a process into AFP institutions so they can be perpetu- for agile resourcing of requirements, such as a ated. Therefore, hard-fought progress could CERP-like mechanism, as well as the ability to be lost when the U.S. effort is reduced in obtain requirements that may seem unconven- scope or eliminated. OEF-P also stands as tional to a procurement system that normally an example of how the U.S. Government has operates for conventional military resources. not been consistently able to synchronize and synergize its efforts in the Philippines for while U.S. direct action operations alone can maximum effect. In a time of decreasing U.S. make short-term gains against global terrorism, resources, it becomes even more important a U.S. kinetic approach is unsustainable in itself to consider how effects can be made sustain- able and how limited resources can be used to obtain maximum effect. Other resources that can be useful in pur- suing the indirect approach are intelligence Lessons for the United States products that support an accurate understand- The lessons of OEF-P are instructive for the ing of the population as well as threat groups, United States over the next decade as it is faced since this facilitates efforts to separate terrorists with maximizing desired effects in an austere from the population. At the same time, assess- budgetary environment. ments to understand host nation capabilities Use of the Indirect Approach for Security and limitations—including operations analysis Concerns. Progress in the Philippines sug- for understanding what elements of the host gests the importance of the indirect approach nation approach were or were not working— to FID and security assistance in addressing would be valuable in helping the U.S. military U.S. national security concerns. While U.S. tailor its advise-and-assist efforts to areas where direct action operations alone can make they are most needed. It may also be valuable short-term gains against global terrorism, to provide expeditionary intelligence, surveil- a U.S. kinetic approach is unsustainable in lance, and reconnaissance platforms to give itself. Partners are essential in the struggle intelligence support to host nation targeting against violent extremism, and partners and boost its confidence. may require the United States to adopt an Monitoring and Reducing Civilian Harm. indirect approach to a common challenge. When host nation security forces injure civil- In addition, the history of the Philippines ians, the political costs can be significant experience with extremism shows that both domestically and internationally. In the direct action without addressing underly- Philippines, extra-judicial killings (noncom- ing factors that lead to grievances can be a bat-related deaths of civilians) alleged to have PRISM 3, no. 4 lessons learned | 131 lambert, lewis, and sewall been perpetrated by government officials have situation. For instance, several examples exist been of particular concern over the past decade. in which forces significantly reduced civil- Nongovernmental organizations have issued ian casualties while maintaining or improv- critical reports about extra-judicial killings, ing operational effectiveness. Other examples and, in 2007, the U.S. Government and United show that when the military does not address Nations Special Rapporteur for extra-judicial this issue, it can find its freedom of action seri- killings both issued critical reports about them ously curtailed. Given these lessons, the U.S. in the Philippines.36 Human rights violations military and Embassy team should be more remain liabilities for the host nation govern- deliberate in tracking and remediating civilian ment and its partners, so much so that they harm given its strategic impact, including in become evidence of the government’s failure to partnered operations. protect civilians or effectively prosecute human Tailored Human Rights Training for Host rights abusers. Moreover, where government Nation Forces. The Philippine forces’ attitudes employees are directly involved in such abuses, toward civilian casualties suggested the need they bespeak the failure of government and for a more nuanced appreciation of civil- its institutions. Such considerations impact ian casualty issues and frameworks by U.S. U.S. assistance to foreign militaries such as Country Teams and forces working indirectly the Philippines due to legislation prohibiting with host nation security forces. In the case of aid to nations with established human rights the AFP, concern about the potential personal abuses. Therefore, human rights abuses com- career ramifications of causing civilian casual- mitted by government actors, even if outside ties appeared to induce significant caution with official military operations, are cause for con- regard to combat operations. One contribut- cern of the Country Team as well as U.S. and ing factor was the fact that AFP operated under host nation forces. domestic law, which served to reinforce con- Despite this importance, neither the sequences for their actions during operations. Philippine military nor partnered forces suc- This stands in substantive contrast to the Law cessfully tracked or analyzed violence against of Armed Conflict (LOAC), which is more per- civilians. This is a common omission. For missive with regard to civilian casualties, and example, the United States and North Atlantic in procedural contrast to the more insulated Treaty Organization were both unaware of any U.S. military justice system. The result for AFP civilian harm during Operation Odyssey Dawn soldiers was a desire to avoid military action and Operation Unified Protector in Libya in in populated areas or without adequate intel- 2011, despite the mission being civilian pro- ligence or real-time verification that no civil- tection and the likelihood of civilian harm ians would be harmed. This case suggests that during airstrikes.37 The exception appears to be FID efforts should not simply assume the cur- International Security Assistance Force opera- rent U.S. framework for understanding human tions in Afghanistan, where coalition forces rights and LOAC (both of which are interna- both tracked civilian casualties and analyzed tional in focus) when working with other them to find opportunities for reducing civil- forces. Instead, U.S. forces should develop the ian harm. Importantly, Afghanistan shows that awareness to assess, discuss, and accommodate focusing on civilian casualties can be a win-win local national law and political considerations 132 | lessons learned PRISM 3, no. 4 operation enduring freedom—philippines regarding civilian casualties or human rights.38 Given that many nations approach counterter- Failure to do so may make it more difficult to rorism as a law enforcement activity, this lack communicate and effectively shape host nation of authority is a significant limitation to sup- force thinking and behavior. porting partner nation counterterrorism activi- Training on Nonlethal Skill Sets. Military ties. This limitation is exacerbated by current forces working in an indirect role would also shortfalls in scope in other U.S. Government appear to benefit from a focus on enhancing programs that could potentially fill this gap, host nation nonlethal skill sets, such as civil such as ICITAP. affairs, military information support to opera- tions, and public affairs. In the case of the in the case of the Philippines, U.S. civil affairs Philippines, U.S. civil affairs and engineering and engineering initiatives provided an alternate initiatives provided an alternate population- population-centric approach to counterterrorism, centric approach to counterterrorism, address- addressing root causes ing root causes that have fueled cycles of vio- lence for decades. This model was so effective that Philippine forces adopted the practice in A Model for Interagency Teaming. Joint their own operations and established a perma- Publication 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental nent command to foster its practice. Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Sustaining Progress: Supporting Both Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol II, Operations and Institutions. Security assistance notes the challenges of interagency coordi- activities should also attempt to make their nation and the value of a clear mission state- benefit as sustainable as possible given over- ment. The Philippines shows both that such all cost constraints and U.S. national interests interagency coordination can occur and suc- in global stability. This is a matter of making cess tends to be ad hoc and personality depen- the most of available resources to make long- dent. The Mindanao Working Group suggests lasting benefit. For example, training could a way ahead for formalizing such coordination be conducted now within JSOTF-P with little in a focused geographical area that might be impact, given its expertise on AFP capabilities expanded across the country. The military often and limitations and its relationships that pro- instigates innovation within the interagency, vide natural openings with AFP personnel in its as was true in the exemplary example of Joint schoolhouses. Funding restrictions for Title 10 Interagency Task Force–South. U.S. Special and Title 22 activities can thus create an artifi- Operations Command has a charter through cial impediment to U.S. forces when there are its Global Synchronization Conferences to simultaneous requirements to provide support help coordinate the U.S. effort against terror- to operations and institutional security assis- ism, although this remains largely a top-down tance activities. undertaking. The JSOTF-P support for the Limited Authorities for Support to Police Mindanao Working Group represents a bot- Forces. Most U.S. forces currently lack authori- tom-up approach that may be more successful ties needed to provide information and oper- because it more closely reflects agency capac- ational support to host nation nonmilitary ity and self-interest in developing a common agencies, such as the police or justice system.39 strategy and implementation plan. PRISM 3, no. 4 lessons learned | 133 lambert, lewis, and sewall Conclusion require flexibility to be able to apply resources The United States faces a host of national in unconventional ways to empower the indi- security concerns, which includes the threat rect approach. of terrorist attacks and the global challenge Indirect military action can be a cata- of combating violent extremism. Given U.S. lyst for reform of U.S. Government structures budget challenges and the exhausting legacy and processes to the requirements of national of two lengthy wars, future military operations security. Best practices have been observed at to address these concerns will likely be char- the tactical edge of the interagency, such as the acterized by presence and shaping combined Philippines and certain activities in Iraq, as well with direct action against discrete threats and as the counterdrug interagency command in individuals. SOF will continue to be in high Key West. These are examples where interagency demand for direct action to counter more partners, compelled by the need for success immediate threats to U.S. interests. SOF also on the ground, overcame barriers of author- have an opportunity to showcase their unique ity, resources, disparate goals, and culture and skills and value in FID, security assistance, and moved toward a synergistic whole-of-govern- other shaping missions in order to address ment approach. In times of limited resources underlying factors that lead to violent extrem- and compelling global requirements, the need ism. Such activity can both sustain progress for better interagency integration is obvious, against terrorist elements and reduce the base- and the U.S. Country Team is a good starting line of violent extremism in the future. point for pursuing such integration. PRISM This indirect approach is a critical com- ponent of sustaining U.S. national security. However, while many resources and much Notes attention have been placed on improving means of direct action and degrading ter- 1 Robert Day McAmis, Malay Muslims: The History rorist networks, the indirect approach has and Challenge of Resurgent Islam in Southeast Asia (Grand not received the same attention. Indeed, the Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism con- 2002). 2 Moro National Liberation Front fighters were cludes that a redoubling of efforts is needed promised positions in the Philippine army, with the in addressing “specific drivers of violence”40 ability to stay in their local areas. 3 and terrorist messages. Seizing this opportu- The Louis Berger Group currently maintains the Livelihood Enhancement and Peace (LEAP) project for nity may require some additional action, a the U.S. Agency for International Development, avail- slight rebalancing of resources, and creative able at 134 | lessons learned PRISM 3, no. 4 operation enduring freedom—philippines 7 Civil-military operations are the “activities of a 31 For example, Philippine law affords much protec- commander that establish collaborative relationships tion to detainees and specifies that detainees can only be among military forces, governmental and nongovern- held for 24 hours without being charged with a crime. mental civilian organizations and authorities, and the 32 Interview with JSOG, May 2011. civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile opera- 33 JSOG and PNP-SAF; interview with JSOTF-P per- tional area in order to facilitate military operations that sonnel, April 2011; interview with JSOG and PNP-SAF, are nested in support of the overall U.S. objectives.” May 2011. See Joint Publication 3-57, Civil-Military Operations 34 One of the contributions to this evolution (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, July 8, 2008). appears to be the Leahy Amendment, which applies vet- 8 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, ting of human rights practices and policies to decisions DC: Department of Defense, February 2010), 28. regarding U.S. funding. This policy was seen by some 9 Interview with Joint U.S. Military Assistance to have a restraining effect on the host nation regarding Group (JUSMAG), May 2011. human rights violations. 10 Interview with U.S. Joint Special Operations 35 “Several key institutions, including the judi- Task Force–Philippines (JSOTF-P) personnel, April ciary and law enforcement agencies, remain weak,” 2011 . World Report 2012–Philippines (New York: Human Rights 11 Interviews with JSOTF-P personnel, April 2011. Watch, January 22, 2012), available at PRISM 3, no. 4 lessons learned | 135 An Interview with J. Brian Atwood Dambisa Moyo and other critics claim that the global development enterprise has been a failure. What is your response to these critics? Atwood: I was once on a panel with Dambisa Moyo, and it’s interesting that perhaps her publishers write better headlines than what she actually believes. Her concern is that foreign aid has created dependencies in the past, and I share that concern. I think that the way to go with respect to development assistance is country ownership. Developing countries do not always have the capacity, so there’s always a tradeoff between whether or not you feel that you can risk using taxpayer money in a country that doesn’t have capacity. But we’ve studied these issues and believe there is more capacity out there than we’re responding to. If we really embrace the notion of country ownership and the developing countries genuinely buy in, and we use the budgets of the recipient country, we can create a situation where there is mutual accountability that does away with the dependency problem. But Moyo is right that a lot of foreign aid in the past has created dependency and that has caused many governments to simply sit back and fail to do the job they’re supposed to do as part of this mutual accountability prism. Considering recent profound economic troubles in developed countries and the value-based chal- lenge coming from the Islamic world, do you think the modernization paradigm that development has been based on is still relevant? Atwood: I would dispute the fact that we’ve been basing development on the modernization model. I think we learned a few lessons from the effort to try to modernize Iran. We realized that it isn’t the stark question of the “Lexus or the olive tree”; that development has to be in context; J. Brian Atwood is the Chairman of the Development Assistance Committee at the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. Previously, he served as Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development. PRISM 3, no. 4 interview | 137 Atwood that we’ve got to work with countries; that consumer-oriented? Are we doing ourselves we’ve got to understand the cultural issues any favors by being so export-oriented? They and the institutions of the country; that we’ve have a huge backup of capital now. Their bal- got to build those institutions in those coun- ance of trade with other countries is skewed. tries where they’re ineffective. There hasn’t They’re worried because they have to operate been a modernization motif per se. There is, within a global economy. Is their currency however, another aspect of modernization: we valued at the proper level? No. Most people need to get these countries somehow tied into think that it’s tremendously advantageous to the global economy, and some of them resist their exports. The fact is that they have had that. They’re not sure they want to do that. another model that isn’t entirely based on We long ago dismissed the notion that capitalism and consumerism, but on a con- we could operate on the basis of comparative trolled capitalism. advantage, meaning that if a country has min- Today, Chinese consumers are demand- erals, you exploit the minerals, if you’ve got oil, ing a bigger slice of the pie. Everyone is look- you exploit the oil. We understand Dutch dis- ing at this. What the Western countries are ease and that single-source economies haven’t looking at is the fact that they are hitting a worked. If countries manage their resources demographic wall; they can’t seem to grow well, then that’s fine, but they have to find fast enough to get out of normal economic a way to compete in the global economy or downturns as they have in the past. People else they’re not going to develop. They have to are beginning to ask the question: do we have make the decision as to what extent integra- this right? Should it be exclusively free-market tion compromises their own values, their own oriented? To what extent should the govern- norms, their own culture, their own history. ment regulate the market? To what extent I think if we do embrace the idea of country does government contribute to the economy ownership, then they will make those deci- by investing in education, health care, and sions, and they will come up with the strategies human development? All of these issues are that best fit their circumstances. constantly debated, and now more than ever as we observe the growth rates of the emerg- Since the 1980s, development agencies ing economies. have been promoting development based on the model of consumer market capitalism. Is China is the most cash-rich country in the this model still the way to go for less developed world. It is becoming a significant donor in cer- countries? tain regions. What is your assessment of the Chinese model for development assistance? Atwood: A lot of people are asking that question now as they look at some of the Atwood: It’s a self-interested model. The emerging economies and their success in Chinese are beginning to ask serious ques- achieving growth. Those emerging econo- tions about their own model. Premier Wen mies are moving along a timeline themselves, Jiabao has said they need to do a better job of and the pressures that the Chinese feel, investing their money. They have only recently for example, are: should we become more announced to their own people that they have 138 | interview PRISM 3, no. 4 atwood a foreign aid program. The Chinese people learned some things from them because didn’t know that until recently. The authori- they’ve done more in the area of poverty ties have been getting feedback through Web reduction than anyone. We’ve met the extreme sites that they put out there—they don’t take poverty goal of the [Millennium Development public opinion polls, but they put out Web Goals] because of the Chinese and their eco- sites and allow the elite to comment. The nomic reforms, but it has been a kind of feedback they’ve been getting asks, “why are reform that might not work in a democracy. you spending money overseas when we’ve got The question becomes whether their reforms problems at home?” They still have serious will work in the long run if they don’t have poverty problems in China. They have prob- more democracy. Wen Jiabao himself has lems with the quality of their economy. The given a speech stating that they need politi- Chinese development budget is probably in cal reform in China just as he’s leaving office. the range of $10 billion [per year]. Compared He has also given a speech saying that they to $30 billion [per year] for the United States, need to break up the banks; they’re too pow- that’s pretty significant for a new South-South erful. So there’s a lot going on inside China provider, as they like to call themselves. that we’re not fully aware of. It’s interesting They have what I call a “foundation to watch. model.” They sit back and wait to see what African or other countries are making requests The United States became involved in for- of them. They generally choose to build mal development aid programs after World War infrastructure. They will then send Chinese II, when it was the strongest and richest country workers in to do the work. The sustainabil- in world. As of today, U.S. outstanding public ity of the development effort is questionable, debt is $15.6 trillion, and if you add in debt of and they’ve been making some bad invest- households, businesses, individuals, and subna- ments so they have been seriously looking to tional government, national debt is well over share information. For the past 2½ years, the $50 trillion. Should the United States still be Development Assistance Committee [DAC] a donor nation? has had a China-DAC Study Group, and we’ve gone to Africa with them. We’ve had meet- Atwood: Yes, of course, because if you ings in Beijing with Chinese development really want to work down the debt, you need authorities; the exchange has been interest- to create new markets. That has been part ing. They’re really thirsty for knowledge about of the philosophy for many years. That may these things. sound like a hard, high number, but as a per- centage of U.S. GDP [gross domestic prod- Do you think the Chinese will try to take uct], we’re not yet in the danger zone. The advantage of the lessons that U.S. and European U.S. economy is beginning to grow again; we donor countries have learned from their own still have a triple-A rating, and we have the development experience? international currency. The American people are going to wake up one day and say this Atwood: For ideological reasons they isn’t healthy, and we’re going to have to go won’t admit this, and I think we’ve already through some serious reform, but it has to PRISM 3, no. 4 interview | 139 Atwood be done carefully and over a period of time. the military to coordinate its activities so they We’re going to have to cut back government provide a secure area. spending, but if we do it too drastically, too I was at USAID talking about Somalia. soon, we will face another recession. It has The military was working in some parts of to be done sensibly, though it’s difficult in Somalia. I asked the question: Is our mili- this political context to do it sensibly as you tary doing anything in that area? Can it pos- can imagine. Still, as a percentage of GDP, it’s sibly provide a little more security against al not such a huge debt. When you talk about Shabab? If we really want to deal with the official U.S. development assistance, you’re problems in Somalia, which is al-Shabaab– talking about $30 billion; that’s a small and al Qaeda–related terrorism and the pirate amount compared to our defense budget, groups, Somalia needs development. We can’t which is $600 billion. A lot of people ask why do development without security, so we need Europeans have done so much better, many to train and work better together. We need to of them having reached 0.7 percent of their understand the concepts on both sides. When GDP. U.S. aid is at only 0.21 percent of GDP. I was trying to rewrite the senior officers’ Part of the reason is that the United States course at the Foreign Service Institute, I wrote provides the defense shield for Europe. The a whole section on defense and why Foreign Europeans can afford to invest in soft power Service officers ought to know more about the as a result. They see that as a security invest- military, the way it builds and acquires weap- ment as well as an investment for value rea- ons, the way it deploys, the doctrines that it sons. follows. And some of the military officers in the groups asked, “Why do civilians need to A development that has been marked over know that?” They need to know more about the past decade is the drawing closer together of the way the military operates, and the mili- the development and security communities, par- tary needs to know more about the way civil- ticularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, but in other ians operate, if we’re to take advantage of the places as well. What are the consequences of strengths of both sides. these two communities working side by side? Should the U.S. development elements and Atwood: It’s very interesting because defense elements of our foreign policy fuse even when John F. Kennedy’s administration cre- closer together, the way they were prior to the ated USAID [U.S. Agency for International Kennedy administration separating them? Development], it, for the first time, separated security assistance from development assis- Atwood: No. Part of the challenge in tance. Today, you can honestly say that in development is trust. Unfortunately when many countries in which we’re working, you people in developing countries see the can’t have development without security, and American military in operation, the American you can’t have security without development. military is obviously the point of a policy It’s obvious to me that the two have to work that is designed to protect American interests together, and that in many of the fragile states explicitly. That’s why the military is there. in particular, we have to find the way to ask That’s why they are in Afghanistan. When 140 | interview PRISM 3, no. 4 atwood those same people see development civilians after the Korean War, and so many Koreans in the field, they know that those develop- say, “I wouldn’t be here today if I didn’t have ment civilians will only succeed if the country milk provided by USAID or food provided by itself succeeds. There’s a natural trust factor USAID.” Korea is the newest member of the that comes into play. As much as I appreciate DAC. Their per-capita income in the 1960s the fact that students at West Point and the was under $100. There is great appreciation Naval Academy are learning a lot more about for what we did back then. The USAID logo is development, and they’re actually undertak- a symbol of two hands clasping; I think that ing a lot of it, it’s very difficult to effectuate has bought friends for the United States all that degree of trust when you have to carry a over the world. gun or wear a uniform. What are your current thoughts about the Can military forces be effective purveyors priority or nonpriority status of democracy and of development assistance? democratization in development? Atwood: They can do some things better Atwood: I think it’s a high priority because than civilians in postconflict situations. There we’ve learned over the years that unless you are many examples of this: civil engineers enable the people of a country to participate going in and building roads so that they can in the development process, you really can’t improve the security environment within a achieve sustainable development results. You country. They do things extremely well when can’t just operate on a top-down basis. Those it comes to building things and logistics. But people have to have the institutions and the again, when it comes to the human develop- rule of law that protects their rights to private ment aspect of it, civilians are much more property, be they entrepreneurs or citizens, effective. or to free speech or assembly. It’s a question of institutions; it’s a way of enabling this par- The military has a long tradition of helping ticipatory development aspect. It’s also frankly in humanitarian disasters. the way you keep governments accountable. If you don’t have full democratic institutions Atwood: But even in those situations that work, obviously consistent with the his- when the President authorizes its mobiliza- tory and culture of the country, then the tion for humanitarian assistance, it operates accountability factor is missing. Then you get under a strategy that is designed by USAID. issues like dependency and other problems that exist, and you may be able achieve a few Can development buy hearts and minds? results for a short period of time, but it’s ques- tionable as to how sustainable those results Atwood: I think development has bought will be. hearts and minds over the years. I was moved at a recent conference the DAC held in Busan, As an international development leader, Korea. Busan was the port where a lot of do you think that the United States abandoned humanitarian relief was delivered during and or diluted its commitment to democracy and PRISM 3, no. 4 interview | 141 Atwood democratization in its efforts in Afghanistan to police training when police trainees were and Iraq? abusing people. But we do need that capacity in postconflict situations. It isn’t right to ask Atwood: No. The United States encour- our military, which is a vertically organized aged elections in Iraq. Some could argue that unit, which is top-down oriented and not sup- it was done top down, and it should have been posed to be operating on a horizontal basis done locally first and moved its way up. You with the community at large. The police basi- can argue about how it was done. But one of cally organize themselves along horizontal the rationales—and I want to make it clear lines. We need that kind of civilian capacity. I that I did not support President [George W.] created something when I was at USAID called Bush’s decision to go into Iraq, which I think the Office of Transition Initiatives [OTI]. That was a big mistake—was to have a democratic could be strengthened. Arab nation in the heart of the Middle East. Just as defense is a different profession I don’t know how Freedom House ranks Iraq from that of diplomacy, so is the case with today, but they have an elected government development and humanitarian assistance that has some degree of legitimacy even if it being different professions. The kind of people has all kinds of problems. I don’t think we that do transitional work are a unique profes- abandoned democracy in Iraq. We certainly sion as well. They have to be a little more polit- haven’t abandoned it in Afghanistan. The job ically oriented than traditional development that Lakhdar Brahimi did in setting up the requires. Their job is to bring reconciliation parliament of Afghanistan and creating the to a war-torn society, and OTI has performed election process is much more democratic that function. I don’t think that the function than it would have been without the interna- belongs in the State Department; it belongs at tional effort. Certainly something has been USAID where the profession can evolve. created that is much more democratic than it could have been under the Taliban. Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice used to speak of the 3Ds—diplomacy, Many believe U.S. civilian agencies need defense, and development—working together. some kind of expeditionary capacity. Is such When Secretary of State Hillary Clinton took a capacity still required in the post-Iraq, post- office, she said that two of those Ds are under Afghanistan environment? her control. It has been observed that during her tenure, USAID has a lost a good deal of its Atwood: Yes and no. I don’t have any ques- independence. As the former administrator of tion that a surge capacity is needed to be able USAID, how do you feel about that? to respond to postconflict situations or in frag- ile states. The conference I mentioned earlier Atwood: USAID had lost control over its resulted in the Busan agreement, called the budget long before Hillary Clinton came in. New Deal on Conflict and Fragility. I think we I think in some ways because of Secretary need to be able to create a policing capacity. Clinton’s intense interest in development, We have a hard time reconciling issues that USAID has been strengthened. There are peo- came up in the 1960s and 1970s with respect ple who act as though the State Department 142 | interview PRISM 3, no. 4 atwood is in charge of development, but I don’t think [Centers for Disease Control]. The CDC is con- that’s what Secretary Clinton intended or cerned about communicable diseases affect- intends. I think she wants to—and she has ing Americans, and it operates that way. When said it a number of times and actually acted it goes overseas, and it has a lot of PEPFAR on it—strengthen USAID as an institution. It’s money, it operates on a short-term basis. The fighting its way back toward a more strength- CDC vision is “let’s get at this disease and let’s ened role. The fact that the President and control it right now” because that’s its busi- Secretary of State have asked USAID to coor- ness. It doesn’t think about putting a health- dinate all government activities with respect care system in place that will take 10 years to to the next G8 meeting, where food security accomplish, whereas USAID people think in is the top issue, is an indication that USAID is those terms. How do you create a sustainable fighting its way back. Whether it will ever be healthcare system? A surveillance system? A on a plane with development and diplomacy system that delivers healthcare and can be is another question. I think the only way it sustained by the people of the country? CDC will ultimately be on the same plane as the has a domestic mission. other two Ds is if it were to become a separate The same is true of the other agencies. Cabinet department. They’re thinking about their domestic mis- sion first; that’s what they get their money Do you advocate that? for. I really do think it’s been dangerous to see this proliferation of development agencies Atwood: I’ve always advocated that. I throughout the U.S. Government. It began advocate it with less enthusiasm when there’s at the time the Berlin Wall came down, and a Secretary of State such as Hillary Clinton the Congress in its infinite wisdom decided who cares about development. But when she’s that they would assign the responsibility for gone, I will advocate it enthusiastically again. development in Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union to the State U.S. foreign assistance is currently dis- Department. The diplomats in charge of these pensed by numerous agencies. Many of these programs said, “I don’t want the Secretary of agencies have their domestic core activity, State to be receiving a call from the Secretary which is not development assistance. Do you of Agriculture or the Secretary of Energy think that there is an ongoing need to have wanting a role, so I’m going to disperse some a separate USAID, Millennium Challenge money to them and let everyone have a role.” Corporation, and President’s Emergency Plan Those other agencies got the money, but didn’t for AIDS Relief, or could those be fused into a have the capacity to deliver overseas. Often single agency? they would put out public requests for pro- posals and they’d end with the same contrac- Atwood: They definitely should be fused. tors or grantees that USAID used. However, I’m less concerned about MCC. PEPFAR, I they didn’t have the capacity to evaluate the think, has modified its approach to its busi- programs or oversee them in the field because ness somewhat. I’m more concerned about they didn’t have people in the field. It was a the domestic-oriented agencies, even the CDC huge mistake. From the point of view of the PRISM 3, no. 4 interview | 143 Atwood DAC at OECD, when we critique the United How should leading donors such as the States it’s because of this proliferation of United States condition their assistance to coun- development agencies that don’t have any tries that are corrupt or behaving in ways that business doing development. we find unacceptable? For example, how should we respond to Egypt, having recently arrested a One thing that the military does well is its number of American workers from the USAID disciplined approach to learning from its experi- Democracy Development Program? ences. Does the development community need to develop such a capacity and practice? Atwood: First of all, we should react when they do something foolish like that. We Atwood: It most certainly does, and it’s should react the way we have reacted. What being developed. Development is a far more the Egyptians did is frankly outrageous, espe- complex mission because we’re talking about cially given the fact that these organizations developing entire societies, and every sec- had asked for licenses to practice as they’re tor is somewhat different. Some sectors lend required to do as far back as 2006 during themselves to quantifiable results and mea- the Mubarak administration. They’ve asked surements, while others can only be mea- every 6 months since, and they’ve asked for sured by qualitative evaluations. It is really more information. They were never given the complicated. Then there is the question of licenses and they were never told to leave. attribution. Who is responsible for success, Then all of sudden they’re arrested. However, or the result? You want it to be the govern- you have to recognize that this is a transition ment you’re working with; it’s a partner- situation. You have to play. You can’t just leave ship. You may be overlapping with another the playing field because you’re offended by donor. Who’s to take credit for the results? something like this. The Egyptians are work- The Government Performance and Results Act ing their way toward a legitimate government. requires all government agencies to be able We need to be there. We’ve got too much at to measure results. Unfortunately, in the aid stake. Too many investments have been made business, congressional authorizers haven’t over the years—investments in peace. I hope enacted a new authorization bill since 1985. that Egypt will become again a leader in the The appropriators have a different outlook: “I Arab world and that it will become a demo- want you to spend the money we give you.” It’s cratic leader in the Arab world. The best aspi- an input-oriented perspective. Development ration would be that it would become a coun- should have an outcome-oriented perspective. try like Turkey that is an Islamic people in a We ought to have a new authorization bill that secular, democratic country. says this our overall national strategy as it relates to development, and these are the out- Pakistan reacted strongly to certain condi- comes we want you to achieve, and you need tions placed on our development program. How to report to us and be held accountable for do we deal with that? achieving those outcomes, not just to spend the money we give you by the earmark but to Atwood: Some countries obviously have look at the outcomes. insecurity problems. Pakistan has both 144 | interview PRISM 3, no. 4 atwood insecurity and security problems as well. Politics in Pakistan are difficult. People are looking to really go after the current civil- ian government, which isn’t very popular. It makes them overreact—even though we should be offended by the fact that Osama bin Laden was sitting there all those months, and obviously someone knew it. It becomes a question of do you leave the playing field or do you try to work the problem. I think that we need to engage and we need to work the problem. It presents us with a diplomatic issue. I used to be the Assistant Secretary of Congressional Relations and I tried to sit down with Members of Congress who are try- ing to respond to a certain constituency with- out understanding what the implications are and how it will be read in a foreign country. We also need to work the congressional side of this as well as the diplomatic side with the Pakistanis. Don’t do anything that’s going to cut off your nose to spite your face. PRISM PRISM 3, no. 4 interview | 145 Book Reviews The Operators: The Wild and Terrifying York Times—suggested that the Unites States Inside Story of America’s War in was losing the war. Under the leadership Afghanistan of General David McKiernan, USA, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) By Michael Hastings had reached a stalemate. McKiernan’s main Blue Rider Press, 2012 problem seemed to be a matter of style, as he 381 pp., $27.95 preferred a low-key public relations approach ISBN: 978-039915-988-6 with the media. Though well respected by his peers, McKiernan was looked upon as a mem- ber of the “old school” generation of generals, Reviewed by George Michael unlike General David Petraeus, who champi- oned the popular counterinsurgency (COIN) s the U.S. military enters its 11th doctrine. McKiernan refused to resign, and year of operations in Afghanistan, Defense Secretary Robert Gates effectively A public support for the effort dwin- fired him, which amounted to the first sack- dles, according to recent polls, as a solid ing of a wartime commander since President majority of Americans now believe the war Harry Truman removed General Douglas is going badly and is not worth fighting. In MacArthur at the height of the Korean War. The Operators, journalist Michael Hastings By removing McKiernan, the Pentagon saw explores the recent history of America’s lon- an opportunity to escalate and reset the war gest military campaign through the prism of in Afghanistan. General Stanley McChrystal and his staff. McKiernan’s replacement, General Not long after his story broke in June 2010 in McChrystal, was the first Special Forces Rolling Stone magazine, General McChrystal Soldier to assume such a prominent bat- was forced to resign. The episode illustrated tlefield command. Over the course of his the deepening division between the White career, McChrystal learned to walk a fine House and Pentagon over the appropriate line in the rigid military hierarchy yet still prosecution of the war. succeed. He first entered the public spot- Hastings begins his story in the autumn light in March 2003 when he served as the of 2008, when conditions noticeably dete- Pentagon spokesman during the invasion riorated in Afghanistan. At that time, some of Iraq. Later that year, he took over as com- major media outlets—including the New mander of the Joint Special Forces Operations Command, overseeing the most elite units in the military, including Delta Force, Navy George Michael is an Associate Professor of SEALs, and Rangers. Relentlessly, his spe- Nuclear Counterproliferation and Deterrence Theory at the U.S. Air Force Counterproliferation cial forces rooted out terrorists, most nota- Center, Maxwell Air Force Base. bly Abu Musab al-Zaraqawi, the recognized 146 | book reviews PRISM 3, no. 4 Michael leader of al Qaeda in Iraq. His willingness to As Hastings explains, several members of get results endeared him to Donald Rumsfeld McChrystal’s staff questioned Obama’s abil- and Dick Cheney, even when it included ity to lead the war effort. Early into his term, bending the rules or skipping the chain of military leaders sensed that the new President command. Controversy seemed to follow was uncomfortable with the military. The him. For instance, in Iraq, he oversaw a net- Pentagon—filled with many Republicans work of prisons where detainees were beaten from the Bush years—viewed him with sus- and tortured. Furthermore, he was accused picion. of attempting to whitewash the friendly fire McChrystal was disappointed over death in Afghanistan of Pat Tillman, the NFL Obama’s lack of engagement in the war. star who joined the Army not long after the Hastings relates the tenuous relationship September 11 terrorist attacks. between U.S. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry The pitched political battles that occurred and McChrystal as they clashed over strat- over troop levels in Afghanistan are recounted egy. McChrystal also had difficulty selling by Hastings. Essentially, there were two major his COIN plan to Afghan President Hamid camps in the debate. The Pentagon wanted a Karzai, whom Hastings depicts as a less-than- big footprint in order to launch a compre- competent leader of very questionable legiti- hensive COIN program. The other camp, led macy who effectively rigged the presidential by Vice President Joe Biden, favored a small election in 2009. footprint consisting of U.S. Special Forces McChrystal operated in the shadow of that would focus on hunting and killing the General Petraeus, whose COIN campaign remnants of al Qaeda. Through sporadic in Iraq—the surge—did much to stabilize and strategic leaks, McChrystal was able to the security in that country. But applying force President Barack Obama’s hand. In the same template in Afghanistan has been September 2009, Washington Post writer Bob more challenging. Petraeus, in The U.S. Army/ Woodward published McChrystal’s confiden- Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, tial assessment of the war in Afghanistan, argued that the cornerstone of the new strat- which concluded that the U.S. military was egy was to protect and gain the trust of the on the verge of “mission failure.” The story population. So-called kinetic operations— spurred Washington to take action, and, in that is, killing and capturing the insurgents— the end, Obama agreed to the 40,000 addi- were given less emphasis. The goal was to tional troops that McChrystal requested with recreate the Afghanistan of 1979, before the proviso that they begin leaving in July it was wracked with foreign invasion and 2011, a year earlier than the general wanted. internecine warfare. For McChrystal, it was President Obama, who voted against imperative to switch from the “shoot-first- the 2003 invasion of Iraq as a Senator from and-blow-shit-up” soldiering of the Special Illinois, pushed for fixing Afghanistan, which Forces to the COIN emphasis on protect- he identified as the most important theater ing the civilian population. To that end, he in the war on terror. But civil-military rela- issued a tactical directive that encouraged tions had been strained by the Afghan war, soldiers to avoid shooting in situations in which led to disagreements over planning. which civilians could be harmed. Over time, PRISM 3, no. 4 book reviews | 147 Michael however, soldiers became frustrated with the In a protracted guerrilla campaign, new policy, which hampered their ability to perceptions are important. According to fight back. Hastings, the “military-media-industrial com- Currently worrisome is the growing plex” in large measure shapes policy on the insularity of the U.S. military from the rest Afghan war. Ostensibly, Operation Enduring of America. As Hastings points out, less than Freedom was launched to capture Osama bin 1 percent of the U.S. population serves in the Laden and crush al Qaeda in retaliation for military or has any connection to the ongoing the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. wars. According to his reasoning, the guilt of Over time, however, bin Laden was practi- the general public for not having served in the cally forgotten in the U.S. military effort military is covered up by an uncritical attitude in Afghanistan. In a sense, his death at the toward those who have. As for what motivated hand of SEAL Team Six was anticlimactic. the soldiers, Hastings found it was not so Nevertheless, it gave the Obama administra- much the objectives of the war, but rather a tion the political cover it needed to declare nearly metaphysical quality that one attained victory in Afghanistan and begin the draw- through tribulation that involved sacrifice and down of troops. White House officials could the risk of one’s life. To his loyal entourage, now make the case that the Afghan surge had McChrystal was a historic figure who gave worked. them a sense of identity. The war on terror, Hastings explains, did Why, Hastings asks, did McChrystal agree not unfold as it was originally planned. When to the Rolling Stone story? According to his take it commenced, President George W. Bush on the man, the general sought to immortalize announced that there would be no “battle- his image as a “badass” and a “snake-eating fields or beachheads.” Rather, there would be rebel” that would be cultivated by a cover story a secret war, conducted in the dark with no in the magazine. As the war in Afghanistan holds barred. As it turned out, however, there extended to the end of the decade, it is not were battlefields and beachheads after all, as surprising that Hastings found that McChrystal evidenced by the fighting in Kabul, Kandahar, and his entourage often comported themselves Baghdad, Fallujah, and Mosul. To Hastings, irreverently in the style of soldiers on the front- the military approach was misguided. Citing line, displaying “frustration” and “arrogance” a 2008 RAND study—“How Terrorist Groups and “getting smashed” and “letting off stress.” End: Implications for Countering al Qa’ida”— Not long after the story was released, President Hastings insists that the best way to defeat Obama fired McChrystal and named General terrorist networks is through law enforcement Petraeus as the new commander of U.S. forces rather than military force. Rejecting the “safe in Afghanistan. According to Hastings, what havens” pretext for the war, Hastings argues was most troubling about the story to the that terrorists do not need to take over a White House’s national security team was country and establish a sanctuary insofar as not that it questioned the competence of the numerous terrorist plots have been planned President and his advisors, but rather its sug- and carried out in the West. gestion that the troops were in near revolt Overall, Hastings paints a grim picture against McChrystal. of the U.S. experience in Afghanistan. After 148 | book reviews PRISM 3, no. 4 moore the U.S. military withdraws, he believes that Galula in Algeria: Counterinsurgency the warlords will take over. He questions the Practice versus Theory quality and reliability of the Afghan army, By Grégor Mathias in whose ranks drug use and corruption are Praeger, 2011 rife. Moreover, Afghan soldiers have occa- 143 pp., $37.00 sionally opened fired on U.S. and ISAF sol- ISBN: 978-0-313-39575-8 diers, bringing into question their long-term loyalty to the new regime. Despite the sub- stantial cost in blood and treasure, Hastings Reviewed by Riley M. Moore avers that the United States was getting its ass “kicked by illiterate peasants who made bombs out of manure and wood.” His pes- With the outbreak of insurgency in Iraq (fol- simism, though, is arguably overstated. To lowed by Afghanistan), an urgent requirement be sure, gauging progress in a guerrilla war is emerged for concise and easily comprehensi- inexact due to the tenuous quality of the met- ble answers to the complex question of how rics used to measure success. Nevertheless, to counter an insurgency. In the midst of two according to a 2011 survey conducted by the wars, with no time or current doctrine and Asia Foundation, the proportion of respon- with a Presidential mandate for solutions, dents expressing some level of sympathy for strategic thinkers and generals were desper- the insurgents groups reached its lowest level ately searching for a foothold to halt what that year (29 percent). Moreover, despite seri- seemed to be the inevitable descent into chaos ous concerns about government corruption, in Iraq. The works of David Galula played a security, and economic future, nearly half of significant role in fulfilling that mandate. all Afghan respondents said that their coun- Touted by General David Petraeus and other try was moving in the right direction accord- military leaders—General Stanley McChrystal, ing to the Asia Foundation. Considering the for instance, claimed to keep Galula’s publica- daunting challenges of building a functioning tions on his nightstand to read every night— state and civil society in the tribal and war- Galula’s work has been influential in forming torn country, problems are to be expected. current U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) doc- Still, the U.S. mission in Afghanistan is far trine. Indeed, his influence on Field Manual from accomplished and Hastings provides a 3-24, Counterinsurgency, which was authored window to view it warts and all. PRISM under the leadership of General Petraeus, is undeniable. Amidst his notoriety and acclaim, there is a limited amount of information about who exactly David Galula was and how his military record measures up—specifically his successes Riley M. Moore is a Professional Staff Member on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, where he is an Adviser on Political-Military Affairs. PRISM 3, no. 4 book reviews | 149 moore and failures. Grégor Mathias has finally shed one would assume that it would have been light on Galula’s previously opaque personal further investigated before it became the cen- history. He juxtaposes Galula’s eight principals terpiece of American strategy. Unfortunately, from Counterinsurgency Warfare and his suc- if we had looked deeper, as this book does, cess in applying these theoretical constructs we would have realized that Galula’s applica- in Algeria in methodical detail. Through tion of this was not successful. Although the Mathias’s exhaustive research and primary platoons’ presence in Djebel Aïssa increased source evidence, the real historical narrative security, it did not prevent or slow down the of Galula in Algeria has now been brought to insurgent political cadre from exerting effective light. After examining all eight principals as control over the population. applied by Galula in Djebel Aïssa Mimoun Similarly, when examining the forth step, in Algeria (the district he commanded), the we realize that although there was initial suc- results were abysmal. cess in the implementation of this principle, Particularly salient steps to current U.S. it was short lived. However, at the time Galula COIN doctrine are the second, “Assign suffi- continued to publicize his self-proclaimed suc- cient troops to oppose the insurgent’s come- cesses. Indeed, he wrote in Lettre d’informations back and install these troops in each village,” that: and the fourth, “Destroy the local insurgent political organizations.” [I]n four purged villages, five members of Galula’s second step is interesting because the OPA [insurgent political organiza- this is where “[he] practiced the ink-spot strat- tion] were killed, two imprisoned, 30 egy. . . . The ink spot refers to the idea of creat- members were arrested and released on con- ing military posts that are gradually extended ditional liberty, and several became council- with economic and social development (mar- men or harikis. . . . The community work kets, clinics, schools) and the establishment is done voluntarily and without coercion. . . of local government, control of the populace, . It is east to evoke Sisyphus when speaking elimination of adversaries, and arming sup- to the destruction of rebel cells. On the con- porters before moving on to another region” trary, if this operation is properly conducted, (p. 23). This obviously sounds familiar to it is irreversible. [p. 39] us all by now. It is commonly and simplisti- cally referred to as “clear, hold, and build” in Afghanistan. By no means was this a new Galula had successfully decapitated the strategy; in fact, it was not even original to OPA, but its demise was far from imminent. Galula. As Mathias points out, it was “invented Subsequent to Galula’s promotion to the by Marshall Gallieni in Tonkin from 1892 to Division of Information in Paris and his depar- 1896 and developed by Marshall Lyautey in his ture from Djebel Aïssa Mimoun, the insurgents article ‘Du rôle colonial de l’armée’ (The Army’s were able to adapt and were ultimately suc- role in the Colonies) in the journal Revue des cessful in their campaign. Deux mondes” (p. 23). Galula’s experience in This begs the question of why Galula applying this strategy was the primary point of was promoted if he failed. Mathias articu- influence on current U.S. doctrine; therefore, lates the answer. Galula published his work 150 | book reviews PRISM 3, no. 4 moore from Algeria in such a manner that it was eas- Exploring further into Mathias’s work, it ily comprehensible and undeniably success- becomes apparent that Galula’s theories were ful. He wrote extensively in the public media not original to any degree. They were para- and made sure his commanders were well phrased or truncated theories and thoughts informed about his success in the field. As from contemporary revolutionary war thinkers Mathias points out in his discussion of one of of the time. Indeed, when looking at Galula’s Galula’s failed steps, he “exaggerated his opera- Pacification in Algeria, he cites only one author, tions in giving a quantitative account in terms which as Mathias points out, is really quite of populations and numbers of peoples treated puzzling given the numerous published works by the AMG [assistance medical gratuite]” (p. on the topic during that time. More startling 93). With advancement and personal gain is the fact that when Galula published his two in mind, he resorted to inflating his achieve- books, he was a researcher at the Center for ments. Although he experienced short-term International Affairs at Harvard (1962–1963). success, this approach was unsustainable and How would a bibliography not be among his ultimately led to the failure of his strategy. duties at that time? According to Mathias, “The Galula’s failure continues to become apparent simplicity of Galula’s counterinsur- clearer as Mathias provides further context for gency doctrine actually issues from the lack of his exploits in Algeria. For instance, it is not bibliographical references to works of other evident how short a period these operations thinkers. . . . Moreover, he deliberately avoids were conducted over. Galula states, “I set out citing a number of references such as British to prove a theory of counterinsurgency warfare, general R. Thompson, the architect of the anti- and I am satisfied that it worked in my small guerilla war in Malaya (1948–60)” (p. 97). area. What I achieved in my first six or eight Galula’s simplicity served as the impe- months in Djebel Aïssa Mimoun was not due tus for his rediscovery by contemporary U.S. to magic and could have been applied much strategists and generals grasping for doctrinal earlier throughout Algeria” (p. 96). However, synthesis of simple solutions for complex Mathias counters this claim by rightly assert- problems. The fact is there are no simple solu- ing that “In reality, Galula’s activities at Djebel tions to complex issues—particularly in coun- Aïssa Mimoun lasted a short time, just over 14 terinsurgency. That said, as previously stated, months, from August 1956 to October 1957. these decisions were made in a compressed Over this period, a month was taken up in timeframe and at a critical juncture. policing Tizi Ouzou, where he was cited for Through the years, there have been having contributed to the arrest of 27 rebels. minimal challenges to Galula’s claims of his The period was too short to reasonably expect the reported successes. He remained unchallenged subdistrict be pacified [emphasis added]” (p. throughout the U.S. war in Vietnam despite 96). This now makes all the more sense when the fact that the RAND Corporation incor- looking at Galula’s Pacification in Algeria. He porated his work into its study to establish a makes no mention of his activities from 1958 COIN doctrine for that conflict. With his con- to 1962, a span that was spent at the Division temporary rediscovery, he went largely unchal- of Information in Paris. Galula’s experience lenged until recently. This book represents the was limited not only in scope but also in time. most concerted effort in questioning his claims PRISM 3, no. 4 book reviews | 151 moore and ideas. We must continue to challenge our assumptions in stability operations writ large. We cannot simply apply Galula’s “eight principals” of Counterinsurgency Warfare to any given operation. But this is what we have ostensibly done in Iraq and Afghanistan given the undeniable influence of Galula’s work on Field Manual 3-24. Take the example of “force ratio” in the manual where there is an actual minimum ratio force for success in COIN operations across the board. Such simplistic constructs, which have been used in a “plug and play” fashion, have hamstrung critical thinking in Iraq and Afghanistan. This search for a blueprint solution is emblematic of the historic rigidity in U.S. doctrine. This book should be a mandated accom- paniment for subsequent reading with any of David Galula’s work. It is straightforward and meticulously sourced, and it ultimately “pre- pares the battlespace” for understanding the work and life of Galula. There is no doubt that Galula’s work should be taken under consid- eration when considering solutions in a given COIN operation. With that said, it cannot be the only source. There is not one answer to a hundred different questions. We should bear that in mind when taking a strategic view of perceived challenges in the future. We must be ready for COIN operations, but not every threat will be unconventional just as not every threat will be conventional. Hopefully, Galula in Algeria will be one of many works that chal- lenge current COIN doctrine and compel us to keep all tools sharp in the U.S. strategic bag of options. PRISM 152 | book reviews PRISM 3, no. 4 PRISM ABOUT CENTER FOR COMPLEX OPERATIONS (CCO) CCO WAS ESTABLISHED TO: ■■ Serve as an information clearinghouse and knowledge manager PRISM is published by the National Defense University Press for the Center for Complex Enhancing the U.S. Government’s Ability to Operations. 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