Security Trends

NCCI’s Security Trends Analysis provides internal advice for NCCI members only and should Analysis not be forwarded outside your st th organization. If forwarded 1 – 19 July 2011 internally, care must be taken to ensure that it is not passed on to any third parties.

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The NCCI Security Trends Analysis is provided to member NGOs twice a month as an informational and advisory report on possible trends, threats and incidents based on information received from NGOs, the media, international organisations and official sources.

Every reasonable effort is made to ensure the accuracy of the information contained in this analysis. NCCI collates information from reliable sources. Where a source is in doubt, NCCI seeks to corroborate that information. There may be an occasion when some information is included and its accuracy cannot be guaranteed. This typically occurs with an emerging or developing situation when it is considered in the best interests of NCCI’s member organisations to be made aware of any available information.

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General information is available to members at the NCCI website, www.ncciraq.org Please do not hesitate to contact us at [email protected]

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Table of Contents

Map of …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…………………………………………….. 4

Use of Security Contractors in Iraq Set to Rise Substantially………………………………………….……………………………..………………… 5

Highest Level of Foreign Military Combat Casualties in 3 Years as Shiite ‘Resistance’ Increases Attacks …………………………. 6

Largest Iraqi Government Crackdown on Shiite Militias since 2008 ……....……………………………….………………………...... …… 7

Iran Steps Up Military Pressure for U.S. to Leave by Deadline via Incursions into Iraqi Kurdish Territory and Indirect Assistance to Southern ‘Resistance’ Militias...... ………………………….…….…………………………………………………………… 8

Sadrists Withdraw Threat to Revive Mahdi Army Militia to Maintain Internal Organizational Discipline………………………… 9

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Map of Iraq

IAU and OCHA

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In the wake of the withdrawal of official foreign military forces, reliance on security contractors in Iraq is to inflate their ranks to as many as 5,500 persons. The withdrawal is currently planned for the end of 2011. Yet Use of Security Contractors there is still no clear legislation on their status. Contractors are not covered by the Status of Forces Agreement in Iraq Set to Rise between Iraq and the United States. The U.N. Working Group on Mercenaries which visited Iraq from the 12th to th Substantially 16 of June submitted proposed legislation on regulating the use of security contractors. However, the legislation must be ratified by the members of the U.N. General Assembly before it can enter into force. Both current U.S. President Barak Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton were once vociferous about the need for more accountability for, and less reliance on, security contractors during their respective presidential campaigns in 2008. Clinton even personally co-sponsored a bill to outlaw the use of Blackwater and other "private mercenary firms," in the war in Iraq. Nevertheless, the U.S. State Department not only continues to use such contractors heavily, but is indeed set to increase its dependence upon them. Since xenophobic feelings may rise within local communities as a result, INGOs, especially expatriate staff, must be vigilant to distinguish themselves clearly from the security contractors.

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June 2011 was the deadliest month for U.S. forces in Iraq in terms of combat-related deaths in over three years. All of the June deaths occurred in the South where Shiite militias are the main armed forces outside the state. Moreover, both the themselves and U.S. military commanders agree that the main factor in the increase in attacks on foreign military personnel in recent months has been the Special Groups. ‘Special Groups’ is a common term for the southern Shiite militia Highest Level of organizations, such as the Promised Day Brigade (Liwa al-Youm al-Mawud), League of the Righteous (Asaib Ahl al-Haq) and the Foreign Military Brigades of the Party of God (Kataib ). In terms of the June attacks, the Sadrist Promised Day Brigade claimed rocket attacks on foreign troop installations in , Diyala, , Maysan, Dhi Qar, and Muthanna provinces. By their own and U.S. Combat Casualties in military estimations, on June 6th Kataib Hezbollah killed 6 U.S. soldiers in an IRAM rocket attack, and on June 30th 3 more U.S. 3 Years as Shiite soldiers in a similar operation using 'Karrar' rockets, accounting for a further 9 of the 14 American military combat deaths in June. Moreover, foreign military deaths caused by the southern Shiite militias have increased steadily this year from 0 in January, and 0 ‘Resistance’ in February, to 1 in March, 4 in April and 12 in June. Thus the Special Groups have also been responsible for a monthly increasing Increases Attacks number of deaths in absolute terms. Likewise Special Groups have caused the vast majority of all attacks on foreign military each month since the beginning of the year. In sum they are the most important threat to foreign troops in Iraq, and a quickly rising one. Iranian logistical, financial, and weapons procurement assistance, has helped facilitate the recent intensified campaigns of the Special Group is Iraq. Iranian assistance is largely denied by the Special Groups themselves. By contrast, both the new U.S. Secretary of Defense and the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq claim to have “forensic evidence” indicating that the provenance of the longer range and more accurate weapons recently put into use by these groups comes from . Independent local Iraqi reporting has indicated an increase of funding to such groups with clear Iranian links as well. Sot al-Iraq for example, reported that Ahl al-Haq was trying to recruit fighters in Basra, Najaf, and Qadisiyah, and that the new benefits offered for enlistment included a monthly salary, housing, and cash for every successful attack upon American forces. Sot al-Iraq also noted the presence of a liaison officer from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards travelling around southern Iraq to meet with League leaders and coordinate their operations. Like the Iraqi Special Groups themselves, the Iranians are likely stepping up activism in Iraq to take credit for helping ensure that the U.S. occupational forces leave in accordance with the December 31st withdrawal deadline. The greater trend in increased attempts to attack foreign troops by local Sunni insurgents, Special Groups, and foreign backers, is likely to continue so long as the option to extend the U.S. troop presence remains on the table. Ironically, once the decision to withdraw foreign troops has been made, Tehran among others, may well scale back its military assistance to militia groups using armed force outside the mandate of the state and focus more on political, economic, and social tools to bolster its interests in Iraq.

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On June 30th Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki ordered the most sweeping military operations in the Shiite- dominated provinces since 2008. The operation included more than 2,000 military and police personnel. To a large extent the crackdown focused on the Sadrists’ elite Promised Day Brigade in Maysan. The action appears driven by the challenge posed by the increased activities of the southern Shiite militias to al-Maliki’s authority. The challenge is both Largest Iraqi military and political. The death of foreign occupying soldiers does not present a problem for al-Maliki per se. However, all violence conducted by militias defies the state’s monopoly on force, opening the door for other forms of Government illegal force use in the future. That is a problem for him militarily. Politically, a rise in attacks on foreign targets in the Crackdown on Shiite South exposes increasing popular support among the Shiite base for al-Sadr’s rhetorical position against extending the foreign troop presence and against al-Maliki’s presumed lingering desire for it. Militias since 2008 The armed faceoff between the central government led by al-Maliki and Sadrist militants is not the only parallel to 2008. Al-Maliki has returned Adnan al-Asadi, an individual involved in the 2008 crackdown, to the Interior Ministry. Al-Maliki himself is acting Minister of Defence with another ally as acting National Security Minister. The current cabinet was formed in November 2010. However all three of Iraqi’s most sensitive security portfolios still await permanent ministers because of al-Maliki’s veto on previously proposed candidates. Thus all three ‘temporary’ ministerial appointments represent a unilateral assertion of authority by al-Maliki over security decision-making, as was the case in 2008. When Nuri al-Maliki began the crackdown on southern militias in 2008, he was a mere compromise candidate for Prime Minister, selected by the Shiite governing factions for his very political weakness. However the crackdown changed that. The crackdown then on hated criminal gangs operating under the banner of the Mahdi Army, was welcomed by the many Shiites who had become the Mahdi Army’s main targets of extortion and torture. It was equally well received by Sunnis who had long felt that the various incarnations of post-invasion governments only included Sunni groups in their understanding of terrorism or who had themselves been victims of the Shiite militias’ sectarian violence. Indeed the 2008 crackdown was the policy action that catapulted al-Maliki into the Iraqi political ring as a national-level heavy-weight. It gave him the reputation as an evenhanded provider of security to the Iraqi people, allowing him to launch his “Rule of Law” Coalition, leading to major successes in the 2009 electoral cycle. By contrast the 2011 crackdown on Shiite ‘resistance’ militias is not clearly a popular move. It will make little difference to the daily security of Iraqi citizens. But it will be seen as in the favor of an occupying force which has inflicted much destruction on the country. Al-Maliki’s 2011 crackdown is therefore more likely to be interpreted by Iraqis as part of his personal accumulation of power. Indeed it runs the risk of being seen as little more than a poor attempt to divert attention from the intense criticism of his government’s failure to deliver the most basic services.

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Iraq has witnessed a string of visits by ranking U.S. security officials pressing for a decision on (and presumably for) an extension of the mandate of foreign troops on Iraqi soil in the last two weeks. In response, Iran has stepped up pressure on the U.S. to leave by the December 31st deadline through direct and indirect displays of force. Indirect displays of force Iran Steps Up Military are embodied in the logistical and financial assistance provided by Iran to Iraqi militias engaged in armed resistance against the foreign military presence in the South. The Iranian military build-up along the northern Iraqi border is the most notable Pressure for U.S. to direct display of force aimed at achieving a timely U.S. withdrawal. Leave by Deadline via Periodic limited Iranian cross-border bombings of supposed strongholds of Kurdish militant organization operating from Iraqi territory, notably the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) which is Iran’s main Kurdish militant group, are not in and Incursions into Iraqi of themselves a new phenomenon. However the 5,000 man troop deployment in the north-western Kurdish borderlands Kurdish Territory and with Iraq in the second week of July was notably larger than any other recent ones. The Iranian troop deployment included tanks and the shelling of artillery. The deployment penetrated 3km into Iraqi territory. It was combined with threats to Indirect Assistance to residents of those areas to evacuate their homes in three days. The incursion furthermore resulted in a number of deaths.

Southern ‘Resistance’ Yet the Iranian operation did not follow a notable rise in Iraq- or Iran-based Kurdish unrest to warrant it. The scale of this operation therefore raises questions about Tehran’s intentions beyond clamping down on Kurdish militants. Indeed the Militias operation’s scale suggests it is more likely a form of military pressure on the United States and Iraqi factions seeking a longer stay for U.S. forces. Washington wants to keep a well-equipped division of at least 10,000 troops in the country that could be reoriented to block Iran. The latter has no interest in the presence of such a retainer force. Hence Iran’s desire to increase the pressure in the status of forces negotiations via incursions into Iraq, using the PJAK threat as cover. Iran has employed such tactics before in the South, such as when, in December 2009, troops from the Revolutionary Guard crossed into Iraq’s Maysan Province to pressure political factions in the lead up to Iraq’s March 2010 elections. However both direct and indirect displays of force against the U.S. by Iran run the risk of backfiring. If Iranian brinksmanship goes too far it could motivate Washington to keep forces in Iraq with or without an Iraqi vote. As the new U.S. Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta suggestively commented July 12th: “the U.S. Amy can and will do whatever it takes unilaterally” against Iranian military assistance and incursions into Iraq. Iranian pressure could also push the Iraqi Kurdish parliamentary representatives further into supporting an extension of the mandate of the U.S. forces as a security guarantor against Iran. Both the U.S. and Iran would have much to lose by direct or large indirect confrontation in or outside an Iraqi theatre. The Obama administration has campaign promises to keep regarding a speedy withdrawal from the Iraqi war- zone. Iran gains much more in a friendly Shiite-majority government in Iraq than military operations there. However inopportune rises in rhetorical and military shows of force could lead to unintended military escalation between the parties played out through and amongst the Iraqi people.

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In a statement issued July 11th, Muqtada al-Sadr indicated that he would "not un-freeze the activities of the Mahdi Army," even if American troops remain. He stated that he had come to this decision "because of the immoral acts that were committed -- or could be committed” by people claiming to be members of the Mahdi Army.” The statement marks a significant reversal for al-Sadr. Since April 9th Sadrists Withdraw al-Sadr had repeatedly made direct threats to revive the Mahdi Army if the mandate of the occupation forces were extended. On May 26th Threat to Revive Mahdi al-Sadr paraded tens of thousands of young men in military-like formations across Baghdad. The show of force, though weaponless, indicated just how many young men could still be rallied under a Mahdi Army banner if the organization were revived. On June 25th al-Sadr Army Militia gave his personal blessing to suicide missions against foreign troops. These escalating threats of and use of armed force were intended to to Maintain Internal pressure Iraqi and American policy makers to insure the departure of foreign troops by the current deadline. Organizational Al-Sadr’s 2008 freeze on the Mahdi Army came in response to two factors. The first was a major offensive on the militia by the central government. The second factor was a major loss of internal discipline which sullied the image of the organization. Both factors are Discipline again behind al-Sadr’s decision to extend the freeze the Mahdi Army in July 2011. On June 30th al-Maliki began the largest crackdown on Shiite militias since 2008. An armed altercation June 20th between members of the Sadrist movement and Abu Dura’s Mahdi Army splinter group in Baghdad resulted in the collateral killing of Iraqi civilians. The June 20th incident was orders of magnitude smaller than the violence carried out by Mahdi Army elements during the civil war. However it represented the first clash between major Shiite militias in three years. Resultant concerns about internal discipline have been discussed by the public and in public by al-Sadr himself. Indeed, in al- Sadr’s July 11th statement he felt obliged to offer a personal “apology to the Iraqi people” for the June 20th “events” in Baghdad, publically attributing his continuation of the freeze on the Mahdi Army to fear of their repetition. Al-Sadr’s concern about internal discipline, and public relations disasters resultant there from, is justified. The Sadrist current has an extensive history in the field of the violent splintering of its armed wing. The extensive use of torture and extortion by Mahdi Army splinter groups such as Asa’ib al-Haq or Abu Dura’s group and simple criminals during the height of civil war chaos in 2006-2008, ruinously eroded al-Sadr’s reputation among the Shiite public. Even the Sadrists’ elite armed unit, the Promised Day Brigade, has not been free of internal disciplinary problems. The Promised Day Brigade was formed in the wake of the dissolution of the Mahdi Army. It has been overall much less plagued by internal disciplinary problems than the highly troubled Mahdi Army was. Yet on December 20th 2010 al-Sadr threatened to expel some members of the Promised Day Brigade who staged a military parade marking the Shiite holy month of Ashura against his orders. At the end of 2010 al-Sadr announced his assent to the re-uniting of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s State of Law-Coalition and the National Alliance, of which the Sadrists were part, to form the 2010 electoral bloc known as the National Coalition. The formation of the National Coalition allowed al-Maliki to head the gov- ernment. In reaction a faction of the Promised Day Brigade released a statement saying that they would abandon Muqtada al-Sadr if he insisted on joining the “traitor, and US, Iranian agent” al-Maliki. The Sadrists have spent the last two years expanding their humanitarian and political activities, shoring up internal loyalties and their grassroots support. Al-Sadr knows he must walk a fine line to maintain his ‘resistance’ image without harming those political gains. Nevertheless, the decision not to unfreeze the large and organizationally challenged Mahdi Army does not necessarily imply a softening of the Sadrist position in support of armed ‘resistance’. To the contrary, the armed ‘resistance’ activities of the Sadrists’ elite Promised Day Brigade are increasing, and increasingly publicized, with al-Sadr’s blessing. Moreover, even divided by questions of ultimate organizational authority, all of the Mahdi Army splinter groups still individually bite hard when it comes to fighting the Americans.

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