DOCSLIB.ORG

Automated Detection and Response to Attacks # Tar -Zxf Ossec-Hids-2.0.Tar.Gz # Cd Ossec-Hids-2.0 # ./Install.Sh

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Automated Detection and Response to Attacks # Tar -Zxf Ossec-Hids-2.0.Tar.Gz # Cd Ossec-Hids-2.0 # ./Install.Sh SYSADMIN Security Lessons Automated detection and response to attacks # tar -zxf ossec-hids-2.0.tar.gz # cd ossec-hids-2.0 # ./install.sh Now you simply choose your language, your server type, and whether you want OSSEC to run the integrity check daemon, run Learn how to monitor and block attacks without lifting a finger. the rootkit detection engine, enable ac- tive response, and enable the firewall to BY KURT SEIFRIED block attacks. If you are setting the sys- tem up as an agent, you also need to ne of the first things I learned system [2]. OSSEC uses a traditional point it to your server and paste in the about computer security was server and agent approach: You install agent key. The agent key is a long string Ologging [1]. If you don’t have the agent software on each system you used to secure communications between logs, then trying to reconstruct what want to monitor, and a central server an agent and the server, preventing fake happened when something breaks, or collects all the data and sends out alerts. messages from being injected, and so when you get broken into, is almost im- Additionally, the OSSEC project has re- on. Why is it important to prevent possible. The second thing I learned was leased a web-based interface; however, it spoofed or fake messages from being that you have to centralize your logging; is only capable of reporting. Unfortu- sent to the server? this is the only way to get a complete nately, it can’t be used to configure the picture and ensure that an attacker can’t system. Beware simply wipe the logs on a compromised If an attacker can trigger fake or spoofed host, leaving you nothing to work with. Installing OSSEC attacks and a system blocks IP addresses But none of this will alert you to an at- When installing OSSEC, you have three or users because of this, the attacker can tacker or, even more importantly, stop options. The server option allows you to easily block legitimate systems and lock an attacker from getting in. It will simply have it monitor itself and collect alerts users out. In a worst case scenario, you give you something to look at once you from other systems. The agent option might have to break into your own sys- figure out you have been broken into. simply monitors local events and fires tem if your accounts are locked out, For this, you need a human being in the anything interesting off to the server. which is why most HIDS and NIDS sup- loop, right? Well, you either need a The local option runs the monitoring lo- port whitelisting (see the “HIDS vs. human being or some smart software. cally and can send email alerts, but it NIDS” box). Administrators simply cre- Wouldn’t it be great if you could moni- does not listen for any remote agents (so ate a list of hosts and networks that are tor critical logfiles (like mail and web) if you have one server or want to test it, critical. Of course, determining which and actually have something respond to this is the option for you). Simply down- hosts are critical depends on the exact attacks, notifying you and even blocking load the OSSEC package (os- setup (DNS, email, file servers, authenti- the attacker from further access if you so sec-hids-2.0.tar.gz”) and unpack it to a cation servers, routers, etc. are all a good wished? Well you’re not the only one. directory: place to start). With OSSEC, the whitelist Daniel B. Cid is the lead developer of the is held in the ossec.conf file (by default, OSSEC project, an effort to build an open # wget http://www.ossec.net/U this is kept in /var/ossec/etc/), and you source host-based intrusion detection files/ossec-hids-2.0.tar.gz can specify individual hosts or networks: <global> <white_list>127.0.0.1</white_list> <white_list>1.2.3.4</white_list> <white_list>10.0.0.0/8</white_list> <white_list>192.168.0.0/16U </white_list> </global> Running OSSEC The OSSEC program comes with its own control program called ossec-control. Ad- ditionally, when installed on Red Hat Linux or CentOS, a standard set of rc.d/ init scripts will be added, allowing the OSSEC services to be control through the standard chkconfig utility. When OSSEC is running, you should see a number of programs running. 58 ISSUE 103 JUNE 2009 Security Lessons SYSADMIN The monitoring processes generally (essentially the guts of al- need to run as root: most any system) and a large number of network USER PID COMMAND daemon logfiles (named, ossecm 17381 /var/ossec/bin/ossec-maild smbd, mysql, telnetd, etc.). root 17385 /var/ossec/bin/ossec-execd To modify which direc- ossec 17389 /var/ossec/bin/U tories are monitored or to ossec-analysisd add new rulesets for moni- root 17393 /var/ossec/bin/U toring services, you simply ossec-logcollector edit the ossec.conf file, root 17405 /var/ossec/bin/U which uses an XML-style ossec-syscheckd format that is largely self- ossec 17409 /var/ossec/bin/U explanatory. ossec-monitord OSSEC WebUI So now that you have OSSEC Agent OSSEC properly set up and Figure 1: The Main tab of the OSSEC web interface shows Once you have the server running, it’s it’s protecting your net- some information about the latest modified files and events. high time to get the rest of your herd re- work, what do you do porting to it. Simply install the OSSEC now? One feature I love about OSSEC is been updated in several years (although software on any machines you want to the reporting. For example, you can gen- one could argue it is largely a finished monitor, choosing the agent installation erate text reports on the top activity for project). option, of course. IP addresses, attempted login names, During the install, you will be asked and so on. Conclusion for the IP address of the server and stan- Of course, a text-based report is un- One of the biggest problems with secu- dard options regarding which monitor- likely to impress your boss; fortunately, rity is the amount of setup effort and ing options you want. Once you have there is a solution for this. The web user continuous maintenance it often re- finished, you will need to create and im- interface for OSSEC allows ad hoc que- quires. OSSEC provides a degree of as- port the agent key, which is done via the ries, but unfortunately, it does not sup- surance and active protection with a manage_agents program. On the server port configuration of the server or agents minimal setup cost and little mainte- you simply add the agent. (for that, you have to stick to the com- nance. OSSEC is lacking in a few fea- Once finished you can extract the key mand line). tures I would really love to see (like tell- for a particular agent, then you will need Additionally, OSSEC WebUI allows you ing me what changed within a file as op- to cut and paste it (remote login via SSH to see the state of your server and agents posed to just telling me that the file has is your best bet). Simply run manage_ at a glance (Figure 1). changed) and lacks some ease of use agents on the agent and import the key. features (like mass configuration and The process is similar for Windows, but Tripwire change management), but weighed a graphical interface has been added as Of course, I would be amiss if I failed to against the simplicity of setup and man- the default to make it easier (fortunately, mention Tripwire [3]. Tripwire is the agement I think it’s still worth it. n the command-line versions of all the granddaddy of HIDS, monitoring and re- programs are available, which allows porting on file changes on Unix systems INFO scripted management to be done re- (and now on Windows), routers, and [1] “Dive Deep” by Heike Jurzik, Linux motely via the command line). other devices. Pro Magazine, April 2008, http:// By default, OSSEC monitors all files in Tripwire is still available as an open www. linux-magazine. com/ w3/ issue/ /etc, /bin, /sbin, /usr/bin, and /usr/sbin source package; however, it has not 89/086-087_command. pdf HIDS vs. NIDS [2] OSSEC: http:// www. ossec. net/ [3] Tripwire: http:// sourceforge. net/ Host-based intrusion detection systems Network intrusion detection systems projects/ tripwire/ (HIDS) are generally defined as applica- (NIDS) typically consist of one or more tions that run on specific systems and network-based sensors deployed at net- monitor local logfiles, inbound network work choke points (such as firewalls) or at- Kurt Seifried is an activity, and other items to detect hostile tached to switches that are configured to Information Secu- behavior. The advantage of HIDS is that it replicate traffic to the sensor. The advan- rity Consultant spe- has deeper access to a system and can tage of NIDS is that you can cover large cializing in Linux correlate local events easily (e.g., a web portions of a network and network traffic and networks since application error followed by a new user with a minimal number of sensors. The being added). The disadvantage of HIDS is disadvantage of NIDS is that you could 1996. He often won- that you must install software on each miss internal attacks that don’t cross mon- ders how it is that technology works system you want to protect and manage itored networks, and you can’t see deeply AUTHOR THE on a large scale but often fails on a many endpoints.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Science DMZ
    The Science DMZ Brian Tierney, Eli Dart, Eric Pouyoul, Jason Zurawski ESnet Supporting Data-Intensive Research Workshop QuestNet 2013 Gold Coast, Australia July 2, 2013 What’s there to worry about? © Owen Humphreys/National Geographic Traveler Photo Contest 2013 7/2/13 2 Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory U.S. Department of Energy | Office of Science The Science DMZ in 1 Slide Consists of three key components, all required: “Friction free” network path • Highly capable network devices (wire-speed, deep queues) • Virtual circuit connectivity option • Security policy and enforcement specific to science workflows • Located at or near site perimeter if possible Dedicated, high-performance Data Transfer Nodes (DTNs) • Hardware, operating system, libraries all optimized for transfer • Includes optimized data transfer tools such as Globus Online and GridFTP Performance measurement/test node • perfSONAR Details at http://fasterdata.es.net/science-dmz/ Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory U.S. Department of Energy | Office of Science Overview Part 1: • What is ESnet? • Science DMZ Motivation • Science DMZ Architecture Part 2: • PerfSONAR • The Data Transfer Node • Data Transfer Tools Part 3: • Science DMZ Security Best Practices • Conclusions Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory U.S. Department of Energy | Office of Science The Energy Sciences Network (ESnet) A Department of Energy Facility Naonal Fiber footprint Distributed Team of 35 Science Data Network Internaonal Collaboraons Mul3ple 10G waves 5 Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory U.S. Department of Energy | Office of Science ESnetSC Supports Supports Research DOE at More Office than 300 of Institutions Science Across the U.S. Universities DOE laboratories The Office of Science supports: 27,000 Ph.D.s, graduate students, undergraduates, engineers, and technicians 26,000 users of open-access facilities 300 leading academic institutions 17 DOE laboratories 6 Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
    Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) Adli Wahid Role of Detection in Security • Part of security monitoring o Violation of security policies o Indicators of compromise o Threat drive or Vulnerability driven o What’s happening on the network? • Rules o Detection is based on rules • Action • What do we do when detection happens? • Alert and Investigate • Drop / Block Perspective – Adversary Tactics and Techniques • Mitre Att&ck Framework https://attack.mitre.org • Tactics – what are the goals of the adversary? • Technique – how do they do it? • SubJect to: o Resources o Platforms • Can we used this knowledge for detection? o Observe Adversaries Behaviour o Techniques, Tactics and Procedures (TTPs) o Deploy in prevention, detection, response Your Adversaries Motives Infrastructure Targets Behaviour Your Assets Your Systems Reference: https://published-prd.lanyonevents.com/published/rsaus19/sessionsFiles/13884/AIR-T07-ATT%26CK-in-Practice-A-Primer-to-Improve-Your-Cyber-Defense-FINAL.pdf Reference: https://published-prd.lanyonevents.com/published/rsaus19/sessionsFiles/13884/AIR-T07-ATT%26CK-in-Practice-A-Primer-to-Improve-Your-Cyber-Defense-FINAL.pdf Making Your Infrastructure Forensics Ready • Detecting known or potentially malicious activities • Part of the incident response plan • If your infrastructure is compromised o Can you answer the questions: what happened and since when? o Can we ‘go back in time’ and how far back? • What information you you need to collect and secure? • Centralized logging Intrusion Detection Systems • An intrusion
    [Show full text]
  • A Brief Study and Comparison Of, Open Source Intrusion Detection System Tools
    International Journal of Advanced Computational Engineering and Networking, ISSN: 2320-2106, Volume-1, Issue-10, Dec-2013 A BRIEF STUDY AND COMPARISON OF, OPEN SOURCE INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM TOOLS 1SURYA BHAGAVAN AMBATI, 2DEEPTI VIDYARTHI 1,2Defence Institute of Advanced Technology (DU) Pune –411025 Email: [email protected], [email protected] Abstract - As the world becomes more connected to the cyber world, attackers and hackers are becoming increasingly sophisticated to penetrate computer systems and networks. Intrusion Detection System (IDS) plays a vital role in defending a network against intrusion. Many commercial IDSs are available in marketplace but with high cost. At the same time open source IDSs are also available with continuous support and upgradation from large user community. Each of these IDSs adopts a different approaches thus may target different applications. This paper provides a quick review of six Open Source IDS tools so that one can choose the appropriate Open Source IDS tool as per their organization requirements. Keywords - Intrusion Detection, Open Source IDS, Network Securit, HIDS, NIDS. I. INTRODUCTION concentrate on the activities in a host without considering the activities in the computer networks. Every day, intruders are invading countless homes On the other hand, NIDS put its focus on computer and organisations across the country via virus, networks without examining the hosts’ activities. worms, Trojans, DoS/DDoS attacks by inserting bits Intrusion Detection methodologies can be classified of malicious code. Intrusion detection system tools as Signature based detection, Anomaly based helps in protecting computer and network from a detection and Stateful Protocol analysis based numerous threats and attacks.
    [Show full text]
  • Ten Strategies of a World-Class Cybersecurity Operations Center Conveys MITRE’S Expertise on Accumulated Expertise on Enterprise-Grade Computer Network Defense
    Bleed rule--remove from file Bleed rule--remove from file MITRE’s accumulated Ten Strategies of a World-Class Cybersecurity Operations Center conveys MITRE’s expertise on accumulated expertise on enterprise-grade computer network defense. It covers ten key qualities enterprise- grade of leading Cybersecurity Operations Centers (CSOCs), ranging from their structure and organization, computer MITRE network to processes that best enable effective and efficient operations, to approaches that extract maximum defense Ten Strategies of a World-Class value from CSOC technology investments. This book offers perspective and context for key decision Cybersecurity Operations Center points in structuring a CSOC and shows how to: • Find the right size and structure for the CSOC team Cybersecurity Operations Center a World-Class of Strategies Ten The MITRE Corporation is • Achieve effective placement within a larger organization that a not-for-profit organization enables CSOC operations that operates federally funded • Attract, retain, and grow the right staff and skills research and development • Prepare the CSOC team, technologies, and processes for agile, centers (FFRDCs). FFRDCs threat-based response are unique organizations that • Architect for large-scale data collection and analysis with a assist the U.S. government with limited budget scientific research and analysis, • Prioritize sensor placement and data feed choices across development and acquisition, enteprise systems, enclaves, networks, and perimeters and systems engineering and integration. We’re proud to have If you manage, work in, or are standing up a CSOC, this book is for you. served the public interest for It is also available on MITRE’s website, www.mitre.org. more than 50 years.
    [Show full text]
  • Network Security Presentation
    http://bit.ly/2LamWxj Network Security & Performance Jason Zurawski Scott Chevalier [email protected] [email protected] ESnet / Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory Indiana University International Networks Linux Cluster Institute (LCI) Introductory Workshop University of Oklahoma May 15-16, 2019 This document is a result of work by volunteer LCI instructors and is licensed under CC BY- NC-ND 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). National Science Foundation Award #1826994 https://epoc.global Science DMZ as Security Architecture • Allows for better segmentation of risks, more granular application of controls to those segmented risks. • Limit risk profile for high-performance data transfer applications • Apply specific controls to data transfer hosts • Avoid including unnecessary risks, unnecessary controls • Remove degrees of freedom – focus only on what is necessary • Easier to secure • Easier to achieve performance • Easier to troubleshoot Science DMZ Security • Goal : Disentangle security policy and enforcement for science flows from security for business systems • Rationale • Science data traffic is simple from a security perspective • Narrow application set on Science DMZ • Data transfer, data streaming packages • No printers, document readers, web browsers, building control systems, financial databases, staff desktops, etc. • Security controls that are typically implemented to protect business resources often cause performance problems • Separation allows each to be optimized Performance is a Core Requirement •Core information security principles • Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability (CIA) •In data-intensive science, performance is an additional core mission requirement: CIA PICA • CIA principles are important, but if the performance isn’t there the science mission fails • This isn’t about “how much” security you have, but how the security is implemented • Need to appropriately secure systems without performance compromises Motivations • The big myth: The main goal of the Science DMZ is to avoid firewalls and other security controls.
    [Show full text]
  • Evaluating the Availability of Forensic Evidence from Three Idss: Tool Ability
    Evaluating the Availability of Forensic Evidence from Three IDSs: Tool Ability EMAD ABDULLAH ALSAIARI A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Design and Creative Technologies Auckland University of Technology in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Forensic Information Technology School of Engineering, Computer and Mathematical Sciences Auckland, New Zealand 2016 i Declaration I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, it contains no material previously published or written by another person nor material which to a substantial extent has been accepted for the qualification of any other degree or diploma of a University or other institution of higher learning, except where due acknowledgement is made in the acknowledgements. Emad Abdullah Alsaiari ii Acknowledgement At the beginning and foremost, the researcher would like to thank almighty Allah. Additionally, I would like to thank everyone who helped me to conduct this thesis starting from my family, supervisor, all relatives and friends. I would also like to express my thorough appreciation to all the members of Saudi Culture Mission for facilitating the process of studying in a foreign country. I would also like to express my thorough appreciation to all the staff of Saudi Culture Mission for facilitating the process of studying in Auckland University of Technology. Especially, the pervious head principal of the Saudi Culture Mission Dr. Satam Al- Otaibi for all his motivation, advice and support to students from Saudi in New Zealand as well as Saudi Arabia Cultural Attaché Dr. Saud Theyab the head principal of the Saudi Culture Mission.
    [Show full text]
  • Active Response Using Host-Based Intrusion Detection System and Software-Defined Networking Jonathon S
    Air Force Institute of Technology AFIT Scholar Theses and Dissertations Student Graduate Works 3-23-2017 Active Response Using Host-Based Intrusion Detection System and Software-Defined Networking Jonathon S. Goodgion Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.afit.edu/etd Part of the Digital Communications and Networking Commons, and the Information Security Commons Recommended Citation Goodgion, Jonathon S., "Active Response Using Host-Based Intrusion Detection System and Software-Defined Networking" (2017). Theses and Dissertations. 1575. https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/1575 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Graduate Works at AFIT Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AFIT Scholar. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ACTIVE RESPONSE USING HOST-BASED INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM AND SOFTWARE-DEFINED NETWORKING THESIS Jonathan S. Goodgion, 2d Lt, USAF AFIT-ENG-MS-17-M-032 DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE AIR UNIVERSITY AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED. The views expressed in this document are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, the United States Department of Defense or the United States Government. This material is declared a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. AFIT-ENG-MS-17-M-032 ACTIVE RESPONSE USING HOST-BASED INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM AND SOFTWARE-DEFINED NETWORKING THESIS Presented to the Faculty Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering Graduate School of Engineering and Management Air Force Institute of Technology Air University Air Education and Training Command in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Cyber Operations Jonathan S.
    [Show full text]
  • Securing Cloud from Intrusion Attacks Using Intrusion Detection System in Virtual Machine Environment
    ISSN (Online) 2278-1021 IJARCCE ISSN (Print) 2319-5940 International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer and Communication Engineering ISO 3297:2007 Certified Vol. 7, Issue 4, April 2018 Securing Cloud from Intrusion Attacks using Intrusion Detection System in Virtual Machine Environment Prof. Mr. M. K. Nivangune1, Ms. Kanchan Bairagi2, Ms. Archita Kotkar3, Mr. Vishnukant Salunke4 Department of Information Technology, Sinhgad Academy of Engineering, Pune, India1,2,3,4 Abstract: In a public cloud computing environment, consumers cannot always just depend on the cloud provider’s security infrastructure. They may need to monitor and protect their virtual existence by implementing their own intrusion detection capabilities along with other security technologies within the cloud fabric. Traditional Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSeS) are not suitable for these environments due to their openness and limited essence. Intrusion Detection System as a Service (IDSaaS), monitors a system or a network for illegal activities in public cloud (IaaS) by providing intrusion detection technology that is portable, secure and fully controlled by the cloud service providers (CSPs). A prototype of IDS is described. Keywords: Security; Cloud Computing; Intrusion Detection System, Handling bulky attacks. I. INTRODUCTION Considering today’s scenario, security is the major concern in vast and fast growing computer networks. We have heard of various data breaches due to poor and limited essence of an Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSeS). Hence a strong Intrusion Detection System is the essential task in day-to-day life practices. There are various approaches being used for intrusion detection. In this paper, we present an Intrusion Detection System model to be deployed using K-Mean Algorithm for determining various types of intrusions or attacks.
    [Show full text]
  • Evaluation of Intrusion Detection Systems Under Denial of Service Attack in Virtual
    Master of Science in Computer Science Engineering October 2017 Evaluation of Intrusion Detection Systems under Denial of Service Attack in virtual Environment Comparative study of Snort, Suricata and OSSEC Venkatesh Nagadevara Faculty of Computing Blekinge Institute of Technology SE-371 79 Karlskrona Sweden This thesis is submitted to the Faculty of Computing at Blekinge Institute of Technology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Computer Science Engineering. The thesis is equivalent to 20 weeks of full time studies. Contact Information: Author(s): Venkatesh Nagadevara E-mail: [email protected] University advisor: Emiliano Casalicchio Department of Computer Science and Engineering Faculty of Computing Internet : www.bth.se Blekinge Institute of Technology Phone : +46 455 38 50 00 SE-371 79 Karlskrona, Sweden Fax : +46 455 38 50 57 i ABSTRACT Context. The intrusion detection systems are being widely used for detecting the malicious traffic in many industries and they use a variety of technologies. Each IDs had different architecture and are deployed for detecting malicious activity. Intrusion detection system has a different set of rules which can defined based on requirement. Therefore, choosing intrusion detection system for and the appropriate environment is not an easy task. Objectives. The goal of this research is to evaluate three most used open source intrusion detection systems in terms of performance. And we give details about different types of attacks that can be detected using intrusion detection system. The tools that we select are Snort, Suricata, OSSEC. Methods. The experiment is conducted using TCP, SCAN, ICMP, FTP attack.
    [Show full text]
  • SFL-ED01-Ossec-The-Quick-And-Dirty
    OSSec howto – The quick and dirty way Savoir-faire Linux – SFL-ED01 TABLE OF CONTENT PREFACE..................................................................................................................................................................... 4 About the Author............................................................................................................................................... 4 About Savoir-faire Linux.................................................................................................................................... 4 Credits.................................................................................................................................................................. 5 1 INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................................................... 8 1.1 If you are in a hurry, and be on track........................................................................................................9 2 FIRST STANDALONE INSTALLATION.............................................................................................................12 2.1 Installation.................................................................................................................................................. 12 2.1.1 Package installation....................................................................................................................................12 2.1.2 Manual installation......................................................................................................................................13
    [Show full text]
  • OSSEC Documentation Release 2.7.1
    OSSEC Documentation Release 2.7.1 Jeremy Rossi Jul 21, 2017 Contents 1 Manual & FAQ 3 1.1 Manual..................................................3 1.2 Frequently asked questions........................................ 85 1.3 User submitted Cookbooks........................................ 99 2 Development 101 2.1 oRFC: 1 The Collective Code Construction Contract (C4)....................... 101 2.2 oRFC: 2 Coding Style Guide....................................... 104 3 Reference 107 3.1 Syntax and Options............................................ 107 3.2 Output Formats.............................................. 149 3.3 Man pages................................................ 150 3.4 What’s new................................................ 177 3.5 Rootcheck / Syscheck Reference..................................... 178 3.6 Glossary................................................. 183 4 Indices and tables 185 i ii OSSEC Documentation, Release 2.7.1 OSSEC is an Open Source Host-based Intrusion Detection System. It performs log analysis, integrity checking, Windows registry monitoring, rootkit detection, real-time alerting and active response. It runs on most operating systems, including Linux, OpenBSD, FreeBSD, Mac OS X, Solaris and Windows. A list with all supported platforms is available at: Supported Systems Contents 1 OSSEC Documentation, Release 2.7.1 2 Contents CHAPTER 1 Manual & FAQ Manual Getting started with OSSEC OSSEC is a full platform to monitor and control your systems. It mixes together all the aspects of HIDS (host-based intrusion detection), log monitoring and SIM/SIEM together in a simple, powerful and open source solution. It is also backed and fully supported by Trend Micro. Key Benefits Compliance Requirements OSSEC helps customers meet specific compliance requirements such as PCI, HIPAA etc. It lets customers detect and alert on unauthorized file system modifications and malicious behavior embedded in the log files of COTS products as well as custom applications.
    [Show full text]
  • Intrusion Detection System Techniques and Tools: a Survey Resmi AM1, Dr
    DOI: 10.21276/sjet.2017.5.3.8 Scholars Journal of Engineering and Technology (SJET) ISSN 2321-435X (Online) Sch. J. Eng. Tech., 2017; 5(3):122-130 ISSN 2347-9523 (Print) ©Scholars Academic and Scientific Publisher (An International Publisher for Academic and Scientific Resources) www.saspublisher.com Review Article Intrusion Detection System Techniques and Tools: A Survey Resmi AM1, Dr. R Manicka chezian2 1Ph D. Research Scholar, Dept of Computer Science, NGM college, (Autonomous), Pollachi-642001, India 2Associate Professor, Dept. of Computer Science, NGM College (Autonomous), Pollachi-642001, India *Corresponding author Resmi AM Email: [email protected] Abstract: An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is a system that tries to perform intrusion detection by comparing observable behaviour against suspicious patterns. The objective of intrusion detection is to monitor network resources and to detect abnormal and irregular behaviours and abuses. This concept has been around for the past several years but only recently it has seen a dramatic rise in interest of researchers and system developers for incorporation into the overall information security infrastructure. This survey gives the overall study about the IDS, its nature and techniques, tools used in the area of intrusion detection. Finally the survey gives the real-time working performance of top selected Intrusion Detection and Intrusion Prevention tools. This paper helps in analysing and evaluating of various IDS tools used in high-speed networks. Keywords: Intrusion Detection System, Anomaly Detection, SNORT, SURICATA, Bro IDS. INTRODUCTION malicious traffic by taking action such as blocking or An intrusion detection system (IDS) examines isolating the user or source IP address from accessing network traffic for any suspicious and irregular activity the network.
    [Show full text]