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Form and II Hylomorphism Developed A Reason for Believing Some Suggestions about Ali

❖ He is a non-conventional, non-intention-dependent diachronic continuant. ❖ He is unified, bounded in space and time; ❖ further, his boundaries are not fiat boundaries. ❖ He is modally ductile; ❖ hence, mereological essentialism does not obtain for him. ❖ He is one and not many; ❖ hence, he is not identical to an aggregate (if the cardinality of the aggregate is > 1). An Abductive Argument for Hylomorphism (AH)

1. There exist non-intention dependent diachronic unities which are (i) bounded in space and time (by, then, non- fiat boundaries), (ii) modally ductile, and (iii) unified non-aggregative compounds. (Call them AC unities.) 2. The best (or only) explanation for the existence for AC unities is hylomorphism. 3. If (2) we should ourselves embrace hylomorphism. 4. So, we should ourselves embrace hylomorphism. Some Observations

❖ As an abductive argument, AH is:

❖ non-deductive

❖ in effect, a two-part argument, the first part of which forms an explanatory hypothesis and the second part of which applies and assesses it.

❖ AH-1 should be regarded as a phainomenon.

❖ Much of the action, then, pertains to (2): why suppose that hylomorphism has such unique explanatory power? Some Concerns

❖ ‘Hylomorphism has strong intuitive appeal and a remarkable pedigree. It dominated medieval thought about the metaphysics of substance, was endorsed in some form or other by a variety of Enlightenment thinkers, and seems to be garnering increasing support from contemporary metaphysicians. But it is up to its neck in controversial commitments.’ (Rea, 1)

❖ These include:

❖ a ‘commitment to the universal-particular distinction;

❖ a commitment to a primitive or problematic notion of inherence or constituency;

❖ and an ‘inability to identify viable candidates for matter and form in nature, or to characterize them in terms of primitives widely regarded to be intelligible.’ (Rea, 4) First Concern

❖ It is not the universal-particular distinction as such, but rather:

❖ Forms as universals or tropes must be in compounds as constituents.

❖ They are thus:

❖ parts—weird sorts of parts, unlike the parts of your car. (‘But surely they would be odd sorts of parts.’— Rea, 2)

❖ somehow located in space—but then again not. Second Concern

❖ What, precisely, is problematic about inherence or constituency?

❖ One worry: the relation, as primitive, is obscure.

❖ Another worry: in so far as it is accessible, it seems to commit its proponents to believing that universals can be spatially separated from themselves. Third Concern

❖ Where in nature are entities playing the roles posited by hylomorphism?

❖ Matter is what exists in potentiality.

❖ What is that?

❖ Form makes what exists in potentiality exist in actuality .

❖ Are these empirically verifiable claims?

❖ ‘Moreover, there is the looming danger of disconnecting our metaphysics of material objects from empirical reality. Where in physics, or chemistry, or biology do we find something answering to the description “something in a material object that actualizes its potential to be a dog [or a hydrogen atom, or a sodium chloride molecule]”? We can begin to answer, of course, by noting (again controversially) that physics, chemistry, and biology all make use of natural kind terms, and that it is the natural kind properties that are supposed to answer to the relevant description. But there is, again, the word ‘in’ to reckon with. In the straightforward senses of ‘in’, nothing in a hydrogen atom looks like a kind property.’ (Rea, 3) Three to Two

❖ Probably these three worries are best reduced to two concerns:

❖ Parts: form and matter are in some sense ‘parts’ of composites.

❖ What sorts of parts?

❖ Do they, for instance, respect the principles of classical extensional mereology we have already noted?

❖ How do parts of any sort vouchsafe the unity of the composites of which they are parts?

❖ Are forms, for instance, predicated of matter?

❖ Forms: what is the of forms?

❖ We have already identified forms of three flavours: BS forms, accidental forms, and essential forms. What is the relation between these kinds of forms?

❖ How, precisely, to forms discharge their myriad obligations in the economy of hylomorphism?

❖ How, for instance, to they serve as principles of unity?

❖ How, further, should one construe forms as universals or particulars?

❖ In either case, however they are to be understood, how are forms in compounds? Wholes

❖ Regarding that which is compounded out of something so that the whole is one–not like a heap, but like a syllable: the syllable is not its elements, for ba is not the same as b and a. . . The syllable is, then, not only its elements, but something else. . .If that something were an element, the same argument would apply. . . This is not an element, but a principle, an element that into which a thing is divided and which is present in it as matter (Met. 1041b11-33). The Argument Reformulated

1. Possibly (e1. . .en are the elements of O at t1, and at t2 e1. . .en exist while O does not).

2. (1) only if at t1 there exists some x whose presence unifies e1. . .en in such a way that O exists.

3. If x is another element of O on ontological par with e1. . .en, then the same argument will apply.

4. Hence, at t1 there exists some x which is not an element, but a principle (archê) in virtue of whose presence O is a unified whole.

5. Further, if this archê is complex, then there will be a further question ad infinitum as to the principle in virtue of which it forms (as well as it and e1. . .en form) a synchronic unity.

6. Hence, this archê is not complex, but simple. Koslick’s Constraints

❖ Koslicki holds that accepts three principles which constrain his options:

❖ Weak Supplementation Principle

❖ WSP: (x > y) → (∃z) (z > y) & (z ∫ x)

❖ where ‘(z ∫ x)’ = z and x are disjoint

❖ Aristotle’s endorsement of a LL arguments rooted in cardinality

❖ Aristotle’s commitment to the view that the matter is literally part of the matter/ form-compound These Constraints

❖ Weak Supplementation: being ‘disjoint’ is not clearly defined in this connection.

❖ Recall that x and y are disjoint iff x and y do not overlap

❖ The argument from cardinality seems correct, if sometimes incautiously applied: a compound C is made of many parts, with a cardinality > 1, but the cardinality of C is exactly 1.

❖ We need to be careful, however, in determining the grounds for the cardinality of C.

❖ Parthood: are literal parts the parts of classical extensional mereology?

❖ If so, this constraint is inapplicable.

❖ If not, then how, precisely, does this constraint constrain? Rea’s Natures

❖ ‘My theory of natures has three central theses:

❖ (T1) Natures are powers; the natures of substances are fundamental powers.

❖ (T2) The natures of composite objects unite other powers (in particular, the powers that are the natures of their parts).

❖ (T3) Natures can enter into compounds with individuators, and play the role of form.’ A Better Way Home

❖ Essence

❖ Homonymy