The Institutional Impact of Chinese Development Cooperation

“It takes two to tango” - The institutional impact of Chinese development cooperation

A field study of China-Sudan Cooperation

Henrik Nordström

Level: Bachelor Credits: 15 ECTS

Thesis Defence: June 2020 Supervisor: Hans Blomkvist

Department Of Government Bachelor’s Thesis in Political Science

ABSTRACT

China’s development model is gaining traction across the developing world, particularly in Africa. As China’s role grows larger in importance for the future development of the African continent, it becomes of significance to examine what this role actually entails. This study explored areas where Chinese development cooperation could have an institutional impact. It did so by conducting elite interviews in one of the countries with most extensive Chinese cooperation in Africa – Sudan. The study found the most prevalent area for institutional impact to be corruption. The case of Sudan showed how China potentially could have introduced a whole new practice of corruption in the Sudanese repertoire. That said, while institutional theory shows it could be possible, the evidence is unreliable. The results does however emphasis the importance for policy-makers, especially in institutional reform, to pay attention to whether China is actively cooperating with the nation of interest, as it possibly could mean a more challenging institutional environment. The future development of the African continent are in many ways uncertain, but it is safe to say China will play their part. Academia could, and should, continue to assist in shedding light on their practices and the significance they could hold.

Keywords: China, Development, Cooperation, Sudan, Corruption, Institution

Words: 13 807

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to thank the people and organisations whose assistance was helpful in the completion of this bachelor thesis. Firstly, I would like to acknowledge Värmlands Nation at Uppsala University who offered me a generous scholarship. Without their financing, this thesis would not have been possible. I would like to thank my supervisor, Hans Blomkvist, who guided me along the winding road of research and provided valuable guidance. I would like to acknowledge Filip Hellberg, National Programme Officer at the Swedish Embassy, who went out of his way in aiding my field study and also offered me to stay with him during my time in Khartoum. I wish to express my sincere appreciation for Dr. Osman Salah Eldien Ismail who went out of his way in guiding and encouraging me at every step of the process. I would also like to thank University of Khartoum and especially Prof. Abdelhameed Elias who offered to supervise me during my time in Khartoum.

CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 Introduction 1 1.2 Research question and ambition 2 1.3 Delimitations 2

2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 3 2.1 Development and institutions 4 2.2 Defining institutions 4 2.2.1 Institutional change 6 2.2.2 Institutional relations 7 2.3 Institutional impact from development cooperation 9 2.4 China in Africa 10 2.5 China’s impact in development cooperation 12 2.6 Contribution 14

3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD 15 3.1 Research Design 15 3.2 Selection of case 16 3.3 Method for collection of material 17 3.4 Constructing the Interview Guide 18 3.5 Selection of Sources 20 3.6 Triangulation 21

4 CASE STUDY – SUDAN 22 4.1 Brief political history of Sudan 22 4.2 China in Sudan 22

5 RESULTS 24

6 ANALYSIS 30

7 CONCLUSION 32

8 REFERENCES 33 8.1 Literature 33 8.2 Electronic Resources 37 8.3 Datasets 39 8.4 Dictionaries 40

9 APPENDIX 1 41

10 APPENDIX 2 42

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AERC African Economic Research Consortium AIIB Asian Infrastructure Bank BRICs Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa CNPC Chinese National Petroleum Company CSR Corporate Social Responsibility CPC China Communist Party DAC OECD’s Development Assistance Committee FDI Foreign Direct Investment FFC Forces of Freedom and Change FOCAC Forum on China-Africa Cooperation GNI Gross National Income IMF International Monetary Fund NCP National Congress Party NIE New Institutional Economics NORAD Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation ODA Official Development Assistance OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OOF Other Official Flows PLA China’s People’s Liberation Army PRC People’s Republic of China SAF Sudan Armed Forces SOE State-owned Enterprise UN United nations UNCTAD - United Nations Conference on Trade and Development US United States

1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 Introduction Today, capitalism dominates the world. Across the planet, countries organize economic production in the same ways with few minor exceptions. Throughout history, this system has existed in parallel with others. If it so was challenged by foraging in the Roman empire or sharing the world stage with Russian communism. Today, capitalism sits alone at the throne, but instead of governing a unified empire, it is splitting into two. In parallel to the liberal meritocratic variant that dominates Western nations, a state-led political version is gaining ground, and it is led by China. Similarly, two different views, or strategies, have emerged in development cooperation. The Washington Consensus which was first introduced in 1989 and led by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and The United States (US) Department of the Treasury. This package of economic and policy recommendations to developing nations embraces the free market while emphasizing a minimal involvement from the state. Diminishing confidence in this strategy, as a consequence of currency crises, stagnations and the collapse of nation’s economic systems, has opened up for new players in development on the world stage. The Beijing Consensus championed by China is gaining traction across the developing world with China's success story at its centre. Recognizing the need for a flexible, unique approach tailored to nations’ needs in front of a “one size fits all” solution, it serves as an alternative model for development in the Third World (Turin, 2010). As China increases its presence in development, it also becomes of increasing importance to look at the actual consequences of development cooperation under the Beijing Consensus. Chinese development projects are largely catered towards energy and infrastructure as Beijing aims to connect African markets with the Chinese economy and enhance its access to natural resources. These massive projects pose all sorts of challenges for African nations as state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and Chinese firms are far behind the international standard for Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), encompassing everything from corruption to environmental violations. There has also been a growing concern over the appeal of the Beijing Consensus and its possible promotion of authoritarian norms. Many of the resource-abundant African countries suffer from serious political problems such as corruption, authoritarianism and weak rule of law (Sun, 2014). The countries that China

prioritises in development cooperation are not only rich in oil and raw materials, but also countries which OECD members typically avoid (Van, 2009). Resource-rich African countries which are both isolated from the western world and suffer from serious political problems might not only be more open for cooperation with less traditional donors, but also inhibit a more fragile context that is more vulnerable to impact. As China’s role grows larger in importance for the future development of the African continent, it becomes of significance to examine what this role actually entails. Actors in development today, are well aware of the importance of taking context into consideration in development interventions, which both outcome and impact depends on. However, context does not only affect the effect of development intervention, the context is also affected by the intervention itself. It is worth underscoring that if cooperation under the Beijing consensus have the effects some writers suggest, it could worsen the conditions for reforms under the Washington Consensus as well as the context which they seek to improve. Although scholars have catered attention towards China's impact in Africa, no studies of knowledge at the time of this thesis have used an institutional approach in understanding how they impact the continent.

1.2 Research question and ambition This study aims to examine if Chinese cooperation can have an institutional impact. It does not aim to prove, or give concrete evidence, for institutional impact, but rather to explore which areas that potentially could be vulnerable for institutional impact. More specifically, it will look at Chinese cooperation in Sudan and the possible institutional impact that stems from China’s characteristics as a state in development cooperation.

Are there any areas of development cooperation in Sudan where China could have had an institutional impact?

1.3 Delimitations This thesis has several delimitations. Firstly, it is restricted to one case of Chinese development cooperation – Sudan. Secondly, it is restricted in time in the sense that the study only examines Chinese cooperation in Sudan under the former regime of al-Bashir. This is

mainly because Chinese cooperation was taken to a strategic level under his regime in the late 1990s while declining sharply after the secession of South-Sudan in 2011 and even further after the transitional government under Prime minister Abdalla Hamdok was put in place in 2019. The study is also delimited in the sense that it aims to discover areas where China could have had an institutional impact during this time period. The emphasis is on exploration and it does not aim to make any definite claims regarding the explanation of the potential phenomenon of interest. Finally, it is delimited in the sense that only aims to illustrate areas of potential impact. Impact is defined as “a powerful effect that something, especially something new, has on a situation or person” in the Cambridge Dictionary (2020), while effect is defined as “the result of a particular influence”. Impact can therefore be seen as an effect to a certain, more intensive, degree. This study does not aim to discover areas where China simply could have had any effect, in fact, this would barely warrant a study at all. The aim is rather to illustrate areas where China could affect institutions in such a significant way it becomes of importance to examine the effect.

2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE

REVIEW

This chapter illustrates the research problem and its importance as well as the relevant literature. The discussion takes off in the century old debate of which factors that can explain development, highlighting the importance of institutions. How to define institutions, how they change and how they relate to each other are then discussed in their respective sub-chapter. This discussion defines the central concept of this study, institution. Short summary of the discourse on Institutional impact from development cooperation is then provided. This is followed by a discussion on why the case of China is particularly interesting by emphasising China’s increasingly extensive development cooperation in Africa and two characteristics which distinguishes China from other external actors in Africa. This is followed by the study’s possible contributions.

2.1 Development and institutions Why are some countries poor and others rich? The question for why some nations achieve wealth while others fail to do so have puzzled economists for centuries. Economics has come a long way since Adam Smith (1776) asked the same question in The Wealth of Nations. That said, 244 years later, the gap between richer and poorer countries have grown even larger. In an attempt to better answer this question, economists have turned towards the importance of institutions. The belief that institutions play a significant role in the market economy, in contrast to the neoclassical emphasis on supply and demand, was introduced as early as 1919 by Walton Hamilton (Hodgson, 2000). This economic perspective is still prevalent today in the form of New institutional economics (NIE) which, while still being based on neoclassical economics, greatly considers the institutional environment the relevant actors are in. To put it simply, NIE believes institutions matter for economic development. Much of how institutions are defined today in NIE comes from Douglass C. North who claimed “the primary source of economic growth is the institutional structure of a political economy (...) Third world countries are (therefore) poor because of the institutional constraints” (1990, 110). Evidence from early research demonstrated that institutions not only matter in theory, but also in practice. Studies applying the perspective of NIE found wide evidence for institutions as an important predictor of growth (Hall et. al, 1999 & Acemoglu et. al, 2001). A widely cited study by Rodrik et. al (2002) estimated the contributions geography, trade and institutions had on income levels across the world and found once institutions are controlled for, both the level of trade and geography are nearly insignificant. In 2000, Tsetsekos et. al (2000) reviewed the current studies which found correlations between institutions and development. Across studies, positive correlation was found in regards to civil liberties, political rights and democracy, property rights and enforcement, institutions for cooperation such as clubs and associations and a negative correlation was found with political instability such as riots, coups and civil wars. In conclusion, it is safe to say there is a general consensus around the critical importance of institutions in development today (Eysinga, 2014).

2.2 Defining institutions Institutions matter, but how should we define them? North (1991) sees institutions as structures which constrains and enables political, economic and social interaction. He

proposes a division between formal and informal institutions. Institutions can constrain interaction through formal rules such as constitutions, laws and rights and informally through customs, traditions, taboos and codes of conduct. Formal institutions are not only discussed more often, but when they are, their relation with informal institutions are often neglected and marginalized. Indeed, much of the current literature simply assumes actors’ incentives and expectations are shaped exclusively by the formal rules (Marosevic & Jurkovic 2013 & Helmke et. al, 2004). This narrow focus becomes problematic as it risks missing much of what drives behaviour, and also, why formal rules exist in the first place. North made sure to emphasize early on that informal institutions played a much more important role in enforcing behaviour than formal ones (North, 2003). Institutions matter, but they also matter to different extents. This is because institutions are viewed as endogenous. In other words, their form and function depend on the conditions they emerge from and endure under (Przeworski, 2004). If institutions are to be viewed as endogenous, a view this study aligns itself with, it is important to carefully consider the nature of informal institutions. Not just because they are harder to define, but also because all institutions that emerge will do so from the existing institutional framework, consisting of both informal and formal institutions. It does therefore make sense to put in an effort in understanding how informal institutions can be defined, emerge, endure, and change. Informal institutions differ in how they are subscribed to. Formal institutions are explicitly subscribed to by people in different ways, from the laws that people choose to live under to regulations imposed by generally accepted organizations. On the other hand, Informal ones are not written down and subscribed to implicitly. The definition provided by North does however pose a pitfall by definition. If informal institutions are structures which people do not explicitly subscribe to, where does behaviour start to become so structural it can be defined as an institution in the first place? As to not reduce informal institutions to a residual category, Helmke et. al (2004) suggests the following additions to the definition. Formal institutional weakness is not the same as the presence of an informal institutions and informal institutions also are not behavioural irregularities, nor is it informal organizations. Lastly, culture in its broader sense is separated as it is defined as shared values while informal institutions are defined as shared expectations. As informal and formal institutions are subscribed to differently, they will also be enforced differently. Enforcement is important as it defines the stakes in deviating from

institutions themselves. On an individual level in an institutional context, there will be winners, those who benefit from present institutions, and losers, those who do not. Losers can be seen as an institutional threat since they have the incentives to try to change it to their advantage. Enforcement in this sense can therefore be seen as the checks which balances institutions in order to maintain them. As informal rules are not explicitly written down, they are not enforced through central state authorities (e.g. a judiciary or police) as formal institutions are. Pejovich (1999) suggests informal rules instead are enforced through means of sanctions by local entities such as exclusion from the community, ostracism by friends and neighbours, or a loss of reputation. Certain communities are known for even more severe punishment which are enforced by tribal chiefs or religious leaders. (Ibid)

Table 1. Definition of institutions. Based on the discussion. Definition Categories Subscribed Enforced Established

Structures Formal Explicitly, By state Consciously through which institutions written authorities decision making, restricted to constrains and down a specific time and space enables behaviour

Informal Implicitly, By local Unconsciously through institutions not written entities imitation, oral traditions and down teaching, gradual over time and space

2.2.1 Institutional change Consequently, the division between informal and formal also means a difference in how they emerge and change. Formal institutions are consciously established, so they are created at a specific time and also restricted to a specific space such as an organization or country. The emergence and change of formal institutions do therefore depend on decision makers and their decisions. North (1991) suggests the change and emergence of informal institutions occur as a process of cross-generational culture over time. Informal institutions are therefore relatively uncontrollable and resilient to change as they develop in a natural process. Williamson (2000) illustrates this when categorising institutions based on their embeddedness in society. Informal institutions are embedded the deepest in society, and will therefore

inhibit the most resilience towards change, leading to a very gradual development. Viewing the change in informal institutions in this sense, it would be impossible for China to pose an impact on informal institutions as their development cooperation with Africa is such a new phenomenon. That said, as institutions are endogenous, they could also emerge as people react to formal institutions. The informal institutional change North and Williamson suggests can therefore be contrasted to a much quicker process. Helmke et. al (2004, 732) suggests the speed of this type of informal institutional change is dependent on to which extent formal institutional change alters the costs and benefits of adhering to particular informal rules. Such formal institutional change can therefore be an important catalyst for informal institutional change. This could occur from changes in the actual formal institutional design, but also a change in their effectiveness. A third source of change is also identified, which Helmke et. al (Ibid) identifies as an update of beliefs/mechanisms for coordination based on a type of “tipping model”. If a sufficiently large enough number of actors become convinced that a new and better alternative exist and there exists a mechanism that can realise these expectations, a shift from one set of norms to another can occur rapidly.

Table 2. Sources and mechanisms of institutional change. Based on Helmke et. al’s (2004, 733) table of sources of informal institutional change

Source of change Mechanism of change Speed

Formal institutional change Change in design of formal institutions Rapid Formal institutional change Change in effectiveness of formal institution Rapid Update in available Tipping Rapid alternatives and mechanism for realization

Evolution of culture Change in societal values Slow

2.2.2 Institutional relations Helmke et. al (2004, 728-729) suggest four different outcomes in informal institutional change which stems from institutional interaction between informal and formal levels demonstrated in table 3. This categorization builds on the more narrow definition of informal institutions presented earlier. The first dimension is the degree to which formal and informal

institutional outcomes converge. If informal rules produce a substantially different outcome than formal rules, they will diverge. If the outcomes are similar, they will converge. The second dimension is the degree of effectiveness of the relevant formal institutions. Effectiveness is defined according to the probability of enforcement. Effective formal institutions will therefore actually constrain, or enable behaviour when actors believe there is a high probability of sanctions from state authorities.

Table 3. Outcomes of informal institutional change. Helmke et. al’s (2004, 728) table of typology for informal institutions

Outcomes Effective formal Ineffective formal institutions institutions

Convergent Complementary Substitutive

Divergent Accommodating Competing

Similarly, if actors believe the probability of enforcement is low, formal rules and procedures will be ineffective. These two dimensions produce the fourfold typology shown in Table 3. Complementary informal institutions will fill in gaps in the formal institutions, therefore enabling goals within the institutional framework. This could for example be to enhance efficiency (Ibid, 728). Accommodating informal institutions are institutions which are not directly violating the current formal institutions but which in different ways alter their substantive effects. These are not enhancing formal institutions efficiency as they are not complimenting them, but rather enhancing the stability as demands for changing the formal institutions are dampened (Ibid, 729). Substitutive informal institutions are employed by actors who seek different outcomes that are compatible with existing, ineffective, formal institutions. Substitutive informal institutions do therefore achieve what existing formal institutions were designed for, but failed to achieve (Ibid, 729). Competing informal institutions appear when formal institutions are not enforced, which enables actors to engage in contradicting behaviour. These rules structure incentives in such a way that they are incompatible with current formal institutions. Such are often found in post-colonial contexts where formal institutions were imposed on indigenous rules and authoritarian structures. Familiar examples of these are clientelism, patrimonialism, clan politics and corruption

(Ibid, 729). This in turn could explain why institutional reform historically has been so unsuccessful when the institution concerned emerged from another institutional framework system than the one where it is supposed to be implemented. Matt Andrews (2013, 13-16) emphasised the informal context when explaining why institutional reform show such a high failure rate (40-70%) in development cooperation. Reforms are only adapted as signals which can be seen and evaluated - formal institutions - but ignores the unseen norms and cultural mechanisms that form the foundations for the rule of the game - informal institutions. For successful implementation of formal institutions, reforms must therefore be harmonised with the underpinnings the informal institutions provide for the current formal institutional context. This study will therefore cater particular attention towards informal institutions of competing character because of its relevance for today's decision- and policy-makers.

2.3 Institutional impact from development cooperation Previous research on institutional impact are divided into intended impact and unintended impact. Research on both intended and unintended impact is commonly found among scholars that examines institutional reform such as Andrew Matts (2013), using a more qualitative approach. Unintended impact is also examined through some purely qualitative studies but several scholars in the field of development economics are also putting effort into this area, often looking at the impact from aid. Most notably, an academic-policy crossover conference on unintended effects of international cooperation took place in 2017. Jointly organized by Netherlands Ministry Of Foreign Affairs and the Radboud University for the 2017 OECD DAC network of development evaluation meeting (Koch et al, 2017). This conference recognized that Western donors are severely lacking in terms of considering unintended effects of their development cooperation. USAID evaluations only paid attention to unintended effects in 15% of the projects. Similarly, every third of NORAD’s evaluations did not mention unintended effects at all (Ibid). The conference led to several interesting working papers such as Marc Dierikx (2017) who illustrates, in a qualitative study, how local culture led to a particular outcome in a Dutch Fishery project in Lake Victoria. Another working paper from Djikstra (2018) examined aggregated unintended effects on governance from the lens of development economics and found that while negative effects often are exaggerated, donors intentions mattered greatly in determining the effect.

2.4 China in Africa Africa has seen a significantly increased presence from China since the dawn of the new century. China says that all of China's foreign policy can be derived from the five principles of peaceful coexistence; mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence (Bijian, 2014). China is also characterized by their flexible, “learn as you go”, approach to development cooperation which reflects their own experience in reforming the country through: Crossing the River by Feeling the Stones. This metaphor was used by former General Secretary of the CPC, Deng Xiaoping, when describing China’s approach towards reform and opening in the 1970s. Along one side of the river was China’s Marxist, closed, centrally-planned economy. Along the other side was an liberalized, open, market-driven one. China was going to cross this river for the first time, and would therefore need to do it gradually, attentively and carefully, by feeling the stones (Hong, 2012). This approach lies at the very heart of the Beijing Consensus and and is one of the reasons China is gaining so much traction across Africa. (Turin 2010) What once was purely political cooperation with Africa, is today development cooperation with economic expansion as the driving force (Mhandra et. al, 2013). China – Africa trade has been increasing steadily, from barely US$10 billion in 2000 to almost US$100 billion in 2009, simultaneously bypassing the US as Africa largest trading partner. Latest numbers from 2018 shows close to a double in trade since then, amassing to US$185 billion, more than three times the value of the US – Africa trade the same year (John Hopkins 2018). China is also becoming an increasingly more important player in providing the continent with Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) where the annual flows have increased from US$75 million in 2003 to US$5.4 billion in 2018, bypassing the US in 2013 (Ibid). According to the UNCTAD 2018 world investment report, China kept the fourth largest FDI stock in Africa at US$40 billion, a significant increase from US$16 billion in 2011 (UNCTAD 2018). In the context of international development, developing states, also known as the global south, engaging in development activities between each other is known as South-South cooperation (UN 2019). That said, what originally was reduced to technical cooperation and

exchange of resources is today also largely characterized by development finance. China has grown to be one of the world’s largest providers through China Development Bank, The New Development Bank (created by the BRICs countries) and the Asian Infrastructure Bank (AIIB) in Beijing (Müller et. al, 2019). China's development finance does however differ from other western actors in the sense that the majority of the allocated funds do not meet the strict international definition of Official Development Assistance (ODA). This depends on the purpose not being the promotion of development in the recipient country and/or that the loan is not concessional (the grant element of the loans is under 25%). China’s development finance is instead referred to as Other Official Flows (OOF) by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and constitutes approximately 80% of China's total development finance (Dreher, 2017). In terms of sectors for these projects, almost 50 percent of Chinese loans financed projects in the sectors of transportation (US$24.2 billion) where roads and railways made up 80% of the loans, and energy (US$17.6 billion) where hydropower, power lines and gas pipes made up slightly more than 80% of total loans (Eom, 2016). Loans concentrated to infrastructure and energy is no coincidence as this ties into Beijing's two goals of connecting African markets with the Chinese economy and enhancing its access to natural resources. These goals originate in a clear demand for energy from China, the world’s largest consumer of energy. The continuing growth of the Chinese middle class and the fact that China’s energy per capita still is catching up indicates demand for energy in China also will grow massively. Goldman Sachs predicts the country will account for 25 percent of the global energy consumption by 2035 (Cohen & Siu 2012). 40.3 percent of the total 83.01 billion China invested in Africa between 2005 and 2017 was invested in metals and 33.4 into energy. The Democratic Republic of Congo, South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt and Niger alone accounted for 49.1 percent of China’s total regional FDI (Johns Hopkins 2018). Natural resource contracts made up four out of the five largest investment deals, US$4.9 and US$4.21 billion deals in Niger and Mozambique in 2008 and 2013 by Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC). Respectively, a US$3.1billion deal in Egypt in 2013, signed by China Petroleum Corporation – Sinopec, and a US$2.7 billion deal in Tanzania signed by Sichuan Hanlong, in 2015 (AEI, 2019). The project in Tanzania, touted as the largest industrial investment in Tanzania since independence, was for resource-extraction in the Mchuchuma coal and Liganga iron-ore mine. (Mirondo, 2020)

Furthermore, the increased engagement has been followed by the official forum of China-Africa cooperation (FOCAC) which have gathered every third year since 2000. The latest summit in 2018 had more than twice as many African presidents present than the 73rd UN General Assembly meeting the same year (Dahir, 2018). As China has gained an increasingly significant role in the development of the African continent, a corresponding heated debate in academia and media is apparent across the globe (Mhandra et. al, 2013). How will China impact the development of the African continent?

2.5 China’s impact in development cooperation China has two characteristics which differentiates it from traditional Western donors, and thus, the other largest investors in the African continent. In the economic dimension, state-led capitalism and in the political dimension, authoritarianism. Much of the current literature on the impact of China in Africa is invested in how this relatively new aspect of south-south cooperation, development financing, is impacting the continent. More specifically, the impact of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOE). Most of the development finance from China that goes to projects also contracts SOEs to realise them. This mainly concerns labour conditions and practices among the Chinese SOE:s which conduct the infrastructural projects. These have been increasingly blamed for violating labour conditions and practices as well as not employing local workforce, instead importing Chinese workers. Highlighted violations in the literature are for example that the local workforce, that actually are employed for projects, work without contracts and with lower wages in comparison to the Chinese. The debate has so far been catered towards if these claims hold any truth and whether the situation is improving. Some of the latest findings show current critique does hold some truth but there is also an ongoing positive improvement among firms (Wegenast et. al, 2019 & Tang, 2016). That said, large variation also exist across firms, sectors and countries in Africa (Veunyeh, 2018). These studies can be placed in the larger discourse on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and the fact that China quite recently started to acknowledge the importance of CSR in SOEs. Although it today is acknowledged as a problem by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), SOEs are still far beyond the international standard (Hinz 2009). The impact these practices could have should not be underestimated, not least because it concerns both economic, social and environmental aspects of society. For instance, one quite recent paper

showed African countries which merely increased their export to China also were affected by a deterioration in labour standards (Adolph et. al, 2017). Consequently, as China is an authoritarian state, many scholars and journalists have pondered over what significance it could hold in the light of development cooperation. Some scholars have for example stated China has a tendency to not only reinforce heavily resource-dependent economies, but also concentrating wealth to African elites (Beeson et al, 2011 & Jiang, 2009). Some scholars point towards institutions determining to which extent elites can expropriate an economy's resources to their private advantage (Bates, 2001). If China concentrates wealth to African elites through the institutional arrangements that enables expropriation, it also becomes of increasing interest to see whether these institutional arrangements are formed by Chinese actors interacting through them. This becomes of increasing significance if one takes into consideration that development cooperation for China in Africa tends to be with authoritarian countries. Sun (2014) suggested China could reinforce authoritarian norms. If China uses the same institutional arrangements which enables expropriation in cooperation with African elites, it could also reinforce those very arrangements that accumulate and uphold power. This could apply to formal institutions of repression and manipulation such as military juntas, secret police, propaganda machines, as well as institutions associated with liberal-democratic regimes such as legislatures, elections, media, and political parties, which can be found in different arrangements across hybrid and pseudo-democratic regimes (Schedler, 2009). One recent study by Isaksson & Kotsadam (2018) revealed that more widespread local corruption was consistently found around active Chinese project sites. The effect lingered after the project implementation period, and was present even when projects had no impact on local economic activity. This indicates that the increase in local corruption is not driven by an increase in economic activity. Rather, it is driven by China merely being present. Institutions of informal character such as clientelism and corruption could therefore, arguably, be reinforced as Chinese actors navigates the institutional landscape in African countries.

As demonstrated, institutions can be divided into formal and informal. Informal institutions are slow and inhibits resilience towards change. Furthermore, because institutions are endogenous, formal and informal institutions have a close, interconnected relationship which leads to a mutual impact between them as they change and respond to institutional changes

among themselves. As mentioned earlier, China has a tendency to cater their development cooperation to resource-abundant, authoritarian ,states, which in turn are, or can be, subject for institutional reforms under the Washington Consensus. These reforms are, just as the formal institutions imposed under colonial times, often imposed on authoritarian structures. But as Andrews (2013) emphasised, current institutional reforms do not consider the informal institutional context which underpins the formal institutional context they aim to reform, leading to the informal institutions competing with the formal. As future institutional reforms take more and more of the informal institutional context in consideration, it also becomes of increasing interest as to how other external actors impact this very context. Furthermore, some scholars have argued that the long debated correlation between resource abundance and worse developmental outcomes, known as the Resource Curse (Venables, 2016), could depend on institutions and their quality (Mehlum et. al, 2006). As theses countries continue to struggle, it becomes of increasing importance to see how external actors aid, or hinder, future development for these resource abundant countries. If Chinese actors adheres to these informal competing institutions in development interventions, it could have a reinforcing effect and possibly, prolong this curse. It is therefore of significant importance to examine the institutional impact from external actors in development cooperation, so we can increase our understanding of what increased development cooperation can mean for future institutional reforms and the possible future development of the African continent.

2.6 Contribution There are several possible areas of contribution for this study, and the aim is to contribute as much as possible within the means of a bachelor thesis. Although scholars have catered attention towards China's impact in Africa, no studies of knowledge at the time of this thesis have used an institutional approach in understanding how they impact the continent. The most significant possible contribution is therefore identified as shedding light on possible areas where China could have impacted institutions. Highlighting the advantages of a systematic, qualitative, institutional approach in understanding the impact from development cooperation as well as inspiring further efforts towards understanding China’s role in Africa's development. This contribution could also help guide policy makers and evaluators in designing institutional reform which takes into consideration how China affects the

environment which they seek to improve, leading to more successful reforms in the future. Furthermore, the studies that systematically examines China’s impact tend to be quite narrow in the areas of interest. This is partly because of preference among researchers but also because of the lack of transparency from China. Another contribution is therefore highlighting possible areas of impact which previously have been largely ignored, or unknown, in the discourse. This applies to the discourse on China's impact in Africa but also the larger debate on institutional impact in development cooperation, as it currently only examines western actors. The relationship between institutional change and development cooperation is on the forefront of evaluators minds, but this is mostly the intended effects. In using the wide, institutional, approach towards impact, this thesis can also contribute towards a more extensive evaluatory approach of development projects which not only considers intended effects, but also the unintended.

3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD

This chapter illustrates the research design which is of deductive-inductive character because of the nature of collecting data in the field. Thereafter, the selection of Sudan as the case of interest is motivated. The method of choice, Semi-structured Interviews, is then provided as well as the thought-process behind the construction of the interview guide, which can be found in Appendix 2. The actual selection of sources is then presented as well as how triangulation was used on the results.

3.1 Research Design Although our world is evermore connected and vast information is available at a moments notice, it still remains true that some data only can be obtained through engaging with people and institutions on the ground. The research design for this study largely stems from the work Doing Fieldwork in China (Heimer & Thøgersen, 2006) which provides a collection of knowledge and experiences on fieldwork methodology and findings. Sudan, like China, is still a relatively closed state and much of the established political science theory has been developed to study different sorts of cases. This has implications for the research design. Essiason et al. (2017, 262-63) notes that interviews is the most successful method for collecting material in cases where there is a gap of knowledge and an ambition to develop

new theories or concepts. But there is a clear challenge in adapting the flowing stories interviews evoke to the demands of theorizing. Because the strength of interviewing is the particular and the vivid. The question which needs to be answered is therefore, how can interviews in field research contribute to theory while also staying grounded in empirical data? This dilemma will be addressed by using a strategy proposed by Kevin J. O’Brien (2006) which he calls Research Re-design. Building on Glaser and Strauss (1967) grounded theory, this strategy defines research design as an ongoing process which underlines discovery rather than verification. A helpful analogy provided is fishing. As researchers, we go to a certain place where we are rather confident in finding some fish. This confidence is based on previous research and theories which in turn have given us some ideas of what kind of fish we will find. That said, we do not actually know which fish we will find, which will be the biggest and which one that will be the most tasty. This can only be figured out in the field. What was first deemed as a minor detail can later be proven to be the most significant aspect in the study, both empirically and theoretically. The key to not only developing data which is rich and persistent, but also contributory in a theoretical sense, is therefore flexibility. The risk is otherwise that we might not recognize a big fish when we catch one, while releasing it for a fish that turns out to be thin, ordinary and close to tasteless (O’Brien, 28-31). Thus, ensuring that the researcher stays open for other possible variables, preventing that the biggest catch swims by in front of our nose. Evidently, this has repercussions for this study. The topic, and the theories and concepts applied to understand it, may evolve as the research is conducted. Theory and evidence become closely intertwined during the process but align first at the end of the research. In that sense, the analysis is both inductive and deductive in reasoning. Working from the bottom up as observations is collected in the field, but also from the top down, as different theories and concepts are utilised, compared and discarded.

3.2 Selection of case In reflecting on the different African nations and which would be well suited for this type of single-case study, three different criteria were used. The leading principle in the selection were based on the fact that applying an institutional approach to examine impact from

development cooperation is a new method, or in best case, heavily underutilised. Consequently, the selection would be based on a most-likely case which pose favourable conditions for the research problem. External Validity, in the sense that the selected case is a representative case for Chinese cooperation in Africa, was therefore not taken into any substantial consideration. On the other hand, Internal Validity was highly prioritized. That is to say, the degree of Chinese cooperation in African countries. This was measured in terms of the amount of Chinese development projects as well as the amount of Chinese investment between 2000 and 2014, based on Aiddata’s (Dreher et. al, 2017) Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset. This left the study with five countries which had both a large amount of Chinese development projects as well as a relatively high amount of Chinese investment; Angola (110, US$16 Billion), Ethiopia (88, US$14 Billion), Sudan (108, US$10 Billion), Nigeria (49, US$7 Billion) and Zimbabwe (120, US$6 Billion). After this selection, the practicality in conducting the study in these different countries was considered. To illustrate, some significant factors that were up for discussion were language barriers, the accessibility to elites, how sensitive the subject could be in interviews and to which degree it was possible to be assisted from the Swedish embassies in regards to the research. As this study is on a bachelor level, practicality was prioritized highly. In the end, Sudan was decided on as the most suitable case. This was primarily because of the fact that the embassy showed great interest in the subject and was able to aid me in establishing contact with researchers at Khartoum University. Dr Abdelhameed, who generously offered to supervise me, described a radically changed environment since the regime change in 2019 where many previously forbidden topics now could be more freely discussed, including Chinese cooperation. Furthermore, the official working language of the government is English which would eliminate the need for a translator. In regards to internal validity, Sudan had both the third largest amount of investment as well as third largest number of projects in Africa. It was also clear from professors at University of Khartoum that China had closely cooperated with the previous regime. Therefore, internal validity seemed to be up to a satisfactory level as well.

3.3 Method for collection of material As mentioned under research design, this study is mainly concerned with giving an empirical account of the impact from Chinese cooperation. This will be done through semi-structured

interviews, which is deemed to be the best method when there is a gap of knowledge and an ambition to develop new theories or concepts (Essiasson, 2017, 261-262) Chinese cooperation in Sudan was mainly between political elites, which in turn leaves the study to what is known in political research as Elite Interviewing. By elites this paper means a group of individuals who hold, or have held, a privileged position in society, and as far as political scientists are concerned, are more likely to have had more influence and insight in political outcomes than the general public (Richards, 1996, 199-200). One of the fundamental questions a researcher have to ask then is if conducting a series of elite interviews will benefit their research. The most significant advantage is the fact that they can provide information not recorded elsewhere or which is yet available (if ever) for public eyes. In other words, the Sudanese elites who have had key-roles in Chinese cooperation can probably also provide the most information. Even if not, elites also have the benefit of access to networks which in turn can provide access to other elites who are more central in regards to the cooperation. (Ibid, 200) This way of selecting interview subjects, which most commonly is known as Snowball Selection, will be utilised in the field. (Essiasson, 2017, 267). Elite interviews in Sudan are therefore most probable, in one way or another, to benefit this study the most. That said, these will also be complemented with non-elite interviews to provide other perspectives. Roger Pierce (2008, 127-128) Semi-structured interviews is the most common structure for elite interviewing as it gives the researcher the flexibility to constrict the interview to certain topic-related questions while also leaving room for follow-up questions. Roger Pierce (2008, 118) highlights how this enables interviews to not only be one of question, but also of discussion. This in turn interweaves with the deductive-inductive research design.

3.4 Constructing the Interview Guide One key to writing a good research guide is achieving a satisfactory understanding of the subject beforehand. This assists in constructing an interview guide which directly concerns the unexplored areas of interest as well as evaluating the value of an actual interview in the sense of what it is contributing to the existing literature (Essiasson, 2017, 266). Satisfactory understanding of the subject is also important to be able to show a mastery of the subject as to be perceived as a credible interviewer by the elite at hand, otherwise it might prove difficult to achieve any depth (Pierce, 2018, 127). This understanding was achieved through the

literature review as well as composing the background section. That said, effective Elite interviews goes beyond a well grounded understanding of the subject, it also requires preparation, planning and confidence (Ibid, 119). This was partly achieved through examination of the interview guide by my supervisor, Hans Blomkvist as well as Dr. Osman Ismail at University of Khartoum. Dr. Osman Ismail as well as my supervisor at University of Khartoum, Prof. Abdelhameed Elias, also helped me deepen my knowledge in the field and China-Sudan relations from the Sudanese perspective and adapt the interview guide to Sudanese norms and customs. In constructing the interview guide, two dimensions were taken into consideration; the thematic and dynamic. These are provided by Kvale, S and Brinkmann, S (2016, 172-175) as guidelines for construction of the interview manuscript. The thematic dimension consists of how the questions relate to the purpose of the interview and the study's theoretical conceptions. The dynamic dimension consists of how the questions affect the interview itself - how is the information of interest best acquired and how can questions be constructed to aid that purpose? The challenge for constructing the guide was therefore in staying true to the subject at hand and at the same time constructing questions that worked with each other in a natural way, so to as closely as possible mimic a real conversation which naturally motivated the subject to share their experiences and knowledge. The interview guide was structured in a way that it would resemble a funnel, moving from broad and insensitive questions to what can be defined as the most sensitive and intrusive. This technique is commonly used in elite interviewing as it increases the chances of gaining the subjects trust and interest (Pierce, 2008, 125). Questions were constructed from three categories; opening questions, follow-up questions and direct questions, finally, silence was also used as a tool (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2016, 176-177). Silence has a tendency to make the subject reflect and associate in a way that often leads to them breaking silence with meaningful information (Ibid). Opening questions were constructed in a way as to really open up for vivid and spontaneous descriptions. Sometimes explicit questions were asked but most of the time a sympathetic head nod or a smile would lead to the descriptions venturing further. Most of the time, the subject got the opportunity to speak his/her mind until they went quiet. If nothing more came up, follow-up questions were utilised to dive into specifics. These could vary greatly depending on the situation but the most common are exemplified in the interview guide. Finally, after the overarching opening questions and corresponding

follow-up questions were asked, final questions where of a direct character. Direct questions were constructed so as to directly ask about the precise area of interest and was often constructed between interviews in the field. To illustrate, Prof. Informant (B1) (See Appendix 1) was very hesitant when discussing cons of cooperation but settled on that some of the Chinese businessmen were corrupt. This was later used as a direct question to explore this specific type of impact as DQ2 (Appendix 2) who asks about the Chinese impact specifically in regards to corruption. These were asked last because they otherwise would risk narrowing down the subject before the informants had the chance to decide for themselves what they see as most important (Ibid).

3.5 Selection of Sources Since elite interviewing was the method of choice, a strategic selection of research subjects was done. This selection was however, easier said than done. Unrepresentative sampling is not often an issue, but when it is, it is because of problems of access. (Richards, 1996) The Sudanese context provided such problems. First is the fact that many of the ministers who were the closest to Bashir, and therefore also had more influence and insight in political outcomes, are in prison. The possibility of interviewing these were close to none, although some efforts were made. Requests were also made to several ones who still are reputed to have close ties to al-Bashir's former party. Many of theses elites declined to be interviewed or simply did not reciprocate my attempts in reaching them. This left the selection to elites who in one way or another were affiliated with the opposition towards al-Bashir and a few previous members of the regime. Secondly, during the six weeks I was located in Khartoum, the 2020 epidemic of COVID-19 was spreading across the world and the city was in lockdown for a majority of my stay. This led to an abundance of inconveniences from trivial things such as travelling around the city or finding a place to conduct the interview, to many potential interview subjects declining to meet because of age and the apparent risk for transmission I would bring as a Westerner. Besides the hardship in accessing many of subjects, some of them were old. That was the case of Prof. Informant (B1), and Dr. Informant (B2), both being over their 80s. David Richards (1996) highlights the reliability can be questionable when subjects are older and thus also far from the events of interests, making the provided information less reliable.

Partly because of the stretch of time, but also the fact that it can be harder to differentiate between what they actually remember from an event, and what they later have read on the same subject. These interviews will therefore be more critically examined in regard to the information provided and thus, less emphasised in the analysis. But even when a Elite is closer to the time of events, subjectivity can still be a severe problem for the reliability. Evidence suggests the group which pose the biggest problem is ex-politicians. These have a tendency to face difficulties in distinguishing truth after too extensive exposure to partisan thought (Richards, 1996). The results presented should therefore be taken more as subjective views and suggestions of how the reality of Sudan-China cooperation could be rather than facts.

3.6 Triangulation The most important aspect in informant interviews is source criticism (Essiasson, 2017 267) In an attempt to differentiate what can be closer and further away from reality, triangulation was strived for in the selection of the informants. Triangulation involves seeking accounts from three or more perspectives to increase validation of any crucial accounts (Pierce, 2008 85-91). Political researchers face a special challenge as they often are concerned with two main parties whose perspectives are diametrically opposed to each other. To overcome this dilemma, one should seek as many independent sources as possible. This was sought for but was also significantly harder to achieve because of COVID-19 and the limitations in available informants. That said, the sample consists of three informants directly affiliated with al-Bashir’s regime, one informant directly affiliated with the opposition as well as two researchers and one engineer. This sample was able to give perspectives from both sides of the political spectrum and independent expertise from one professional worker as well as two researchers. Validity is still far from satisfactory, the accounts will therefore be supplemented with a report from Transparency International (Martini, 2012) as well as data from Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (2019), the World Bank’s Listing of Ineligible Firms and Individuals ((a), 2019) and the World Bank’s dataset for Worldwide Governance Indicators ((b), 2019).

4 CASE STUDY – SUDAN 4.1 Brief political history of Sudan Political stability in Sudan have been realised through economic strength. As the cotton-boom in the early 1950s diminished and the second Sudanese civil war was underway, the discovery of oil enabled Omar al-Bashir and the National Congress Party (NCP) to permanently sustain power for the first time since independence. The regime took power through a military coup which put an end to the newly established democratic system of the time and replaced it with the totalitarian regime present until 2019. The circumstances around the regime and al-Bashir - civil wars, political islam and the support for Saddam Hussein during the first Gulf war, led to a political backlash among the international community. Substantial decline in aid made the regime turn to Tehran which provided both debt cancellation and loans to finance substantial investment in Chinese weapons. This temporary trade and support from China was made into a permanent one as President Bashir visited Beijing in 1996, prompting the establishment of a strategic partnership as the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) entered Sudan (Large, 2011). This partnership could effectively realise the maintaining and expanding of the apparatus of state violence led by President Bashir. The access to wealth led to Khartoum’s concerns essentially shifting, from extensive Islamization to extraction of oil wealth. Other regions in the Sudan - east, west and south - was only significant as a potential source of oil. It is foremost this strategy of pragmatism and low aspirations that made the regime the longest lasting in the modern history of the modern Sudanese state (Ryle et al, 2011, 61-62).

4.2 China in Sudan The extractive nature of China's engagement in Sudan have, rather than altering it, conformed to the historical pattern of state behaviour and politics, with oil at the heart of the relationship. China-Sudan relations have been defined through shared experiences of resistance and adversity against British Imperialism, and across time, western influences. Most recently through Chinese economic engagement countering the influence of US sanctions against Sudan. The shared colonial experience, an internationally isolated Sudan and resource-seeking Chinese Oil Companies were all important factors that aligned after the

1989 Sudanese coup d'état (Large, 2011, 1-10). While relations with Iran and other Middle eastern states weakened over time, the NCP turned to China for it’s principle of non-interference in internal affairs, opposition to the political condemnation of the regime as well as an offer to construct an oil refinery. CNPC effectively replaced the American oil company Chevron which left Sudan in 1992 while also promising rapid completion of an 1600 kilometers long pipeline, giving China a central role in the sudanese sector. To put it into other words, China could here on its own strategic terms successfully exploit the opportunity created by Western policy on Sudan. Indeed, Large (2011, 14) notes Sudan was mostly open to Chinese oil business because it was legally closed to American. In the upcoming years, several projects was established in Sudan, making the state not only an outpost for demonstrating the accomplishments of Chinese Oil Companies, but also providing a successful case of Chinese directed investment and the Beijing Consensus (Large, 2011, 10-13). The economic relationship presented here does, however, have its political counterpart. Khartoum, and later the government of South Sudan, have both established close political relations with China. Large (2011, 24) underlines how China’s perceived principles of political equality, state sovereignty and non-interference led to a relation managed on a different basis compared to Sudan’s more established international partners. Political relations between Beijing and Khartoum have remained purely bilateral, extending to cooperative interaction in regional organisations such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, the China-Arab Cooperation Forum and international organisations such as the UN and G77. China have also engaged in two major peacekeeping operations, the UN mission in Sudan (UNMISS) and the African Union/UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). That said, China has still not been integrated in any other multilateral bodies and bilateralism still reigns in Beijing-Khartoum relations. Khartoum's relation with China under al-Bashir was structured into different channels with the Joint Sudanese-Chinese Ministerial Committee at the forefront. Key leaders for the NCP did also involve themselves in managing the relations, including al-Bashir himself. Similarly, China’s relations have been directed by senior leaders and key figures, such as former General Manager and Party Secretary Zhou Yongkang. The relation was not only confined to ministries among the two countries but also conducted on other levels, including state level. There was also a cooperation between the Communist Party of China (CPC) and

the NCP. Rhetoric solidarity from the CPC have been reciprocated by the NCP through support for the One China policy and occasional practical assistance in the energy sector. This type of relation shows the significance of non-formal relations and an interest in China’s political experience. Lastly, state-owned enterprises, notably the CNPC, had their own relations with the NCP and Sudan's central ministries in a form of state-corporation interaction which tied in with China’s energy diplomacy with Sudan. (Large, 2011, 25) Military relations are less documented but bears significance in the their relationship. China provided technical assistance to northern Sudan’s military-industrial complex in the 1990s through supervision of arms assembly processes and help with the construction of at least three weapons factories near Khartoum. There has also been a connection between the China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) with several known high-level meetings conducted between the PLA, SAF and China’s Central Military Delegation in 2002. Furthermore, China has not only indirectly funded Khartoum’s acquisition of weapons through increased oil sales and production, but also been a significant supplier of arms to northern Sudan, among others. (Large, 2011, 26) Finally, China’s aid programme constitutes the last piece of its political relations to Sudan. Actual Chinese aid have been limited in scope in the context of its economic relations, limiting itself to older, established, aid links as well as a newer humanitarian aid programme to Darfur. Additionally, more and more Chinese assistance have gone into actual projects such as water and road construction in the Darfur area, implemented by Chinese companies. These have notably contributed to efficiency in overcoming the conflict while acquiring a disproportionate amount of significance in China’s wider African and international diplomacy on Darfur.

5 RESULTS

Results are presented through a systematic examination of China’s institutional impact. First, potential formal institutional impact is considered. Then, informal institutional impact is considered. The informants are categorized depending on their categorisation (Appendix 2). They are categorised by if they were primarily affiliated with al-Bashir (B), the opposition (O), or if they were an Engineer (E).

The most evident way of having an institutional impact in Sudan would be from direct, domestic, interference by China in internal affairs, such as affecting a policy decision. This idea was brought up to all informants and discussed directly, but was often answered long before the question was brought up in the interviews. As demonstrated further on, in this sample, China largely conforms to the perception provided in the literature as an actor that respects their own principles, especially of non-interference Large (2011, 24). Ambassador. Informant (B3) thought the achievements from the China-Sudan cooperation primarily was because of China’s principle of non-interference and emphasised the fact that they never once interfered during the almost 70 year long relationship. Prof. Informant (B1) and Dr. Informant (B2) both aligned themselves with this and brought up China’s principle of non-interference as vital for the cooperation. Professor Informant (O2) emphasised that the conditions for any eventual interference was favourable for China in the sense that they were the only major player in Sudan under al-Bashir. He perceived that China definitely had an influence in Sudan and they could have interfered if they wanted, but that they clearly did not. He also emphasised the principle of non-interference and the fact that China is very dogmatic in development cooperation. He thought China's history of “miserable colonialism”, referencing the opium wars, made them genuine in their intentions and therefore they wielded their influence through cooperation instead of directly interfering in domestic politics:

“China is genuine about their own history and instead wield their power through cooperation. That said, I don’t think they would even try to change policy proposals. Even at their embassy, their biggest amount of staff is oriented towards trade. They could have done more, if this was of their interest. But in practice, they never gave any indication for this.” - Prof. Informant (O2)

Amb. Informant (B3) thought it would be a great mistake to approach China and Chinese Politics and issues without taking the Chinese context into consideration. He also thought China's history played an important role in why they faithfully followed the principle of non-intervention in their relation with Sudan. Potential institutional impact can rather be found by considering the relationship’s economic dimension as well as the conditions for development cooperation at the initiation of the relations. Amb. Informant (B3), emphasised that China opened up a path when all other relations was starting to deteriorate, especially

with the US. He saw CNPC, and the investments that came to Sudan through them, as vital in fulfilling the “Petroleum project” and sustaining the Sudanese economy. As Chevron had sold their concessions and no other country wanted to invest in Sudan, Sudan was open for Chinese oil business. This conforms with what Large (2011, 14) noted - Sudan was mostly open to China and CNPC since it was closed to the west through the sanctions. These circumstances did naturally create a sort of dependency on China, as no other country were genuinely interested in cooperating with Sudan. Prof. Informant (O1) stated that:

“When you negotiate with somebody who is locked in a room, you dictate the terms of whatever the agreement. We were really in a box as a country. We negotiated from a weak position.” - Prof. Informant (O1)

Whether one saw this seized opportunity by China as a blessing or a curse depended on if they were affiliated with al-Bashir or the opposition. Prof. Informant (O1) illustrated that while there were good aspects to the Sudan-China relationship for Sudan, such as slight improvement in infrastructure and increased confidence in the oil business, it also sustained al-Bashir's regime through securing support from China in the U.N Security Council. On the other hand, Amb. Informant (B1) additionally thought China did not provide strong enough support for Sudan in the Security Council. He also saw the principle of non-interference as something that can go both ways, as it can also lead to a lack in oversight of the projects and deals conducted in the cooperation, stating:

“The reason is that most of these governments and most of these governments officials are corrupt in the receiving country. Because of this corruption, the Chinese officials who are sent here to oversee these projects, also get involved corrupted. This happens because there is not enough governance, oversight, from the Chinese. Why? Because they don’t like to interfere.” - Amb. Informant (B1)

The picture painted here, is one where China is simply adapting to the government and governmental practices of the day. Amb. Informant (B1) emphasised that “China gives the decision to the organization of the country and the army, they are ready cooperate with you as long as you want to, democratic or not”. In Sudan, corruption permeates all sectors and

comes in various forms, from petty and grand corruption to a system of political patronage deeply ingrained within the fabrics of society (Martini, 2012). The international community perceived Sudan as extremely corrupt under al-Bashir (Ibid). The available, scarce, data still indicate persistent, widespread and endemic corruption - Sudan is currently placed among the top ten most corrupt countries in the world (Transparency International, 2019).This considered, Sudan can be perceived as a country where corruption is institutionalised. Naturally, as China are “crossing the river by feeling the stones” (Hong, 2012) while emphasising non-interference to the degree pictured by Amb. Informant (B1), who also saw it as an issue in regards to corruption:

“China could have helped more in the area of production. Most of these governments [in development cooperation with China] and their officials are corrupt. They didn’t do anything because they don’t like to put pressure on governments on do this, do that.”

In theory, if China follows the principle of non-interference religiously, then even questioning the corrupt system in place would be to challenge this dogmatic approach. As the system also could provide advantages for China, as in achieving contracts with better conditions, there is also incentives not to challenge the institutionalised corruption. China could instead adhere to the current Sudanese context and conduct “business as usual” as to not meddle in Sudan's internal affairs. That said, present corruption in both ends of the cooperation does not equal to collective corrupt behaviour in development cooperation, even if it seems plausible. Amb. Informant (B3), Prof. Informant (O1) and Prof. Informant (O2) all agreed on the idea that since both Sudan and China were authoritarian, increased corruption as a consequence of the cooperation was an evident risk. In the interviews, all of the informants across the political spectrum brought up corruption as a disadvantage in cooperating with the Chinese. The question was never whether the Chinese were corrupt, but rather to what extent. This complies with current information on corruption among Chinese SOEs as well as medium-small sized enterprises. Several Chinese companies such as the China Energy Fund Committee, the telecommunications firm ZTE and the China Roads and Bridge Construction Company have all have been accused of bribing senior government officials in Chad and Uganda, Zambia and Kenya, respectively (Transparency News, 2019).

Both bribes in Chad and Uganda was to assist a Chinese oil and gas company (Cassin, 2017). Joshua Meservey (2018) underlines that many Chinese businesses, including government-linked and government-owned companies, routinely use corrupt practices to gain advantages in Africa, reinforcing these practices in the process. Lack of transparency in Sudan in regards to al-Bashir’s regime have made it hard to distinguish similar cases in Sudan and Amb. Informant (B1) did not have any idea of which Chinese companies it could concern. There are over 150 Chinese companies listed on the World Bank's blacklist of eligible firms, listed for corruption and fraud (World Bank (a), 2019). That said, he emphasised that Chinese actors did engage in corruption because of the institutional nature of corruption in Sudan. On answering the question of whether China contributed to the institutionalization of corruption in Sudan or not, he said:

“It takes two to tango. Corruption is like tango. It is between two. If there is no corrupt person in the giver, the receiver will not be corrupt. You will be more inclined to corruption if both dancers are corrupt. [...] because the environment was so full of corruption, the Chinese had an impact. During the previous regime, you had institutional corruption. Like you come, and you are a Chinese investor. There will be people meeting with you and they will say, we will work with you, but you will have to give us a percentage. ” - Amb. Informant (B1)

Dr. Informant (E1) worked extensively for the CNPC as an oil extraction engineer and confirmed that the Resource-backed loans which were given to China was very generous because of the fact that no other nation was interested in investing in Sudan. Although he could only speculate on how they were negotiated. He also confirmed corruptive behaviour took place at the CNPC, citing two internally released reports on high-level officials. This can be contrasted with Amb. Informant (B1) who explicitly said corrupt practices was non-existent in the petroleum project and in all relations on a governmental level. On the other hand, Dr. Informant (E1) emphasised that the Chinese were in charge of the management team which was cheating with the figures, as millions of dollars were missing from the regular reports. Transparency International (Martini, 2012) also reported that there were major discrepancies between oil revenue figures published by the Sudanese government and those published by the CNPC, representing massive sums of money. Considering this,

Amb. Informant (B1) statement on corruption being non-existent in the petroleum project seems highly unlikely. This also warrants questioning of whether corruption was non-existent in governmental relations between China and Sudan. Amb. Informant (B1) was insisting on that corruption only was present in relations with Chinese businesses, government-government would not entail corruption but government-business could. That said, government and business elites were closely intertwined in Sudan under al-Bashir (Martini, 2012). Relatives of high government officials would often own companies that do business with the government. There is evidence that at least 164 companies, operating in a diverse set of services and industries, were controlled by the top party-leadership of the NCP. To illustrate, Al-Bashir’s brother was one of the wealthiest Sudanese, controlling much of the cement market. In turn, he was the main supplier for the Merowe Dam construction, which China was the biggest external financer for (International Rivers). Two other brothers of the President are also said to be the major shareholders of a business group with shares in more than 20 companies working in sectors such as the petroleum, engineering, arms, and telecommunications. There are also evidence that government contracts were awarded to those large companies linked to the ruling elite irrespective of bidding (Martini, 2012). The dividing line between government and business in Sudan is close to non-existent and projects between Chinese SOEs and Chinese businesses may as well, in practice, be between government officials. Prof. Informant (O2) thought government officials and business elites were almost synonymous and went one stage further in explaining the corrupt practices between them:

“The Chinese went beyond ignoring it, they even used the corruption. When you see the deals, a lot of the deals, when you see the interest rate. It goes up to 30% while the greediest bank in the West doesn’t go past 10%. Thirty percent is agreed upon because of a commission business which was introduced in Sudan by the Chinese. In the past, the government never had commissions. Now during the most recent fifteen years, commission was often the first line in the contract. It’s a governmental institution. Since the government is a closed circle. They get money at any expense because they know that they will not be the ones who pay for it, it’s the Sudanese people [...] I think it’s important to remember, China didn’t pick the

people it was working with. Instead, Sudan came to China and China worked with those who came. So, the corruption, you can never blame China for starting it. Corruption was definitely started here. What you can do, is blame China for contributing to it and for benefiting from it on the expense of the Sudanese people. ” - Prof. Informant (O2)

Prof. Informant (O2) claimed to have witnessed several of these contracts and described that the commision-based system built on middlemen, sometimes companies, who were securing the loans for around 15-20% of the actual loan as commision. At the time of the interview, he had recently received a copy of a Chinese contract with an interest rate of 20%, approved by NCP members. The question posed by this is then, if China introduced this commision-based system, could it have been institutionalised as Prof. Informant (O2) suggests and therefore had an impact on current institutionalised corruption?

6 ANALYSIS

One should first reflect on what kind of institution corruption really is, or if it even can be categorised as such. For that to occur, it has to, as North (1990) puts it, in some way construct the “rules of the game”. It is not enough if actors simply are corrupt in practice, there has to be some sort of expectation that enables and/or constricts certain corruptive behaviour. In the case of corruption, this can simply be the lack of enforcement. As demonstrated by Helmke et. al (2004), ineffective formal institutions can lead to substitutive and competing informal institutions. Substitutive are employed by actors who seek different outcomes which are compatible with existing formal institutions. In the case of corruption, it is directly competing with existing formal institutions which form the foundations for the game. Martini (2012) emphasised that Sudan is, without a doubt, one of the most challenging environments for anti-corruption in the world. Sudan performs extremely poor in controlling corruption and has a legal anti-corruption framework in place that faces major implementation challenges in practice (Ibid). The World Bank measures governance in relation to corruption, Sudan only scored -1.5 [on a -2.5 to 2.5 scale] in controlling corruption (World Bank (b), 2019). Corruption should evidently be seen as an informal institution, as it is not consciously established through decision making, but rather established through imitations gradually over

time. But if corruption is such a persistent, competing, informal institution, how could China have an institutional impact to such degree it introduced a whole new method of corruption to the current institutional framework Helmke et. al (2004) demonstrated four different sources and mechanisms of institutional change (See Table. 2). It seems no formal institutional change in Sudan occurred as a consequence of China in development cooperation, in either design or effectiveness. Such change would directly contradict China’s non-interference principle which both the literature and informants have emphasised is strictly followed. Furthermore, it is unlikely formal institutional change, in either design or effectiveness in regards to corruption, have occurred under al-Bashir. Transparency International have measured corruption in Sudan for nearly twenty years, almost as long as China and Sudan’s development cooperation under al-Bashir. During these years, corruption have not fluctuated more than 1-4 steps on the 100 step scale. The same can be said for The World Bank’s ((b), 2019) indicator for control of corruption which have fluctuated 0.6 steps since 1996, indicating no real change in either design or effectiveness in formal institutions. That said, these are, at best, estimates of how the actual institution of corruption and its related institutions have evolved over time. Which in turn is far from a guarantee such change never was established by the Sudanese government under al-Bashir. There are definitely possible changes which could have led to the integration of the commission-based system in the already institutionalised corruption without China. For instance, a significantly increased enforcement of already existing anti-corruption laws could drive actors to alternative methods, such as utilising commissions. Then again, as all available data points towards persistent, widespread corruption without any substantial change in present corruption or governance during the time of cooperation between China and Sudan, it does not seem very likely. In view of this, the final explanation for rapid institutional change seems to hold some explanatory strength in regards to the material and data available. That is, an update of beliefs and/or mechanisms that could realise and enable expectations. Using commissions as a method to gain advantages in contracts could simply not have been perceived as a viable alternative. This could be explained by the fact that party members adherent to al-Bashir developed their corrupt practices over time. The right conditions for introducing the commision-based system, such as no substantial enforcement of

anti-corruption laws, was definitely there, but the actual practices and methods were still being discovered by the NCP. As Chinese initiated the practice with NCP members, many of them started to perceive the benefits and utilize commissions, until so many did that behaviour on a structural level simply “tipped” towards utilising commision in contracts.

7 CONCLUSION

This study have shed light on several things. Most importantly, it has demonstrated there are areas where China could have had an institutional impact. The case of Sudan shows how China potentially could have introduced a whole new practice of corruption in the Sudanese repertoire. That said, while institutional theory shows us it could be possible, the evidence is unreliable. Further research on China’s institutional impact is evidently needed and also highly motivated: China’s increasing need for energy resources are bound to lead to increasingly extensive development cooperation in Africa. For policy-makers, especially in institutional reform, increasing attention should be paid to whether China is actively cooperating with the nation of interest, as it possibly could mean a more challenging institutional environment. This study especially calls for increased research on the relationship between China and its impact on corruption in development cooperation. Both informants and current literature witness of improvements among Chinese SOEs and firms. It therefore becomes of even more importance to not only look at similar cases of Chinese development cooperation, but also cases which are more recent. Since China's development cooperation is largely concentrated to countries which also are resource-abundant, countries subject for future studies could tentatively be Angola, Nigeria or Zimbabwe. The future development of the African continent are in many ways uncertain, but it is safe to say China will play their part. Academia could, and should, assist in shedding light on their practices and the significance they could hold.

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9 APPENDIX 1

Presented here are the list of conducted interviews. They are categorised by if they were primarily affiliated with al-Bashir (B) or the opposition (O), or if they were an Engineer (E). The name of the informants are provided, current occupation at the time of the interview, previous relevant experience according to their own opinion as well as the date the interview was conducted. All interviews were conducted according to the ethical guidelines for research in the humanities by the Swedish Council for Science (Vetenskapsrådet 2002). For instance, all subjects were informed of the subject of the study beforehand and offered anonymity if desirable. Subjects who wished to be anonymous are simply described as Informant with corresponding number and their occupation as well as professional experience have been described in more general terms.

Name Current occupation Previous professional experience

Prof. Informant (B1) Retired. Advisor for the Foreign Ministry Council, extensive work for the Islamic Movement in South Sudan and Darfur, former director of a university with close ties to the NCP.

Dr. Informant (B2) Retired. Minister in the Government of al-Bashir, extensive work for the National Islamic front in Sudan.

Amb. Informant Secretary General of a Representative to China for Sudan. Key role in establishing (B3) NGO Sudan’s relations to China in the government of al-Bashir.

Dr. Informant (E1) Post Doctorate Ph.D in Petroleum Engineering. Oil extraction engineering for Researcher various companies.

Prof. Informant Coordinator for an FFC Leader of an association which is a faction of the FFC, member (O1) program. of the FFC Central Policies Committee

Prof. Informant Secretary General for a Policymaker in a research council under al-Bashir. Professor. (O2) development organization in Sudan.

10 APPENDIX 2

Presented here are examples of the questions asked during the interviews as well as the general structure that was used. Opening questions are coded as OQ, follow-up questions coded as FQ and direct questions as DQ. While the structure is resembling the one that was used in person, the order of the OQs, and therefore also the FQs, would often change. The appendix is provided for transparency.

OQ1 How would you say China established their relations to Sudan? OQ2 How would you describe and characterize Sudan’s relation to China under al-Bashir? OQ3 What would you say were the motives that drove China to increase its engagement with Sudan under al-Bashir? FQ3.1 How would you say these motives became clear? FQ3.2 Would you say these motives changed over time? If so, how did they change? FQ3.3 Are there any events where you think China’s motives in Sudan became especially clear? OQ4 What would you say were the pros and cons in cooperating with China? FQ4.2 When thinking about the pros of cooperating with China which events stands out? FQ4.3 When thinking about the cons of cooperating with China, which events stands out? OQ5 In China-Sudan cooperation, who would you say had the upper hand? Q5.1 Can you think of any specific events where this dynamic was especially clear? DQ1 If you would assess the impact from cooperating with China, how would you describe it? FQ1.1 Which events in the history of Sudan-China relation under al-Bashir do you see as most significant in regard to the impact from the cooperation? Be specific. FQ1.2 Which areas do you see as most significant in regard to the impact from the cooperation? DQ2 If you would assess the impact from China on corruption in Sudan, how would you describe it?