THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

School of International, Political and Strategic Studies State, Society and Governance in Melanesia State Society and in Governance Melanesia

DISCUSSION PAPER

Discussion Paper 2011/5

Compensation and State Avoidance in the Bugis Frontier of the Mahakam Delta, East

INTRODUCTION jaap timmer

Haji Idris of Sungai Banjar came from South sell the dry shrimp to buyers from the nearby Sulawesi with his wife and three children to the town of . It is hard for them to make Mahakam Delta in in 1997.1 ends meet and at the same time they face a sig- Idris began to work for a local pond owner, and nificant debt (about IDR50 million or AUD$6,100) within two years a local businessperson and the with the punggawa (patrons) who are no longer pond owner trusted him to operate ten hectares willing to give loans. This is how Idris expresses of ponds near Sungai Banjar. At the time, the his concern: number of ponds in the region was growing rap- There is almost no hope. We don’t know idly as profits were mounting. Idris built a large what to expect. We have no money to go house in Sungai Banjar, which he furnished elsewhere so we try to survive here. We still nicely with an impressive set of couches and eat but we’re not sure about tomorrow. The two tall cabinets filled with porcelain. After some government should come and see how we time, Idris managed to collect big harvests and live, how we suffer. They should teach us he and his family cashed large sums of money. about what to do. It would be great if Total They saved a part of it and went on pilgrimage [Total E&P , a sizeable oil and to Mecca three times in a period of five years. gas industry active in the region]2 is going Since 2003, harvests began to decrease and to compensate the land that I own [tanah by now Idris is unable to collect shrimps any milik saya] so I can use that cash to pay more. He now fishes small shrimp, which he and off my debts and move to another coastal wife dry on the jetty in front of their house. They region. It seems they are not going to com- Compensation and State Avoidance in the Bugis Frontier

pensate us for the pollution that killed who appraise the prospects for more equitable 2 the ponds. That is not fair. But they and more sustainable models of governance. come to listen and they gave assistance Bugis evade the state systematically unless to the mosque and they are funding the there is a demand for justice to which some rehab of our school. The government is kind of state procedure is mandatory. not at all listening. Not sure what is all The ways in which the Bugis patrons in behind that. Alas, the little people do not the Mahakam Delta relate to the state illus- have power. (Interview with Idris (42), trates the argument by James Scott in his Sungai Banjar, 10 June 2008) book The Art of Not Being Governed: An A growing number of Bugis shrimp Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia farmers in the delta of the Mahakam River (2009). Scott’s is an area study that focuses experience injustices with respect to limited on the periphery of nine Asian states in which redress from the oil and gas industry by numerous peoples are not fully incorporated Total E&P Indonesia (henceforth: Total) and into nation-states. He sees that these the government. The redress sought relates hill peoples are best understood as run- to declining or even loss of shrimp produce away, fugitive, maroon communities who that people link to environmental changes have, over the course of two millennia, allegedly caused by the activities of Total. The been fleeing the oppressions of state- social, economic and cultural background making projects in the valleys — slav- of these injustices and the grievances that ery, conscription, taxes, corvée labor, they have evoked are identified in this paper. epidemics, and warfare (Scott 2009:ix) I will show how local livelihoods of shrimp Generally, the livelihoods, social organisa- farmers who work within a patron–client tion, ideologies and their largely oral cultures system have become increasingly linked to are mostly read in terms of weapons of the large-scale resource exploitation and, as weak, ‘designed to keep the state at arm’s also indicated in the quote from Idris, hope length’ (2009: x). Scott argues, however, that that the government might provide justice. Since the end of President Suharto’s New ‘for those living in the shadow of states, such Order regime in 1998, the Indonesian state evasion is perfectly compatible with deriva- and society are experiencing the devolution tive, imitative, and parasitic state forms in the of central power and concurrent increases hills’ (2009:x). in regional autonomy with its own political The argument that Scott puts forward is dynamics (Schulte Nordholt and Van Klinken counter-intuitive yet works for understanding 2007). One would expect that a region like the case discussed in this paper. the Mahakam Delta would by now fully fall My research among Bugis shrimp farm- under autonomous regulations promulgated ers in East Kalimantan indicates that much by the province of East Kalimantan, and that of their culture, in particular those of the local Bugis elites would have significant con- patrons who keep in place a patron–cli- trol over state governance. While Bugis elites ent system, is an adaptation designed to are powerful in provincial politics, Bugis in evade both state capture and state forma- the Mahakam Delta enjoy a different form of tion. These Bugis see the state as attractive, autonomy — a frontier culture that is hardly and patrons in particular mimic elements of controlled by the state but relates to the state the state to legitimise their position and to in a different way. facilitate access to the waters and lands of People in the delta are generally not keen the delta, to exploit the shrimp ponds, and to engage with the government and they do not to engage in trade with shrimp buyers. As a respond to the greater autonomy afforded by result, they enjoy a great deal of sovereignty. Indonesia’s new political constellation. In this Most patrons in the Mahakam Delta present sense, they do not fit in the kind of situation themselves as the state in terms of provid- that is addressed by Indonesia watchers such ing money and welfare to their clients. They as John McCarthy and Carol Warren (2009), suggest to their clients that they are the only Compensation and State Avoidance in the Bugis Frontier

reliable state as the other state is uncertain trated in this quote from one of my interviews: due to unclear and ever-changing plans and Look, you know the delta. This is a place 3 programs and its own interest in terms of with no government regulations and subordination and taxation. in which the company acts arbitrarily, The other elite in the delta are the Bugis and where the people are legally illiter- who represent the village-level government. ate [buta hukum]. When the investors The village heads, in much the same way [migrants] came and opened ponds as patrons, like to be seen as a state, while there was no sharing and there was they are also keen to steer safe from the no control whatsoever. Since 2002, state unless it provides funds for projects. the fishery department says that the For these purposes, they mimic the state ponds we have made in the past are no at the local level. Physically, attempts are good. What’s that? For ages they told also made to mimic the ‘magic’ of the state. us that they should be devoid of any The village heads’ tidy offices have desks form of vegetation. Now they are sup- and filing cabinets like in real government posed to be green. Should we oppose offices, with clear signs indicating func- that? Those who still believe in ponds tions and department, for example financial plant , get some money for it officer, planning officer, first secretary, and from the government and hope that the so on. The jetty in front of these offices green pond will produce good harvests. often has curbs painted with black and There is no protest. People are in debt white stripes imitating government offices in and feel they can’t demand anything towns and cities. This copying of the state as long as they owe millions of rupiahs has, however, hardly any power, and most to someone else. Shame! People can’t of their ‘subjects’ laugh at the rhetoric on be free in the delta. People are slaves strict regime, effective law enforcement, and [budak]. It’s the punggawa [patrons]. smooth bureaucracy. The government does not realise that From the point of view of the clients or by being absent they actually allow the subjects, the state and the company have colonisation of a whole group of people become immediately important for access- who as a result become vulnerable. He ing compensation monies. While the Indo- does not think like a leader. He is not nesian government outside their realm in a leader. The government has the guts the delta holds little attraction for them, they to govern, but it does not dare to take are inclined to see the state as a provider of responsibility. We, the people, have little justice, as an alternative system to the one knowledge. We just enjoy the things that that subjects them. They need this alterna- we can still enjoy here while not being tive system to get access to compensation concerned about the future. The govern- with the idea that large amounts of cash will ment behaves like a king [raja]. They give them more control over resources. They bring security guards when they visit us. are, like their patrons, keen to avoid all the Allah knows what kind of system that evil that they see in wider Indonesian society: is. What are we, who are we, what can drudgery, subordination, and immobility. we do, what should we stand for? They The tension between the patrons and the don’t help us to answer those questions. clients partly illustrates Scott’s thesis and (Pak Amir, Sungai Banjar, February 11, 2009) shows that the Bugis elite controls the local economy on the basis of patronage, that While the Bugis patrons in the Mahakam they appreciate a high level of sovereignty to Delta successfully keep the state at bay and safeguard themselves from that system by operate as shrimp producers with a high level mimicking that system, but that the clients are of sovereignty, the state does see the delta keen to engage with the state by using it to as a useful territory. It has given the area in get access to compensation payments by the concession to Total from which it reaps tax company. The position of the clients is illus- payments. For the extraction of oil and gas, Compensation and State Avoidance in the Bugis Frontier

neither the state nor Total need to firmly the production of shrimp began to decline, 4 control this ungoverned region as long as discourse around environmental damage the Bugis shrimp farmers do not obstruct the ensued. This, however, does not mean that operations. Most Bugis see Total as another the issue is solely environmental or ecologi- frontier actor, as a sovereign body who is cal. This is because people are fundamen- working hard to grab resources. This reflec- tally concerned with control over resources tion on Total informs much of the way in which and the control sought is expressed in terms Bugis conceptualise their right to access com- of relationships. As Stuart Kirsch (2006: pensation payments from the company. 79–106) points out with respect to the impact To show how the Bugis’s art of not of the Ok Tedi mine in the Upper Fly- being governed informs their ideas about Plateau of Papua New Guinea, Yonggom compensation, this paper will discuss the people accusing the company of being a sor- frontier culture and Bugis’s self-identification cerer inflicting harm should be seen in terms as sovereign and not belonging to the state, of their relations with the mine. while at the same time being the state for The resulting compensation claims their own subjects. I also include an overview show how pollution should be seen and analysis of the role of the government as a social relationship rather than an to show that by systematically neglecting environmental problem that can only be the Mahakam Delta in terms of planning and addressed by technical means (Kirsch regulation, it allowed this frontier culture to 2006:106). evolve and protract. The government failed The case of the Bugis and Total examined to develop and implement clear policies that in this paper is also best understood when could have fostered an environmentally more grounded in the fundamental aspect of social sustainable and socially more just future for relations within the region. Glenn Banks the people of the Mahakam Delta. (2002) eloquently sets the agenda for such Below, I will identify these perceptions an approach in a comparative analysis of the of injustices and situate them in the Bugis explanations of conflicts generated by the culture of sovereignty and people’s relations Ok Tedi, Panguna and Freeport mine sites with the state. This paper is of particular in Melanesia. It allows for the incorporation importance for policy making on the issue of of subsistence resources derived from the access to justice in the aquaculture frontiers natural environment (such as the shrimp pro- of Indonesia. These frontiers are often areas duction in East Kalimantan), as well as other where people master the art of not being socially and culturally constructed resources governed and as such should receive specific (such as the patron–client system among policy attention. Moreover, the sheer scale of Bugis and Bugis migrant’s emphasis on these frontiers in most of Southeast Asia, and autonomy) (Banks 2002: 41). The greatest the human problems involved warrants for value of the approach proposed by Banks is specific policies. For policy advice purposes, that it replaces frameworks that solely focus the legal analysis in the section of this paper on an ‘ecological crisis’ and that it allows for ‘Claiming compensation for the declining recognition that the environmental impacts shrimp harvests’ is a good starting point. of the mines have created the possibilities for accessing justice by tapping into political, Compensation legal, and media resources. ‘In this sense community complaints over environmental It is in the situation sketched above that peo- issues may be symptomatic of wider prob- ple increasingly seek compensation from the lems’ (Banks 2002:42). company. As mentioned earlier, Bugis tend As I will show below, certain groups in to see the company as a potentially equal the Mahakam Delta are keen to access com- partner in a frontier of opportunities but pain- pensation payments by Total by framing their fully realise that it is an unequal competitor problems as environmental, in tune with the and a source of compensation monies. Since language of their lawyers and NGO advisors, Compensation and State Avoidance in the Bugis Frontier

because it will be heard by the company. The region because of the potential of aquacul- wider problems faced by these people are, ture, especially when US dollar-related export 5 however, about degrading ponds, reducing prices for shrimps increased sharply due to shrimp catches, low shrimp prices, massive the drastic devaluation of the Indonesian debts with their patrons, and unrequited rupiah during the Asian financial crisis that hit reciprocity with the company. On top of that, the region in 1997 and lingered through 1998. there is a sense of limited control over In particular, those who felt marginalised in resources (patrons own the land and have their Bugis homelands in South Sulawesi control over collection and sales of shrimp), because of growing pressure on land and and loss of direction in their lives (as only other resources, sold their land and houses those with funds can invest in a new region). and tried their luck in East Kalimantan. They The presence of Total and the environ- invested cash and manpower to clear veg- mental impact (whether real or alleged) of etation and to construct ponds, mostly of two its operations impinge further on people’s hectares in size but sometimes up to hundred already limited security over their resources. hectares. Some see themselves as victims of allegedly After they cleared the and toxic gas leaks from pipes of Total installa- established signs indicating the borders of tions (as I detail below) particularly if it opens the land claimed, the migrants would arrange an avenue to compensation payments. This a new Civil Registration Card (Kartu Tanda also explains that in their discourse about Penduduk) and next a so-called segel or pollution Bugis in the Mahakam Delta link izin garap (a permit ‘to till’, ‘to cultivate’ or ‘to Total’s evils to the end of their autonomy work on’ the land) from the most accessible (and concurrent growing interest in linking village head (Kepala Desa) or head of the with the government) and the ordeal of mov- village neighbourhood or hamlet or sub- ing on to a new region and starting anew as village (Bapak Rukun Tetangga). Next they opportunistic migrants, which is a costly and hired an excavator for digging the ponds, uncertain venture. purchased baby shrimp (benur) and fertilis- ers, constructed a dwelling at the pond, and A frontier economy recruited pond workers. Over a period of two decades, more than half of the landmass of To understand the situation in the Mahakam the delta was converted into shrimp ponds. Delta, it is important to see the region as a To harvest a quality product, the pond ‘frontier economy’. It is a region of opportu- needs acceptable water quality — something nity, where previously intractable mangrove that is hard to maintain in the delta due to has been turned into privately owned land improper water management and salination albeit without official consent of the state of the soil. There is also significant competi- that formally claims the whole delta as state tion for the natural food in the pond. Many land (apart from a few plots for which people farms are concentrated in a small area in the hold official land certificates). Bugis pioneers delta and this, along with the other factors arriving from regions where their freedom of mentioned above, have a negative effect on movement and residence became restricted, the environment and reduce pond productiv- ventured into this land considering it as open ity. Shrimp diseases have also entered the access, as common property, where they ponds as a consequence of the use of the could be self-reliant by growing shrimp in commercial feedstuffs used to speed up ponds. Each arriving family or group had its growth rates. These produce large amounts own independent access to land and waters of waste and fertile conditions for the growth for building shrimp ponds. Right from the of viral and bacterial shrimp diseases. Pollu- beginning of shrimp farming in the Mahakam tion of the waters — due to a combination of Delta, an ethos of independence began to the oil and gas industry, upstream deforesta- underpin the frontier culture. tion, and the local use of feedstuffs — has The newcomers were attracted to the also contributed to the decreases in harvests. Compensation and State Avoidance in the Bugis Frontier

The evolving social and economic rela- A recent study by Andrew P. Vayda and 6 tionships are typical of the contemporary Ahmad Sahur (1996) indicates that the migrant Bugis patron–client system. It above characterisation of the patron–client involves seemingly unconstrained exploit- system also applies to contemporary relations ation facilitated by inequitable profit sharing, between Bugis entrepreneurs and their and belongs to a tradition that is foreign to relatives who work for them in sharecropping the region but is typical of contemporary in Teluk Pandan of East Kalimantan. Bugis (see Timmer 2010). In line with Chris- The characterisation can be expected tian Pelras’s (2000) descriptions, scholars to apply all the more in the case of see other current manifestations of Bugis Teluk Pandan enterprises insofar as patron–client systems primarily as examples those regularly working for others in of the effects of modern capitalism. Studies Teluk Pandan appear to be mostly their report changes in ‘traditional’ patron–client poorer and/or younger relatives (Vayda systems not only in the Bugis South Sulawesi and Sahur 1996:16). heartland but also in migrant communities elsewhere. In general, these groups experi- In the Mahakam Delta as well, there is a strong preference for having relatives as ence shifts from more encompassing ties workers. Like some of the Teluk Pandan between contingent leaders and their follow- entrepreneurs, punggawa in the delta also ers to more circumscribed commercial con- invoked the following Bugis saying: ‘If nections between patrons and clients, reach- you have a relative work for you, you are blind ing a general pattern of indebtedness (see in only one eye; with a non-relative, you are Acciaioli 1989, 2000; Ammarell 2002; Vayda blind in both’ (Vayda and Sahur 1996:16). and Sahur 1985, 1996). For example, as Greg In other recent studies of Bugis in frontier Acciaioli points out with respect to patron– areas outside their homeland, the increasingly client relationships in commercial fishing in a modern economic context of the operation North Sulawesi Lindu fishing community, of leader–follower relations is a recurring Unlike the wide-ranging obligations theme. Acciaioli (1989:172–79) describes the recognized by more traditional generally significant erosion of the totalistic punggawa … the bos or pengusaha nature of patron–client ties among Bugis. The ikan maintains his relations with sub- increasing impact of direct rule by the Dutch ordinate fishermen by one primary East Indies government eliminated the need mechanism: debt. Characteristically an for local leaders to compete for political power. operator of a kiosk, he provides daily The advent of modern capitalism has also necessities — rice, salt, kerosene, soap, contributed to the dwindling of many of the etcetera — to a fisherman on credit. But displays of protection, loyalty, sponsorship, the fisherman is then obliged to supply and followership that marked patron–client only him with the major portion of his relations in the past (Acciaioli 1989:172). daily catch (Acciaioli 2000:224–25). The development of individually claimed This appears to be the dominant type of tracts of land for shrimp ponds in the delta patron–client system among Bugis abroad, appears to have produced a more secular including those who settled in the Mahakam and more individualistic patron–client system. Delta. The Bugis in the Mahakam Delta On top of that, punggawa take from the state include punggawa, entrepreneurs who act certain principles for legitimising their role not so much as employers dealing with wage as entrepreneurs and ‘service providers’. earners in the shrimp businesses as they do Using largely New Order regime terminology, heads and regulators of complex networks of they suggest that they bring government dependents, including family and relatives, (pemerintah) — the most crucial aspect of helping their workers cover expenses for bringing development (pembangunan) — in a building a house, medical or other emergency region where the state fails to do so. expenses, school fees, expenses of ceremo- The social fabric among the migrants has nial obligations, and so on. developed in particular ways upon settle- Compensation and State Avoidance in the Bugis Frontier

ment in the Mahakam Delta. The punggawa to lend money. However, most clients remain as provider of services, insurance company entangled: they have debts with a patron 7 and pension fund that Pelras (1996:333) that should be repaid before breaking the observes, functions in the delta as long as relationship, and the punggawa have agreed the aquaculture business supports it. Now, among themselves that they will not buy with the decrease in shrimp productivity shrimps from another punggawa’s anak buah, combined with the advance of individually leaving an anak buah with little choice but to claimed tracts of land for shrimp ponds has remain with his patron. produced a rather individualistic patron-client Besides being in a relationship of debt, system. The punggawa is the intermedi- there is still loyalty that comes from the fact ary between the smallholders (owners) and that the anak buah has so far relied on the keepers of shrimp ponds and the shrimp help of the punggawa for housing, health traders or the cold storage plants. Most pung- costs, school fees, and expenses when gawa lend money to their clients for building suffering a misfortune such as the death a home. They also provide money and of a relative, or when needing to arrange materials for the maintenance of the sluice and celebrate marriages. Punggawa would in the discharge channel. These investments ideally also take care of ‘retired’ anak buah. and related achievements give them status However, as investors in the region, the big and allow them to behave as elites and find punggawa bear little risk even though some culturally accepted ways of moving shrimps may have high debts with the cold storage through the delta. plants. This means that when they spot The owner or the small punggawa usually opportunities elsewhere they will pull out of puts the baby shrimp in the pond and they the delta and leave most of their dependants are also present at harvest time. In the past, behind in dismay. harvest time was exciting, as harvests would generally be good and both the patron and Finding a culprit for his client could begin to count their shares declining shrimp harvests in millions of rupiah. The customary profit sharing (bagi hasil) is 75 per cent for the Do people blame themselves and the ponds punggawa and 25 per cent for the anak they operate or is the culprit for the declin- buah (‘bagi empat’) but this catch-sharing ing situation to be found elsewhere? I have arrangement may vary and is subject to already indicated that there is a tendency negotiation especially when harvests are to blame Total, but to fully understand this it poor and income for the punggawa appears is instructive to look at a number of factors, uncertain. Moreover, the negotiations include including social and economic success and consideration of the debts that are deemed social and economic differences. necessary to be repaid and subsequently will A survey conducted in February 2009 lead to further deduction of the share in the reveals that income inequality is wide, rang- profit-sharing agreement. ing from IDR4 million to estimates of IDR1 Nowadays, harvest time comes with billion to IDR1.5 billion (about AUD$275 to increased anxiety and stress, as pond produce AUD$68,000 to AUD$103,000) per year.3 is poor, while the price is lower than ever The higher numbers are estimates by the before. A few years ago, people would harvest financial assistants of punggawa, who stress around five times a year and experience at that their bookkeeping is sloppy and merely worst one poor harvest every year. Nowadays, account expenses and earnings.4 Many also one or two good harvests a year is seen as try their luck in gambling. unusual luck. It is in this situation that the Overall, incomes tends to rise and drop disparity of wealth between punggawa and rapidly because, revenue-wise, most are clients grows with the dependency of the largely dependent on aquaculture and fish- latter on the former mounting. Nowadays, to ing. These activities both experience quick minimise risks, the punggawa are reluctant and significant price changes due to unstable Compensation and State Avoidance in the Bugis Frontier

international markets and changes in the people see that Total provides aid to villages 8 rate of the Indonesian rupiah against the US and compensates for losses although not dollar. This dependence on aquaculture also always according to people’s expectations. makes people vulnerable to the effects of Another problem faced by the shrimp exhaustion of ponds. farmers is that people see that their ponds Because of this context, the decline of regularly flood, likely because of a rising sea shrimp harvests has had a devastating impact. level, but according to the people, it is due This has led the poor and vulnerable shrimp to Total’s drilling activity causing the land to farmers in the Mahakam Delta to complain or sink. This observation is linked to anxiety express grievances about the environmental caused by an increasing number of oil and pollution that they believe has inflicted the gas platforms encroaching on their land and misfortune. In particular, pollution is believed waters. Total is drilling increasingly more to reduce the productivity of shrimp ponds wells in what is known as the Mahakam (sometimes to zero) and the subsequent Block. Angular, brightly coloured and firmly action of making a charge or even a claim is guarded offshore platforms mark the horizon directed towards Total. This is, however, hard of the sea, while pipes cutting through the to prove for local people because they do not land connect regulating units and plants. have access to the equipment and facilities And there is an increasing amount of traffic needed to scientifically establish these links. associated with the production of oil and gas. At the same time, the immediate link people Overall, people feel besieged by an industry establish between Total and shrimp demise over which they have no control. neglects other factors like shrimp diseases, The 2009 survey indicates a strong corre- or ‘natural’ exhaustion due to the shrimp lation between proximity to Total installations production system exceeding the carrying and the level of knowledge about company capacity of its natural environment. and state regulations (while education and In other words, the risks related to shrimp income levels are the same). That is, people farming feature less prominently in people’s who have experienced the effects of seismic awareness than the normative frameworks exploration and gas and oil drilling in the that potentially offer redress for grievances vicinity of their shrimp pond or in their fishing that point to the wrongs of others as the grounds are more aware of certain company cause of decreased productivity. Besides and state regulations (see below). It is, there- blaming Total, they also blame the gov- fore, no surprise that people living close to ernment for having allowed the excessive installations of the oil and gas company are expansion of ponds in the delta through lack more inclined to voice grievances towards of regulation and by stimulating production. that company. They blame Total’s activities Many argue that if the digging of ponds had for reducing the productivity of their ponds been regulated initially there would be less due to pollution and geographic disturbances crowding and competition and farming would and demand the government take responsi- be more productive as a result. bility. It is also their perception of the natural With respect to teachings about production environment that inclines them to do so. enhancement, people are at loss about advice The natural environment is a shared from the department of fishery to make man- concern of many because it is crucial to their grove-clean ponds (that are prone to exhaus- livelihoods. The aquaculturists see the delta tion) and the use of certain kinds of feedstuffs as a commodity frontier in which they see (that increase the risk of shrimp diseases). themselves as ‘super-natural’ (above nature). Less immediately related to shrimp farming, To understand issues of access to justice people see that in general the government related to the environment it is important takes little responsibility for the people and to understand the cultural backdrop. For the environment. Most concretely, the gov- example, people tend to reason that if Total ernment does not compensate for losses and is allowed to exploit natural resources to damages. In comparison to the government, the detriment of the natural environment, Compensation and State Avoidance in the Bugis Frontier

then the people should be allowed to do Banjar, where the shrimp ponds begin. the same. If Total hinders free access to Fishermen saw a massive stream of gas 9 land for ponds and waters for fish and bubbling up to the surface. This is continued limits successful harvesting of shrimp then it at least until my last field visit in mid-2009. should compensate the people as an equal The surrounding water has a brown-yellowish economic competitor in the Mahakam Delta colour, arousing suspicion and fear about frontier. Total and the people are considered environmental pollution. equal actors in a frontier of entrepreneurial Around the same time, the shrimp farmers and capitalist exploitation. That Total thinks of Sungai Banjar began to face increasingly differently and may not always play the game severe declines in their shrimp harvests. according to Bugis’s frontier culture leads to In combination with the observation that resentment. Total must be the cause of this decline, The identification of blame is also they seemingly began to overcome frontier grounded in people’s awareness of laws individualism. What united people was and regulations. People learn about laws the realisation that organising themselves and regulations by experience, stories from collectively may facilitate easier access to others, and from explanations disclosed compensation money. during information-cum-counselling sessions It took, however, until 2005, for people (penyuluhan or sosialisasi) by the state to establish the so-called Kelompok Petani and the company. State law and company Tambak Mulai Maju (Group of Shrimp Pond regulations are, according to most, in Farmers Commencing Progress) for claiming principle capable of providing justice for all compensation from Total. The main driving and enabling the delta to be managed in such force behind the establishment of Mulai Maju a way that all would benefit from its wealth. was Syaiful Kanibua, a lawyer based in Samarinda, who was invited to assess the Claiming compensation for situation in Sungai Banjar. Kanibua promised declining shrimp harvests to be able to arrange compensation for environmental pollution if evidence could This section details the evolution of the be established. He also told people to unite Sungai Banjar case and discusses the way when voicing their concern. in which people bring allegations to forums Soon after Kanibua came on the scene, and the kind of redress obtained. Fear, the number of members of Mulai Maju uncertainty, hampered communication, increased to 79, covering almost all shrimp intermediaries, and self-interest play a major farmers in Sungai Banjar. Many initially role. Self-interest is not only part of the expected to benefit from the concerted frontier culture sketched above, but also action in relation to the assistance offered emerges forcefully in the context of declining by Kanibua. They were soon to find out, harvests, increasing economic hardship, and though, that Kanibua’s promises would not the absence of meaningful development from materialise as quickly as hoped. Those who the state. Self-interest as part of the frontier were disillusioned quit the organisation and culture of the shrimp pond workers relates to currently believe it is unlikely their financial survival of the individual man and his family contribution to Kanibua will be repaid, let on the basis of the investment made and the alone receiving compensation. They have venture developed in the frontier. also become wary of outsiders who promise As of the year 2000, a number of people to assist in seeking redress through courts, in Sungai Banjar began to suspect pollution negotiations, or lobbying. of their shrimp ponds. They saw that one of In the beginning, Kanibua planned to focus the pipes of the Total platform named GTS the case around pollution due to seismic TN 10 Charlie (henceforth: Platform Charlie) activity but, following discussions with Pak was leaking gas. Platform Charlie is situated Amiruddin, the claim began to focus on about 300 meters from the shore of Sungai the leaking pipe. According to the stories I Compensation and State Avoidance in the Bugis Frontier

collected, upon the advice of Kanibua some arguing that he was merely representing 10 shrimp farmers began to gather evidence the people who considered only the original from their shrimp ponds in the form of claim just. Apparently, and according to local photographs and camera footage (usually narratives, Total began to perceive Kanibua with 1–2 megapixel mobile phone cameras). as a profiteer. In the end, Total no longer dealt The photos show dead shrimp and the video with Kanibua and decided to pay IDR150 footage gas bubbling up from the leaking pipe million to the people through one of its of Platform Charlie. Community Development funds. But people Again following advice of Kanibua, the allegedly received only IDR70 million, which members of Mulai Maju agreed upon a finan- had to be shared among 79 shrimp farmers. cial compensation of IDR15 million (about Seventy families received IDR1 million (about AUD$1,800) per family, but Kanibua swiftly AUD$120) each and nine families did not raised it to IDR60 million (about AUD$6,100) receive anything. per family. People were happy to agree, and The kind of redress advocated by Kanibua on the basis of discussions with Mulai Maju, and agreed upon by the shrimp farmers leads Amiruddin, Sungai Banjar’s sub-village head to distress. A potentially rewarding road to (Bapak RT) and apparently also with the justice proved to be ineffective. The company village head of the village of Sepatin, Pak handed out cash money to the claimants but Thamrin, Kanibua moved the case upward this did not provide redress. Instead, as the to the district parliament Dewan Perwakilan amount was so little and nine families did Rakyat Daerah (DPRD) of Kartanegara. not receive money, resentment towards Total He told the people that this step would bring grew. ‘This is not how one does business in them close to redress as Kanibua is well con- the delta, not with Bugis,’ is how a woman nected to a member of the DPRD named Pak expressed her anger. Marwan. To approach the company is not easy as The immediate result of Kanibua’s efforts its offices are in Balikpapan and further afield is that an official team went to the village in Jakarta and Paris. This largely explains to collect water samples from the shrimp why they were keen to trust a mediator like ponds. The team included officials from the Kanibua and strengthen themselves as a Environmental Monitoring Board (Badan group with similar concerns, despite a frontier Pengawas Dampak Lingkungan Hidup) of the culture that encourages them not to work Regional Planning Bureau (Bappedalda), and together. Previously, people tended to report Total. The attention of some highly positioned their concerns about environmental pollution officials made the members of Mulai Maju and declining harvests to Amiruddin, Sungai hopeful that their claims would be accepted. Banjar’s sub-village head. They were vesting Others reasoned that this may be an their hopes in him to process their complaints attempt by Total to wash its hands by proving to a higher state forum. However, Pak Amirud- to the government and the people that there din and also other elements in the village is no environmental pollution. The water sam- government (aparat desa) did not respond as ple was taken to the laboratory of the Pusat effectively as expected by the justice seekers. Pendidikan Lingkungan Hidup at Universitas Disappointed, people reasoned that if the Maluwarman in the city of Samarinda. The lowest level of government felt that there is results of their investigation indicated that no reason to advocate their concern to higher there was no evidence of pollution. However, levels of the state, then those higher levels this did not discourage Kanibua and Marwan. might disparage them. Having departed from They continued to claim compensation. a level they would describe as buta hukum People told me that at a certain stage (legally illiterate), they now felt let down by Total made an attempt to negotiate with what they considered the only and the most Kanibua a settlement of the case with a powerful forum: the state. Many realise that compensation payment worth less than the this is part of the game of living frontier lives claim. Kanibua did not enter the negotiations, and as a result most do not complain much Compensation and State Avoidance in the Bugis Frontier

but instead try to seek alternatives. These interest, not the absence of regulations. alternatives include petty business, catching Most of the previous studies on nature and 11 small shrimp, producing and selling shrimp development in the delta indicate that more crackers, or moving to another region. The or less proper regulations are in place and latter option is only available to those who should in fact have prevented massive have enough money to invest in a new destruction of mangrove forests. But due to venture. It is in this situation that most try to the failure of policies the delta has become get what is potentially available, including the stage for a typical drama of the commons. compensation money from Total. Below I detail the history and evolution of In terms of legal awareness, it is important official regulations and show that lack of state to note that people realise the potential intervention has allowed this drama to evolve benefits of engaging with a lawyer, in particular (see also Simarmata 2010). with someone who is connected to people in Since the late 1960s, control of the delta’s the DPRD. The DPRD is an influential body mineral resources were given to the national nowadays. In the past, DPRDs were seen oil company Pertamina. The postcolonial gov- as rubber stamps of the central government ernment gazetted it as a Mining Conces- but decentralisation has brought functions to sion Region or Wilayah Kuasa Pertambangan the regions that have greatly increased its (WKP) comprising the Mahakam gas and oil powers. The DPRD not only makes local rules fields — an area covering about 95 per cent and regulations Peraturan Daerah (PERDA) of the estuary of the Mahakam River. With but also oversees and monitors the role of respect to land and natural environment, this local governments. Law 32/2004 states that concession demands that companies operat- DPRDs have the obligation and authority ing in that area should conduct a baseline to conduct oversight of implementation of environmental assessment as a precondition PERDA and other regulations, decisions of for permit granting. Furthermore, the com- governor regents/mayors, implementation of pany is obliged to protect the ecosystem, and local budgets, local executive policy and prevent environmental pollution. implementation with respect to international The Oil and Gas Act of 1960, the Mining cooperation in the region. The DPRD can Act of 1967 and a Presidential Decree of play a role in settling conflicts between 1976 detail that oil and gas companies foreign companies and local communities. are not obliged to obtain right to land Realising the authority of the DPRD has for their exploitation activities. They only likely encouraged Total to look seriously into need to compensate for land taken from accusations of environmental pollution and local landowners, with the provision that actively join government teams investigating compensation does not transfer rights to the situations on the ground. The Sungai Banjar company. After mining has ceased, the land case has increased awareness about the should be returned to the original landowner, present role of the DPRD. This may provide in most cases the state. others with the incentive to push the DPRD to Recently, related regulations that were put act on complaints and grievances expressed in place at the time when Total was already by their constituents with respect to local extracting oil and gas in the region, outline policies and the quality of public services. that all land compensated by the company is expropriated to eventually become state The failure to implement land. This is ruled in a Government Regula- government regulations tion (Peraturan Pemerintah) of 2004 and in a Decree of the Head of the Oil and Gas Until today the government has failed to Agency (BPMIGAS) of 2007. In addition to control the situation in the delta so as to these two regulations, there are rules that foster the sustainable development of say that landowners have to allow mining resources that would benefit everyone. The activities on their land by parties who can main reason behind this failure is lack of produce evidence of being a WKP conces- Compensation and State Avoidance in the Bugis Frontier

sionaire or its contractor. resources. There are a number of reasons 12 For the shrimp farmers, these regulations for this. The first has to do with a tradition or impact most significantly on the issue of legacy of colonial policies relating to natural who receives compensation and who does resource management. not. Confusion about this arises because Until the end of the nineteenth century the regulations are not clear about who has there was little interest in the natural the right to be compensated. From a legal resources of the delta. The Kutai sultanate perspective, Total paying compensation to appeared to be unaware of a few small the pond owners who do not possess a land groups of settlers on the islands in the certificate is illegal. The ponds are illegal as delta. These were mostly Bugis engaged in they exist without any permit from forestry fishing and gardening (including coconuts) minister, governor, regent or the forestry as well as trade with groups upstream the agencies. A significant amount of ponds are Mahakam River. The Kutai sultanate was also illegal because they are located within a more interested in levying taxes on trade of protected zone.5 forest products from upstream Dayak groups The provincial land-use planning agency to seafaring traders. declared the Mahakam Delta a protected Next, the colonial government focussed zone in 1999 and the only legal ponds are heavily on resource exploitation and largely those for which the owners have a land cer- denied resource rights to local populations, tificate — a total of only five percent of the let alone in sparsely populated areas like the landmass of the delta. None of the newcom- Mahakam River Delta. The main resource ers hold land certificates and feel no need for extraction activity in that period was in the more legal certainty. They are sure that, when hands of capitalist ventures (then owned by needed, they can sell or let the land, and in Dutch). This practice continued after indepen- case the government wants to evict them, dence when the government faced the chal- it will certainly pay compensation. Indeed, lenge of state building and chose to use struc- many farmers hope that Total will dispossess tures left over from the former colonial power. them so that they can collect a relatively high The ownership and management of amount of compensation money for the land resources for the local people were often not that is becoming increasingly unproductive. clear. Additionally, political elites did not have This will enable them to invest the money much trust in the state as its structure and elsewhere. ideology often changed during the republic’s If the legal status of the Mahakam Delta first two decades. As a result, they sought to is a forest zone Total should secure permits maximise personal benefits and did not put before cutting mangrove. This is not happen- much effort in establishing credible govern- ing. As a coastal region, the Mahakam Delta ment structures. is a protected area where aquaculture and The third reason is of particular impor- land registration for cultivation and settle- tance to the situation in the delta, namely ments by the village governments are not the nature of shrimp markets and the inter- national system of resource use with respect allowed. If all these legal provisions had been to oil and gas. International trade in shrimp implemented the delta would likely still look and the transnational oil and gas industry is like it did some three decades ago. What largely skewed against regions such as East went wrong? Kalimantan with plentiful natural resources. Since the process of devolution of government power that commenced shortly after the fall of the Suharto regime, the Conclusion regional level has become increasingly responsible for regulating extraction of natural The case of environmental pollution near resources. However, there appears to be a Sungai Banjar shows how small-scale lack of political will to develop policy that may shrimp farmers try to hold the oil and gas stimulate sustainable development of natural industry responsible for declining produc- Compensation and State Avoidance in the Bugis Frontier

tivity of their shrimp ponds. Since approxi- compensation from the oil and gas company mately 2002, shrimp harvests have declined for the decline of shrimp harvests. This kind 13 across the delta. Concurrently, access to of modern self-interest evolves when people’s and control over social and natural resourc- economic ventures are no longer productive. es have become tenuous. At the same time, It appears to be the result of a realistic view the presence and impact of Total’s gas and that relates to development and compensa- oil operations is growing and the prospect of tion promises by the company, and, to a much receiving compensation payments for envi- lesser extent, the government. ronmental damage has become popular. In People know that representatives of this situation, a group of shrimp farmers in the government and Total come and make Sungai Banjar have come to see themselves promises about financial rewards, bridges, as victims of supposedly toxic gas leaks restoration of nature, saving the delta and from pipes of Total installations. They link so on, which are unlikely to be sustainable. the pollution to the end of their autonomy In these circumstances, people in the delta and the ordeal of moving on to a new region have a realistic view to get what they can, and starting anew as opportunistic migrants while they can. Hence, what is often seen as — an undertaking almost no-one can afford. opportunism or greed is a response to the People in the Mahakam Delta are hardly failure of the frontier as a productive zone motivated to develop their region for the and the failure of government policies to common good. They see their activities effectively regulate development. and themselves as above nature and they In a coastal region that is abundantly rich are keen to remain autonomous from the in natural resources, where people do not state and other institutional frameworks. As share equally in the profits of shrimp ponds, a result, the recent hardships of settlers fishing and other resource extraction, this residing in the Mahakam Delta resulting kind of response is understandable. In other from the decline in shrimp harvests does words, mounting claims for compensation not necessarily translate into care for an presented to Total is not merely a condition environment that is allegedly destroyed by created by the migrants or Total, but a condi- the oil and gas ventures of Total. tion that offers opportunities for people who In this context, sustainability is not on peo- know how to gain access to that particular ple’s minds, the focus is on sharing wealth. kind of justice. The punggawa think differently about sharing, Policy action with respect to coastal and claim a larger share as they feel that they shrimp frontiers should focus on outlining are like the state in terms of providing money arrangements for controlling access for and and welfare to the people (their clients). They the pace of scale of small-scale resource tend to think that the state provides uncer- projects so as to ensure sustainable devel- tainty due to unclear and ever-changing plans opment. Regulation with respect to pollution and programs and its own interest in oil and should focus around compensation for dam- gas exploitation in the delta. In many respects, ages that can actually be proven. Bugis’s ideas about ‘rights’ to access to state Any consideration of compensation should services and company compensations are pit- take into account past investments of the ted against their supposedly inherent frontier victim related to the amount of land or self-reliance. As a result, Bugis’s demands for waters used and the size of the land or justice do not contribute to a demand from for- waters polluted. This is the reality that people mal institutions that may improve governance in the delta are all too familiar with and for the benefit of all or for the protection of the which informs much of their understanding natural environment. of current injustices. At the same time, one In this context the ‘justice’ of environmental should realise that the absence of clear justice is best understood as an ambiguous regulation about land ownership leads to concept; in particular, varying claims about confusion, tension, and claims that are hard injustice appear to be attempts at trying to get to assess. Compensation and State Avoidance in the Bugis Frontier

To effectively engage with the kind of References 14 frontier civil society that I have identified here, it is important to acknowledge the Acciaioli, G. 1989. Searching for Good For- extent to which social organisation and tune: The Making of a Bugis Shore Commu- people’s attitude towards the state and nity at Lake Lindu, Central Sulawesi. PhD companies is shaped by the long-term dissertation, Department of Anthropology, absence of the state and the prevalent The Australian National University. local patron–client relations. In order to Acciaioli, G. 2000. Kinship and Debt: The deal with the environmental degradation in Social Organization of Bugis Migration the area, suitable mechanisms of dialogue and Fish Marketing at Lake Lindu, Central are needed to ensure a smooth interface Sulawesi. In R. Tol, K. van Dijk, and G. between all stakeholders — from villagers Acciaioli (eds), Authority and Enterprise and village heads to punggawa, money- among the Peoples of South Sulawesi. lenders and company representatives — to Leiden: KITLV Press, 210–39. ensure sustainable development of natural resources and justice for the most vulnerable. Ammarell, G. 2002. Bugis Migration and Modes of Adaptation to Local Situations. Acknowledgements Ethnology 41(1):51–67. Banks, G. 2002. Mining and the Environ- Ethnographic fieldwork for this paper was ment in Melanesia: Contemporary Debates conducted during a number of visits to the Reviewed, The Contemporary Pacific 14(1): region from July 2007 onwards. On top of 39–67. that, a team of students conducted a sur- Bourgeois, R., F. Rahmadani, E. Sudiono, vey on access to justice in February 2009. and B. Sulistiadi 2002. A Socio-Economic The Netherlands Organization for Scientific and Institutional Analysis of Mahakam Delta Research funded the research. I thank Stakeholders. Unpublished report. Akhmad Wijaya (MA Student at Universitas Kirsch, S. 2006. Reverse Anthropology: Mulawarman), Rikardo Simarmata (PhD can- Indigenous Analysis of Social and Environ- didate at Universiteit Leiden), and Rony mental Relations in New Guinea. Stanford: Fardyan Paath and Bagus Rai Wibowo Stanford University Press. (Students in the Law Faculty at Universitas Mulawarman) for their assistance in the field McCarthy, J. and C. Warren 2009. Communi- and insight on versions of this paper. The usual ties, Environments and Local Governance provisos about personal responsibility apply. In Reform Era Indonesia. In C. Warren & J. F. McCarthy (eds), Community, Environ- ment and Local governance in Indonesia: Author notes Locating the Commonwealth. New York: Routledge, 1–26. Jaap Timmer is senior lecturer and Direc- Pelras, C. 1996. The Bugis. The Peoples of tor of the Master of Applied Anthropology South-East Asia and Pacific. Oxford: Black- at Macquarie University, Sydney. He is the well. author of Living with Intricate Futures (2000) and numerous articles on cultural change, Pelras, C. 2000. Patron-Client Ties among the millenarianism, and political developments Bugis and Makassarese of South Sulawesi. in Indonesian Papua and Solomon Islands, G. Acciaioli, trans. In R. Tol, K. van Dijk, and and on political ecology and access to justice G. Acciaioli (eds), Authority and Enterprise in East Kalimantan. He is currently focusing Among the Peoples of South Sulawesi. Leiden: KITLV Press, 15–54 on the anthropology of the state, alternative constitutions, religion, and lost tribes in the Schulte Nordholt, H. and G. van Klinken Pacific region. 2007. Renegotiating Boundaries: Local Compensation and State Avoidance in the Bugis Frontier

Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia. Leiden: so-called Mahakam Block. The Mahakam KITLV Press. Block is also a top-tier oil and condensate 15 Scott, J. 2009. The Art of Not Being Governed: producer. An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast 3. These numbers are consistent with the Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press. findings of a household survey reported Simarmata, R. 2010. Legal Complexity in by Bourgeois et al. (2002: 57–58). Other Natural Resource Management in the Fron- data from the survey also largely concur tier Mahakam Delta of East Kalimantan, with their socioeconomic and institutional Indonesia, Journal of Legal Pluralism and analysis of Mahakam Delta stakeholders. Unofficial Law 62: 115–46. Moreover, the results of the survey echo Stonich, S.C. and P. Vandergeest, 2001. Vio- issues in other tropical coastal regions lence, Environment, and Industrial Shrimp where aquaculture and fishing are the Farming. In Peluso, N.L., and Watts, M. main economic activities (see, for example, (eds), Violent Environments. Ithaca: Cornell Stonich and Vandergeest, 2001). The University Press, 261–86. presence of oil and gas mining in the Timmer, J. 2010. Being Seen Like the State: Mahakam Delta adds a number of different Emulations of Legal Culture in Customary problems that are detailed in this paper Labour and Land Tenure Arrangements (and see Timmer 2010). in East Kalimantan, Indonesia. American Ethnologist 37(4):703–12. 4. The Banjar fishermen who live on trawlers Vayda, A.P. and A. Sahur 1985. Forest Clear- for extensive periods of time (for periods ing and Pepper Farming by Bugis Migrants of up to three months) are generally better in East Kalimantan: Antecedents and off. Pedagang or traders and shop and food Impact. Indonesia 39:93–110. stall entrepreneurs comprise a middle class Vayda, A.P. and A. Sahur 1996. Bugis of a sort. Also living in the villages are blue- Settlers in East Kalimantan’s Kutai National collar employees of Total holding mostly Park: Their Past and Present and Some fixed-term contracts (ranging from one day, Possibilities for Their Future. CIFOR one week to three months, but rarely to one Special Publication. Jakarta: Center For year). These are mostly younger men and International Forestry Research. generally sons of fishermen who rank at the lowest economic level. Endnotes 5. Since the Mahakan Delta is a coastal region, it is also subject to the so-called 1. To protect the identity of my informants Joint Forestry and Agricultural Ministerial I use pseudonyms when referring to them Decree of 1984, which outlines regulations and I have fictionalised any contextual for aquaculture in coastal forest (man- clues to their identity. grove). This decree prohibits aquaculture 2. Total is the Indonesian upstream unit of on land masses (islands) smaller than ten Franco-Belgian TotalFinaElf SA. It has square kilometres. For the delta, almost all been present in Indonesia since 1968, its islands belonging to that category have and is the country’s leading gas producer. become home to aquaculture and thus Total has been active in the Mahakam have little forest left. On top of that, a Presi- region since the early 1970s; production has been growing ever since, in particular dential Decree of 1990 — the so-called with the discovery of massive fields in the organic regulation of the Environmental late 1990s. The production in and offshore Law of 1982 — aims to prevent environ- the delta now supplies most of the feed gas mental damage in coastal and mangrove for the Bontang liquefaction plant from the environments. The State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Program (SSGM) is a multidisciplinary research unit within The Australian National University’s College of Asia and the Pacific. The program conducts research on important contemporary issues affecting the Pacific, and especially Melanesia, including topics of particular relevance to Australia’s aid program and to the Australian and partner government policies more generally.

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