Daf Ditty Eruvin 63: /Disciple Responsibilities

Sweet are the uses of adversity, Which like the toad, ugly and venomous? Wears yet a precious jewel in his head; And this is our life, exempt from public haunt, Finds tongues in trees, books in the running brooks, Sermons in stones, and good in everything

William Shakespeare (As You Like It, Act II, 1.14-1)

Elazar Kalman Tiefenbrun

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….what is the concerning whether or not a disciple may rule about these matters in his teacher’s place of jurisdiction? said to him: Yosef said as follows: Even when Rav Ḥisda was asked about the permissibility of cooking an egg in kutaḥ throughout the years of ’s life, he refused to issue a ruling.

Rav issued halakhic rulings in the town of Ḥarta De’argez during the years of Rav Ḥisda’s life, even though Rav Ḥisda was his teacher.

The Gemara relates that Ravina once examined a slaughterer’s knife in to check if it was fit for slaughtering, during the lifetime of his teacher, , who also lived in Babylonia. Rav Ashi said to him: What is the reason that the Master acted in this manner? Isn’t it prohibited for a disciple to issue rulings while his teacher is still alive?

Ravina said to him: Didn’t Rav Hamnuna issue halakhic rulings in Ḥarta De’argez during the years of Rav Ḥisda’s life, as they were not in the same town, even though they were both located in Babylonia? Since I do not live in the same town as you, it stands to reason that I would be permitted to issue rulings as well. Rav Ashi said to Ravina: It was actually stated that Rav Hamnuna did not issue halakhic rulings during Rav Ḥisda’s lifetime, and that is the correct tradition.

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Ravina said to Rav Ashi: In fact, it was stated that Rav Hamnuna issued rulings, and it was also stated that he did not issue rulings, and both traditions are correct. During the years of the life of Rav Huna, Rav Hamnuna’s principal teacher, Rav Hamnuna did not issue rulings at all, but he did issue rulings during the years of Rav Ḥisda’s life, for Rav Hamnuna was Rav Ḥisda’s disciple-colleague. And since I, too, am the master’s disciple and colleague, I should also be permitted to examine a slaughterer’s knife when I am not in the same town.

4 said: A scholar may examine a knife for himself and use it for slaughtering, without having to show it to the local Sage. The Gemara relates that Ravina happened to come to Mehoza, the hometown of Rava. His host brought out a knife for slaughtering and showed it to him. He said to him: Go, bring it to Rava, the town Sage, for examination.

Paskening in front of his Rebbe: one in מלת י ד Our daf begins by continuing the discussing of a was alive in another שא י ר ב city, while his Rebbe בר י אנ רס כס י אנ לבבב – checked Ravina חש י ט ה knives he justified doing so, based on the fact that he was a , שא י בר city. When taken to task by his Rebbe who was , מה נ ו נ א בר s equal in scholarship. He cited‘ שא י בר he had become - שא י ר ב of רבח מלת י דימת ב .and would not rule - even in another city - during the lifetime of his Rebbe , וה אנ בר of מלת י ד first a ,However . וה אנ בר of מלת י ד who was also a , אדסח בר of מלת י ד he became a וה אנ בר After the passing of ח אדס בר while his Rebbe גראד ז אתרח he DID Pasken in אדסח בר of רבח מלת י ד was a מה נ ו נ א בר since was alive. may inspect a knife for his personal use. However, if he is paying for the meat, he may not מלת י ד A המ ג ר ו נ י א עלא ז ר ' ,may generally inspect a knife for his own use מלת י ד inspect the knife. Even though a either because they had already started - בקעי רב אחא בר was punished for doing so in the city of ר to discuss whether to show it to him, and it is therefore disrespectful not to show it to him - or significantly older and greater than everybody else, and – גלפומ was a בר י בקע רב אחא because . בכ ו ד therefore deserving of extra

Rava:

5 even in front of רתומ it is, רוסיא If the purpose of Paskening is to stop somebody from violating an לכ םוקמ שיש וב לוליח 'ה יא ן יקלוח ן דובכ – ;that in such cases we say בר י אנ explained to שא י ר ב .a Rebbe to a בכ ו ד we are not concerned with showing proper', ה לוליח When there is a possibility of ברל ר Rebbe.

Issuing a psak in his teacher’s vicinity1

The Gemara continues its discussion of issuing a psak in the vicinity of one’s teacher, specifically regarding the custom of bring a slaughter knife to the for inspection.

Rava ruled: A student may issue a ruling in his teacher’s vicinity to prevent another from sinning.

1 https://www.dafdigest.org/masechtos/Eruvin/Eruvin%20063.pdf

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Rava stated: If a student issues a ruling in his teacher’s presence, he is liable to . If he issues a ruling when not in his teacher’s presence, he has violated a prohibition but is not liable to death. Rava’s statement is unsuccessfully challenged. The severity of this prohibition is expressed in a number of different ways.

The Gemara also presents the consequences for ruling in one’s teacher’s presence. Two reasons are presented to explain why Yehoshua died without children. The discussion concludes with the topic of the restriction against inhibiting marital relations.

Our Daf begins a discussion of the prohibition against issuing a halachic ruling in front of one’s Rebbi. ( )

Shulchan Aruch codifies this halachah but notes that there is a difference whether one is a full- .( רבח מלת י ד ) fledged student of one’s Rebbi or whether one is a student who is also a colleague

He also draws a distinction whether one is in the actual vicinity of his Rebbi when he issued the ruling or not.

Shvus Yaakov, in a responsa to a rov who had quickly declared an animal to be , criticized the rov for issuing his ruling without first researching the matter in halachic works even though the matter seemed obvious to him.

Since the Torah expresses concern about people’s money, he should have been more hesitant to issue a ruling that would cost people money. Additionally, warned against issuing a halachic ruling in the presence of one’s Rebbi and in our times that applies to sefarim which stand in the place of our rebbeim.

Sefer Yosef Ometz references these comments of Shvus Yaakov and then adds the statement of R’ Yehonasan Eibishutz who wrote that whenever a question is not יתוא תו – ”absolutely clear he is careful to research the matter inside since “letters make one wise .and it is essential nowadays since people have such a strong tendency to forget כחמ י מ ו ת ח

Yosef Ometz then adds that if R’ Eibishutz was careful to look at the halachah inside before issuing a ruling and he was well known for his phenomenal memory, certainly the rest of us should take note and be particular to research question before responding to halachic questions.

Aruch HaShulchan however, disagrees with the assertion that one must consult sefarim before issuing a ruling in the same manner that one must consult his Rebbi. Issuing a ruling in the presence of one’s Rebbi is a sign of disrespect but has nothing to do with the concern that one may have forgotten the halachah. Therefore, since ruling without

7 consulting one’s sefarim will not be a sign of disrespect there is no obligation to do so if one knows the halachah.

Showing Respect for a Teacher in His Presence

Steinzaltz (OBM) writes:2

On the previous daf the Gemara set down a rule that we always follow the teachings of Eliezer ben Yaakov. This rule leads to a discussion that focuses on whether a student is permitted to make a decision that follows Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov without deferring to his teacher. Generally speaking, a student was not permitted to issue rulings on issues of halakha in the presence – or place – of his teacher, a tradition that stemmed from a concern for the teacher’s honor. Some argue that ruling in the place of one’s teacher is tantamount to a rebellion again the

2 https://steinsaltz.org/daf/eiruvin63/

8 king – mored be-malkhut – which would mean that even were the student to receive permission, it would be forbidden for him to rule.

An example of a tradition that exemplifies this concern is that the shohet, the ritual slaughterer, would give his knife to the Rabbi of the community to check, even if he himself was a learned and knowledgeable person. The Gemara tells of a group of in Yaakov’s city who, while preparing a calf for slaughter, argued among themselves whether it was necessary to show the knife to Rav Aha bar Yaakov.

Rav Abba bar Tahalifa said to them: Should we not be concerned with the respect of the Elder, Rav Aha bar Ya’akov, and present the knife to him for inspection, as this is his town? Rabbi Elazar from Hagronya said to them: That is unnecessary, since Rava said as follows: A Torah scholar may examine a knife for himself. Rabbi Elazar from Hagronya then inspected the knife, but he was later punished at the hand of Heaven for disregarding the honor of the senior rabbi.

The Gemara expresses surprise: What was Rabbi Elazar from Hagronya’s mistake? Didn’t Rava say: A Torah scholar may examine a slaughtering knife for himself? The Gemara answers: It was different there, as they had already begun to discuss the issue of the honor of Rav Aha bar Ya’akov. Had the name of Rav Aha bar Ya’akov never arisen, they would have been permitted to examine the knife themselves. Once his name had been mentioned, however, they should have approached him with the knife. Their failure to do so is considered a display of disrespect.

And if you wish, say instead: Rav Aha bar Ya’akov is different, as he was illustrious in age and wisdom, and thus deserved more honor than a regular Sage.

Rav Aha bar Yaakov was a second generation Babylonian amora who lived long enough to interact with Abaye and Rava, who were fourth century . He was well known for his piety and for miracles that took place on his behalf. His students included Rav Papa and his nephew Rav Aha the son of Rav Ika.

Rabbi Jay Gelman writes:3

The teacher/student relationship is a most special one. A teacher must treat his student as he would treat his own child, and a child must relate to his teacher as a parent. The even rules that one must return the lost object of one’s teacher before that of a parent, for “a parent brings you into this world, whereas a teacher brings you to the World to Come”1 (Bava Metzia, 33a).

One of the ways in which a student must show respect to a teacher is not to issue rulings on matters of Jewish law in that teacher’s presence (our daf). In fact, the primary purpose of semicha today is to allow a student to issue rulings—provided he does not do so in the presence of his teacher (hence the term

3 https://www.torahinmotion.org/discussions-and-blogs/eiruvin-63a-may-we-debate

9 for semicha, heter hora’ah, which translates literally as permission to issue rulings2. This prohibition is taken extremely seriously by the Talmud, which ascribes the deaths of Nadav and Avihu to the fact that they issued a ruling in the presence of their uncle, Moshe Rabbeinu.

Even when there is good reason for such rulings, one must exercise great caution. Our Sages note that, “one who comes to anger will come to mistake”. This statement is made three times in reference to Moshe—and is the reason given as to why the laws of kashering utensils were told to Elazar (the younger brother of Nadav and Avihu) to relay to the Jewish people. Moshe, who had just expressed anger, could not be trusted with such an important mission (see Bamidbar 31:13-25). Elazar, sensitive to his Rebbe, actually noted that G-d told the laws to Moshe—and that he, Elazar, was just a messenger—yet, the Talmud says that he was “lowered from his high position” for doing so. The Torah records that “before Elazar the shall he (Joshua) stand, who shall inquire of him of the judgment” (Bamidbar 27:21). Yet Joshua had no need ever to inquire of him on matters of Jewish law. While Elazar was obligated to teach these laws, he should have only done so when not in the presence of Moshe (see Torah Temimah, ibid).

Joshua, too, may have violated this principle, as the Talmud quotes a (contested) opinion that the reason Joshua did not have any children was that he told Moshe to prevent Eldad and Meidad—about whom we will read this week—from prophesying in the camp (Bamidbar 11:28). Even when looking out for the honour of one’s teacher, one must be extremely careful.

Notwithstanding the respect because one’s teacher, the search for truth is even more important. Based on the verse in Proverbs that “there is no wisdom, and no understanding, and no advice against G-d” (21:30), our Sages teach that, “whenever there is a desecration of G-d’s name, we do not show honour to the teacher”. Thus, if a student sees one doing something wrong and his teacher does not respond, the student should do so.

The demand to refrain from expressing one’s opinion in the presence of one’s teacher is one that might strike many as odd. However, such was never meant to stifle debate; students are encouraged to question that which they hear. They may even present arguments and proofs against the position of their teachers. It is offering rulings independently that concerned our Sages—and this prohibition applies even if the rulings are in full agreement with those of one’s teacher.

More striking is the halacha that a child must not even assert that his parents are correct, because such a statement implies that there is a possibility that they are not. We (at least I do) live in a culture that values the exchange of ideas, that encourages children and students to think independently, even (I would say, especially) if they disagree with their mentors. What constitutes respect can and does change from generation to generation, so that while debating with a parent may have been considered disrespectful in the past, that may no longer be the case. And even if one were to argue that such laws are fixed, Jewish law notes that parents or teachers may renounce their claims to the honors due them.

What is most important is that we show the utmost respect to our mentors. The exact form that might take is one that requires sensitivity to one’s time and place, and to the personality of those involved.

10 R. Abby Sosland writes:4

When my father, Rabbi Henry Sosland, was alive, I would defer to him if anyone asked a question about Jewish practice in our presence. If it was a difficult question, it would have been the height of arrogance to start pontificating in front of my father. But what if someone asked a simple question, like whether it’s permitted to eat a ham sandwich. Would it have been a show of disrespect for me to answer?

That’s the question that gets addressed on our daf. One of the worst social crimes in rabbinic culture was the appearance of arrogance in front of one’s teacher. For the rabbis, this principle banned actions like issuing rulings on complex issues in Jewish law in the teacher’s presence. But even on simple questions of Jewish law, the rabbis were cautious about answering if their teacher was around.

Rav Yosef said to Abaye: Even when Rav Ḥisda was asked about the permissibility of cooking an egg in kutaḥ, a dairy dish, throughout the years of Rav Huna’s life, he refused to issue a ruling. Rav Ḥisda was a disciple of Rav Huna, and a disciple may not issue a ruling in his teacher’s place of jurisdiction about even the simplest of matters.

According to the Gemara, even though Rav Hisda was asked a simple question, he declined to answer while his teacher, Rav Huna, was alive. Ruling on an obvious point of Jewish law was considered an insult. But even this practice has its limits.

Our Daf continues:

Rav Ḥisda nonetheless issued halakhic rulings in the town of Kafri during the years of Rav Huna’s life, as he was not actually in his teacher’s place.

Being respectful in Rav Huna’s presence was essential. But it was apparently okay for Rav Hisda to teach far from Rav Huna’s home even while he was alive.

In the midst of its discussion on boundaries, the Talmud turns to focus on boundaries that are essential in human interactions. It might be hard to imagine a person of great intellect staying quiet on something he knows. We might picture the rabbis debating one another with bluster and grand displays of knowledge. But perhaps they needed to be reminded that keeping one’s expertise to oneself was actually a way to demonstrate an even more important trait: humility in the presence of one’s teacher. And there was nothing quite as impressive as that.

4 Myjewishlearning.com

11 A Matter of Life and Death (?)

Rabbi Jesse Paikin writes:5

“A teacher wields much more power than a doctor,” one of my teachers once told me. “A doctor only holds one life in their hands at a time. A teacher can impact the lives of hundreds in a single moment.”

I often think about the truth of this little aphorism. And yet, considering the occupations we reward most in terms of salary and status, how true is it actually? Who gets to board airplanes first or walk down red carpets? How should we understand the place teachers occupy in our society? And what kind of respect and deference should they be afforded?

We’ve been examining these questions since yesterday as the Gemara focuses on the teacher- student relationship. We’ve seen the Talmud’s insistence that a student cannot issue halakhic rulings while in the presence of their teacher. And today's daf makes this rule, quite literally, a matter of life and death.

Rava said: With regard to one who issues a halakhic ruling in his teacher’s actual presence, the disciple is prohibited to issue such a ruling, and if he does so, he is liable to receive the death penalty. However, when he is not in his actual presence, the disciple is still prohibited to issue the ruling, but he is not liable to receive the death penalty.

According to Rava, a student who issues a halakhic ruling in the presence of his teacher is deserving of death. And if that isn’t surprising enough, the Gemara goes on to relate a story that further emphasizes this point.

Rabbi Eliezer had a certain disciple who issued a halakhic ruling in his presence. Rabbi Eliezer said to his wife, Imma Shalom: “I will be surprised if this one completes his year,” i.e., if he lives until the end of the year. And so it was, he did not complete his year.

His wife said to him: “Are you a prophet?” He said to her: “I am not a prophet, nor the son of a prophet, but I have received the following tradition: Anyone who issues a halakhic ruling in his teacher’s presence is liable to receive the death penalty.”

This is an understandably shocking story. No matter how much we wish to valorize teachers, we would be hard-pressed to advocate enforcing respect out of fear of death. So, what can we take from this story?

It’s worth recalling that while the Talmud discusses many cases where the death penalty is to be applied, the rabbis were considerably wary of wielding such awesome power and essentially legislated capital punishment out of existence.

5 Myjewishlearning.com

12 We even catch a glimpse of this hesitation in the words of Imma Shalom, whose shock at her husband’s declaration suggests an understanding that deciding matters of life and death should be out of human hands. Imma Shalom (whose name means “Mother of Peace”) is one of the few women quoted by name in the Talmud, so her rebuke stands out all the more. For the most part, the death penalty here can be understood as carrying rhetorical, not legal weight.

So why the appeal to such an out-of-reach idea?

In rabbinic culture, learning was not just a matter of practical importance, but carried deep spiritual significance as well. Consider how often the Torah is referred to as an etz chaim, a tree of life. The power to issue halakhic rulings was not just a matter of practical legal authority, but an honor bearing the weight of a life-giving tradition.

To overstep one’s bounds vis a vis one’s teacher, then, can be seen as a kind of spiritual murder, the stealing of a teacher’s vitality -- and maybe even their livelihood. Rhetorically speaking, the punishment fits the crime.

Our daf reminds us of the great responsibility carried by teachers and invites us to consider the degree to which we should recognize that.

"MOREH HALACHAH BIFNEI RABO"6

Rava states that a student who pronounces a Halachic ruling (on an issue that is not straightforward) in the presence of his Rebbi ("Moreh Halachah Bifnei Rabo") is Chayav Misah. If his mentor is not present, it is forbidden, but the student is not Chayav Misah.

6 https://dafyomi.co.il/eruvin/insites/ev-dt-063.htm

13 The Gemara implies that "Lo b'Fanav," not in front of his mentor, means that the Talmid is more than three Parsa'os (twelve Mil) away from his mentor, and yet he is still forbidden to issue a Halachic ruling.

How is Rava's ruling to be reconciled with the our daf that says that ruled in Kafri in the days of Rav Huna, his mentor, and Rav Hamnuna ruled in Charta d'Argaz in the days of Rav Chisda, his mentor? If one is forbidden to be Moreh Halachah even when not in front of his mentor, then why did they do so?

TOSFOS (DH Rav Chisda) answers that Rav Chisda was a Talmid Chaver of Rav Huna, and Rav Hamnuna was a Talmid Chaver of Rav Chisda, and that is why they were permitted to be Moreh Halachah when they were not in front of their mentors. In front of one's mentor, though, it is forbidden even for a Talmid Chaver to be Moreh Halachah.

1. According to Tosfos (62b, DH Rav Chisda) and the Rosh, this means that the Talmid is farther than three Parsa'os (which was the size of the encampment of the in the wilderness) away from his Rebbi. According to the Rashba and Ran, this refers only to a Talmid who renders a decision within three Parsa'os of one's Rebbi (but if he is farther than three Parsa'os from his Rebbi it is Mutar for a Talmid to render Halachic decisions even if he is not a Talmid Chaver…

2. This is the opinion of Tosfos (DH Rav Chisda), based on the Gemara which says that Rav Chisda was allowed to render Halachic decisions in Kafri, for he was not in the place of his Rebbi, Rav Huna (who was in Pumpedisa) -- even though Rav Chisda was a Talmid Chaver of Rav Huna. However, the Rambam (Hilchos Talmud Torah 5:9) seems to say that a Talmid Chaver may render Halachic decisions even in the same town as his Rebbi.

3. This is clear from the Gemara which says that Rav Chisda and Rav Hamnuna rendered Halachic decisions when they were not in the same town as their Rebbi; apparently each was a Talmid Chaver of the other for otherwise it would have been Asur for them to pass decisions even when not in the presence of their Rebbi (Tosfos, DH Rav Chisda; however

14 other dispute Tosfos' conclusion and suggest a different explanation for why Rav Chisda was permitted to render Halachic decisions in a place other than his Rebbi's;

TOSFOS in (5b, DH Ela Im Ken) answers that a student is permitted to issue a Halachic ruling while not in the presence of his mentor when he is more than three Parsa'os away, but only on condition that he has permission from his mentor to do so.

When the Gemara here says that it is forbidden even not in the presence of his mentor, it refers to when the student does not have permission from his mentor.

RAMBAM answers that one is forbidden to issue Halachic rulings even not in the presence of his mentor only when he regularly does so. A student is permitted, though, to issue occasional rulings when he is not in the presence of his mentor.

If the distance between one and his master be twelve miles, and a man asked him a question, he is permitted to answer it. To separate one from committing a forbidden act, one may decide even in the presence of his master. For instance?

Suppose he saw a man doing something which is really forbidden, because he did not know that it is forbidden, or because of his wickedness, he has authority to prevent him from doing it, and say to him: "This act is forbidden," even in the presence of his master, and even though his master did not give him the authority to act, for wherever there is a likelihood that the Name would be blasphemed, no honor is meted out to a master.

Whereat are these words said? Only in matters which come to pass incidentally, but for one to establish himself for the purpose of rendering decisions, and to sit in a master's chair and render decisions to everyone who may ask of him, even though he be in one end of the world and his master be in the other end of the world, it is forbidden to do so prior to his master's demise, unless he obtained authority from his master. But not everyone whose master died may occupy a master's seat and teach the Torah, save if he be a disciple who attained judicial rank.

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RAMBAM (Hilchos Talmud Torah 5:3

RASHBA and RAN explain that when the Gemara says that "she'Lo b'Fanav" is forbidden, it means that the student is within three Parsa'os but not directly in front of his mentor. If he is more than three Parsa'os away, then even a lowly student is permitted to issue Halachic rulings.

Halacha

Yoreh Deah 242

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RAMBAM Hil Talmud Torah 5:1

Even as a man is under command to honor his father and fear him, so is he obliged to honor his master, but fear him yet more than his father; his father brought him to life upon this world but his master who taught him wisdom, brings him to life in the world to come. If he chances upon a lost article of his father and a lost article of his master, reclaiming that of his master precedes the one of his father.

If his father and his master are burdened with a load, he should unburden the load of his master first and then that of his father. If his father and his master be incarcerated in a prison, he should free the master first and afterward free his father. If his father was a disciple of the wise, he should free his father first. Likewise, if his father be a disciple of the wise, even though not weighty alongside his master, he should reclaim the lost article of his father first and after that reclaim the lost article of his master. There is no honor greater than the honor due a master, nor awe greater than the awe due a master.

The sages said: "The awe of thy master is likened to the awe of Him Who is in heaven." (Pirke Abot, 4.15). They have, therefore, said: "He who differs with his master is likened unto one who differs with the Shekinah, even as it is said: 'When they strove against God'" (Num. 26.9; Sanhedrin, 110a).

17 Whosoever strives with his master is like unto one who strives against the Shekinah, even as it is said: "Where the children of Israel strove with the Lord and He was sanctified in them" (Ibid. 20.13); and whosoever murmurs against his master is like unto one who murmurs against the Lord, even as it is said: "Your murmurs are not against us, but against the Lord" (Ex. 16.8); and whosoever has suspicious thoughts against his master is like unto one who has suspicious thoughts against the Shekinah, as it is said: "And the people spoke against God and against Moses" (Num. 25).

Who is considered differing from his master? It is he who establishes by himself a school and settles down to preach and instruct without having authority from his master to do so, and his master is living, even though in another state. It is even forbidden to render a decision in the presence of one's master, and whosoever renders a decision in the presence of his master is guilty of an offense punishable by death.

Any talmid who establishes an independent 'house of study' or beit din in the vicinity of his Rebbi is considered 'quarreling with and attacking' his Rebbi. This behavior is tantamount to rebelling against the Shekhina (as and his constituents did). Learning Torah demands that we appreciate our study as part of the unfurling Masorah. It cannot be approached in a vacuum as an independent course of study. The value we place in our Rabei'im stems from our recognition of the vitality of our Masorah within our learning, and we honor a Rebbi as the transmitter of that Masorah. One who subverts his Rebbi is indeed attacking the Shekhina, for he has lost sight of the importance of Masorah and no longer can trace himself to Sinai.

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The Prohibition of Issuing a Verdict in the Vicinity of a Rebbi

Rav Moshe Taragin writes:7

The gemara in Sanhedrin (5a) discusses the various parameters governing the issuance of halakhic pesak (rulings or verdicts). One such stipulation pertains to the proximity of a to his Rebbi. According to the gemara it is Biblically prohibited for a talmid to issue pesak in the vicinity of his Rebbi. This article will explore the scope and logic of this prohibition.

The simplest approach toward understanding this halakha would be to base it upon the honor and kavod due to a Rebbi. The gemara in Pesachim (108a) declares that a student must fear his Rebbi just as he fears Heaven and the Rambam (Talmud Torah chapter 5) draws the inevitable conclusions: One may not sit in his seat, call him by his first name etc. Clearly, stripping him of the service of issuing pesak would entail the greatest indignity.

Our Daf however, suggests a slightly different understanding of this halakha. The gemara refers to the conduct of preempting one's Rebbi as 'Afkirusa' - which might be loosely translated as 'irreverence' or 'brazen contempt'. (ibid.) interprets the term as 'Chutzpah'.

This term might reflect a different understanding of this issur. A student who arrogates to himself the duty of issuing pesak without utilizing the resources of his Rebbi (which are easily at hand) is arrogant and overconfident.

Aside from the insult to his Rebbi, he is presumptuous about his own ability to tackle the halakhic question at hand. Said slightly differently, he insults the Torah by assuming this heavy responsibility without exploiting the wisdom and experience of others. To him Halakha is a 'light' matter which can be decided upon effortlessly and quickly.

We have suggested two different perspectives on the prohibition of issuing a pesak in the presence of a Rebbi. One version locates the issur in the insult or affront caused to the Rebbi whose opinion was not sought. Alternatively, the issur might reflect an inner haughtiness or even a carelessness with regard to halakha.

Several different halakhic consequences might stem from this fundamental difference of perspective. In this respect the ruling of the Pitchei Teshuva (Yoreh De'ah 242:1) is revealing. He cites in the name of the Shevut Ya'akov that in contemporary times, a posek who does not sufficiently research his position using the necessary sefarim is guilty of this prohibition. Obviously, the prohibition (thus extended) cannot possibly reflect an insult to the Rebbi's honor

7 https://www.etzion.org.il/en/prohibition-issuing-verdict-vicinity-rebbi

19 (there is no particular Rebbi being insulted!). Evidently, according to the Shevut Ya'akov, the issur entails a personal arrogance in reaching a pesak irresponsibly.

A second manifestation of this question might be the status of the prohibition if the Rebbi licenses the talmid to issue pesak. in Sanhedrin (5b) assume that such authorization would eliminate any prohibition. The Chidushei ha-Ran agrees but cites the dissenting opinion of Rabeinu Dovid (a talmid of the Ramban) who maintains that the prohibition applies even if the Rebbi has waived his concern and been 'mochel' on his kavod. The Chidushei ha-Ran justifies his own position by claiming "since the entire prohibition is meant to honor the Rebbi, he is able to forgo this honor just as he is able to waive his honor in other areas (by allowing students not to stand etc.)." Might the Rabeinu Dovid have disputed this basic assumption and claimed that the concern of personal arrogance underlies this halakha and, hence, even if the Rebbi is disinterested in his honor, the prohibition still applies?!

A third manifestation might pertain to the type of question the pesak is answering.

תופסות ה"ד בר אדסח ירוא ירפכב ינשב ברד וה אנו ר יש יפב ראאס רהדתפו

(Tosfos permits only a Talmid Chaver, even not in front of his Rebbi.)

שרפמדכ וקה סרטנ אלש היה םש ומוקמ לש בר וה אנ ו פב דבמו אתי התיה ומוקמ התיה אתי דבמו פב ו אנ וה בר לש ומוקמ םש היה אלש סרטנ וקה שרפמדכ

Explanation: This is like Rashi explained. [Kafri] was not Rav Huna's place, and Pumbedisa was his place.

'צו ל' דימלתד רבח ברד וה אנ הוה ומכ בר נמה ו אנ ירואד אתרחב זגראד ינשב ברד אדסח שרפמד ךומסב םושמ םושמ ךומסב שרפמד אדסח ברד ינשב זגראד אתרחב ירואד אנ ו נמה בר ומכ הוה אנ וה ברד רבח דימלתד ל' 'צו מלתד י ד רבח ד י ל י ה ה י היה היליד רח דימת

We must say that he was a Talmid Chaver of Rav Huna, just like Rav Hamnuna, who ruled in Charta of Argaz in the years of Rav Chisda. It explains below that this was [permitted] because he was Talmid Chaver of him;

לבא דימלת רומג ןיא לוכי תורוהל וליפא אלש םוקמב היבר ירמאדכ ןנ נשב י ברד וה אנ אל ירוא בר נמה ו אנ אנ ו נמה בר ירוא אל אנ וה ברד י נשב ןנ ירמאדכ היבר םוקמב אלש וליפא תורוהל לוכי ןיא רומג דימלת לבא אתרחב גראד ז 'עא פ' היהש ומוקמ לש ר ב ה ו נ א ב פ ו מ ב ד י אתידבמופב אנוה בר ל

However, a full Talmid may not rule even not in the place of his Rebbi, like we say that in the years of Rav Huna, Rav Hamnuna did not rule in Charta of Argaz, even though Rav Huna's place was Pumbedisa.

NOTE: The Gemara did not say so explicitly, but it says that Rav Hamnuna ruled in Charta in the days of Rav Chisda. Had he done so even in the days of Rav Huna, it should have taught this bigger ! Rav Hamnuna was already an "Adam Gadol" in Rav Huna's lifetime (Kidushin 29b). Tosfos infers that he did not rule at all in Rav Huna's lifetime, for he was a full Talmid.

20 וליפאו קוחר נממ ו שלש תואסרפ וא וליפא יפט רוסא יאו נ ו יח בי התימ בי יח ו נ יאו רוסא יפט וליפא וא תואסרפ שלש ו נממ קוחר וליפאו

Pesak: Even if he is three Parsa'os away, or even more, it is forbidden, but he is not Chayav Misah;

ךירפד הלע ותואמ דימלת יחתנש בי התימ לע הרוהש קוחרב שלש תואסרפ 'רמ א' לבא םא אל יחתנ בי התימ אל אל התימ בי יחתנ אל םא לבא א' 'רמ תואסרפ שלש קוחרב הרוהש לע התימ בי יחתנש דימלת ותואמ הלע ךירפד הוה אישק ידימ וליפא אכיא ארוסיא היתלימב ארוסיא אכיא וליפא ידימ אישק הוה

We ask about the Talmid who was Chayav Misah for ruling three Parsa'os away from R. Eliezer. However, had he not been Chayav Misah, it would not be difficult at all, even if there is an Isur in the matter.

יברו אנ רסד יכס אנ לבבב עמשמ היהש קוחר הברה ברמ ישא היהו רוסא םש םא היה ודימלת רומג וכ ' כרמ דמתההם שרס יו ש ר בהקח ישעש בבא כ ס ניר

Ravina checked [his own] knife in Bavel. It connotes that he was very far from Rav Ashi, and it would have been forbidden if he were a full Talmid...

אהו ירמאד נ ן 'פב ק' ירדהנסד ן ףד( :ה ) םוחנת הירב 'רד ימא עלקיא ארתאל שרד והל רתומ תותלל יטח ן חספב ט ול

It says in Sanhedrin (5b) that Tanchum the son of R. Ami came to a place and expounded that Lesisah of wheat (to wet it and immediately grind it) is permitted during Pesach;

ורמא היל ואל 'ר ינמ ןמד רוצ אכיא אכה אנתו דימלת אל י הרו הכלה םוקמב ובר 'אא כ' קוחר נממ ו שלש שלש ו נממ קוחר כ' 'אא ובר םוקמב הכלה הרו י אל דימלת אנתו אכה אכיא רוצ ןמד ינמ 'ר ואל היל ורמא . תואסרפ כ נ דג הנחמ לארשי הח גנכ תאר

They told him that [his Rebbi] R. Mani of Tzur is here, and a Beraisa teaches that a Talmid may not teach Halachah in the place of his Rebbi unless he is three Parsa'os away, corresponding to the length of the encampment of Yisrael [in the Midbar]!

ךירצ רמול דימלתד רבח הוה 'שמו ה' ץוח גל ' תואסרפ ירש תואסרפ ' גל ץוח ה' 'שמו הוה רבח דימלתד רמול ךירצ

Answer: We must say that he was a Talmid Chaver, and therefore it is permitted three Parsa'os away.

אהו ירמאד נ ן נפב י ו רוסא יחו בי התימ לכ ךות שלש תואסרפ בישח נפב י וינבבש וספששךתל תמב ח רס וינב רא ה

We say that in front of him is forbidden, and he is Chayav Misah. Anywhere within three Parsa'os is considered in front of him;

עמשמדכ ותואב דימלת הרוהש נפל י 'ר א' םאד היה ךות שלש תואסרפ ידב ן היה יח בי התימ אמתסמו ימנ אל אל ימנ אמתסמו התימ בי יח היה ן ידב תואסרפ שלש ךות היה םאד א' 'ר י נפל הרוהש דימלת ותואב עמשמדכ פב נ י ו שממ היה שמ וינפ

21 The episode with the Talmid who ruled in front of R. Eliezer connotes like this. If he was within three Parsa'os, he was properly Chayav Misah. Presumably, he was not literally in front of him. (He would not be so brazen to rule literally in front of him.)

ןכו ינב ןרהא אמתסמ אל ורוה ינפב השמ שממ רקיעו רועיש ןנירמגד שלש תואסרפ דגנכ הנחמ לארשי ינבמיב אש הח גכתאר ל ןימדרעשריושמהמ נב רהא מס ןה יב כ ןרהא ןנירמג הל םתהו יבייח ימ הת ה ו ווה ה

Also, Aaron’s sons, presumably, they did not rule literally in front of Moshe. The primary Shiur that we learn three Parsa'os corresponding to Machaneh Yisrael we learn from Bnei Aharon, and there they were Chayav Misah.

רמואו 'ר ' י וד אקו רבדב הארנש שודיח לאושל וליפאו אתעיב אחתוכב תלגמו נעת תי יכב יאה ג ו ו אנ יא יריי נווג יה כ ינתתגו חובאעב לפו אש וי

Pesak (Ri): We discuss only a matter that appears to be a Chidush to the questioner, and even an egg with Kutach, and Megilas Ta'anis;

אלו יטקנ והנ אלא יעומשאל נ ן וליפאד נהב י דימלתהש ומצעב י עדו וניאש העוט רוסא תורוהל רוסא העוט וניאש

They were mentioned only to teach that even regarding these, that the Talmid himself knows that he does not err, it is forbidden to rule.

לבא רבד ושהש לא י עדו עודיש וגהנמ לש רבד הז וגכ ן נ ןתו םעט םגפל יכו אצו וב הרומשכד ול רתיה ןיא המוד ול להו רבד יח ד שו ירש שו ד יח רבד

Tosafot in our daf Eiruvin (62b) claim that the prohibition only applies if the pesak contains some new or novel element (a chidush). If, however, the pesak merely restates common knowledge it may even be offered in the presence of a Rebbi. Possibly, Tosafot in Eiruvin view this prohibition as stemming from the concern of personal arrogance. Answering a simple question (which we sometimes refer to as a "no brainer") does not indicate arrogance. If, however, halakha forces a talmid to exhibit discretion in deference to his Rebbi we might not differentiate between levels of difficulty.

The Torat Chayim (Rav Avraham Chayim Schorr - a 19th century Talmudic commentator) draws a similar distinction to Tosafot in Eiruvin. Commenting upon a Tosafot in Sanhedrin (21a) he claims that the prohibition might not be relevant at all in monetary cases but be applicable only with regard to pesak dealing with issurim.

This distinction as well might reflect the essence of the halakha. If the halakha arises out of concern for the Rebbi such differences regarding the type of question posed might be difficult to defend. The Rebbi's insult would be commensurate in monetary cases.

22 Yet, if the halakha evolves from the need to avoid 'intellectual arrogance' we might be more tolerant in monetary cases in which the danger of an issur being committed as a result of the pesak is almost non-existent and the money can always be returned. Such 'luxuries' might make us less sensitive to the issuance of pesak.

The case of a Talmid Chaver

Another ramification might be the case of a 'talmid chaver'- an advanced student who has studied many years and is almost at the level of his Rebbi.

Though our daf appears to grant such a student the license to issue pesak, it only addresses a case where the talmid is not in the Rebbi's immediate vicinity (she-lo be-fanav). What would his rights be if he were in the Rebbi's immediate vicinity?

Again, we might return to our point of departure: If the halakha is based upon the honor of the Rebbi, the relative caliber of the student would not mitigate the possible insult- this student is still a talmid and his 'usurping' is still an affront.

If, however, the halakha is based upon the arrogance of the 'hasty posek' who does not even bother to consult his Rebbi, we might view the advanced talmid in a different light. After all, he has acquired almost as much knowledge as his Rebbi and would seem to be just as equipped to handle the question.

Interestingly enough, the issue of how to understand the prohibition MIGHT be glimpsed in the sources cited by the gemara: Our Daf cites the death of Nadav and Avihu as the Biblical source for this prohibition. The gemara attributes their untimely death to their having preempted Moshe in 'deciding' the exact sequence by which the fire on the altar was to be kindled.

The gemara in Sanhedrin (5b) cites a different source - the desert encampment and the manner in which halakhic queries were processed: The Torah:

Now Moses used to take the tent and to pitch it without the 7 ז מוּ שֹׁ הֶ ִ י ַ קּ ח תֶ א - לֶהֹאָה הָטָנְו - וֹל ץוּחִ מ ץוּחִ מ וֹל camp, afar off from the camp; and he called it the tent of ,הֶנֲחַמַּל קֵחְרַה ןִמ - ,הֶנֲחַמַּה אָרָקְו ,וֹל ,וֹל אָרָקְו ,הֶנֲחַמַּה meeting. And it came to pass, that every one that sought the לֶהֹא ;דֵﬠוֹמ ,הָיָהְו לָכּ - שֵׁקַּבְמ ,הָוהְי אֵצֵי אֵצֵי ,הָוהְי שֵׁקַּבְמ LORD went out unto the tent of meeting, which was without לֶא - לֶהֹא ,דֵﬠוֹמ רֶשֲׁא ץוּחִמ .הֶנֲחַמַּל ץוּחִמ רֶשֲׁא ,דֵﬠוֹמ לֶהֹא the camp.

Ex 33:7 that whoever had a question would pose it to Moshe (even if this procedure entailed considerable traveling across the length of the encampment).

23 This setup, according to the gemara, reflects the Biblical prohibition. In a sense the two different sources present vastly different scenarios. In the description of the machaneh we witness QUESTIONS arising amidst the population and their being deferred to Moshe.

His students, though more proximate to the 'source' deferred to Moshe. Their handling the question on their own would have constituted an affront to Moshe.

The case of Nadav and Avihu is different in as much as NO question arose or was actually posed. They merely took their own initiative based upon their own judgment without consulting with Moshe. They did not 'snatch' a pesak by intercepting a question.

We might wonder whether their initiative was an affront to Moshe, or (since no question was ever posed) merely a sign of arrogance and recklessness.

In conclusion we might suggest that this issur is really two dimensional; sometimes it entails an insult and other times it is prohibited because it suggests intellectual arrogance.

Our Daf cites the position of Rava that "in close vicinity to the Rebbi this prohibition carries a punishment of death, while if performed at a distance (according to most Rishonim within a distinct radius, yet not in the same house or town) the conduct is still prohibited but no death penalty applies".

How are we to explain the split-leveled issur; though it applies even at a distance the penalty of death applies only within the immediate vicinity?

Possibly, we might cross-section the issur as follows: Within a Rebbi's immediate vicinity (his house or town) usurping his pesak would insult his honor.

This facet of the issur, is not only forbidden, but carries a death penalty. Outside of that immediate vicinity (but possibly within a reasonable radius) no insult occurs and no death penalty applies.

Yet, a talmid who issues pesak arrogates to himself a function which is weightier than his hasty response indicates. He displays the arrogance which is incompatible with being a true talmid chokhom.

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Judaica postcard Rabbi & Student, by Trinbetsch

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Different Types of Relationships: Rebbe/Disciple

Rav Tzvi Sinensky writes:8

Just as Talmud Torah itself is multidimensional, so too there are a variety of rebbe- talmid relationships, each of which is governed by a distinct set of rules. There is, firstly, a sharp differentiation between the general obligation to revere a Torah scholar and the obligation to respect one’s own rebbe.

Thus, Rambam treats these subjects in separate chapters (see above) in Hilkhot Talmud Torah (Chapter 5 addresses respect for one’s own rebbe, Chapter 6 for any Torah scholar). While the meaning of the term “rav muvhak” (primary teacher) is unclear and has been subject to wide debate throughout the centuries (see Bava Metzia 33a), it is clear that this is the most intimate type of rebbe-talmid relationship.

Authorities debate whether, on a biblical level, the range of obligations of respect mentioned above apply only to a rav muvhak or to any teacher one has. Strikingly,

Avot 6:3 teaches that one must treat as one’s rebbe even a person who teaches one a single halakha.

Does this mean that there is a biblical obligation to treat any every such individual with reverence? This seems to be the subject of a dispute.

Rabbi Eliezer of Metz (Yere’im 231) clearly states that the full range of biblical obligations apply even to the teacher of a single law.

Tosafot (Bava Kama 41b, s.v. Le-rabot), however, imply that the biblical requirement of respect is limited to one’s primary teacher. (See also Responsa Binyan Tziyon 83, which follows Tosafot.)

8 https://www.etzion.org.il/en/shiur-25-rebbe-talmid-relationship

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'סות ה"ד תוברל ח"ת (Summary: Tosfos explains why, in light of this D'rashah, the Torah needs to write "Mipnei Seivah Takum".) ,ת"או נפמ" י הביש "םוקת המל יל , קופית היל ?אכהמ (a) Question: Why does the Torah see fit to write "Mipnei Sewivah Takum", since we can learn it from here? ,ל"יו אכהד וברב ,קהבומ ןנתדכ תובא( ד"פ הנשמ )ב"י ארומ' ךבר ארומכ ,'םימש וא ברב ברב וא ,'םימש ארומכ ךבר ארומ' )ב"י הנשמ ד"פ תובא( ןנתדכ ,קהבומ וברב אכהד ,ל"יו גלפומ והד י יעכ ן ובר . (b) Answer: The current Pasuk is speaking about one's main Rebbi, as we learned in the in Pirkei Avos (4:12) 'The respect of your Rebbe should resemble the respect of Hashem'; or else it speaks about a distinguished Talmid-Chacham, who has the same Din as one's Rebbe.

Further muddying the waters, there are a whole range of in-between scenarios: a student who rises to or supersedes the teacher’s level (talmid chaver); a first teacher of , including aleph-bet; a teacher who brings one into the world of Torah and mitzvot, even as a convert. In these and other situations, the authorities debate the precise parameters and malleability of the rebbe-talmid relationship. Put differently, just as there are countless facets to , so too there are numerous permutations of being a teacher of Torah.

Parent-Child Relationship

At its most profound level, the relationship between rebbe and talmid is the relationship between parent and child. Taking this as a full-fledged halakhic principle, Rav Moshe of Trani (Kiryat Sefer, Hilkhot Talmud Torah 5:1) notes that Rambam opens the chapter by writing that “Just as one is obligated in the honor and reverence of his father, so too one is obligated in the honor and reverence of his teacher, even more so than his father.” Rav Moshe deduces from here that the biblical obligation to revere one’s teacher is an extension of the biblical obligation to respect one’s parents.

Nowadays

Despite the great significance accorded to the obligations attending one’s respect for a teacher, there is a striking suggestion, already among the Rishonim, that these laws may no longer be applicable in the modern age. The 14th-century Tosafist Rav Aharon from Narbonne (Orchot Chayim, Hilkhot Talmud Torah 21) cites a letter from Rav Shemuel of Évreux and his brother:

From the day on which our forefathers were exiled, our holy Temple was destroyed and our lands were corrupted, the Torah and our hearts have been diminished, and we can no longer say that

27 “the reverence of your teacher should be like the reverence of heaven.” All the laws governing how a student ought to interact with a teacher have been nullified; for the Gemarot, their explanations, the novella and compositions are the teachers of people, and everything follows the intelligence of the hearts. For this reason, in their town, they were accustomed for the student to teach, and we do not apply the rule that one who issues halakhic rulings in the presence of one’s teacher is liable to death. Likewise, a student may contradict his teacher’s words if he can, in accordance with his analysis.

Analogously, Maharashdam (CM 1) argues that, nowadays, “it is not the scholar who rules, but the book.” Thus, if the Évreux brothers hold that nowadays one may issue halakhic rulings in the presence of one’s teacher, it is certainly justified for a student who has reached the level of a posek to issue halakhic rulings in the same community as another posek, which would otherwise be prohibited out of respect for the teacher.

Maharic (Responsa 171), however, forcefully rejects the position cited in Orchot Chayim. Noting that Rambam and Tur cite the full range of halakhot regarding proper respect for one’s teacher in their halakhic compendia, he infers that these authorities maintain that these rules remain in force nowadays; there is no basis whatsoever, he contends, for relaxing these rules.

In reflecting on this seminal argument, we have seen three disputes concerning whether or not the parameters of Talmud Torah have shifted in light of technological changes in the nature of learning.

First, in regard to the question of Sinai and oker harim, Rav Shelomo Kluger and Peri debate whether nowadays all would agree that analysis is prized over breadth of knowledge due to the proliferation of books in print.

Second, the Vilna Gaon controversially maintains that the prohibition against forgetting one’s learning is no longer in force nowadays.

Third, we have now seen the debate between Orchot Chayim and Maharic regarding the deference owed to one’s rebbe nowadays.

While there is certainly room to distinguish among these three areas, taken together, they raise an overarching question about the interplay between the timeless value of Talmud Torah and the technological shifts that have impacted the nature of learning throughout the centuries.

In a different sense, Rav Kook’s treatment of Torat Eretz Yisrael suggests that there are other ways in which the meaning or live experience of Torah study may shift not only with technological advances, but also with new stages in Jewish history.

While the value of the rebbe-talmid relationship and Talmud Torah generally is a given, the manifestations of these overarching values may shift significantly over the course of time.

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