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1+ Emergency Planning Planification d'urgence Canada Canada

C;CMCCIN 52

Ot\ coviviealc.P,-v er

-- 1. ism&

COMCON 82 Summary Record

Canada EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CANADA 257 SLATER STREET, 2ND FLOOR JACKSON BUILDING OTTAWA. K1 A OW6

14% COMMUNICATIONS SEMINAR

• COMCON 82

SUMMARY RECORD

GENERAL

1. COMCON 82 was held at the Federal Study Centre, Arnprior, Ont, 25-28 May 82. It was chaired by A.F. Wigglesworth, Director Emergency Operations Coordination, Emergency Planning Canada, and 81 delegates attended.

AIM •• 2. The aim of the conference was to bring federal, provincial and municipal government officials and industry experts together to identify, discuss and, Whe're possible, resolve problems in- herent in developing and operatingommunications systems and facilities in timeS.pf'emergencies,

PROGRAM

3. The agenda is attà.Ched.at Annex ' A.

4. A list of those attending is attached at Annex B.

5. The opening address was given by Mr. K. Hepburn, Assistant Deputy Minister, Department of Communications.

6. Papers were presented by the'following persons on the subjects shown:

a. R.H.C. Gamble, Director Training and Education, EPC - "Emergency Planning Canada" ,

b. J. Scanlon, Emergency Communications.Research Unit, Carleton University - "Crisis Communications - the Ever-Present Gremlins" (Full text at Annex C)

c. E.J. Oldham, Consultec Canada Ltd. - "integrated Communications.- Nova Scotia"

d. Jose Mathieu, Director of Information, :Bureau de la Protection Civile du Quebec - "Radio Amateur Quebec Incorpore"

e. J.W. Strangleman, Canadian Radio Relay League, K.K. Kendall, Canadian Amateur Radio Federation and W.R. Campbell, COMSONT - "Amateur Communications in Canada"

f. T.H. Birtch, Rapifax Canada Ltd - "Facsimile Communications"

g. J.M. Beaulieu, Assistant to:the Vice-President, CNR - "CNR Emergency Colimiunications Van"

...2 - a -

h. L. Lees, WR Communications Ltd.- "Canadian Radio Communications Carriers Association"

. B.F. Murphy, SATEL Consultants Ltd - "Satellite Communications"

J Dr. P. Bhartia, Defence Research Establishment "Electro Magnetic Pulse" (Full text at Annex D)

k. G. Desclouds, Marketing Manager, CNCP Tele- communications - "CNCP "

1. L. Hummel, Coordinator, Emergency Operations Planning, - "Trans Canada Telephone System.Emergency Communications" (Full text at Annex E)

m. F. Duveau, Group Supervisor, Operations Control, Teleglobe Canada - "Teleglobe"

n. A. Ingham, Manager, Blaupunkt Car Radio Division, Robert Bosch Canada Ltd, G. Lebow, Consultant, Robert Bosch Canada Ltd, and H. Duckeck, Blaupunkt Werke - "Automatic Radio Information Emergency Broadcast System"

o. W. MacRae, Consultant, Brimordyne (Canada) Ltd "Wide Area Communications System - Operation BIG SPEAK"

p. A.F. Wigglesworth, Director Emergency Operations Coordination, Emergency Planning Canada - "Joint Emergency Planning Program (JEPP)"•

q. T.E. Stewart, Assistant Director, Communications Support Services, Dept of Communications - "Where do we go from here?"

7. A transcript of questions, answers and general comments from the floor is attached at Annex F.

DISPLAYS

8. J. Mathieu, Protection Civile du Quebec, displayed mobile radio equipment which operated effectively to Hull and Quebec City.

9. The CNR Emergency Communications Van was on display. J.M. Beaulieu and his staff conducted tours of the van and demonstrated equipment.

10. B.F. Murphy of SATEL set up a satellite dish antenna and demonstrated its capabilities.

11. Amateur radio equipment was demonstrated by K. Kendall and A. Stark.

...3 12. W. MacRae demonstated the Wide Area Communications System at a distance of approximately Con`ë"mïlé.

RECOMMENDATIONS

13. The conference recommended:

a. that a communications conference be held in 1983 and that a program committee be formed.

b. that the tentative date for COMCON 83 be 24-27 May 83.

c. that COMCON 83 take the form of plenary sessions with syndicates staffed by experts to discuss problems.

d. that representatives from the broadcast industry be included in COMCON 83.

e. that a training program be developed for emergency communications.

f. that the need for positive government leadership in the emergency communications field be emphasized.

ANNEX A COURSE NO. EPC 358

COMCON 82

MAY 25-28, 1982

ARNPRIOR, ONTARIO

MAY 25, 1982

0900-1600 Equipment Displays arrive and set-up

1700 onwards Arrival of participants

DAY 1 - WEDNESDAY, May 26, 1982 TOPIC 0845-0915 A.F. Wigglesworth Welcome 0915-0930 K. Hepburn - ADM DOC Welcome 0930-1000 R.H.C. Gamble Emergency Planning Canada 1000-1030 Coffee Break

1030-1115 J. Scanlon Crisis Communications The Ever Present Gremlins

1115-1200 E. Oldham Integrated Communications Nova Scotia 1200-1330 Lunch 1330-1405 Jose Mathieu/Marcel Lachance Protection Civile Comm's 1405-1500 CRRL/CARF/COMSONT Amateur Communications 1500-1530 Coffee Break 1530-1600 T.M. Birtch Facsimile Communications

DAY 2 - THURSDAY, MAY 27, 1982 0845-0930 M. Beaulieu/R. Beck CNR Emergency Comm's Van

0930-1000 B. Von Hempeln CRCCA

1000-1030 B.F. Murphy Satellite Communications 1030-1100 Coffee 1100-1200 Dr. P. Bhartia EMP 1200-1330 Lunch . . . 2

- 2 -

1330-1400 G. Desclouds/N. Ostiguy CN/CPT 1400-1430 L. Hummel/Claude Poirier TCTS DAY 2 - THURSDAY, MAY 27, 1982

1430-1500 T. Kurtz/F. Deveau Teleglobe 1500-1530 Coffee 1530-1615 A. Ingham/G. Lebow/H. Duckeck ARI - EBS DAY 3 - FRIDAY, MAY 28, 1982 0845-0930 W. MacRae WACS 0930-1000 A.F. Wigglesworth JEPP 1000-1025 Coffee

1025-1200 T. Stewart, DOC Where Do We Go From Here? 1200-1315 Lunch

DEFINITIONS

CRCAA Canadian Radio Common Carriers Association CRRL Canadian Radio Relay League CARF Canadian Amateur Radio Federation COMSONT Communications Ontario (Amateur) EMP EIectro Magnetic Pulse ARI-EBS Automatic Road Information - Emergency Broadcast System

WACS Wide Area Communications System JEPP Joint Emergency Planning Program

EQUIPMENT DISPLAYS 0800-0845 Wednesday/Thursday 1615-1800 Wednesday/Thursday 0800-0845 Friday ANNEX B

COURSE NO. EPC 358

COMCON 82

MAY 25-28, 1982

ARNPRIOR, ONTARIO

NAME & ADDRESS OCCUPATION REPRESENTING Arditti, Ms. M. Information Offr EPC Emergency Planning Canada 2nd Fl, Gillin Bldg 141 Laurier West Ottawa, Ontario KlA OW6

Bailey, Capt. L.W.J. DND Officer DND 105 Penfield Dr. Kanata, Ontario K2K 1L9

Beaulieu, J.M. Assistant to Vice- CNR 935 Lagauchetiere W. President Montreal, P.Q.

Beck, H.R. Chie Communication CNR P.O.Box 8100 .Engineer Montreal, P.Q. H3C 3N4

Bhartia, Dr. P. Defence Research Defence Electronics Div. Establishment Defence Research Establishment Ottawa, Ontario

Birtch, T.H. Sales Rapifax Canada 181 Bank St. Mezz. 2 Ltd. Ottawa, Ontario K2P 1W5

Borbridge, C.R. Marketing Manager Spar Aerospacae 21025 Trans Canada Hwy Ltd. Ste-Anne-De-Bellevue, P.Q. H9X 3R2

Bradley, J.T. Public Servant T.C. (Air) Telecommunications Place de Ville Ottawa, Ontario KlA ON8

. . . 2 - 2 - Burrill, D.R. Retired Amateur Emerg. 151 Fanshaw Ave. Communications Ottawa, Ontario K1H 6C8

Campbell, W.R. Retired Communications 1454 Woodward Ave. Ontario (COMSONT) Ottawa, Ontario KlZ 7W3

Carroll, R.G. Supt. Telecomm. Transport Canada 618 Glenhurst Cres. Ottawa, Ontario K1J 7B7

Casavant, R. Emergency Planning Çommunicat ions 300 Slater St. Rm 812 Telecommunications Ottawa, Ontario KlA 008

Charier, B. Telecommunications Teleglobe Canada 680 Quest rue Sherbrooke, Representative Montreal, Que. H3A 2S4

Clark, H. Amateur Emergency Canadian Radio 146 Harding Cres. Coordinator Relay League London, Ontario N6E 1G3

Coell, R.H. Coordinator N.S. EMO P.O. Box 1502 Plans & Operations Halifax, N.S. B3J 2Y3

Collison, C.L. Director Ontario 90 Harbour Street Telecommuncations Provincial Police Toronto, Ontario M7A 2S1

Considine, M. Communications Provincial Emergency Parliament Bldgs. Officer Program, B.C. Victoria, B.C. V8V 1X4

Cousins, R.B. Communications Communications 55 St. Clair Ave. E. Development Officer Canada (Ont Region) Toronto, Ontario M4T 1M2

Desclouds, G.A. Marketing Manager CNCP Telecommunications Suite 300, 150 Kent St. Ottawa, Ontario KlP 5P4

...3 - 3 -

Deslauriers, Y. Training Officer Communications 2085 Union, 20e Emergency Devel Canada Montreal, P.Q. Programs H3A 2C3

Draper, F. Manager Sask EMO 368 Stadacona St. W. Director/ Moose Jaw, Sask. Coordinator S6H 1Z6

Dubois, Mrs. J. Operations Support EPC 10-970 Gulf Place Officer Ottawa, Ontario K1K 3Y1

Duckeck, H.G. Electrical Eng. Blaupunkt Werke Blaupunkt Werke Gmtt Postfach D3200 Hildersheim, West Germany

Duveau, F. Group Supervisor Teleglobe Canada 680 Sherbrooke St. W. Operations Control Montreal, P.Q. H3A 2S4

Ellard, J.L. Deputy Coordinator Ministry of the lst F1, 25 Grosvenor St. Emergency Planning Sol Gen, Ontario Toronto, Ontario M7A lY6

Evanoff, N. Chief Communications EPC 712-85 Sparks St. Ottawa, Ontario

Fearey, A.E. Emergency Planning Alta. Government P.O. Box 2411 Officer Telephone Edmonton, Alta T5J 2S4

French, L.F. Regional Director EPC 850 Avord Tower Regina, Sask. S4P OR7

Gamble, R.H.C. Director, Training P.O. Box 40 and Education Arnprior, Ontario K7S 3H2

Glanfield, H.E. Planning and 15th Fl. 405 Broadway Research Officer Winnipeg, Man. R3C 3L6 -4--.

Guerette, J.C. Chief, Programs Communications P.O. Box 5090 Canada, Atlantic Moncton, N.B. Region ElC 8R2 Hayward, D.S. Engineer Manitoba Gov't P.O. Box 6666 1321 Ellice Ave Winnipeg, Man R3C 3V6

Hepburn, K. Communications ADM Spectrum Management Canada Communications Canada Ottawa, Ontario KlA 008

Hiller, M. Project Officer Transport Canada 5th Floor, Tower A Leased Comm. (Coast Guard) Place de Ville Ottawa, Ontario KlA ON7

Hoffner, K. National Sales Cardon Communications 95 MacNab St. N. Inc. Hamilton, Ontario L8N 3C8

Hollett, R.G. Product Manager A.C. Simmonds 975 Dillingham Rd and Sons Pickering, Ontario L1W 3B2

Hornstein, M. Ham Radio Operator Scotcom Radio 2300 Laurential Blvd Inc. St. Laurent, P.Q. H4R 1K3

Hummel, B.L. Coordinator, Bell Canada Rm 890, 160 Elgin St. Emergency Operations Ottawa, Ontario Planning

Ingham, A. Manager, Blaupunkt Robert Bosch 6811 Century Ave. Car Radio Div. Canada Ltd. Mississauga, Ontario L5N 1R1

Kedar, M. Communications KVA Communications 364 Supertest Rd Consultant & Electronics Downsview, Ontario M3J 2M2

Keim, T.F. District Manager Communications P.O. Box 2700 Canada & Gov't Yellowknife, NWT of NWT X1A 2R1

. . . 5 - 5 -

Kell, W. National Sales Lenbrook Industries 1145 Bellamy Rd. Manager Ltd. Scarborough, Ontario M1H 1H5

Kendall, K.K. Training & Canadian Amateur 777 B Springland Dr. Examining Officer Radio Federation Ottawa, Ontario K1V 6L9

Ker, D.G. Director of Radio Common 318 McNabb Cres. Marketing, Carriers Assoc. Milton, Ontario Multitone Electronics L9T 3G2 Ltd.

Kraav, J. Manager, Technical CPR Rm 415, P.O. Box 6042 Services Montreal, P.Q. H3A 3E4

Lachance, D. Chief of Program Communications 2085 Union, 20e Services Canada Montreal, P.Q. H3A 2C3

Lachance, M. Hydro Quebec VE2 RUA Emergency 4274 Rang St. Saiclose Network Laterriere, P.Q. GOV 1K0

Larson, K.F. Chief, Emergency Communications 300 Slater St. Plans Canada Ottawa, Ontario K1A OC8

Leblanc, Capt E.P. Officer, DND 1134 St. Emmanuel Terr. Plans & Requirements Orleans, Ontario K1C 2J7

Lebow, G. Consultant Robert Bosch/ 58 Round Hill Rd. Blaupunkt Dobbs Ferry, N.Y. 10522 U.S.A.

Lees, L. Engineer WR Communications 1600 Laperriere Ave. Ltd. Ottawa, Ontario K1Z 8P5

MacDonald, M.R. Technical CBC P.O. Box 248 Supervisor Cornwall, P.E.I. COA 1HO

...6 - 6 --

MacRae, W.F. Consultant Bimordyne (Canada) 601-151 Slater St. Ltd. Ottawa, Ontario KlP 5H3

Massaroni, R. Chief, Environment Canada Atmospheric Environment Communications Service Management Division 4905 Dufferin St. Downsview, Ontario M3H 5T4

Mathieu, J. Director Bureau de la 1200 de L'Eglise Information protection civile Ste-Foy, P.Q. du Quebec G1V 4M1

Meek, R.E. Trunks & Switching The Island Telephone 7 Maxfield Ave Supervisor Co. Ltd. Sherwood, P.E.I. CIA 6K6

Murphy, B.F. Prof. Engineer Satel Consultants 1013 Wiseman Cres. Ltd. Ottawa, Ontario K1V 8J3 Mussenden, R. Prof. Engineer Min. of Universities, c/o Ministry of Universities, Science & Communications Science & Communications B.C. Gov't Parliament Bldgs. Victoria, B.C.

Oldham, E.J. Consulting Engineer Consultec Canada Site 4, Box 19, R.R. 2 Porters Lake, N.S. BOJ 2S0 Ostiguy, N. Exec. Consultant CNCP Telecommunications 740 Notre Dame W. Montreal, P.Q. H3C 3X6

Pearce, L.D. Assistant Regional EPC 378-816 Government St. Director Victoria, B.C. V8W 1W9 Pedersen, A. Program Manager Communications 55 St. Clair Ave. E. Canada Toronto, Ontario L5C 2N7 . • .7 - 7 - Pilloud, R.P. Transportation Government of P.O. Box 2703 Manager Yukon Whitehorse, Yukon YlA 2C6 Poirier, C. Director Bell Canada 1140 de Maisonneuve B403 Montreal, P.Q. HlA 3M8 Pujo, Miss L.J.M. Communications Communications 200-386 Broadway Ave. Development Canada Winnipeg, Man. Officer R3C 3Y9 Renaud, Miss L.M. Secretary EPC 708 Morgan St., Apt 2 Ottawa, Ontario K1K 3M4 Rowe, E.H. Communications Government of Ground Floor Analyst Newfoundland Confederation Bldg. St. John's, Nfld. AlC 5T7 Rumstein, A. Engineer Supply and Services 11 Laurier St. Canada Hull, P.Q. KlA 0S5

Salter, E.C. Forestry Super. Gov't of Nfld. & 11 Rosscommon Place Labrador, Society Wedgewood Park of Nfld. Radio St. John's, Nfld. Amateurs AlA 3C7

Sargeson, W.G. Coordinator New Brunswick EMO Burtts Corner, N.B. EOH 1B0 Scanlon, Prof. T.J. Professor Carleton University Carleton University Ottawa, Ontario K1S 2X8 Sheedy, K. Communications Alta. Disaster 10320-146 St. Officer Services Edmonton, Alta. T5N 3A2 Stark, A.P. Retired ICOM Canada 22 Lyall St. Ottawa, Ontario K2E 5G8 ...8 - 8 -

Steeves, W.W. Communications Government of .Dept. of Transportation Policy Advisor New Brunswick P.O. Box 6000 Fredericton, N.B. E3B 5H1 Stewart, T.E. Asst/Director Communications 300 Slater St. Communications Canada Ottawa, Ontario Support Services KlA 008

Strangleman, J.W. Emergency Canadian Radio 512 Pinetree Dr. Coordinator Relay League London, Ontario N6H 3N1 Thomas, J.H. Engineer Transport Canada Transport Canada Area 10D, Tower C Place de Ville Ottawa, Ontario KlA ON8

Thwaites, J.B. Liaison Officer Communications 300-325 Granville St. Canada Vancouver, B.C. V6C 1S5

Tremblay, A.G. Regional Director EPC 855 Rochette Beauport, P.Q. G1C 1C3

Vanderzande, F. District Manager Dept. Communications 185 Valleyview Yukon Government Whitehose, Yukon EMO YlA 3C9

Wigglesworth, A.F. Director, EPC 980 Cres. Emergency Operations Ottawa, Ontario Coordination K2B 8C5 ANNEX C

CRISIS COMMUNICATIONS: THE EVER PRESENT GREMLINS

By

Joseph Scanlon

Emergency Communications Research Unit, Carleton University

Reference to COMCON '82

Arnprior, Ontario

26 May, 1982

The original version of this paper was a talk with slides. This version has been somewhat edited to clear up ambiguities, especially where there were references to pictures. PRESENTATION BY J. SCANLON

CRISIS COMMUNICATIONS - THE EVER PRESENT GREMLINS I've been doing disaster research for 10 years and I'm going to tell you a little bit about what I've learned. I don't want to suggest it's all bad; there have been some very efficient achievements. The Canadian Radio Relay League did an excellent job for the Red Cross in Mississauga. The CB radio people did an excellent job in Sydney, Nova Scotia, when Sydney had a wind storm. But I think it's probably true and important for us to recognize (and that's why I picked the title) that whether I'm talking about fires or snowstorms, mudslides or toxic spills, windstorms or a tornado, or a building explosion or an earthquake, everytime we do research we find that something has gone wrong with communications. If I ever had any doubts about that, I think they were dispelled when I was down in the United States for the Department of the Interior this week doing a prototype course for the Rangers of the park service of the United States (they are an incredibly interesting group of people by the way), responsible for everything from the Grand Canyon to the Statue of Liberty. They had all kinds of experience and they started telling us about these experiences and I'm going to mention a few of them because they make the point I want to make. One of the officers was one of the first respondents to the Air Florida crash at the 14th Street bridge in Washington, D.C. which it turns out is right beside a park rad. He was telling us that when that plane, (remember the plane just hit the bridge and went in to the Potomac River, and they brought a park service helicopter in to rescue people), well that plane also cut the telephone cable as it hit the bridge so part of the police telephone system wenÈ at the instant of the crash, and that was one of their problems. That same day in Washington they had something that in some way is classic in disasters, they had a subway collision and they had exactly the same problem that occurred in London at the time of the Moorgate tube train and that is, underground to surface communications would not function in the of the District of Columbia. That is what London, England found at the time of Moorgate (you might remember that's when the tube train driver drove the train through the end of the platform and committed suicide). You would say London with the blitz background, etc., they should have no problems. Well they had incredible problems at that time, and basically that's what we find. Slide: There was difficulty in establishing adequate communications with the accident site. No accurate estimate of the number of casualties, the severity of their injuries, or the time when they were likely to arrive at the hospital was obtained. Effective communication probably requires direct radio contact between the site medical controller and the hospital medical controller. This was not possible because the accident occurred underground, and much of the information from the site was confused and .../2 - 2 - exaggerated. Moorgate Tube Train Disaster (February 28, 1975)

Another example: one of the Rangers was at the Bandolier Memorial in the United States. They had a fire, it was getting serious (they call them wild land fires in the States, we call them forest fires), but it was burning towards Los Alamos which seemed to cause a few headaches, and then it suddenly jumped a road and cut telephone communications, cut radio communications, knocked out the complete communications systems. They couldn't communicate across the fire they couldn't communicate with each other. Another example: the Thompson Canyon in Colorado. I don't know if you remember the flash floods that wiped out people down there. One of the officers had been one of the first respondents to that scene. He actually saw some people dying in front of him, people who came in with him. They lost their radio communications, their telephone communications, they didn't know what was going on for quite a while. The one radio channel that survived, they were listening to it. It was the only one that they could get through on, they heard someone saying the dam has burst. Now there is a huge dam in the Estes Park which could have caused a few problems, so a chap who, by the way among other things, describes himself humorously as Lawrence of the Canyon, got all his evacuees to high. ground. (5>turns but there is a tiny little coffer dam, beaver type dam, that is what had burst. It was described by a helicopter pilot. The huge dam was doing fine. But communications problems are very very real. At the same time we heard these stories, (people like Bill Sargeson in N.B. will love this), all their state emergency vehicles are equipped with discs so they can communicate by satellite during an emergency, back and forth, unit to unit, satellite via satellite communication to the state emergency organization. We have these incredible capacities. Incidentally satellite communications was used at Mount St Helen's but at the same time these gremlins - and if you don't remember gremlins, they are the little devils that get into things and make them not work - always show up. So what I thought I'd try to do, not from the technical side, but as Armand Wigglesworth suggested, from the human side, is try to say what happens, what sort of problems we see and classify them. My first attempt at classification was to split the problems between human and technical. I thought I'd split between human problems and technical problems and then the more I thought about it, the thought that struck me is that most technical problems are caused by humans who either have not thought it out, or developed a system where you consider the possibilities, or whatever. So what I then decided to do is take another approach and essentially list the basic problems which I've seen occur in crises under a series of headings. I'm going to end with the ones that are

. . . / 3 the most common of all - incompatibility and overloading - I'll explain those later - and then say one more thing about policy implications of communications. I'm going to go through step by step, giving you some examples, mainly Canadian, of some of the things that we've seen.

(No. 1) Now, the first problem which struck me is when there is nothing wrong with the technology but there is a lack of awareness of what's available or how it works. In other words, the system is functional but people are not necessarily aware of it. (Slide). That is a tornado that hit Woodstock, Ontario. The afternoon that the tornado hit, Environment Canada put out a warning that in effect said there were tornado possibilities. This was never broadcast by anybody and the reason was fairly simple. The last line was "THIS IS NOT A WARNING", so they didn't put it out. First human problem. Later, when it became apparent that the possibility of impact in Woodstock was pretty high, people from Toronto tried to call to both the radio station there and the police. The lines appeared to be busy. In fact, the tornado had blown them down. Now, there were a number of alternatives. They could have gone to Broadcast News wire and asked them to put out a teletype. They could have called the Ontario Provincial Police who have an office in Toronto had asked to go on radio or on the Canadian Police Information system. They didn't do any of those things; they weren't aware of the alternatives.

The number one problem tends to be that systems exist but peopre are riert—a-Ware of them. Recently with the N.B. earthquake - I don't know how many of you realize, but from Saturday, 9 January we've now had better than 200 earthquakes in N.B., more than 60 above 2 on the Richter scale and half a dozen that were serious enough to cause impact, and the epicenter is gradually shifting north from the place where it started. The day of the first earthquake one of the problems that arose was when the provincial Emergency Measures Organization tried to connect to the federal emergency organization, it appeared there were problems with the phone system - a sort of a twinkle tone sound. We now realize that the people trying it didn't realize that that is how the system works. It was actually functional. But that lack of awareness means that the link didn't take place. And I guess what I'm trying to say is that a system that exists but is not understood might not as well exist.

When I went down to Darwin, Australia, to look at the aftermath of Cyclone Tracy, the first report I heard was a speech given by one of the senior Darwin disaster people who said Darwin was different from other disasters. I thought that was interesting, I wondered why. He also said all communications broke down; there were no technical systems operational. This also surprised me. I went up to Darwin to find out why it was different. Of course what I found is that it wasn't different, ail sorts of systems survived, in fact at no time were all the technical links to Darwin and the outside world out. The dilemma was two part. Number one was people

.../4 weren't aware of them and number two was the internal community system was so badly damaged that people couldn't hook from one to the other. One of the police officers said to me, "I kept getting these stupid calls saying, 'what's going on?' It was the middle of the night, it was dark, the storm was raging, I was under a table, the building was shaking around me and I was damned if I was going to go out and see what was happening, and they phoned and asked, 'how is it?' and I said, 'I don't know'." And basically they didn't, and they had some other incredible problems, the cable link that brings the television signal never went but it's automated. Nobody mans it at the other end. And Christmas morning, after the cyclone hit, some people who were on that system sat there and watched His Holiness the Pope give his Christmas message in full living colour, but they couldn't get back to him to tell him they had a problem. (Slide). By the way, that's what the main street of Darwin looked like on Christmas morning. It's the only picture I could ever find because you could not walk, drive, bicycle or whatever through any of the streets of Darwin. And it creates interesting problems by the way.

One of the interesting examples of what happens in crises: the Darwin hospital, Christmas morning, activated its emergency plan and did quite a good job and was ready to receive casualties, and nobody came. The reason was very simple, you could not move on the streets so casualties could not get about, so the hospital sat and waited for several hours before the casualties started to trickle in. So a lot of the realities of a disaster are somewhat different than we might expect. So lesson number one is no technological system, however remarkable, is of use if it's not known or understood by those who may have need for it. That's number one.

(No. 2) The next problem, and it's the classic problem of disasters, and it's one we are all familiar with in the field, is that people do not want to believe that it's happening to them and as a result of that, no matter how efficient the alarm system, or the communication system, they simply don't respond.

St. Joseph's hospital in Hamilton had a fire May lst, 1980. The fire started in the boiler room; smoke went through the building. In pediatrics in that hospital the children were all moved to one end of the floor. They were all in heavy smoke, they were all wearing wet surgical masks trying to breathe and they were all waiting to see if they could survive the fire. Eventually they evacuated but a long time went on in which they waited for the signal to go and that's a reality in catastrophies and crises, that is people don't want to believe.

.../5 If we move to Winnipeg, Manitoba, the Fort Garry Court Apartment that got hit by a fire that took five lives and left a lot of people homeless and injured. An incredible fire. The building alarm functioned perfectly. Everybody in the building, with one or two exceptions heard it. The exceptions were people who were totally deaf and one fellow who had his stereo headset on. But did they react by leaving? (That's what you are supposed to do.) Well, of the ones who did, 50% went back in the building and others behaved in ways that in retrospect don't make sense. One man attempted to get upstairs to see if some of his friends were okay, couldn't get through because of the fire, went back in the burning building and drank rye with the caretaker while the building burned. And I guess some of my favourite people, the two guys who are fans of the Winnipeg Jets hockey team, they sat in the basement watching a hockey game and kept moving their TV set so that the water from the firemen's hoses wouldn't get in the way.

(Slide). This was the Barry Building in North Bay, Ontario. It blew up at 3:30 on a mid-winter afternoon. The smell of gas, or the smell that you put in natural gas, you could smell in the building for three hours. All equipment is functional, all communications systems are fine, the police department is across the street, the fire department is around the corner. They don'_t call anyone, they don't get out, they don't do anything. The only evidence we have that anybody left is one man who took his wife there to the doctor said, "'it stinks in here. You stay here, I'm going outside.'" She blew up and he didn't. Bût aside from that, everybody stayed. So it's not a communications problem,in that sense, and that's one real problem in a crisis. It's that a lot of people don't accept it.

Let's get to this situation:

Slide: Thus, we have the almost incredible situation around noon on Friday. A city is about to be inundated. The Chief Engineer, who has received warnings, tells no one. The Mayor and the Chief Administrator do not realize it. The headquarters of the GRCA is in the city, possessed of all the information, and is not contacted. The police do not learn of the possible flood until it has started.

Royal Commission Inquiry into Grand River Flood 1974.

This is a Royal Commission report from Ontario. GRCA stands for Grand River Conservation Authority. They correctly predicted that in fact floods would hit Cambridge the next day. It is of particular interest to people in Arnprior because the case study they used here for years really is that flood - an accurate forecast of what would happen. You can see what actually happens is not a problem in technical capacity, but a problem in human capacity, human willingness to believe a disaster is about to strike.

.../6 -6- I was at a seminar at the Kitchener-Waterloo Record newspaper this winter when a reporter came up and said, "I want to talk to you about the Cambridge floods." He was on the main street, he got into a phone booth up to his waist in water, called his paper and said there's a flood here and they hung up the phone and said, "'you always get excited about things that don't matter'". They in fact did not do anything about covering the story at that point. So lesson number two is: the most sophisticated technology will not overcome human nature. If you read what happened at Three Mile Island it's quite clear that the technical systems were not the key problem, it was the operators declining to believe the signals and reacting.

(No. 3) There are some other problems too and they relate to having systems that to some extent aren't ideally suited to emergencies. One that comes to mind really relates to the snow emergency. That's an Ontario Provincial Police car (Slide), and that's a phoney picture, because that was when the roads got better. (Slide). This is,what they really looked like through most of the snow emergency. Impassable. The radio station in that area operates on a sunset type situation which is common to a lot of radio stations in Canada, and that means it changes its range and power at night. That's also true for a number of the stations in N.B. in the earthquake area and what that means is that a station that reaches people at certain times of the day can't at other times.

The southern part of Prince Edward County, Ont., the • station that serves that county at night, comes from Aruba in the Dutch West Indies. Not particularly useful'. In the United States, the Federal Communications Commission has figured out that problem and has a standing order that says any station on its own initiative, can make its own decision in a disaster situation to maintain daytime standards or stay on the air. We haven't quite got to that point. One of the dilemmas in Prince Edward County was what does a station do? As it turns out, the problem was resolved by the fact that the equipment that switches over froze, and they stayed on full power for the emergency by accident. But it's a real dilemma in technical terms, another example occurred in Sydney during a windstorm. The local technology type person at the weather office in Sydney is not empowered to issue forecasts and when the link broke between Sydney and Halifax, even though he could tell there was a storm, the fact is there was nothing he could do about it in a formal sense. So communications eliminate the ability to act because of regulations or other types of situations.

(No. 4) Another problem is that some of the things that go wrong simply are unexpected in a sense. What happened at Malton when a DC-9 went off the end of the runway and crashed into a ravine? Metropolitan Toronto Ambulance have an excellent communications setup, repeater towers all over the

.../7 7 area but they discovered they couldn't trigger the repeater from the place of the crash. They still say that's the only place in Toronto that would happen. I say that's the only place they've had a disaster since they put the system in. You can expect that kind of situation, and back to Prince Edward County, you may not believe this (Slide), but that'a a Ministry of Transportation & Communications provincial government snowplow plowing a main highway. Where is it? Well nobody really knew because it turns out they don't put radios in the plows and the reason why is because they have pickup trucks with radios to keep track of the plows in snow emergencies. Unfortunately, the pickup trucks weren't doing too well that day. The system which seemed to be effective suddenly turns out not to be. (Photos are courtesy of the OPP helicopters which were flying).

(No. 5) Another problem is somewhat more complicated but it gets in situations where backups are not available, or systems go for other reasons related to that. Back to the Woodstock tornado. If you're not familiar with the Woodstock tornado, incredible devastation in very very short time. (Slides). One of the really devastating situations that I've been to and got little public attention. A town called Oxford Centre just outside Woodstock was virtually completely wiped out during this tornado. Power loss caused a number of problems. If you have any doubts about impact that tells you. (Slide).

A number of things happened. The ambulance had no backup power when the power went they could not operate it. Then they put in a backup system that requires some physical ability to start, they have a crippled dispatcher. It still didn't work. You get into situations like that, either you don't have backup or perhaps it can't be activated by the people who are there. The police station lost it's radio . The have backup power but when you go to backup power you have to re-start the repeater. The dispatcher was ill the person on duty didn't know he had to push that button. They couldn't figure out why they weren't repeating their messages. Finally somebody figured that'out; but for a while they had some real problems. The fire department had an alarm system which generates alarms to individual homes if those homes have power - no way of telling which homes have received the alarm and which hadn't. Some personnel came, some didn't. They didn't realize that those that didn't respond thought there was a power outage and that's all because the storm caused widespread power loss but damage only in specified areas. So you find that particular kinds of breakdowns occur and in Woodstock a real headache and one that's not uncommon was that the radio station had no backup power at all. It went off the air and stayed off the air the entire emergency period. When the police, health and other individuals wanted to tell the public about what was available, what might be happening, again the system was not functional.

.../8 -8 - (No. 6) You get other kinds of situations that are happening and these relate sometimes to language. In Winnipeg after the Fort Gary Court fire we were told by the social services organizations there had been no language problem. Nobody came who needed help in another language which seemed interesting except that when we finally found the citizens who did not speak English, we discovered that they had not gone to the social services because they knew that nobody spoke their language. So sometimes you don't realize what happened . In fact, (I guess we're very proud of this one), we had trouble locating a lot of the occupants of that apartment, its really a derelict type place - and it occurred to me perhaps that the people who compiled the original list had misspelled the names so I thought, I wonder if they could be French Canadian. I went down the list and took the names that had vague resemblance to French names and changed them over to names like Ducharme and Dupont and so on and we found all of them. The officers who had been there had no French knowledge, didn't know how to spell in French, and had mangled the names. And we found that in fact these people had gone to the French community and never integrated. And what happened when they broadcast notices that the Red Cross would provide assistance. They were entirely in English. Again the French did not hear about that. We were just looking at the earthquake data from Bathurst from this winter and it's interesting to note that Fredericton, an English community, had much larger use of radio than Bathurst. It occurred to us it might relate to language, so we ran the data (we have language data on our survey) and we found that those persons who spoke French as children and still speak French at home 25% of them linked to the radio station which is English. Those people who have spoken both languages at home over their lifetime, 36% of them were linked to the radio station, and those people who spoke entirely English over their lifetime, 50% were linked to the radio station. You start to realize that the system itself isn't sufficient to guarantee an interconnection.

(No. 7) We get into other things that sometimes surprise you. Prince Edward County - other things that developed at that particular situation. First of all, communications systems sometimes worked but transportation didn't and its part of the system. In this particular snowstorm for example the police got a call that a young chap had tried to push his car, got tailgated and his legs got smashed and he had been carried into a house, and the ambulance system had no four-wheel drive. It took four hours to get an ambulance out to the house where this chap was lying. In Ontario, ambulance drivers can't administer medication without authorization from a doctor - no telephone system - and finally brought him in a four-wheel vehicle without any medication. They got another call saying a lady was pregnant and about to deliver. They put her on a snowplow, the snowplow couldn't get through, so they had to deliver the baby in a home for senior citizens. They got another call saying a man had a heart attack. A dilemma occurred

.../9 when the helicopter couldn't get visual reference because of the snow conditions on the ground. The Ontario Provincial Police had to go out there by snowmobile, make the connection and then make a ground situation waving so that the helicopter could spot them because the normal visual reference was gone.

We move to Terrace B.C. for some flash floods. (Slides). You can see that's the lake area, that's the main highway, which wasn't working too well. People got stranded between every highway break. One guy drove a pick-up truck off a bridge, the highway crews saw the accident, pulled him out - broken neck. The radio worked on the highways vehicle, but you couldn't go out there by road, you couldn't go out there on a fixed-wing aircraft, you couldn't get out there by rail, and the conditions were too low for the helicopters to fly. So they kept reporting they had him, but nobody could get there. A little town called Rosswood, north of Terrace had two sick children, and although there are no phones there, a school bus with a radio telephone had been stuck there because of the floods. They called the RCMP every hour all night long saying, "you've got to get to us", and they could not. So communications sometimes survives but other systems don't. And the messages just start to haunt you because there is very little you can do. There is another Terrace story, and that was the people in a little place called Cedarvale. The Provincial Emergency Program broadcast messages over television - if you needed help you could call the following number and they could provide it. They (Cedarvale) could hear the messages over FM radios, but they had no telephone. And they got very frustrated with that because they couldn't call in. They got even more frustrated because helicopters kept landing on the other side of Cedarvale across the river - all kinds of helicopters - which baffled us for two weeks until it was discovered that the only restaurant you could have a coffee break in the entire highway, and they were all going down for morning coffee.

(No. 8) The key problems I wanted to deal with are two basic things that happened and incompatibility is number one. Port Alice, B.C., a little town of 2000 to the northwest tip of Vancouver Island. The RCMP and Public Works can practically trip over each other if they go out of their buildings a little bit up the hill. Their radio systems are not compatible, the phone systems were jammed (I will say a little more about that later). So in a mudslide which led to the town's evacuation, two key agencies cannot communicate except by walking back and forth. It is probably not surprising that the Mayor and the Chief of Police got into a public shouting match and at one point the RCMP radioed in, 'the mayor said people can come back, has he got any authority over this?', and the mayor was in the police car at the time. It didn't lead to a happy exchange of relationships. I might say that the Mayor got re- elected and the senior police officer got transferred. So I .../10 - 10 - guess that says something for the politicians. If we go to this incident - (Slide), Mississauga. Ontario police forces basically have a common channel they can use, but every force in the province doesn't have that common channel. The three forces that responded to assist Peel Regional were Ontario Provincial Police, Metro Toronto Police and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and they are the three forces in the province that don't have the common channel. So the four responding forces could not intercommunicate on the radio system. Now to some extent by, in fact, having each force taking on a different task, and this was resolved by having each force having its communication centre, to some extent in the case of the OPP, they had a link to the command post, and in the case of the RCMP and Metro they set up at one of the Divisional Headquarters of Peel Regional. But, in the early stages, when Metro officers and OPP officers were responding to the evacuation, and they were sent into areas that were presumably exposed to chlorine. The despatcher could not communicate when the officers separated, so they carried portables. There was a very real fear the night of the evacuation that an officer might have gone down in gas and they wouldn't know it, and it made for very difficult communications situations. So compatability is one of the major problems you run into. I was talking to one of the rangers in Grand Canyon this week he was involved in the MGM fire. 22 agencies responded and 22 incompatible radio situations. They could not talk to each other, not one single agency could talk to another in the existing communications system. So that kind of a situation is very very real.

(No. 9) Now the other situation which is also real is the situation that deals with jamming. I think most of you probably know this, but incident after incident, starting with North Bay, we have run into situations Where the phones simply can't function because of jams. Port Alice RCMP has just a listed phone number. The outside media from all across North America started calling, the police found it impossible to get on their phones with outside media calling. Though the jamming situation wasn't caused locally, it was just as serious. And in fact the police incorrectly announced that the bridge between the town and the mill had gone. The Mill manager tried to tell them, they got it wrong he could not get through because of the jammed telephone situation. And virtually the same thing happened at Mississauga. We had telephoning jamming conditions at Peel Regional police in 30 seconds, because the amount of calling was just incredible. Now they did have back up systems and systems that operated, but the point I wanted to make is that jamming is not uncommon. When you evacuated the community of Mississauga you had a situation that led to that kind of problem.

Another example takes us to Bathurst at the time of the earthquakes, Bathurst, N.B. Even though the earthquakes caused virtually no damage, just a few cracks, etc., certainly no serious injury, the public calling that built up on Saturday morning, January the 9th, knocked out the downtown Bathurst for half an hour. The step system - 200

.../11 - 11 - people on 20 switches, each switch stays connected once you pick up the phone until you have finished your call - the system stayed out for half an hour. I know systems like line load control but they require time to put in place and then on occasion you have to figure out in advance whom is wanted on the system. In any case, reality was that the phones went out.

Back to Hamilton to the St. Joseph's Hospital fire - there, there was another kind of jamming. Hamilton Wentworth Regional police went to that fire and discovered that none of their portables would work in the hospital building. They are not sure precisely why: it appears that it may have been the total amount of radio traffic in the area; it may have been the officers on overtime who hadn't recharged their portable batteries; it may have been shielding at the hospital; they are not quite sure. But the reality was no radio communications for police inside the hospital. We also found that other systems had their problems too. The police radio operates on a repeater which means that if the officer broadcasts a message other people hear it when it comes back from base station; so they didn't get through. Fire department unit to unit radios worked fine, but that doesn't tell us what the firemen said because a lot of the unit to unit stuff worked but never got recorded. The ambulance people taped their messages but they don't always have a time frame on their tape. When we went to analyze the three tapes we found some we didn't have at all, some we didn't have because they hadn't worked and some we didn't know when they occurred. It made for an interesting attempt to reconstruct what happened and it's an example of communications problems.

(No. 10) Something else I think is terribly important that I want to mention to you. When a disaster happens, communities tend to change shape in such a way as to create an entirely different kind of need for communications. I'm not going to go through the whole routine but just to give the example fairly simply, you take Port Alice, a small town, basically most people employed by the mill. Now most of us can visualize that kind of town, shift work etc. If I said, "well, I want to get the word around the town", you could probably in five minutes figure out how to do it. When you evacuate the town over miles of highway and you evacuate some of the people before there is any kind of registration or control systems at the edge of town, you have some homes empty and some not and some people away and some not, some children picked up by their parents at school and others not, suddenly you don't know where the population is. You have a very different kind of problem .of getting out information. It was the same thing at St Joseph's Hospital. You take a hospital which is a very structured and organized place and a lot of people know how the system works and you suddenly say evacuate, and put 2500 people in the parking lot, and you now try to communicate

.../12 - 12 - among those people. A physician wants to see a patient, a nurse wants to see a patient, a relative wants to pick up someone. You suddenly have a very different kind of problem in terms of communication. And if you do the same thing in Mississauga you take 217,000 people and evacuate them, Mr. Wigglesworth already mentioned many of them were evacuated three times by the police from place to place. You put 12,000 of them in an emergency centre for registration, and then you decide you want to warn all 217,000 about health dangers before they come back. It doesn't matter how many media systems you have you really don't know if you are getting through or not. So communications problems are very, very real.

So I want to suggest to you that even beyond the problems I have talked about, there are a lot more difficulties than that, because the post-impact situation is sometimes quite different in terms of the communications need, than the pre-impact situation. And one of the concerns I have in looking at crisis communication systems, is that you really understand that the whole community system, the whole community structure is totally altered by disaster in such a way that your pre-existing communications systems may no longer be of value to you no matter how functional they are.

You understand that a lot of communities in this country have no media. I think, as a professional journalist, the first shock I got, and it probably doesn't surprise any of you in rural areas, was that they don't have media in some places, and the effects are bizarre. If I can use one hostage instance as an example, this is by the way one of the realities in communications in crisis that the media descend upon you en masse. (Slide). (That's one of the news conferences at Peel Regional Police Press HQ across from the main command centre.) One of the realities that one of our hostage taking situations showed me that was very interesting. We have a town Oak Lake, Manitoba. A man has kidnapped some people taking a doctor, his wife and another man hostage in the heart of this town of 400. The RCMP are very concerned for people around the hostage house lest the man open fire. But they are also concerned that in the middle of the night if they turn on the lights and start to move people that will give him moving targets. So they decide to wait to evacuate until right after dawn when the movement won't be so obvious. But the news has spread all over the province, people in Winnipeg, Brandon and also Regina. What do you do if Mama is living in a town where there is a hostage taking? You phone from out of town. The fact is the phone calls from out of town told most of the people in the evacuating area before the police got there. So in fact the communications system, news broadcast from Winnipeg, Brandon, whatever, created a problem that the local police had trouble dealing with. Not only that, these callstotally tied the

.../13 - 13 - telephone lines in the community and created a jamming situation. The last thing I wanted to show you, is that what I'm talking about is not very new. (Slide). That's Canada's best known disaster. You'll recognize Halifax N.S., the place we've all been talking about the place Mr. Wigglesworth comes from. The fact is that research in the field of emergency communications really began in Canada at the time of the Halifax explosion and the reality is that it was recognized almost immediately that if we're going to examine human behaviour in crises we're going to have to understand that communications was at the core of that. Slide: Many indeed of the uninjured folk at a distance seemed unable to realize the terribleness of the immediate real need in the stricken area. In fact, owing to the collapse of communication they did not for an appreciable time discover there was an area more stricken than their own ... The vital place of communication in society was recognized at once. It is a major influence in association and upon it in disaster depends the immediacy as well as the adequacy of relief... Samuel Henry Prince (1920) Catastrophe and Social Change

That's an extract from a doctoral dissertation from Princeton University from the first person who ever studied the nature of human behaviour in disaster in a formal way, a man named Samuel Henry Prince who Settled in Canada and taught here for the rest of his life. And the second paragraph really indicates that the stuff I have been talking about is not new, the facts have been with us for a long, long time.

The last thing I want to tell you is one other thing, it is the most recent study we have been involved in and it indicates to some extent how communications can be important. And that was in New Brunswick in the earthquake situation. Because what happened is rather interesting, and that is when the earthquake occurred most people in the province felt it, felt themselves shake and whatever. Most people also did not know right away what was happening, sometimes they figured it out from previous earthquake experience, sometimes they deduced it because it shook long enough that they figured it wasn't a truck or a plane or whatever. Sometimes they asked others who told them and sometimes they went to the media. But the critical question became - OK, we understand that in fact there has been impact, but where is it, where is the epicentre of the earthquake? How big was the earthquake? - and bit by bit people started asking emergency organizations like fire, police, etc., and they started asking other police organizations and the other emergency measures organizations. And the dilemma .../14 - 14 -

is this that at EMO NB, they didn't know, they didn't have any seismologist in their operations or scientists on hand, you wouldn't expect that, so they too started to search for information. One of the places they went was EMR in Ottawa and they said, "it is an earthquake." EMO asked, "well where is the centre? How much?" and they EMR didn't know at that point and they said that they would get back and they didn't. And you heard already that they (EMO) had difficulty with the telephone system getting through to Emergency Planning Canada. So, in fact, the provincial EMO, which, as is reasonable, did not have its own earthquake expertise, (the last earthquake that they felt down there was in 1929), starts to realize that it is caught without access to expertise, then the real dilemma builds up. They are listening to local radio, and local radio is quoting the experts, EMR is talking to Canadian Press, they are not talking to the EMO. And that causes a credibility problem that is very real. Then the situation gets, in my opinion, more serious, so we talked about this to the people of N.B. and Bill Sargeson of N.B. may have more than this to say. A local university professor who is not a seismologist but is a physicist starts giving news conferences describing what is happening. He is getting all this stuff from EMR Ottawa - they are talking to him too. And all of a sudden he becomes the focus of attention. Now as far as we know everything he said was accurate, but we now have the media starting to focus on an individual who is not the response organization, and that starts to shift perception. And what I want to suggest to you is that the evidence we have, and we have said this years ago and it's still true, is that to a considerable extent whoever controls communication, whoever controls the access to information, whoever is the source of information becomes the centre of operations and control and if you don't have communications systems operational, if you can't gather information, if you can't disseminate it, then you also lose the power to have operational control and it will shift to whoever has that. While I think that policy finding is not by any means new, it has very important implications. And if you think that in some cases that the reaction won't be very quick because you have lots of time to do it, then this isn't the case. I can't resist by ending with a little bit of sound, but this is the sound that you would have heard if you lived in Fredericton or near that area in New Brunswick on Saturday morning January the 9th, shortly after 8:53:56 the first earthquake went off as the disc-jockey started to describe what happened. It off radio station CFNB New Brunswick, courtesy of CFNB. (Music) It's five minutes before nine. Gee, we just - uh - we're still shaking here. I thought a train was passing by our radio station and I think we just had an earthquake. My microphone is still swaying on the stand here this morning. We're investigating now. We'll see what we can find out. Strange feeling. I thought they only happened in California. Five minutes before nine on CFNB. Here's Charlie Pride.

.../15 - 15 -

What am I saying then, in summary, is that the evidence is overwhelming that communications are essential in crisis. In fact, control and authority often tie to communications and almost every incident we have looked at there have been various types of communications problems. A lot of them are human problems but some of them are technical problems in the sense of jamming, incapability, whatever. And it is quite clear that a lack of understanding of how systems work will create difficulties for you. In fact in the regular courses up here I usually say to people you have to expect that given an incident you will have some communications problems and basically the question is, is that if you have alternatives you deal with them. Now I don't want to leave you with the impression that everything is bad I should tell you that in a number of situations, the alternative or backup methods that have been followed make a lot of sense and sometimes they are not very technical.

Response was done by Protection Civile at St. Bonaventure Quebec, when the little town was hit by a tornado. And the real problem was communicating with the people: There are no local media right in a small town in the Eastern Townships. The one person who came in from Quebec City to help simply arranged by hand to type out mimeographed notices which they simply stuck up in the town signed by the Mayor and everybody could read them and it worked. Perfectly acceptable, brilliant, cost very little and didn't require any power, and everytime the Mayor had something new to say they ran up one new sheet of paper and stuck it up. So what I don't want to suggest to you that communications requires amazingly sophisticated technology to achieve. Hamiltdn Wentworth Regional police - their solution was simply to use runners in the hospital and some officers can run very well, and they did fine. So that works too. Peel Regional police - they had some designated phone lines they could use which didn't get tied up because they by-passed the switchboard, were unlisted and unsequenced. In fact, they got through quite as well. In Sydney, Nova Scotia as I mentioned, they went to CB radios. Port Hardy, the place where the evacuees from Port Alice were taken used notice boards in the general eating place and got B.C. telephone to put in a special bank of telephones where you could call for the latest information. Sarnia, Ontario in a tornado used loud hailers, went to all the evacuation centres and announced what was going on. So I'm not suggesting there haven't been satisfactory solutions to the problems or innovative ideas. But what I am suggesting is that in virtually every incident there have been communications problems. They are constant, real and you can expect them, and a lot of them relate to human rather than technological problems. But the most common of all it seems to me, both the jamming and the incompatibility do relate to technical realities, and in fact, therefore, I titled my talk Crisis Communications, the Ever Present Gremlins. You can fully expect, and my experience is it hasn't changed since Halifax that there will be communications difficulties in any crisis and/or disaster situation. ANNEX D

ELECTRO MAGNETIC PULSE (EMP)

Presentation by

DR. P. BHARTIA ELECTRO MAGNETIC PULSE (EMP) INTRODUCTION

As you well know the explosion of a nuclear weapon produces blast, thermal and radiation effects. Up until now, the so-called radiation effects referred to nuclear radiation specifically. There is a fourth effect known as the electro- magnetic pulse or EMP which is very important. It effects the operation of electronic equipment.

In the short time available to me it is impossible to go into great detail on the mechanism of this phenomenon and its effects. I will make use of vieweaphs to convey the message to you as quickly as possible.

GENERATION OF EMP

We will consider only surface and exo-atmospheric bursts for the sake of 8implicity. The first vu-graph shows the situation for a surface burst. The gamma-rays emitted by the weapon interact with the air molecules producing free electrons. The electrons move rapidly away from the centre of the explosion leaving behind a positively charged core of air molecules. This separation of charges, occurring on a wholesale basis creates intense electro- magnetic fields. In the case of a surface burst the other weapons effects are also important so any consideration of EMP damaging effects must be discussed with context of the other effects. We have a balance hardening problem. Next let us consider an exo-atmospheric burst; that is one outside the atmosphere. In this case the gamma-rays can travel a great distance before encountering a substantial number of air molecules. The situation is illustsrated in the next vu- graph. The important point is that this time the source region can be about 1000 miles in diameter and 20 miles thick and so the extent of the electro-magnetic fields radiated onto the earth's surface is greatly augmented by the very large size of the source region. In the case of a high altitude burst the other weapons effects are greatly diminished and the only weapon effect that represents a "kill" capability is the EMP. The next vu-graph shows the EMP ground coverage of a high altitude burst. You can see how almost the whole of the North American continent could be covered with one single weapon. We are not implying that all equipment will be destroyed but simply that all equipment is subject to damage; the degree will depend on various other factors which I will discuss later.

COMPARISION OF EMP TO OTHER NATURAL PHENOMENA A natural phenomena most similar to EMP is lightning. The spectrum and waveform of lightning and EMP are shown in the next vu-graph. These are representative spectra. The EMP

...2 - 2 - frequency spectra has higher frequency components up to several hundred MHz in fact. In the time domain the duration of the EMP pulse is much smaller and the intensity peaks almost instan- taneouslr compared to lightning. The total energy in an EMP pulse is considerably larger. The next vu-graph compares lightning and EMP effects. Lightning, except for a direct hit, results in radio static whereas EMP can cause burn out of sensitive electronic components. Lightning strikes are not simultaneous while the EMP effect can be nearly so. This means that the effects can be additive. ENERGY COLLECTION MECHANISMS

The electromagnetic radiation emitted from a nuclear weapons burst causes a flow of charges or electrical currents in distant metallic conductors. This is comparable to the way electromagnetic fields from a TV transmitter set up currents in your roof top TV antenna so any metallic object even though located some considerable distance from a nuclear explosion can collect EMP energy.

The following 2 vu-graphs give an illustration of electro- magnetic energy collectors. So EMP susceptibility is a three- factor function as shown in the next vu-graph. In summary, the energy appearing in the electromagnetic environment is converted, often in a complex fashion, into high level currents and voltage flowing on any metallic conductor. To cause damage it is necessary that a sensitive component be encountered - a transmitter for example. Remember that in the case of an antenna this is the normal purpose of an antenna. In the case of other metallic structures various obscure details (such as the quality of welds) control the situation. The next 3 vu-graphs illustrate some typical energy collection situations that could be encountered. The inadvertent conductive loop. Reducing efficiency of an energy collector by reducing area. Bad circuit layout - the so-called rats nest. SYSTEM AND COMPONENT RESPONSES

I have very briefly discussed the ways energy can be collected and directed to the sensitive components - that is the stuff inside the black box. I should digress very briefly here and mention that in the early days when atmospheric testing was rampant that although the EMP effect was noted, the electronic components or active elements were vacuum tubes. These are relatively insensitive to EMP compared to the solid state devices that came along later. So the advent of high technology ICs has made EMP a serious problem. Electrical systems exposed to EMP may suffer degradation in two distinct ways:

a. Functional Damage - when a component or subsystem becomes permanently inoperative until some part

...3 - 3 -

or parts are replaced. This includes devices or systems which become partially incapacitated or whose lifetimes are decreased.

b. Operational Upset - temporary impairment of a system. It could last for only a few microseconds or could be as long as one hour.

SOME EXAMPLES

Burnout of a transistor or opening of a fuse - functional damage.

Erosion of magnetic core memories of computer systems or opening of circuit breakers.

The next vu-graph shows the electronic components that are sensitive to functional damage in order of decreasing sensitivity.

microwave diodes field effect transistors radio-frequency transistors audio transistors silicon-controlled rectifiers power rectifier semiconductor diodes vacuum tubes .

Systems employing vacuum tubes are far less susceptible to the EMP effect than those employing transistors.

The next 2 bu-graphs show various systems in terms of degree of susceptibility. Most susceptible:

- Low power, high speed digital computer (upset) either transistorized or vacuum tube.

- Systems employing transistors or semiconductor rectifiers (either silicon or selenium), such as:

computers computer power supplies transistorized power supplies semiconductor components terminating long cable runs, runs especially between sites alarm systems intercom systems life-support system.controls some telephone equipment which is partially transistorized ...4 transistorized receivers transistorized transmitters transistorized 60 to 400 cps converters transistorized process control systems power system controls, communications links

Less susceptible: - All vacuum tube equipment (does not include equipment with semiconductor or selenium rectifiers) transmitters receivers alarm systems intercoms teletype-telephone power-supplies

- Equipment employing low current switches, relays, meters alarms life support systems power system control panels panel indicators, status boards process control - Hazardous equipment containing: detonators squibs pyrotechnical devices explosive mixtures rocket fuels - Other long power cable runs employing dielectric insulation, equipment associated with high energy storage capacitors or inductors

Least susceptible:

- High-voltage 60 cps equipment transformers, motors lamps, filament heaters rotary converters heavy duty relays, circuit breakers air insulated power cable runs ...5 - 5 -

It must be remembered that less susceptible equipment can be made more susceptible if they are connected to long exposed cable runs such as intersite wiring or overhead exposed power or telephone cables. On the other hand susceptible equipment can be made less susceptible if they are hardened. HARDENING MEASURES

The next vu-graph shows eight possible approaches to hardening systems to EMP effects - Shielding - Band Limiting - Amplitude Limiting - Upset Resistance - Damage Resistance - Decoupling - Operational - Good Practice

The most common protective technique is to enclose the whole building in a continuous envelope of highly conducting and permeable metallic material. However in practical situations this cannot be realized as illustrated in the next vu-graph. To the left we have the so-called ideal situation with no pene- trations and protrusions. On the right we see the real situation where we might have an antenna, openings etc. The bottom of the vu-graph shows a typical problem that may be encountered for a piece of equipment. You can see the problem can be quite formidable and so it is most likely that a combination of hardening measures would have to be taken to protect this gadget. Special types of limiters and filters may have to be used at the inputs of equipment. This is illustrated in the next vu-graph. The energy collected by an antenna may be reduced before it impinges on a sensitive component by filtering techniques. A bandpass filter between the antenna and sensitive components may be inserted to provide some protection. However it should be remembered that the EMP which is passed by the filter may still be sufficient to cause some damage. The filter must be able to withstand transient voltage impulses associated with EMP - these voltages could be tens of thousands of volts.

The most common amplitude limiting technique is the use of lightning surge arrestors. These may not respond fast enough for EMP waveforms so other techniques are used when arrestors . . . 6 - 6 - are employed. A band pass filter will tend to stretch out the distance of the EMP pulse so that the arrestor has enough time to respond. Zener diodes can be used, however, these are subject to burnout. It is obvious that proper test procedures are required when incorporating such protection measures into equipment.

Upset resistance means designing electronic circuits so that they are less susceptible to EMP voltage pulses. This is most pertinent to digital type data processing systems which control missile launchings or the inflight performance of missiles.

Substitution of damage-resistant components for more susceptible ones is of great importance. An example, which I have mentioned before is the substitution of vacuum tubes for transistors in the front ends of receivers.

Decoupling of the antenna or line cord to a potentially susceptible electronic system during EMP threat periods is another possibility. Connection can be made only during the actual time of use or need.

Operational techniques can minimize the effect of EMP on systems. If, for instance, an EMP pulse shuts down a system and the operators of the system are aware that the outage is an operational and not an equipment failure, a much faster recovery procedure can be implemented which would tend to reduce the EMP effect on the system operation.

Good practice involves the use of good electromagnetic design procedures which ultimately lead to a hardened system. An example of what I mean is shown in the next vu-graph where the wiring of the system is important. The so-called rats nest wiring shown on the left results in a lot of pick-up loops while the tree-system minimizes them or could eliminate them entirely. ANNEX E

CONTINUITY OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS

Prepared by

B.L. HUMMEL

COORDINATOR

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLANNING

BELL CANADA CONTINUITY OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS

INTRODUCTION

Since the beginning of time man's struggle to survive has depended directly upon the extent of his preparedness to meet threats to his life and property. In primitive society howéver, alertness largely meant vigilance against natural hazards.

Today in our complex world, nature's outbursts are far more disruptive than when life was simpler. Hurricanes, floods, fires, earthquakes, and snow and ice can bring transportation breakdowns with lack of food, drugs and other vital necessities; the life of a community can be threatened by the failure of the water supply, or the pollution of water sources; the failure of electrical power plants can darken a city, shut down electrical facilities and silence radio and television.

And if the telephone system, intricately woven into all this complexity, is affected, man may lose his "voice" at exactly the moment he needs it most to summon help.

Bell Canada is no stranger to disaster. Emergencies of various kinds and degrees of severity occur each day. Every year brings one or more out-bursts of nature's strongest forces. Sometimes an act of man, willful or accidental, produces similar damage. In each of these the Company is challenged and tested in its capacity to react promptly and effectively to minimize disruption of telecommunications services. These hazards we must live with and expect. In recent years an additional hazard, military aggression, has been added to these perils we must live with on a day-to-day basis. The realities of the modern world have forced us to think seriously about these perils and to plan continuously to improve our ability to match them.

PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The purpose of this paper is to outline the more important measures Bell Canada has taken, and is taking, towards making telecommunications as reliable as possible.

The plans for meeting natural and National emergencies discussed herein are those of Bell Canada and as such are confined to the areas in which the Company provides service. While many of the member companies of the Trans Canada Telephone System follow similar plans, the details of each of these member companies' plans are not included in this story.

BELL CANADA POLICY

A fundamental Bell policy is to provide the best possible telecommunications service at costs which are reasonable to the public and result in an adequate rate of return. To provide dependable service economically requires planning and close

...2 - 2 - coordination of telephone construction throughout our territory. An important consideration in the overall planning is the provision for "Continuity of Service" during emergencies. By including this planning in the annual construction program, normal growth provides the means for much of the protection built into the telephone network.

A great deal of coordination is also required to cope with natural disasters when they occur. The full resources of the Company can be brought into play. Personnel, material and vehicles can be mobilized and transported great distances to the affected area. Efforts are made immediately to provide service to the perimeter of the area so that the appropriate government agencies, other essential users and the general public have telecommunications for the protection of life and property and the direction of the rescue and restoral efforts.

Bell Canada operates on the principle that successful conversion to emergency operation is dependent on simplicity and the ability to incorporate under emergency conditions the same procedures used to operate the Company on a day-to-day basis.

PROTECTION OF THE TELEPHONE NETWORK

The two sub-sections of the telephone organization which are most affected by emergencies are Traffic Network Management and Plant Maintenance. Traffic is the voice, data and other communications carried over telephone facilities. Plant refers to cable, microwave towers, switching equipment, buildings, etc., in short the physical and electronic devices used to transmit telecommunications.

A. Traffic Network Management

Today more than 80,000 long distance lines criss-cross the country connecting more than 15,200,000 telephones. This network of electronic highways is organized into a flexible arrangement of telephone circuits so that calls can be completed rapidly. For telephone purposes, Canada is divided into 2 regions, each of which has its own regional switching centre. Each region is in turn divided into sections with sectional switching centres, then primary centres, toll centres and finally end or local offices. The network is programmed to handle any call in a systematic, economical manner with alternate routes provided when the normal one is not available.

Alternate routing helps prevent delays. If the most direct route is operating at full capacity when a caller dials a number, the equipment will search out a free route, often testing four or five alternatives, with

...3 -3 no noticeable time lag. For example, a caller in London, Ontario, wants to reach Vancouver. There are direct circuits between these two cities because the volume of calling is sufficient to justify a direct group of circuits. When the caller dials the Vancouver number, the switching equipment would first try to complete the call on the direct circuits. If these are busy, the London switching machine would try its circuits to Regina where the call would be routed to Vancouver. If this group is also busy, the call is forwarded to Toronto where the Toronto machines try their circuits to Vancouver and then to Regina if the former are occupied. If these circuits are busy, Toronto passes the call to Montreal which tries its Vancouver and then Regina circuits. It is extremely unlikely that all six alternate routes would be fully occupied at the same time. As can be seen, the breakdown of the London to Vancouver circuits due to some natural or other disaster would not eliminate communication between the two cities as would be the case if there were no alternate routing facilities.

Like their concrete couterparts, electronic highways are susceptible to traffic jams should there be a sudden upsurge in calls from a particular city or a facility failure. Keeping an eye on the telephone network with its alternate routing and switching equipment are the network managers. They keep a constant record of traffic flow over long distance lines. At each regional centre there are effect calls in progress or incoming calls which are completed even to lines restricted from originating service. This means that the switching equipment in the local office is free to handle essential calls.

In addition to Traffic Network Management and Line Load Control, the telephone companies have built other emergency precautions into the day-to-day operations of the telephone network. a. Route Diversity To guard against complete interruption of service, circuits between two main points traverse more than one route. The minimum acceptable restoration in the event of a route failure includes all special services and defence circuits as well as nearly 50% of the regular message traffic. Detailed restoration plans are available and have been tested for all main routes throughout the country. The circuits in each traffic and special service group are planned so that they are divided between the available routes as evenly as practicable. If there are two routes between two points, and loading on each is kept reasonably close on a

. . .4 continuing basis, then at least 50% of the traffic will be unaffected by a failure of one of the routes. Three equally-loaded routes means that no more than one-third of the facilities will be out of service at the moment of failure of one route. b. Metropolitan Facility Junction Planning Two-thirds of Canada's population lives in 15 metro- politan areas. To obtain maximum survivability and take advantage of the diverse routes serving these areas, a method of by-passing these large centres is used. Metropolitan areas are obvious targets in a war time situation. In peacetime, dividing the many circuits flowing into an urban area means that a natural disaster is unlikely to isolate the area as some of the circuits are likely to remain operational. The main features of Metropolitan Facility Junction Planning are: 1. Through circuits by-pass metropolitan centres. 2. The various routes do not cross one another. 3. Junctions are so planned in the vicinity of metropolitan areas that only one route in each direction passes through the common point. 4. Traffic loads on all routes are kept equal so that the loss of any one route or junction will cause only limited failure. To be effective, a minimum of two, and preferably three, evenly loaded routes are required in each of the East-West and North-South directions for each metropolitan area. The North and South junctions service as routing points for East-West traffic while the East and West junctions are routing for North-South traffic. Each junction has a terminal link joining it to the terMinal office. (Exhibit 1). The junctions are kept approximately 35 miles apart so a nuclear blast or other major disaster affecting the terminal office would not affect the junction points. Metropolitan Facility Junction Planning is in effect throughout 7 major cities in Bell Canada's territory. ...5 - 5 - c. Emergency Network Access Emergency Network Access is a service designed to provide senior governments and governments of certain large metropolitan areas with alternate access to the Direct Distance Dialing Network in the event of an extreme emergency coincident with a failure of their normal Toll Switcher. Emergency Network Access is in effect at 10 locations in Bell Canada's Territory. B. Maintenance of Plant

Telephone company operating organizations are structured along military lines, with responsibility and authority delegated to various levels of management. To perform normal functions, line operating people are located throughout the country and are held responsible for service within their respective territories. A Control Office is designated for each circuit installed. This office 'in control' has the responsibility for fast restoration of service and gives the necessary directives to all other offices on the circuit. The lines of control are clearly defined and respected by all. High reliability depends on having qualified personnel available to oversee all service aspects and take action to restore service in case of failure. Larger toll offices, major carrier and microwave route maintenance centres are manned 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Smaller centres are manned eight hours a day and have trained craftsmen on call the rest of the time. To manage the telephone system both in times of emergency and under normal conditions it is essential to know the operational status of the network at all times. To do this Bell Canada maintains a number of service coordination centres (Exhibit 2) which monitor the network continuously in order to keep senior management informed of serious service interruptions and threatening conditions such as widespread power failures, civil disturbances, strikes, fires, floods, etc. Should the emergency become widespread then these same service coordination centres are capable of expanding their facilities into an emergency mode of operation in order to deal with the situation. Management personnel on an interdepartmental basis relocate at these centres and commence analyzing the situation and to initiate appropriate action.

a. Restoration Planning As mentioned earlier, bypass and alternate routes have been constructed around major cities and across the country. Further diversity has been assured . . . 6 - 6 - through reciprocal agreements with American and independent telecommunications systems as many as 14,400 voice circuits or 12 television programs, or a combination of the two, may be transmitted between two points. In addition two radio channels are maintained for protection purposes and should trouble occur, the protection channel automatically switches in - so rapidly that customers never know there has been a failure.

However, there are times when natural or man-caused disasters strike our communication facilities - in these cases the protection channel itself may be a casualty or the extent of the failure may be such that available protection is inadequate. Broadband restoration has been designed to meet these situations. In many cases these re-route plans will detour the original facility by hundreds of miles utilizing the protection channels of other routes. These plans and their implementation are under the control of offices located at Ottawa, Calgary and St. John, N.B. and dry runs are conducted on every plan on a regularly scheduled basis. Broadband restoration is designed for failures of short duration. Where permanent repairs will take weeks or months, broadband restoration is supplanted by a system called emergency restoration. Emergency restoration would be required in the event that a radio building or radio tower was destroyed. Bell Canada has in readiness the procedures and facilities to transport and erect six permanently assigned portable microwave radio systems capable of restoring 3600 voice circuits and 1 TV program. Its tower is constructed from standard building scaffolding which may be rented virtually anywhere in our territory. These systems may be augmented, if necessary, by standard video pool equipment which is available in most major communities. Several portable satellite earth stations are available from Telesat Canada in Ottawa. These systems are intended to provide the initial response to telecommunications needs at disasters which happen in remote regions. Each system can provide 2 voice and 1 teletype facility and is designed for transport by Otter aircraft. Besides being able to restore microwave service in an emergency, Bell is also prepared for the loss of repeater stations along the many systems of "Short Haul" carrier. Two mobile repeater trailers, each . . . 7 -7

capable of restoring 720 voice circuits are main- tained in operational readiness. In addition, four mobile central offices are available to restore small community offices should the need arise. Each mobile unit houses five operators and is capable of restoring 1000 subscriber lines.

To facilitate the installation/restoration of tele- communications equipment within restricted/sensitive areas, Bell maintains a cadre of between 2500 to 3000 employees who have been processed for security clearance. b. Emergency Power All switching centres in the Company are equipped with batteries capable of operating the equipment at peak loads until emergency portable power generating units are supplied. All major switching centres and microwave repeater stations are equipped with permanently installed diesel or turbine power generating units. Fuel and lubricating oil supplies are stored on site in underground tanks and in certain locations will last for 14 days of continuous operation. In addition some 250 portable generating units ranging in size from 1.5 kw to 150 kw are strategically located throughout our territory. c. Protected Locations Early in 1962, the Company surveyed all major buildings to determine the protection factor for each. Key locations for the maintenance, control and restoration of facilities were identified, and measures were taken and are still being taken to improve the protection factor, even to the extent of relocating critical equipment. In addition, all major centres have been provided with security measures in varying degrees depending upon the importance of the location and risk factor. d. Records Protection Few businesses are more dependent on good records than the telecommunications industry. Bell has, for many years, maintained an essential records protection program designed to protect customer services, Corporate Assets and the interests of its shareholders/employees in the event of a catastrophe. e. System Compatibility In addition to the special precautions that have been taken to insure "Continuity of Service", many of the standard features that have been built into the system to provide highly reliable service become of utmost importance in a national emergency and should not be minimized. . . .8 STANDARDIZATION - assures compatibility between the multitude of equipment and circuits in the network and permits emergency patching over a variety of routes and facilities.

FLEXIBILITY - plug-in units, multiple switching points and test-boards permit fast restoral actions through diverse means.

TRAINING - standard courses, material and methods assure that maintenance and remedial actions are uniform.

DESIGN MARGINS - equipment is designed for long life, placed in well-designed buildings it can operate unattended for long periods.

DUPLICATION OF ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT - common control circuits such as senders and markers are duplicated and each is capable of taking over the entire load. The same applies to multi-frequency (MF) and single frequency (SF) equipment.

SPARE FACILITIES - trunk relay equipment, signaling units and carrier channel units are held on standby, ready to take over.

BUILDINGS - are designed to rigid specifications and house equipment in their most protected parts.

CONCLUSION

Perhaps the single most important segment of Bell Canada's emergency operation program is the continuously manned service coordination centres where information on threatened or actual conditions affecting service, plant and personnel is known at all times. This is because without such locations management would not be aware of the "big picture" and without the "big picture" decisions could be fragmented and ineffective.

There are as well, other less tangible factors than planning, experience and preparedness which also bear upon any group's performance during extreme conditions. These are mostly factors of morale, tradition and principle. Service is the commodity that Bell Canada sells, and historically, the service idea has always been an integral part of the telecommunications business.

While this is a large and complex program, history indicates that in times of extreme emergency, survival and preservation of property are in direct proportion to preparations made ahead of time. ANNEX F

Questions and Answers

COMCON '82, Arnprior, Ontario

May 25 - 28, 1982

Wednesday, 26 May

Professor T.J. Scanlon - Crisis Communication - The Ever Present Gremlins

Question

Mr. Chairman, I was wondering if you were aware of the role played by the Mennonites during the Woodstock Tornado in bringing back order to the community?

Answer (Scanlon)

The Mennonite response is always interesting. First of all, their political clout is incredible. They had virtually every senior political person in the community convinced they should get total cooperation immediately, which they did. It was that impressive. Secondly, they did offer assistance by setting up in the area and helping to clean up debris, etc. They ran into a fair amount of resistance though, because a lot of people were afraid that if the Mennonites cleaned up their property, the insurance claims wouldn't be accepted because the property would look too good. The other thing they did fascinated me and I thought it was really incredibly sophisticated and very perceptive. The older Mennonites who were physically incapable of cleaning up debris, stayed around at the place where you could call for assistance - and listened to people who had problems. That performed a very valu able function and they go all over North America responding to incidents. The Mennonites are a very impressive group and I didn't mention them because they do not have communications problems.

Question

Mr. Scanlon, you mention the human element, in respect to when a disaster is actually taking place and people are reluctant to react to what they know is happening. I wonder if you have ever done any studies or considered the human element in respect to planning for disasters, and the fact that we have a lot of difficulty getting people to accept the fact that in our country today we have these things going on and we need money and resources to be able to react to them. Why are people so reluctant to commit funds before the disaster, knowing very well that when there is a flood or something the federal government, for example, is going to contribute. Have there been studies or analyses done on why governments tend to hold back funds?

.../2 2 Answer (Scanlon)

Wiggy can comment too, but the fact is, it takes public pressure to create public expenditure. There is a lot of evidence that with political leadership, you can in fact educate the population. There is evidence in places like Wichita, Texas, that was hit by a severe tornado, that because the whole public understanding was so clear, and the warning system was understood, people went to their radios, and they knew what to do. Along the Fraser River, the federal government, the provincial government, the municipal government, and •the media in British Columbia have organized a warning system that I don't doubt will be efficient because it is very effectively run. In the Manitoba flood situations of recent years it is quite clear that southern Manitoba has developed a very effective, adequate warning system. However, it is still true that we are very reluctant to accept the idea that we should not build on flood plains. Every year, right where I live, the Rideau River floods and everybody demands help from the city even though they built there knowing there would be flooding. I think it is very difficult to create an understanding without a constant banging away at it. It may be interesting to know that in California the survey they did suggests that the public wants the media to do more education and warning. They don't feel they are getting an overdose about earthquakes - they feel that they are not getting enough, which was a surprising finding to most of us. So I think that even in your position with media, that there is a potential for demand. I think it has got to come from all directions. Politicians have to be pushed as does the bureaucracy; the media can do that as well, but the public do have to demand action. And when we heard the earlier question that nobody answered, about what is happening, the answer is people like you make it happen by demanding expenditures in'this area. I couldn't agree more, and it makes sense to me. All the research we have done shows that planning reduces and mitigates the impact of disasters. Answer (Wigglesworth)

Most people know about Environment Canada's Flood Reduction Program. It is a cost sharing program between the federal and provincial governments and has carried out extensive work in Manitoba. Also, Environment Canada has agreements with other provinces. New Brunswick is one; the flood prone areas have been identified and maps have been prepared. Now the problem and where it breaks down, as Joe mentioned briefly, is at the municipal level. It is difficult to get municipalities to pass zoning bylaws. That is where the plan breaks down and this will continue Until municipalities adopt a different attitude. I would like to mention the Mennonites and state that they are well recognized by emergency measures organizations and by Emergency Planning Canada. They are not publicity seekers and perhaps that is the reason you don't read or hear too much about them - we know they are there when needed and are a wonderful group.

. . ./3 3 Wednesday 26 May

Mr. E. Oldham - Integrated Communication - N.S. Question

How do you solve the problem of people coming from their normal operating area to assist in an emergency? Answer (Oldham)

I think the basic premise is that a municipality, for example, would not normally go out of its own operational area. Some people do, particularly in the fire service. We have a three channel plan - one, the local repeater, the second is their own local channel, and the third is what we call a mutual aid channel, which is common throughout every area in the province. So the fire trucks therefore can go from A to Z and be quite happy. The other users of the network, the ambulances, the forestry service, the RCMP, the highways people, have the channels in their vehicles which will accommodate any particular area. Setting up is dependent upon the situation. Having said that, to be able to communicate from one net to another is simply achieved by putting the two repeaters in the back of that configuration by using the microwave trunks and a switch. All the way through the feasibility, study, we looked at dynamic channel assignment to develop a real trunk failure system. The cost of it became a little bit too much. Question

One of the problems that our department faces is full integration of our provincial, municipal and federal systems. Answer (Oldham)

The point that you mention is, of course, how much spectrum you have to play with when you are working on a channel plan such as this. The forestry system, for example, uses 7 repeater pairs, that is 14 assignments plus 2, a block of 16 assignments. If you run through the whole list of other users you quickly come up with quite a number of assignments. To find it is a little difficult, which most of you who are familiar with the spectrum will realize. Then you throw in some other hurdles - you throw in the fact that fire departments use 153.83 as a mutual channel, and the ambulances for example, well, hell would freeze over before they ever gave up their so-called private operation. I should explain that the ambulances that we have in Nova Scotia double up for other eventualities such as looking after the body when it is no longer living. .../4 - 4 -

You might call it conflict of interest, they call it living. So, you have these problems imposed upon you and you have to think ahead and decide how you are going to work it out.Once we had looked at the trunks system we realized it was not the way to go because of the cost and because of the technology. Remember, it was five years ago the design was promulgated. The rationale then came out that we could connect everybody by putting repeaters back to back. So we had our inter- agency communications problem solved. So the next thing was to slot the users into a particular part of the spectrum that would suit them, and the forestry people, for example, ended up with around 165 megs, the ambulances at 159, the fire at 152, the RCMP were tucked in there somewhere else, the hi«ghways department was 149, and the Emergency Measures Organization is between 143 and 148 megs. Question There was a cost for new crystals? Answer (Oldham)

Yes. Of course at that time you always get people who try to push a little bit. I had invoices coming in for new radio systems and it was rather amusing. It was quite a task, but it was done and I would say that the cost of it was somewhere around forty or fifty thousand dollars:with the province paying. Question

The central region, Yukon Territories, is at the moment looking into a feasibility study of an integrated radio system. They have looked at Nova Scotia's system, also the Yukon system, which I feel is mbre of an integrated radio system because they use just one trunking frequency as such, and they are all on that one frequency. My question is, when maintenance is to be done, are you charging each individual department and what are your costs per mobile? Answer (Oldham)

We are integrating communications, which means the ability of people to talk to each other. I can think of one in Cape Breton where there are six radio towers on the same plot of land. Is that integration? Well, to an extent. In the Yukon system, they are not only using the same sites and the same towers, but they also use the same trunk audio channel. And, one of the limitations of that, of course, would be that that one channel would be blocked. As to the cost, the entire budget for this appears in one agency's account, so there is no charge back to users of the system. ./5 Question

All your trunking through using a multiplex, and the same equipment, how do you divide the cost? In other words, each individual department has their own sys'tem that costs x number of dollars so they pay that into a central fund. You must have a way of charging it back.

Answer (Oldham)

Of course not, because if we were to do that we would then be contravening our license with DOC, which is very specific about re-sale of service. So, one has to be very careful to avoid that and to avoid giving the indication that the government itself is a carrier, because it is not.

Wednesday, 26 May

Mr. T.M. Birtch - Facsimile Communications

Question

I know nothing about facsimile and I direct two questions. One is that you said any type of twisted pair could be used. I assume you meant a land line, and would that have to be broadcast quality? And the second question is, you talk about a fail-safe system in the digital system. If you had a digital facsimile system and the recipient was analogue, how would that fail-safe system operate?

Answer (Birtch)

Those are good questions. The first one - voice grade lines are sufficient. If you can establish a line connection that you can talk over, even with difficulty, there is a very good likelihood that the facsimile device, digital facs device, will communicate over that. Fail-safe only works digital- facs to digital-facs. When you are communicating through a c6mpatability option to analogue facs from a digital facs, the weakest link in the chain prevails.

Question

Most of my questions have been answered. However, with the use of a facs machine from a remote location where you're restricted to a. a generator, and b. radio, are there any criteria for that generator as to power fluctuations?

Answer (Birtch)

Yes, but I don't know what they are.

Question

How about the interchange between transferring telephone to radio?

.../6 6

Answer (Birtch)

That is not a problem. It is possible to defeat fail-safe and some other things and use it on a simplex channel, but it's not recommended. But if you can permanently key two VHF channels for say 30 or 40 seconds a page, you have it made. There are all kinds of specialty facs that have been constructed for special applications. They have even built facsimile devices to go on aircraft carriers and boats called Tippifacs - so that they can rock and roll through a very wide arc and still not cause any problems. So, on special applications, I think with a bit of lead time, the company that supplies you can come up with the machine that can do the job for you.

Question

I have used your Rapifax on a number of occasions and even though it was on our best quality high transmission lines, I must say that is one of the best things since sliced bread. I would be very interested though, if you would share with me more of the information regarding the security aspects of it; I haven't all of the détails on that yet. And, if you wish, I would be happy to consult with you on how we used it in emergency planning.

Answer (Birtch)

I really appreciate that. Thank you for the compliment.

Question

In a world of diminishing sources documents do you still see facs expanding?

Answer (Birtch)

I have been reading a number of articles on that question and have some personal opinions. Most experts feel that the paperless office is nonsense. By the way, you sometimes have to communicate microfiches. Facs machines have been made to communicate microfiche. So, even if you put your paper onto microfiche, or store it on disc or whatever, you still eventually at some time have to communicate it. I can see facs in the office of the future being an integral part. I don't think it will disappear, and I don't think that the communicating word processor will throw it out the window. I can see it augmented by optical character readers as an input mechanism where you can have the choice of OCR or facsimile in the same equipment unit, but I can never see it disappear, simply because human resources are too expensive to have everything re-keyed and re-typed, transpose errors and re- send on another medium that requires alpha-numeric for one thing, and secondly requires manual intervention.

.../7 - 7 - Question (Wigglesworth)

You manufacture a tempest compliant facs. Why does it take two to three years to get an encryption device to put the machine on line? Answer (Birtch)

Well, as you know the encryption devices aren't available from the manufacturers of the facsimile. I can only think it is partly political and partly the rigours of the spec itself which calls for fairly limited production. But I think in Canada sometimes we play second-fiddle to the Americans who manufacture it, and when their needs for their crypto keys have lessened, we will get what we order, and that explains the three year waiting period. Comment (Wigglesworth)

I have been advised that the SATEL company representatives have arrived and have set up a display. The dish is parked behind the CN emergency van, and we now invite you to visit all exhibits. I know that Protection Civile is out there with their field installation, and we also have the amateur station in place. The CN people have gone to a great deal of trouble to bring their van so we would appreciate it if you could find time to look at it.

Thursday, 27 May

Mr. Ray Beck - CNR Emergency Communication's Van Question

First of all I would like to congratulate the CN on building the command post; it is beautiful. I have two questions. Your wind direction finder I assume had to be corrected, and do you have a compass on board? Answer (Beck)

Yes, there is a small compass. Question

Why did you not instal a ham station aboard? Answer (Beck)

Wé thought about that with everything - I think that this is a new item that has been introduced for pretty serious consideration from what we have heard in the last couple of days.

.../8 - 8 - Question

Yesterday we informed you we had 21,000 volunteers spread out throughout the province and my colleague over there has made reference to the ham station. That is the first thing we noticed when we came here. Maybe we are biased, but for long distance your system is inter-connected to telephone lines, is that correct? (yes) If you end up in a place, say you had a derailment in Lac Bouchette, where there is absolutely no way a telephone company will run lines unless they spend about 9 to 10 hours on snowshoes, then you are pretty well stuck with local communications. You don't have anything for long-range communication. Now there are commercial facilities for HF commercial frequencies. Do you plan to instal HF so you can reach your Montreal or Toronto offices in case you cannot use the telephone line system for at least 9 to 10 hours because of weather conditions. Answer (Beaulieu)

I think I mentioned it to you when I read my speech, and I said that we had all kinds of equipment and that on the longer term we will know if we have the right mix. One of the reasons we are here and why we are showing this trailer is, that some of you in the audience will have ideas that you can transmit to us, and I am here to listen.

Question I have two questions for Mr. Beck. That quotation that you made on the cost I gather includes labour? (Yes) I might point out that we have a trailer similar to that, the only difficulties that we have had with it, is the freezing of the water system. What precautions have you taken to prevent that? Answer (Beaulieu)

The water system in Mobile I will not freeze because it is heated 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Question So when the trailer is not operational, it is kept plugged in. (Yes). What about when it is being moved? There is a little red light on the side of the truck so that the driver knows if the heating system is off or on. When he is driving, all he has to do is look in the mirror on the left hand side of the truck and he can see the red light and he knows that all equipment inside is functioning. It is insulated for 60 below zero. The half million dollars spent includes the cost of truck as well.

.../9 -9 Question

It is not clear to me if you are making this trailer available for any kind of emergency or just for train emergencies. Answer (Beaulieu)

I will answer in two ways. It is for railway purposes basically, but if there is a major disaster of some type there is no doubt in my mind that the CN, as good corporate citizens, would make it available. However, there would be a fee.

Thursday, 27 May Mr. L. Lees - Canadian Radio Common Carriers Association Question

RCC means radio common carriers. Answer (Lees) That is correct. I assume that everyone knows, but maybe that is a wrong assumption, but these operators are all individual entrepeneurs or in some cases large corporations. Their business is radio, they have repeaters and they are providing communications to business, industry and government on a local basis every day, and they have a fairly large facility that can be used in an emergency. Thursday, 27 May Mr. B.F. Murphy - Satellite Communications Question

My question is not really a question, more of a comment and a suggestion that when the pay TV comes into this country EPC negotiate access to pay TV so Canada will be able to use the system to warn and guide the people of this country. Question I would just like to make several comments and there are several technical people here and some people that have said they have little or no background. I would like to make an analogy between using the current series of satellites for emergency communications purposes. The series might be an example. They are providing long distance telephone communications in Canada and satellite TV communications from various points in Canada. An analogy to tapping into that for emergency communications purposes would probably be something like tapping into the microwave system across Canada. You have a tower and thousands of voice circuits .../10 - 10 - but you can't tap into it; as it wasn't designed for that. If you look at the Anik B satellite that was developed by the Department of Communications, it is a hybrid satellite. One of the things that wasn't mentioned this morning is something that the CBC is involved with at the present time, i.e. satellite news gathering. They have the capability of getting to sites across Canada by vehicle, by air as well, within whatever time is necessary, and setting up in 30 minutes, providing live television coverage from the site, plus three voice circuits. That's part of the Anik B series that is currently in operation in Canada and has been proven and will be developed by Canadian industry. The other two things that weren't mentioned and this is where we are going in Canada. The Department of Communications is working on something called "MSAT Mobile Satellite" and I don't think it comes as a surprise to anybody here that one of the express purposes of this, and one that our Department has been talking about to various agencies across Canada during the last year, is emergency communications. The satellite is on the drawing board now, but it's a long way down the road. The gestation period for a satellite is in the order of five to seven years and MSAT is going to provide communications from most remote rural areas of Canada and if it proves economically viable then we will have to pay for these things whether its government, private industry, or volunteer agencies. It's not a satellite designed for long distance telephone traffic and television traffic across Canada. It's being designed for mobile communications and you will be able to have communications from mobiles, and from transportable stations in almost all areas of Canada, excluding the northern part. I don't want anybody to get the impression that these are new ideas. For the last year or two our Department has been working at it with industry in Canada, and emergency communications is one of the prime considerations in establishing MSAT with the present satellite system, Anik and Anik B. They weren't developed for emergency communications. They were developed for long distance traffic so I hope that people do have the feeling something is being done in Canada with respect to emergency communications. It extends beyond MSAT to SARSAT which is a Search and Rescue satellite. I won't get into that, but if anybody is interested in some of these specific programs, we might be hearing a little bit about them on Friday from Tom Stewart of our Department when he makes his presentation.

Question

I think the point is well taken, and as you know, Canada has been unfortunate with this technology in terms of its development. MSAT, when it comes, will cater to a need which really is unique but is universal. I'm not taking exception but I wouldn't want people to think that the Anik A B C D series can't do what you want, they can do it very well. The point I tried to make, is this; here we are ten years later, in this country, the first country in the world to operate its

.../11 - 11 - own domestic satellite system, and we are not using it for emergency communications. And I put the question to you, why not? It is not a question of cost, but a question of ownership and decision. Somewhere in Ottawa, already packed, is a piece of equipment that the Mobile-4 has ready to be shipped out. There is mobile satellite transmitting/receiving station that could be used, and we want to know one thing - tell us who can we go to to arrange a protocol for use in cases of an emergency?

Answer

Lee Hummel stated that he had the answer to that and if they wanted to stick around until this afternoon he would answer it.

Dr. P. Bhartia - EMP

Question

Dr. Bhartia, we were sent EMP arrestors from England a few months ago. We were offered this equipment at a fairly high price per unit. I checked with EPC and they told us to put a freeze on accepting or refusing. Now, do you have any items that could be used on installed equipment? Do you know of anything that could be used for EMP suppression?

Answer

What you are referring to, I think, are filters that were built in England on sponsorship from AWRE. That's a pretty good filter actually, and it would take away or remove about 90% of energy from the EMP pulse, but it still leaves the other 10%, and that is a problem, no matter what you do. You can use single surge arrestors which are EMP surge arrestors and a number of companies in the US build them, but beyond that there is nothing really specifically designed for an EMP type of filter.

Question

Is there someone here who can answer what type of equipment DND has used for their equipment either in Canada or overseas - in Germany or anywhere?

Answer

As far as I know most of the DND systems are not protected against EMP at present.

Question

Dr. Bhartia, what is the cost ratio of equipment cost versus hardening equipment? Are we looking at double or triple the cost?

.../12 - 12 -

Answer For a building, if you are talking about equipment hardening in the design phase, then the increase in cost is not significant. Probably in the order of 10% to 15%. If you are trying to do a retrofit, it's going to be pretty expensive because you have to make all kinds of mods to the design. Now as far as buildings are concerned, the costs are significantly higher. You will have to have good control of points of entry like doorways etc., you'll have triple or double doors and every building will need a shield barrier. I would say that the costs would double. Question What does it do to people, if anything, especially if they are using electrical systems such as pace makers or anything of that nature?

Answer Well, I guess a human being is a good conductor. There has been a lot of research done on Carrier Wave effects - mostly at 2450 MHz and some at 915 MHz. Most of the American, North American, and let's say the free world research, has really shown no significant effects on human beings due to electro- magnetic energy. Secondly, I don't think there will be significant effects to the individual because the amount of energy they will collect will be very little really and the short duration is microseconds. Question Dr. Bhartia, I understand that the EPC counterpart in the United States, Federal Emergency Management Agency, has a program with the broadcasters in order to ensure that the US National Warning System will remain in operation after the effects you discussed this morning take place. Can you comment on what has been done in the US with respect to protection of the National Warning Service? Answer Well, I'm not really sure what has been done. I know they do have a program with the broadcasters. Basically, I think what they are trying to do is make sure that in most of these major centres they will have, under all circumstances, one or two radio stations operating, no matter what happens. If an event occurs they have encouraged some of the stations to locate the transmitters and antennas far away from the city. You have to take into account the fact that it is not just the EMP which can occur; basically you've got missles and anti-missiles so even if somebody sends up a missile and you send up anti-missiles and have a detonation, that will create EMP. .../13 - 13 - Question

Thank you. One other question with respect to your diagram showing the continental US. You talk about high intensity effects. Was that from one detonation at a high altitude level?

Answer Yes. That was one - just one event.

Comment (Wigglesworth)

Fine, thank you very much - I would like to compliment you on an excellent presentation - obviously a very complex topic. Question If we have a nuclear explosion a hundred and fifty miles in the air, how deep into the earth would it penetrate?

Answer That's simple to calculate. Actually it's basically a skin depth problem. You will find it's somewhere in the order of 20-30 feet, it depends upon the soil conductivity and resistance in different areas and that is one of the reasons why a lot of measurements and research programs into measuring soil conditions are taking place right now.

Question Dr. Bhartia, what is the EMP situation in Canada? Answer Right now there is no protection in Canada for EMP except for a couple of sites that are hardened and they are basically military sites.

Question Dr. Bhartia, I have a question. In this country we have seven sites that are underground. They are completely grounded even to the steel - every piece of steel is grounded to infinity. Would you say they were hardened because of what was built into them without any knowledge of the EMP? Answer Well, if you are referring to the Carp and other sites around the country, they are hardened quite significantly because of the depth to which they are built, at least from EMP anyway. From that point of view they are hardened quite well. At least for an EMP it would have very little effect on the antennas. .../14 - 14 -

Comment

They do, well that's news to me. Question DND - do you know anything about surge arrestors at the sites? Answer No, but they do have their own generators and are not relying on external power.

Thursday, 27 May Mr.G. Desclouds - CN/CP Telecommunications

Question (Scanlon) What happens if somebody sets off a bomb in the Control Centre? Answer (Desclouds)

In the centre? We would be in a lot of trouble. The people who are concerned with security, such as the RCMP, have told us there is very little you can do about a situation like that unless you have an alternative centre - a complete backup centre some place else. The centre is fully secured from intrusion from outside with all the necessary devices. But if someone was to set off a bomb, there is very little that we could do. Thursday 27 May Mr. Lee Hummel - Trans Canada Telephone Systems Question I understood that Bell Canada operates on its own power source and you are not dependent upon any other source. I mean by that, whenever there has been a power failure where I live, our telephones can operate through a 48 volt system, so where does it come from? (Hummel - we generate it). Well that is what I am saying, you generate your own power. So you are totally independent from the system? (Hummel - that's right). At all times? Answer (Hummel) No, not at all times of course, but we normally operate off commercial power.

Question Are there any cooperative plans between Bell, TCTS, CN/CP for emergency restoration of service, and if so, what are they? .../15 - 1.5 - Answer (Hummel) Yes. When they are short of lines they come to us, and when we are short of lines we go to them. And that is basically it. If they want to get from point A to B and they don't have the facilities or their lines are down - remember I said we had reciprocal agreements with independent and American telecommunications companies, and that includes CN/CP. I don't think we have ever had occasion to go over and ask them to loan us some people. Question Tell us how to get the satellite station. Answer (Hummel) Remember the five pieces of orange paper I showed you earlier. One of them was entitled Emergency Response to Disasters. There is a Provincial Services Coordination Centre in each telephone company across Canada, and they are the hub of the whole thing. When a disaster happens you go through the normal escalation process. If the resources of the community are exhausted, they go to the province, and subsequently they wind up with the federal government, asking for assistance. Arrangements have been made through DOC whereby a number of people who, from the region, have been given the responsibility of authorizing emergency at the scene of a disaster. We have supplied those names, along with their verifying numbers, to our Provincial Service Coordination Centres. In other words, if you call you will be recognized and you state your needs. The result is that the equipment will be made available, at a cost, of course. The piece of equipment is in storage in Ottawa along with several other pieces just like it. It is not waiting for a disaster to happen, but it is sitting there and it is available in the event it is needed. Question Are you saying that I can have a piece of that equipment to put in my trailer in case I need it. Answer (Hummel) No, not to put in a trailer. Telsat will fly it out to wherever it is required. Remember it is for remote, very remote regions where the telephone company cannot supply point to point radio. Question

OK, where are you from? (Hummel - Ottawa). I would like to have that piece flown 25 miles west of Capreol at 5 o'clock in the morning and it is 5 o'clock now. (Hummel - and it has been OK'd by DOC?) But I don't want to do all of those things. .../16 - 16 - Answer (Hummel) I am sorry but that is the arrangement. I am sure you appreciate the fact that it is impossible for us to have in the SCC, hundreds of names, and go through the updating and the verification, and all of this sort of thing. So what I am really saying is there are three names for each province who have been authorized to release the equipment. Now, it is up to you to get to know these people. Question And they have the number? (Hummel - yes). I'll be frank. So have I. We have a derailment at 5 o'clock in the morning, there are 25 cars derailed, the next town has 2000 people and I have to phone DOC, or whatever circle that I have to call (Hummel - just DOC). What am I going to do, wait till the people die, or am I going to use other types of communication. Lets be frank, when these things occur, its not like a flood.... a derailment is unpredictable, the same as an airplane crash, and we are talking about bureaucracy, going from here, to there, and back. I would like to see a simpler method. That is all I am asking. Answer (Hummel) Well, I don't know. At this moment in time we are tied in to this method. If we can simplify measures, great, I'd love to see it too.

Answer (Tom Stewart) In the federal scheme of things, DOC is responsible for making emergency communications arrangements, and we have made this arrangement with all the carriers. If you want a system in your van, you can always approach them and lease it, if you want it there all the time. But you would have to come to some agreement about paying for it. Now if you want it 25 miles from Capreol, how long is it going to take to get your vehicle there? You surely won't wait until you were there before you ordered it up. Question May I make a comment. I am not involved in emergency measures and I am speaking strictly from a personal point of view, but it seems to me that some of the questions that are being asked tend to surround the bureaucracy and are looking at it very simplistically. Surely, it can't be a major problem to establish, say, a hot line with a published number for those people who need to know and to go as far up the government as necessary. The question of who pays for it certainly could be sorted out afterwards. Question The equipment is the property of Bell Canada. We are talking about the dish. (The Telsat). But you don't administer the equipment for them, so why is it in your hands?

/1•"7 - 17 - (Hummel - it is not, it is in Telsat hands). In Telsat hands? Then why are you bringing it up?. Is this your responsibility as far as (Hummel- as a member of Trans Canada' Telephone System - and it happens to be another resource at our disposal). Are the licenses owned by Intersat, the company that you just mentioned, Telsat or who? They have a license to operate within Canadian territory, so why go through DOC if they have a permit? Why don't we go directly to Telsat, - they hold a federal permit to work the equipment. How much time is involved in getting all the green lights to get the equipment? Answer (Hummel) One phone call to DOC, one phone call from DOC to us. Answer (Tom Stewart)

We can not. The provinces will have to make their own arrangements. This deal of ours is a federal requirement and it is because of this factor somebody has to pay. We can't have everybody coming up and saying they are going to call up a couple of satellites for their own amusement when the walkie talkie can do just as well. And for our own control purposes, we negotiate. We haven't come up with a sensible arrangement whereby the provincial people can come through us because there is no way our people can provide the funds. That is one that is still outstanding. Mr. Hepburn referred to it in his opening remarks, that's one of the problems at the scene of a disaster, we still have to resolve this question of how you accommodate the requirements of people, taking care of our own problems; we haven't taken care of the others. Comment (Wigglesworth) Thank you all, but I don't think this is one that we are going to resolve to- day. It could mean setting up a committee to look into this and come up with a recommendation. The problem is not a new one. Just try to get a 200 bed emergency hospital or an advanced treatment centre, or a casualty collection unit without going through the same kind of process. It is not a new thing in the federal/provincial field. It has been with us forever, and if we don't soon sit down and work out arrangements so that we can react quickly, we are going to be in the same situation we have been in for years. Thursday, 27 May Mr. A. Ingham - ARI - EBS Mr. H. Duckeck - ARI - EBS Mr. G. Lebow - ARI - EBS A demonstration was given with a brief explanation in French. .../18 - 18 - Question

This system is sensational, a very good system, a very good idea and I have seen something similar to this I'm sure you are aware, in Los Angeles, where you turn to the low end of the broadcast band for information about airport arrivals, but you talked about a coding system for the encoding. Could you elaborate a little on that? Answer

We don't want to talk too much about that yet. We're not merely talking about it, we're doing it. The encoders are built. I have ten in the U.S.A., Allen has 5 up here in Canada, 40 more are coming. We are starting in January in New York, we are going to Chicago, Los Angeles, from San Diego to San Francisco by the end of '83 and we will start in Toronto, mith the blessings of DOC, and the people here. We simply recognize once we put the system in, if the emergency aspect catches on, and we know there is a question of security. We have talked to government officials, we've talked to you here and we have talked to other countries and they feel that this thing will work. People will get these radios and the system will work and then they wonder what happens if some crazy guy pushes the button at two o'clock in the morning and wakes everybody up. So we have simply addressed the question in advance, we have done some very sophisticated technology which will pre-empt that and that is all I really want to say. We know the problems and we have taken care of them. Answer This question went into another direction. In Los Angeles this station gives information on the airport, or on,weather, and has no other use so the man loses the entertainment capability of his car radio, which is not the case here because he listens to a normal radio station. The music comes on the main channel, and the traffic message or emergency message comes also on the main channel so the signals, the coding signals, are used only to ensure that this man is tuned to the right station and to ensure that he gets the message, even if he does not immediately listen to that station. So that is the important point. He does not lose the entertainment capability. Question I think maybe I didn't make myself clear. But I understood you to say, and you just pointed out, that someone could easily access the system and put out an alarm at 2 o'clock in the morning. Answer We recognize the possibility, but it is not easy. We have to control the radio station first. .../19 - 19 -

Question

Who accesses that system?

Answer

Government. We turn that over to government, not to the radio station.

Question

Oh well, that was the question.

Answer

We give you the facilities. It is EPC or the provincial police, I don't know which, or in the States, FEMA. Certainly not the radio station. It's connected by microwave and telephone lines, and is security coded, so that if the public gets in on a line and doesn't know the code, nothing is going to happen. The radio station doesn't do that. The radio station broadcasts over their main channel a message but you have to tell them what to say. The radio stations would never take the responsibility of switching it on and off.

Question

You talked before of traffic reports and you talked of weather. Now those are local situations, not governed by a federal agency.

Answer

That is done by the station. Traffic and weather is done by the station autonomously, and that has nothing to do with the emergency alerting system.

Question

If we have a real emergency, let's say between Cornwall and the Quebec/Ontario border along the St. Lawrence River. Radio stations located in that area could be 150,000 watts FM and their zone radiators would be way off the scale. Now for an emergency message this would have to come in under complete control of the government because each radio station has different ways of doing things. It is the one that makes the most of the situation that gets the greatest number of listeners. Now, in Europe, due to the fact that this is in the car, who controls the emergency information in Europe?

Answer

We don't have an emergency information system.

.../20 - 20 - Question

They only have traffic and weather? Answer That's right. Question Have you been to CRTC to propose this system for Canada? Answer We have made a start. Our first move in Canada was to talk to DOC and get station CHFI to technically test and approve the capability. Our next step was here. We came to show it to you to see if we have something that you want. We're going to do it for traffic and weather. That is our program. If you think the emergency aspect is something you want, we will do it for you and cooperate with CRTC and DOC, regional people, etc. Question Right. Now we have a system in Canada, it is linked to CBC radio stations across Canada. And this can be used in different provinces in case of emergency. The standard rule is that all private radio stations will tune into CBC to receive messages. Answer But are you sure that the man who is in his car gets this message? Question OK, that Is one point I wanted to tell you. I will speak for Quebec anyway. In Quebec, if you tell somebody "don't drive through that highway", everybody will go there. This is the way we are, this is in our blood. Mississauga happened at 9 something Sunday night, right? 11? OK. Most of the people were at home. Is there any way that this can be turned on by impulses even if the radio is off? You'd leave it on standby? (Yes on standby). Is there any way that if the radio is off it can be turned on by remote control or by a high tone pitch? Answer

The radio is on a low power condition, it is just running the minimum front end RF. Obviously if the radio is completely disconnected it is a box of transistors with no power. (Q. is this AC/DC?) Oh, it is DC, it is battery operated and running on 110 volts. As soon as the power fails it switches to the back-up battery and will run for 24 hours.

.../21 - 21 -

Question

I was wondering when you intend to go to CRTC with it?

Answer

You could even install one ARI decoder in each radio station and if the central guiding station, for example, say the CBC station, will transmit the emergency code, then all stations would automatically, due to the decoder that they would have, be switched over and get the message right from CBC. (Q. to 20% of the population?)

Question

Yes, but this is used only for national emergencies. Whatever you say on the air doesn't have to be picked up by private radio stations. But if there is a system accepted by an area, like Montreal's 21 radio stations, you know if CKBL gets it, CKC will want it and so will everybody else. Can you count on the whole city for radio station coverage?

Answer

You don't want to do that. I will tell you a little about the marketing as this was kind of a marketing project as well. The basic reason a station is going into this is because it is going to help distinguish a radio station and the traffic and weather mode. (Q. that's promotion?) ..... find that radio station amongst 20 others, if you know an FM radio dial, sometimes it is this small in a car radio, you can't tell the difference between 96 and 101. If you are looking for a particular station and the formats are similar, you can't find it to save your life. If you know it is an ARI station and it is number 3, you simply dial 3, push the button and the radio will skip over everybody else. So we are working with the stations that are doing the best job in traffic and weather information. If they have helicopters or fixed wing aircraft, if they do that kind of service already, we're going to highlight them. We also pick the best facility. We go after the 100,000 watt stations if we can get them, we take the best technical facility and the best station compatible with traffic and weather. And that is how we are building our network in North America in the States and up here in Canada. Once we have these stations on, it is your job to figure out what you want to do with them, you have to figure out how to control them, how to program them, how to deal with them. We only give you a technical facility. We are not going to get involved with figuring out how to do it, we will help you, but we don't know what you want. You tell us and we will try to help.

.../22 - 22 -

Question

How is an ARI station different from any other station?

Answer

Just by its inaudible tone, that's all. Distinguished by the equipment installed at the transmitter which allows that station to be physically and electronically identified by special radios, allowing them to transmit these inaudible control signals.

Question

It is a soft tone actually that falls into the frequency, right?

Answer

Right. But it is inaudible. Its a 57 KHz inaudible soft tone which is used for identifying the station, identifying the zone, and even identifying messages transmitted, then this inaudible 57 KHz tone will carry another signal into the radio and the radio will switch over to the message.

Question

But does the ARI station transmit messages that are any different from any other station?

Answer

No. It only ensures that the motorist gets the message. That's all. It is on the main channel. Everybody will hear the traffic message if you have an ARI radio or not. Everybody will hear all the verbal messages. I think that is the important point. If you have the ARI radio, you will get the control functions helping you find that station, stopping your cassette, bringing your volume up. If you are a regular listener to CFMO, and CFMO is on the air now, you don't hear it right now, but 200,000 people are listening to it, so it is operating in a normal mode. You simply control the radios that are being provided to the stations and you, the emergency people, are able to get messages to peoples' places of work, and where they live, in a way they can use them. This system can be gradually introduced without excluding, at the beginning, a big group, and forcing everybody to buy a new car radio with ARI, because if you have no ARI system in your car radio, you listen to the station as usual and you will get your traffic information, but you must listen to the station, and you cannot listen to a cassette. While if you buy a new car radio and you buy one with ARI, then you are sure you get the messages even when you turn the volume down or when you listen to a cassette. That is the only difference.

.../23 - 23 -

Question

I would like to ask a question. Did I understand it correctly that if you have a radio which is equipped for ARI and you are listening to a non-ARI station, that it has the capability of swinging over to the ARI station for emergency broadcast or is that only on the self-seeking station?

Answer

The answer is yes from a technical point of view, the answer from a marketing point of view is a big question mark. Because if I am CFMO and we have another station in Ottawa and we rip off the audience from one station to another, they are obviously are not going to be very happy. That is a question where we are having dialogue with the radio stations in the States and Canada to find out what their reaction is. Technically it is easy, but it is a marketing problem.

Question

But could it not be restricted to an emergency broadcast?

Answer

Yes. That is why we made this set.

Question

Which may happen once in 25 years. I can't see anybody objecting.

Question

Gentlemen. I've been sitting back listening and I think it is a super idea, but it seems to me in the case of a genuine emergency, and let's admit that we are not trying to sell anything now, we are trying to advise the public that there is a genuine emergency. It seems to me that the only way to do that is to effectively broadcast on all channels. (We agree, absolutely). But gentlemen, hear me out. If you do that, then you don't need self-code, you don't need anything. I gather that this is restricted to FM because of the 57 KHz sub-carrier, and so AM is passe, despite the fact that the AM audience I believe in this country is in excess of 50%'or greater. What I am saying to you is that if North America has an emergency, if Argentina has an emergency, which I think it has, what you do is send the message, not via this kind of thing, you send the message via all the devices you have, all the radio, all the TV, whatever other media you have. You don't need gimmicks to get the message across to people. I grant you that there is one feature I like, that little box that is sitting over there, the alert box. The alert box it seems to me has something going for it. But the rest of it has nothing going for it because if it is a genuine emergency whether it be national,

.../24 - 24 - regional, or municipal, the authorities who are dealing with it will gain access to the media in total if they have to. If there are 21 stations in Montreal, the same message will go on all 21 of them and it will go on television and radio, and if we have morse code we could use that too, so I just wanted to put this into perspective. I like the alert mode, but I am not sure that we are not confusing, in this presentation, the civil emergency with the promotional aspects which ARI obviously offers to those who subscribe to its service.

Answer May I make comment on that. Number one, the system will work on AM. We did not design it on AM for the reasons that we gave earlier because of the distance, etc., that it could work (Q - in a different mode?) - yes in a different mode. Number two what you say about the quantity of AM stations in North America is quite true. However, on the other hand the AM stations gradually are dying because of FM, and one of main reasons that AM stereo for example, has come out, is an attempt by the AM stations to get some of the lost business back. Question

There is no agreement on AM stereo. By the way, it has been rejected by ITU and it is not likely to happen. Answer We are inclined to agree with you, and for that reason we foresee that FM is going to continue to grow. In our belief, AM will never entirely disappear. I think our comment is that everything that you say we agree with and we are not saying that our ARI emergency alerting system is a be-all, to end-all, I believe we said that it was to supplement existing systems, and that is exactly what we propose. As we said, it is a solution looking for a problem. If the problem isn't there, so be it. We are, God willing, going ahead with it on the traffic system anyway, and the emergency aspect will be built in anyway. If it is not used, it is not used. Comment (by Wigglesworth) I now have to make an agenda change. However, due to the interest in this subject, and the fact that we have a gentleman here all the way from Germany, I permitted this session go 35 minutes overtime. However, they will be available this evening if you want to discuss this further. .../25 - 25 -

Comment (by ARI people)

They appreciated the extra time allotted their presentation and they would certainly be available tonight if people wanted to come back after dinner and have a more personal discussion and demonstration.

Friday, 28 May

Mr. A.F. Wigglesworth - Joint Emergency Planning Program Question

Have any provinces participated in JEPP? Answer

Yes, several have. Question

How many provinces have not agreed upon the criteria, and are you approaching the provinces on a bilateral basis? Answer

No, not bilateral as yet, but I expect it will go that way in the near future. Friday, 28 May

Mr. T. Stewart, DOC - Where Do We Go From Here? Question

Mr. Stewart, yesterday you made a statement with regard to the integrity of the provincial governments and their respective organizations. This was in response to questions asked regarding the availability of the satellite, in which you concluded your remark by stating the equipment was not available for the, and I will quote "the personal amusement of provincial authorities" unquote. I suggest, sir, that the remark is unbecoming of an official of the federal government and should be either substantiated or retracted. Answer

Well, did anyone else hear this because I am sure I didn't say it. And if we can provide a tape from yesterday, I'm sure I never said anything like that. What I was talking about was that the system of rapid call up of circuits based

.../26 - 26 - on a telephone call, was not available to provincial people. Simply because, as I said, there are financial questions. I don't know what all I said, but I know it wasn't that. Now if anybody can produce the tape we'll hear what I said and people can make their own judgement. Did anybody hear anything else that sounded at all like that? Because I am quite sure I didn't say it. (No attendees commented) Question I'd just like to support Tom Stewart's assessment of RETCs. Really good. We sort out not only things like REGHQ communications, wartime communications, but also peacetime emergency communications such as that related to search and rescue and that type of thing. I would like while I am on my feet to ask if we have another one of these conferences we have representatives from the broadcasting industry because I think they are a very important to overall communications.

Question I would like to speak on behalf of John Bradley, who unfortunately had to leave early, but I know John felt that in view of the topics and interest that came out of this meeting, it would be good to build on it. And I think he would support Tom in saying we should have future meetings which would cover more specific details. To do this implies a similar sort of conference next year, and in order to go along with what you were proposing, to form perhaps a program committee to choose topics and develop the context for the next meeting. And John, I know, would like to help you in that regard. Comment (by Wigglesworth) Would you be more positive and make a recommendation to that effect so that I will have something to work with? Answer

Yes, I would in that case, make a recommendation that we hold a meeting along the lines of this meeting next year to cover more specific topics. Comment (Stewart)

The regional people should submit items through the emergency telecommunications committee, as I had suggested. We could then review these proposals in committee. Question

Just an observation Wiggy. I guess I am not speaking for the common carriers when I say this, but I am speaking for myself. I would personally like to see continued positive .../27 - 27 -

leadership in the field of emergency planning for the telecommunications business. This leadership must be in the interest of Canada and all of it's citizens, and completely and utterly divorced from politics. I don't know how we are going to do this, but that is a problem that must be overcome. One of the things that upsets me no end is to see a group of people who have no real knowledge, develop plans, and then go out to the carriers and say, hey, we would like you to implement these things. And last, but not least, with some of the money that you may have, if you could find a few dollars, I sure would like to see you provide emergency telephones along the major highways of this country. I don't care where you start, but I'd start at the 401 and 417 and at least put a great long extension line in the event of poor citizens like myself running into difficulty and standing for three and four hours on the highway with no communications at all. (Q - can you promise us a low rate?) I am not a marketing manager, no way. But I am quite sure that there would be no automatic dialing, its probably just push a button and say - "hey guys, I am here stranded at phone number 3", or something like that, and hopefully somebody will send help.

Question

Not meaning to sound as if I am trying to rush things, but we had a suggestion from DOT here to run another session in a year. I'd like to know what is going to happen one year from now, and is it out of turn to say that another conference should take place sooner than that. Answer (Wigglesworth)

I am going to ask Miss Linda Renaud to go and see Mr. Gamble to study his schedule and see what it looks like for next year. We might even be able to set a tentative date today. Question

Would it not be proper to have a representative from the Coast Guard here? Answer The Coast Guard is here. Comment (Wigglesworth)

There is one group not represented here and that is the RCMP. The telecommunications people were invited and just at the lastininute pulled out. I have no idea why. you • might wonder why Dr. Massa of FEMA isn't here. I was wondering too, but after extensive search yesterday to find out if he was

.../28 - 28 - coming, we discovered that he had received the invitation but someone a bit higher than he decided that perhaps the Director of Communications was the one we really wanted, and then it apparently fell into a beaucratic crack. The request for another FEMA representative to come here was lost. That is their explanation and they were most apologetic. Question (Scanlon)

I have written out a few comments, if you don't mind. I am involved in building research in relation to fires, etc., and when I was in Washington this fall at a conference, I was struck with the fact that the problems are just the same as in other kinds of disasters, with the interaction between the two research groups being almost nil. I thought your observation was well taken. I wanted to say a couple of things. One is that modern technology and much of what I heard here is new to me, overwhelms me and fascinates me and obviously has a very direct relationship to crisis situations, I don't have any doubt about the application. I must say that I was impressed, I don't want any doubts about that, but I started wondering about a couple of things. And really two questions came to mind. Number one was when disaster strikes, what do we say over all these wondrous devices? Number two is who says it or who decides who says it. And I just have the terrible feeling that those are the two questions that strike me more than ever. In fact, I was also struck, - I thought Marty was going to say this, - so I will, and that is, I am curious to know who is going to take the leadership role and responsibility, because when he kept asking I didn't hear any answers. I worried about that because looking at the Air Florida crash on the 14th Street bridge again, one of the problems that came out of the report was that they got all upset because there were live cameras on the scene while they were reporting. As you know I worked on the hostage taking, we had live cameras rolling when the police officer got there. In fact, they filmed his arrival and he was somewhat taken aback because a lady ran out and started telling him that there was a killer on the loose and he is being recorded on camera. So I would suggest a couple of things. Disasters rarely happen in private. They are public events, you have to realize that. But they are going to be recorded events and given the changes in technology now with the media, they are going to report it at incredibly high speed. In fact, probably you are going to have a lot of live disasters from here on in. And it also doesn't matter if the media became involved. Some of our research data is kind of interesting. I didn't mention this but I think you should know it. In North Bay for example, at the time of that building explosion, our data suggests that 1/10th of the population was on the scene before the first radio newscast because word of mouth travels that fast. The Kennedy assination got to about half the people in the U.S. by word of mouth - and that is very solid research data. During the Detroit riots they had

• • •/ 29 - 29 - very specific information about how rioters heard about what was happening, and got involved. There was a total media blackout in Detroit at the time but it didn't stop the word of mouth involvement. People got there from outside areas because the word spread, so it is not just a media problem. So I suggest to you that if you have major disasters, the word is going to spread at extremely high speed, it is going to be known to everybody, in fact it is highly probable that it will be known to the public as fast, if not faster, than it is known to official agencies. I would like to throw a couple of questions at you, because I have looked at this technology and I am starting having visions like this one. Some of them we used on the course here, but I think they are both applicable. Number one, the scenario of the Thompson Canyon. All of you camping in a camp ground. A state trooper arrives. It is getting dark and there are signs of thunderstorm activity, and he says a flash flood is coming. This is what happened by the way. OK. How many of you would get in your car to get out of there? Let's see the hands. ( A majority of hands showed). OK, all of you have just died. What did the smart ones do? - They climbed the wall. Now that's unfortunate when a hundred and some people die because of that error. The dilenio is that you can't get out of a canyon rri with a car when the flash flood is coming faster than you can drive in a traffic.jam. The dilem& is that the message has to be very explicit and no matter how good the communications and in the Thompson Canyon they,weren't very good, doesn't really help if you don't know what to tell people. The second scenario I wanted to try, and I am not going to ask for a show of hands, but I want to get an answer. It is 7:40 am, August, hot summer day, 1986, and ARI has been installed. It works, and everybody has got it and we have an equivalent of Mississauga except we move it over to the No. 10 highway where it is a little more populated. The media get there immediately, a high profile team and you push that button and you are able to operate ARI. I would like to know what the volunteer is going to say to all these people. I am waiting? What are you going to say?

Answer

I'll use the same procedure we have in Quebec. The man in charge of the operations at the municipal level is the man who will issue orders, based on information and action of the Fire Chief, the Police Chief and chemical officials on the site. They are the ones who are going to decide what moves should be made. The Mayor will authorize the broadcast, and noboby else will be on the air giving official statements. You let the press make their own comments, an analysis, whatever they want, but everytime we go on the air, we always open with "this is an official message from the Bureau de Protection Civile Quebec". It is repeated twice and we have a closing statement saying who is speaking and to listen for further broadcasts. So then the people can tell the difference between the press comment and the official statement. .../30 - 30 -

Comment (Scanlon) I have now driven about 10 miles down Canada's busiest highway and I have no information about what to do because you are now assessing it. Which proves the point that we have the technology but not an operational system that works in any way with reliable high speed information. I get the impression from this conference that the technology is far ahead of the planning. I got the impression sitting here this week that the communications technology is very close to the nuclear technology in the sense that it is out there, it seems to have incredible potential, but our planning capacity to cope with this potential is a long way behind.

Answer I would just like to tell you what this group, in my opinion, is not. We don't originate the message. We are the conveyors of the message. So our task, the way I see it, is to transmit the official message. We don't originate it, we don't decide what has to be said. And that is where this technology that you heard so much about in the past four days is at a very high level. We are ready to go. We just need the direction. Comment (Wigglesworth) I would like to hear from another province. I know how we do it in a wartime situation and I will explain that, if anybody is interested, but what about another province. How are you geared up to get the message out? Ron do you want to comment. You have had enough floods and forest fires. Answer (Ron Coell) N.S.

Well, it is not as simple as it sounds, to be very honest. Everybody here is talking about radio communications etc., and the problem in Nova Scotia is that you have a large metropolitan area where approximately one third of the population is located. Sometimes we have run into the situation where we are broadcasting a national program; do we then want to broadcast the message across the entire Canadian network to get it down to Shelburne, Liverpool, etc? We do advocate that the authority is the mayor. It is his word that is gospel; we teach this in our municipal planning and I think we are doing well. We have looked at it, as Joe said, with 66 municipalities. However, we do run across the problem, I am sure we all do, of getting people to commit

.../31 - 31 - their thoughts to paper. Only 18 of those municipalities have a written plan. But we do run into problems getting the word out very rapidly in the community. We must rely on the police force, i.e. we look to the RCMP as our provincial force, plus the 26 locals, and we have to use them and any other methods we can, to pass the word around. With the integrated net we have an excellent communications system getting back to us to let us know what is going on. We now have the capability going out. On the amateur side, we twinned the EMC for the municipality to an amateur in his area to ensure that he had communications to get back to us.

Comment (Wigglesworth) Thanks Ron. Mike, would you like to comment on B.C.

Comment (by B.C.) We actually asked Ottawa some five years ago, I guess, for information on the federal intentions in this respect. At this time, quite a long way down the road now, there is nothing really definite. So we set up an arrangement with broadcast news, which has a teletype and voice system to all broadcast stations in the province. We also equipped all the stations in the province with a warning tone tape which they would play both for actual warning messages, and for a test. We gave them another tape which has the same warning tone on it, a rather distinct one, plus the test tape and test message. And we have carried out tests. It is the usual thing that somebody, the housewife or whoever in the house, - if you just come on with the voice, - it is just another part of the background noise. So we wanted something to alert them to it and it does seem to work. And that is what we have now. We have an arrangement where we keep the broadcast news informed at all times of those who are authorized to originate messages together with their telephone numbers. So you identify yourself when you call them, they then look at the list and call the number to verify'that you are who you say you are. Eventually, I sure would like to have access to whatever system Tom Stewart has, because we do have perhaps one particular problem, I think Tom is aware of it, and that is Tsunamis. For those of you who don't know a Tsunami, it is another name for tidal wave.

Question (by Stewart) Mike, could you mention the arrangement you have with the CBC to use the repeaters for local emergencies. Answer

Yes, it has been very successful so far. There are over 100 LPRTs around the province and we have an arrangement with the CBC whereby they will permit local access to that LPRT by certain authorized people in the community. An example

.../32 - 32 - of this is in Squamish where there is a chemical plant and they have access to a local LPRT and can actually push the mike button in the RCMP detachment HQs.

Comment

I would like to state that the conference has been successful in increasing our awareness, in the need for emergency communications planning. I think we all recognize the need to have plans to deal with emergency situations. I recommend or suggest to the Chairman that for any future activities, especially where departments will be asked to provide resources, that the terms of reference for any future activities be clearly established and defined. I think it is very important so that management can decide what resources they can devote towards the activity.

Comment

I want to say two things. First of all I would like to address the comment that was made by Lee and was supported by others in the room, about the rather, and I use this word, and I hope you don't get upset, rather parochial approach by the communicators. I have been a communicator for thirty years and it seems to me that the communicators have always led. It was the communicators quite often who said "here is the means that we hâve, here is what is at your disposal, and you make the decision." The RETC in B.C. sits down and discusses a wide'range of situations and we bring people in from various agencies and try to provide leadership and information on what is available, even providing, in some cases, a concept where it could be utilized. And I have heard everybody here discuss concepts and how they can see' things happening. So I don't think you should go away from this conference with the idea that you are going to sit in your communications ivory towers and produce systems, and not tell anybody about it. The other thing is I would like to support the need for RETCs. I know I am very fortunate to be associated with a very active one in B.C. And Mr. Chairman, that is one of the things I would like to stress that the other areas of the country really need to get together and get that cooperative spirit going.

Question (Kendall)

I have listened for two and a half days at this conference, and I have heard the common carriers say they will provide a service for a price, to CNR saying that they will provide their emergency operations centre if it is not a rail disaster, for a price. I think the government should recognize that amateur radio provides a totally free service. Unfortunately, for us to expand our facilities, we must go to the individual amateurs and get funding from them to assist in emergency communications. I see DOC subsidizing an emergency broadcast system for the CBC which does not really

.../33 - 33 - have a very large listening audience in Canada, based on Neilsen reports, and I wonder if it would not be possible for the government, in some way, to provide some sort of subsidy, or equipment, for emergency purposes, that could be used by amateur radio operators, adequately dispersed across the country in such a way that in an emergency amateur operators would be able to have quick access to it. Not having to wait for it to come in from Ottawa or Calgary or facilities like that, but rather having it dispersed in regional centres or local municipalities' centres. The price of amateur radio gear is a lot cheaper than commercial equipment, and I think that we could probably have a lot more support from amateur radio in emergency communications if the equipment was more readily available.

(A SIREN AND WARNING DEMONSTRATION WAS GIVEN AT THIS TIME OVER THE LOUDSPEAKER SYSTEM)

Comment (by Wigglesworth) You have just heard a tape used here at the College, during a small exercise. The tapes are in all regional CBC stations across this country. This system through the Canadian Forces Warning and Reporting System, will be able to report fallout and give directions to the public. The tapes are also in the Regional Emergency Government Headquarters where there is an emergency broadcasting facility. We do recognize the amateur radio resource that is in this country. It has been hard to get this across in some areas, but we know what is out there. We have set up a government station in our emergency situation centre with the call VE3G0C, (Government of Canada). There are areas, particularly in the territories, where we have assisted, so there is a possibility. Go talk to your province. We can't initiate action, but the machinery is there for you to set in motion. Question The decoder machines that were taken off because of costs, have not been put back in. Is there any plan now to re- establish that link across Canada? Answer (Stewart) We are attempting to refund some equipment. The system is rundown and this is recognized to a degree. The old alarm receiver that you mentioned was causing the telephone companies untold grief, and they became quite nasty with us about it, so they had to be taken out. They have been replaced for the central, the regional and back-bone national systems.

.../34 - 34 -

Question I have a question regarding the National Warning System. In Quebec sometimes sirens are accidentally triggered and the procedure is to advise Valcartier and then Bell Canada to have them turned off. It is still under the PMs decision to turn them on. If we have an emergency, a regional emergency, these could be very useful if we could control them regionally without having to alarm the whole province. Is there any thought of working this out for provincial people to get access to these siren systems on a regional basis if it is justified? Answer (Wigglesworth)

The sirens are not all triggered from one control location. Don't forget the provincial warning centres that are in each province. But I will ask one of our DND reps, Captain Les Bailey to reply to this question. Answer

We are now turning over sirens for use at the Pt Lepreau nuclear power station. You may not be aware that under the new emergency planning order, National Defence lost its responsibility for providing the warning system to DOC. It is our intention now over a period of time as CHAT comes on line, that we will remove, hand over or return the sites to their natural state. So whether or not the sirens will be included in part of CHAT is still an outstanding item. Question From the moment that the Prime Minister makes the announcement of war or apprehended war, there will be no amateur service in Canada. Perhaps you might like to talk to Tom and see about special - arrangements for the amateur service to continue under certain circumstances. Another point that Ken brought up, concerning making more amateur equipment available is for someone to work on the Revenue Department to rescind the federal sales tax. They have kindly rescinded some of the customs duties, but they are still imposing federal sales tax. Answer (by Wigglesworth)

I know the problem. It means that Canadian amateurs now pay roughly, without the recent remission, somewhere around 35 to 40% more than the American amateur for equipment. .../35 - 35 -

Closing Remarks - Friday - 28 May

Comment (by Wigglesworth)

One positive thing I get from this conference is that we need another conference in 1983. (Wiggy then read the aim of the conference). I feel that we brought the proper people together and identified the problems and that was the aim. Not everyone will be satisfied. We didn't invite directors of the EMO organizations but suggested that the provincial communications officer or consultant be tasked, and in most cases we got them. But there are some people I am sure - I can't help hearing things as I move around - that aren't quite happy because we didn't satisfy all their needs. If we could put together a conference that satisfied the needs of everyone, we should put a big mark on the wall, because that just doesn't happen, not in real life anyway. There is no doubt in my mind that we have accomplished the aim. I now have some dates for next year and there are three of them. One I don't like very much, 29-31st of March, as that is the start of the flood season in many provinces. April 6-8, this is the week right after Easter Sunday. However, the 24th-27th of May is free. I will ask Mr. Gamble to block that in if that is your wish. Agreed? Agreed. Then we will do all the spade work to convince our superiors that they should spend the money, and I'll certainly do everything in my power to bring it about. Now, to set up the type of conference that we visualize, will be time consuming and we will get on with it right away. We will probably discuss major problems in a plenary session, and then off to syndicate rooms and use the brains of the experts we have to help us solve the problems. Does that sound reasonable? Agreed.

Question

Mr. Chairman I would like to just re-emphasize my earlier statement that in the establishment of committees, that we do have some clearly defined goals and objectives, so that getting and devoting resources to it, management can make a decision.

Answer (by Wigglesworth)

That's right. Goals and objectives must be set. (Wiggy then thanked Nick Evanoff, Dorothy and Bob of the College staff, and Jackie and Linda) EPC. He also thanked the group for their participation. "I thank all of the people from industry, for really opening our eyes about some aspects of communications, provincial reps., the federal people, just the entire group. The participation, has been much greater than most conferences I have attended, and I thank you for it. So with that, I thank you again and let's look forward to next year."