British soldier prepares to attach load onto Chinook helicopter during resupply mission at Camp Bastion, Afghanistan Royal Air Force (Graham Spark) After 2015 The Next Security Era for Britain
By John Mackinlay
he great international intervention in Afghanistan is due to run down to a token presence by 2014. Foreign troops are returning home already, and their continued reduction will T change the nature of the operation there. Closer to Europe, the Arab Spring has displaced more than a million people along the north coast of Africa. The efforts of those refugees to migrate toward Europe could begin to unsettle the region. Meanwhile, the European economy seems to be heading for long-term decline, and last summer’s rioting in the United Kingdom (UK) has alarmed
Dr. John Mackinlay is a Teaching Fellow in the War Studies Department at King’s College London.
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politicians and damaged British urban areas. their expeditionary pretensions and alter the Looking ahead, this article argues that 2015 nature and role of their armed forces? may mark the start of a rather different security The next security era may bring the need for era, one in which the British government may and prospect of a new type of armed force. For sev- have to determine whether the safety of its own eral centuries, the worst scenario facing most states population takes priority over supporting U.S. has been invasion by another state. Armed forces operations overseas. could be raised for expansionist ambitions, but the worst-case scenario remained the possibility of the next security era may bring the invasion. For this reason, the role and status of the armed forces has for some time been fixed into the need for and prospect of a new type of state’s hierarchy by constitution, academic theory, armed force and public sentiment. Their deployment or adap- tation for any other purpose—such as emergency Following the relative calm of the Cold relief or even countering insurgency—meets with War, North Atlantic Treaty Organization disapproval and resistance. Socially and constitu- (NATO) armies have experienced a turbu- tionally, the armed forces in most NATO coun- lent 20 years of campaigning punctuated by tries have a rigid function that requires them to several dramatic changes in their operational prepare constantly for an attack by the armed concept. After the collapse of the Berlin Wall, forces of another state. This role is enshrined by there have been three short but distinct secu- military conservatism, academic orthodoxy, and rity eras, starting with a period of peacekeeping the prospect of the awful consequences of their led by the United Nations. Global disillusion- failure to protect the state. ment after Somalia, Rwanda, and the former In 2011, the idea that being overrun by Yugoslavia led to the next period, character- another state is the worst thing that can happen ized by peace-support operations under NATO may be under pressure. Climate change and migra- leadership. The current period, which began tion bring with them invasions of another kind after September 11, 2001, has been dominated that are just as violent and deadly as an attack by coalition interventions led by the United by another state. In distant regions in Asia, the States. Each of these successive chapters has Middle East, and Africa, urbanization and deserti- been defined by a different leadership, an fication have shifted populations from rural areas, increasingly muscular approach, and a change concentrating them along the coastlines. In 2004, of doctrine: “peacekeeping” was followed by when a tsunami swept across Southeast Asia, the “peace-support operations,” which was fol- wave and its aftermath could be regarded as the lowed by “counterinsurgency.”1 The start of worst-case scenario for the 200,000 dead and the an entirely different security era could arise in millions who were displaced. In Japan, the devas- 2015. If that is a probability, should the British tation of the 2011 earthquake and tsunami, com- not be asking with greater determination what plicated by a nuclear emergency, was reminiscent the approaching chapter might look like? Will of damage caused in 1945. Also in 2011, 29,000 the consequences of global change, climate children died in 90 days during an emergency in change, migration, and above all popular opin- Somalia fueled by violence, drought, and famine; ion at home compel the British to abandon and in Pakistan, 1,500 died and 200,000 were
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made homeless by repeated floods. Dealing with expeditionary competence, and future overseas these catastrophes has been a major test for indi- operations, such as they may be, will have a dif- vidual nations as well as for the international com- ferent scale and purpose than the forces that munity, and it raises the question of whether the went to Afghanistan and Iraq. Second, popula- threat of invasion is the most likely worst-case sce- tion migration and the effects of global change nario, especially for those devastated populations. may start to put pressure on the UK’s own sta- Is it unimaginable that Britain may soon bility as part of Europe. Third, the British at find itself in need of armed forces that are much present have no plausible design for using armed more versatile and have greater capabilities for forces in the nontraditional roles suggested by dealing with other kinds of worst-case scenarios? these changes and therefore need to develop In 2011, the short-term success of rioters and one as a matter of urgency. demonstrators associated with the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, Saudi The Expeditionary Era Ends Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Iran, Libya, Bahrain, Oman, A variety of factors oppose the notion that Djibouti, Kuwait, and Morocco seemed to push for Britain, the post-2015 era will be a continua- the techniques of political violence over the tion of the current security regime. For a decade, threshold of a new chapter. Across the region, the British have accepted that overseas expedi- the images and techniques of mass deployment tions will be provided from the military, and the by the population of one state seemed to incite police will deal with terrorism at home. This tidy violence in another. The crowds that surged into assumption is set to change. The likelihood of the streets were impulsive, leaderless, and without further military expeditions is diminishing, and a deliberated manifesto. Their guidance through their enormous cost in treasure and manpower the streets relied on the widespread possession of sits badly with their tangible but minimal benefit. cell phones and access to the Internet. In the UK, British politicians have not been able to explain similarly leaderless crowds using similarly impul- to their constituencies how operations in Iraq sive networking methods surged onto the streets of and Afghanistan improve security in the streets London, Manchester, and Birmingham. of the homeland.2 After several Parliamentary Looking ahead, especially in view of the Defence Committee hearings, the population speed of these physical and social changes, there is and its key communicators are measurably a strong possibility that the next security era after unconvinced about the necessity, success, and 2015 may turn out to be surprisingly disconnected professionalism of military expeditions. News of from recent experience. When the troops come the staggering cost of these operations comes at home from Afghanistan, their future tasks may a time when Europe and the United States are lie well beyond traditional military competencies. struggling with the mother of all financial crises. However, if these tasks are likely to be different Moreover, the Bush-era security imperatives, and surprising, there are at least some factors and which launched the war on terror and the mili- planning assumptions that can be anticipated. tary expeditions that followed, are eroding. Al In particular, there are three known issues Qaeda and its affiliates have altered their game, that must influence the British approach to the and their inspirational potency has greatly dimin- next security era. First of all, the British may ished. Military expeditions to deny al Qaeda the have reached the end of their brigade-level territory from which to plan and put together
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their operations are not an absolute necessity for troops to Iraq provoked the largest peacetime British survival. The government’s insistence demonstration ever held in London.5 UK politi- that the 120 or so UK-domiciled individuals cians who had supported the U.S. invasion met who have so far been convicted for Islamist- with public abuse from their constituencies and related offences were inspired and mentored some were dismissed in later elections. Looking from al Qaeda bases overseas sits uncomfort- ahead, regardless of failing public support, the ably with nongovernmental research that finds Foreign Office will argue for its continuing desire 68 percent of these individuals “have no direct to influence events overseas using British armed links with any organisation currently proscribed forces. However, at present there is no plausible by the UK government.”3 In the next security strategy that justifies or underwrites a brigade- era, the government cannot reasonably use the level intervention capability. Moreover, in the al Qaeda bogeyman to justify further expedi- present fiscal climate, hopes to retain or, at some tions. Politicians have begun to point out that future date, resuscitate that capability are unre- the tenuous benefit to national interests in terms alistic. To be credible, a UK strategy would have of improved home security does not warrant the to show that intervening overseas would be an human cost of a military expedition.4 The public act of absolute necessity and not merely a desire can see for themselves that al Qaeda is faltering, to retain that choice. The British population is and that for several years it has failed to grab the more certain that “boxing above its weight” with front-page media space that it strives so hard to the United States is not intelligent, adds little to reoccupy. Hardcore war-on-terror enthusiasts security, and that the cost in terms of dead and will say that that is a victory for former President wounded is more than it needs to pay. Bush and his antiterrorism strategy, but the con- tinuing evolution of insurgency provides more Converging Pressures on Europe’s powerful reasons why al Qaeda’s significance is Domestic Stability waning. During the violent surges of the Arab Meanwhile, in the UK, the scale of immi- Spring, the only published pictures of al Qaeda’s gration since 1948 and its social consequences iconic leader were of a frail old man watching his have become a condition for disaffection. In May best television moments on a home video shortly 2001, several months before the attacks on New before his death. York City and Washington, DC, rioting between Muslims and “white youths” in the greater the public can see that al Qaeda is Manchester area caused £25 million (approxi- faltering, and that for several years it mately USD 38.7 million) worth of damage, and has failed to grab the front-page space more than 200 police officers were injured. A Home Office commission found that the cultural that it strives so hard to reoccupy isolation of migrant communities had encouraged separation, ignorance, and fear between the immi- Public support for UK expeditionary mis- grant communities and the UK’s majority culture.6 sions has been in decline for some time, and a Although in the intervening decade there large-scale, regime-changing, regime-supporting has been a great effort by successive governments intervention seems inconceivable after 2015. In and the Home Office to encourage social cohe- 2003, the UK decision to send British tanks and sion, the continuing concentration of immigrants
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into particular boroughs is now being reinforced Mediterranean states from Syria to Morocco by internal migration. White populations are are, at the time of this writing, in violent tran- moving out of areas with a high ethnic minority sition. Huge segments of their populations are population, which has resulted in a rapid increase below the age of 20. All of the countries have in the relative size of migrant communities liv- high rates of unemployment, and in most cases ing in the same areas. Integration becomes more their young people have been living under gov- difficult to achieve in these large and socially iso- ernments that are authoritarian and corrupt.8 lated communities, and when pressure on schools, Rioting and violent repression have created public services, social care, and housing becomes large populations of internally displaced people, acute, then interethnic tension begins to rise. as well as refugees fleeing to bordering states. In Meanwhile, migration into the UK continues to some cases, a fresh upheaval adds to an existing increase, and in 2010, the annual net migration tide of displaced people—for instance, to the 1 was the highest figure on record.7 Looking ahead, million Iraqi refugees who are already in Syria we need to know whether the Home Office has having fled from their own country in 2006.9 In set right the problems of cohesion and exclusion Libya, there are a quarter of a million internally that have led to interethnic rioting. According displaced refugees and a staggering 1 million to the 2010 Parliamentary Commission on the who have temporarily moved out of the coun- Prevent Strategy, it has not been wholly successful. try to Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, Niger, and Chad. If this is correct and the UK is barely managing to keep its head above the water in this respect, it is crucially disabling that there is then the obvious questions for the next security no Europe-wide policy or strategy for era seem to be how much more migration we can safely absorb, and what is likely to happen dealing with massive upheavals overseas if demographic change overloads the UK living and their effects space to an unbearable degree. Europe is unprepared for a security era It is impossible to see the long-term con- dominated by insecure and migrating popula- sequences while these massive disturbances in tions. Its defense reviewers acknowledge that North Africa and the eastern Mediterranean population growth and climate change are are still continuing, but it is probable that the increasing the scale of disasters in other regions movement of large displaced populations so close of the world, but they seem less concerned to to Europe has already resulted in an increased know whether these massive upheavals will flow of unregistered migrants into Europe. This stress domestic stability in Europe. We must pressure falls on Europe as a whole and not on hope for the best-case scenario and that Europe individual states. European border security is in will be a responder to tragedies in other regions principle systemic; without effective internal bor- rather than to massive disturbances on its own ders, refugees landing in Italy, Spain, or Greece territory. But the less-than-best-case scenario is from the sea have comparative freedom of move- that the effects of global changes may impinge ment until they reach a natural obstacle such as visibly on the European homeland population. the English Channel. A European state’s ability Recent events in North Africa are to monitor or control migration is dictated by worth considering. The southern and eastern the weakest point at the outer edge of the system.
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At present, Europe seems reluctant to face Although the British army is now operation- the possibility of further stress on its living ally more fit, experienced, and professional space; its borders are poorly secured, its moral than at any time since the end of the Cold position is weak, and its migration controls War, this excellence may have little appli- are systemic and therefore governed by the cation after 2015. The Taliban arises from a inadequacies of the weakest member state. It uniquely poor and underdeveloped society, and is crucially disabling that there is no Europe- the UK and U.S. doctrines for dealing with it wide policy or strategy for dealing with mas- offer a strong continuity to the past, but not sive upheavals overseas and their effects. In to the future. The latest version of British and the longer term, getting a consensus to deny American counterinsurgency doctrine is essen- entry by force to a new wave of migrants may tially derived from a methodology to counter not be possible, especially when a rising num- Maoist insurgencies; its principles can be traced ber of the ethnicities are also represented in the through the DNA of previous British doctrine homeland population. When it comes to taking back to 1934. The problem is that while British measures to head off future waves of uprooted and U.S. troops have been dealing with the families fleeing from the effects of global change ancient societies of Afghanistan, the rest of the and civil war, the moral argument favors the world has been moving on at a fast pace, espe- incoming migrants. Our own scientists and cially in the European region. government institutions point out that it is our In stark contrast to Afghanistan, in postin- European industries and lifestyle that are the dustrial societies the techniques for uprising and major contributing factors to climate change insurgency have continued to evolve rapidly and the consequent environmental damage and, particularly after 9/11, the relationship that now threaten the world’s bottom billion.10 between terrorism and insurgency has altered So it will be morally difficult for rich and safe in an important way. Understanding this Europeans to deny entry to a new wave of progression in the techniques of insurgency migrants when it is Europe’s prosperous life- is now crucial to what may arise after 2015. style (and support of the wrong dictators) that A traditional Maoist insurgency was (and in has contributed to the situation. Weakened by traditional societies still is) largely a political economic problems and without a consensus for process in which the insurgent’s success hinged preemptive action, the possibility that Europe on having the support of a population that was may drift into a security era dominated by its territorially defined. The insurgency’s objectives own domestic pressures has to be a planning were tangible: overthrowing a regime, decoloni- assumption for the after-2015 security era. zation, secession, and so forth. The significance of the terrorism-insurgency relationship was Finding a Relevant that terrorism was subordinated to the overall Operational Design insurgent purpose; it was just one of several During the 9/11 security era, British forces techniques that could be used (see figure). have narrowly and intensively focused on coun- Without popular support, a purely terror- terinsurgency, in particular in Afghanistan ist organization on its own could not become a where they ultimately adopted a successful successful uprising, and by definition a terror- method for dealing with the Taliban uprising. ist organization that acquired a political wing
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Figure. Insurgency Techniques
Military Action Information Political Extortion Campaign Activism In ltration Terrorism Subversion
to organize popular support was on the way to The vertical structures of the 1950s and 1960s becoming an insurgent movement. began to resemble the hubs and chains of the In postindustrial societies, the terrorism- Internet; the individual terrorist now lay prom- insurgency relationship has become inverted. inently at the center of a network of activists. The pressures of mass migration, diffusion of The overall insurgency’s aims had become mass communications, and increasing facil- ethical and less concerned with physical out- ity for the man on the street to view televised comes. The terrorist act—the bomb blast that images from another city or country in real would become the visual icon for the move- time made it easier for insurgent organizations ment—was now top priority, and the object to challenge fragile governments. It no longer was to stage one attack after another. required labor-intensive preparation to orga- The problem caused by this inversion is nize an insurgency; it was possible to reach that politicians and security officials failed to a disaffected population spread over several understand that insurgency had evolved into countries and to push them toward activism other forms. Faced by the effects of a post- by other means. Images of terrorist acts trans- Maoist uprising, they made counterterrorist mitted by satellite news channels across the responses to what they hoped was terrorism. world have an instantly rousing, activating, Certainly terrorism, was now the visible and and recruiting effect. Insurgents were swift to sensational start point for every security dis- see this, especially in populations where there cussion, but there remained a significant and was a high use of social media or mass com- barely understood anomaly: the violence they munications. In less than two decades after the faced was more than terrorism, because to publication of British counterinsurgency doc- survive in the past, the terrorist group had to trine in 1969, insurgencies arising from swiftly have effective popular support from its local modernizing societies had moved on to become populace. That was no longer a condition for the antithesis of Maoist phases and structure.11 postmodern terrorism, which can draw on sup- Insurgency was losing its Maoist definitions; port from a global audience. it was now more complex, deterritorialized, The danger by 2015 will be the tendency to leaderless, and horizontally structured, with see every new form of political violence as terror- a bottom-up creative energy and an amoeba- ism. Political leaders like to blur definitions, and like capacity to regrow itself organically.12 they prefer to call insurgents “terrorists.” Their
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defense officials have to be more precise; they violence and disorder. This is not about the tar- cannot rely on opting for a counterterrorist cam- gets and the causes but rather the “smart mob” paign if they are faced by something that is funda- techniques that are now being used. mentally insurgent. The planners who are look- Anticipating this as a possible scenario for ing ahead must recognize that in a post-industrial the next security era, the problem for future society, insurgency evolves more rapidly than their planners is that they will not find many control ability to conceptualize a response. This realization structures on the government side suited for sta- becomes crucial to Britain’s domestic security and bilization in a European context. A campaign its ability to alter the game in its favor. to anticipate excessive migration into Europe, secure borders, counter terrorism, deal with urban Responding to Smart Mobs disorder, and make a humanitarian response to Insurgency and the techniques of uprising overseas disasters would require an extensive have recently evolved in other ways. In addi- redesigning of the UK’s own 19th-century security tion to counterterrorism, government forces structures. The first Duke of Wellington would will have to deal with the outrage of disaf- instantly recognize Whitehall’s existing arrange- fected communities within the population, and ments for ministerial control, the vertical lines in the future this may become a more serious for operational direction, layered decisionmaking and difficult task. In the North African region, apparatus, and on the ground, the basic military several factors facilitated the Arab Spring—in and police units; they still have a familiar 19th- particular the possibility that while the govern- century rigidity. ment institutions in many affected states were But in North Africa and Europe, the people structured vertically (in the fashion of a 19th- in the streets have moved on; they live in the century bureaucracy), the young effervescent horizontal plane; they form relationships by populations they sought to control, in stark con- joining communication highways with their trast, were organized horizontally in a very 21st- mobile phones and the Internet and as a result century manner. The result was that the 21st- have much faster collective decisionmaking century populations easily outwitted the slow cycles than their governments. In a disaffected moving 19th-century metropolitan authorities. community, when outrage boils over, they can Looking ahead, Europeans should learn quickly take over public spaces where they from this experience. Summer rioting in UK move and communicate spontaneously like a urban areas has become a growing phenomenon, huge flock of starlings in flight, changing direc- and according to damage and disruption statis- tion at a moment’s notice to head off to a new tics, the August 2011 riots greatly exceeded destination. As an organism, they have no for- those of 2007. The fact that UK summer rioters mal leadership structures, and they act impul- and their counterparts in North African cities, sively and change their short-term direction politically speaking, have absolutely nothing much more quickly than the vertically orga- in common is not important. In respect of the nized security forces that seek to contain them. security of our populations, what is far more The convulsions of the Arab Spring (using the interesting is that there are now more effective same principle as the urban rioters in the UK) techniques for outraged communities, whatever seem to demonstrate that a smart mob can seize their cause, to assemble and cause irrepressible the guts of a city and bring it to a halt. What
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happens after that is still unclear, but the initial counterinsurgency. After 2015, UK planners success of the Arab Spring is undisputed. once again will face the uncertainty of transi- British thinking in response to this latest tioning to the next security era. In this case, evolution is at a standstill. In Whitehall, set- the growing relevance of global change, climate ting up a relevant comprehensive structure is discussed but not practiced. Throughout the planners will need to think in terms of a post-9/11 security era, government structures to conduct expeditionary operations overseas have security force that is relevant to a been separated from the ongoing counterterror- 2015 Europe ist operation in the UK. Doctrinally, the British do not have a bank of researched ideas to help change, mass migration, a collapsing European them find a pathway into the next security era. economy, and more immediately the effects Existing counterinsurgency doctrines describe a of the Arab Spring raise the possibility that concept for campaigning in the world’s poorest unimaginable contingencies will confront them. and most backward societies, but not in London, These contingencies will have little continuity Manchester, Birmingham, or further afield in with the past. Defense officials cannot reason- Europe where the proliferation of mass commu- ably be expected to plan for the unimaginable; nications is, comparatively speaking, sky high. however, it is possible to reduce surprise by At the ground level, planners will need to identifying some anticipated conditions, which think in terms of a security force that is relevant may influence the future. These conditions to a 2015 Europe. In addition to existing police should become planning assumptions: and warfighting arms of the military, a new secu- ❖❖ The end of expeditionary operations. rity force might take the form of gendarme-style The British public and many members units, made up by local reservists with the col- of Parliament are not likely to man- lective ability to patrol an international border, date future expeditions on anything quell a riot, speak relevant languages, under- approaching their previous scale to stand how to do stabilization, and travel abroad support U.S. military missions. After at short notice. A debate on these lines would more than a century of overseas cam- recognize the evolutionary gap that has opened paigning, ending the primacy of expe- st at ground level between Europe’s 21 -century ditionary forces will have a radical th populations and the 19 -century government effect on the role and organization of structures that are supposed to protect them. the armed forces.
Conclusion ❖❖ Giving primacy to domestic secu- In 20 years, the British have moved with rity. In a decade dominated by the uncomfortable speed through three distinct unexpected, it must be considered security eras in which primacy has been given a possibility that the net effect of to their expeditionary forces. Each era has global changes, migration, a failing demanded a different approach. Consequently, European economy, and failure to British forces have had to adapt themselves to secure European borders will erode the peacekeeping, peace-support operations, and stability of Europe’s urban populations.
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❖❖ The need to keep up with the evolution of insurgency. Insurgencies reflect the societ- ies from which they arise. Current doctrines address a 20th-century form of insurgency, which is relevant to traditional societies but not to the kind of insurgency that is being experienced in post-industrial Europe. In addition, European governments have fallen far behind in developing an acceptable response to smart mobs, which can seize control of urban spaces. ❖❖ The need for unimaginable changes. The next security era will not be a continuation of the previous century of expeditionary campaigning. Unimaginable changes may be needed to the controlling structures of British security forces and to the role and nature of the forces themselves. This will require an unimaginable change of attitude in Whitehall and some effort to organize a deliberate program to engage a wider community of experts in consideration of these possibilities. This effort should begin now, not in 2015. PRISM
Notes
1 Each period is represented by a unique doctrine: United Kingdom (UK) Army Field Manual Vol. V, Peacekeeping Operations (London: Ministry of Defence, 1988); UK Permanent Joint Headquarters (JWP 3–50), Peace Support Operations (London: Ministry of Defence, 1996); UK Army Field Manual Vol. I, Countering Insurgency (London: Ministry of Defence, 2010). 2 House of Commons Defence Committee, “Fourth Report: Operations in Afghanistan,” July 6, 2011. 3 Robin Simcox, Hannah Stuart, and Houriya Ahmed, Islamist Terrorism—the British Connections (London: Centre for Social Cohesion, 2010). 4 House of Commons Defence Committee. 5 BBC News claims over 1,000,000 protestors, but police counted 750,000 on the streets of London. See “‘Million’ march against Iraq war,” BBC News, February 16, 2003, available at
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