Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments

Yemen: GCC Roadmap to Nowhere WP Elite Bargaining and Political Infighting Block a Meaningful Transition

Mareike Transfeld S

The transformation process in , as initiated and defined by the roadmap of the (GCC), is frequently praised as a model for a peaceful tran- sition. Despite some delay, formally speaking, the process appears to be on track. It has just entered a new phase with the conclusion of the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) at the end of January 2014 and the establishment of the constitutional drafting committee in March. While the results of the NDC present a good basis for the future Yemeni order, increased violent conflict on the ground is casting doubt on the way ahead. Rivaling elite factions continue to exploit the transition process for their own political and economic interests. This has blocked the emergence of a more participa- tory system. To support a meaningful transition, Germany and the European Union should pressure the transitional government to address the legitimate grievances of the popular movements that are challenging the rule of the old elites.

The GCC roadmap, signed in November and the family of former President 2011 after 10 months of popular protest, Abdullah Saleh (see Box 1, p. 2). At the heart initiated a transfer of power from then- of the conflict between the three alliances President to his vice stands access to the state’s institutions and president. The agreement also mandated a its resources, which serve the various fac- reform of the fragmented Yemeni security tions by securing their economic interests apparatus and the NDC to resolve the coun- and maintaining patronage networks that try’s internal conflicts. However, rather consolidate their power. than being a process that includes all social The international community has been and political groups in the country, the driving and monitoring the transition pro- transition in Yemen has evolved into a cess, motivated mainly by its interest in the power struggle within the elite. country’s stability. Given Yemen’s depend- Since the transfer of power, Yemeni poli- ence on foreign aid and the fear of discipli- tics have been moving toward a tri-polar nary measures based on UN resolution 2140 elite constellation: interim President Abd of late February 2014, which threatens Rabbu Mansur Hadi; the alliance of the sanctions against individuals who obstruct Ahmar family and General Ali Mohsin; or undermine the transition process, no

Mareike Transfeld is a Ph.D. fellow in the project “Elite change and new social mobilization in the Arab world” SWP Comments 20 realized by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). The project is funded by the German Foreign Office in the framework of May 2014 the transformation partnerships with the Arab World and the Robert Bosch Stiftung. It cooperates with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Ph.D. grant programs of the Heinrich Böll Stiftung and the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung.

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Box 1: Key figures Hadi – and with it the transitional period – was extended for another year on 25 Janu- SALEH ALLIANCE: ary 2014. Ali Abdullah Saleh: President until The different elite coalitions have differ- February 2012; Secretary-General, GPC. ent interests with regard to the implemen- Ahmed Ali: Son of Ali Abdullah Saleh; tation of the GCC initiative. A successful until 2013 Commander of Republican formal implementation is in the interest Guards. of President Hadi and his loyalists, as it will Ali Mohsin: Same tribe as the Saleh guarantee the support of the international family and Commander of First Ar- community – on which they mainly rely – mored Division. Defected to opposition and favors their drive to occupy political in March 2011. Now forms alliance with positions and control state institutions. Al-Ahmar family. However, despite Hadi’s professed support for political change and his close coopera- HADI ALLIANCE: tion with the international community, Abd Rabbu Mansur Hadi: Interim neither comprehensive reforms nor an im- President since 2012, Vice-President mediate implementation of the NDC results (1994–2012); member of GPC. can be expected, as persisting patronage Abdulkarim al-Eryani: Former Foreign networks and tribal loyalties render reforms Minister and Prime Minister, Advisor to in state institutions difficult. Ali Abdullah Saleh; member of GPC. The Ahmar family and Ali Mohsin are leadership of Islah not aiming for office themselves. Rather, as well as the leaders of other opposi- they are trying to use the GCC roadmap to tional parties, such as the Yemen ensure the establishment of a system that Socialist Party. functions to their advantage. This includes their business interests in the telecommu- AL-AHMAR ALLIANCE: nication and oil sectors. Yet, in the course Abdullah al-Ahmar (died in 2007): of the violent conflicts in northern Yemen, Supreme sheikh of tribal feder- the Ahmar family has lost much tribal sup- ation and President of Islah party. port, and thus political influence. Sadeq al-Ahmar: Eldest son of Abdullah Ex-President Saleh and his supporters are al-Ahmar; supreme sheikh of Hashid. interested in seeing the implementation of Hamid al-Ahmar: Son of Abdullah the GCC initiative fail, as this would legiti- al-Ahmar, business tycoon, and-high mize them vis-à-vis the transitional presi- ranking member of Islah. dent. The group behind Saleh is aiming for political offices, as their economic interests are related to the control of the military. elite faction can afford to openly obstruct Although the results of the NDC prohibit the process. While the elites profess support any individual who has served in the mili- for the transitional process, they continue tary in the last 10 years to run for the presi- to use their networks in tribes, political dency, it cannot be ruled out that this group parties, state institutions, and the media to will attempt to nominate Ahmed Ali – claim legitimacy, delegitimize competitors, Saleh’s son and former commander of the and curry favor with external sponsors. Due Republican Guards – as a candidate in the to these elite maneuvers, the implementa- presidential elections scheduled for 2015. tion of the GCC initiative has been delayed, With instability increasing, a comeback of with negotiations in the NDC dragging on the Saleh family and a partial restoration for months in a volatile political environ- of the pre-2011 regime continues to be a ment and increasing insecurity. As a con- possibility. sequence, the term of transitional President

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The Saleh regime before 2011 to discord between the elite factions. By Before the 2011 uprising, the Yemeni weakening Ali Mohsin militarily, Saleh regime was based on an alliance between alienated his long-term confidant, the the Saleh and Ahmar families. The Saleh commander of the first armored division, family and members of Saleh’s tribe, the who hails from the same tribe as the Saleh Sanhan, were high-ranking military officers family. The fissure between Saleh and the who collectively controlled the security Ahmar family began to widen in the run-up apparatus. Through their positions within to the 2006 presidential elections. Hamid the military and within the military-con- al-Ahmar was the first member of the inner trolled Yemen Economic Corporation circle to openly defect from Saleh and lead (YECO), they were able to secure vast eco- the Islah party in its vocal opposition to the nomic gains. YECO is the country’s main government. It was at this time that Islah importer of food, among other things, and fully joined the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), a major player in the Yemeni economy. On a strong alliance of five opposition parties. the political level, this group was (and is) represented by the General People’s Con- gress (GPC), which had been the main Changing elite coalitions ruling party for decades. As a non-ideo- As the first step of the GCC roadmap, an logical entity, it was designed to channel interim government that was equally com- patronage and coopt influential social posed of GPC and JMP representatives was actors, including potential opponents. sworn in in December 2011. In February The Ahmar family derives its influence 2012, Hadi was endorsed by both parties as from its leading position in the Hashid presidential candidate and confirmed in a tribal federation, the most powerful tribal public vote without competition. The oppo- coalition in Yemen. The Ahmar family has sition’s increased political influence was established one of the biggest business em- now reflected in the unity government, pires in Yemen, the al-Ahmar Group, with with Hadi as the transitional president interests in crude oil, telecommunication, building a new (if weak) pole between the import and export, and tourism markets. two equally strong elite alliances. At the Sadeq al-Ahmar, the eldest of 10 Ahmar same time, the relatives of Saleh and Ali brothers, is currently the supreme sheikh Mohsin retained their positions within of the Hashid, while the younger Hamid the military. al-Ahmar has emerged as a prominent busi- Yet, the GCC roadmap mandated a nessman and politician. restructuring of the security apparatus, The Ahmars are closely linked to Islah, a with the goal of reorganizing the military party comprised of the Yemeni branch of and security services under the Ministry the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafis, as well as of Defense and Ministry of Interior, respec- conservative tribesmen. Islah was created tively. With this restructuring process, the by northern elites after unification of South power balance within the elite was bound and in 1990. Throughout the to change, as it implicitly aimed at remov- 1990s, Islah remained a close ally of Saleh’s ing Saleh’s relatives from the armed forces. GPC, which ruled Yemen from 1997 until Indeed, it led to the weakening of the Saleh 2011. faction, whereas Hadi and the Ahmar–Ali The initial cracks within this elite coali- Mohsin alliance were initially strength- tion emerged when President Saleh began ened. to groom his son, Ahmed Ali, as successor Although Hadi, who was responsible to the presidency in the early 2000s. Saleh’s for the implementation of the military strategy to marginalize potential competi- reforms, faced resistance from individual tors to his son and to centralize power in officers and troops concerning the person- the hands of his immediate family gave rise nel changes within the military, he was

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supported in the implementation by UN restructuring, in their view, does not aim Special Advisor on Yemen, Jamal Benomar. at turning the military into a truly national While keeping Ali Mohsin in place as a institution but is geared to allocate more counterweight to Ahmed Ali, who remained power to President Hadi himself, as evi- in charge of the well-trained and well- denced by his stacking of the armed forces equipped Republican Guards, Hadi began with supporters from his southern home to remove Saleh loyalists and family mem- governorate, Abyan. bers from their positions in the security Hadi and his supporters in the GPC – the apparatus. In August 2012, a series of “dove” faction – form the second center presidential decrees removed troops from of power and profess to offer compromise the command of Ahmed Ali and, to a lesser with other forces. Supporters of the dove extent, Ali Mohsin, thus weakening both faction in the past played an important men from below. Only after these measures role in negotiating with the opposition. It did Hadi move to replace both Ahmed Ali does not come as a surprise that they have and Ali Mohsin. However, while the former formed an alliance with the leadership was dispatched to become Yemen’s ambas- of the JMP. Although this elite faction is sador to the , Ali rather weak in terms of tribal and military Mohsin was appointed presidential advisor support, it enjoys the backing of the inter- on military affairs. Although he formally national community. The GCC roadmap has lost his position in the army, he has not served to legitimize their claim to political only remained in the country but has also power, and thus this group has gained the indirectly retained his influence among most since the signing of the power-trans- many officers and troops previously under fer deal. They have also come out as the his command. strongest proponents of the GCC initiative. Through the restructuring of the mili- The Ahmar family, Ali Mohsin, and Islah tary, Saleh and his supporters – represent- form the third center of political power. ing the first center of power – lost influence The Ahmar family was unaffected by the on the top level of the institution. The family military restructuring. In particular, they of the former president still retains support saw to it that many Saleh supporters were among the troops, however. This is particu- purged from positions in the state appa- larly true for units previously led by Ahmed ratus and replaced by members of Islah. Ali, which had been paid, trained, and Potentially, their interest to retain power treated better than the rest of the armed by means of patronage and tribal loyalty forces. The defection of the Ahmars also may put them on a collision course with affected the tribal support base of the the forces around Hadi that attempt to Salehs, yet the former president retains the arrogate more authority to the state insti- loyalty of various tribal leaders, some of tutions that they control. Since the signing whom are intermarried with the family or of the GCC initiative, the Ahmar family and are members of the GPC. Also, as Saleh has Ali Mohsin have scaled down their direct remained Secretary-General of the GPC, the presence on the political stage and instead party still serves him and his supporters pursued their interest through Islah via the as a vehicle to exercise political influence. implementation of the roadmap. Increasingly, however, the party has become divided between die-hard Saleh loyalists and a current that would prefer The rise of identity politics if the new president took the helm of the Although access to political power and party. The former, also referred to as the resources is at the heart of the conflict GPC “hawks,” accuse President Hadi of between Yemen’s different regions, the colluding with the international commu- elites frame the conflicts with sectarian nity and the former opposition. Military language in an attempt to instigate con-

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flicts between their respective Zaidi and Box 2: Shafi’is and Zaidis Shafi’i supporters (see Box 2). This has been the case in the north in Whereas central and southern Yemen particular, where the government has been predominantly adhere to the Shafi’i engaged in a conflict with the so-called school of Sunni , between one- Houthis. Motivated by their demand for third and half of the population of Yemen political participation and economic devel- are (nominal) adherents of Zaidism, a opment as well as the defense of their Zaidi branch of Shiite Islam distinct from religious tradition, the Houthis waged the version practiced in Iran. According six rounds of war against the government to the Zaidi tradition, political rule is between 2004 and 2010. Since their fall restricted to the class of Sayyids, who from power in 2011, the pro-Saleh hawk are considered to be descendants of faction of the GPC has discovered the Prophet Mohammed. The 1962 revolu- Houthis as potential allies. Toward the end tion overthrew the theocratic rule of of the NDC, a loose and informal alliance the Sayyids and established a republic between the two groups emerged. On the in which they were no longer privileged. popular level, Zaidi centers within the capi- Saleh and his predecessors, as well as tal that supported Saleh during the 2011 influential tribal leaders, had no inter- uprising have become sympathetic to the est in emphasizing this separate reli- plight of the . The Ahmar gious identity, which restricts power family, the Hashid tribes allied with it, and to a class they were not a part of, and General Ali Mohsin, on the other hand, which legitimizes rebellion against un- have long since maintained links to Sunni just leaders. Rather, they encouraged Islamist currents. the spread of strict interpretations of As a consequence, tensions between Sunni Islam propagated in particular by Hashid tribes and the Houthis have repeat- , such as Salafism. Resent- edly escalated into violent clashes in the ment against the influence of such Ahmar stronghold of Amran, a mere 50 km ideologies, paired with social marginali- north of . In the spring of 2014, the zation, has prompted resistance against Houthi movement reached the outskirts of the central government in the northern Sanaa, causing widespread fears about the Saada province since the early 2000s. The possibility of the violent conflict entering resistance has since taken on the char- the capital. The Houthi movement has acter of a Zaidi revivalist movement, aimed at weakening the Ahmar family and named after its first leader, Hussein Islah by gaining territorial control, which Badreddin al-Houthi. it could then use for leverage on the politi- cal level. In the course of the conflict, the Ahmars, who are widely perceived as being Hashid tribes turning against their leader, corrupt and following their own interests, Saleh supporters have profited from the lost the support of a significant number recent developments, as they have weakened of Hashid tribes, who began to support their strongest opponent. the Houthi movement. Besides facilitating tribal arbitration, until recently Hadi had not taken serious measures to stop the The National Dialogue Conference Houthis’ advancement. In late April 2014 Interim President Hadi has had an interest the Houthis agreed to negotiate with the in pushing forward the implementation of government. Hadi’s strategy appears to the GCC roadmap. Besides the restructuring have been to use the conflict to weaken the of the security apparatus, the NDC was the Ahmar family, after Saleh and his support- second major component of the GCC road- ers had already been weakened. Yet, with map’s approach. Ostensibly, the goal of the

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NDC was to bring together the various con- With regard to the southern question in flicting groups and establish a national particular, the NDC was not able to come to consensus. The conclusion of the NDC on a consensus. Federalism was brought up as 21 January 2014 was internationally cel- a solution to the various conflicts the coun- ebrated as a success of the transition process. try is facing, particularly the secessionist Undeniably, the conference was an conflict with al-Hirak. The question of the achievement, in that it brought together federal regions was the greatest bone of conflicting parties, elites, and members of contention for the delegates, as it touched grassroots movements, such as the youth, directly on the distribution of power and al-Hirak, the Houthis, and women (for more resources. All three elite factions vying detail, see SWP Comments 23/2013). Also, for power in Sanaa share similar attitudes the results of the individual working groups toward the south: secession is a red line. (Southern Issue, Sa’ada Issue, Transitional This is not only because the political elite is Justice, State-Building, Good Governance, overwhelmingly northern, but also because Military/Security, Special Entities, Rights/ separation along the pre-1990 borders would Freedom, and Development) provide a good leave the northern rump state with little oil. basis for the new constitution to be drafted. With no solution to the southern issue in Yet, the conference was dominated by sight during the NDC, popular confidence the old elites (GPC: 112 out of 565 seats; in a positive outcome decreasing, and esca- Islah: 50 seats). The dominance of Hadi’s lating violence across the country, Presi- supporters in vital committees in particular dent Hadi presented a document to the ensured that the results of the NDC would NDC in late December 2013 stipulating that be favorable to the transitional president all parties agreed to a just solution for the and the international community. While south, but that the exact form of the federal the so-called independent youth had a great structure would be determined later. He impact on the outcomes of the NDC, some then established a committee outside the of their more progressive demands – such NDC that adopted a controversial six-region as a transitional justice law and a reform solution. Thus, an open failure of the NDC of the telecommunication sector, which on this issue was avoided by bypassing the would have touched on the interests of the NDC and imposing the solution preferred old elites – were blocked by the GPC hawks. by the Hadi alliance. Also, the demands of the representatives The adopted solution can be seen as an of the were frequently achievement in two ways: it secured the ignored. The southern movement, common- vital interests of the three elite groups and ly referred to as al-Hirak ( for “The served to maintaining the support of the Movement”) had begun calling for civil international community for Hadi’s group. disobedience and protests against what it However, the solution has not been accepted perceived to be a northern occupation since by most of the factions making up the frag- 2007. Pent-up grievances deriving from the mented al-Hirak movement. The Houthi general political and economic marginali- movement has likewise expressed opposi- zation of the formerly independent south tion and criticized that the decision was boosted al-Hirak. It developed into a potent taken outside of the NDC. Some GPC hawks protest movement demanding the resolu- appear to oppose the conclusion out of tion of land disputes in the south, the re- principle. Thus, violent conflict in the instatement and compensation of forcibly north and protests in the south are con- retired military officers and state bureau- tinuing. crats, and the release of political prisoners. But as these demands have not yet been addressed, it has continued to demand secession.

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The protest movements and the participation with skepticism. Perceived GCC roadmap’s shortcomings as part of the same regime they were trying The conclusion of the NDC did not achieve to bring down, activists saw the elites as its goal to reconcile the conflicting groups. hijacking the revolution. Also, the government in Sanaa undertook In April 2011, the GCC – backed by the few trust-building measures. Thus, the UN, the US, and the EU – put forward what grassroots movements continue to distrust became known as the GCC initiative to it and rely on protests and violence as strat- resolve the crisis and initiate a peaceful egies to attain their goals. So far, none of transfer of power. By October 2011, inter- the immediate grievances that drove the national pressure on Saleh to sign the road- 2011 protests have been addressed, in- map proposed by the GCC mounted, with cluding extreme poverty, high unemploy- both the UN and the EU threatening to im- ment, and widespread corruption. Even pose sanctions. After securing legal immu- though grassroots movements played an nity for himself and his closest supporters, important role in the 2011 uprising, they and after the JMP agreed on vice presi- have had little political influence since dent and long-term GPC member Hadi to then, with the transitional period being become interim president, the deal was dominated by the old elites. This did not finally signed in the Saudi capital, , happen by coincidence but can be traced in November 2011. back to the approach chosen with the GCC To negotiate the transfer of power, the initiative. external mediators had turned to estab- What had begun as small protests in lished leaders and political bodies, namely January 2011 developed into a full-fledged, the GPC (and thus Saleh) and the JMP (and countrywide, popular uprising that lasted thus the Ahmar family and Ali Mohsin). for 10 months. In absolute terms, of all the The youth movement that had had a cru- countries participating in the , cial role in the uprising was ignored. The Yemen had the largest protests by far. The Houthi movement and al-Hirak were like- new popular protest movement encouraged wise excluded from these negotiations. by the Arab Spring occupied public squares With their reliance only on the old elites, in all major cities and demanded the the sponsors of the GCC roadmap sup- overthrow of the regime. United by their ported the maintaining of the old system, demands for political change, al-Hirak and whereas the street lost its leverage in poli- the Houthis quickly declared solidarity tics. On the elite level, as detailed above, with the “youth revolution,” organized the GCC initiative enabled a reshuffling protests in their home governorates, and of political power and access to state joined the main protest square in Yemen’s resources. capital, Sanaa. The UN and the initiative’s Western The opposition parties and those mem- sponsors claim that the international bers of the political elite who had been at engagement aims at achieving a democratic odds with Saleh used the opportunity to transition in Yemen. Above all, however, it put pressure on the regime. In March 2011, is the attempt to contain the threat of the after more than 50 protesters had been further destabilization of fragile Yemen, killed in the capital, General Ali Mohsin which would allow Al-Qaeda on the Arabian and Sadeq al-Ahmar formally defected to Peninsula to expand its already worrisome the opposition. As a consequence, the pro- presence, that drives international engage- tests became better organized and grew ment. Rather than a genuinely inclusive even further in size. Despite the weight system, the priority thus is to achieve politi- that the JMP and the elites added to the cal stability and to maintain territorial independent protest movement, many of integrity. the activists viewed the parties’ and elites’

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Conclusion The GCC initiative has effected a superficial transition on the political level and a fragile balance between three camps vying to max- imize their grip on power. By putting pro- cess before substance, the implementation of the roadmap is, however, liable to lead neither to democracy nor to stability. The international community should acknowl- edge that, despite the conclusion of the NDC, the conflicts in the country are far from resolved. Further dialogue must address the conflict between the three political fac- tions and work to achieve a buy-in from

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und the Houthis, al-Hirak, the youth movement, Politik, 2014 and other civil society actors. All rights reserved Indeed, with UNSC resolution 2140, the These Comments reflect international community has sent the time- solely the author’s views. ly signal that obstruction of the transition SWP will not be tolerated. Yet, it should be care- Stiftung Wissenschaft und ful when identifying the source of obstruc- Politik German Institute for tion and avoid giving carte blanche to International and actors who attempt to bend the process to Security Affairs their own ends. Rather, European facilita- Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 tors of the GCC initiative should pressure 10719 Berlin the transitional government to build trust Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 among the various groups by answering www.swp-berlin.org their legitimate grievances. Implementing [email protected] those results of the NDC that were, in fact, ISSN 1861-1761 consensual would be the most obvious start- ing point. Given the state of the Yemeni security forces and the balance of military power, only compromise with the Houthis and al-Hirak can restore stability. Germany, being very popular among Yemenis, could play an important role as a mediator that is perceived as neutral. Such mediation would be of particular importance between northern elites and the southern move- ment.

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