Colloquium 2 The Psychology of Aristotle's Rhetoric Amélie Oksenberg Rorty

I. The Aims, Skills, and Types of Rhetoric In preparing a handbook on rhetoric, Aristotle proceeds as he does for a discussion of any craft or practice. After distinguish- ing rhetoric from other closely related arts, he defines its proper aim: that of finding the means to persuade [an audience] on any subject whatever (1355aff; 1355b26ff). In explicating his defini- tion, Aristotle draws an analogy: just as the physician does whatever can be done to restore his patient's health, so the rhetorician uses the best available means of persuasion, even when it is unlikely that the accused will be aquitted. Since the most effective exercise of any craft or faculty is conceptually connected to its fulfilling its norm-defined aims, his counsel is directed to guiding the master craftsman who is responsive to the larger issues that surround the exercise of his skill, a rhetori- cian speaking about important matters to those authorized to affect them. Aristotle's advice to the rhetorician imports the results of his philosophic investigations: the Rhetoric presuppos- es and is implicitly informed by Aristotle's logical works, by his philosophy of mind and his theory of action; it is also strongly conjoined with his political and ethical theory. But while the rhetorician relies on these theories, he is not himself a philoso- pher, logician, statesman, or moralist.' Ideally, the best oratory addresses the minds as well as the psy- Copyright @ Am,41L- O. Rorty. From the paper read Oct. 10, 1991, at Wellesley College as part of the 14th Annual Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy. 1. Parallel: Aristotle relies on his theory of action, his ethics, his philosophy of mind in advising the tragedian, who uses this material without himself becom- ing a philosopher. chology of its audience? Aristotle chides the authors of earlier handbooks on rhetoric for concentrating primarily on tech- niques for swaying the emotions of judges and legislators, instead of first and primarily considering the best modes of rhetorical persuasion. Metaphorical speech is most convincing when it figures in reasonable arguments; and even maxim-rid- den speeches are more persuasive when their assumptions and conclusions are plausible(L1, 10-12).3 Wryly Aristotle complains that addressing the emotions of a judge is like warping a ruler before using it. The best orator does not manipulate beliefs in order to make the worse appear to be the better course, but rather presents the best case in a way that is comprehensible and moving to each type of character (NE 1113a30ff). In presenting the best course as gloriously noble to young and as prudent to the elderly, the rhetorician need not be lying.4 The argument of Aristotle's ethical works is that the best course is, in principle, under ideal circumstances, and in the long run, also the most pleasant, the most expedient, and the noblest. As long as his rhetoric is also constrained by what is true and what is best, the rhetorician will not "warp the ruler." But like all abilities and crafts, rhetoric can be used well or ill. The rhetorician can be evaluated both for his skill and for his 7tpOaípEOtC; (1355bl8). As the existence of clever villains attests, sheer intelligence is not sufficient for virtue; so too, highly suc- cessful but canny and corrupt orators attest to the undeniable fact that not every brilliant rhetorician is a c:ppÓVtj.10ç. Even if the audience must be brought to trust the intelligence and the char- acter of the rhetorician, still a clever huckster might be skilled at 2. Although there are subtle distinctions between oratory and rhetoric, I shall use the terms interchangeably. 3. Cf. Cooper (forthcoming); Halliwell (forthcoming); Garver 1991 and Griswold 1991; and Engberg-Pedersen 1991. 4. Aristotle uses the analogy to o1C1.a:ypa.홢pla. (III. 12.5) that Plato had developed Republic X. The proportions of a successfully mimetic sculpture or painting must be adjusted to the perspective from which it will be seen. But in taking into account the perspective from which it will be seen, the sculptor or painter—and, Aristotle might add, the rhetorician-does not necessarily misrepresent his sub- ject. Only those who do not understand the laws of perspective will construe what he does as distortion. Cf. Labarriere, p. 38-41 ms.