Journal of Information Technology & Politics

ISSN: 1933-1681 (Print) 1933-169X (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/witp20

Developing the “Good Citizen”: Digital Artifacts, Peer Networks, and Formal Organization During the 2003–2004 Campaign

Daniel Kreiss

To cite this article: Daniel Kreiss (2009) Developing the “Good Citizen”: Digital Artifacts, Peer Networks, and Formal Organization During the 2003–2004 Howard Dean Campaign, Journal of Information Technology & Politics, 6:3-4, 281-297, DOI: 10.1080/19331680903035441 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/19331680903035441

Published online: 27 Jul 2009.

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Download by: [UC Berkeley Library] Date: 04 January 2018, At: 15:21 Journal of Information Technology & Politics, 6:281–297, 2009 Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 1933-1681 print/1933-169X online DOI: 10.1080/19331680903035441

WITP Developing the “Good Citizen”: Digital Artifacts, Peer Networks, and Formal Organization During the 2003–2004 Howard Dean Campaign

Kreiss Daniel Kreiss

ABSTRACT. The 2003-2004 Howard Dean campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination is often heralded as the prototypical example of peer-driven politics. Building from an emerging body of literature on the Dean campaign, through interviews with key staffers and a survey of public docu- ments I complicate this view by analyzing the interplay between the formal campaign organization, digital artifacts, and citizen networks. I demonstrate that from the earliest days of the primary the cam- paign developed strategies and innovative organizational practices for convening and harnessing citi- zen networks. Drawing on analytical perspectives that combine Foucauldian “governmentality” and actor-network theory, I argue that this was facilitated through the deployment of a set of artifacts that realized and leveraged “networked sociality.” Finally, I argue that while the Internet Division of the campaign adopted many “postbureaucratic” practices, it was embedded in a formal organizational hierarchy that shaped its technical work.

KEYWORDS. Actor-network theory, campaigns, democracy, Internet, open source politics, organizations, peer production

On a warm August night in 2003, Governor campaign through the use of new online Howard Dean, frontrunner for the Democratic networked communications tools. Many aca- presidential nomination, bounded up on stage in demic accounts echo Trippi in emphasizing the New York City’s Bryant Park carrying a red peer-to-peer processes that appeared to be driv- inflatable baseball bat. In the midst of a drive to ing the Dean campaign. For example, Henry raise $1 million before the governor’s appear- Jenkins (2006, p. 208) argues that “peer-to-peer

Downloaded by [UC Berkeley Library] at 15:21 04 January 2018 ance, a comment on For America sug- rather than one-to-many communication” char- gested that, in recognition of their achievement, acterized the campaign. Dean carry the bat as a reference to the online (2003) argues that the Dean effort demonstrated graphic that showed donors their progress “yet another context into which open source towards the goal. For Dean’s Campaign Manager ideals can usefully migrate,” while Manuel Joe Trippi (2005, p. 8) this was a canonical Castells (2007, p. 251) describes the campaign moment, symbolic of the fact that volunteers as an example of “autonomous forms of politi- and small donors had ownership over the cal organizing.”

Daniel Kreiss is a Ph.D. candidate in Stanford University’s Department of Communication. The author thanks the anonymous readers of the Journal of Information Technology & Politics; Fred Turner, Nicholas Anstead, and David Karpf for detailed readings of earlier drafts of this article; and is indebted to the insightful comments of the audience at the Politics: Web 2.0 conference hosted at University of London, Royal Holloway, April 17–18, 2008. Address correspondence to: Daniel Kreiss, Department of Communication, Building 120, 450 Serra Mall, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-2050 (E-mail: [email protected]).

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These characterizations in turn reflect para- collaborations, and partnerships take place digmatic theoretical perspectives that proceed outside of the formal organization. from and rework well-established theories of This study turns to the Howard Dean cam- collective action (Olson, 1965; Tarrow, 1998) paign for the Democratic presidential nomina- in positing how new communications technolo- tion to explore the relationship between digital gies are fundamentally reshaping the problem artifacts, formal campaign organizations, and of “free riding” and the necessity of formal, peer networks. Despite a rich body of theory on hierarchical organizations. Bimber, Flanagin, and collective action, empirical research on the Stohl (2005, p. 381) argue that “self-organizing” organizational structures and technical prac- increasingly characterizes collective action in a tices of electoral campaigns is surprisingly lim- world with dramatically falling information ited. Students of politics generally have little costs and routine “private-to-public boundary purchase on the processes by which artifacts are spanning.” Meanwhile, similar to other formu- adopted by campaign organizations, and many lations of networks as a distinct organizational studies detailing how candidates use new media form (Podolny & Page, 1998; Powell, 1990), (Bimber & Davis, 2003; Howard, 2006) were Benkler’s (2002, 2006) influential theory of conducted prior to the emergence of the social- “commons-based peer production” describes technical practices that broadly characterize voluntary, leveled, and communicatively recip- “Web 2.0 environments” (Chadwick, 2009, p. 34). rocal networked collaboration that is distinct Meanwhile, an emerging body of work finds from both the firm (Coase, 1937; Williamson, the Dean effort to be a rich research site, given 1975) and the market. This new form of large- the campaign’s unprecedented adoption of net- scale collective action is posited to have great work theory and Internet applications (Foot & import for political practice, especially with Schneider, 2006; Wiese & Gronbeck, 2005). regard to the public sphere, and is made possi- These studies undermine many accounts of the ble by “decentralized information gathering and campaign as a uniquely participatory, emer- exchange” (Benkler, 2002, p. 375). gent, and decentralized phenomenon. For While these analytical approaches do not example, Hindman (2005, 2008) demonstrates entirely overlook the existence and persistence how the campaign used the Internet to revolu- of formal, hierarchical organizations in a tionize the “backend” of institutionalized politi- world suffused by networks, these structures cal practice: fundraising, volunteer recruitment, are generally understudied or assumed to be and voter mobilization. In addition, a body of taking on features of networks, given shifts in work documents the limits of interactivity, lack the information environment. For example, of substantive forms of citizen participation on Benkler (2002, p. 391) acknowledges the role the campaign (Haas, 2006; Stromer-Galley & of formal organizations in convening and Baker, 2006), and ongoing importance of Downloaded by [UC Berkeley Library] at 15:21 04 January 2018 “harnessing” peer production, but there is a formal organizations and elite professionals in general lack of attention to the ways this collaborative, participatory campaign practices occurs and the interactions between organiza- (Hindman, 2007, p. 195). tional forms. Indeed, much work on commons- In turn, a number of scholars have pointed to based peer production proceeds as if networks the organizational complexity of the campaign. are autonomous organizational entities. Mean- Jett and Välikangas (2004, p. 3) characterize while, a body of work on “postbureaucratic the campaign as a form of “open source orga- organizations” (Heckscher & Donnellon, 1994) nizing” that is “a network in many respects, but posits that some formal organizations increas- it also exhibits the fluidity of a market and the ingly resemble networks. In the political goal-oriented discipline of a formal organiza- domain, Bimber (2003) argues that postbu- tion.” Taking a more meso-level view, in an reaucracy is characterized by a flexible analysis that includes the Dean campaign, structure, an acute orientation to changes in Chadwick (2007, p. 14) draws from social the external environment, and a decline in for- movement theory to argue that “digital network mal roles as contracts between individuals, repertoires” facilitate the creation of “hybrid” Kreiss 283

organizational forms that use “mobilization CENTERING THE DEAN CAMPAIGN strategies typically associated with parties, interest groups, and new social movements.” By the late summer of 2003, Howard Dean, Each of these perspectives makes a valuable former governor of Vermont, was at the top of contribution in providing an analytical frame- the polls for the Democratic presidential nomi- work for thinking about networked collective nation despite entering the race as an outsider action in a way that avoids overemphasizing candidate. To many close observers of politics, peer-to-peer processes while paying close Dean’s meteoric rise was fueled by new Inter- attention to the complexities of organizational net applications including and Meetup—a forms and practices. Web site that facilitates offline gatherings— This article extends this empirical work on that enabled citizens to self-organize. Trippi the Dean campaign and contributes to theoreti- (2003) even argued that the role of the formal cal perspectives on networked politics by campaign organization was simply to “provide closely detailing the campaign’s organiza- the tools and some of the direction . . . and get tional and technical practices. Through open- the hell out of the way when a big wave is ended interviews with key staffers and a survey building on its own.” While this is a romanti- of public documents, including archived Web cally democratic account, in reality these citi- pages, professional press articles, blog posts, zen networks were convened and harnessed for and first-hand accounts, especially Trippi’s backend labor through an innovative set of (2004) autobiographical The Revolution Will organizational and technical practices honed by Not Be Televised and Streeter and Teachout’s the formal campaign organization. As Jerome (2007) edited collection Mousepads, Shoe Armstrong (2006), an influential progressive Leather, and Hope, this article proceeds in blogger who served as an advisor and consult- three parts.1 I begin by discussing the strategy ant for the campaign, described their strategy: behind the campaign’s uptake of networked communications tools and argue that staffers Much has been said about the decentral- and consultants developed a novel set of prac- ized and emergent quality of the Howard tices that centered and thus leveraged the peer- Dean campaign, and many people, to-peer networks that emerged independently actions, and efforts did emerge with the of the campaign early in the primaries. Draw- volition to join in word and deed; but from ing from analytical perspectives that couple the very beginning, from May and June of Foucauldian governmentality and actor- 2002, there was tactic encouragement of network theory, I next turn to analysis of the the decentralized campaign, from the very innovative networked artifacts that realized center. and structured digitally “networked sociality” Downloaded by [UC Berkeley Library] at 15:21 04 January 2018 (Wittel, 2001) to further backend campaign Understanding how this strategy developed practices, detailing how campaign staffers’ is contingent upon the detailed consideration of version of the “good citizen” (Schudson, the socio-technical context within which the 1998) was technically and discursively pro- 2003–2004 primaries occurred. Political blogs, duced. I then show how these practices were while not new, had growing user-bases and shaped by, and in turn influenced, formal visibility by 2002, the time when potential can- organizational processes, especially as peer didates were making initial hires to staff their networks served as resources for staffers nascent campaign organizations. Blogs served and advisors in internal organizational con- as sites for Democratic Party activists to discuss flicts. In the process I argue that the case of the politics and candidates independently of the Dean campaign suggests that collaborative formal campaigns, many of which lacked dedi- peer networks are structured by the demands cated Web sites for presidential runs until the of an inter-organizational environment, fall and winter of 2002, and even then were political institutions, and intra-organizational technically unsophisticated.2 The majority of processes. these online progressive party activists and 284 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & POLITICS

bloggers were interested in and active promot- organization. Armstrong recalls a meeting in ers of Dean’s candidacy, becoming engaged early 2003 with his consulting partner Markos well before he formally announced his intention Moulitsas Zúnigu, founder of the blog , to run for the nomination. This was, in part, a and Trippi, during which they crafted the broad result of Dean’s antiwar stance, which appealed contours of the campaign’s Internet strategy: to the base of the party. Not only did Dean’s independent online sup- The three of us discussed what we port outstrip that of the other candidates early in believed could be brought inside the cam- the primary cycle, it also proved highly conse- paign from the ongoing decentralized quential with respect to identifying and taking effort—the gist of “the revolution” being advantage of opportunities that were later lever- to launch an official national campaign aged by the campaign. During the summer of blog, where the online community, fund- 2002, a network of blogs including MyDD, run raising, and organizing efforts could be by Jerome Armstrong, and the volunteer-created centralized. . . . (Armstrong, 2007, p. 45) and administered Howard Dean 2004 (later called Dean Nation) not only provided activists This strategy was implemented through the with outlets to become engaged in Dean’s campaign’s Internet Division, which crafted candidacy in the absence of a fully functional novel organizational practices and deployed formal campaign organization, these efforts networked artifacts including blogs and Meetup also served as Dean’s de facto Internet pres- to bring extant and new networks inside its ence. For example, when William Finkel of sphere of operations and thus provide them Meetup was contacting all the Democratic pri- with direction. As such, the campaign worked mary candidates in early 2003 to offer them for- toward creating and fostering a geographically malized use of the online application, he wrote distributed community of bloggers, supporters, to the volunteer administrator of Howard Dean volunteers, and funders that congregated at the 2004, Aziz Poonawalla. After featuring a link Web site and blog and monitored the activities on the site, Howard Dean 2004 drove the initial there. The aim was to ensure that supporters use and growth of Meetup among the cam- could be routinely and quickly mobilized to paign’s supporters. Armstrong (2007, pg. 47) perform the fundraising and organizing tasks eventually put Finkel in touch with Trippi and that needed to be accomplished, often to attract convinced the campaign to adopt it as an orga- press coverage. nizing tool, making Dean the only candidate To implement this strategy, the campaign that responded to the firm’s initial inquiry. recruited and hired a number of staffers for the Meetup went on to become the organizational Internet Division who had technical expertise core of Dean’s online effort and a significant from outside the political field and often in Downloaded by [UC Berkeley Library] at 15:21 04 January 2018 fundraising vehicle. Just as importantly, it was commercial settings. Trippi (2004, p. 54) him- a symbol of the campaign’s technological profi- self exemplified the way some of these staffers ciency for the political press. By the summer of bridged professional fields: he possessed nearly 2003, Meetup supporters even served as a trans- three decades of experience running political parent and verifiable metric for political jour- campaigns, in addition to having worked for a nalists to judge the strength of primary number of Internet startups during the late campaigns. 1990s that he referred to as “a few brash young These blogs were also hubs of online activity companies,” including Wave Systems, Smart that the campaign strove to incorporate to gar- Paper Networks, and Progeny Linux Systems. ner financial and human resources. After Trippi Trippi argued that this work shaped his under- formally joined the candidate as Campaign standing of how technology could be used in Manager in January 2003, he sought to provide electoral politics. He was joined on the coordinated, routine direction to these volunteer campaign by a number of individuals who pos- efforts by convening them through the net- sessed less extensive political experience, but worked technologies of the formal campaign who shared knowledge and skills relating to the Kreiss 285

Internet that were then applied to a political necessary to be competitive. This was all the campaign. These resources were essentially more important given the candidate’s limited carried across contexts, a phenomenon that a resources and name recognition, his estrange- number of scholars have noted with respect to ment from the Democratic Party’s establish- social movement organizations (Gusfield, ment, and the press’s relative dismissal of the 1981; Staggenborg, 1988; Taylor, 1989). candidacy. This helped foster what Zephyr On the one hand, this was reflected organiza- Teachout (personal communication, July 10, tionally. For example, Bobby Clark (2007, p. 77), 2008), Dean’s Director of Online Organizing, an entrepreneur who worked on technology characterizes as innovation born of necessity, startups in Colorado and , was the and this was supported by Trippi’s considerable first Web strategist for the campaign and resources as Campaign Manager. For staffers recruited his former colleague, Dave Kochbeck, within the Internet Division, Web-based tools to serve as the campaign’s first information including blogs and Meetup maximized the technology (IT) director. Clark describes how resources of the campaign by leveraging the Kochbeck’s commercial technology experi- work of thousands of supporters and volunteers. A ence helped him understand the challenges of a conversation in early 2003 between Armstrong campaign, as he “served as our campaign’s (2006) and Trippi makes this clear: “You don’t chief technology officer (CTO), as he had for understand,” said Joe. “This campaign has no our San Francisco startup. . . .” (Clark, 2007, money. Look, John Kerry has a list of 20,000 p. 77). On the other, these professional and hardcore supporters, nationwide, OK. . . . How technical skills helped shape the practices of the are you guys going to get Howard Dean enough campaign. Clay Johnson, a freelance technol- people to go head to head with John Kerry? Can ogy consultant and lead programmer for Dean, the Net do this?” and Nicco Mele, the Webmaster for the cam- As such, these concerns drove much of the paign who had extensive experience in similar campaign’s uptake of networked tools. The positions with various progressive organiza- Internet not only provided resources, but was tions, were both central figures who created the also the basis for staged, high-profile events campaign’s technical infrastructure. Staffers that attracted press coverage, as journalists mar- within the Internet Division also included veled at Dean’s success in raising money in Matthew Gross and Joe Rospars, both of whom small online increments, part of the campaign’s were bloggers prior to joining the campaign and communications strategy detailed below (see were instrumental in the launch and development Armstrong, 2007, p. 50). Through online fund- of Blog for America, the first blog hosted by a raising and Meetup, Dean was not only able to presidential campaign. In characterizing their keep pace with Kerry’s fundraising and volun- approach to using the Internet in electoral poli- teer operation, but by summer of 2003 actually Downloaded by [UC Berkeley Library] at 15:21 04 January 2018 tics, Zack Rosen (personal communication, April exceeded him. At the same time, online fund- 7, 2008), a volunteer developer with Hack4Dean raising, combined with the continued growth of who was hired as a staff member in late fall 2003, Dean Meetups, served to legitimate the cam- described the Internet Division in new economy paign for other actors in the field, especially terms as “feeling like a creative, creative project journalists, but by extension elected officials rather than a managed organization.” and the public; this was reflected in Dean’s Professional backgrounds alone do not high-profile endorsements and rise in the polls explain the organizational and technical inno- throughout 2003. vations of the Dean campaign, because a All of this was premised on the development number of candidates had Internet staff mem- and deployment of networked artifacts that bers that similarly bridged fields.3 Many staff- were themselves the result of novel organiza- ers also attribute these innovations to a tional practices. Similar to the commercial willingness to experiment born of the wide- firms that Neff and Stark (2003) describe as spread acknowledgment during the early stages “permanently beta” with their flexible organi- of the primaries that a fresh approach was zational structures and continuously developed 286 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & POLITICS

and in-process products, the campaign’s Inter- their own 24-hour alternative messaging ser- net Division turned to the Web to recruit the vice that was highly responsive to the campaign volunteers and consultants who helped develop environment. In turn, many staffers cited how many of the networked artifacts that the their positions on the Internet team were more campaign ultimately deployed. As Teachout fluid than those of other divisions, as they grap- (2007, p. 68) describes, when the Internet Divi- pled with shared technical challenges, worked sion needed a new organizing tool they would on collaborative projects, and interacted with the often “put up a request for help on the blog.” At peer networks around the formal organization. other times technical projects that originated in This does not mean that there was no special- the supporter community were incorporated ization or formal processes within the Internet into the campaign. For example, the volunteer Division. Mele (personal communication, July 29, group Hack4Dean, a distributed network of 2008) had deep knowledge of the Internet’s use over 100 programmers, developed the Web in political and advocacy campaigns and application DeanSpace, a toolkit built on the describes a sentiment echoed by many other open source platform Drupal that enabled sup- staffers: “In the beginning we were very reac- porters to set up their own Web sites and plan tive, we were trying to figure this out on the events for Dean. Mele (personal communica- fly.” Over time, he argues, the campaign devel- tion, July 29, 2008), Dean’s Webmaster, argues oped more stable goals and routines relating to that these practices of utilizing a volunteer base e-mail list growth and organizing, while staffers tied together the political culture of the grass- increasingly took on more defined tasks. Zack roots and “the open source, collaborative Rosen (personal communication, April 7, 2008) world.” That said, they were also compelled by describes how routines coexisted with the the limited resources of the campaign. Given a demands of networks: lack of programmers, staffers were used to going online and “asking for help when we There definitely was some formal man- needed it” (Teachout, 2007, p. 68). There was agement and formal work processes that also the expediency in some cases of reaching had to be done to run a national organiza- beyond the formal boundaries of the organiza- tion. The Web site needs to be updated, tion given the “political maneuvering” neces- you’d be writing, blogging, there’s news- sary to have technical needs addressed in an letters and fundraising. All the necessities environment with limited resources and com- of a national campaign organization had peting staff priorities (Nuxoll, 2007, p. 197; to be filled. But in addition to that was a Teachout, 2007, p. 66), bunch of work that had to do with directly As is clear, many of the organizational prac- leveraging the work that was done outside tices of the Internet Division resemble the fea- of the national campaign organization by Downloaded by [UC Berkeley Library] at 15:21 04 January 2018 tures of postbureaucratic organizations detailed the volunteers independently. by Bimber (2003). Indeed, the postbureaucratic work style of the Internet staffers is what These tasks were continually negotiated in enabled the campaign to center the labor of peer practice, and through interactions with the other networks. Staffers responsible for Internet divisions of the campaign. fundraising and Meetup were constantly captur- The practices of the Internet Division ing and monitoring fundraising data and volun- resulted in an extraordinary array of Web-based teer numbers, tailoring their work to respond to tools that were not only innovations in the polit- the labor of peer networks and changes in the ical field, but also stood alongside some of the campaign environment. Staffers were also, at earliest prototypes of what we now refer to as times, attentive to comments on Blog for America “social networking” sites. To analyze these and used their own posts to rebut charges from shifts in political practice, I draw from theorists rivals, respond to professional press articles, that couple Foucauldian “governmentality” disseminate the campaign’s messages, and and actor-network theory. I argue that these issue calls to action. In essence, they convened artifacts realized certain citizenship practices Kreiss 287

while harnessing the work of peer networks guide, and direct the conduct of others … and it towards the campaign’s strategic ends. also embraces the ways in which one might be urged and educated to bridle one’s passions, to control one’s instincts, to govern oneself” NETWORKED ARTIFACTS AND THE (Rose, 1999, p. 3). As such, governmentality DEVELOPMENT OF CITIZENSHIP does not explicitly relate to the state and extends beyond overtly controlling and con- The Dean campaign was the first electoral straining forms of domination, detailing the effort to widely deploy new media platforms to multiple ways power is productive of actions, realize, convene, and make visible social net- guiding and shaping them from various sites works in order to channel their collaborative (Burchell, 1996, p. 19). Extending Foucault, the- labor towards organizational goals. As such, orists have used actor-network theory (Callon, digital artifacts were innovative means of con- 1986; Latour, 2005; Latour & Weibel, 2005; necting citizens to political institutions and Law & Hassard, 1999) to analyze the role of structuring their practices. This occurred artifacts in structuring particular practices of through the leveraging of digitally “networked citizenship. For example, Barry (2000, 2001) sociality,” which Wittel (2001, p. 51) describes argues for research into the politics of interac- as consisting of “fleeting and transient, yet iter- tivity, suggesting that through engagement with ative social relations; of ephemeral but intense artifacts and technical regimes, we cede agency encounters. . . . In network sociality the social to tools that are productive of actions in struc- bond at work is not bureaucratic but informa- tured ways (see also Andrejevic, 2004; tional; it is created on a project-by-project Stromer-Galley, 2004). Of particular interest basis, by the movement of ideas. . . .” While are the ways technical devices are embedded in Wittel is concerned more broadly with the assemblages that facilitate what Latour (1987) social practice of network-making, for the pur- refers to as “action at a distance.” Barry, poses here I refer only to the collaborative Osborne, and Rose (1996, p. 12) for instance social mode that characterized the digital peer describe how artifacts deployed at local sites networks clustered around and convened by the help enroll citizens in networks that have state Dean campaign. In predating both the coining power as their effect. of the phrase Web 2.0 (Scholz, 2008) and the The work of these theorists provides a lens commercial applications including Facebook for analyzing the artifacts that mediated and YouTube that are now synonymous with between the Dean campaign and the peer net- social networking, the campaign was a proto- works that predated and were constituted by it. type for the socio-technical practices that, as As noted above, the Internet Division actively Chadwick (2009, p. 16) argues, constitute a turn sought to develop and implement online appli- Downloaded by [UC Berkeley Library] at 15:21 04 January 2018 from the “deliberative assumption.” cations that would maximize the campaign’s While the literature on peer production and resources, given the uphill nature of Dean’s bid new forms of online collective action generally for the nomination. To that end the Internet lacks a theoretical account of the relationship Division of the campaign used technically between formal organizations, peer networks, skilled volunteer labor along with paid consult- and mediating artifacts, science and technology ants to develop a host of applications for the studies offers a series of conceptual tools for campaign that were not only innovations in the analyzing the ways power is exercised through political field but were both inspired by and and structures networks. In recent years a num- stood alongside early commercial social net- ber of scholars have productively combined working Web sites. For example, DeanLink actor-network theory with Foucauldian “gov- was a social networking Web site modeled after ernmentality” approaches to theorize relations Friendster (Teachout, 2007, p. 69), and Genera- of power in socio-technical practice. For Fou- tion Dean was a virtual community for young cault, “governmentality,” or “the conduct of supporters (Michel, 2007, p. 155). GetLocal, conduct,” “refers to all endeavors to shape, developed with the help of Zach Exley, then the 288 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & POLITICS

Organizing Director of MoveOn.org, “allowed Dean, which were then networked through syn- people to offer political events to those who dication technologies that allowed the sharing wanted to attend, and turned the candidate Web of content (Koenig, 2007, p. 207; Lebkowsky, site into a place where people could find each 2005, p. 6), including that produced by the offi- other. . . .” (Teachout, 2007, p. 65). This tool cial organization. supplemented, but did not replace, Meetup, and Dean staffers within the formal organization provided greater functionality for supporters. in turn were acutely involved in the work of Finally, TeamRaiser was a Web-based fund- these networks. For example, there was a raising application developed for nonprofits by National Meetup Coordinator within the cam- the firm Convio, which the campaign modified paign’s field operations who was responsible to enable volunteers to set fundraising goals on for working with these groups. Michael Silber- personalized Web pages (Larry Biddle, per- man (personal communication, July 28, 2008) sonal communication, October 20, 2008). describes some of the challenges he faced in While these social networking technologies this role, as volunteers afforded supporters the opportunity to digitally gather around the campaign and form online, . . . wanted to help elect Howard Dean and even in-person, social relationships based president. Their goal was to do whatever on their political interests, identity, and geo- we said was most useful. On the other graphic location, the successful channeling of hand, we had to be really careful of not this networked sociality towards the ends of the being too much command and control campaign entailed indirect forms of structuring because they were all volunteers, we citizen participation given that these peer net- didn’t know what worked in every com- works were outside the boundaries of the for- munity. . . . Even though a lot of the mal organization. This involved technically campaign was described as self-orga- producing certain types of citizenship practices nized, people want to check in with the along with legitimating select forms of partici- campaign and have a direct line to the pation through the hosting and design of these campaign. . . . social spaces, messaging through e-mail and the blog, and, at times, direct staff contact. For This direct line consisted not only of best prac- example, much of the design and functionality tices for the volunteers who were new to poli- of the Dean For America Web site reflected the tics, but also detailed agendas for the volunteer campaign’s priorities by steering users towards hosts of Meetups that clearly conveyed the contribution pages and offering interactivity priorities of the campaign (Silberman, 2007, only in select domains: users had numerous p. 114; see the Appendix). In many respects, opportunities to make a donation to the cam- the Meetup program resembled traditional field Downloaded by [UC Berkeley Library] at 15:21 04 January 2018 paign but could not contribute to a policy plat- operations, but with a greater reliance on volun- form (Haas, 2006). Other applications were teer leaders to self-identify and play a staffers’ explicitly designed to leverage off- and online role in their own community, all of which was social relationships for the ends of the cam- facilitated by an Internet application that paign. The TeamRaiser pages, which provided enabled supporters to quickly and easily find supporters with the opportunity to “create their their geographically proximate peers. own content on personal pages within the Web The socio-technical practices that leveraged site—most often telling friends and family why networked sociality occurred in conjunction they supported Howard Dean and asking them with the narrowcasting communication and to do the same,” were directed towards fund- data management practices that were institu- raising and were estimated to have helped raise tionalized in the field and that Howard (2006) “more than $1 million for the campaign” argues realizes forms of “managed citizenship.” (Clark, 2007, p. 84). Meanwhile, DeanSpace This was clear in that while the campaign enabled supporters to create their own affinity- deployed many new social networking applica- and identity-based group blogs and forums for tions, e-mail remained the primary vehicle Kreiss 289

through which the Field, Internet, and Finance are no other examples of the candidate recon- divisions delivered messages to supporters. As sidering or taking a new public position on a Kelly Nuxoll (personal communication, matter of policy or strategy as a result of citizen November 19, 2008), the E-mail Director for input. In a largely complementary article in the campaign, argues: “The campaign used e- Wired, Gary Wolf (2004) noted this explicitly: mail as a broadcast mechanism rather than as a “But since none of the grassroots groups are two-way mechanism” in urging citizens to officially tied to the campaign, there is no guar- attend fundraising and political events and antee of influence over policy. Dean is free to donate money online. This strategy had its roots ignore the political wishes of any of these in the practices of MoveOn, which created the groups, and he often does.” Even the candi- “industry standard” format of short text blocks date’s Internet policy was closed to public with embedded links to donation or action debate, crafted in part by the campaign’s “Net pages (Biddle, 2007, p. 172). Indeed, Teachout Advisory Net,” a group of leading technologists (2007, p. 64) describes how the visit of Zack and scholars that included Joichi Ito, David Exley and Eli Pariser of MoveOn to Dean Weinberger, Howard Rheingold, and Lawrence headquarters in April 2003 revolutionized the Lessig. The limited nature of networked partici- work of the Internet Division: “That visit, pation is also clear in the public criticism, aired more than any other single day, transformed after Dean’s losses in the early primaries, of the the way we thought about much of the Internet campaign’s decision to spend the bulk of its campaign. In that day we moved from chaotic resources on television advertisements.4 creativity to creativity driven by the need for In sum, networked artifacts were productive e-mail list growth.” Coupled with the gather- of certain types of citizenship practices, as ing of addresses and use of e-mail was the they convened and leveraged networked soci- development of analytics that tracked not only ality towards the strategic ends of the cam- the most successful appeals (so that messages paign. These organizational and technological could be tailored) but also supporter informa- innovations centered on the creation of a geo- tion across the range of Dean social network- graphically dispersed and stable pool of sup- ing applications. As Larry Biddle (personal porters who could consistently be called upon communication, October 20, 2008), the Direc- to perform the fundraising and organizing tor for Direct Mail, Telemarketing in the needed by the campaign. As the social affor- Finance Division, described it, he worked to dances of these artifacts implies, this stability make sure that the campaign digitally captured was furthered by the range of emotional what individuals were doing for Dean, includ- attachments and relationships that individuals ing hosting parties and attending events, so developed through their engagement with each the campaign could “get the most active peo- other and the campaign, not unlike Web 2.0 Downloaded by [UC Berkeley Library] at 15:21 04 January 2018 ple and have them telemarketed” to make a business models that commodify social labor contribution. (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005; Terranova, As is clear, how these artifacts were 2004), although with the shared political end deployed was a social decision and not a of getting Dean elected. In this sense, while technical necessity. The tactics to “crowd- or these supporters were outside of the formal open-source organizational processes” (Zack organization’s boundaries, their work was Rosen, personal communication, April 7, 2008) structured through artifactual practices. At the at the backend of operations came in lieu of same time, these artifacts extended the reach more substantive involvement in the campaign, of citizens, offering them powerful new tools for example at the level of policy, strategy, or to organize their peers and support the candi- the allocation of resources. The policy platform date. While this addresses the relationship of the candidate was the purview of the cam- between the formal organization and peer paign’s formal advisors. Outside of an online networks, the next section details how these vote that the campaign hosted about whether to new media practices were shaped by internal participate in the public financing system, there organizational processes. 290 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & POLITICS

THE DEAN CAMPAIGN party organizations. Meanwhile, the consulting ORGANIZATION firms hired by the campaign were well estab- lished in the political field. For example, Paul Given that the focus of attention among the Maslin, Dean’s Pollster and Senior Advisor, is a press and scholars was on the Dean campaign’s partner in Fairbank, Maslin, Maulin & Associates, online effort, many accounts have overlooked a highly regarded firm whose presidential cli- the ways in which the Internet Division of the ents included Gore, Dukakis, Hart, Mondale, campaign was embedded within a formal orga- and Carter. nization. This in turn has led to characteriza- These campaign divisions and specialized tions of the campaign that elide its formal staff roles reflect the institutional context and structure, decision-making hierarchy, special- organizational environment in which the cam- ized divisions, and defined staff positions. In paign was embedded. Thus, it is only in light of sum, in many respects it had an institutionalized an academic literature that emphasizes peer- organizational form that was broadly recogniz- driven political processes that scholars should able to professionals in the field. A detailed be surprised by the formal Dean campaign look at the structure of the campaign organiza- organization. The Dean campaign had to tion and its internal dynamics suggests that become credible to other actors in the field, flexibility, a sensitivity to the external environ- especially professional journalists and party ment, and the decline of formal staff roles— leaders, by adopting a legitimate organizational typical postbureaucratic practices—were not form. At the same time the campaign needed to uniformly the features of the Dean campaign develop structures to accomplish routine tasks, organization, nor was it a radically decentral- including reporting to the Federal Election ized and leveled form of political organization. Commission, dealing with journalists looking Open-ended interviews with key staffers pro- for easily reachable and authoritative campaign vide a richly detailed look at the Dean cam- spokespersons, coordinating volunteers and paign organization and suggest how strategy staffers in multiple states, meeting with influen- and resource conflicts within its boundaries tial citizen groups, and preparing the candi- helped shape what peer networks were called date’s schedule. In sum, while the formal upon to do, as much as the demands of a com- organization leveraged collaborative labor for petitive electoral environment and the institu- the backend tasks detailed above, there is little tionalized practices of the political field. evidence that these peer networks could have While it was less publicly visible than the commanded the resources necessary to deal Internet Division (part of the campaign’s press with what required routine coordination. strategy detailed below), the Dean campaign In turn, staffers outside the Internet Division had a formal organizational structure that was largely used new media in ways that “ampli- Downloaded by [UC Berkeley Library] at 15:21 04 January 2018 responsible for its strategic planning and policy fied” (Agre, 2002) the institutionalized positions, as well as carrying out routine, day- practices of their respective domains. This was to-day tasks, including coordinating field oper- apparent in the Finance Division, which was the ations, managing communications, and per- first to be staffed on the campaign and which forming the majority of its fundraising (see grew to encompass over two dozen staffers Figure 1). The individuals in these positions in under the direction of National Finance Direc- turn generally had professional backgrounds tor Stephanie Schriock, a veteran who joined that differed from the staffers of the Internet Dean after a three-year stint at the Democratic Division. Many of the Deputy Campaign Man- Senatorial Campaign Committee. While it agers and Directors of the Field, Political, functioned outside of the public eye, by all Finance, and Communications divisions were accounts the fundraising efforts of the Finance either long-time Dean aides or seasoned politi- Division were highly successful, especially cal staffers with extensive work experience in given the underreported fact that offline sur- other campaigns, the Clinton administration, or passed online donations (Kelly Nuxoll, personal Kreiss 291

FIGURE 1. Select snapshot of the Dean Campaign National Organization, December 2003. Organizational chart based on Federal Election Commission filings and adapted from the George Washington University campaign database, available online at: http://www.gwu.edu/∼action/2004/ dean/deanorg.html. For space and clarity, this leaves out the advisors and consultants who did not have defined roles in the campaign organization, in addition to many non-senior level positions (for example, the Finance Division had over two dozen staffers). As detailed in this article, it also does not reflect many of the actual working relationships of these staffers.

Mike Ford Joe Trippi Campaign Manager Kate O'Connor Senior Advisor

Andrea Pringle Tom McMahon Robert Rogan Deputy Campaign Manager Deputy Campaign Manager Deputy Campaign Manager

Finance Field Communications Policy Internet

Stephanie Schriock Tamara Pogue Tricia Enright Jeremy Ben-Ami Nicco Mele National Finance Dir. Field Dir. Communications Dir. Policy Dir. Webmaster Zephyr Teachout Linnea Dyer Michael Silberman Courtney O'Donnell Julie Norton Dir., Online Organizing Dep. National Finance Dir. Nat. Meetup Coord. Dep. Communications Dir. Dep. Policy Dir. Matthew Gross Jay Carson Dir. of Internet Comm. Larry Biddle Nat. Spokesman Joe Rospars Dir. for Direct Mail, Telemarketing Writer Bobby Clark Clay Johnson Database Finance Lead Programmer Kelly Nuxoll Ken Herman E-mail Dir. Database David Salie Jim Brayton House Parties Programmer Research Jascha Franklin-Hodge Nat. Systems Administrator Brent Colburn Joe Drymala Research Dir. Speechwriter Zack Rosen State and Local Tech. Coord. Political

Paul Blank Political Dir. Operations

Mark Michaud Dir. of Operations

communication, November 19, 2008). And for The communications strategy of the campaign

Downloaded by [UC Berkeley Library] at 15:21 04 January 2018 the professionals working in finance, the Inter- relied on a very old tactic: finding an effective net was seen as a tool that could extend estab- news hook for journalists that would compel lished fundraising practices. For example, them to write about Dean. The Internet proved Biddle (personal communication, October 20, immensely useful in this regard, as Trippi, an 2008) argues that he brought his experience as a established political professional for whom com- nonprofit and political fundraising professional munications was a primary concern, deliberately to bear on using the Internet to facilitate the staged high profile online fundraising actions to events, telemarketing, and direct mail efforts of garner media coverage (Armstrong, 2007, p. 50). the campaign. Biddle urged potential donors to For example, in July 2003, the campaign posted sign up for events online so that the campaign a picture of the candidate eating a turkey sand- could better manage involvement. He incorpo- wich on the Dean For America Web site to coin- rated proven text from solicitation letters into cide with a $2,000-a-plate fundraiser hosted by online asks, and he developed the analytics that Vice President Dick Cheney. Small donations enabled him to trace involvement and craft fol- poured in, and Dean out-raised Cheney by nearly low-up appeals. $200,000. Meanwhile, this episode, and others 292 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & POLITICS

that were similarly designed to simultaneously platform—one that was put to a wide range of raise money and receive press coverage, organizational uses. This in essence created a grabbed headlines heralding Dean’s online suc- series of shadow divisions that were housed cess, as journalists construed it as evidence for under the rubric of the “Internet.” The roles of the radically innovative nature of the campaign some staffers make this evident. For example, and, by extension, the candidate. Zephyr Teachout served as the Director of At the same time there were numerous sites Online Organizing and Matthew Gross was the of internal conflict and organizational tension, Director of Internet Communications, while the as staffers argued over strategy, resources, the Division as a whole was constantly involved in candidate’s ear, and Dean’s public image. fundraising efforts. Outside of the Internet Given that Trippi only hints at these conflicts in Division, the campaign’s deployment of The Revolution Will Not Be Televised, they networked technologies reconfigured job pro- have received little attention in academic cesses and division boundaries. As Nuxoll, accounts of the campaign. While Trippi was the E-mail Director for the campaign, (2007, Dean’s Campaign Manager, and was thus for- p. 197–198) describes: mally responsible for all of the campaign’s operations, advisors who had long relationships It was beginning to be unclear that depart- with the candidate from his time as governor ments were separate entities at all, since and who held his trust made competing claims field and communications were running for organizational power. After the campaign’s together thanks to Meetup; finance was losses in Iowa and New Hampshire, the profes- increasingly part of field, courtesy of sional press reported on these conflicts within house parties; the policy people realized the formal organization as keys to the spectacu- they could get their message out with the lar collapse of a frontrunner. For example, writ- Web pages, blog, e-mail, and forms; and ing in Salon, Benson (2004) echoes many scheduling knew a few things that impacted participants in describing a campaign that was the grassroots, reached partly through Meetup and the blog. . . . roughly divided into three groups of the governor’s top advisors from Vermont— This was not, however, a frictionless pro- Kate O’Connor and Bob Rogan in one cess, as staffers were at times unclear who they camp, Trippi in another, and everyone were supposed to be reporting to and, as else in a third. The result was that internal suggested above, there were at times radically decision-making processes tended to be different approaches to using these networked chaotic, with top supporters getting con- tools. Dean’s National Meetup Coordinator tradictory marching orders from Trippi Michael Silberman cites how he straddled both Downloaded by [UC Berkeley Library] at 15:21 04 January 2018 and the Burlington staff in the same day. the field operations and Internet Division, so much so that it was not always clear who his However, the specific history of these conflicts supervisor was. At the same time, he describes is less important for the purposes of this article how he saw his work more in terms of field, than how they were shaped by and consequen- given that “the ethos was more in line with tial for the campaign’s internal organizational what I was doing. While the Internet team was dynamics and what peer networks were called more of the hot ticket, being more reactive, upon to do. what we were doing was more about building At the center of many of the dynamics of the capacity and infrastructure” (Michael Silberman, campaign was the unique organizational posi- personal communication, July 28, 2008). tion that the Internet Division occupied. As a Silberman’s comments reveal how different number of staffers described, the Internet Divi- divisions, with divergent goals and with staffers sion assumed tasks that spanned the domains of with varying professional backgrounds, had finance, communications, and field given that contrasting approaches to similar or the same it was organized around a communications tools. Nuxoll was hired as a member of the Kreiss 293

Internet Division but subsequently moved to CONCLUSION Finance. From this vantage point she describes how she navigated divergent genres of e-mail While many scholars see the Dean campaign across divisions that were derived from differ- as the prototypical example of a new, radically ent institutional models, namely organizing for participatory democratic politics, other accounts the field staffers, nonprofit direct mail fundrais- point to the campaign’s complex hybridity ing for the Finance Division, and the MoveOn (Chadwick, 2007). This article demonstrates model for the Internet Division (Kelly Nuxoll, that it was a complicated and often contradic- personal communication, November 19, 2008). tory phenomenon. It was clearly not the purely This spanned the range of the event mobiliza- decentralized, emergent, and self-organized tion pitches of the Field staffers and lengthy, effort that some have celebrated. At the same formal direct mail letters of Finance to the short time, Jett and Välikangas’s (2004, p. 6) argu- paragraphs and action items that the Internet ment that “the Dean for America campaign is team used. like an island of formal organization in a sea of These divisional boundary-spanning activi- autonomous volunteers” does not capture the ties of the Internet staffers, and the lack of clar- complex interactions between the campaign’s ity about reporting among individuals using formal structures and peer networks. The cam- the Internet in other divisions, provided Trippi paign’s Internet Division rather successfully with the opportunity to implement strategy deployed a series of innovative organizational without coordinating with other senior aides or practices and networked artifacts that structured consulting division heads. As Teachout (per- the networked sociality of these volunteers. This sonal communication, July 10, 2008) recounts, work in turn was shaped in accordance with the the Internet Division was a “fifth head,” or perceived demands of an inter-organizational organizational division, that was “at the bleed- environment, political institutions, and internal ing edge of all kinds of things”; for example, conflicts over resources. These peer networks Trippi could make “communication decisions were not wholly autonomous. While volunteers through his very willing foot soldiers on the did take the reins of all sorts of projects, they Internet team, as opposed to through a commu- were in domains far from the substantive pol- nications person who is expressing any kind of icy, strategy, or allocative decisions of the cam- judgment about the nature of messaging.” One paign. The formal organization was shaped by oft-remarked upon detail is that the Internet efforts to guide the work of these networks, staffers all sat outside of Trippi’s door where which often required postbureaucratic work he had easy access to them when he wanted processes that in turn were embedded in more something done. This also helped to ensure stable organizational routines. As noted above, that while their tactics were flexible at times, the production of these networks also served as Downloaded by [UC Berkeley Library] at 15:21 04 January 2018 goals were not, and routines did develop. For a resource in intra-organizational conflicts. example, fundraising was clearly Trippi’s pri- While the Dean campaign is only one case, ority, and the Internet Division was both disci- this study suggests that a more nuanced discus- plined about its pursuit and had a reasonable sion of the relationship between peer networks understanding by the late fall of how much it and formal organizations is necessary for our could garner through each clockwork pitch. understanding of online forms of democratic The success of this online fundraising in turn practice. Scholarship that celebrates peer-to-peer offered a clear set of metrics, in many respects political collaboration often overlooks the fact the most important, through which to ground that online practices of citizenship are still pri- claims for organizational autonomy and help marily realized through formal political organi- ensure influence in the strategy and allocative zations. Citizenship not only continues to be decisions of the campaign. In this sense, the mediated by formal organizational structures, campaign’s use of peer networks for backend but also the artifacts they deploy to connect operations was also conditioned by organiza- individuals to institutions. As the Dean cam- tional dynamics. paign’s interaction with peer networks makes 294 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & POLITICS

clear, even “emergent” forms of collective project, materials that bear directly on this study and do action can over time become formalized, given not violate the privacy of or disclosure agreements with the work of stable organizational forms that subjects will be made publicly available for the purposes concentrate resources, make strategic decisions, of replication upon the completion and publication of this work. In the meantime, the author welcomes all inquiries mobilize activists, and signal to other actors, as to the data presented here. especially journalists and elected officials, their 2. Dean’s presidential Web site, Dean for America, legitimacy in order to accomplish their goals. went online in September of 2002. It had limited function- As this article has argued, formal organizational ality, providing a way to sign-up for e-mails, contact the resources still matter a great deal and convene governor, read about the candidate in the press, and learn and harness peer networks towards ends that about the issues. The contribute link was only added in are very familiar: fundraising, recruitment, and December. Other primary campaigns, including those of Kerry and Edwards, were at a similar stage in the waning mobilization. Indeed, new media political con- months of 2002. sulting companies including Blue State Digital 3. Kerry and Edwards’s Internet staffers had similar and EchoDitto, both of which were founded by professional backgrounds. This suggests that while there alumni of the Dean campaign, help their organi- were a range of established firms that provided Internet zational clients do precisely this. political consulting services during this time period Scholarly discussion of these processes is all (Howard, 2006), new media campaign staffers were not the more necessary given the implications for yet professionalized and were drawn from the commer- cial, nonprofit, and political sectors. A survey of presiden- democratic theory. To date, the types of net- tial primary campaigns during the 2007–2008 cycle worked participation available to citizens through suggests that this changed somewhat, as a number of the formal organizations that mobilize them have campaigns hired prominent figures from the 2004 cycle, received too little attention amid the embrace of especially former Dean staffers, many of whom had what appears to be new forms of politics online. launched their own consulting companies. It is more complicated, and subsequent cam- 4. Trippi’s firm Trippi, McMahon & Squier, handled paigns have extended many practices pioneered the campaign’s media, including television advertisements. by Dean staffers. As the preceding demonstrates, They were roundly criticized for large expenditures in early primary states, which nearly bankrupted the campaign the Dean campaign was open to participation in shortly after the New Hampshire primary (Justice, 2004). some instrumental realms but had no channels for convening a public debate or incorporating sug- gestions with regard to the candidate’s policy REFERENCES platform. As such, the campaign was not deliber- ative nor especially participatory in many con- Agre, P. E. (2002). Real-time politics: The Internet and the texts; rather it largely reflected an extension of political process. The Information Society, 18, 311–331. elite-guided, mediated electoral practices that Andrejevic, M. (2004). Little Brother is watching: were institutionalized in the field during the The Webcam subculture and the digital enclosure. Downloaded by [UC Berkeley Library] at 15:21 04 January 2018 1990s, or by some accounts even much earlier In: N. Couldry & A. McCarthy (Eds.), MediaSpace: (Howard, 2006). That said, the opportunity to Place, scale, and culture in a media age (pp. 193–208). New York: Routledge. partake in the backend of campaign operations to Armstrong, J. (2006, June 29). The journey with Trippi, help Dean get elected in a competitive electoral Dean, and DFA. MyDD. Retrieved December 12, context still inspired thousands of volunteers and 2008, from http://www.mydd.com/story/2006/6/29/ Dean staffers who may not otherwise have partic- 12475/7402. ipated in the political process. Armstrong, J. (2007). How a blogger and the Dean campaign discovered each other. In T. Streeter & Z. Teachout (Eds.), Mousepads, shoe leather, and hope: Lessons from the Howard Dean campaign for NOTES the future of Internet politics (pp. 38–54). Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers. 1. For the data presented here that is drawn from Barry, A. (2000, September). Making the active scientific publicly available sources, full citations and URLs, where citizen. Paper presented at the 4S/EASST conference, appropriate, are provided for all material quoted and refer- “Technoscience, Citizenship and Culture,” University enced in text. As this article is a piece of a larger research of Vienna, Austria. Retrieved December 12, 2008, Kreiss 295

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APPENDIX Sample Meetup Agenda (Dean for America, 2003)

HOST GUIDE: JUNE DEAN MEETUP

June Meetup Goals Excite people to do the following . . .

1. Help Dean reach 100,000 members in the 5 days after the Meetup by taking home sign-up sheets and asking others to join the Dean’s List. 2. Schedule local events for Dean supporters with the new features on DeanForAmerica.com (available Monday, May 26). 3. Schedule fundraising house parties during June to strengthen our numbers before the June 30th FEC filing deadline.

Suggested Agenda

1. Hand a sign-in sheet to everyone who walks through the door—and recruit helpers! During your remarks to the group, explain that Dean cannot contact his supporters or interested indi- viduals without these names. Registering for Meetup does not automatically sign you up for Dean emails. 2. Introductions a. Introduce Yourself: Why are you working to elect Dean? b. Explain how this campaign is different . . . Importance of grassroots activities such as the Meetups. Remind the group that thousands of voters are attending hundreds of Meetups at the same time across the country. c. Briefly introduce above goals (1 minute or less) d. If your Meetup is small enough, ask others why they support Dean (10-15 min.). If your Meetup is large, you’ll probably want to skip this step. 3. Play a Howard Dean video if possible, or read the welcome message from Governor Dean, which will be available at www.deanforamerica.com/meetuphosts. Downloaded by [UC Berkeley Library] at 15:21 04 January 2018 4. Explain the three different actions that we’re asking everyone to take: a. Take-home signup sheets: Distribute the take-home signup sheets (available as a down- load) to allow people to signup others who want to get involved. Meetup members can help double Dean’s email list by sending the forms back to the campaign as soon as possi- ble. Please be sure to ask people’s permission before you add them to the list. b. Local Dean events: This week, we’re launching a web page that will allow individuals to schedule local organizing events and sign-up directly on the DFA website. Anyone can plan a Dean event and invite other to join. We can’t miss an opportunity to spread the word and recruit new supporters at parades, fairs and other public events. Please encour- age everyone to vsit [sic] www.deanforamerica.com and start using these new tools! c. House party fundraisers: Join or schedule a house party fundraiser before the June 30 FEC filing deadline. www.deanforamerica.com