Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 10, No. 2: 115-140
Responsibility and Rascality The Nigerian National Assembly, 1999-2013
Oarhe Osumah
Abstract
This essay, which is based on desk analysis, considers the legislative responsibilities and political rascality of the Nigerian National Assembly in its unbroken fourteen-year lifespan from 1999, when Nigeria redemocratized, to 2013. Within this period, although the National Assembly performed its legislative responsibilities in certain unique ways, it largely portrayed itself as self-seeking rather than driven by enlightened public interest. Thus, for the National Assembly to become more responsive to popular interests in the discharge of its legislative duties, the essay suggests the need to tackle the prevailing prebendal and neopatrimonial conceptions of public office through better education, electoral reform, and citizen action.
Keywords: Legislature, responsibility, rascality, politics.
The National Assembly of Nigeria resumed in May 1999 after nearly two decades of military rule (1983-1999). Since 1999, the federal legislative body has had its longest stretch of legislative practice in Nigeria’s constitutional history. It has enjoyed a fourteen-year lifespan, which is longer than legislative practices in the country’s three previous republics combined. During the former three botched attempts at democratic experiment, the National Assembly had a lifespan of four and five years in the First (1960-1966) and Second (1979- 1983) Republics, respectively, and less than a two-year lifespan in the Third Republic (1992-1993), which was a stillbirth due to a military coup and a dubious civil-rule transition program. Since the inauguration of the National Assembly in 1999, the actions of its legislators have generated intense debate and castigatory remarks that the assembly is an “expensive, irrelevant talking shop.”1
Oarhe Osumah lectures in the Department of Public Administration, Ambrose Alli University, Ekpoma, Nigeria.
December 2014 | 115 Shortly after the inauguration of the Fourth Republic in 1999, most of the federal lawmakers exhibited predatory traits reminiscent of their counterparts in the previous failed democratic experiments. In the First Republic, the bellicosity and rascality of the legislators conflated with intraparty squabbling and interparty rivalry, which resulted in the demise of the Republic.2 In the Second Republic of 1979 to 1983, haunted by the specter of the possible return of the military to power, legislators were preoccupied with seeking executive patronage. They deployed legislative powers and prerogatives in order to pilfer from the national treasury before a potential end to the military’s recess from politics. Legislators obviously subordinated their statutory responsibilities to psychopathic primitive accumulation due to a lack of confidence that the political system could be stabilized. Their engrossment in self-indulgence became a self-fulfilling prophecy. In December 1983, the military ended the Republic, partly on account of the legislators’ excesses. Also, in the political transition to the Third Republic, the charlatanry, feigned exuberance, and compromises of the federal legislators in the face of the annulled June 12, 1993 presidential election result, impugned the legislators’ professional competence and partly contributed to the demise of the Republic.3 In the advanced democracies of the world such as the United States, France, and Britain, as well as in the newly industrializing countries, the prominent role of the national legislature has been central to effective socio-economic development and political stability.4 In the light of international experiences, the ontological contradictions of the historical experiences of legislative traditions and practices in Nigeria stir the need for research. This essay examines the legislative activities in Nigeria’s National Assembly between 1999 and 2013, within the framework of the body’s statutory responsibilities. In pursuing this principal objective, it is argued that when the lawmakers have deployed legislative powers and prerogatives to promote collective interest through socio-economic development and political stability, they have been effective. However, if the federal legislators have been preoccupied largely with self-serving endeavors at the expense of socio-economic and political development, they have behaved in a rascally manner. Furthermore, the essay illuminates the socio-cultural imperatives that infringe on the abilities and integrity of the National Assembly to competently and effectively discharge its legislative responsibilities to advance collective interests. Before proceeding with this argument, the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings must be considered.
2 Billy J. Dudley, Instability and Political Order: Politics and Crisis in Nigeria (Ibadan, Nigeria: Ibadan University Press, 1973). 3 Chike F. Okolocha, “Social Quotients of Legislation,” in Issues and Processes in Legislation, ed. Chike F. Okolocha (Benin City, Nigeria: Uniben Press, 2002), 110-115. 4 Ibid.
116 | Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 10, No. 2 Political Responsibility and Rascality in Nigeria: Conceptual and Theoretical Notes
Political rascality is conceptualized as the discharge of legislative responsibilities in such a way that political actions are driven by personal interest rather than by the collective good. It is a kind of politics characterized by crass opportunism, individualism, and personalized rule. Political rascality is broadly anti-people. Rather than focus on the promotion of collective interest through socio-economic and political advancement, political rascality is concerned with the building of personality cult and the quest for primitive accumulation at the expense of the vast powerless majority. It is short-sighted, superficial, pedestrian, and ideologically deficient in content and context. Political rascality spawns devastating consequences. It is alienating and incapable of engineering efficient and effective institutions. It also trivializes popular participation in the formulation and implementation of decisions and the discharge of responsibilities.5 Responsibility is a matter of intense academic concern and public interest.6 Essentially, it denotes the obligation and duty assigned to an individual or institution to perform in accordance with the directions and expectations of him or her, or an institution’s principal. Responsibility is based on tasks and activities that are undertaken to accomplish overall objectives.7 There are various dimensions of responsibility, namely social, moral, legal, and political. The political dimension of responsibility is frequently cited and seems to acquire elevated importance8 as an integral part of representational democracy. By this understanding, the overall objective of political responsibility is the advancement of self-enlightened interest through socio- economic and political development. It is not driven by personal motivation of the trustees of the state but by the collective interests of the majority in the individual constituencies or larger society. This means that the aim is the conduct of governmental business for the welfare of the majority of the people in various constituencies or the entire society. Thus, if a legislator follows the genuine demands and aspirations of the majority of the people in his or her constituency, which nevertheless may be
5 Julius O. Ihonvbere, “Keynote Address at the Opening Ceremony of the International Conference on Rethinking Governance in the 21st Century,” organized by the Institute for Governance and Development, Ambrose Alli University, Ekpoma, Nigeria, June 25, 2003, in Rethinking Governance and Development in the 21st Century, ed. Friday Ebose Iyoha, Vincent Osa Aghayere, and Patrick Osa Oviasuyi (Ekpoma, Nigeria: Institute for Governance and Development, 2003), 474-482. 6 Lorraine Holmes, “The Concept of Political Responsibility” (Durham Thesis, Durham University, 2008), Durham E-Thesis Online, http://ethesis.dur.ac.uk/3888/ (accessed April 15, 2014). 7 Benjamin C. Osisioma and Hilda E. Osisioma, Management Practice (Enugu, Nigeria: J. B. H. Publication, 2002). 8 Holmes, “The Concept of Political Responsibility.”
December 2014 | 117 opposed to the interests of the majority in the entire society, the representative has behaved responsibly. But if a legislator rationalizes personal needs, desires, and aspirations as those of his constituency, he has behaved irresponsibly. Instructively, while a legislator is following the popular demands and aspirations of the people in his constituency, the representative also should consider the stability of the entire society. This is because, without national stability, the pursuit of projects and the fulfillment of the needs and aspirations of constituencies cannot be realized to the fullest. The twin concepts of responsibility and rascality are not mutually exclusive. Rascality can be shrouded in responsibility. The pursuit of selfish objectives in office, sometimes in the quest for primitive accumulation by representatives in government, may conflate with, or be projected as part of, their constituencies’ agenda. In other words, rascality can be rationalized as responsibility. Also, in the quest for legitimacy and retention of the status quo, predatory political actors, who are largely thought to be rascally, can show little concern for socio- economic development and political stability in patterns that portray them as responsible and responsive. Indeed, effective discharge of responsibility in public office is not very easy. It requires incumbents or occupants of public office to display a high sense of self-discipline, industry, commitment, honesty, prudence, justice, equity, nationalism, and balanced development rather than egocentrism and the desire for self-aggrandizement. The discharge of responsibility in public office is expected to be rooted in adequate preparation, requisite experience, and a passion for societal development.9 The specific normative values inherent in the concept of responsibility are development, justice, and equity, which designate it as a discrete and potentially crucial ingredient of the maintenance and relegitimization of the polity. On the other hand, the most devastating consequences for the failure to effectively discharge responsibility for the polity include legitimacy crisis, injustice, and alienation.10 In the analysis of phenomena such as political rascality or irresponsibility in the post-colonial Nigerian state, as in most other African states, certain models have been pursued. Prominent among these are the theory of two public realms by Peter Ekeh, the theory of prebendalism popularized by Richard Joseph, and the Weberian neopatrimonial model. According to Ekeh,11 representatives in government in Africa, including in Nigeria, function in two public realms (the civic and primordial public realms) side-by-side. These two publics emerged as products of the contradictions of colonialism. In these two publics, the logic of relationships in terms of morality is different. In the civic public realm, government officials extract material benefits from the state but,
9 Ese Malemi, Administrative Law (Ikeja, Nigeria: Princeton Publishing, 2008). 10 Holmes, “The Concept of Political Responsibility.” 11 Peter P. Ekeh, “Colonialism and Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement,” Comparative Studies in Societies and History 17, no.1 (1975): 91-121.
118 | Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 10, No. 2 in return, they give only sparingly to the civic public. On the other hand, state officials are expected to freely donate their services and material benefits to the primordial public without expecting any reward in return. The epitome of this dialectic is that a good trustee of state power is expected to serve the primordial public dutifully, with a sense of honesty, integrity, and purpose and without anticipation of any material reward. The same public official is expected to extract material benefits from the civic public realm and shirk as much as possible his or her responsibilities to that public. In another prism, Richard Joseph12 explained the individual and group pursuits or relationships within Nigerian political circles based on the theory of prebendalism. In this theoretical perspective, public offices approximate “prebends” that can be appropriated by occupants, who use them to acquire material benefits for themselves and their proximate constituents and kinfolk. Related to Ekeh’s theory of two public realms and Joseph’s prebendalism is the Weberian notion of neopatrimonialism, which is a modern derivative of patrimonialism. Neopatrimonialism denotes the use of state resources by patrons and officials to secure the loyalty of their clients and constituents.13 Within this framework, distinction between the public and private domains becomes blurred and rational-legal authority is privatized and instrumentalized for primitive accumulation of material wealth.14 The assumptions of the three theories are interrelated. In this analysis, these assumptions are combined in the study of the predatory behavior of representatives in government and their seemingly gross deficiency in the pursuit of enlightened self-interest. In Nigeria, public officials tend to personalize their offices and privatize common national resources, while demonstrating little concern for the socio-economic development of the larger society. Indeed, being in public office is perceived as an opportunity to secure wealth and other rewards of self-aggrandizement. It is perhaps for this reason that the representatives in government, in their pursuit of personal ambition, manipulate primordial networks and sentiments. The primordial networks become, or are perceived as, instruments of elite deception. The self-indulgent pursuit of representatives in government yields only scanty benefits for the primordial groups. This is evident in the poverty, malnutrition, hunger, squalor, and disease within the various primordial groups. The predatory elite use a chunk of their stolen wealth to establish personal estates, purchase chieftaincy titles, and obtain honorary doctoral degrees.15
12 Richard Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 13 Richard Synder, “Explaining Transition from Neopatrimonial Dictatorships,” Comparative Politics 24, no. 4 (1992): 57-83. 14 Oarhe Osumah, “Tonic or Toxin? The State, Neopatrimonialism and Anticorruption Efforts in Nigeria,” Korean Journal of Policy Studies 28, no. 1 (2013): 111-134. 15 Ibid.
December 2014 | 119 Although it might not be easy for representatives in government to dampen primordial interests in the discharge of their responsibilities when they are faced with the demands of diverse identities that must be considered in the pursuit of the collective national interest, it nevertheless is feasible. It is possible to accommodate varied interests and at the same time advance the national well-being. The primordial value-orientation of the elite and their self-serving motivation ruin the pursuit of collective national interest in the midst of competing primordial interests, as the case of the Nigerian legislature demonstrates.
The Legislature
The legislature is one branch of the tripod of governance in modern states. It is charged statutorily with the function of enacting laws. A legislature is indispensable to the effective governance of any society. In the threshold of history, the legislature symbolizes the struggle for democracy and against arbitrary government. It is also authorized to check executive excesses and monstrosity. As Ubhenin noted, this organ of government is an important instrument of socio-economic and political advancement.16 In a representative democratic government, the legislature is statutorily charged with a threefold function or responsibility of law making, representation, and oversight. One of the principal responsibilities of a legislature is to make laws on behalf of the people in the political community. Law making relates to the process of fashioning new laws and fine-tuning previous ones to reflect the changing conditions of life. Law making entails several activities such as budget making and approval of the financial expenditures of the executive as well as the nature of taxes that are levied on citizens as individuals or on corporate bodies. Through law making, the legislature establishes policy programs and determines the content, extent, and timing of policies, as well as the personnel, mode, and intensity of funding.17 Thus, in law making, a legislature requires creative ingenuity for the reformation, reconstruction, reinvention, and rejuvenation of extant standing orders and procedures of governance as well as in its relationship with the other institutions of government.18 In discharging its rule making function, the legislature establishes policies through deliberation, approval, or rejection of bills on matters brought before it. The legislature deals with bills in committees; listens to public testimony; consults with lobbyists, constituents, and bureaucrats; makes speeches; and even socializes with those interested in specific law or the law-making process.
16 Oscar Edoror Ubhenin, The Legislature (Benin City, Nigeria: Research, Policy and Contracts Network, 2004). 17 Augustine O. Ikelegbe, Public Policy Analysis: Concept, Issues and Cases (Benin City, Nigeria: Imprint Services, 2006). 18 Ubhenin, The Legislature.
120 | Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 10, No. 2 Another major responsibility of the legislature is representation of the diverse interests in the country. Members of the legislature are often described as trustees, delegates, and representatives who are elected to make decisions for the good of the majority in their constituencies and the entire country.19 As the representatives of the people, legislators are required to work closely with the members of their constituencies and to respond at least to some degree to their yearnings and aspirations.20 In order to effectively respond to the needs of their constituencies, legislators are expected to be regularly present in sittings, actively involved in debates, and engaged in writing and submitting briefs to the House concerning the demands and needs of their constituencies.21 Also, as the eyes and voices of their constituencies, the legislators have representational responsibilities for civic education. This means that legislators should help citizens to understand diverse constituencies, conflicting interests, and differing values in a representational democracy. So, it follows that legislators should help address conflict, build consensus, and achieve settlement. A further principal responsibility of the legislature in a representative democracy is legislative oversight. Statutorily, the legislature is a separate but co-equal arm of government that shares in the responsibility of governance. Thus, it follows that the legislature performs a watchdog role over the executive arm of government. Legislative oversight is summed up as the process by which a legislative body takes an active role in understanding and monitoring the performance of government concerning the application of legislation to its other primary functions of law making and public policy formulation, setting budgets, and raising revenues. Furthermore, the legislature plays an important role in the screening of nominees for key appointive positions, such as ministers, ambassadors, high commissioners, and top government functionaries for public corporations, boards, and parastatals. Legislative oversight also includes the burden to respond to the tardiness and irresponsible conduct of public officials over issues that affect the welfare of citizens. In this case, the legislature can indict and sometimes sack the official involved through impeachment.22 Impeachment is usually the last resort of the legislature against any official unresponsiveness or constitutional breach. In addition, in the event of issues detracting from its image, the legislature
19 W. Brewer Stouffer, Cynthia Opheim, and Susan Bland Day, State and Local Politics: The Individual and the Governments (New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1996). See also, Marcel Blanchet, “Orientations and Principles of the Quebec Legislation on the Financing of Political Parties,” Participation 27, no. 2 (2003): 1-10, and Richard M. Pious, American Politics and Government (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986). 20 Cristina Leston-Bandeira, “Studying the Relationship between Parliament and Citizens,” Journal of Legislative Studies 18, nos. 3-4 (2012): 265-274. 21 James O. Akpojaro, “The Legislator and His Constituency,” in Issues and Processes in Legislation, ed. Chike F. Okolocha (Benin City, Nigeria: Uniben Press, 2002), 61-85. 22 Collins Chuks, “Anambra House Panel Indicts Board over Relief Materials,” The Guardian, March 19, 2007, 6.
December 2014 | 121 performs a self-investigatory role. Aggrieved by an indictment either from within or outside, the legislature can insist on investigation of itself. Members can come to a consensus that the legislature is drifting, and, if nothing is done, the reputation of its members will be jeopardized.23 In discharging oversight responsibilities, the legislature is not expected to rubber-stamp executive proposals. Rather, it should be dispassionate enough “not to allow any form of primordial politics and resort to petty considerations to influence them negatively” in dealing with executive-initiated proposals.24 Thus, the legislature must be self-assertive and relatively independent of the executive. However, the ability of the legislature to effectively undertake its three statutory functions has been linked to capacity and institutional variables.25 Capacity relates to the broad integrity or upstanding reputation of the legislators themselves. This applies to the personal profiles of the parliamentarians, particularly the principal legislative officers.26 Requisite experience, competence, mobilization skills, and integrity are vital to the exercise of principal legislative responsibilities. Yet, legislative capacity is not an end in itself. It is one thing to possess legislative capacity but quite another to realize or to exercise it.27 The measure of institutional capacity also applies to the relative regularity with which legislators turn over briefs.28 Also vital to legislative effectiveness is the influence of party caucuses. The majority party is the principal forum for deciding key issues. For example, it has been contended that the United States Congress is party-oriented. By the 1990s, two-thirds of floor votes in the House were along party lines.29 Similarly, in Canada, several bills and proposals have been delayed, amended, or discarded after private consultation with party backbenchers, especially in informal meetings. Pressure from party caucuses in these meetings, or by any other means, can lead to the ruin of proposals.30 Still, committees are key agencies in the effective performance of legislative responsibilities. Committees are a microcosm of the legislature,31 or what Woodrow Wilson
23 Shehu Mustapha, “How Bauchi Legislators Found Their Voice,” This Day, February 3, 2008. 24 John Alechenu, “Rep Pleads with Senate over FIRS Boss,” The Punch, March 2008, 7. 25 Alan Rosenthal, “The Good Legislature,” NCSL State Magazine, July/August 1999, http:// www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/legislature/the-good-legislature.aspx (accessed September 6, 2013). 26 B. Imeagwu Chukwumah Ijomah, “Legislators, Legislation and Social Imperative,” in Issues and Processes in Legislation, ed. Chike F. Okolocha (Benin City, Nigeria: Uniben Press, 2002), 39-49. 27 David Arter, “Introduction: Comparing the Legislative Performance,” Journal of Legislative Studies 12, nos. 3-4 (2007): 245-257. 28 Rosenthal, “The Good Legislature.” 29 Arter, “Introduction: Comparing the Legislative Performance.” 30 Jonathan Malloy Member, “The Executive and the Parliament in Canada,” Journal of Legislative Studies 10, nos. 2-3 (2006): 206-217. 31 Ubhenin, The Legislature.
122 | Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 10, No. 2 called “the little legislatures.”32 Committees are the practical instruments for discussion and scrutiny of government proposals and actions.33 A number of other factors identified as critical to effective legislative capacity and performance include the presence of reformers in the legislative ranks; effective presiding officers who can muster forces for or against change; the disposition of the national president; the status of civil society, which can provide training and encouragement for an effective legislature; and the electoral framework or processes of a country, which can encourage people of integrity to participate in political contest.34 Indeed, various indicators have been identified to assess the performance of legislatures within the context of their principal responsibilities. Most of the growing body of legislative studies focuses on evaluation of output in assessing legislative performance. One dimension of the evaluation of output is the temporal, which compares a national legislature in two distinct assemblies. Another measure of legislative performance is based on the quantity of the legislation that is introduced and enacted independent from executive leadership and possibly in the face of presidential opposition. Also, legislative performance is evaluated based on the quality of legislative initiatives from legislators who are involved in major policy matters. As Nicolas Baldwin argues, a well-performing legislature is one that makes policy with positive people-centered effect rather than one that mills policy with outcomes that are hardly popular.35 In this essay, all three dimensions for evaluating legislative performance are deployed in relation to the Nigerian experience.
Performance of Nigeria’s National Assembly since 1999
Globally, in both old and emerging democracies, the parameters for the assessment of the performance of legislatures such as Nigeria’s National Assembly are based on the three principal functions: law making, representation, and oversight. Consistent with the conceptual framework discussed earlier, the demonstration of responsibility or rascality depends on how much the output activities of the federal legislators serve as instruments of socio-economic and political advancement in their individual constituencies and within the larger society during the period under review.
Law Making A vital aspect of the legislative power of law making pertains to the extent to
32 Milton C. Cummings and David Wise, Democracy under Pressure: An Introduction to the American Political System, 8th ed. (Orlando, FL: Harcourt Brace, 1997). 33 Jonathan, “The Executive and the Parliament in Canada.” 34 Thomas O. Melia, “What Makes Legislatures Strong?” Journal of Democracy 21, no. 2 (2010): 166-170. 35 Arter, “Introduction: Comparing the Legislative Performance.”
December 2014 | 123 which the bills passed reflect the genuine needs, yearnings, and aspirations of the citizenry and address matters of national importance. Between 1999 and 2013, a total of 2,905 bills (1,344 Senate bills, and 1,561 House of Representatives bills) were introduced in Nigeria’s National Assembly. Among these bills, 214 acts became law, having been processed, passed, and given presidential assent.36 Table 1 below provides detailed figures. Regarding evaluation of the quantitative output of the National Assembly, the 214 acts of the Assembly between 1999 and 2013 compared to the thirty- seven acts of the Assembly during the Second Republic (1979-1983), suggest that the legislators in the period under review performed more effectively in the area of law making. While the National Assembly of the Second Republic passed an average of 9.25 bills yearly, in the period under review, the federal legislators passed 15.29 bills annually.37 As evident in table 1, between 1999
Table 1. Number of Bills Introduced, Processed, and Passed in the Nigerian National Assembly, 1999-2013
House of Row Total of Year Senate Number of Acts Representatives Bills Introduced 1999 13 33 46 3 2000 26 99 125 13 2001 23 30 53 4 2002 17 84 101 11 2003 50 91 141 29 2004 138 99 237 19 2005 18 18 36 17 2006 92 97 189 16 2007 53 32 85 38 2008 219 213 532 9 2009 208 245 453 5 2010 178 210 388 17 2011 128 149 277 19 2012 23 62 85 6 2013 58 99 157 8 Column total 1,344 1,561 2,905 214 Source: Nigeria’s National Assembly Web site, http://www.nassnig.org/nass2/legislation. php (accessed May 22, 2014).
36 National Assembly, http://www.nassnig.org/nass2/acts.php?pageNum_bill=9&totalRows_bill =214 (accessed February 19, 2014). 37 Inusa Bright Bello-Imam, The War against Corruption in Nigeria: Problems and Prospects (Ibadan, Nigeria: College Press and Publishers, 2005).
124 | Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 10, No. 2 and 2013, the National Assembly was more prolific in transitional years (2003, 2007, and 2011) than in nontransitional years. In 2003, twenty-nine acts were passed, while in 1999, three acts; 2000, thirteen acts; 2001, four acts; and 2002, eleven acts. Similarly, in 2007, thirty-eight acts were passed, while nineteen acts were passed in 2004, seventeen in 2005, and sixteen in 2006. Also, in 2011, while thirty-eight acts were passed, in the preceding years, nine acts were passed in 2008, five in 2009, and seventeen in 2010. A discernible explanation for this trend was the rush to pass bills so that they did not elapse, as constitutionally specified, at the expiration of the lifespan of an assembly. Notably, the performance of Nigeria’s National Assembly between 1999 and 2013, compared with some legislatures of established democracies, indicates that the latter are more outstanding. For example, the British parliament passed a total of 366 bills between 1979 and 1983. This represents an average of 73.2 bills yearly. In comparison to the United States, the U. S. Congress passed into law 1,017 bills between 1961 and 1962, and 528 bills between 1973 and 1974.38 One of the plausible reasons why the national legislatures of older democracies were more prolific than the Nigerian National Assembly in the legislative sphere could be their prolonged consistent period of legislative practice. In every human endeavor, consistent practice increases deftness and adeptness. As a result of the weak adroitness of Nigerian federal legislators in law making, a number of bills that were introduced were stalled between 1999 and 2013. Only 214 acts resulted from 2,905 bills that were introduced within this period, meaning that 2,691 bills were stalled in the legislative process either by delay in passage or by the withholding of presidential assent. Owing to constitutional provision, these unpassed bills elapsed at the end of the various assemblies, except for those that were reintroduced as fresh bills. The same fate befell the bills and proposals stalled or delayed in the legislative process in the National Assembly. By 2011, there were 176 bills awaiting presidential assent.39 Also, by 2012, about 189 bills reportedly were pending in the National Assembly, some of which were deemed to be crucial to the economy.40 They included the Nigeria Railway Amendment Bill that sought to repeal the Colonial Railway Act of 1955 and open the way for private-sector and state investment in railways, thereby ending the federal monopoly over this strategic transportation subsector. The bill suffered over seven years’ delay. Other bills that were blocked included the Mineral Bill, which was expected to open the floodgates to private-sector investment in the exploitation of solid minerals, and the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB), which was expected to boost investment
38 Ibid. 39 Chinyere Fred-Adegbulugbe, “Nigeria: National Assembly Makes 206 Laws in 11 Years,” Leadership, May 8, 2011, 1. 40 Editorial, “Our Unproductive National Assembly,” The Punch, March 7, 2012, 7.
December 2014 | 125 in the critical oil and gas sector.41 Similarly affected was the National Social Security Agency Bill aimed at establishing an agency to provide financial assistance to elderly persons and at addressing other matters.42 Passage of some of these important bills, in contrast to others, plausibly was impeded due to the inability of the National Assembly to either legislate or enforce a moral code of self-control and prudence, owed to its emphasis on uncontrolled consumerism and a mindset to share-the-money.43 Further, some bills became mired because they were susceptible to being captured by narrow interests, as the PIB clearly showed. Debate and passage of the PIB in the 6th National Assembly (2007-2011) was stymied partly due to stiff opposition and the demands of stakeholders, especially big oil corporations, and also as a result of the inability of legislators to moderate either the contentious elements of the bill or the political intrigue and wrangling within the National Assembly, on the one hand, and the Assembly’s rivalry with the executive branch, on the other.44 Another factor that possibly affected the performance of the National Assembly in the passage of bills is the delicate check and balance dynamic of the presidential system of government, in which there is separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches. As provided in the Nigerian Constitution, bills passed by the National Assembly require presidential assent to have the force of law. But there is a constitutional clause that after the president withholds assent for thirty days, the National Assembly can pass a bill into law by a two-thirds majority without presidential assent being required. In keeping with the Constitution, between 1999 and 2003, the National Assembly vetoed four bills for which the president had withheld his assent.45 However, the presidential system’s delicate check and balance practice is insufficient to offset the fundamentals of prebendalism and the poor commitment to popular welfare associated with unnecessary delay in giving presidential assent to bills or passage of some important bills by the National Assembly, even though both arms of government are controlled by the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). Like many parties in Nigeria, during the period under review, the ruling PDP at various times experienced a high rate of intraparty squabbles and indiscipline, often to the point of creating parallel factions which spilled into the National Assembly. The inability of the PDP to settle its internal conflicts as “family
41 Bello Olusola, “PIB Delay Slows Deepwater Project Devpt, Increases Cost,” Business Day, March 17, 2014. See also, Louis Iba, “Aviation Sector Stagnates as NASS Delays PIB, 2014 Budget,” The Sun, May 12, 2014. 42 Monsuru Olowoopejo, “Fashola’s Wife Urges NASS to Pass Social Security Bill,” Vanguard, February 17, 2014, 9. 43 Glenn Ubohmhe Olowojaiye, “Still on Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) Part 1,” Business Day, May 7, 2014. 44 Vincent Nzemeke, “Making PIB a Priority,” Realnews Magazine, May 19, 2014. 45 Bello-Imam, The War against Corruption in Nigeria.
126 | Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 10, No. 2 affairs” was manifested in the brawl between the executive and legislative branches in the 2002 impeachment bid, in the Obasanjo-Atiku squabble during the greater part of 2006-2007 over purported tenure elongation and succession politics, as well as in the division of the party into factions of old PDP and new PDP, rebel PDP, or aggrieved PDP over the composition of its executive office in 2013.46 On another dimension, the evaluation of qualitative output, a few bills passed by the National Assembly and approved by the president tend to suggest that, between 1999 and 2013, the federal legislature performed well. Among these bills were the Pension Act 2004; Trafficking in Persons Prohibition Law Enforcement and Administration Act 2004; Compulsory, Free Universal Basic Education Act 2004; Freedom of Information Act 2011; the Terrorism Prevention Act 2011; and the Same-Sex Marriage Prohibition Act 2011. These acts largely agreed with the complex socio-economic dynamics, needs, and aspirations of the country. For example, the Terrorism Prevention Act was passed in response to the growing acts of terrorism in Nigeria, as exemplified by the radical Islamist sect, Boko Haram, and commoditized hostage-takings. The Pension Act 2004, as amended in 2011 and 2013, seemed underpinned by the plight of retirees under the previous pension regime. The Same-Sex Marriage Prohibition was passed in the face of opposition from the United States and some other Western nations. In addition to these laudable acts, the National Assembly passed some landmark resolutions. A few of them are mentioned here. The national legislature invoked the “doctrine of necessity,” after a series of street protests by some groups in civil society, such as the Save Nigeria Group, which sought to rescue Nigeria’s democracy in the face of the constitutional crisis generated by the prolonged absence of President Umaru Yar’Adua from the country.47 The president left the country in 2009 for the treatment of pericarditis in Saudi Arabia, and returned to Nigeria in 2010, where he died in May of that year. Also, in January 2012, a strike and mass protests championed by a coalition of labor unions and civil society organizations over an increase in the pump price of petrol challenged the legitimacy of Nigeria’s political institutions. The coalition disrupted the nation’s economic activities for five days. Protesters occupied Gani Fawehinmi Square in Lagos as well as streets in major cities across the country, during which antigovernment slogans were chanted. The two chambers of the National Assembly played an important role in resolving the impasse. The House of Representatives, the lower chamber of the National Assembly, called off its Christmas and New Year recess and held emergency
46 J. Shola Omotola, “Trapped in Transition? Nigeria’s First Democratic Decade and Beyond,” Taiwan Journal of Democracy 9, no. 2 (2013): 191. 47 Oarhe Osumah, Fundamentals of Government: Concepts, Issues and Analysis (Benin City, Nigeria: Amfitop Books, 2010). See also, Richard Joseph and Alexandra Gillies, “Nigeria’s Season of Uncertainty,” Current History (May 2010): 185.
December 2014 | 127 session on a Sunday to deliberate on how to avert the imminent dangers which the strike and protests could unleash on the country. The House passed a resolution asking the government to restore the price to the status quo ante. Although the price was not totally reversed, at least it was slashed from N140 to N97. Also, the Senate cut short its vacation to assume the role of mediator in the resolution of the strike and mass protests. Similarly, the National Assembly amended the electoral law to limit the lengthy period of adjudication of electoral disputes to, at most, 180 days post-election. This amendment was to ensure that political impostors in office could not benefit unduly from a lengthy period of litigation.48 Yet, these bills and resolutions were largely insufficient to improve the welfare of the majority in the various constituencies of the country. According to the United Nations Human Development Index (HDI), Nigeria consistently has ranked among the poorest nations in the world. In 2013, the HDI ranked Nigeria 153 of 186 countries. National Bureau for Statistics (NBS) 2013 data showed that about 112 million of the 160 million Nigerians were wallowing in poverty. This means that 67 percent of the population is mired in abject poverty. Also, the World Bank May 2013 Nigeria Economic Report (NER) held that the number of Nigerians living in poverty was increasing too rapidly for comfort.49 In the face of the parlous situation in the various constituencies and, indeed, in the entire country, legislators nevertheless have been concerned with pecuniary gains. This is exemplified by their higher emolument compared to that of counterparts in consolidated democracies and more advanced economies such as the United States, Italy, Germany, Canada, Japan, Britain, and France, which constitute the G7. A Nigerian federal legislator with an annual basic salary of $189,000 (N29,479,749 million) places second after an Australian counterpart who earns $201,200. But while the $201,200 is three times Australia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per person, the $189,000 earned by a Nigerian federal lawmaker is 116 times Nigeria’s GDP per person.50 The emoluments of legislators of some other countries and their GDP statuses are presented below in order to give a clearer picture of the vested interest of Nigerian national legislators. Instructively, some federal legislators as individuals contested reports on various occasions regarding the excesses of their salaries and allowances. But none of them went further to present exact figures on their earnings. Thus, there is popular disaffection with the huge salaries and allowances of the legislators
48 Joseph Yinka Fashagba, “The Nigerian Legislature and Socio-Political Re-engineering in the Fourth Republic,” Fashagba-on-the-Nigeria-Legislature-APSA-2012 (accessed January 12, 2014). 49 Olukorede Yishau, “Nigerians... Suffering, Smiling Amid Plenty,” The Nation, November 1, 2013, http://thenationonlineng.net/new/nigerians-suffering-smiling-amid-plenty/ (accessed November 11, 2014). 50 Editorial, “Our Unproductive National Assembly,” The Punch.
128 | Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 10, No. 2 Figure 1
December 2014 | 129 in the midst of extreme poverty in the country, as reflected in the views of most opinion leaders and commentators, which tend to substantiate the legislators’ self-indulgence and egoistic motivation. In 2011, the then governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, complained about the high cost of running the National Assembly. Sanusi held that the N158 billion needed to run the National Assembly was 25 percent of the entire federal overhead in 2010.51 In fact, some members of the public, including the former governor of the Lagos State, Bola Tinubu, called for the scrapping of the Senate because of its prohibitive cost.52 Also, on account of allegations of the huge cost of running the National Assembly bureaucracy, some citizens, including delegates to the just concluded National Conference and a former World Bank executive and Nigeria’s Minister of Education, Dr. Oby Ezekwesili, suggested the operation of the legislature on a part-time basis.53 This suggestion presupposes that salaries and allowances of part-time legislators will be less expensive than what the present full-time legislators consume. Furthermore, in place of the prohibitive salaries and allowances of the legislators, some political observers have suggested that the lawmakers should receive sitting allowances only for the days they report for work.54
Representation In terms of general representation, between 1999 and 2013, the National Assembly was comprised of 469 members-109 senators, and 360 members of the House of Representatives. Senate membership is composed on the basis of the equality of states, while the membership of the House of Representatives is founded on population. Based on composition, federal legislators seem closer to the grassroots than other trustees of state power at the federal level. Compared to the National Assemblies of the Second Republic (1979-1983) and the Third Republic (1992-1993), the membership size of the National Assembly during the Fourth Republic (1999-2013) differed. In the Second Republic, the membership of the Assembly was 545 representatives (95 in the Senate, and 450 in the House of Representatives). Each of the then nineteen states was represented by five senators.55 The states in the Second Republic
51 Editorial, “Legislators’ Jumbo Pay Must Be Reviewed,” The Punch, August 4, 2013. 52 Zebulun Agomuo, “Relevance of Nigeria’s National Assembly,” Business Day, October 12, 2012. 53 John Ameh, “Jumbo Pay: Reps Accept Ezekwesili’s Public Hearing Challenge,” The Punch, August 23, 2013, 1. See also, Yaqoub Popoola, Augustine Adah, Daniel Abia, Patience Ogbodo, Ibrahim Umar, Igoniko Oduma, Emeka Okafor, Felix Uka, Oladele Ogumola, Yemi Akintomide, Dele Moses, Segun Adeleye, and Chukwujekwu Ilozue, “Nigerians Divided over Part-time Legislature,” Daily Independent, November 5, 2014. 54 Agomuo, “Relevance of Nigeria’s National Assembly.” 55 Bonn Obiekwe Godwin Nwanolue and Uche Grace Ojukwu, “Legislative Efficiency and Democratic Stability in the Fourth Republic Governance and Politics in Nigeria: A Re-appraisal of the National Assembly,” Kuwait Chapter of Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review 1, no. 9 (2012): 116-131.
130 | Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 10, No. 2 were larger geographically than those of the Fourth Republic. This difference in size was due to the exercises of state creation undertaken under the Babangida and Abacha administrations. In the Third Republic, the National Assembly was comprised of 684 members (91 senators, and 593 members of the House of Representatives). This suggests that the number of representatives in the National Assembly in the period under review was smaller. It is instructive to note that, in terms of representational pattern, the National Assembly between 1999 and 2013 was a mirror image of that of the Third Republic. In both republics, three senators represented each state in the Senate, while one seat was allocated to the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. But, unlike the Third Republic, the federal constituencies in the period under review did not strictly coincide with the spatial boundaries of the 774 local governments of the Federation.56 In the discharge of representational responsibilities, the federal legislators in the 4th Assembly (1999-2003) helped to secure the introduction of the constituency project fund as part of the annual national budget. The constituency project fund, by design, was to ensure equitable development in all constituencies and senatorial districts. In addition, between 1999 and 2003, political representation in the National Assembly helped to ensure ethnic balance. Although geopolitical zoning is not a new political formula for managing ethnic imbalance, its ingenious use by the ruling PDP in the choice of the leadership of the National Assembly helped to ensure relative ethnic balance. On account of the geopolitical zoning arrangement, the impeachment of principal officers of the National Assembly was hardly ever construed as an attempt to marginalize the ethnic or geopolitical zone of the affected officer. For example, in the House of Representatives, when the first speaker, Salisu Buhari from the North, was deposed for certificate falsification, he was replaced by Alhaji Umar Ghali Na’aba, a Northerner also. During the 5th Assembly between 2003 and 2007, Alhaji Bello Masari was the speaker. Also, in the 6th Assembly, when Patricia Etteh, a Yoruba from the Southwest was impeached as the speaker of the House of Representatives, she was replaced by Dimeji Bankole, a Yoruba also from the Southwest. Similarly, in the Senate, during the 4th Assembly, when Evans Ewerem, an Igbo from the Southeast, was deposed as Senate president, he was replaced by Chuba Okadigbo, an Igbo also from the Southeast. Okadigbo was later replaced by Ayim Pius Anyim, an Igbo also from the Southeast. In the 5th Assembly, when Adolphus Wabara, an Igbo from the Southeast was ousted as Senate president on allegations of bribery, he was replaced by Ken Nnamani, an Igbo from the same region.57
56 Nwanolue and Ojukwu, “Legislative Efficiency and Democratic Stability in the Fourth Republic Governance and Politics in Nigeria.” 57 Williams Ehwarieme, “The Military Factor in Nigeria’s Democratic Stability, 1999-2009,” Armed Forces & Society 37, no. 3 (2011): 494-511.
December 2014 | 131 Notwithstanding the sense of ethnic balance and representation conveyed in the application of the geopolitical zoning of the positions of the principal officers, the impeachment cases were not necessarily a demonstration of legislative independence and competence. Instead, they were indicators of the undue influence of the executive arm. Between 1999 and 2007, the executive was personalized, authoritarian, dictatorial, and imperial. In desperation to get the National Assembly to dance to its tune, the executive penetrated, compromised, and factionalized the legislators through monetary inducement. Indeed, some former and current principal officers of the National Assembly, such as the current Senate president, David Mark, Aminu Bello Masari (former speaker of the House of Representatives, 2003-2007), Anyim Pius Anyim (former Senate president during the 4th Assembly), Ken Nnamani (former Senate president during the 5th Assembly), attributed the rapid leadership and membership turnover in the National Assembly between 1999 and 2007 to party and executive machinations, coupled with self-seeking behavior of some legislative members.58 For instance, in his valedictory speech, Pius Anyim described the Senate during his tenure as,
factionalized into various groups and the various groups were at one another’s throats; a Senate whose leadership was at war with itself; a Senate where the motivating reasons for attending sittings was to forestall the chance of an opposing camp taking an advantage against the other, in fact, a Senate whose relationship with the executive was very very sour and therefore counter-productive.59
The geopolitical zoning of the positions of the principal officers in the National Assembly seemingly conveys a message that these positions are used to serve the primordial public realm. But this was largely not so. Most of the legislators who served as principal officers, especially during the 4th, 5th, and 6th National Assemblies, used the positions to fatten their personal purses. Most of the leaders were tainted by allegations of personal enrichment. For example, it was alleged that, as Senate president, Adolphus Wabara demanded a N55 million bribe, and his successor, Ken Nnamani, also was accused of self- enrichment and mismanagement of public funds.60 Similarly, the first speaker in the 6th Assembly of the House of Representatives, Patricia Etteh, was
58 Yahaya T. Baba, “Executive Dominance, Party Control and State Legislatures in Nigeria: Evidence from Three States in the North-west Geo-political Zone of Nigeria,” draft TMs, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Sokoto, Nigeria. 59 “Nigeria: Valedictory Speech by Senator Anyim Pius Anyim,” Daily Trust, June 2, 2003. 60 Ilufoye Sarafa Ogundiya, “Political Corruption in Nigeria: Theoretical Perspectives and Some Explanations,” Anthropologist 11, no. 4 (2009): 281-292.
132 | Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 10, No. 2 indicted for misappropriation of funds, and her successor, Dimeji Bankole, also was overshadowed by allegations of brazen financial rascality.61 Regarding the constituency project fund, the purported intention was quite laudable at face value. The federal legislators argued that the fund was targeted at poverty alleviation, the improvement of infrastructure, other welfare packages in all federal constituencies and senatorial districts, and the equitable and even distribution of development projects and programs to all constituencies.62 However, the executive-legislative brawl, which included accusations and counter-accusations over the execution of constituency projects, discounted the contention that the fund was people-centered. Legislators accused the executive of insisting on executing projects at prohibitive costs that had no bearing on the needs of their constituencies. The executive alleged that legislators sought to execute such projects either directly or through proxies. In fact, it was observed that the constituency project funds became a conduit through which members of the National Assembly siphoned public resources,63 a charge which the legislature always denied. These accusations and counter- accusations clearly demonstrated politics of personal ambition rather than concern for the collective interest. Another indicator of the weakness of the National Assembly in the discharge of its function of representation was the accusation of distance in relations between some legislators and their constituencies. A study conducted by the Centre for Democratic Leadership and Communication (CEDELC) revealed that, by 2001, only 236 of the 469 federal legislators had established the required offices for consulting and connecting with members of their constituencies.64 This situation did not change during the period under review. Also, some observers of the National Assembly noted that, after their election, most of the legislators visited their constituencies only at the time for mandate renewal, when they returned to their districts to distribute rice, spices, and clothes to some people to indicate that they were giving back to their constituencies.65 In addition, there was a strong notion that most representatives were absent from plenary sessions. Although section 63 of the Constitution
61 Oarhe Osumah, Corruption-Complex and Challenges of Anti-corruption Policy Effectiveness in Nigeria (Ph.D. diss., University of Benin, Benin City, Nigeria, 2012). 62 L. Chinedu Arizona-Ogwu, “NASS N60b Constituency Project: Strictly Economic Loot Than Boost!” http://www.pointblanknews.com/artopn1188.html (accessed October 8, 2013). 63 Ben Ose Ogbemudia, “Non-implementation of Constituency Projects Worry Oshiomhole,” The Tide, September 28, 2010, http://www.thetidenewsonline.com (accessed October 8, 2013). See also, Obiora Ifoh, “Nigeria: Reps Carpet Oshiomhole over Comments on Constituency Allowance,” Daily Independent, May 25, 2010, 5. 64 Bello-Imam, The War against Corruption in Nigeria. 65 Sunday A. Akpotor, “Good Governance and the Accountability Question,” in Rethinking Governance and Development in the 21st Century, ed. Friday E. Iyoha, Vincent Osa Aghayere, and Patrick O. Oviasuyi (Ekpoma, Nigeria: Institute for Governance and Development, 2003), 175-186.
December 2014 | 133 requires a minimum sitting of 181 days in a year, and section 68 requires any lawmaker who is absent for more than one-third of this requirement to vacate his or her seat, neither attendance nor penalties were taken seriously by the leadership of either legislative chamber. Among the legislators who attended plenary sessions, a number of them had been accused of not taking the Assembly’s business seriously. As a House of Representatives member, Ndidi Elumelu, representing the Aniocha/Oshimili Federal Constituency of the Delta State, noted in an interview with Global Village,
some of them are busy chasing what is not worth chasing while some of them are not ready to understand what is going on in the Chambers; in some instance after motions all of them take off. They don’t even understand, they don’t even sit down to look into the aspect of the legislation, which is constitutional, you can count how many members have been able to sponsor bills ... .66
Legislative Oversight Section 88 (2b) of the 1999 Constitution specifically empowers the two chambers of the National Assembly to “expose corruption, inefficiency or waste in the execution or administration of laws within its legislative competence and in the disbursement or administration of funds appropriated by it.”67 This section obviously takes into consideration the fact that the responsibility given to the executive to implement projects can be subject to abuse; hence, there is a need for legislative oversight. In the event that legislators have sufficient grounds to suspect that such an abuse has taken place, they are empowered to institute a probe to bring culprits to book. An important element in the exercise of this function is the use of committees and probe panels in the review of government expenditures and investigation, with due process, into allegations of noncompliance in the areas of procurement and administration. Pursuant to its oversight responsibilities between 1999 and 2013, each of the two chambers of the National Assembly was constituted by a number of committees. In the 4th Assembly, the Senate had forty-four committees, while the House of Representatives had forty-two. In the 5th and 6th Assemblies, the two chambers had forty-two and seventy-two and fifty-four and seventy-two, respectively.68 The different committees undertook various probes between
66 “Some National Assembly Members Eat Their Constituency Allowance Alone, They Don’t Even Go Home-Hon. Elumelu,” Global Village, http://www.globalvillageextra.com (accessed September 28, 2013). 67 Federal Republic of Nigeria (FRN), Constitution for the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Lagos, Nigeria: Government Press, 1999.) 68 Heinrich Boll Stiftung, Do Parliaments Matter? African Legislatures and the Advance of Democracy (Cape Town, South Africa: Erschienunsort, 2012).
134 | Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 10, No. 2 1999 and 2013. In a nonexhaustive search of literature, some of the probe panels are listed in table 2 below. Based on the evaluation of quantitative output, between 1999 and 2013, the federal legislators seemed productive in the discharge of their oversight function. But in terms of qualitative output, the legislators were not too impressive in the discharge of their oversight responsibility. This is made evident in the high scale of corruption and in the lapses of many federal government ministries, departments, and agencies, despite the various probes. Another indicator of the weakness of the National Assembly’s oversight through probes was the litany of revelations and accusations concerning compromises, bribes, and vested interests that overshadowed most of the probe panels. Indeed, observers of the activities of the National Assembly have noted that the federal legislators employed fraudulent practices, such as making spurious claims about their oversight functions, which could not be verified.69 Also, a number of principal officers of the National Assembly were accused of inflating contract prices and over-invoicing purchases for oversight functions.70 For example, in the 4th Assembly, the deputy president of the Senate, Haruna Abubakar, was impeached in 2000 over embezzlement of N16.9 million for Christmas and Sallah gifts. Also, in the 4th Assembly, some members of the House of Representatives were alleged to have taken money from the executive to impeach the speaker. In the 5th Assembly, the Senate and House Committees on Education were alleged to have collected a N55 million bribe from the former Minister of Education, Professor Fabian Osuji, to inflate the budgetary allocation to the federal ministry. In the same Assembly, Nasir el-Rufai alleged that the Senate Committee for Screening Political Nominees requested a bribe of N54 million to facilitate his confirmation as a ministerial nominee. Also in the 5th Assembly, the ad-hoc committee that investigated the Petroleum Technology Development Fund (PTDF) case was alleged to have taken a bribe from the vice president to cover up the truth about funds stolen from the PTDF. Similarly, in the 6th Assembly, the chairman and the deputy chairman of the Senate Committee on Power and the chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on Rural Development were charged with alleged complicity in power contracts amounting to N5.2 billion.71 Also, in the 6th Assembly, the Senate committee overseeing the pension probe was alleged to have collected a $3 billion bribe from one of the pension scam suspects.72 Moreover, the chairman of the Senate Committee on Health was alleged to
69 Nik Ogbuile, “How N/Assembly Members Rip Off Nigerians,” Business World, February 7-13, 2011. 70 Osumah, Corruption-Complex and Challenges of Anti-corruption Policy Effectiveness in Nigeria. 71 Ilufoye, “Political Corruption in Nigeria.” 72 Chibuzo Ukaibe, “7th Senate: How Senatorial, A Year After?” Leadership, June 10, 2012, 1.
December 2014 | 135 Table 2. Some Probe Cases Conducted by the National Assembly
Senate probe in 2003 of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) 1 under Gaius-Obaseki. 2 Senate probe in 2010 of the Halliburton bribery scam. 3 House of Representatives probe in 2008 of the energy sector. 4 Senate probe of Federal Capital Territory Minister, Nasir El-Rufai, in 2008. 5 House of Representatives probe in 2010 of the railway project. 6 Senate probe in December 2008 of the Jos crisis. House of Representatives probe in 2008 of the Finance Ministry over the 2007 7 budget. 8 House of Representatives probe in January 2009 of the Jos crisis. 9 House of Representatives probe in January 2009 of the Customs scam. Senate probe in February 2009 of Obasanjo and Yar’Adua concerning a solid 10 minerals special account. 11 National Assembly probe in March 2009 of World Bank Aviation loans of 2006. 12 Senate probe in 2010 of Federal Government sales of houses in Lagos and Abuja. House of Representatives probe in February 2010 of the sale of Nigerian houses 13 in New York. 14 Senate probe in 2010 of lead poisoning in Zamfara. Senate intended probe in 2008 of the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety 15 Agency (NIMASA) and Shippers Council. 16 Senate probe in March 2008 of the Ajaokuta Steel Company concession. 17 House of Representatives mooted probe in May 2008 of Banks and Stock Exchange. 18 Senate probe in May 2008 of the Ministry of Transport, 1999-2008. 19 House of Representatives probe in 2009 of the NNPC fund. 20 Senate probe in September 2008 of the transport sector. 21 House of Representatives probe in 2011 of the Salami Katsina Alu face-off. 22 House of Representatives probe in 2012 of the capital marke. 23 House of Representatives probe in 2012 of the fuel subsidy regime. 24 House of Representatives probe in 2012 of the pension administration. 25 Senate probe in 2012 of the pension administration. 26 Senate probe in 2012 of Dana and Allied Air crashes, both on June 3, 2012. Sources: Extracted by the author from various Nigerian newspaper articles, such as George Oji, Omeiza Ajayi, and Tordue Salem, “National Assembly Probes: Between Politics and Probity,” National Mirror, July 7, 2012. See also, Onyedi Ojiabor, “Probes: Can National Assembly Redeem Its Image?” The Nation, July 19, 2012.
136 | Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 10, No. 2 have collected N10 million as his share of the unspent Ministry of Health’s budget for 2007.73 Although, these allegations were not verified, they were considered significant indicators of prebendalism, or conversion of public office by the legislators into instruments for primitive accumulation.
Digesting Rascality in the National Assembly since 1999
Flowing from the analysis above, the legislative responsibilities of the National Assembly between 1999 and 2013 were largely marked by personal ambition, preferences, and interests rather than by a commitment to the maximization of collective interest. One of the major explanations for the self-dealing of most members of the National Assembly is the prevailing corrupt and corrupting social system in Nigeria. Members of the National Assembly are products of the Nigerian society, which anticipates that representatives in governmental institutions are wont to extract material benefits from the state and, whenever possible, will dodge giving back anything that is due to the state. The messages and communications to those who have been elected or appointed to government offices are to enrich themselves and their friends with public funds. Okecha captures this culture thus:
Here in Nigeria, any time someone was appointed or elected to some position of authority in any sector of the economy, his friends and relatives would spontaneously bless themselves with the sign of the cross, and thank God for His mercies. A few of these people would ask the new appointee to toe the line of righteousness, and would genuinely pray for his success in office. The rest of his friends and relatives would unashamedly say openly or privately to him a number of things including: This is your chance to become rich; Make the best of this God-given opportunity, God don butter your bread [God has blessed you], so make it fast; If you do oyibo for this job, na you go suffer [if you choose to just play by the rules on this job, you will live to regret it]; Grab anything that comes your way, opportunity comes but once; Don’t be like John XYZ, the mugu [big fool], who has nothing to show for all his years as permanent secretary; Make hay while the sun shines; Na where man de work, naim ide chop [where a goat is tethered there it feeds] ... steal, but thou shall not be caught.74
73 Osumah, Corruption-Complex and Challenges of Anti-corruption Policy Effectiveness in Nigeria. 74 Steve A. Okecha, “Leadership, Ethics and Accountability in Office,” in Ethics, Standard and Accountability in Governance, ed. Vincent Osa Aghayere and Friday Ebose Iyoha (Benin City, Nigeria: Imprint Services, 2009), 160-161.
December 2014 | 137 Such communications and messages are particularly directed at elected public officers, such as federal legislators, who surround themselves with praise-singers and swear an oath obligating them to their political patrons. Thus, when the federal legislators assumed office, they legislated for themselves huge salaries and allowances and started to expropriate the nation’s assets for themselves, their family members, and their associates. Much in line with what Bayart described as “politics of the belly,”75 the desparate federal legislators in the 4th Assembly legislated for themselves N3.5 million for each senator and N2.5 for each member of the House of Representatives as furniture allowance. Also, they approved new cars for themselves on a yearly basis as well as stupendous travel allowances.76 In addition, the federal legislators in the twilight of the 5th Assembly sold the Legislative Quarters in Apo village in Abuja to themselves, without giving a thought to the implications of such an action for future legislators.77 This was despite the monetization policy under which they had claimed allowances for accommodations and furniture. Furthermore, the self-motivation of most of the federal legislators between 1999 and 2013 is traceable to the prebendal internal political arrangement of the most popular parties. The internal politics was characterized by predatory opportunism, money influence, and patron-clientelism. The internal politics and dynamics of the parties often snowballed into activities in the National Assembly and also affected its relationships with the executive arm. For example, based on the outcome of four successive nationwide elections held between 1999 and 2013, the PDP, which dominated the National Assembly, was branded by most critics as a party of scoundrels and criminal elements,78 and a giant corruption machine.79 The membership of the party was believed to confer on individuals the right to loot the national treasury, hence, the party’s slogan, ‘‘PDP, Power to the People,’’ was popularly replaced with ‘‘PDP, Share the Money.’’ In the period under review, divisions, schism, and squabbles in the ruling PDP over personal ambition were central factors in legislative- executive conflicts, which undermined effective legislative performance. Instructively, self-indulgence was not unique to the ruling PDP. Legislators who were members of the opposition parties did not show that they were different by exposing selfish deals or rejecting egoistic pursuits. Rather, they were quick to reach a consensus whenever decisions bordered on the welfare of the legislators.
75 Jean-Francois Bayart, The State in Africa: Politics of the Belly (London: Longman, 1993). 76 Obed Awowede, “A Conclave of Corruption,” Insider Weekly, December 9, 2002, 9. 77 Thomas Akhigbe Imobighe, “Introduction,” in Themes and Issues in Nigerian Governance and Politics, ed. Thomas Akhigbe Imobighe and Sylvanus I. Ebohon (Kuru, Jos: National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, 2012), 1-4. 78 Oarhe Osumah and Augustine Ikelegbe, “The People’s Democratic Party and Governance in Nigeria,” Journal of Social Sciences 19, no. 3 (2009): 185-199. 79 Ehwarieme, “The Military Factor in Nigeria's Democratic Stability, 1999-2009.”
138 | Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 10, No. 2 The lack of credibility of the elections between 1999 and 2013 also had implications for the quality of representation in the National Assembly. Election monitoring committees and observers had reported that the elections of representatives to government were marred by substantial electoral irregularities and rigging. The lack of validity of the elections had implications as well regarding the moral authority and legitimacy of the members of the National Assembly. In addition, the poor conduct of elections, coupled with prior intermittent military rule, discouraged many well-respected men and women in Nigeria from participating in the political process. Thus, the field was abandoned to political adventurists having no ideological commitment or development plan for the nation. What brought most legislators together was their greed to quickly secure power and personal profit from whatever resources they could before the military might return to power.80 There, indeed, were brief concerns during the 2007 post-election violence that the military might be tempted to call off its political recess and resume the reins of power.81 Indeed, frequent military intervention and rule had severely limited legislative practice in Nigeria. Unwittingly, Benson A. Alegbe, a member/ speaker of the defunct Bendel State House of Assembly in the Second Republic and a member of the House of Representatives in the 4th Assembly, confirmed the severe consequences of protracted military rule on legislative practice in Nigeria when he noted: “As a one-term legislator/Speaker (1979-1983), I do not have enough experience to draw from. Such experience is severely limited. No legislator in this country can claim otherwise.”82 The federal legislators during the period under review included men and women who had held various offices in Nigeria as parliamentarians, ministers, governors, permanent secretaries, directors-general, university professors, and professionals from other callings in fields including business, the military, law, and medicine. Some of them allegedly were associated with criminal activities such as certificate forgery, the Advanced Fee Fraud, drug trafficking, and the sponsorship of insurgents groups. Though the National Assembly established committees between 1999 and 2013 to investigate some of these matters, the reports were rarely made public. Some of the federal legislators are still being prosecuted for financial crimes and sundry offences, such as alleged conspiracy with Boko Haram. Most of these cases have stagnated in the courts.83
80 Imobighe, “Introduction.” 81 Richard Joseph and Darren Kew, “Nigeria Confronts Obasanjo’s Legacy,” Current History (April 2008): 171. 82 Benson A. Alegbe, “Legislative Powers, Privileges and Immunities in Our Laws,” in Issues and Processes in Legislation, ed. Chike F. Okolocha (Benin City, Nigeria: Uniben Press, 2002), 1-6. 83 Oarhe Osumah, “Response of the Nigerian Defense and Intelligence Establishments to the Challenge of Boko Haram,” in Boko Haram: Anatomy of a Crisis, ed. Ioannis Mantzikos (Bristol, UK: e-International Relations, 2013), 60-72.
December 2014 | 139 Conclusion
In this discourse, the responsibilities and seeming rascally behaviors of the federal legislators in Nigeria between 1999 and 2013 were examined. It was observed that, within the period under study, although the legislators performed some of their responsibilities, in the main, they were driven by self- indulgence. Furthermore, it was revealed that the impulse for the irresponsible behaviors of the legislators was underpinned by the corrupt and corrupting nature of Nigerian society; political parties that were ideologically deficient; and the dominance of political adventurists in the National Assembly. Thus, for the Assembly to serve as an instrument of socio-economic and political development, which is its responsibility, measures must be taken to address the prevailing culture of corruption in the country. One step is to demystify the prebendal network or ties that are being manipulated by the political class in favor of rascally behavior. This can be actualized by the education of the political elite in seminars and workshops to develop the attitude that being in government is a responsibility to serve rather than an opportunity to pursue primitive accumulation. Also, the masses require education to help them develop critical minds that understand the need to hold their representatives to account. This can help the masses to reduce their dependence on economic handouts, such as rice, spices, face caps, and clothes, from their representatives when it is time for mandate renewal. Through education, the citizens can come to realize that prebendal politics skews socio- economic benefits in favor of the miniscule ruling elite, while only scanty benefits trickle down to the larger populace. In addition, through education, the citizens can become the watchdog over collective interest. Citizen action should be championed by a vibrant civil society. Civil society, comprised of professional bodies and nongovernmental organizations, can persistently mount pressure on representatives to undertake their responsibilities in a manner that reflects the genuine needs and aspirations of the larger populace. A case in point is the January 2012 street protests against the removal of the subsidy for petroleum products that was championed by a coalition of the Nigerian Labour Congress and organized civil society groups. Furthermore, in order for the representatives in government to become much more concerned about their responsibilities rather than being engaged in seeming rascality, there is the need to reform the electoral process, particularly in the areas of campaign financing, political violence, and election processes. Such reform would encourage more people of high moral integrity who seek the collective interest to participate in politics. Unfortunately, there is no definitive cure for rascality in the country’s government, given the diverse and dynamic nature of Nigerian politics. Thus, the strategies suggested here would have their distinct challenges. In this connection, application of these recommended strategies should be deployed with objective devotion and genuine commitment to the public interest.
140 | Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 10, No. 2