Swiss Foreign Policy 2012: Challenges and Perspectives Swiss Foreign Policy Has Become More Dynamic in the Past Decade

CSS Analysis in Security Policy CSS ETH Zurich No. 106 • December 2011

Swiss Foreign Policy 2012: Challenges and Perspectives Swiss foreign policy has become more dynamic in the past decade. However, the latitude for a distinct foreign-policy profile has diminished in recent years. The country’s EU policy has reached an impasse. If it is to preserve major national interests in an environment marked by economic crisis and growing multipolarity, Switzerland will have to identify priorities more clearly, take a more strategic approach, and improve coherence in its foreign policy. Further efforts to consolidate domestic support for the country’s peace policy are also needed.

and South Africa), and Turkey. Since then, the government has signed memoranda of understanding to this effect with all of these states except India. In addition, it has come up with economic strategies for a series of other high-potential non- Western markets, such as Indonesia or Mexico.

Third, during Calmy-Rey’s term in office, European affairs were no longer as much of a priority as they once had been. The strategic question of how Switzerland should position itself vis-à-vis Europe, once at the forefront of foreign policy debates, was supplanted by operational issues of REUTERS/Pascal Lauener how to implement and consolidate the bi- Newly elected foreign minister Didier Burkhalter speaks in the National Council, 19 December 2011. lateral track with the EU. This shift of focus was to some extent due to the fact that During the tenure of Federal Councillor In terms of substance, Calmy-Rey’s foreign the Federal Council had to defend sensi- Micheline Calmy-Rey (2002 – 2011), Swiss policy was marked by three shifts of em- tive bilateral treaties such as the Schengen foreign policy has acquired a remarkable phasis. First, civilian peace support was Agreement or the free movement of per- dynamism. More than any foreign minister expanded into a key area of Swiss foreign sons in four national votes between 2005 before her, Calmy-Rey has been an advocate policy. Within a decade, the annual budget and 2009. It was also, however, an expres- of the principle that Switzerland can only for these activities has doubled to over sion of the widespread assumption that preserve its interests by actively exerting CHF75 million. In the process, Switzerland the decades-old “European question” had influence and maintaining an international has pursued a distinctly autonomous pol- been resolved, at least for the time being presence. Consequently, Swiss foreign policy of dialog and mediation, often main- (cf. CSS Analysis No. 37 ). icy has become more ambitious and more taining its distance to the US and EU posi- visible. It is true that this approach has tions (cf. CSS Analyses No. 44 and 63 ). Overall, compared to the 1990s, Switzer- occasionally given rise to domestic con- land has shifted back to exploiting niches troversy, particularly since Swiss politics Second, the Federal Council decided in and idiosyncratic approaches in its foreign has been deeply divided over the coun- 2005, pursuant to a request by the Feder- policy in the past decade, similarly to the try’s international positioning during the al Department for Foreign Affairs (FDFA), Cold War period. While there was a domes- past decade. Overall, however, Calmy-Rey to aim for an expansion of Switzerland’s tic majority for this approach, Switzerland has succeeded in securing support for the area of political influence beyond Europe. has come under growing pressure from foreign policy she shaped among the gen- The declared objective was to respond to Western states to toe the line, especially in eral public, making a convincing case that the global power shifts by forging strate- the last three years of the Calmy-Rey era. it would be unhelpful for Switzerland to re- gic partnerships with the US, Japan, the For instance, the EU has made clear that it main passively aloof in a globalised world. BRICS states (Brazil, Russia, India, China, is unwilling to continue the bilateral track

1 CSS Analysis in Security Policy No. 106 • December 2011

to reach out for an immediate solution New Swiss foreign minister Didier Burkhalter either, especially because it is not clear First member of the liberal party (FDP.Die Liberalen) to become foreign minister in 50 years. at this time how the EU will evolve in the Born 17 April 1960, graduated in economics from the University of Neuchâtel, elected in 1991 to Neuchâtel communal council. context of the debt crisis. If the model of a two-speed Europe should eventually gain Elected in 2003 to the National Council (Nationalrat); in 2007 to the Council of States (Ständerat); inter alia, member of the Security Policy Committee. traction, for example, new forms of co- Member of the Swiss delegation to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly 2005 – 2009. operation for Switzerland might become Elected to the Federal Council in 2009; moved from the Department of Home Affairs to the possible. Even then, however, access to FDFA at the end of 2011. the core European markets – which is in- dispensable for Switzerland – will require in its current form and that in the future, European market was regulated in a sec- concessions in terms of sovereignty, which Switzerland – similarly to the member tor-specific approach, and based on largely is why the domestic political debate must states of the European Economic Area (EEA) static treaties under international law. address this fundamental question. – will have to submit to supranational in- Today, Brussels is essentially questioning stitutions with uniform legal arrangements the second of these concessions, demand- Switzerland should approach the institu- if it wishes to continue to participate in the ing an institutional superstructure for the tional questions with the EU in the context single European market. The leeway for bilateral treaties to facilitate accelerated of an overarching strategy for Europe as a autonomous policies on financial and tax adoption of new EU legislation and con- whole. This would require, first, defining in matters has also diminished as Switzer- sistent interpretation, monitoring, and le- detail a comprehensive package solution in land has been forced to make important gal enforcement of the treaties. the framework of which Switzerland could concessions under international pressure, agree to put its relations with the EU on a especially from neighbouring countries and Rather than treating Switzerland as a privi- more dynamic basis. But on top of that, the the US. In its peace policy, finally, the Fed- leged third country, the EU more and more Swiss government should also examine to eral Council eventually submitted to pres- perceives it as a participant in the single what extent the current strategy of seek- sure from Brussels and Washington to sup- European market who should be subjected ing selective economic-technical integra- port Western sanctions against Iran that to the same laws and conditions as EU and tion with the EU while largely maintaining go beyond those imposed by the UN. This EEA member states. Keen to transform the political distance is still commensurate has obviously weakened Switzerland’s role bilateral track with Switzerland, the EU with Switzerland’s interests. as a go-between in the dispute with Iran seems to envisage several options includ- (cf. CSS Analyses No. 61 and 81 ). ing not only an EEA solution, but possibly Unlike other third states in Europe, Swit- a sector-specific bilateral association for zerland does not maintain structured The international pressure on Switzerland Switzerland with characteristics resembling political relations with the EU. There is no is likely to increase further against the the EEA format. What both of these models political dialog, nor does Switzerland sign background of the European debt and cur- have in common is that Switzerland would up to any CFSP declarations. Expanding rency crisis and the renaissance of power be able to continue on an independent path Switzerland’s political presence in Brussels politics in a multipolar world. After all, in areas such as foreign trade, agricultural, and enhancing solidarity with the EU might Switzerland has weathered the crisis re- and taxation policy (though its freedom of help the country gain more support for its markably well so far, despite an overvalued action in these fields is diminishing too,- ir own concerns and to maintain its global currency. It is still reducing its debt burden respective of whether they are covered by interests more effectively in cooperation while other states in Europe seem close to treaties with Brussels or not). The EU’s de- with European partners. Political relations financial collapse. In this context, and as mands also mean, however, that even as a with Brussels would not undermine Swiss new foreign minister Didier Burkhalter has non-member state, Switzerland would have neutrality in any way. Neither would they taken the helm from Calmy-Rey, it seems to accept a further loss of sovereignty as the preclude an independent peace policy, as timely to take a closer look at the country’s price of access to the single market. the example of Norway shows. They might, current foreign policy challenges. As will however, at least to some extent, make up be argued in this brief, major issues for the The current situation is all the more diffi- for Switzerland’s shortcomings in terms of government to address concern the future cult for the Federal Council because public access to political networks in Europe. course vis-à-vis the EU, the setting of prior- esteem for the EU is at an all-time low in ities and the allocation of resources within Switzerland today. At the same time, after To date, such comprehensive perspectives the network of diplomatic representations, years of official praise for the bilateral track, on Switzerland’s role in Europe have not the coherence and strategic outlook of the general public is hardly familiar with, received much attention. This may change Swiss foreign policy, and, to a lesser extent, and prepared for, the difficulties in the rela- as the Federal Council has decided that the the future of civilian peace promotion. tionship with the EU. The fact that the FDFA Swiss Integration Office, i.e., the govern- did not initiate a domestic debate on the ment’s centre of expertise for European pol- European policy in crisis EU’s criticism of the bilateral track, which icy matters, will no longer be jointly run by Unblocking the logjam of European policy had been voiced since 2006, until the end the Department of Economic Affairs and the is both the most important and the most of 2009 constitutes one of the biggest FDFA but rather be fully integrated into the difficult task of Swiss diplomacy. After the omissions in Calmy-Rey’s foreign policy. latter. While this – unexpected – decision “no” vote against the EEA in 1992, the EU has caused fears of a loss of influence of the made a twofold concession to Switzer- In the election year 2011, the Federal Coun- Integration Office, it also offers an opportu- land, intended as an interim solution. Un- cil wisely played for time on European af- nity to finally go beyond economic and insti- der this arrangement, access to the single fairs. In the new legislature, it will not wish tutional considerations in shaping EU policy.

in Switzerland’s political system (collegial Total Swiss exports by destination country (2010) decisionmaking among the seven Federal Strategic partners: Councillors, who in principle are collective- South Africa 0.38 % Others Neigh- ly responsibly for the country’s foreign pol- Turkey 1.04 % 19.08 % bouring icy), special efforts are required to ensure Brazil 1.14 % states 38.02 % coherent action in the international arena. India 1.26 % Some measures have actually been under- Russia 1.32 % taken to this end in the past years. For in- Japan 3.31 % China 3.67 % stance, there is clear progress in the realm Rest of EU USA 10.12 % of development policy, where in 2008 the 20.66 % Federal Council for the first time present- Source: Comtrade 2010 ed a consistent strategy for all actors in- volved. Overall, however, the shortcomings Geographic refocus There may be good reasons for the shift in coordination across (and within) de- A renewed emphasis on Europe in Swiss of financial and personnel resources from partments still appear to be considerable. foreign policy need not necessarily con- Western Europe and the US to Asia, Africa, Calmy-Rey was definitely more comfort- tradict the expansion of relations with and the Middle East, as outlined in the able with the role of a bridge-builder on emerging non-European states. However, Foreign Policy Report for 2009 and other the global stage than with the task, explic- despite all power shifts, the importance for statements by the FDFA. However, the ar- itly assigned to the FDFA, of coordinating Switzerland of the eight strategic partners gument that the importance of the Euro- foreign policy within the Federal Council. identified by the Federal Council in 2005 pean capitals for Swiss foreign policy had It is also true, however, that some of the should not be overestimated. Leaving aside diminished in view of EU centralisation in departments have shown little interest in the US (Switzerland’s second most im- Brussels was not convincing even during coordinating their international activities portant trade partner after Germany), the the heyday of the bilateral track. It is all with the foreign ministry. share of these states in Switzerland’s total the less convincing today, when Switzer- exports was just 12 per cent in 2010, more land must defend not just its EU policy in Collaboration on security policy is par- than half of which, in turn, accrued from these capitals, but also its competitiveness ticularly underdeveloped within the Fed- trade with China and Japan (see table). as a financial hub and a location for busi- eral Council. The suspension of efforts to While this means that the share of these ness. develop a civil-military peace promotion seven states has grown by 3.5 per cent strategy, and the decision taken at the since 2000, three quarters of this increase Switzerland today has a very dense global end of 2010 to abolish the FDFA’s seat on are directly due to increased exports to network of diplomatic representations. the Federal Council’s Security Committee China. The EU-27, for their part, accounted However, 86 per cent of these posts have (Sicherheitsausschuss), speak volumes in for 60 per cent of Swiss exports (and 77 per three or less diplomatic staff. The effective- this regard. There is also a need for action cent of imports). A remarkable 38 per cent ness of the many mini missions (42 em- concerning the so-called sectoral foreign of exports and 55 per cent of imports came bassies have only one diplomat) remains policies. Formalised coordination between from trade with its neighbouring countries questionable. As long as no expansion of the FDFA and other departments in the Germany, France, Italy, and Austria. diplomatic resources is in the offing, it is form of a common agreement or strat- preferable to have a more stringent prior- egy has only been achieved in a few areas To be sure, the envisaged free trade agree- itisation in the network of representations such as health, education, or energy policy. ments with economic powerhouses China, than to dissipate those resources in the Increased use of such coordination instru- Russia, and Brazil would be economically name of the traditional FDFA principle of ments would seem promising. It is also attractive. But they might well be scup- universalism. worth considering whether Political Affairs pered by Switzerland’s agricultural protec- Division V, which was created to coordinate tionism, as already happened in the case Coherence and strategy sectoral policies, or the Cellule Diploma- of the US. As for the annual consultations For Switzerland, the importance of foreign tique, which was formed after the Libya agreed with several strategic partners, policy will continue to increase in view of Crisis to support the (annually rotating) they are no doubt very useful. The extent the progressive internationalisation that is Federal Presidency, should be strengthened to which they will serve Switzerland in affecting almost all areas of domestic pol- as central points of contact for the various expanding its political influence remains icy and the increasing attempts to exert specialist departments when it comes to questionable, however. Finally, as far as pressure from abroad. Given the deficits linking their international activities to over- other extra-European markets are con- in political leadership that are inherent all Swiss foreign policy objectives. cerned, the current strategy of seeking free trade agreements (through EFTA or bilater- Shifts in Switzerland’s network of representations under Calmy-Rey ally) certainly makes sense. Yet, it remains open to which extent the FDFA’s diploma Switzerland today has 101 embassies (2002: 90), 13 missions/delegations (13) tic presence is really still required once and 30 consulates-general (45). such deals have been accomplished. Number of embassies/consulates-general: Europe 37/10 (2002: 36/19), Americas 17/10 (15/11), Africa 22/1 (19/3), Australia/Oceania 2/1 (2/2). Against this background, the geographic New embassies under Calmy-Rey: Cameroon*, Haiti*, Sudan*, Dominican Republic*, configuration of the FDFA’s network of rep- Kazakhstan, Angola, Azerbaijan*, Kosovo*, Nepal, Armenia*, Qatar (2012). * = former consulates-general Source: FDFA resentations should be constantly reviewed.

Another way of improving coherence tion with the Geneva Initiative, the dialog These framework conditions of Swiss for- might be to elaborate a new strategic re- with Hamas, or mediation in the Iranian eign policy and the looming challenges port on foreign policy analogous to those crisis, it lacked the political clout to achieve outlined above indicate the manifold skills published in 1993 and 2000. The compre- sustainable mediation successes in this that the head of the FDFA must ideally hensive annual accounts published under central region. bring to the job today: Didier Burkhalter Calmy-Rey’s tenure since 2009 are com- will have to demonstrate leadership and mendable in terms of providing transpar- Should the economic upheavals in Switzer- at the same time act as a compromise- ency on the FDFA’s activities. However, as land’s environment boost the importance seeking coordinator, take a cosmopolitan they are short on conceptual messages, of Swiss material interests even more, civil- outlook and still be able to build bridges they do not offer a common substantive ian peace promotion may well come under domestically, be competent in EU matters focal point for either the FDFA or cross- increasing pressure to prove its worth in and yet be familiar with global develop- departmental coordination. By covering the coming years. Against this background, ments, be experienced in economic af- themes and issues so comprehensively it is particularly important that the FDFA fairs and still be knowledgeable in a broad and in a descriptive manner, these reports continues to focus its peace efforts on a range of topics. It is an almost superhu- have inadvertently even discouraged polit- small number of regional and thematic man job profile. Unsurprisingly, Micheline ical debates about foreign policy to some priorities so as to enhance the chance of Calmy-Rey has not mastered all of these extent. As for the five foreign-policy goals really making a difference. In this respect, job requirements equally well. Nor will her laid out in the federal constitution, they the future perspectives outlined in the re- successor. But what can be said at the end are too vague to make up for the lack of cent dispatch on a new framework budget of the Calmy-Rey era is that she has suc- strategic guidelines that marks Swiss for- for 2012 – 16 give reason for some doubts. ceeded in giving new impulses to Swiss eign policy today. foreign policy, anchoring the principle of Domestic and foreign policy active international engagement in the Peace promotion: Consolidation Due to Switzerland’s political system, mat- bedrock of domestic politics. In doing so, With regard to the policy of civilian peace ters of domestic and foreign policy are she has provided a good basis for tackling promotion, a high degree of continuity can even more closely interrelated here than in the challenges that lie ahead. be expected. Domestically, these FDFA ac- other countries. Decisions made in direct tivities enjoy much legitimacy, as can be democratic processes may conflict with seen in the broad parliamentary support foreign-policy goals and activities. Also Editor and author: Daniel Möckli in the respective budgetary debates. At the related to direct democracy, the diversity [email protected] international level, Switzerland has gained of domestic interests makes it difficult to considerable clout with its bilateral peace prioritise in matters of foreign policy and Translated from German: policy and its contributions to resolving leaves little scope for major policy shifts. Christopher Findlay international problems in the framework Conversely, the increasing number and other CSS Analyses / Mailinglist: of the UN. With its good offices, provided intensification of international regula- www.sta.ethz.ch for instance in the Iran crisis or the Geor- tory processes puts Switzerland’s complex gia conflict, Switzerland has also managed domestic decisionmaking system under german and French versions: to improve its contacts with major powers growing strain. www.ssn.ethz.ch such as the US and Russia during Calmy- Rey’s tenure. At the same time, good rela- Previous issues tions with Muslim actors allowed Swiss diplomats to alleviate the negative fallout No. 105: Mediating Conflicts with Religious Dimensions of the Minaret Initiative for Switzerland’s No. 104: Fukushima and the Limits of Risk Analysis image in Muslim countries. 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