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i .J ' -./ ( grl @ F=r ' =&i 'DfiU I trh g -.8 E.= 3

FE o -r* o ASSESSI'4ENTOF orD:r THTDAIICER OI. SUI(PRISEATTACK II,I EUROPE -- o c=ct - e& At{O0F NATO'SVULi,lEit/\t}ILITy T0 SURPRISE E5 i o $!" Ittterlrn ^ C:t Eeport rro6 c a.E

ul 'D

Preparedfor Deparbrnntof the Ai r Force UnderCorrtract Nwrber F496?0-77-C-0026

August1977

T.N. DUPUYASSOCIATES,INC. P.0. Box157, 2301Gallows Road DunnLoringr Vlrglnla 220?7. -' t tt\

,'.,

TABLEOF CONTENTS

Report . .11 AnnexA crses of surpririini o...ptionin'e.n..il nir.uici_ig6sill AnnexB Surprlse tn NniO'Coni"rt' Blt AnnexC seteiteo-caseitrai.i ioi ini.nrir. inu.itigition cct AnnexD Part Dn Onei'si"itug!.'gl.iliruin'tne'rg+i iorr.t. surmr-FalI campaid ic;;;'iiuavl AnnexD -surptir* PartTwo, in'*,e'gitire .Dgz7, (CaseStudy) ot'trre'gurg.'r9ci

AnnexD 'ei \' part .03e __\ rhreei aririrn,'z:o.iou* tgiz'(iaia'siuivi AnnexE . rnesovtet-concept'oi iripiir*' El AnnexF . -coni.reng; AGilDAa ;r'Iluor'"i Fl Contexti,, :lrrorir. in.trre.nnroi Dunnt-oringl vi,-jriv zo, tg77 \

{$$gs5iffiiIsf {t$ gtrJ{iliH$} sudfHtsf asA€{ Ifl furuFf, ANOOF I{ATO'S VULI.{EMBILITY TOSURPRISE

Aq.Interiq .R.elort

Thls lnterlm report ls being subnrittedunder Contract F4g6A0-77-C-0026 as np_dlfledby RevlsedStatement of Nork dated I August1977, Slnce the tttodlflcatlon terrnlnatedthe work as described ln thi origlnal contract, lnd dlrected tJre balaloeeof the work under that contract torvird a comptiiiiy-'-- dlfferent obJectlve, thls ls of necess{tyan lnconrpletesttly and'tho 6port bglng submlttedas qgrecdunder the tersrsof the modlflcatlbn lncludes iire por- tlon of the workwhlch has beendorre. It ls not to be conslderedflnal, ina- all elementsof lt are subJectto revislon and addltlon at length. Hadthe work on thls study bgt been halted a differenttand uruchmore c6mpletereport would have been submltted.

The obJectlveof the study as origlnally contractedwas to examinerele- vant hlstorlcal experleneeand docurierrtaryevldence to arsess the llkellhood gf a pglllble surprlse attack in Europeby.the sovlet unlon and lts Hansaw Pact allles, and the vulnerablllty of I'l/\T0and the Unlted States to such sur- prlse. Partlcular attentlon wlll be glven to tlre followlng five sub-obJeiilveg: a. Analyzlngand assesslngthe likely inrportanceof surprrse as an elcl|ent of sovlet planninqfor potentlal mllltary opera- tions as revealedby methods,techniques, and goarsevrdeht ln past casesof strateglc and tactical surprlse by Sovlet armed forces, and ln Soviet speechesand writlngs; 'Analyzlng b.. the potential relevanceto tire NATOcontext of other cns€s olher casesof stmteglc and tactlcal surprlse ln modernhls- tory, partlcularly those affecting Europeand the unrted states; c. Analyzingthe problemsof irrterpretin{tlnformation whrch wasavallable and could haverevealed the surpriser's Inten- tlons ln the casesexamlned;

d. Catalogulngand categorlzinqthe factors, mechanisms,and procesEesthat havebeen, or are llkely to be, slgnlflcant In the achievernnt,or frustratlont or surprlse--bothstrategrc and tactlcal;

e. Surveylngpotentlal actions wlrerbbyl{,\T0 and tlre United States could undertaketo rssure (l) rnaxlnrumalertness and readinessto pFclude surprlse and, slnrultaneously,(e) approprlatecontrlbu- tlon to ltAT0'sdeterrent posture thrbugli irusbivalle alertness and readlnees. -\

As of 20 July,.the date ulrorrvrlriclr i.rork towarrl tlris objectivehalted, the followlngwork had been dcine:

1.. Utlngthe rciearchof Bar.torrl.Jtraley* as a basls, Oentailveand Incom_ plete llsts of surpriseoperatlons, deflnitions, andcategorles *eie-iiveioiia. Thesellsts lere to be revlewedcorrstantly as the study progrisseO. It was lntendedthat a flnal list of definitions-,as agreed-bi[it;-;i"if.fpanis,-nouta be suhnlttedwlth the flnal report. Tnedtscusilon at-the rlvtew conference enphaslzedthe needfor arrivlng a! qlear, agreetldeflnltlons oi surprisein alt Its facets andcategorles. llo iecislon hiit 6eenmade as to whatpurpose the other two llsts wereto serveor ln whatform they wouldbe;etresented In the flnal report. Thethree llsts in their tentatlve formare attachedrtsAnnei n. .2, A prellmlnary"outllneof the final reportwas prepared as a guldefor workon the study. Thfs vrastct be sub.jcctto condide"able'revislon- oi-tfii Uistl of the researchto be donel It la attichedas Annex-B:- 3. A selecttigtlotoperatlons .invojvlng syrprlse to be studleJwas made, frgmthis listr dlvldedlnto Soviet-relatedlutdile East,-ina-GsternEuoppe'rnd Asla, !!9-or."qtlons to becomecase studles were to be rifttteaoon the basls of avallablllty of materlal. Thellst is attachedas Annexc. 4. l{orkwas begun on three cEsestudies: TheSovf et Surrnnr-tallCampalgn of 19441 the Battle of EleAlanreln(ts+l); andthe Battle of the Bui;; lig+li.'' Flrst drafts to thesewere lrltten, but'theywere not revlsedafter-beifg..: vlewedby atl the partlclpants. It wasintinded that further researchshould be doneto seekarDrers_to questlons that revlewershave ralsed andto improve-inO- focus the content. TheSase studies are attccniA as AnnerD. Theyrri noi to- be conslderudflnal HEROproducts. 5. 0n the basis of sonprese4rch ,,The ln Soviet sourcesa roughflrst draft 9slay,was_prepared, entltled, SovietConcppt of Surprlse.r It.*as-inten_ dedthat further researchUe done for thls seclion andthat lt be revlsedon tte- basis of the casdstudles and conments of the particfplnti-ln-t[e study. The draft ls attachedas AnnexE. It ls not to be constbfreda ftfai [iid"i.oililt. 6. Thereview conference that hadbeen schedules at the start of the con- trstt washeld as plannedaon20 Jyly.Hat{gnyuseful points vrere-madeanO li ii conslderedto havebeen frultful is-a guiAl towardireas that-shouldbe siudied whenthe prcJectls resumed.The agenda and a sunmnryof the dlscusslonli attachedas AnnexF. Also attached-isa paperentittia, ssonre-ltoteson the Phenonenonof Surprise{n Milltary Affalri,i' preparedaiter the conference- by oneeofthe partlclpants.

,,strategem: ..tUnpubllshedmanuscrlpt enfitled, Deceptionand Surprlse In llar. u -Corrunel!!

.Althoughn9lt3,ot ihe.partlal obiectiveswas achleved,,sufflclent nesearch wasdone to establlsh a flirn founclationtor contlnring iil';;;i Noconcluslons to lts completlon. can be drawnat this stige, Uui"a few observatlonscan bo made. 1' TheSovlet.case-study, when vlewetl with the casesturlles andthe Battle of on El Alareln the Bulge,ihows li-gni oi ion*n-onrv factors-wtiit, rt.nd out strongly eventhoush the protasonlitswere difierent. th;-G;;maiii'6ijr^g-iiriiirffi;; ln all three' For eximplc,the role oi iiipo*.. operatlngIn cooperttoonilftbh groundelenents to establlshan environnrent-in-wht6ni,irriirie waslmportant iourabe achlEved tn all. Andtechn(ques ror iuirettt-*triil'i;;s;'nrechantzedforrnt atlonslnto posltlonto launcha-surprlse atiair were.ln-alt elernentIn the achlevennnt {rrreecases a maJor of surpriie. Ia ;il be expectedthat theseand o0her factors wlll be foundrn rnanyothlr rporuoioni"tou. studled. 2i 0f partlcular lmportancefrorn the polnttof vlewof the defenderIn an opsratlonls the^dangerof consclousor iuuioniciors pr..on..pitonr. the caseof the As ln 9.ry"ry hlgh connnndin ig++, *nrc[ *is-;il;iffid that the sovlets weregofng to attack lh thi ukralnewhen-the'nnrn erioit-iciriiiv at the forces wasdlrected north.ln Byeloruss.la,.pe"concuptionr.on .riiii-result In mls{nter- prefatlonof Intelllgencl andof tioiiiiio;;';i-pre-assault preparatlons. 3' Therels need for clear deflnltion of whatconsiltutes surprlse and of varlouscategories of lt. Thedocunrents in AnnexA ilt6;fi-ifie attemptto ldentlfv uegfnnlngof an them. Fromthe conferenCuoircuiiifi-ii ii-.pp.rent that It ls Inportantto understandrt ln art its'iipects.

4' sttdy mustbe madeof the context ln whichsurprlse occurred past andln attemptto galn.lnslghts ln the lnto ionlitioni"whrchln'r' curentbe!'s'r or future tlrB frams mlghtbe.conductve t6 beingsurprlsed. 5' In vlen of the fact that the sovletsconsider-surprlse the mostlmpor- tant elennntof the.mllltary art it ls esseniiii tnat rurtiicr-itudy thelr wrltlngs be madeof on tbe gubJeltand of td-;il;;tion, whlchthey stress as parttc_ ularly lmportantexamples of lt. 6' Thework doneto dateon this studymakes lt clear that lt ls a hlghly lmportantsubJect and that consideraure-iJv"anilil;"orii-io*"iror of further study lt' HER0reconmends that thls stuclyue ionpfetedas plannedand expandedto tlolude: that ft b6 - rsvlewof classlfled andunclasslflerl studlespof surprlse aspects ln lts varlous - s-tfdY 1 of the Sovlet polltico-military conceptualframework and of the Sovletconcept of ours, so thlt we cin"recognii.-i olr.ioprng atnnsphere that mlght signal an {nmlnentattack - deeperinvestlgation than tlris study pernrltsof the lnfluence of the nuctearpotentlal on the cllnrate for surprlse.

The potentlal bonefltii accuulng-to.tlre unlted States and lts strateglc planners fi'om completlonand expanslonof the study :- are of such magnttuae,-iiOtlt" fractlon that has beencompleted seems so prornislng,tnat fi-is UeiteveO-6sientl.ftil;---" It be contlnuedas soonas possibie. - deeperlnvestigatiort tfiatrriri> >L,rJyf)cfriits of tlre lnfluenceof the nuclear potential on ilre clirnauefor irrp"ii.. The potentlal bonef{ts:accuuing^totlre united states and lts strateglc planners -" fnomcompletlon and expanslon6r tire study are oi-iucrr magnltude, ' that has and the fractlon beencompleted seerns so. prorn{tirii,-tnai'ri-ir belleved essentlal It be contlnuedas soonas posslUie. that

I CASESOF SUIIPRISE AND DECEPTION IN GENERALI,IAR l9 14-1968

Llege, 4 August1914 0stend Dennnstratlon,27 August1914 Tanga,2 Novenber1914 WlnterBattle of l4asuria,7 February1gI5 NeuveChapelIe, 10 MarchL9l5 SecondBattleeof Ypres, 22 Aprll l91S Galllpoll, 25 Aprll 1915 Gorllce, ? lhy 1915 SuvlaBay, 6 August1915 Serbla, 7 October-3l November1915 Evacuatlonof suvla Bay and Arrzactseacrr z0 Decerrrber1915 Evacuatlonof Helles Polnt, 9 January1.916 Verdun,2l February1916: 0peratlon ,,GERICl"lT,' LakeNaroch, 18 March19lg Battle of Jutland, 31 May1916 Brusllov 0ffenslve, 4 June1916 Invaslonof Ramania,August 1916 Battles of Scarpeand VimyRldge, 9-11 Aprll tgll Battle of Messlnes,7 June1917 Hutler's Rlga 0ffensiye, I Septenrber1917 Caporetto, 24 0ctober 1917 Thlrd Battle of Gaza,31 Octoberi9I7 Canbral, 20 November1917 GermanSorm Offenslve, 21 March1918 GermanLys Offenslve, Aprll 1917 Chemln-des-Dames,27 l4ay-6Jdon 1917: G0LRZ Hanel,4 July 1918 SecondBattle of the Marne,l5-l7 July 19lB Amlens,9 August191c1 St. Mihiel, 12 SepteurberlglU tileglddo,[0Stptenber lgl8 l,leuse-Argonne,26 Septgmber191g l{arsaw,16 Argust 1920 :' Battle of Esklshehlr, 9-20 July lgZl Dumluplnar,266Argust t92Z Battle of the JarannRlver, 6 Februaryl93Z GuadalaJara,12 l'larch 1937 Brunete, 6 July 1937 Ebro, 25 July l93B Battlo of Khalkhln-Gol(Norrxrrrklrarr), -,) /\uyu:t 1939 Poland,I September1939: Operatiofr"ilHIT[,, Denmark,9 AprlI 1940: Exerclse "tJ[56ttS0Ul'11,, Noruqy,9 Aprll 1940: Exercise "W[SU(NORTlt" Netherland,l0 l'lay1940: Case"ffLLOt,J', Belglum,l0 tlay 1940: Case"YELL0!J" France,10 May1940: Case''yELL0W' .' Dakar, 23 Septenrber1940: 0peration ,t'tEl,lACE,, ,,C0F1PASS,' , Sldl Barranl, 9 Decelnber1940: 0perat,lon Itallan East Afrlca, February-t4ayl94l Mersael Brega, 3l t4archl94l lygoslavla, 6 Aprll 1941: Understaking25 Crete, 20-31 ltlay1941: MERKUR Russla,22 June1941: CEcee',I}ARBAR0SSA,, Klev, 25 August1941: FuhrerDlrect.ive No. 34--Soppplment ' Sldl Rezegh,19 Novernber1941: 0peratlonC0RUSADER', Pearl Harbor, 7 Decernberl94l: 0peration ,,2" Malqya,718 December 1941: 0perationt'lo. 1 l'lersael Brega, 21 January 1942 Burma,Slttang Rlver, 18123Feb 194? Burma,Lolkaw-Taunggyl, 18-23 April Ig4Z Kerch, 8 l,lay 194?: 0peration "BUSTARD" Gazala(btestern Desert), 26 May lg4?: Fall ,,VEI,IEZIA,, Itlldway,3 June 1942: 0peratton ,'14I,, Tobruk20-21 June 1942: 0peration ,,OOUBLEtlED,, Surnnr0fCenslve ln Russla, AB June l94Z: Case,'BLUE', ihkln Atol'l , 17-18August 1942 Dleppe, 19 fugust L942: Operation "IruBILEE':. MakinAtoll, 17-lUAugust n l94Z Uleppe,19 August1942i Operatir.rrr,ttli.iil L[. ' AlamHalfa, 3l Augustl94Z Alameln,23 0ctober 1g{z: 0peratiurr,'LIgilTFOOT', North Afrlca, g Novemberl94Z: 0peratlon ,,T0RCH,, I Kasserlne,ll4February 1943:. 0perailon ',spRINGHIND,, l'ledenlne,6 March 1943 ,,sTRIKE',g(al i'lasslcault,6 May1943: Operatlon so ,,vuLCAN,,) ,,ELKTSN HuonPenlnsula, June-September 1943: 0peration III,, Slclly, l0 July 1943: 0peratdon,,ltUSKy,, Bougafnvllle,L November1943: Operailon,,cHERRyBL0ssoM,, Tarawa,20 November1943: Operatlorr,,0ALVANIC,, Battle of thc sangoo,zlj Novarrrber.-i,rreccrrrber r943 ilonte camlno,2-10 Decenrber1943: Operafion,,llAIN COAT,, Anzfo, 22 January1944: Operailon,,SllINGLE,, KwaJalelnAtoll, I February1,944: 0peration ',FLINT0OCK,, Sacondcountenoffenslve at Anzio, 29 February_March1944 Chlndlt 0peratlons, Bunna,March ' 1944 Crlmea,8 Aprll-l2 May1944 . iylt(yena, Aprll-May 1944 Hollandla, 22 Aprll 1944: 0peratlon ,'RECKLESS,, 4th Battle of casslno, ll May1944: 0peration "DIADEM" Normandy,6 June 1944: gperatlon ,,0VERLgRD,, Karella, l0 June 1944 Slapan,15 June1944: Operatlon',FORAGER', Belorussla, ZZ June 1944 Irlphal , 5lhrch-Z2JJune1944 Tlnlan, 24 July 1944: part of 0peration ,,F0MGER,, NormandyBreakthrpugh, 25 July 1944: Operation,,C0BRA',, SouthernFrance, 15 August1944: 0perrtion ',DMGOON: Battle of the Gothlc Llne, 25 August1944: 0peratdln"0LIVE,' , : Anehem-NaJmegen,L7-26 Septernber9944: Operatton ,'MARKETCARDEN,' Leyte Island, 20 0ctober 1944: 0peratlon ilI4USKETEERII,, Leyte Gulf, 24 October1944: Sho I Ardennes,16 Decenber19rt4: 0peratlon,,WATCH-0N-RHINE,, Lbrsog,990anuary ',I4USKETEER , 1945: 0peratlon I I I,, tsavarianRedoubt: Jarruary*tia.y1y4> Battle of the Reichswald,B FebruaryIr)4:;. rJperdtion,,VERITABLE,, Irrawaddy,13 February1945i 0peaation "[XTEt{tjEDCAPITAL,, Irlo Jlma, 19 February"1945: Operation,,DETACIIMENT,, Po Valley, 9 Aprll-2 May1945 :' Hlroshlma,6 Augustlg45: The S-l prograrrr t'lanchurla,9 August lg4g ' Palestlne, !S-Z? Octoberl94g: 0peration ,,y0AV,, Galllee, 28-30October l94B: Operation"llIRAM,' Israel , 22 Decemberl94B; 0perafion ,,AYIN,, Koreaint{Ur : llilotth Ktto:aanI lrrel 0on, Zg SJrluae I t g00 Koreanl{ar: RusslanIntervenilon, i9S0-1953 Inch'on Landlng,Q5 september 1950: Operatlon,'CHROMITE,' Yalu Rlver, 25 0ctober 1950 KoJoFelnt, 15 Octoberl95Z: Operation,,DEC0Y,' I Dlenblenphu,z0 llovember1953-7 May 1954; 0peratlon ,,GAST0R,, slnal carpalgn, 29 0ctober 1956: Operation,,r(ADEsH,, . SuezCanal, 31 0ctober 1956: 0peration ,,MUSKETEER,, Bayof plgs (Cuba),17 April 196l: 0peration ypLUTO,, ., CubanMlsslle Crlsls, 1961 Slx-Dayl{ar, 6 June 1967 Tet Offenslve, Vtrltnam,196g Czechoslavakla,20 Aggest1969 L,t !!gOM:

Major---TutffiIenot Cateqories: sought'"nc,rach i evctl Surprisenot soughtbut achjeved Surprisesought and achievedwiilrout deception Surprise soucthtand achievedwi th dr.:ception !rtprise soughtbut not achicvedwiilr,ut det..prtiurr Surprisesought but not achievedwith deceptiu,, Strategic surprise ) appI I es to Tact'ical surprise l- eacfrof the abr-rvecategori es Dbfensive/Of fens'iveicounter attack (a I I t-rfabove nrdy be one of thesethree)

!,rus1{ .1rru r:,('- lnt()nt Pl.rce Tinre Strength Method

Playi ng 0n preconceptiorrs Secrecy/security Mobi1 i ty Deception Tactical variation/Newtechrro lt.rgylUi lerrra False al anns Intel I igence breakthrough Terra'in Weather/visibility . Insanityl I rrati onali ty b. Passive Ignoredwarrri ngs Fail ure to perceive/acceptoprL run Intel f ir;enr:efai Iurt, E*cessi ve security Bureaucratic fai lure Panic/ I rrati onal Behavior

Types of Decept_jon: . Diplomacy/Negoti ation Diversion(demonstration, feint, f'alseoperators) Concealment(canrouflage, hide) Physicalsimulation Disinformation

Typesof Dis i nfornration : 0verl oad Discred i t False ' cover story Falseconmunications A5 SURPIIISLIJTFINITIOf,.IS

surprlse - A milrtaryactron bI-y,,:, arJversary the vlctlmand catches ylrsh_rsnot angcrpatedby may -tlreletier"oii iirin.iil' ;il; vrcilm,r be Passlve(he overloor.i-6r-is unaware role optlon)' dr actir.-ir,i of ttre-iaversary,s 313:t il iio to choseu,e-*ions optton). Tactlcar - A surprlseac*on affecting surprtse battrefierdoperr*ons. T.N.D. :fil:rlf"a.Tfil".ists wii6;-;i;ii cormnhoeit; ;.naFr6l?one A dondltlongafned on Urefleld of - batile. USt0 ;ifili3:' i':i!|i'l;,"il:];',Tnl;l:;ffiH,ll,'ilfi loT.,,,tarv stratesv or Locusof comnaiirests yrti poiiti.u-iffiors Itles above or nrfttary author- the tactl.oi iioii'io,i,ionourantr renpved narnowzone of battle. 0.8. froma A condltlongalned outsiia-ii,u realrnof ilre fleld of battle. u,st{A Deceptlon- Act(s)-f11en$90 bv the surpriser to mtrlgtd the Intended concernrnsat or part or i proJeiiea vlct0rn - ;iii;.il-.;[iln. G.B- Ir:'rff'r[,fi'liJ;.i';J'1f,:T,ri:rgr]'.,lr.concept_ _-.r r . s..,,ev vJ r,|ltr ofan op- ;!::::::Intgntlon )ur-prt 5

Surprlse - The victim falls to anticipate'f;;: the""=true of Place planned,r"piii. iitii,,i. locailon of the surprller,t Surprlse - Thevlctlrn_falls to anticfpate of Tlme prlser,, the date and/orhour of the sur- pfonnujiirprtse actlon. G.B. Surprlse - TheUlctlm falls to assesscorrectly prlseris pii'i"i'i-o"-Ji; the staengthwhlcn hls sur_ 3[*;J' ;;'ffi;;i In anopera*on. G.B. surprlse - Thevrctf m fails to anticipate the tacilcs of l.'lethod whlchthe aOveri.iv f s plannlng ,and/or newtechnology to employln an operatlon. G.6-. Dlverslon- lbvenent of units lntendedto irnplya rrn'lnattack to dlvert the vlctlm,s whlchls used attentfon'a"na strength awayfrom prlser,s malneffort. G_8. the sur- Dennnstra-'-Adlverslon lnvolvlng a commltrrentof someforces s$atlon srsnedto roc[ ih;';i.al;;;"i;;;; to batile de- reserves ;r_combatand draw orr hrs fnto an ooeratignOfrt.iiirvely' y'ge.v nrlnor opposlngqbJectlvei. qg.- slgnlffcanceto the Felnt - A diverslonIn whlch the-vlctim ls glven_thefalse impresslon that the surprrsets r,uitoi;; b'ioi.u, roi-an-iilirient It ls employedto operatron: dlrert-the"vlctlm wrthout tying down forcesor tircurrtnguattt; i";;;;:.,, L.o. onesown False A dlversion lnvolviru'r\-rrrir.rissarrce,borilrardnent, etc. against 0perati ons muchwlder areas_thanare,scrrccJutoJ-ior-at;;;[-T, scure order to ob_ the exact rocatiorrof the planredop..ullor. G.B. A dlverslonInvol vins a seriei-or,r"l.lpili'ii.rl'iirffi" felnts.desl.gned Include to obscurethe exacttbiition'ina tt* of the plannedoperatlon. R.B. - Physlcal The placlng of-dunnrrq,equipment,'io'u,u-.in.,\y' weapons Slrulatlon the-tntenl-lr and/or faclllties wlth !fplving tnat ioi"i.u-Lqr-^liisr at a stven locailonbut whlttr,tn faci,-u"u-n'otthere. conceal- - Hldlng or wlthdrawlngfrom observtltoonunitsor rEilt lnclude equlpment. can use of undercoveror^undeigrouno facilrtres, nrght mentsand/or camouflage, qjB. mova- carnuflage--Actlon taken to make- equipment and/orerr-' ! forces appear to be Eorp- flage thlng they are noi. q.,!-.'".-'r-

Dlslnfor- - Thedellberato dlstrlbutlon of lrrfornratlorrwlth the Intent of matlon mlslnfornlngor confustngine.;;,qy: g.Br- 0verload - The,dellberate produclng.af a heavyvoluure of cormunicailons trafflc or lnfonrntlon with the Inient of so or..iouorng eneqy'sprocesslng the capablllty ln oider to'y obscurevvsvs' s theel' truth about an lntended-action. c.!-. Dlscredft - To sowinfonnatlon through credlble channels wlll,cause^the whlch, ln turn, enenryto iouut in. veraclty of hls own rources. G.B. rellable False - generatlon The of false lnformatlonand/or nrnor Cover mlslead designedto the enemyconcernlng ;n.,s onn-iru.'Intenfions. G.B. False - Thegeneratlon of comnunicationsvrhlch imply the existenceof conmlnl- forcesat a locatlonwhen such roiies catlons q.[. oo iroi riisi-in reality. - vlctlm Thelndlvldual or collectivebody whose response fs rmparred to aggresslon by unexpectedactrvr"ties oi tn.'iurprii".. R.B. surprlser- '. Theindlvldual or collective bodywhlch perpetrates galn advantage ac6onswhlch over an opponent6y employlnga varlety of con- fuslngand decelvlng nreasures. n.n.

KEYto lnltlals: c.B. GordonBrown R.B. RayBell T.N.D. Trevor Dupuy UgI,lA Unlted States Milltary Aca,Jemy 'Aiti{tx B

SURPRISIIN MTOCONTEXT SttJ.COutl lpe PR,EfACE

-Purposeand scopeof study :31$t3.tl.[if.d.oecesJori:Fuller, Leeb, whaley, shlatm (?) -Crlterla -!hy.non-surprlse casesexcluded -Study l lmltailons

-Surprlse ln prlnclples of tilar -fthlcs of surprlse -Brlef hlstorv of surprfse and decepilon -l{s developments cArEG0RrEsANppEF.rNrrrory! q0

IOfi -l{AT0Countrles .USSR t PREVI OUS FI.II.D I},IGS- -FulI er -Leeb -|l|haley., -Others

-Qualltatlve analyslsof -Quantttattre effects/avoldance/rethods--"--' rrqer'eof echlevennnt anaiysts(siiiii;i;i-of i' -loryRaratlve assessment -Relatlonshtp fl nJiurl, to Fuller/Le.bitjili;t f tndtnss

-l,lhat to antlclpate from the USSR -Other potentlal but non-Sovletforms of surprlse cONcLUsIONS-AND REC0I,{lENtiA'iI0il_5_ (currtrl -Sovlet strengthsand wcakrresscs (fro,,, 1r.rst casus) -t{AT0strengths and weaknesses(fri.rrri past cases) -Radoupndatlonsfor lryprovement/newprocedures-

I ANNEX:Case Namatl ves

22 AHIitXC

-rl GRO,PA Sovlet-Related ' 1940 Karella(?lnland) 1941 Bartarcssa 1941 RusslanCounteroffenslve ln front of Moscow 1942 Crlsnalmphlblous lssault (Kerch) 1943 Stallngrad 1943 l4ansteln'sCounteroffenslve (rharkov) 1943 Kur:k 1944 Sovlet Sumrrer-FallCarnpalgn 1945 l'lanchurla 1968 RusslanInvaslon of Czechollovakla GR0UPB l{lddle East tltf l0 Gaza 1918 lhggldo 1956 Slnal l{ar L967 3lx-Day l{ar 1973 Octoberl,lar

" 880!ll_!. l{estern Europeand Asla 19t0 Nonrqy 1940 Invaslonof LowCountrles 1941 Pearl Hmbor L942 Alamllalfa 1942 El Aluneln f943 Dladest(Ronn Campalgn) 1944 Hollandla " 19tt4 Invaslon of Nonnandy 1944 Battle of the Bulge 1947 Chlnac0peratlon -48 1950 t{orth Koreanattack 1950 Inch'onLandlng 1950 Interventlon of Chlnese ANNLXL) i DRA['T* STRATEGIC SUNPNISTIN THI 1944SOVIET SUMMER-FALL CAMPAIGN (CaseStudy)

The experienceof world war II, as errrphasizedin Inanysoviet writings, not on'ly iIIustrates the major role playeclby surprise, but also indicates that to achievesurprise on the strateqic level, while the war wasalready Ooingon, was('xt.r.(,lt(,ly r.rllrlrl ir,rl.r,rl . llri,, t.,urlrr: expl,rilrcrl ;rr.irrrari ly by the fact that with the enemyin Plv5scssiorrof a skil lful andagqressive intelli- genceorganization it wasdifficult to concealnot only regroupingand massingof forces, but also the strategic intention of the hiqh corunand. This'is why, the sov'ietspoint out, in orcrerto achievestrateqic surprise it was necessaryto carry out complexmeasures of camouf'lageand deception. In the spring of I944, the Soviet tligh Commandfaced the problemof howto conceal preparationsfor the forthcomingsummer campaign in Byelorussia and in the ukraine, and surprise the Ge4mans.Having the strategic initja- tive, the Sovjets believed, would he.lpthem inrnensely in ach.ievingsurprise; for it wouldpermit the soviet commandto dictate its will, and put the Germansin a wait-and-see situation. ln other words, the soviet conunand, havingthe' strategic init'iative, could colcentrate i.ts f orces at wiI I , and launchthe attack in a time place and which in its v"iewwould ensure the best results. ' TheSoviets realjzed that to achievesurprise in the forthcomingcampaign they must, in the first place, take all measuresto concealthe preparation for the offensive. After almost three yearsof war they hadaccumulated con- siderableexperience in surprise anddeception. Now,the time hadarrived to adaptpast experience creatively andadd new elements which would f.it the situation

andrevision. ysion /), As the preparationfor the offens'ivecormenced the Stavkajssued a specjal directive to the armygroup commanders'in which it wassa'id that:

all troop movemen!sconnected with the regroupingand concentration

in the assemblyareas were to be carried out at night, with strjct adherence to blackoutrules; \! ' - the intensity of all typesof fire shouldcontinue unchanged; for firing art'illery ,procedures registratjon gunsshould be so de- signedthat the mainconcentration of artillery wouldnot be detected; 'in the sectorsntarked for future active offensiveoperations work shouldcontinue on defensivemeasures;

combatreconnaissance should be carried out alongthe entjre front and . not only in the zonesof armygroups scheduled for. the offensive; radjo silenceshould be strictly adheredto; - : no written ordersor directives with regardto the future offensiveshou'ld

-. be issued. Instead,a'll ordersshould be givenorally only direcgy to those whowould carry themout;

only a limited numberof officers shouldtake part in the planningof the operation. 'An extremelyimportant element of strategic surprisewas the prooiemof how to deceivethe Germanswith regardto the objectjvesof the operationsand to the sectorand dirtlction of l.ltcrrr.rin cf lorL. t^lit.hthis in rrrindthe pr.'arati'n

for the campaignwas carried out in severalsectors of the front. TheSoviets ' ; decidedthat they wouldstart the campaignin the secondarysectors (e.9.,

advgnceof the LeningradArmy Group toward Vyborgsk) several daysbefore 'launching the offensivein the mainsector.

-.------! ,was 'involved Onlya narrowcjrcle of officers direct'ly in the planningof the surmer-fallcampaign. Even this limited groupdid not knowall the de- tails of the entire operqtion. Theplan of the campaignin its entirety was knownto only sjx individuals, namelyto the SupremeConmander (Stal.in), his First Deputy, the Chief of Staff and his deputy,and the Chief of the 0pera_ tionsDirectorateand his deputy. Sjnrilarrestrjctjons on the numberof men involved in planningwere placed on the armygroup and armies. Theplan of 'in the operationwas hand-written only one copy. Thearmy group cormanders reporteddetails of their planspor5ondlly directly to the Conmanderin Chief.

Sovietwriters stress that the concealmentof the preparationfor the of- fensivewas great'ly helped by the Sovietpract'ice of sendjngrepresentatives of the Stavkato armygroups. This rnadeit possjbleto resolvemany problems facing an armygroup irmed'iately on the spot, without the necessityof ca_rrying on bulky correspondencebetween the armygroups and the GeneralStaff or Stavka. The succerroi;t)t;il3a"rruns as to the sectorof the maineffort in the forthcomingoffensive was facjljtated by the actual deploymentof Soviet forces at the endof the spring(tgqq) operations. Thepeculiarity of this deploy- mentlay in the fact that the mainforces of both sides, andespeeia'l1y their tank troops' werein the southwesternsector bf the Soviet-Germanfront. Thus, at the beginningof May1944 the Sovietshad all six of their tank armiesand sevenseparate tank andmechanized corps deployed south of the pripet River.

In that area they had27 out of 37 tank and mechanizedcorps, near1y 15%of their total armorstrength. Facingthese Soviet tank forces wasthe majority oflhe Germanpanzer formationsdeployed on the easternfront, 22 out of 27 panzerdivisions

It wasknown to the Sovietsthat, after analyzingthe availableinfor- mationon the deploymentof Sov'iettroops, the GermanConmand had concluded that whenthe Sovietsunleashed the new'sunnrcncarnpaign they wouldlaunch the maineffort in the southern sector of the soviet-Germanfront. Th.iswas a majormiscalculation. 0f,course, .it wasin the Sovietinterest to keepthem misinformed,and they were doingthejr best to keepthe Germansunaware of the real Sovietintentions. ' To makesure that the Germanswould continue to beljevethat the major soviet.offens'ivswould take placeon the southernflank of the soviet-German front' the soviet Highconrnand developed a highly complexand sophisticated deceptionscheme' Theconmander of the 3d ukrainianArnry Group was ordered to concentratea large force consistingof eiqht rifle divisions, twoartillery d'ivisions,and one tank corpsin tlre Kish.inevarea. Fourrailroad stations wereselected as ostensibleplaces for troop unloading. Between29 Mayand 14 July dunmymovements of troops and equiprnentfrom these stations to va.rious assemblyareas were carried out. From15 Juneto 5 July the sovietsmade it appearthat the concentration of forces hadbeen completed and increasedthe activities of troops in the area in an effort to convincethe Germansthat they were90ing to launcha majorassault towardRomania. This wasintended to preventthe Germansfrom transferrinq part of thejr forces from the south to Byelorussia' Formations andunits whichtook part jn the deceptionwere given false identification ntltttbersof rif l. rrnrlrlrtilrery clivisiorrsand tank corps, to give the' intpressjoltttl the at'r'ival ol lresh tr'oops. lrr tlur*rryconcent'atiorr and assemblyareas huts and dug-outshelters werebuilt, andmodels of guns, tanks, airplanes' depots, dlrd radio stat"ionswere erected. The durmyconcen- tration areas were "real " defended(protected) by elementsof antiaircraft defenseand by fighter aviation.

At the sametime, the Soviet Conmanderof the LongRange Air Forcewas directed to concentratea large part of his force in the areas to the west and southwestof Kiev to give an itrrgrression'thathis planes wore targeted toward the southwest.

. The GermanCormand.djd not remajn indifferent to the Soviet deception moves. It transferred part of the reserves of the SouthernUkra.ine Army Group

from the rear to the tactical defensezone and through increasedactivities 'of air reconnaissance tried to find out as muchas possible about Soviet in- tentions

Theinability of the Germansto divine the true Sovietplans, that is,

the directionof the Russianrnain effort,'is corroboratedin GermanoKH,s Bulletin No. 100of 2l Maylg44* in wlrichthe GerrrnnConrnand evaluated the

* "Briqf OKHForeign Armies East Section, Evaluationof the EnemySjtuation.,' us NationalArchives, T-311, Rolr 466, Frames6446152-3.

situation on the Soviet-Germanfront in the Southernand Northern Ukraine

ArmyGroups' sectors. The bulletin reportedthat in front of both armygroups.

railroad traffic, includingflat cars with tanks,continued to be quite heavy. This, accordingto the Genmans,implied that the Sovietswere carrying out large-scaleactivities aimedat troop rejnforcement."The Soviet deployment,,, "suqgests the bulletin pointedout, that the enemyis preparinghis future operationsvery carefully, andthat their aim, as before,is tied to the 'Balkan Decision'(tnat is a Sovjetadvance southward toward Romania and Bul- garia.)"

Assumingthat the mainattack would come south of the pripet River,gKH orderedArmy Group Center to transfer jts LVI panzerCorps to the Northern

UkraineArmy Group,effective 30 May1944. To compensatein part for the loss of the corps, the GermanArmy lligh Conmandmoved the border line betweenthe two armygroups farther north. However,jn a messageto colonelGeneral Zeitzler, Chief of the ArmyGeneralstaff, Army'Groupcenter's cofimandercomp'rained that the changemeant that ArmyGnoup Center would give up 6%of its front, but wouldlose 15%of its diyis'ions,BB% of its tanks,23% of its assaultguns,

and a fourth to a third of its artillery.* This is onemore proof of the effec-

* -! l.larDiary, ArmyGroup Center, 21 May1944.

t i veness of Soviet deception.

The30 Mayissue of the sameBulletin (Bulletin No. 101)* reportedthat

* T_311,Roll 466, Frame6446153.

information recejved from air reconnajssanceindicated heavyrailroad traffic

in the Dnepropetrovsk,Kiev, Rovno,and Ternopol areas. The Germansconcluded

that the Sovietswere transferringformations from the Crimeato that front. As the troop echelonswere moving primarily to the Balta, Ternopol,Rovno, and

Kovelareas, they wouldbe usedto reinforceSoviet troopsdeployed for the attack againstthe southernand Northern ukraine Army Groups.

Concea'lmentof Strategic Regroupment of Soviet Forces andPreparations for the 0ffensive

Theprime objective of the regr^oupmentof Soviet forces wasthe concentra- tion of mostof the SovietArmy in Byelorussia. It shouldbe emphasjzedthat for the off,ensive the Sovietstran:;ferrecl [o Byelorussiasix combinedalus

armies,two tank armies,and one air army,three separaterifle corps, four

cavalrycorps, five tank corps, andone mechan'ized corps, anda large nurlber

of air andartillery formatjons. TheSoviets also movedhuge quantities of varioussupplies into the area.

Theregroupment of forces andthe transportof supplieswas carried out

mostlyby rai1. However,automotive transport was also widely used. Duling the period betweenI anri22 ,June,.77,t$0'box r;ars with troops, equipment,and supplies were movedto the fropt. At the destination stations in the rear areas of the four armygroups a.ssigned .|00 to the Byelorussianoperation, rai.lroad trainsarrived dai1y. The lst, Zd, and 3d Byeloruss.ianArmy Groups received over 85,000tons of supp'rigsby truck. In addition, rarge redeproymentsof forces were carried out by each of the army groupsancl armies. rhis intensive traffic was well camouf'laged. The Stavka and the conmandsof army groups and armies paid special attention to the concearmentof movements,concentration, and deploymentof troops. To be r.ertain that even in thc areas far away from the front nobodywou'ld knowthe final destination of the transports, each day rail traffic control officers receiu*o u newcode which was to be used in all telephoneand telegraphmessages.

while transportingtanks and artillery, the soviets madesure that all the ordnanceand equipmentwas camouflaged by special nets, tarpaulin, boards, ba'les of hay, or brush. corunandersof echelons were not permitted to showthe. destination documentsto anyone,includirig the mi'litary commandantsof rail- road stations' Detraining stations were at a distance of some100 kilometers from the front ljne. Theywere also chosen as far as possible from eaclrother. The detraining took place at night only, with strict observanceof the blackout rul es.

As soon as units anclfovlttatiolrs d0t.r',r irr('rl, ilroy woro ilnrediately lilovedto areas which provided good protection from enernyair observation, and were care_ fu]ly camouflaged' To conceal the arrival of armies and separatecorps from - the.General Headquartersreserve jn the frontal zone, they were assigned to the army group reserves and assembled50 to 100 k'ilometers from the front. The flying personne'lof the newly'arrived air formationswerenotpermitted to make familiarization fl ights over enemyterritory. Advanceof the troops front the iisertrblyare.l towardthe front l'ine to

the waiting areawas carried'out five to sevendays before the start of the

offensive. Thewaiting..breas were no closer than 12 to 20 kilometersfrom tfre Germanlines. Hereagain, the troopswere well camouflagedand concealed. Battalionsof the first echelondivisions did not moveto jumpoff positions until oneday beforethe start of the operationor on the eve of it.

For the advancefrom the assemblyarea to the waiting area, marching

orderswere issued for the divisions only andthese covered only oneday. Tank andmechanized corps which arrjved fronrthe GHqreserve were not givenwrjtten

ordersat al l; conrttun'icationswith therrrwere oral . As wasthe casewith rif le units, the mechanizedformations moved by night only, with lights out. Floatinf -- bridgeswere operatjve at night anddismantled for the day)ight hours.

At short halts (rests), dayhalts, andin newconcentratjon areds, the

troopsusually set up their campsoutside settlements. Alongthe routesof marchof tanks, self-prope'lledartjllery, andartillery towedby tractors,

special primemovers with attachedtravo'is and branches were sent to obl.iterate the marks. Officers from superiorhelat'lrlu.rrtt:rs were attached to subordinate

units to sde that camouf'lagedjrectives werecarried out, and if necessaryto preventirregularities in observingthe establishedrules for the march, 'in halts, and the concentrationarea';. lhe rluality of camouflagewas also checked by visual dir observationand by aerial phoLography.. 'All fresh units andformations wh'ich were assigned to the first echelon of combinedarms armies were forbicltien to r:onductcombat reconnaissance without specia'lpermission from the armygroup conrnander. By and large, reconnaissance

wascarried out by units andformations fornrer'ly deployed at the front I jne.

TheSoviet conmand directed that reconnaissancebe carried out only in small

groups,and only by menin infantry unif orrnscrnd insign'ia. Reconnaissancewas

----.._--::---"-r conductedon a wide front rn passrvesectors as well as the mainoffensive one.

To preventGerman in.felligence aqents from gaining information, great

attention waspaid to concealingand protectingtroop concentrationareas,

railroad stations,and road junctions. All movementof soldiers, individually irndin groups'was strictly controlled. All susp'icious-lookingindividuals werestopped and thoroughlyinvestigated.

In Mayand June, defensive engineering works were built by the forcesof the lst Baltic, zd, and3d tlyelorussiarr,-andthe right wingr?la,n"lst Byelo- russianAnny Groups. Undercover of theseworks which were/to a considerable depth, Soviet forces preparedwaitjng areasand jump-off posit1ons for the groups, as:sault includingtrenches, and cormunjcat.jon trenches. To give an

impressionof serious defensivework, manyfalse trencheswene dug and jmita- tion obstaclesbuilt.

0n 16 June, the Stavkaordered the conrnandersof the 2d and 3d Balt.ic

ArmyGroups and the lst UkrainianArmy Group to conductcombat reconnaissance

operationsin several sectors of their respectivearmy group zones between 20

and 23 June'. The str"engthof the reconnaissancegroup was to be betweena reinforced companyand a battalion. Thesemeasures, plus combatreconnaissance

carried out by the lst Baltic and the three UkrainianArmy Groups, made it difficult for the Gemransto i

As a result of the false informationand camouflagemeasures conducted on

all levels from the Stavkadown, the Sovietsbelieve that they wereable to concealthe dimensionof the forthcomingoffensive in Byeloruss'iaand delude

the Germansas to the time and place of their maineffort in the 1944surrner

campaign.To provethe point, Soviet historiansquote General Keitel, Chief of Staff of the 0KW,who in a speechdelivered before a groupof high ranking

-_-:---T Germanofficers sa'id in May1944. that'the s'ituationon the easternfront was stabilized to sucha degree [hat onecould relax becausethe Sovietsare jn no position to start an off-e,nsive soon. Thenhe (Keitel) stated that,,basedon the available data on the regroupmentof soviet forces andon the overall poli- tical andmilitary situation, it Liaz/correct to assumethat the Russianswould 'probably concentratetheir mainforces in the southernsector of the front. At presentthey not /iere/ in conditionto attack on severalmain d.irections simul- taneously"'* The samewas said by the formerchief of the operationalbranch * Opera t si i Sov e t-l!:Iy. gp_q_,rrs _Vp ry$_!__tjI y VSUS-ol_0tec hestlqllUgJ. -V-q^yl*e-, 194 l - 1945(Moscow, 1958), p. ZgS.

of, the OK['l'GeneralJod],during the Nuremberg ,,!,le trial.. assum€d,,,said Jodl, "thbt the Russianswould attack in the south, namelytoward the Romanianojl fields, andthis is whymost of our tank divisionswere concentrated in the area of the southernarmy groups.,' Evenin June, whennumerous indications such as the concentrationof fresh troops in Byel0russia, deploymentof newforces betweenpolotsk and Zhlob.in, and increasedartillery activity pointedtoward preparations for an offensive in Byelorussia,OKH continuedto assumethat the Sov'ietswould attack in the south' Bulletin "There No. 104of 13 June1944 reported: havebeen movements lasting for weeksinto tho cntirc ar(,(rl)ot.w(.(i1) the BlackSr',r ,rnrl the pripet_ River with the maineffort apparentlyin the area jn front of the Northern UkraineArmy Group. In addjtjon, especiallyjn recentdays, the enemyseems to be bring'ing new forces into the area oppositeArmy Group center. The mainthrust is still to be expectedbetween the carpathiansand the area north of Kovel' Theoperatibns against the SouthernUkraine Army Group and ArmyGroup Center will be'launchedfirst in order to deceivethe GermanCormand and to drawreserves away fronrthe aft'a'betwer:nthe carpathianMountains and Kovel. Theattack towardLvovw'i I I fol I ow i n the secondwave. ',*

* "Comprehensive Evaluafionof the EnernySjtuation oppositethe GermanEastern Front, and txpectedMaior Soviet 0bjectives." T-311,Roll 466, Frames646lbl-66.

' Still' doubtsas to the Sovietobjectives were beginning to appearin the Germanestirnates. "soviet Thebulletin continues: goals in the area of Army Group Centerwill be moresignificant than hadbeen anticipated. This conjec- ture is based on the increasein forccs, sorrccred.ible agent reports, and several radio intercepts. l,lemust count on the possibitity that the enemy has expandedhis plan beyondcontainment attacks and is planningan offensive-_ operation from the greaterGomel-Smolensk area, with Minskas a final objective.,, However, it wasstill beingconcluded from the testirrnnyof pWs.andfronr rail reconnaissancethat mostof the fonmationsfrom the Crimeahad probably beenmoved into the areaopposite the NorthernUkraine Army Group. And, the bulletin "upon continues, conclusionof the attack preparations,which t'some extent are alreadycompleted in part in the area of the Southerntjkraine Army Group possibly and finished on the other fronts,wemust count on the resump- tion of attacks in strengthcomparable to thoseof recentmonths. Thecoming "Comprehensive developmentwill presumably,as alreadyindicated in the Evalu- ation of the EnemySituation .', of 30 March,lead to a very great needfor German forces in the southernpart of the easternfront. This appearsto make it necessaryto preparereserve forces there inmediately."

, 0n 16 June,on'ly a few daysbefore the majorSoviet offensive .in Byelo- rusSia cormenced,the conmanderof the NorthernUkra.ine Army Group, General

Model,sent a teletvpe to the Chief of the ArmyGeneral Staff (with a request "The that it be shownto Hitler), whjchread: ArmyGroup evaluates the enemy situation as before, with thq expectationthat the enemyis preparingmost carefully the majorattac.k into the areasKilomya, Horodenka, Czortkov, north .- _ of Ternopol,and on both sides of Brodyand Luck-Kovel. The attack area at Kovelhas beenextended to the armygroup's northernborder. preparations 'must nowbe regardedas so far advancedthat the offensive,after a rapid de- ployrnent of the assault tt'oops,which may take two or three nights, maybreak out at any time."*

* TeletypeModel to OKil,T-31l. RolI 466, Franre6446351-2.

"Comprehensive Threedays later ArmyGroup Center's Eva'luationof the tn:I, Situation," reportedactivity that indicated: "In surmaryit can be established that attacks to be expectedat the

front of the ArmyGroup, against Bobruisk,Mogilev,Orsha, and pos-

sibly northwestof Vitebsk, will havemore than a local character.

Judgingby the conmjtmentof armyand ajr forces, their overall goal

will be to bring about the collapseof the armygroup'ssalient arc.

at several pojnts, tearing up the front, 0n the other hand, the pic_

ture of RedArmy forces, ds recognizedor estimated, does not yet re-

flect a remoteobjective, suchas Minsk, for example. To be sure,

attenfion must be drawnto the dispor'lrortion betweenarmy and air

strengths, and also to the dirricujties in reconna.issance,which are es- pecial'lygreat at this time."*

* "comprehens.ive AGcenter, tvaluationof the Enemys.ituation, 19 June1944.,, T-311,Roll 233, Frames1061-66. Attached as AnnexA.

TheGerman Command still could not bel'ievethat the Sov'ietmain thrust .in wou'ldbe in Bye'lorussia.General Gottfrjed von Erdmansdorf his memoirsmen-

tioned that during a meetingof high rankingGerman officers in Sonthofenon ', 't.

---T--_---"1 19 June1944 General Keitel declaredtha,t he did not believethat the Russians wouldattack in the central sector of the front. He reckonedon the possibility of a Sovietoffensive jn j.he southernsector towardLvov and Romania, but not irmediately,at sometjme in the future. TheSoviets stress that the efficient redeploymentof their forcesr cor- binedwith firm adherenceto the rules of camoufldg€,gdve positive results. Despitethe fact that the Germanswere doing their best to determinethe real intention of the soviet conmandand prevent surprise they wereunsuccessful. True, Germanintelligenbe . gaveits conmandquite detailed data on the dep.loy- mentof the first eche'lonsof Sttvietarrrries and army groups, but it erred in assessingthe concentratjon of reservesin operationaland strategic depth. This wasone of the basic reasonsthat the Germans.failed to evaluatethe situ- .in ation at the Soviet-Germanfront its totality correctly. Thefact that Germanintel'ligence did not havea clear picture of major Soviet transfers and redeploymentis illustrated by an OKHsituation mapof 22 June1944 reproduced from capturedGerman documents (Map r)++ showingthe deploymentof soviet forces as the OKHbelieved it was. Germaninability to learn about.thetransfer to Byelorussiaof severalmajor soviet formationssueh-- as tank and combinedarms armies added greatly to the surprise. TheGermans believedthat the soviet Secondand the Third GuardsTank Armies were deployed on the southernflank of the SovierL-Gc.nrnnfront north of yassy,whereas in fact the SecondGuards TankArmy was at the time a'lreadyin the Kovelarea in the lst Byelorussian ArmyGroup sector, and the Fifth TankArmy was south of Smo]enskwith the 3d ByelorussianArmy Group. It is interestjngto note that, as the Soviets claim' evenafter ttre stant of the offensivethe Gernnnsex- presseddoubts that the Fifth GuardsTank Army would be conmittedin the central sector of the front, Thus,in the GermanBulletin No. 108of 2 July 1944*,ten ffi, Frames ++Rough 1446173-40KH. draft included daysafter the start of the Byelorussianoffensive, it wasstated that: ,,the questionof the transfer of the Fjfth GuardsTank Army from the sector of the SouthernUkraine Army Grolrp to that fac.ingArmy Group Center arises again.

However,all availableinformation still doesnot give a clear pictureas to - the whereaboutsof the Fifth GuardsTank Army. Wecan merelymake the following comrnentwith respectto the possibility of the army'sdep'loyment opposite (German) ArmyGroup Center: Withdrawalof the Fifth GuardsTank Army from the area of the SouthernUkraine Army Group would mean a reductionof one-sixth of the tank corpsdvdilable for arr

* T-311,Ro'll 466, Frames1446113

quite is strange, since the Fifth GuardsTank Army was committedto combatin the sector of the Soviet Fifth CombinedArms Army of the 3d ByelorussianArmy Groupin the morn'ingof 26 June.

As for: comb'inedarms armies, the Germansdid not learn of the transfer of theEighthGuards Army to Byelorussia,and as bf 22 Juneshowed jt still east of Tiraspof in the 3d Ukrainjan ArmyGroup. Theyconsidered the Twenty-eighth

Armyto be-.northof Otlessa,wtre reas in fact i t wasntoved frorrr the Nikolayev area to the lst ByelorussianArmy Group.and took part in the offensive at

Bobruisk. Germanintelligence v,,asalso unable to detect the transfer of the

SecpndGuards and Fifty-first Armiesfrom the Crinteato the Snrolenskand Gomel areas, that is, to the sectors of the main effort. The arrival of the polish

First Armyin the area east of Kovel was also not discovered. i.trd',_l ., 1..r:, I l,(

Gernnnrod,e.lliEenc,:.onl ir,ueo [o-l ocat.(,dll :,,..: i | ,.i

south betweenthe Black sea and Ternopol. Hence,the Gerir,anf ,r;nn",arioeal ried

the wrongconclusion with regard to the soviet main effort. ' In additionto the measuresused by the Sovietsto cgncealthe true aim

of the.surmercampaign already nrentloned, radjo silencealso playedan impor- tant role in the overal'lsurprise schenre. To deprivethe Germansof the pos-

sibil ity of cliscrlvcryof t.ctl.rr in rrrr',r',r,rr'{,,,t.r.kcrr by l.hr:liuv icts witl rcgard to the preparatiort of the carrtpaign, Lhrough interception of radio ntessages,in

Mayof 1944the Stavkabarred the use of radio in all anny groupsand army

radio nets, exceptfor the air force, antiaircraft.defenseand reconnaissance

elements. Arti'llery wasperrnitted to use radio for f ire registration,

Actually, the effects of radio silence might have beena two way street and blown the surprise elementif it had not beencombined with other deceptionmeasures. German Bulletin No. 99 of 10 Maypointed out that the almosttotal Soviet radio silencewh'ich had prevailed from 9 Mayalong the entipe easternfront could augur,as previousexperience showed, the endof the Soviet preparat'ionperiod and their readjnessfor the offensive. "l^le haveto considerthe possibility of (Soviet)attack at any time andmost pro- bably in thg sector of the NorthcrnUkrainr: Arrny Group and the right flank of ArmyGroup Center (Kove1 area)." Thelast sentenceof the bulletin states that the enemy(Soviet) conmand might try 1oca1attacks at first, in order to jm- provptheir positions,(for example,establishing bridgeheads west of Ternopol).

Thediagram prepared'by the OKHin 0ctober1949 shows that jn the spring and sunmerof 1944the Germanshad nrany indications pointing to Sovietattacks southof the Pripet River. Thediagram refers only to the KovelArea. Howimportant rarlio irrtell i1;enc0'wasto the Gerrnanswas recordedin the

14 Juneissue of the bulletin*,which said that due to the Soviet radio silence

* T-311,Roll 466, Frame6446150. the GermanCommand had lost one of its nrost'importantsources of intelligence. "Because Andthen the bulletin adds, radjo intelligenceactivities are no longer effective, d'ifficulties in establishing Soviet deployrnenthave arjsen.

At present, air inte'lligcrrce is rrrrrchrrrur'o cliff icult to carry out thrrnbcfore becauseof' thr: t rttt',l,t1tl.ilrr.r'r',r',r' ol t,lrr,l(rr.,,rirln rlnLiair. rk., l(lrr.,t,:,. Ilr is is wlry the details of the cortc.luclintyplra';e ol the Soviet strategic deployrrentis inr- possibleto ascertajn."

rlr-q!_91q1_t.! 9f tfre sltalgg11lg1gtjJg ' In the morningof 23 June1944 Soviet forces launched what turned out to be a surprise offensive in Byelorussia. Almostsimultaneously the Soviets struck in five different sectors on that front, broke through the German defenseson a 500 kilometerzone, and in the following six days advancedsone 150 kilometers.

Germanmilitary historians and Germangenerals captured during the opera- tion certified to the fact that the Soviet attack wasa surprise. Whileassessing the Soviet ,tss.rult.in thc Vitr.lr,,l,,trr',1 , thr, Ccrrrr,lrrrrilit;rry hirtorian

Tippe'lskirch*wrote that the Sov'ietaclvance northwest of Vitebskwas part.icularly

* Kurt VonTippelskirch, _D1q!r,e_lcJric-h_tg_d_qp1_w_e_j,!en Welt!^iegs (Uonn: Athenaum, 1es4) sickeningbecause it wasa total surpriseand it struck'in a particularly lightly defendedsector of a decisive zone.

LieutenantGeneral Al fons flitter, corrlnranclerof the 206th Infantry Divis.ion, "We testifjed after his capture, knpwI ittle about the Russianpreparat'ionfor 'large, the offensive. By and rnostof irs believed that the Rtrssianoffensive

wouldtake place in the south.. Beforethe start of the Russianoffensive,

I as well as manyothers;. thought that irr the Vitebskarea, and possibly in

ther places' only diversionaryor secondaryoperations would take p1ace.,,

Anotherhigh ranking Germanofficer, LieutenantGeneral Hilmar Moser, testi- ' fied that the advanceof Soviet troops wascarrjed out with surprising strength, vigor,. and speed. Lieutenant GeneralLverhard von Kurovsk'i,conmander of the German 110th Infantry Division, stated after his capture that one of the reasons

lor' Lhe Lot,rI dt:lc,rl 0l (rr'(,rt1r(.t.lrl.r,t /\Iilt,y w.t:, Llr.rL Llrc pl(tlt5 ,.1rdo lrrrsof Llre

Russiancommand we t'c ttuL f u lly rlct.ct-Lecllry (iunrunirrte ll i1lcrrcg. Due to the swift advanceof Sovir:t forces, the Gerrnansituation in t).ye-

lorussia becamecrit'ical. In order to stabilize the front line, the German Command was forced to transfer a considerable nurnberof troops from the o.ther : sectors of the Soviet-Germanfront. This in turn weakenedthe Germansin

'- sectors wherethe troops had been transfered and contrjbuted to the success 'in of the subsequentSovjet offensjves the Ukrajneand the Baltic States.

Duringthe last nine days of June (tnat is, frornthe time the Soviet

offensive started) and in July the Germanstransferred 16 divisions from

other sectors of the Sovie,t-Germanfront to Byelorussia. 0f these three - infantry and one panzerdjvisions were taken from ArmyGroup North, six 'infantry panzer and four divisions fronr the NorthernUkraine Army Group, and

one infantry and one panzerdjv'isions from the SouthernUkraine Army Group.

In addition, three divisions and two brigadeswere transferred to Bye'lo- r ' russia from Germany,two djvisions frorn the gKHreserve, and from Norwayand Holland one division each. Thus,during this period the GermanCormand rein-

forced ArmyGroup Center with 23

t Takingall this into con:;idr:ratiorr,it- js reasonahrleto assumethat the

achievementof strateg'icsurp.rise in [3yelorrrssiawas not only helpful in the

defeat of GermanArmy Group Center, but jt causedthe weakeningof other Ger-

manforces' especially the'Northern UkraineArmy Group. Transfer of German

forces to Byelorussiafrom different sectors of the front causeda peculiar kind of chain reaction, whenthe Gerrrrans,not hav'ingenough reserves to counter Soviet. blows in Byelorussia, had to d'ivert large forces from the Lvov sector. This weakenedthe NorthernUkraine Army Group. In turn, when1n the second half of July 1944the Soviet lst Ukrainian ArmyGroup conmenced the Lvov-

Sandomierzoperdtiolt, the [.iertrrarrCorrurr,.urd translerred scvcnrltvisions there, including three panzerdivisions, frornthe Southerntjkraine Army Group. Sub- sequently, this facilitated a quick defeat of the.SouthernUkraine Army Group

when'it wasattacked by the soviet 2d and 3d ukrainianArnry Groups.

GeneralConcl usions:

The experienceof the 1944sunrner-fal1 campaign suggests that, in compari-

son with past wars, the achieverrrentof surprise in World War II had become more difficult and conrplicated.Whereas in previouswais the defenderbould receive information about the attacker's preparation for the offensive pri- mari'ly throughagents, PW$and defectors, in WorldWar Il his capabilities in- of gathering creasedconsiderably by adding such effer:tjve meins/ inte|iqence, ds itir recon_ jntelligence. najssance,and radio Underthese circumstances it wasvery dif:- ficult to securea surprise.

Despite increasedintelliqence and reconnaissancemeans the Germ,rnConmand

I wasunable to find out the operat'ionalairtr of the SovietCornmand, and could not define the sectorof the maineffort. Thesecrecy of the preparationfor the ma'inattack'in Byelorussiawas achieved by carryingout a systemof carefully- plannedand brilliantly executedmeasures of whichthe mostimportant were: ' 1, ^r' Spe€d *tt. . .'f. ;ii,(. ;'.:,)..:,

- uffet:tir '.,(

- lt i ddri n i' i, r. -), - .,-.,d firm ddi,€"L jj j.

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Ctrt'i;,.filnfgl'lt i',i l;i'i:ltjr.:.lrrtr, ,i {jl ,,r,.lfr, ; ,;;-,,, _. : uel,i:ic,

5,iaft anti the staffs of ariny g."uuys, i; he'ij ;r;,etn€tfl ti:re ei.mi qrc.,-.pqer,r armies, and downto lower units .,) \i \ ) /_\.,,,.,i,,, I .___/.* r \ I

f*..-'+--r- i + -l-* + -'----i \ /\ I lr "i lt, 1 ',{.,llr --. i

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1'ne),rn) I "tr *\.Jt I-lclinl '\Yo., , \ 'r14,111 '.l;t$: l:ii :.ii# :r1: Alnfgt lceue,o 6utuur6a8 , I l:Tt I:.1 / l-*l\ / tt\ ', ( t-!-t \ gZ uo rel I aaunf lsullV_suorleredejd lcepe lo uo!snlcuoc I I I '/I

lt^

5; -,'t (urrrllutf itou(, srr't;rr.rurlortlsrrot;rr.ru

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ap, c t- !.l I o-E + ,.,3 lFgll5zt\z \ \ 1,1/| l\ = ?= '\ cFr (h lealOi I'l\ I*j L o, \ L=l)l. E o L \ L=l/lE \ o t=l\ E l t:r/r-l L \

sJoleclpul aAtltsod J:i-- srolectput aAlle6aN

I APPENDIXA

ArmyGroup Center Hq., Dept. ICIA0

Intelligence: Operations19 June1944.

Cou,prehensiveEvalration of the Enem.vSituat.ion* I. The eltettlylrit l.ttr0 ltas t-haltq()dr.orrsiderably sinr:e 2 June (sec Brief Evaluation of the [nerrrySituation).

Whatwe hadtt-r reckon with up to thenwere local attacks, regroupingand pul 'ing I together avaiI able sourcesw j th the goal of operationalconta.inment. Now

eventsat the ArmyGroup's easternfront, especially in the Gome'larea and east of Orsha,give evidenceof expansionof enemyundertak'ings.

II. No essential changehas taken place with respect to knownformations in the powerscheme. However,we can surely assumethat newforces, as yet not identified

by name(Crimean troops?) are. on their way into the Gomelarea--currently these are

believed.tobe I2-L4rifle djvisionsand 3-4 tankorganizations--and the llth Guards (8-10 Army rifle divisions,2 tank organizatjons)ismostprobably moving into the areaeast of 0rsha.

In addition, there are believedto be sometroop movementsof lesser extent,

probablyprimarily armytroops, headinginto the Krichevarea and southeast of Vitebsk. Thebuildup of strongpoints is assumedto be considerablygreater in the air forces (6th Air Army,Kovel - 400; l6th Air Army,Gomel - 1600; lst Air Army,

Smolensk- 1600; 3rd Air Army,south of Nevel- 900planes, making a total of 4,500 out of altogether11,000 planes wjthout ADD/ebbr. unknownT.

*t-ltT, Tol I 233, Frarnesl06i-66. A comparisonof RedA;i1ny and RedAir Forcestrengthsleadsto the questionwhether

still moreRed Army Forces have not beenmoved up undetected. (0nedisturbing factor is, for example,the appearanceof MarshalRotmjstrov's name--conmander of the 5th yartsevo GuardsTank Army--in the area, accordingto a securesource.) Then,however,

the over.allevaluation would no longer be accurate. Accordingto Arqy High Conmand (0KH)information, hou,ever,there is sti I I no reasonfor th.is assumption. III. this .In connection,the dttticultjes of reconnaissancein all fields mustbe cited again.' Theweakness of air reconnaissanceis sufficiently known. Recengylt has provided essentiallyonly rail reconnajssanceand air photographyof enemyartillery positions, but has beenunable to identify large movementseven in the area close to the front.

Likewise'no further mentjonis neededof the difficulties of maintainingsecure sources. Theagent reconnaissanceespecia'l1y set up in the armygroup has achieved somevery goodresults in the area of SecondArmy, but is scarcelyable to penetrate the tightly closed fronts of the eastern front and recently also of the northeast front (Vitebsk-Polozk). Unfortunately,conm'itment of parachuteagehts has not brought

the results we hadhoped for, andcasualtjes have been great, presumablyas a result of betrayal outside the army.

FewPtr.|'s and deserters have been picked up.

IV. In SecondArmy, enemy evaluation on the wholehas not changed.Despite active agent reconnaissance,it wasnot possible to confirm the presenceof strong operational resefvesin the rear area of the Seventiethand sixtieth Armies.

As before, we will haveto reckonwith expansionof the expectedattacks agqinst ArmyGroup North Ukraine into the southflank of VIII ArmyCorps. Nodata is yet availableon forceswhich would confirm plans for an attack in the directionof Brest, whichmight be expectedbecause of certain consjderations.However, mention mustbe '2 madeof increasingreconniirrun.uactiv'ity northwest of KamenKashirsk in viewof the conditionof the l2th HungarianReserve Djvision. After an increasein frorton . the both sides of Horyn,'localattacks in this sector cannotbe excluded.

In the N'inthArmy there is a clear indjcation of intent to launcha concentrated attack on Bobruisk. In this area just now,presumably since 3 June,there has beena jn rai'l movement proqress,the extent of whichis not yet known. By careful calculailon,

L2-L4rjfle djvisions andaround 4 tank orgdnizationscan be broughtup by 18 June, with a great part of the transportationfacility usedto strengthenthe air force in this area. By usingthe mainlines fromKiev it sbemspossible, and this hasalso beenreported by PW's,that troops havebeen brought foruard from the Crjmea,as h,e knowfrom a securesource has beendone for the air forces.

Basedon enemybehavior and especially an increase in artil'lery, the following areasappear to be the assemblypositions:

a) Sl'lof the Beresina,between Kobylshchina and Chjrkovichi ; . the b) Betweery'Beresi na and the Dnleper , j n the area both sides of Morma; c) TheDrut sector andnorth of Rogachev.

The main concentrationpoint, accordinqto the strength picture (artillery) and on the basis of operationalconsiderations,might'lie southwest of the Beresina.

In FourthArmy as before,we mustcount on attacksagainst Mogilev, however, with the addition of a newoperation against Orsha. |.lhilejt wasnot possibleto {. makeany determinationof the supposedstrength total southwestof Chaussy,the bujldupof a mainconcentration point'in the areaaround Ryassna, already assumed after the arrival of the Thirty-third Armyand on the basis of groundobservations and agent reports, is comingto light. Air pho.tographicinterpretation reveals an artillery increaseto 125batteries (80 accordingto artil'lery reconnaissance).This number seemssomewhat high for the,eight-tenrifle divisionsknown to be available...at

tl" iun.tion of the Forty-ninth and Thirty-th.ird armies.1.'|ith a continual increase in the use of the railroad line, the shipmenfof newindivjdual formationsvia

Krichev'is possible. OnePt,J statement on the unloadingof 200 tanks at Krichevneeds confirmation;however, wg mustreckon with the presenceof somesmall tank organiza- tlons

A definite deploymenthas beenunder way on the highwaysince l0 June. A secure 'source has reportedthe arrival of a newGuards Army (llth?). Therehave been strong

movementsfrom the north via Dobromyssl(llth GuardsArmy? Twodivisions of this have

beenconfirmed by PW's.)andalso from the east on the highwayas detectedby ground

observation. Air photographyhas also shownan increasein artil'lery to 213batteries (140 accordingto artjllery reconnajssance).Upon confirmation of the 1lth Guards

Army,t{e must reckon with the arrival of NineGuards rifle divisions andtwo-three tank organizations.

Thefrontal attack against0rsha apparently is to be supportedthis time by a simultaneous thrust from the north over the Suchodrovkasector (direction of 0rsha or Seno?). This thrust will strike the southernpart of the Third panzerArmy. The picture of the forces here'is also unclear. Besidesslx position formations,t{e can

also assumethe presenceof the v GuardsRifle corpsand the v Arti'llery corps, and the conmitmentof three organizat'ionseach from the armyreserves and the GHQreserves.

Aboveand beyond this,'in viewof the heavytraffic on the Smolensk-Liosnorailraod 'limited between10 Juneand 15 June, w.emay also haveto expecta use of the rails to bring troops forward. It is still uncleanwhat role is to be playedby an unidentified cormandstaff reported by a secure source.

l"lecannot eliminate from the enemypicture at presentthe objective of a concentrated 4 attack on Vjtebsk. Considerationsnot only speakfor it, but there havealso been

securereports from partisansources. This is all the morepossible in viewof the apparent withdrawalof the V GuardsRifle Corpsfrom the east front of Vitebsk to the Sucholdrovka sector in the south. Clarification of the enemypicture on and north of

the Sur'ash-Vitebskroad will probablygive us an answerto this question. Thereare no special indicationsat the north front; however,the identif.icationof heavyarmy artlllery (one brigadeand at least two regirnerrts)rrorthwest of Vitebskspeaks for attack obiectivesthat, to be sure, are not reflected in the infantry picture.

Nevertheless'the mainpoint of effort for the enemyforces can be assumedto be in front of the southernflank of the TankArmy . V' In surmary, it can be establishedthat attacks to be expectedat the front of the ArmyGroup, againstBobruisk, Mogilev,0rsha, and possibly northwest of Vitebsk,will havemore than a local character. Judgingby the conrnitmentof armyand air forces, their overall goal will be to bring aboutthe collapseof the armygroup,s salient arc at points, several tearing up the front. 0n the other hand,the picture of Red Armyforces' as recogn'izedor calculated, doesnot yet reflect a remoteobjective, such as Minsk,for example.To be sure, attent.ionmust be drawnto the disproportion betweenarmy and air strengths,and also to the djfficulties.in reconnajssance, whichare espec'ially great at this time . SignedWorgitzky ( IntelI igenceOfficer)

.a{ Note- TheDeputy Chief of the GeneralStaff and the Conmander-in-Chiefhave been O*r"O on this evaluation. As ordered,no written report will be made. Handwrittenquestion in margin: ',l'lhy?,, ANNEXD (cont)

l.'

DRAFTT

CASESTUDY

SURPRISEIN THEBATTLE OF THE BULGI 1944

. Thereis no doubt the Germanattack il|firo"nnes in 1944achieved effective surprise.

Analystsattribute the Germansuccess to a gross failure by Allied groundand air in- telligence. Germans,on the other hand,cite the thoroughnessof deceptiveand camouflage nEasuresas the reasonfor obtaining completesurprise. Both are correct. The

achievementof surprise is particularly noteworthyin light of the overwhelmingAllied

air superiority, the limited area in wh'ichthe Germanshad to assemblelarge formations,

and'the overall defensiveposture of the Germanarmed forces. Usingan elaboratede-

ceptibnscheme, placing great store in an extensivecamouflage program, and insisting

on strict secrecy,the Germanssuccessfully persuaded the Allies not to refnfsree the

weakfour-division force in the area chosenfor the breakthroughwhich was designed to -l capturethe vital logistics complexat Antwerpas well as to severthe Allied front.

TheGerrnn plan called for the Sixth SSPanzer Army under SS General Sepp Dietrich,

the Fifth PanzerArmy cormanded by Generalvon Manteuffel, and the SeventhArmy led by GeneralBrandenberger to launcha coordjnatedoffensive against the AmericanVIII Corps

deployedalong the Ur River in Luxembourgand Belgiumon 16 December1944. Thebeefed- up Sixth SSPanzer Army was to advanceas rapidly as possiblein a north-westdirection

and captureAntwerp. The Fifth PanzerArmy was to attack towardthe EnglishChannel-, and securethe area aroundBrussels. TheSeventh Army was given the mission,with its

four.infantry divisions,of securingthe Fj.fth PanzerArmy,s southern flank. Theresult

of this maneuverwas to be to force the 21st Anglo-CanadianArqy Groupand the Ninth andFirst U.S. Armiesto withdrawfromthe continentala Dunkirk1940. Preparations for the offensive were to be maskedby a special plan to misleadthe Allies.

TheGerman deception plan relied on us'ingthe operationsaround Aachen as a cover

ffin andexpansion. for massingtroops. TheAmericans had bden heavi]y engaged in frontofAachensince September,and the American2d,4th, and28th Infantry Divjsionshad suffered badly as a result of the heavyfighting there. Theywere relieved and removedfrom the batile area whentheir combateffectiveness was substantially reduced,and transferred to "quiet" sectors. The 28th and 4th Infantry Divisjons foundthemselves moved to the precise area wherethe Germansplanned the breakthrough,t|,hile the 2d Infantry Division wasso placedthat it wasdrawn into the Germanoffensive by v'irtue of be'ingon the northernflank of the attack whenit was.launched.This placementalone of weakened allied divisionsis a stark indicatorof'the lack of importancethe Allies.assigned to the proposedarea of operationsfor the Gernrancounteroffenslve and showsthe Arnericandiscounting the lessonsto be learnedfrom the Frenchdebacle in 1g40.

' TheGerman ploy wasto massthe'ir d.ivisionsbehind the Aachenfront so that the Americanswould assume that these Germanforces wouldbe deployedin battle there, or that they wouldbe employedto counterattackif the Americansmanaged to breakthrough to the Rhine. Theseformations were then movedsouttflvest to their jump-off positionsshortly beforethey wereto attack. This techniqueminimized the revelationto the Allies of the intendedarea of operations.

To intensify this ploy, the Sixth panzerArmy, wh.ich was to play a majorrole in the attacki waschosen as the majorveh'icle of deception. Fourof its arnpreddivisions assenbledin the vicinity of Cologne,northwest of whichwas the army'sheadquarters. i. Muchmovement was made in dayl'ight, and the intensification of rail and road traffic whichbegan about mid-November was only partly concealed. Therewas increasedroad repair, radio traffic, andantiaircraft support,all to reinforce the thesis that the { Germansreally feared a breakthroughand drive to the Rhinefrom the Aachenarea.

A ghost dfltty,the Twenty-fifth, waseven organized and publicized to emphasizedthe Germanconcern.

At the sametime that Germanformations were mass'ing opposite US forces in Aachen, 12'

,t Measures weretaken to ensurethat an illus'ion of normalitywas maintained opposite the Anericandivisions in the Ardennes. Thuselaborate security measureswere adopted in the intended areaof oierations. Thesector hadbeen quiet since the Allied dash acrossFrance had halted in September.The German div'isions identified there were battle-weary, understrength,and seemedto require rest and refitting. Although fresh divisions had appearedfrom time to time, their stay hadbeen brief. The Germansintended to perpetuatethis illusory s-ituation. Thearray of small vi'llagesin the Eifel, the heavilywooded terrain wherethe Germansassembled for the counteroffr.n:;ive,wds skillful.ly exploitedto hide large formations' Although individuallythe villageswere not worthyof Allied intelligence consideration,collectively they assumedgreat importance.The clustering of these villages madedispersion of numbersof trooo, porrible wh.ileat the sametime main- taining unit cohesiveness 'The since the villages rierefairly close together. Germans exploitedthe use of camouflage,an art whichthey hadbecome very skillful in, especiallysince the Allies gained had air superiority. Thenumerous wooded areas of the Eifel also madeit possibleto concealtroop locationsand unit movements. In addition to the natural coverafforded by the terrain, specialmeasures were taken to assurethe facadeof normalcy. strict traffic regulation confinedmovement to night time. vehicle park size wascontrol'led by special security detachments. charcoalwas issued to troopsfor fuel for their field kitchens ;. andheating stoves to reduce the amountof tell-tale smokegenerated in troop areas. A special demarca- tion line was establ'ishedbehind which field andantiaircraft artillery troopsand bridge units were kept. A radi.oblackout was thrown over the concentrationarea exceptfor those units actually facing the enemy. Noartillery registrationswas permittedby weaponson line; and thesewere permjttedto fire only a few roundsper day' Reconnaissance wasrestricted, with only a handfulof higher rankingofficers beingpermitted to reconnoiter. Combatpatrolling wasalso limited, andmost of it wasdone to locate anddestroy American patrols.

Strict security exte.ndedfrom Hitler downto the soldjer in his fighting position. Indeed,security was so tight that key Germangenera'ls felt that it becamea hindrance in executing p1ans. (There their is muchevidence to supportthis view in the actions of the attacking units oncethey crossedthe line of departure. Therewere good reasons for the failure of the Germanoperation,including stiff USresistance, Allied'air superiority, andparticularly inadequateGerman resources to sustaina drive of this magnitude againstan adversarywith superiormobjle assets. But the inability of the Gerrnans to adhereto their tirretableand thus reachobjectlves on time mustbe attributed in part to lack of familiarity with the conceptand area of oPeratlonsby combattroops which were deprived of.sufficient jnformat.ionand prepara- tion time to launchand maintain an effective effort.) 0n 3 November1944, Hitter held a conmandbriefing for a small selectedgroup of high rankingofficers at whichcolonel General Alfred Jodl, chief of the ArmyH.igh cormand'soperation staff, outlinedthe draft plan for a,'decisiveoffensive,,in the West' Prion to the briefing eachattendee had to pledgehimself to preservecomplete silence concern'ingthe information to be divulged. Thepenalty for disclosurewas to be death' This meeting andthe pledgeset the tone for the entire operation,and, althougheffective in assuringsurprise, the extremesecrecy is blamedfor later muddles .

In addition to an elaboratedeception pldn, the extensiveuse of canrouflage, andstrict security, the Germanssought to achievesurprise in launchingtheir attack by varying the timing andmethod of attack. Thus,the'init.ial attack waslaunched at 5:30 in the morninginstead of the origipally projected7:30. Thepurpose of the time changewas not only to confuseand thus surprise the Americans,who were not whatwas haooeni.ng-,^-bj.t-J9^ give the Germansmore ight in accustomedto'early"morningatdacks dayl which to l;;rri;i', ui tolgain.initial objectives. Tank formations werealso to movefomard at night of the first day so as to be in position '1 to attack at dawnof the secondday. As to the methodof attack, eachinfantry division formeda special "stormbattalion", whichwas to penetratedeep into Anericanlines and bypurs:'resistanceat the front so as to attack Arnericanposltions from the rear and therebyease the advanceof the following troops. Thesemeasures to obtain local surpriseon launch'ingthe attack metwith varied success,since factors like Americanreadiness and weather heavily influencedtheir effectiveness. Surprise,both tact'ical andstrategic, wasachjeved by the Germans.The reasonswhy the Americanswere surprisedcover a wide spectrum,but fundamentally the Allied cormandersd'id not think the Germanswere capable of launching.another offensivebecause of their conv'ictionthat Hitler did not possessthe forcesor resourcesto launcha decisivecounterstroke. ' Froma strategic point of vjew, the Allies developeda preconceptionthat-the Germanswere incapableof suchan attack. This preconceptionserved as a screening devicefor all informationobtained and filtered backup the chainof cormand.This preconceptionallowed the Americansto place battle-wearyand untried troops in the front lines,grouped'inan armycorps (the VIII) rather than dispersethem among tnore combatready or fresher troops. Thepreconception could also justify the placing of suchformations in an area wherecombat was considered unlikely, to wit the

Ardennes. Thuswhen the Germanslaunched their counteroffensivethey surprisedan Allied high commandwh'ich underestimated the enemy'scapabilities while misinterpreting his intentions.

. TheAllies weresurprjsed by the strength of the enemyattack and by its location.

!,lhy: As part of the preconceptionthe Allies' planningu,as incomplete. Thecourses of action opento the Germanswere inadequatelyanalyzed. Accordingto the official

U.S. Armyhistory of Worldl,'lar II an offensive of the magnitudecontemplated by

Hitler appearedout of the question,especially since the Amer.icans,'knew',that

Field l'larshalvon Rundstedtwas'cormanding in the West. Allied intelligenceassessed him as a conmanderwho could be expectedto act accordingto the rules of the military art' Hewas a generalwho wouldhusband his dwindlingresources and then counter- attack at an appropriatetime, falling backto the Rhinefor a majordefensive bat'e. Theonly flaw wasthat Hitler, not von Rudstedt,cormanded, and intuitjon, not conventionalprofessional judgntent, deterrninedthe courseof action. TheAIlies, idea of whowas in cormand,i.e. von Rundstedt,then, coloredthe thinking of those responsiblefor the analysisof enemycourses of action to a markeddegree, and Alied planningdid not take'into accounttlre possibility of a bold counterstroke. Likewisethe All'icd hiqlt <:rtttttttantltttir;jutlgcd the terrain restrictions in f ront of the vIII corps' The1940 Frenchand Allied experiencewas lost on the Anrericans as evidencedby their placingtroops at less thanpeak fighting conditionon l.inein the Ardennes' The Frenchdid the sarrrething i.n May1940. TheAmerjcans, however, did not haveto labor underthe sanre restrictions the Frenchhad to, since Belgium wasnot neutral in 1944,ald the Americans hadbeen on the groundsince early fall. As a result, throughthe sophisticated meansavajlable to the Allies, it waspossible to developa very detailed andvalid picture of the terrain andanalyze its features, by hypothesizingat the sametime how a Germanattack mightbe launched,and with sufficient strengthsucceed. This failure on the part of the Ailies mustbe attributed to poorjudgment, then, in light of their knowledgeof the terrain andthe lg40 Frenchexperience.

A very importantAll'ied failure whichalso contributedto the surpriseobtained by the Germanswas the lack of cooperationbetween the Allied ajr and groundrecon- naissanceelements and the inadequate cal'iber of informationgenerated by suchco- operationas did exist. Ihe intelligence staff at von Rundstedt,sheadquarters on 15 Decemberdetermined that there was a lack of interest in the sector chosenfor the operationwhen it notedhow little Allied aerial reconnaissancewas being conducted over the area. TheVIII Corpsdjvisjons askedon nunrerousoccasions. for air reconnaissance during the five days precedingthe Gennanattack, but only three missionswere flown directly oppositethi corps area and thosewere on 14 Decemberover Trier. In November,before the final assemblyfor the attack began,d large numberof missions wereflown, but during the first half of becember,while the 67th Tactical Recon- naissanceGroup (lX Tact'icalAir Cormand)cons'istently included Eifel targets-in-its missionsorders, the mjssjonswere often scratchedbecause they had sucha low priority. Noone really appeared'interestedin whatwas going on in the area. Even whenVIII Corpsrer;ttests w('F('rt(t(t('1rted b.yhir;her r;rorrnd echelons and forwarded to alr headquarters,these m'issions retained such a low priority, whencompared to demands for air reconnaissanceon the Roerand Saar fronts, that they often droppedright off the missionlist whenthe tasks weredistributed to the group'ssquadrons. From 16 Novemberto 15 December,then, there wasa rapidly decreasingamount of aif intelligence informationbeing made available to the groundforces

Becauseof priorities the small amountof current informationmade available to VIII Corpsmight be iustified, but there wasan add'itionalproblem, and that was interpretationof the results of thosemissions flown. The67th Groupsripported the entire First U.S. Armyand, as noted, flew manyreconnaissance missions along the Roerand Saar fronts. Thesemissions identified a large increasein rail activity westof the Rhineon 30 November,and there weresiqhtinqs of a'large numberof hospitaltrains, searchlights,and flatcars bearingTiger tanksjndicating preparations for attack. Lights indicating large scale niqht movementswere consistently reported by nlght fighter squadrons

But againpreconceptions co'lored the interpretationof thjs jnformation. Both the Allied air and groundheadquarters expected the enemyto rejnforce the areas wherethe First andThird U.S. Arm'ieswere attacking, that js north andsouth of the Ardennes.Interpreters then concludedthat indicationsof increasedactjvity in the

.7 Eifel actually reflected movementsof troops on'ly to the Roerand Saarbattle areas. For example,trainloads o.f Tiger tanks wereseen on a rail net which ran to the Roer, but a rail branchof the net also led south to the Eifel. The interpreters v{ere interpreting just as the Germanswished, evidence the Germandeception plan u,as effecti ve.

Also distressing wasthe poor lia'ison betweenthe air and groundheadquarters with regardto the initial interpretatjonplaced by the air forces on the data collectedthrough air reconnaissancewhich resulted in a loss of confidencebetween the branches.The U.S. Army Air Forces'official history attributesthjs.shortcoming to a.matterof organizatjonand admits to a twilight zonebetween air andground headquartersin photointerpretation where responsibility hadnot beensufficiently pinried down. Theresult wasa tendencyto downgradethe reljability attributed to suchinterpretation.

0n 15 December,the Allied a'ir conunanderswere told by the SHAEFG-3 that the Germanarmor had not movedin responseto the Allied attemptsto captureor destroy theRoerdams,thus insuring a successfulpenetration in the area. Therewas nothing to report on the VIII Corpsfront, whichwas consjdered normal since nothingwas expectedin the region anyway. TheA-2 stated that the Luftwaffe's activitjes were rnving westward,but these'wereonly defensivein nature.

Informationfrom groundsources wds,l.,sketchy as that fromthe ajr. Intelligence surmaries,periodic reports, andbrjef.ing precis up to 16 Decemberprovided only fragmentaland skeletal informat'ionon the enemyoppos'ite. Duringthe period 13-15

Decemberonly sevenintelligence'items wh'ich could g'ivecause for alarmappeared in VIII Corpsunit reports. . Theywere treated in the samelight that mostinformation was' that is that importanthappenings transpired north andsouth of the Ardennes, but neverat that location.

The/8th Infantry Division reportedincreased vehicular activity to its front on the n'ightsbefore the offensive. Thedivis'ion discounted thjs activity by noting that this often happenedduring an enemyfroniline relief andthat the samething had happenedwhen a Germanunit had beenrelieved someweeks previously. The l06th Infantry Division also reportedincreased act.ivity, but being greendid not knowwhat 'weight to assign to thjs information. Thereappears to havebeen no further effort to developadditionar information about such movement. 0n'14 Decembera womanline-crosser reportedmasses of Germanequipment located in the Bitburg area to the Z8th Infantry Divis'ioncormander. Her information,,as conslderedreliabre enoughto have her dispatchedthrough vII corps,and, gt corps behest, to the First Annyheadquarters, whereshe arrived on 16 December,the day of the attack.

'The four other incidentsinvolved prisoners takenshortly beforethe attack was launched' Twowere deserters. Their reports of fresh troops and an impendingall-out attack weretreated lightly, andthe two menwere dispatched to the prisonerof war cage' Theother two prisonerswere vJounded, and althoughthey also spokeof newunits anda counteroffensivein the offirg, rot muchstock wasplaced in their reports either. ThevIII corpsreceived four intelligence. reports. Threeprisoner reports from its subordinateunits werenot fon,rarded to corps, havingbeen discounted as unreliable rumors' The First Armyreceived the four reports from the corps, but onry one of thesewas foruarded to the lZth ArmyGroup. This report wasabout the large amountof traffic, but'it wasassessed as the predictedrelief of the German326th Infantry Divisionand dismissed as havingno speciarsignificance. Theset in the mindsof the Americansas to the lack of importance { of the Ardennes evidentlycontributed to the lack of aggressivepatroiling and reconnaissancealong the vIII corpsfront' An almostindifferent attitude, accentuatedby the greenness of sometroops and battlewear.iness of others, seemsto haveprevailed jn seekingout enemyinformation' But it also is evidentthat the Germandeception plan wasworking since everythingappeared to be reasonablynormal across the battle lines. 9 I assassinateGeneral Eisenhower..

In conclusion,the Germanssuccessfully lulled the Allies into believeing

that they wouldnot launcha major counteroffensivein the Ardennesthrough an elaborate deception,camouflage, and security scheme.,The Americans were surprised principally

becausethey hadpreconce'ived ideas as to Gernrancapabilities and intent'ions;they

improperlyassessed the Ardennes'potential as an avenueof attack; they placed

insufficient priority on their ajr andground jntelligence effort; andthey wereduped

by the Germanefforts to concealthe projectedGerman counteroffensive. vet, in spite of the surprisega'ined, the results of the attack weredisappoint.ing, as

Antwerp,the objective, wasnot gained;the Germanslost excessivenumbers of men andmaterial; andonly a few weeks'respite weregained. PreciousGerman reserves

andInaterial had beenexpended, and few resourcesremained to stop the impending

- disaster in the East. This campaign,then, mustbe viewedas an outstandjngexample

of a strategic operationwhich failed eventhough almost complete initial surprise : wasobtai ned.

t1

i BIBLIOGRAPHY

BaueF'Eddy. Der Panzerkrieg. 2 vols. Bonn: Verlag 0ffene !'lort, n.d.

Cole, HughM. The Andennes: Battle of the Bulge. U.S. Armyin lrlorldgar II. Washington:GpO,1965. Frieden, Seynnrrr.& l,Jilliam Richarrlror, eds. Thof-atgl D..isions. Newyork: l,|illiam SloaneAssociates, 1956.

Liddel-Hart,Basil Henry. The0ther side of the Hill.

Whaley,Rarton. Strataqem,unpublished manuscriot.

12 ANNEXD (cont ) I DRAFT*

CASESTUDY

ELALAMEIN, 23 OCTOBER1942 0n 23 0ctober 1942,artillery of GeneralMontgomery,s Eighth Army, com_ posed.ofBritish, Cormonwealth, andAllied units, openedfire on the combined Germanand ltalian armiesunder the temporarycornnand of the GermanGeneral Sturmeat El Alameinin Egypt. Fourteendays later defeatedAxis formations beganto retreat alonqthe northern coast of NorthAfrica. Field Marshal Ronmel,overail conmanderof the troops facing the British EjghthArmy, had returnedon 26 October,three daysafter the initial djversionaryattacks be- gan0n the southernflank, but in the endeven his charismaticpresence could not'inspire his devotedtroops to beat backthe tremendousmain attack in the north. TheCormonwealth jnfantry, fol.lowedby Montgomery,sthree armored divisions,penetrated the minefierds and,,Devi],sGardens,,in the sectorbe_ tweenthe MediterraneanSea and Ruwei:;atRidge. Theoverwhelming superiority of Allied mightcould not be stopped, and the Axis troopswere forced to re- treat to the MarethLine in Tunisia.

Montgomeryprepared this offensive with characteristicareat deliberation. Hewas forced to puncha hole througha well preparedGerman-ltalian position 32 miles lor9, anchoredon the Medjterraneansea on the north andthe quick-sand filled QuattarDepression on the south.' TheAxjs forces hadspent more than thr'eemonths building their defenses. Triple belts of minefieldsand well defendedpositions adorned the northern sector, while the southerndefenses, if not so forrnidable,were sited to canalizepenetration. No practicableway wasoffered to take this line in flank.

* Subjectto expansionand revisjon. Oppositethe Allies wasa'line of Italian infantrydivjsions interspersed

with Germanparatroop units,. situated behindminefields up to 9,000meters

deep. Behindthe static.foot units weresjx mob'iledivisions, with the l5th PanzerDivision and the Italian Littorio ArmoredDivision in the north and the 21st PanzerDivision and the lta'lian Ariete ArmoredDivision in the south. 'Echeloned to the rear alongthe seawere the German90th Light Divisjonand the Italian TriesteDivision

Montgomeryplanned his mainattack againstthe Germanposition jn the

north, using a feint in the south to hold downthe enemyreserves located there. He sent hls engineersand infantry in first. Becausemany of the German'mine- fields werenot coveredby fire, c'learinglanes through many of the fields was accomplishedwith relative ease. But the Germans.andItalians preventeda

quick brdakthroughin hard fighting. Reversingstandard tactics and proc.edures,

ion of wtriCnwas too muchfor Rormel'sinadequately supplied but tenaciousdefenders.

TheEighth Army's initial dispositionsfor the offens'ivewere established

with two thoughtsin mind. Thefirst wasto concentratethe maximumcombat power at the point of decision, and the secondwas to concealfrom the enemy the time, strength, and locat'ionof the maineffort. In order to accomplishthe latter, an elaboratedeception plan wasexecuted. A brief examinationof the- Cormonweal,thand Allied order of battle revealsthe foundationupon which this plan wasbased.

TheXXX Army Corps, conmanded by LieutenantGeneral 0liver Leese,occupied

the northernsector of the front. It consistedof the 9th Australian Infantry

D'ivision,51st Infantry'Divjsion(Hightand), 2d NewZealand Infantry Division supportedby the 9th ArmoredBrigade, lst SouthAfrican Infantry Division,4th Indian Infantry Diy'ision,and the 23dArmored Brigade. This jnfantry-heavy force wasto makethe maineffort, but,its composition,i.e., five infantry

divisions and two annorbrigades, was contrary to the modusoperandi in the desert for mobileopera.tions, where the tactics called for tanks leadingand

infantry following. TheAxis, on analyzingthese dispositions, could reason-

ably assume,in light of past experienceand method of operationin North

Africa, that this corpswould conduct diversionary operations in any offensive. TheXIII ArmyCorps, cormanded by LieutenantGeneral Brian Horrocks, held the southernsector. Thecorps containedaGreek Brigade, the S0th and 44th Infantry Divisions, the lst FreeFrench Brigade, and the 7th Armored Dlvlsion. Thocolrllx)5ition of'thls ort.;anlzat.lonsuq(,():,tccl two posslbllltles to the Germans. "Desert The7th ArrpredDivision, the famous Rats,,,wasthe only Allied annoreddivision on line. Its deployment.gavethe Allies the capability of launchinga mechanizedattack in the south,a capability Montgomerywished to imply to the Axis. Second,one armored division couldnot hopeto break

througha preparedposition with four comparablehostile armoredformations

waiting'in reserveto pinchoff the attack. Obviouslyadditional armored divisions wouldbe required,and the Axis could gaugethe timing of the anti- cipatedattack on the rate of reinforcementin this area. By this standardthe Allies werenot yet readyto attack.

Thethird maior formationMontgomery had was the X Corps,made up of two armored dlvlslons, the lst and the lOth. Theywere not placedclose to the line whereraiding parties could identify units andstrengths, but wereheld

80 kilometersbehind the front, althoughthe Germansdid captureone trooper of tie 10thArmored Division's reconnajssanceregiment. Thesedivisions were pass to throughthe minefieldlanes swept by the allied engineersand attempt to encircle the Axis forces and destroy them.

3 0ncethe battle openedin the south,and diversionary attacks h,ere exe- cuted' the British 50th Infantry Divisronand the 7th ArmoredD.ivision were pulledout of line and dispatchednorth to join the armoreddivisions of the x corps to add weight to the offensive. Theentire attack wentas Montgomery hadplanned, but the tenaciousAxjs defenseslowed the forwardpush, and 'l'lontgornery hadto use all resourcesat handto accomplishhis mission. Theseinitial dispositions formedthe frameworkof a mostingenious cover plan' Themost elaborateand sophist'icatedmeasures were taken to suggest a maJorattack in tho ',ottth' whil('

Montgomery'sdeception plan wasinitiated early in October1942, when a pattcrn of materiel concentrationsin the forwardareas was set up, using spare and durmyvehicles. As strength wasaccumulated for ttre big push, thesedurrnies werereplaced with actual equipmentof different types, whichoffered a picture of constantdensity to Axis aerial observationduring the buildup. In the 4 attack positionstanks were concealed beneath dunmy vehicles of all sorts.

Durmytrucks wereparked in gyn positjons. Thenthe gunswere brought up and hiddenbeneath the dunmies. Sljt trencheswere dug and camouflagedto accomo- date assaultinginfantry that wouldbe djspatchedforward at the last moment.

In the rear areas, tanksand guns which had been moved forward were in thejr turn replacedby durmies. This act'ivity tookplace principal ly in the northernsector to maskthe strength of the majnattack. Mostmovement was also doneat night, troop moveswere rigidly controlled, andefforts weremade to guardagainst tell-tale tracks in the sand. LieutenantGeneral Bayerlein, whotook over the Afrika Korpsafter Itronmwas capturerl, says this part of the plan wasso successfulthat the Brjtish succeededin concealingfrom the Axjs two new'lyarrived armoreddivisions with a strengthof 240guns and 150tanks in the northernsector

In the southernsector a ploy wasmade to ind'icatethat the mainattack wouldbe launchedthere and that the attack could not be madebefore November.. Largedunmy supply dumps and waterinstallations wereprepared. A dunmyfuel pipeline wi'thfake gasolinestatjons and storageareas was built, usjngempty gasolinebarrels laid endto endto simulatethe line itself. Vehiclemovement in the southernarea indicateda gradualbuildup of strength,and caqouflage efforts werepurposely less expert in the south than they were jn the north.

Tell-tale tracks and sloppycarttouflage were condoned in an et'fort to lead the Axis reconnaissanceto interpret the majnattack as beingplanned for the south, but care wastaken not to give the impressionthis wasa deceptionscheme. hadio traffic wasemployed to strengthenthe impressionthat the enemy mainthrust wouldbe in the south (southof the RuweisatRidge). Thepresence of the 7th ArmoredDivision and jts wirelesstraffic, combinedwith the estab- lishmentof a fake'radionet, the sole purposeof whichwas to misleadthe Germanintercept servjce, also helpedto djvert Axis attention fromthe north. 0n the night of the attack,.a sparearmored divisjon headquarterswas employed to create radio traffic..that wouldindicate the movementof large armored forces to the southernsector.

Thusdid the Allies seekto misleadthe Axis as to wherethe mainattack 'was to be launched. In trying to decejvethe Axjs as to the timing of the attack, whichthe Germansknew had to come,a subtle schemewas adopted. The first elementinvolved control of the skies, wh1lethe secondconcerned the rate of the dumrybrrilduJl.

Montgomeryexhibited a livcly a;rprrcciat.ionlor the role of airpower'ln the land battle, and Cormonwealthair-ground cooperation provided a modelfor the basic doctrinewhich is still valid today. In this vein, as early as zZ september,Air vice Marshalconingham, commander western Desert Air,Force (I{DAF), outlined the air force's role in the up-comingoffensive to a meeting of all group captainsand wing cormanders.stepped-up counter-air force action wast0 cormenceon 20 0ctoberto ga'ina high degreeof ajr superiority without whichMontlomery wouldnot move. The preliminaryair offensive emphasizedde- struction of the enemyair force. At least 800counter-air force sorties were flown before the infantry movedto its assault positions on the night of ZZ/23 October, and as a result the Allied concentrat'ionswere not molestedfrom the alr at a tlmewhen the roadswere clogged wlth thelr transport,whlch also denied to the Axis knowledgeof wherethe mainthrust wasto be launched. The enemyair beingdislocated, the WDAFcould intervenefreely in the groundbatge

and,'it washoped, insure a certain initial tactical surpriseby denyingthe enemyair reconnaissance coningham's efforts worked,as the Axis weredenied air reconnaissance. Thatreconnaissance which did jn take placewas the south,where the Axis air observersnoted the buildup of Allied forces. Theynoted, however, that the builduprate wasslow and concludedthat an Allied attack could not be launched before November'The expansion of the dummydepots and supplydumps was cal- 'culatedby Montgomery to indicate long andcareful preparations. But perhaps the best deceptivedevice was the fuel pipeline and the progressbeing made in laying it. Its progresswas measured simpry by observing ,,pipell howmuch _ waslaid eachday and howincomplpte it was. Bymeasrrrinq the clailyconstruc- tion' it wassimple for German intel'ligenceanalysts to calculatewhen ii could be expectedto be operatjonal. Allied air super.iority,however, FFC_ vbntedAxis air observersfrom getting too closea look at the pipelineto see if it wasreal or not. Thecombination of dunmyconstructjon and l.imited exposureto Axis air reconnaissance providedgood reason for the Germansto misinterpret 'launch Allied capabilitiesto an attack in October. Montgomery,then, by allowing someenemy air penetrationto discoverhis preparations'succeeded in dece'ivingthe enemyas to the timing of the attack. Thi.ssuccess in gaining surprisewas a combinationof usingdeception and achievingsecurity through air superior.ity. 0n the night of the attack, Montgomeryfleshed out his schemeto gain sur- prlse by simulatinga larrdingbchincl thr: errerrry,s lines. 0n the afternoonof 23 Octobera Britjsh attack convoysimulating an am- phibiousforce sailed fromAlexandrja. .if .it It proceededwestward as wereto stagean envelopmentfrom the'seaof the Axis forces, left flank. underthe coverof darkness,however, the ships, with the exception.ofa few fast craft, returnedto port. Thesefast ships proceededto off-shorepositions behind Germanlines andat H-Hourplus three for the maineffort openedfire on coastal 7 installations and troop concentrationswith djrect fire weaponsand mortars mountedon the ships. Debar.kationnoises were simulated, and light signals weretransmitted back andforth from ship to ship to indicate feverishactivity. 0nceGerman response wasdrawn to theseAllied ships, the demonstrationforce disengagedand returnedto homeport. ' That surprise wasachieved is hard to challenge. Manynarratives from the Axis side of the battle te'll of the visit of colonelLiss of the intelli- genceservice of the ArmedForces supreme conmand, who was sent from Rastenburg in Germanyto Africa to infonttthc Axis forcr':,l.h,rt. Montuom(:r'y cou'ld not pos- sibly attack in 0ctober. In arl

Neither Field Marshal Ronmelnor Generalstunme had any idea of the inten- tions of General Montgomery.without this knowledgethe Germansanticipated that the attack wouldbe alongthe heightsof Ruweisat. so they dividedthe

€ four armoreddivisions intq two groupsso as to pinchout the All.iedattack

as it cameover the ridge thr:oughthe m'inefjelds. Unfortunately,th.is dispo- sition to coverthe most.,likelycont'ingency, as false'lyperceived by the Gerrnans,resulted in the 15th PanzerDivision and Littorio ArmoredDivision beingpulverized when the British attackedin the north. ' In spite of thjs lack of knowledge,the Germanshad the advantageof

havingtheir flanks protected,and they took full advantageof this by laying the minefieldsand establishing formjdable defenses. The 220th(2lst panzer

Division),the 33d(tSttr Panzer t)ivision), and the 900th(90th Light Diviston)

EnglneerBattalions wcro responsible lor tlris nrassivetask, andthey once agaln proved their worthand cotnpetence. The Axis preparedas best they cou'ldin spite of tremendouslogistica'l problemsas well. Theywere not unprepared,

but they werenot so readyas they wouldhave liked to havebeen. Nonetheless

they werelulled into a false senseof security, becausethey developeda strongmisconception as to whenthe attack wasto be launched,and, of course,, the British tried to foster this misconception.

Germanproblems in intel'ligencegatherinq began well beforethe El.Alamein

offensive. Rommelheld Germanintel I igencereports in low esteem;so howmuch reliance he placedin themis opento question. CertainlyRonmel,s lack of confidenceseems justifiabte in l'ight of subsequentevents, such as the sending of a special envoyall the wayfrom Gernrany to say that the Allies could not

attack beforeNovember. Ronmel also did not havethe best relationshipwith

his supportingair, andthis hamperedhis ability to gatherrequired information. Thenearly in Septembera sourceof informationwhich the Germansfound extremelyuseful dried up. Tobruk,a strongBritish position that wasencircled by the Axis alongthe NorthAfricancoast and which was supplied by sea, was forcedto capitulate jn the surunerof 1942through the unw'ittinghelp given Ronmelby the USMi'litary Attache in Cairo, Colonel BonnerFellers. Every detail of British operatjons.hadbeen radioed by Fellers to Military Intelli- gencein Washington--andibecause they had brokenthe State Department,s

Black Code,which Fellers wasusing--to the Germansas well. Everymorning at breakfast, General Ronmelhad been presentedwith a concise apprec'iation bf his opponent'sp1ans, locatjon of units, morale,and strength. SinceJan- uary 1942, Rormelhad been receiving the very information neededto reverse his fortunes. The Afrika Korps, for instace, had beendriven back during the previousyear, but on 2l January 194?Ronrnel rebounded with such elasticity that the British were forced to retreat rapiclly for seventeenstraight days.

Thenthere wasalso the unexpectedfall of Tobruk. Finally, Br.itish traffic analysis of enemytransnrissions concluded that Roumelwas getting advanced information from the uS Embassyin cairo, and the leak was plugged.

The coordination betweenair and groundjn the Axis forces wasmade more difficult by the condit'ionof the Germanajr force, wh'ichwas deployedwell fortrard and expectedto provide the main opposition but had deterioriatedso badly as to causeserjous concernin Berlin. Major Generalof the Luftwaffe,

Galland, flew to Fukaon the North African coast'in September,interviewed von Waldau,who conmanded the air forceS, and looked over the situation. Air

Field MarshalKesselring is reputedto haveresented Galland's inspection.

Further, accordingto Galland'spossibly apocryphalstory, Goeringdismissed as durmieshalf of the 800 aircraft shownto be on RAFfields. Ronmel,not on goodterms with his supportingair, neglectedto ask for reinforcements until too late.

Goeringmight havedone better to take the aeria'l phdtographsmore seri- ously. 0n 16 0ctoberthe RAFhad 1,098aircraft--8l3 jn conmission(6?8 fighters, 383bombers of all types, and87 sea reconnaissanceaircraft). 10 TheAxis air forcescould muster only'2,18 Italian and165 German fighters,

about150 bombers, T5 Italian CR-42attack planes,and smallernumbers of sea- planesand reconnaissance aircraft. Clear"lythe capability to penetrate

Allied air spaceand conduct effectjve air reconnaissancewas l'imited. An examinationof the GermanArmed Forces Supreme Cormand's War Diary 'for the period8-24 0ctoberunderlines the tenor of Axis air activitfes. Starting on 8 0ctober,the Air Force'sreporting indjcated ajr attacksagainst allied

tL'ansportparks, artillery pos'itions,armor assembly areas, and other ground targets. 0n 11 0ctober,truck arrdtarrk parks at Ll Alameinv,,ere attacked for

the first, andaccording to diary entries, the last time. Thenon 12 0ctober air efforts wereturned toward the RuweisatRidge, which divjded the Allied north and southbattle sectors. For four days, unt'il 15 0ctober,attacks on an armunitiondump (dunmy?), trucks, andantiaircraft positionswere re- corded. Fromthat time on, air attackson a'llied concentrationswere reported, with the middlesector, that is aroundRuweisat, receiving additional atten- tion. Thenon 24 0ctober,heavy Alljed activity and fighting werereported. In the night of 23/240ctober, I ight enemy sea forces werereported to .have landedbehind the front, but the attack wasbeaten back by Stukadive bombers and Italian aircraft. Theboats retreated east--as the British had intended as part of their deceptionplan.

These,.crypticreports lackeda senseof urgency. Thetargets wereassem- blies of vehiclesor supplies,not troopmovements, which indicates that the sorties wereprobably conducted during the day. Therewas no evidencefrom the reports that a generaloffbnsjve was expected. In addition, the large de- greeof air activity in the southand central battle areas'jndicatedparticular interest by the Axis in those ar{}AS,which was clesired by the Al I ies. There wasalso no mentionof discoverjngany dumniypositions, nor wasthe fuel pipeline n reported,but'it mustalso be expectedthat the l,,larDiary at the highestlevel recordedmaterialthat hadbeen susceptible to pruningas'it madeits wayup the chain of conmand.There can be no doubt, however,that Ronunel'stroops werenot getting muchworthwhile infornration from thejr air counterparts.

Certainly, no indicat'ionsto precludesurprise were reported by the Luftwaffe. ' 0n the other hand,activjty on the groundbetween 7 and24 Octoberdid not provea bonanzafor Germanintelligence either, ds the lllarDiary shows.

0n 7 0ctoberthere wasboth artillery and reconnaissanceactivity on both sides. A markedincrease in lhe nurrrbc'r'o{t-r..rrl crrt.anrplrenLs wasnoted as tap to the rear as Cairo. lhis w,tstirc r,ol(,rroL,rl rorr ol a builclupof troopsto be found in the armysection of the !.larDiary hretween7 0ctoberand the start of the offensive,although on l0 0ctoberheavier A'llied movement in the southand middlebattle sectorswas noted and credited to reinforcements.These two re- ports werethe only indicators that the enemywas building strengthto attack. This inforrnationwas not unusual,sinr.e the Germanswere expecting an offen- sive, but not in 0ctober. Allied securitycan take credit for the paucity of information. Thefact,that the movementwas discovered in the south.and middlesectors can be attributed to Montgomery'sdeception plan.

TheAllies, however,did not havea fool-proof systemfor preventingthe

Axis fromgaining information, for on B 0ctobera trooperof the British House- hold Cavalrywas captured. Ihe uniL, llre reconnaissancereginrent of the l0th Arrpred Division, had recently returnedto Egyptand beenon line for only a few days. Whatthe reconna'issanceregiment of an armoreddivision of the army

..raru. wasdoing on line is ofen to questionin light of Montgomery'sattempt to galn surpriseby first concealingthe magnitudeof his force and second keepingfrom revealingthe typesof units, espec'ial'lythe armorhe had in his force structure. TheGermans, however, provjded no additional informat'ionon

FI js the capture,and there no indjcation the trooperknewmuch of importancer certainly not the placeand.time of the offensive. Interestinglyenough, there are no further reports.of anymore Allied prisonersbe.ingtaken prior to the offensive.

Except for the one order of battle report and the two reports on increased Allied movement growing and troop encampments,all other notations in the War Diary are of an inconsequentia'lnature right up unt'il 23 October. Thuson

11, 13, 14, and 18 Octoberthere are no reports at all. The 17th of gctober was a quiet d.ty, and on ?1 0ctollt'r tharr, witSrt roport on tho poor state of

Axls suppljes' 0n 20 0ctoberactive Allied reconnaissancewas reported,'and there washeavier than usual artillery activity in the south. But no changein qnemy organization was noted. 0n 22 0ctober the.artillery fire and reconnais- sance was back to normalwith no changesin the Allied picture. 0n.23 0ctober muchactivity wasnoted, as wereair attacks on troop positions, airfields, and "actjve" coast roads. Thenon 24 0ctober air and artillery fire was re- ported,.and for the first time an apparentresponse to Allied activity was noted whenGerman Infantry Regiment47 was ordered to Africa--too little, too I ate.

js For the Axis side the p'icture one of limited informationon their enemy. It also indicates lack of aggress'iveinformatjon seekjng, acceptanceof mlslnfonnatlon, or draconiansecurity rneasuresby the Allies. Again, however, the l{ar Diary must be viewedin the perspectiveof the possibility of screening of information at lower levels. But although the intelligence surmarieswere brief, they did contain essential informat'ionwhen'it wasavailable; so.it "hard" appearsthere was a real paucity of information. .lt is easy to see, "Foreign however,how the intelligence staff in the ArmiesWest,'Section could cometo the conclusionthat the British would be unable to attack in 0ctober. FT TheAxjs soldier in the fox.holeon the front line maynot havebeen sur- prised, as the security providedby deeprninefields gave him sufficient stand- off time anddistance to react to his enemy. But the conmanders,already plagued by shortagesof equipment,fuel, andspare parts, gainedscant warning of whatwas confronting them. Montgomery'stactics of sendingin infantry 'first, his diversionaryattacks in the south,his tight security,and h.is master- ful deceptionplan allowedhim to put his maxjmumstrength at the placehe chose,when he wantedto. TheGermans, on the other hand,were misled by the Allles' init'ial di',1ttt',itiorr',i l.lr.y wcrl tlcrrierlc,,$elrtial infgrnution retlulred to makecorrect decisionsthrough Morrtqornery,s deception and security efiorts; they lacked smoothair-ground cooperation; and they fell victim to a false sbnse of security derivedfrom adopting a preconceivednotion as to the timing of'the attack. Theresult wassurprise.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Bauer, Eddy. Der Panzerkrieg. 2 vols. Bonn: verlag 0ffene wort, n.d. Carell, Paul. Foxesof the Desert. Craven, Hesley-Frank,and JamesLea Cate, eds. TheArmy Air Forcesin t.lorld l'larII. Chicago: Univers.ityof Ctrica Frieden,seymour, andlrlilliam Richardson, eds. lhg Fatal Decisions. New York: l,lilliamSloane Associates, 1956:

Hillgruber,,Andreas, ed. Ircgstaqebuchdes Oberkormandosder Wehrmacht. 4 vols. Frankfu r.n, 1963.

Liddel-Hart, BasiI Henry. The0ther side of the Hil l , _. Stamps,T. Dodson, and v'incenfJ. Esposito, eds. -UmA,A_!]-litary Histsry of world l,larII. 2 vol.s. l,lestpoint, Newyork:

Stevenson,l'lilliam. A ManNamed Intrepjd. NewYork: HarcourtBrace Jovanovich, t976.

Wha"ley,Barton. Stratagem. Unpublishedmanuscript. Young,Desmond. Rormel .

15

:'^ - _ r ANNEXT

FIRST DRAFT*

THESOVITT CONCIPT OF SURPRISE

Surprise stunsthe opponent,paralyzes his will, and depriveshim of the opportunityto offer resi stance. -- FieldManual of the RedArmy, 1941.

Soviet field manualsand military writings sincewell beforeWorld War II haveemphasized the importanceof surprise as the best aid to achieving v.ictory in modernwar. planners Soviet incorpor'atedthe conceptof surprise in all their operatlonsin World l,larII and successfullycarried out a considerablenumber of opqrationswith strategic, operatjonal, and tactiial surprise.

The Sovietsdefjne surprise as activities unexpectedby the enemywhich contributeto jn success a battle, operdtjon,or war. Surprise,which in their view is oneof the mostimportant principles of military art, consistsof selecting place, time, methods,and meansthat makejt possible to deliver a blow whenthe enemy is least of al1 readyto repulse it, with the result that his wjll to resist is paralyzed.

TheSoviets state that surprisecan be achievedby: - deludingthe enemywith regardto one's intentions,

- keepingthe conceptof the operationsecrer, - adoptingnew vreapons and tactics unknownto the enemy,

: soundselection of the sector of the maineffort andof the time of the attack, - unexpectedair artillery andtank attacks,and sudden employment of all available fi re means, - rapidmaneuver, resolute actions, and forestalljng the enemyin carrying out an assault(mounting an attack)

*N.8. This draft is subject to t.:xtensiverevjsion. "il conductingdeceptive operations and using camouflaqe, - makingthe best useof the terrain, weather,season, and time of day. TheSoviets emphas'i.ze that the greatest.successis attainedby the side which usessurprise in coryrbinationwith injtiative andboldness. An enemy which is unpreparedto countera surpriseattack is forcedto changehis ptanshastily, 'and hasto adaptto the act'ivitiesof the side whjchgained the initiative. l'lhenboth sides are of approximatelyequal strength, surplise makesit possible to securethe best results with the minimumloss of resources,manpower, and time' However,the advantageof the surprjsefactor is only temporary.How long it continuesdepends on the ability of the surprisedside to I'inclways, means, andmethods for the necessarycountermeasures to nullify the.initial effects the surprisehad on the batilefield, op€ration,or evenon the war as a whole. if usedski'llfully, The'sovietofficer corpsis constantlybeing taught that surprise,/creates the mostfavorable conditions for the destructionof the enemy,and that the js ability to achievesurprise a test'imonyto a commander'scraftsmanship. Th.e soonerthe situation whichresults fromthe surpriseact'ion is takeninto account andacted upon, the longerthe effects of the surprisew.ill last.

Thesoviets distinguish three typesof surprise: strategic,operational, andtactical. Thedistinctjon dependson the scale of the operat.ionand on the results achieved.

Stratggicsurprlse can be achievedboLh in the beginningof a war (taklng advantageof the opponent'sunpreparedness for war or as a preemptivestrike);, or while carryingout strategic operationsin the courseof war. Thelatter incluuesunexpected use of newweapons whose commitment would render strategic results, applicationof hewstrategy, skillful selectionof the axis of the main effort, anddisinformation. TheSoviets point out that by taking advantageof surpriseand of the strengthof the deployedforces ahead of time, the attacker canusually gain considerablesuccess at the start of the war. Countrieswhich

L( werevictjms of a surprjse Axis attack during WorldWar II ejther suffered a tota'l defeat as Polanddid in 1939,capitulated without exhaustingal1 meansof defense like Franceand the Low'Countriesin 1940,or lost considerableparts of thejr territorjes and for quite a time wereunable to capturethe strategic initiative, Iike pearl the ussR,or the tJSafter llarbor in the Japaneseattack. ' In the attack on the USSRin June 1941,the Germanl"ligh Conmand relied heavily on surprise. The sudden.invas jon of the Sov.ietUniofl, the superiority of the Germanforces, and the'ir almost two years of experiencein wagingwars, combined wlth unpreparc'dntl',',Irtr wcll'oIrLlrr:1r.rrl. oI t.lrcSoviet tr.oops,lrdve the Germans a serious strategic ',l,rr'l advantagc'at thc of the war and put the Soviet Arrled Forcesin a very djffjcult situation. During l.lorldWar I I, the Soviet_Loriurrarrd was able to achieve strateqic surprise manytimes. Themost significanl.were the counteroffensiu.,o, Soviet forces at Moscow(Ig4I/42), Stalingratl(Ig4z/43), Kursk (sunmer1943), and in Byelorussia (summer 1944). The unexpectedtransition of Soviet troops from the defense to a counteroffensiveput the stronqestGerman forces at a disadvantage and abruptly changed the situat'ion on the Sovjet-Germanfront. In these operations the Germanswere deceivedby the Soviels wtLlr regard to the jntention of the Stavka(the Soviet SupremeCommand), the piace, and the time of deljvering the mainattack.

The Sovjet command tried to take rrraxirrrim advantage of the ef fects of surprise by gradual'lyincreasing the strengtirof thr: attack in order to maintainmomentum, thus forcing the Germansto changetheir plans repeatedly. The Germanconrnand, not hiving enough informationon the clirectionand date of the future mainSoviet attacks, d'id not have tjme enouqhfor carrying out large s.trategic redep"loyments from one sector of the front to the other. ultimately, this jnability resulted in defeat.

t,3 It should be noted that the crisis of the Germandefensive and offensive

strategy was in a great degree causedby the suddencommitment to the operatjon of massiveSoviet GHQreserves. Timing of the comm'itmentplayed a prominent rol e.

0perat'iona1surpri se can be ach.ievedby: - concealmentof preparations,forestalling the enemy,sdeployment in battle formations,and sudden . commencementof an operation, - selectingthe sector of the maineffort in the sectorwhere the enemy- doesnot expect it, - uslng newrrrt'l.lrorls 0f o;)tr.,rIiotr o.r.rrtw w{rrtJfons whir;h lnuyhave an ef f ect on the battle, - I suddenlylaunching a counterattackby an armygroup or an army.

During lrlorldWar II, the Soviet Commandachieved many operatiopal surprises, with considerableeffect. Evenin the sunmerof 1941,when Soviet troops were retreating eastward,they rea'lized that in this disadvantageoussituation local surprise attacks might turn out to be very useful. Thus,a suddenattack de'livered'between14 and 18 July 1941in the Soltsy area by the Soviet Eleventh

Annyresulted in splitting and defeating the German8th PanzerDivision and parts of the 3d MotorizedDjvision, and the advanceof Soviet troops for a d.istanceof some40 kilometers. Duringthe Stalingradcounteroffensive, the Soviet XXIV

TankCorp5, in djfficult snowyconditions and on bad roads, brokethrough the

Germandefenses and in the following five days advancedsome 240 k.ilometers.

The tank corps appearedunexpectedly in the Germanrear zone, and capturedthe

Tatslnskayarailroad station and a large airfield with aircraft on the ground.

The GermanCommand was forced to divert jts iith PanzerDivjsion, 306th Infantr^y

Division, and other units previouslyschedu'led to reinforce the maineffort.

Thusthe tank corps's unexpectedactivitjes helpedto achievesuccess jn the operat'ion.

E4 Between25 and 28 October1943, on the eve of the battle for Kiev, the

Third GuardsTank Army was secretly transferred from the Bukrinsk bridgehead

to the Lyutezhbridgehead, and then, on 4 November,after a three_daypreparation period, struck suddenlyin the main sector of the 1st Ukrainian ArmyGroup. This surprise attack predeterminedthe successof the operation.

Tactical surprise can be achievedby:

- vrell concealeddeployment of troops'in the jump-off positions for the offensi ve, - forestall irrq l-lr. r:lr.rrry'srrr,lrl'yrrurnr. frlr t-

- diversity in carrying out the attacks, combatreconnaissance,. artjl lery preparation,etc.

An important elementin achievingtactical surpriseis,'in the Sovietview, suddenoFening of fire frbm all avaiiable guns, counterattacks,and daring and audaclous raids by task forces or groupson tactically importantenemy installa- tions, positions, or terrain features. It shouldbe noted that great surprise was often achievedduring World War I by the suddenuse of gasesand tanks.

The first time the Sovietsemployed a battery of multiple rocket launchers on 14 July.1941 in the 0rsha area (WesternArmy Group), causeda panic amongthe

Germans. In the sectors in wh'ichthese newweapons were used, the Soviet forces met almostno resistance.

Anotherexamp'le of tactiial surprisewas a fejnt attack executedby specially designatedp]atoons some 30 or so mjnutesbefore the enddf the art.illery prepara- tion alongthe entire front of the Fifth GuardsArmy of the lst UkrainianArmy Groupin the Vistu'la-Oderoperation of January1945. TheGermans assumed that E5 the feint attack wasa real one' moved out thejr forces fromthe shelters, and subsequentlysuf 'rosses .rery fered heavy. f romthe arti r f i re. soviet rniritary hi'sto.ianspay great attention to the rore prayedby surprise in rnajoroperations carried out by soviet forces in l,lorldt{lar II. During the first periodof the war,* despite great difficulties causedby the surprise *The soviets divide the soviet-Germanwar into the start three periods:/fi rst from of the war(zzJune r94ri to-ig"N.;.ruer 1942, js the Stalilgfqd counteroffensiu"; that to the start of tn. secondfrom 19 Decemberl94Z 'to te43;and the thi rd rrJmtne nes to the end of ffi:.1!:: i nnr nd"'or;anua ry- rgii the end of

Gennaninvasion and the resultarrtheavy lossessuffered by the soviet Army,the soviet conmandcarried out a numberof offensiveoperations jn whichsurprise playeda paramount role' amongthem the offensivesat Toropetsk-Kholmsk, Varvenkovo-Lozovsk, Rzhev-Kholmsk,and above all the Moscowcounteroffensive. In the counteroffensiveat Moscow,the sovietsmade skillful useof the miscalculationsof the Germancommand in its assessmentof the s.ituationat the front andexplo'ited their owncapabilities to masterall availableresources to launcha counteroffensive.An entry in the personalwar dairy of the.chiefof- the GermanArmy General (OfH;, Staff GeneralHalder, proves the Soviet point. Halderwrote on 2 December 1944three daysbefore the major soviet Moscow counteroffensive:"Enemy defense (capability) has reachedits peak. Nomore reinforcementsavai I able.',*

*Franz Halder,ThePrivate t'lar !pg1a_]: of ColonelGeneral Franz[alder, Tr. ArnoldLissance (DunnLoring, Virginia, l9Z6).

However,as it turned out, the Soviets had secretly massedtheir reserves east of Moscowand early in December 1941with troops of the westernArmy Group they'launcheda sr-rccessfulcounteroffens'ive. Sonre50 Germandivisions were defeatedand retreated westwardup to 250 kjlometers. It should be noted that E6 at the time of the counteroffensivethe Sovietshad only a very slim advantage in the air, andoverall strengthsin nren,artillery, and tankswere almost equa1.

Nevertheless,the effect.ivenessof strateqic surprise was so great that jt assuredthe Soviets a v.ictory.

Againand again the Sovietsemphasize that the basic reasonfor the 'successful achievementof surprise at Moscowwas their correct evaluationof the erroneousGerman estjmateof Soviet capabilities, their correct estimateof

Germanunreadiness for a w.inter campajgn,and of courseGerman intelligence fai:lures. They prlirrt rtttt .tl',o t.lrat.Ltro !oviot Cornn,urd,,clor t.od the proper axls and time for launcltilttl Lhcttt(titt (lt.t.rt.k, (.onnnilLcrl t.lrcir.r'os{frvL,s t, the tjattle direct'ly from the marchafter they had proceededquite a distance from the cgncentration areas in the rear to the front line.jn an extremelyshort time, and explcjitedunfavorable weather conditions, time of day and terrain. After the Moscowbattle, the Sovjets trjed to improvethe art of surprise in manyways, "operational but first of all by better camoufldg€,',the Russian 'terrn for.deception, by applying newmethods of combatoperations unexpectedby the Germang,and by moreskillful use of the terrain and weather.

soon, disinformatjonbecame an organic part of deception. In the Toropetsk-Kholmsk operation of the Soviet NorthwesternArmy Group (9 Januaryto 6 February L942), in addition to the main attack in a i00-kilometer sector, two simulatedattacks werecarried out. This action Ied the Germansto spreadtheir reservesand helpedin achievingsurprise in the main sector. In the

Barvenkovo-Lozovskoperation of the Southwesternand SouthernArmy Groups (lg-31 Janual"y L942) for the first time the Sovjet conrnandissued false jnformat.ionby radio' implyingthe arrival and concentrationof five fresh rifle divisions at the left wing of the SouthernArmy Group.

Anotherexample of disinformation occurredduring the offensive operations of the Westernand Kalin'in ArmyGroups in the Rzhev-Vyazmabatge in the winter r7 l94l/42. There, due to false radio broadcastsby the Sixteenth Army, the Germans got the impress'ionthat the errtire armyhad beentransferred to the Sukh.inichi area' whereasin fact only the army staff had movedthere.

In the Rzhev-Sychevoperation (Ju1y-Septemberlg4|) of the Kalinin and

WesternArmy Groups, the Soviets were ab.le to conceal the concentration of the.ir striking task force, the Twent'iethand Thirty-first Armies, and to feign preparation for an offensjve'in the zonesof the Forty-third, Forty-ninth, and Fiftieth Armies.

Accordingto Soviet historjans, cohc,sive,tinrely andstrictlyexecuted deceptivemeasures made it possible to mislead the Germanswith regard to the axis of the maineffort, compositjonof the main striking force, and the time of the attack. Thus for example,in the fall ot 194?the commandof German

ArmyGroup Center sawdanger to its 0rlov force in what later turned.out.to be pretendedoffens'ive actions. The Germanstransferred three panzerdivisions and one infantry divjsion to the Yukhnovarea, leaving the right w.ingof the

Sov'ietWestern Army Group inadequately protected. The Soviets claim that the attack of the main forces of the Soviet WesternArmy Group committed on .its right flank caught the Germansby total surprise. The Germandefenses in that sector were broken, and the troops of the WesternArmy Group advanced 30 to 45 ki'lometers,defeating elements of the GermanNinth Field and Secondand Third

PanzerArm'ies. TheSoviets note that this offensive diverted considerable

Germanforces from the Stal'ingradand caucasianfronts.

Germanmil itary historian GeneralKurt Tippelskirch, discussingthis "Localizat'ion engagement,wrote, of the breakthroughcan be exp)ainedonly by the fact that three panzerand several infantry divisions i^rhichwere readying themselvesfor the transfer to the south were, instead, first conunittedto stop the Soviet advanceand then to launch a counterblow.*

*Kurt Tippel ski rch, History of |./orld l^larI I (Moscow,1955) Trans'latedinto Russianfrom German.

EB soviet authorsg ive nutticrror/sexdujp lr,rs j of howsk I lful selection of the axis of the maineffort could often lre srrr'1;risingto the errerry.For instance, in the Toropetsk-Kholmoperation the nraineffort was launchedin a wooded, roadless area coveredwith deepsnow. Attack in suchdifficult terrain wasby itself very unusual,and the Germanconunand had consideredit inrpossible. Becauseof this, Germandefensive posjtions in the sector wherethe Soviet Third and Fourth ShockArmies launched the offensive werenot cont.inuous,but werebased on individual strongpoints. lhe soviets a'lsoclainr that in this operation GermanintelIiqence cliclnot. detect their strikinq force, an4 conse- qtlontly t'hr' (it'I'ltt,llt t ttttlttr,urrlrlirl rr,t t,rl.{, rurt ,r{,.r,,rr.f,(,l' iJr(:,{,,r,,(, rf ,, rl.f.oyr,;r, capabiI it'ies 'in the forthcorninqzone of ,rt tack. This, in turn, permitted the Soviets to achievesubstantial nurnericaI superiority. ' As the result of the surpriseof1r:nsivc, thc-soviet Third and t'urth Armies advanced up to 250 kilometers toward Vitebsk, and created a deepwedge between GermanArmy Groups North and center, en(lanqeringtheir operationalcooperation. In their analysisof surpriseduring the first periodof the war the Soviets poi'ntalso to the mistakes they nradeduring this phase,in successful as welI as operatjons. frowever, .unsuccessfrrr they emphasizethat in the unsuccessfuloperations thbre always wereclefects in their deceptivemeasures. 'in For example' May rg42, durinq prerparations the for the Kharkovoffensive, the cormandof the Soviet Sotrt.hwr";t.c.rrA'rrry (i'orrp rlicl nol. i. take adequatenreasures to concealthe transferand concentration of forces,especially at the Barvenkovo bridgehead.Describing the operationMarshar v.s. Moskarenkowrote, ,,Large troop'movementstook placewithout proper orgdnizationand secrecy. For this reasonthere is no wonderthat the German-fascistcommand discovered our intentions."*

*K.S. Moskalenko,Na yuqo_Zapa4I9JL !_gffi,-qv_tS1.i_!(Moscow, 1969)

E In a numberof successtul operdLrt;rrswhere surprise wasachieved, there u'ereneverthe'less some errors. rnadein nreasurestaken to achieve surprise. 0ften there was inadequate coordinationof surprise measureswith p1ans,force deployment, and disinformatjon. For example,during the Toropetsk-Kholmsk operation, there were instances whentroop nrovementstook place during the day, and combatreconnaissance was carried out only in those sectors wherethe attack was sc,heduled' In the Barvenkovo-Lozovsk operation, radio disinformat.ionwas totally ineffect'ive, because'it wasnot corroboratedby false concentrationsin one area anclnonttal tro0;r ar. livitir", in .rrrollrcr. Ilr t.hcDcnry,rrr.,k 6f fgnsive of the Soviet NorthwesternArmy Grougr (,ltily 194?)r.hc t'alse and the real axis of the mainattack in essencecoinc.ided. Thesoviets craim that in duecourse these and other faults werecorrected. Stavkaand the armygroups commandstook ail the necessarymeasuresto el.iminate the shortcomingsin carrying out deceptionand in efforts to misinformthe enemy. During the secondperiod of the war the importanceof surprise 'increased great'ly becauseof - 'increase the of firepowerand maneuverabi'rity of .forces; - better knowredgeof Germanstrategy and tactics; - the necessity to break through deeply eche'lonedGerman defenses - the attempt to decreaseSoviet losses and prevent the Germansfrom parrying Soviet blows.

The rise jn the importance of surprise demanded,in turn, perfection of methodsfor its attainment. At the end of L942,the Soviet officer corps, in general' wasconsiderably better than during the first year of the war. It had gainedrich experience in carrying out defens'iveand offensive operations,and had becomewel'l acquaintedwith Germancombat methods. This helped the soviet high cormandto conduct large deceptiveoperations.

E10 The experienceof the Stalinqradcounteroffensive showed that surprise in strategic operationsof a groupof arrrrygroups could be achjevedonly by cohesiveand continuousconduct of various measuresajmed at securingsecrecy and imparting false information. Suchoperations, the Soviets believed,must be centralized and carried out underthe generaldirection of the Stavka.

In the Stal'ingradbattle, the intention of the Soviet high commandwas kept totally secret, and the camouflage.ofthe strateg'ic regroupmentof the

Soviet forces was successful. This assuredsurprise. In addition, active (ictttt(rlt (irorrlr operations at;,tilt', 1. nr'lty (.r'rrl.r,r'ilr tlrc Mozrlokrlr.('rt, gr.rlt:r.url lry tht:

Stavka,apparetltly (.onvinr.od tht: (i0v'rrrarrst.lrat. thc rrrainevcrrts in the winter

1942/43campaign would comein the central sector of the Soviet-Germanfront, and not in the south

Strategjc and operationalmiscalculat.ions by the Gerrnancommand were the result of an intelligence fai.lure; the Gernranshad not detectedthe forthcoming

Stalingradcounteroffensive, in whicheleven arm'ies, several independenttank,. mechan'ized,and cavalry corps, 13,500quns and mortars, 979 tanks, and 1,350 airplanes took part. The Chief of 0perrationsof the OKl,l,Colonel GeneralAlfred "We Jodl' admittedafter his capture in May1945, ent'irely missedthe concentration of hugeRussian forces on the flank of the Sixth Army(at the DonRiver). We did not havethe sl ightest idea of tht' strenr;thof the Russ'ianforces in that area." *

*Voyenno-lstorich Z!,ur1ql,No. 4, lq61

Strategicsurprise at Stalingracl was successfully conrplemented by operational surprise. TheGermans were surprised by the unexpectedbreakthrough of their defensesin sevensectors of their 400-kilorneterzone of defense, by cornrnitment of large tank formationsinto the breaktfrroughand by determinedact i on deep beh'indthe original front.

ili By and large, it can be said ttraLthe connlencementof the seconoperiod of the war brorrghtwith lt a consitler.iblt-'irrrprovenrentjn rrrethodsof surprise. Thus, for examp'le,in November.and December rg42,the VoronezhArmy Group carried out a complexdeception. In order to achievesurpr.ise at star.ingrad,the Voronezh ArmyGroup twice successfullyfeigned preparationsfor an attack .in the Fortieth 'Army sectoi of the storozhevskbrjdgehead. Thethird time, in the secondhalf of December1942, in the voronezh area, the soviets simulatedthe concentration of the armygroup's main forces. This time, however,it wasin orclerto achieve surprise in the sector of the Fort.ielhcorrrlrirrcd Anmsancl Third TankArmies. At the sametinre t'h0 (lolrltllrlll(l 0f llrc lor t r.llr Arnyr,u'r.ir.rl rrrl rrr',,1 ,f l.hrrr'al preparatorywork for the 0strogozh-Rossosh operationunder the coverof false activities' TheGermans were deceivedonce nrore. This assuredan operational surprise,' andconsequenily great successfor the operation. Sovietwriters believethat fronr the summerof 1943,that is, after the battle for Kursk,it became moredifficult thanbefore to achievesurprise, becausethe soviets wereusing larqer attack groupsand consequenily there were moretroops in the departurearea. In addition, the Germancomnand, wh.ich had often beendeceived by the Sovietsduring the wjnter of l94Z/43,jncreased its vigilance' improvedits intel 1igence procedures, and evaluated the situat.ion morerealistically. Thusthe Soviets wereforced to improvethe.ir methods, and apparentlY,.theywere successful. For exarnpie,in the Belgorod-Kharkovoffensive in the surmerof 1943the voronezhArmy Group carrjed out special divers.iona.y activities, includingdemonstrative actionsin the sudzhaarea wh.ich gave the Germansthe impress'ionthat the sovjets werepreparing to attack towardBelovody andvorozhba' consequentlythey reinforcedthat sectorwi.th panzer and infantry divisions

In planningsqrpr.ise the Sovietswere able to anticipateGerman miscalcula_ t'ions. Thus,during the last phaseof the Kurskbattle, on i3 July 1943,the ET? commanderof GermanArmy GroupSouth, [:ield Marshal[ric von Manstein,assured Hitler that he had defeated Sov'ietforces defendingKursk from the south, drd that the Soviets not only were unable to attack any more, but they could not evenhold their defensive lines. convincedof the correctnessof this statement, OKH(Army High Command) panzer transferred the Fourth Armyand Task Forc.eKempf 'to the Donbass area in the Ukraine and to the 0rel area five panzerand one motorizeddivisions

After learning about the Germandecision the Stavkarequested that the Voronezh,Steppo, anrl Sout.hwe',t.crnArrrry [ir.()rr1r,, lril.n t.()tlrf, off0rrrivr. in t.he shortest possible tirne. The attack preJrarerlin orrly ten days carrrernuch iooner than the Germansexpected. Soviet wrrters point to this as an illustration that a short period of preparation can result in surpr.ise. In this operationtwo to three times as muchartillery was useclin the breakthroughsectors, and there were coordinatedthrusts by the adjacent w.inqsof two armygroups. Moreoverthe initial infantry successesof the voronezhArnry Group were promptlyexploited. by tank armies' The Germansanticipated noneof these and they all contributed to the effect of surprise.

TheSoviets see in the battle for the DnieperRiver in the fall of 1943a progress'ion from tactical to operational to strategic surprise. The various participating units arrived swift'ly at thr: river bank, crossedthe rjver under cover of darkness'using 'irnprovised antl lot.ally obtainedcrossing e(luiprnent, and capturedtiny bridgeheads, in a tactical surprise operation. By decisively and rapidly enlarging the bridgeheadsthey rnadethe surprise becomeoperational. Andfinally the destructionof the so-called tastern t^/allon the Dn1eperRiver in a short time the Sovietsconsider strategic surprise. In the Kiev offensive,3 to 13 November1943, the commanderof the ist UkrainianArmy Groqpin great secrecytransferred his maineffort from the Bukrinsk bridgehead to the Lyutezhbridgehead. l1eeffectively carried out demonstrations

Ll3 by the Fortieth and Twenty-seventhAnrries and concealedthe concentratjonof an

enormousartillery force (344-416guns and mortars per kilometer of the breakthiough sector). Thenhe stunnedthe Gerrnansby a night attack of the Thjrd TankArmy,

striking throughthe darknesswith their headlightsblazing. In period the third of the war Soviet forces were able to take the offensive 'more often and consequentlythere were nroreopportunities to surprise the enemy, but at the sametime achievementhad becomemore difficult. The length of the front had narrowedconsiderably, and consequentlyit was easjer for the Germans to detect not 'l only whereof fensives wero ike'ly to be launchedbut also the sectors where the effort at breakthroughwclul

their concentration. An addjtional problenlwas the fact that the war had moved

ouiside the terrjtory of the USSRand into areas wherethe Germanshad had an opportunity to organizeand leave behjndan effective intel I igencenetwork. The

Stavkain this period continuedto exercise responsibility for the complex mea.sures,that could assurestrategic surprise. Soviet analysts note that amongtheir successesin the third period wasthe defeat of GermanArmy Group Center in Byelorussiain the summerof 1944,where the achievementof surprise wasgreatly assisted by Germanmisconceptions about plans. Soviet In May1944 the Ch'iefof the GermanOKW, Field MarshalKeitel,

discussingthe operationalsituation with the armycommanders of the eastern front, concludedthat the situation had stabilized and the Russianswere in no position to start an offensive in the near future. The GermanBulletin for the Evaluation of the Situation on the Eastern Front of 13 May 1944reported that preparations Soviet for'attack against ArnryGroup Center were aimedat ',deluding

the Germanconrnand with regard to the Soviet nraineffort and drawingGerman

reservesaway from.the area betweenthe CarpathianMountains and Kovel.,,*

*See "strategic the case study, Surprise in the 1944Soviet Sunmer-Fall Campaign . "

E14 a-t This Germanmisconception resulLrd fronra series of Soviet measures,of whichthe most importantwas.secrecy. concealingtheir true jntentions wasnot an easy task' The Sovietshad to asst'rtrble six combinedarmy armies, two tank armies' five separatetank corps, two rnechanized corps, four cavalry corps, and elevenair corps, as well as tens of independent req.imentsand brigadesin the designatedareas' In addition they had to amassenormous quantities of supplies. (Over 28,000tons werebrought up by trucks a1one.) To misleadthe Germansas to wherethe maineffort wouldbe, the Soviet cormandcarried out fake offensivt: r)r'0pd.al.ionsrn th. soutlrin the 3d Ukrainian ArmyGroup zone and in the north, 'Group in the uartic states, i n the 3d BaI t.ic zone.

Leavingtheir tank armiesin the southwas also an interestingSoviet ruse. Germanintell.igence kept these tank armjes underconstantsurvei I I anqe. Because they did not moveto another area, OKHconcluded that the offensivewould be 'in I aunched the south.*

*S. M. ShtemenkoGenra , I nyy SIJ3,!v _C!_dJV-qf_ly (Moscow, 1968).

TheYassy-Kishinev operation car'ied out by the soviet 2ndand 3d ukrainianArmy Groups in August1944 presents an excellentexamp.le of howthe sovietsmisled the Germans.To be sure that they wouldachieve surprise, the -. sovletshad to devisean entire systenr of clcceptiverneasures. The soviet aim wasto convincethe Germansthat the RedArmy wourd attack alongthe western bankof the seret Riverand hit Kishinevfrom the northeast. Howsuccessful the sov'iet'deception measureswere js testified by the formercommander of the German ArmyGroup Southern Ukraine, General G. Frisner, ,,1 thoughtthat the second(soviet) depioyrnentin the Tiraspolarea--the 3d ukra'inianArmy Group--would be ordered, at first, to containthe /Romanian_/ DumitrescuArmy Group."* General Frisner also incorrecily assumedthat the Ets *G. Frisner,Projgranye Sjazhenjyq (Lost Battles)(Moscow, from German. 1966). Translated

main effort of the 2d ukrain'ianArmy Group would comefrom the area east of yassy downalong the Pruth River. In reality this attack was launchedfrom the area -northwestof Yassy toward Vasluy. At the end of the first day of the operation (20 August), the staff of the DumitrescuArmy Group concluded that the Soviet offensive south of Tiraspol was a typicar breakthro'ughoperation, and not as it waspreviously thouqht., a local att,rrk. Achievenrent of sttrpriscwds dn irrrlrortalrtf ar-t.or irr tlru srrr:t-essfulolrerations of the 2d and 3d Ukrainjan ArmyGroups, whjch resulted in the encirclementand destruction of most of the forces of the GermanSouthern ukraine ArmyGroup, and createdfavorable condjtjons for advancingdeep into Romaniaand.Bulgaria. The Soviets point out that becauseof surprise this sizable victory was achievedwjth only small losses, 11,000men. Thjs figure shouldbe compared with the'146'000 lost by the lst, 2d, arrd3d Baltic, and the Leningradarmy groupsin the first period of the operdtionin the Baltic states, wheresurprise did not p'lay such an important role.*

*Operatsj i Sovetskikh Voorug!_Utrf!|= Veli kov tg+t-t !il_ -u_ _0leqlqllyl1lgXJgJIg

Although the Germancommand often krrewabout the preparatjonsfor forthcoming Soviet offensives, jt did not knowhow larqe they wouldbe and consequengywas unable to respond correctly. For exanrple,when in the summerof i944 the Soviets were preparing the Proskurov-Clrernovitzand the Umansk-Bogoshanskopera- tions in the Ukraine, the Germanslearned only about the forthcomingattack of the lst Ukrainian ArmyGroup in the Iernopolsector. seeinga possibledanger to its flank in the ukraine, the Gernrancorrunand transferred sjx panzerdiv.isions (five from the Umanarea) and three infarrtry d.ivisionsto th.is flank. However, Ll€, by strengthening that sector the Gernranswcakened the one in front of the 2d

UkrainianArmy Group' where tfey overlookedSoviet offensive preparations. Subsequently, the troops of the 2d tJkrainianArmy Group in a surprise attack defeated the Germans wjth muchqreater ease than the forces of the lst Ukrainian Army Group.

' In the Korsun-Schevchenkovskiy operation, due to errors madeby the Soviets in their false radio transm'issions,and becauseof ineffective deceptivemeasures, the Germans d'iscoveredthe preparationsfor the offensive in the Novo-Mirgorod sector. However' they did not t.rtkertny effective count.ernredsrrresbecause they failed to find otrt whir:hot'tltc l,ovir.t.,rc-t.ivitieswere re,rl anclwhich wefe deceptions. By the time the Gr:rrnarrsraurrched a counterattack, on the f i f th day of the offensive, it wastoo late. Sovjet rifle divisions hadalready broken through the tact'ical defensezone, and the tank formationshad reachgdShpo'la, after an advanceof about S0 kilometers.

An excellent exampleof achievingsurprise by attacking in the sector where the enemyexpected jt least, was, accordingto the soviets, the crimeanoffensive in the - spring of 1944. In this operationthe commanderof the 4th Ukrainian ArmyGroup, Generalof the Arnry.F.l. Tolbukhin,decided to deliver the main blow in the zone of the Soviet Fifty-first Arrny,deployed on the bridgeheadto the south of the Sivash marshesand salt lagoons. The Fifty-first Armycould be supp'liedonly by two crossinr;swltit.lr werc rrrrrl.crconstant Gerrl.rn artillery and air attacks. The decisjonto strjke in this particular sectorwas bo1d and correct, for the Germansdid not expect the assault would be launchedthere, becauseof supplydifficul ties, j In their I teratuFe;the Sov.ietspoi nt out that in the last periodof the war soviet forces perfectedseveral measures leadino to the achievementof surprise. Amongthem, the mostimportant were:

817 - concealmentof troop regroupnrent, especially of the secondechelons and reserves

- unexpectedtransfer of effort fronrone axis to another, - bold and resolute maneriver,

- skiI I ful use of weather,terra i n, and t.imeof day. ' In mostoperations a combinationof thesemeasures was used. ' In the vyborgoperation of the Leningrad ArmyGroup (June 1944), the soviets were able to conceal the preparation for the offensive by well organized deception' The Finns, against whornprart of the attack wasdirected, were totally surprised. The sovict', crrrlrlra., irrr Lh,rt.l.ht: of lerrrsive was so unexdected that the Finns, being unawareof the preparations, had granted'leaveto ll% moreof their troops than usual, so that they could work on ' their farms. The Soviet Twenty-third Arrrryconta i ned the Germansalong i ts enf.ire f ront

I by active demonstrationson 10 June, rrrakingjt irnpossiblefor the Gennansto detect the Sovjet maineffort. This rn turn helpedthe Twenty-first Armyto break through the Germanfirst defense zone. GenerarGovorov, commander of the LeningradArmy Group, then transferred the nraineffort to the sector of the cIX and cvIII Rifle corps' Duringt.he rrir;lrt, the Soviet cornnrandregrouped the artillery and movedthe cX Rifle corps behindthe clX and cvlll corps. The transfer of effort from one axis to anol.her.w(ls totally unexpectedby the Genmans greatly and influenced the outcomeof the batile. Between10 and z0 June the troops of the LeningradArrny Group broke through three heavjly fortified defense zones' advancedsome 130 kirometers, and capturedthe city of vyborg. 0ther examplesof transfEr of effort from one axis to another in order to achievesurprise can be seenin the Korsun-shevchenkovskiy (1st ukra.inianArmy Group),Uman-Botoshansk (Zd UkrainianArnry Group),and Memel(lst gaitic Army Group)operations.. In the Merneloperation, the.troops of the lst Baltic Army Group in a ten-day period between24 septernber and 4 0ctober 1g44carried out

Lrd a large scale regroul)lll€tnt of lorr-c:,. lr',rrr,,lerlt,rlLo the S6yallya area werethe FourthShock, Forty-third, Fifty-fir,,t., Stxth [iuards,andFifth Guards Tank Armies,two tank corps' one ttiecharrizcrl(orl)r;, dncl the entire supprlrtartil'lery. As a result of various deceptivenleasures, the Germansdid not detect the

transfer of the Sov'ietmain effort to ilre lnlerrrelaxis in tirne. ' The Soviets considerdecisive troop nranerJVerrnost important in achieving surprise' As an examplethey point out that in the Lvov-Sandomierzoperation of the lst Ukrainian ArmyGroup in the sununerof 1944a bold and swift thrust by the Third GuardsTarrk Arrrry' ftll lttwcrllry 1r.rrt'lr,rlr,rr ol l.lrcloul.t.lr I.urk Ar.rrry 6t:ep into the Germanrear' assuredthe brcakLlrrorrrllrrrl tlrg (.igr.rrrarrdele'ses and tle encirclementand destructjon (lerrrrarr of the lorces at Brody. Subsequen;ythe advanceof the Third Guards TankArrrry t,,. tlr,'Y.rvorovarea west of Love and a simultaneousunexpected thrust along two axes, one towardLvov, the other toward

I Przemys'lled to the (ier.rrr,rn , defeat of the torccs arrriliberation of both cities. Sovjet analysts havepointed out rrranyr,rx.lnples of sti I I f ul use of terrain, weather'and time of day in order to aclrievesurprise. Therewas for example the night attack by the SteppeArmy Group on Kharkovin August 1944, and.the liberation of the city of Zaporozhiyeby the SouthwesternArmy Group rn a surprise night assault. And in the Berezne-snigirevoperation an armygroup mobile force was conmjttedto combatdurinq the njqht in pouringrain along roads that were I i ttl e better thttr rluar;nt r.(,r,.

l{ith the development of newmeans of corrrbat,the importanceof surprise, accordingto Sov'ietmil itary writers, has irrcreasedsharply. It reachedits high point w'ith the adventof nuclearrrrjssjles and other newand powerfulmeans of destructjon. TheSoviEts bel ieve Lliat tho avajlabilit.yof nuclearweapons, combinedwith high mobility anclInaneuveldbil ity of troops, w1l'l presentexcellent opportunitiesfor employmentof the nrostd iversjfjed nrethodsof surprise. Beinq

I le in constant combatread jness arttlPosse5'; inrl trerncndous11e:;tructive power, the -

newweapons can deliver suddenblows with highly effective results. 'The increasedspeed of aircraft has sharplyenhanced the possibility of surprise a'ir attacks against the most importantenemy facilities, installations and defensivepositions. The Sovjets believe that aviation can deliver surprise 'attacksagainst nrissile launchingpads, enemyair forces, groundforces, and miI itary-jndustrial targets. In addjtjon, ai r powercan di srupt 0r even inmobilize land and sea communications,thus preventingt.he enemy from taking effective countr.r.-nl(.(t.,rtrcr,ql{lrrilr,,l .,rrr.1rr.i.,r, ,rt.t,rr k. SovieLrrri lil-,rry l-ltt:tll't"t.', 1livc l,t'r'iuu',.rl.t.crrt.iolr Lo ilrc r.ulc ut :,rr.1,r.is,,irr airborneoperations. Theysay that surprise is a basic elenrentjn suchoperations. Surprise is achieved,'in their view, by rapid preparationand concentrationof troops jn the departure area, as well as by swift landinqs. Niqhtsare the best time for a surprise airborne landing, becauseit js easier to makea secret approachto a selected target under the cover of darkness. Taki'ngjnto cons'iderationthat the effects of surprise are only temporary, the reinforcement of the landing zonernust be carried out quickly and continuously. This will prevent the enemyfront concentratingadequate means for a counterattack and destruction of the airborne force Particularly importantin Soviet conceptsfor achievingsurprise are demonstrations, disinformation,canrouflrl{l{), rillcl various nteans of deceptirrns. However,the indispensab'le ingredient in preparationsfor surprise is almostalways strict secrecyin guarding the intentions of the conmander.Contributing to secrecy, and making it easier to preserve, i s reducingpreparation t.inreto the absolutemin'imum, and coRcealmentof nrajorweapons. This will be particularly importantfor nuclearmissjles.

L2(l The Soviets sttr;r;cstth,'rt. irr ollrrtr,,tvr,ol,(,rdt.ions the lollowrnqbasic measuresshould be taken to at hit:vt:r,1,.r',rt l'[rr]l and tactir:al surprise: - direction of heavy f irt' ,tty,tin',t. .,rrr.,n(l(r['y sectors in order to divert an enemy'sattention f rornprel)arat igns tor the nrain attacx - selection of djfferent hours arrrlrnet.hocls of startjnq attacks; in one ' case simultaneousattar;k try l.lrr:rntire forr:e, in another a sequential attack with wel I coorrlirraletl(tr.ourrs - rapid movementof troops f ronr rcar assernbryareas to the.ir jump off positions innrr:rJjat_clylrcf or.c tlrc irl.t.,rrl. - conceallttettt 0l l.lttlt.ittttt ol l.lrr' ,rl.l.,rr l. rrr llrt, vt,r'y l,r.,t.rrrrrrra,t.-

In the defense, surprise t-artlrt] ,rt lr rcvt'ri lrlirrr,rrilylry lravirrqa well organized, strong, flexib.le, and well directed lirt' sy.,Lcrrr, which will pe,rrrritdelivery of heaVyand effective fire in t'irneof nt,r'rl .rt areas wfrereattack rs I ikely or possible.

Developmentof technical intell tq.rrtr neansrtreaily irrrpedesachievement of surprise'. Massivejntroduction of ratlio-elt'c1.rorncclevir-es r;realy increases the chanceof detection of the prepa|c.rtion for an attack. fhe soviets point out that wjth the he'lpof modernradio-elect.ronic instrurrrentsit is possible to determinewith a h'ighdegree 'launching, of accuracythc. very momentof nrjssi1e the take off of aircraft, the approach ol naval ro.ces, r(]qr'oupingand transfer, andother activitios.

Theavailability of newmeans of detection,Soviet rrj I it,rry writers say, calIs for more researchefforts to djscover newways ancl rnethods of concealing from the enemythe deploymentof weapons and wedponssysterrrs. Add-itjonal research shouldbe directed at types of electronic courrternreasureswhjch would disrupt enemyintelf igenceoperations. 0n the otlrt,-rhand, the soviets realize that the potent'ial opponent,in order to detect ur Lirrre f-orces r.eadying themsel ves for an attack' woulduse all the available r',rrli'-eler,tronicequipment, not only to I /'l detectthe preparationsfor the attack.but also to disrupt the other side,s cormandand navigation system.

The Sovietsemphasize that the ability to deljver a surprise attack increases the importanceof correspondingcounteractions. Thesecan be achieved

by various means,primarily by detailed fauriliarity with the enemytactics, goodknowledge of his combatcapab'iljties and possibilities, tjmely warningof the forthcoming surprise attack, and by keepingonebownforces in high combat readi ness.

,,scientif A Soviet asses',lllL'ntof the int.rr:.r,,ilrr.;t,flcr-L of surprist:: ic- technical progressjs the nraterial basir ol t.hoscrevolutiorrary charrges which

haveoccurred in the Sovjet armedforces.in recent years. . .LThis/revolution

in military affairs to a significant degreehas rajsed the importanceof

surprise. High combatreadjness of the Sovjet ArnredForces is causedby the t most importantof all the tasks confrontingthem--that'is, to thwart the intentions and provide a decisive and completedefeat to any aggressor. The . present capabilities of the Soviet armedforces makeit possjble to solve this problem. "*

*Colonel GeneralN.A. Lomov,S-cjentific-Technical Progress L- - and the Revolution in Militar.v Affajrs (Moscow,1973)..-

tl'2 ' ! , or, ,Dup"v,

-1. Objective of conference

b. Recentdevelopments

2. Backgroundof the conference(Brown, Bell)

a. Thedraft study outline

b. The matrix

c. Explanatjonof re'levance " "REading 3. Period"Review of addjtjonal documents

: 4. Sovietviews on Surprise(Martell)

5. Therelationship between possible Soviet surprjseand NAT0 deterrence 6. Themorphology of surprise (Dupuy)

a. Srjrprise: an actjon to disrupt (princ.ipleof [.lar) b. Surprise-disruption:the effects of successfulsurprise

r Q. Security: action to preventsurprise (Principle of t.lar)

, 7. TheCase Studies as exentplarsol' surpriseand its diversity . Selection

b. Numberrequired

' c. Typesrequired

8. Thenarratives a. Approach b. Style

c. Relevance

FI 9. ReviewOutl jne; possibleactjons a. Approve b. Amend

, c. Rejectand replace o' 10. The Interim Report - I a. Formand content b. Recormendations

F? SUMMARYNOTES UN IIIVII.i.ICOIII.TRENCT, 20 JULY1977

Presentwere: ColonelTrevor N. Dupuy,Executive Dlrector Lt. Col. JohnF. Sloan,Staff Assoclate l'lrs. GraceP. Hayes,Dlrector of Research Prul tlartlll, Staff Assoclate RayE. Bell, Consultant GoldonS. Bluwn,Conslltant ColonAlAngus l.!. Fraser,Consultant Brfg. Gen.Sldn€y F. Glffln, Consultant

. Colonel-Dupuy surrnarlzed the workdone to date andreported on the decl- slon to ternlnate workon thls proJectand dlrect ttre remainderof the effort underthls contract to anotherstudy. Thepurpose of thls meetlngwas to ob- taln cormrentsfrom the three consultantson thb workdone so far, and to plan on whatwe pq-l-d- have done had the redlrectlon declslonnot beennnde. (ittt paperstraC 6ddi'*alstrlbuted to the partlclpants.) Mr. ltartell spokebrlefly aboutthe Sovlet conceptof surprlse0s evldent' '- ln thelr rlrltlngs andln the casestudy on the Byelorirsslanatlack, He erphaslzedthe extrenndanger of preconceptlons. Mr. 8rcrn descrlbedthe workhe haddone to lay out the dlrectlon ths study mlght be expectedto take.

Thedlscusslon that followed, basedon the agendatoplcs, covereda wlde range.

Therewas conslderable dlscusslon of deterrenceln relatlon to surprlse. General0lffln polntedout that noneof our allles can be expectedto sbend- !h9 rnney necessaryto preparean adequatedefense unless thby are realiy frl.ghtened. Dothe Sovletsreally believe that a nuclearwaican ue foulht andwon? he asked. npplrenlly they do lf the situatlon ls dangerousenoigh. Thereal strateglc problemls politlco-nrilltary. t'lemust deteinlne wtrit-6ver frlghtens them. -Whatwould they really conslderreason for golngto wair-l[E rust avoldtrlpplng traps whlchwlll worryor upsetthem. I[ ls-essentlalto rsnesberthat whatseems loglcal to us mayseem very llloglcal to them,and vlce versa.

ColonelFraser polnted out that NAT0ls only onesegment of the US-sovlet confrontatlon. Andas a corollary, only to the USand the USSRls the Eon- frontatlonworldwlde. Our allies don't seelt that ray. GeneralGlfftn suggestedthat a strong anti-SovletMarxlst governrnent In westernEurope mlght^trlgger the Soviets. lle also notedthat tlreyare obvlously concernedabout tlre Carter hrnanrlghts cr.rncept.lle suggestedtwo a

Therewas conslderable dlscussion of tlre artlcle "Fallures ln Natlonal Intelllgnce Estlmates"'byAvl shlalm (I.Iorldpolltrcs, Aprll 1976). There trqs agreementwlth hls thesls on the neEfJ6'FT-Ea ully ttrought-out thcory of surprfse.

Dlscusslonfocussed on deflnitlons and theorles of surprlse. Fromlt flnelgedthree bqslg aspeclsof surprlse, surmrarizedby Colonel Dupuyas: l) the actlon of.the surprlser; 2) the effect of the Surprler,s action on the surprlsed; 3) actlon taken by the potentlal surprlseb to avold belng rur- Pllsed. -It-becameapparent that there mustbe dlscirsslonof semantlcs,-and of the dlstlnctlon betweensurprlse, lgnorance, stupldlty, and underesilma- tlon and the consequencesthereof.

The dlscusslon then returne

l'lr. Eell ralsed the questlonof wlrateffect *t wouldhave on the Sovlets lf we evacuatsd(at least from vulnerable areas) dependentsof personnelIn the fotrat{ unlts ln Germany. And what about nnvlng a reserve conrponentand Its oqulpmentto Europe?

Generll Glffln suggesttrdthat we would both strengthenourselvbs, and deter the Sovlets, if we were to concentrlte on fortlfilng a substantlal num- ber of PGHsln Euoope.

Therewas also conslderablequestlon of the practlcrl and polltlcal prob- .leoEInvolved In preparatlon of substantlal defenilve works In ttre fonvari aroac Just west of the East Gernranfrontler. It was agreedthat ilrls would havethe deslred dual effect of helping our forces nnet a surprlse attack, SlLl 9!vtng clear notlce to the Sovlets that successfulsurpiloe wlll be dlfflcult,

It was_suggestedthat the adaptationto llest Gernnnyof the Swlssurllltla conceptcould be most effectlve In terms of defenseand deterrencelf the Qrqans rould lgree to equlpplngthelr local mllltla wlth substantlal nurntrers of ATGI'lsnand lf.the necessaryoction was taken to lncorporate thls concepa lnto MTO defenslrg plannlng.

GeneralGlffln expressedthe vlew that the study as outllned ls too narnow. It ralces manyquestlons that wlll requlre further research.

In a dlscusslonof the El Alanreilrcase study, lts lmportanceas an exarrrple of the llmltatlols of surprlse ras broughtout. Generalbtfftn suggestedthit the alr elemnt In the operatlon slrouldbe ernphaslzed.

Therewas a brlef dlscusslonof ttre existenceof considerableclasslfled llterature In thls area qhlch shoulrlbe related to thls study.