Commission of The Submission

by

Marc Mc Sharry, T.D. Constituency of Sligo/Leitrim

Februrary 16th 2021.

A Chairde,

I attach below my submission in response to the call by the Commission on the Defence Forces. It is drawn from the experience of both myself and other sources including retired members of the DF from regular private to the more senior ranks.

The headline themes are summarised below.

 Defence Forces (DF) crisis. Recruiting continuously leas than voluntary retirements.  Retention of personnel is the solution. Worst pay and conditions in public service.  Army, Aer Corps, Naval Service and Reserve help underpin stability and state security.  Stability facilitates economic development, FDI; political/citizens reassurance needed.  Post Brexit political issues emerging ‘On Island’. Resourced and capable DF critical.  DF planning needed to 2030 and beyond. Contingencies are not “light switches”.

The Defence Forces and the Constituency of Sligo/Leitrim

1. I represent the Dáil Constituency of Slig0/Leitrim. This submission honours serving and retired Defence Forces (DF) members who are constituents of mine. The DF is a bulwark of our democracy, a crucial pillar in safeguarding our security and freedoms. Stable democracy facilitated economic development and attracted Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). FDI success is significantly enhanced by the contribution, often unseen or unattributed, of the DF. Serving and retired members provide social capital in communities, provide leadership, mentoring, organisational skills, benefitting cultural, sporting, community clubs, societies and local initiatives.

2. My constituency spans all of counties Sligo and Leitrim, but also large tracts of North Roscommon and South Donegal. These four geographical areas are places have a long and proud tradition of intergenerational military service, be it in the Permanent Defence Force (PDF) or the Reserve (Res). This is particularly true of the post 1969 outbreak of violence in Northern (NI). , home of 28th Infantry Battalion since 1973, is now one of only two remaining DF posts along the 499-kilometre border with NI, is in my constituency. There remains potential security, NI Protocol/Article 16, emigration, customs, single market, smuggling, pandemic, public health, and animal sanitary and phytosanitary issues along this border. Locations for additional DF Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) in gaps along the border need to be identified and pre-planned urgently.

3. The nature of military life frequently entails absence from home and home base. The presence of many military installations in our region, however was an additional incentive to serve. Soldiers from my constituency, of all ranks, proudly served throughout the Army, Aer Corps and Naval Service, and in troubled locations in the Middle East, Balkans, Africa and Asia. The Res provided invaluable support to the PDF, most especially post 1969.

4. County Donegal is the geographical ‘panhandle’ of the . It is remote from the capital city and from centralised national decision making. It is continuously challenged by this “remoteness”. Geography, and proximity to NI, effects those living and working in politics, health, education, travel and security. Brexit and Covid brought this reality into more immediate and challenging focus. Three army brigades are needed in order to have effective DF national “reach” and sustain the operational cycle of the DF.

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Barracks/Post Consolidation, 2012 Defence Forces Reorganisation and Demise of the Reserve

5. Military installations in the Midlands/Northwest at Lifford, Letterkenny, Manorhamilton, Ballyconnell, Cavan Town, Longford and Mullingar are now all closed. , Athlone, suffered a major reduction in military jobs in 2012 when the ill-judged Reorganisation of the DF led to the closure of the 4th Western Brigade (4 Bde), its Headquarters Unit, four other PDF units and four Res Units there. This Reorganisation had inevitable knock-on negative consequences in my region, negatively effecting my DF constituents and their families. It will continue to do so unless wisdom and prudence reverses the 2012 Reorganisation.

6. These closures and reductions in numbers in the past fifteen year had detrimental consequences on the security posture of the state in my region. In significantly reducing the PDF presence there, but especially collapsing the non-integrated Res in Donegal, Sligo, Leitrim and Roscommon, it removed a geographically dispersed, readily available security contingency resource in the northwest and of the country.

7. The Res were a resource of security data in remote locations. This was especially true of the border area abutting NI of Donegal, Sligo, Leitrim and Cavan. During the three-decade long conflict in the North the existence of Res units all over Ireland, especially in border regions, allowed young men/women to join a legitimate force instead of an illegitimate one. The threat from dissident organisations has not fully abated. Whether full advantage was taken of this Res “eyes and ears” resource needs requires investigation and analysis.

8. Closures of DF installations coupled the 2012 Reorganisation, have negatively affected recruitment, and especially retention challenges the DF now faces. The Res was the most consistent and proven conveyor belt of recruits into Cadet and General Service recruitment. The “Single Force” concept of substantially amalgamating the PDF and Res has not worked. Overworked and under resourced PDF units struggle for operational viability themselves, not to mind the added challenge of overseeing Res units. The forced closure of Res units, and their removal from geographically dispersed rural areas of the country, had unwelcome consequences. I am reliably informed that this decision was to save the €40m overhead of PDF personnel administering and training Res units post financial crisis. It was a very short-sighted decision with disastrous consequences for recruitment.

Ireland’s Strategic Needs, the Defence Forces, and the Border with

9. Ireland is facing uncertain political, economic and security times with a horizon spanning a number of decades. The DF must be safeguarded in national strategic planning and capability development for those impending challenges. Brexit, and as yet unseen issues arising from its “all island” fallout; the increasing potential for political change; a possible Border Poll North and South, and all that may flow from that; the not unrealistic potential for a Federal Ireland, Agreed Ireland, or indeed a United Ireland must be considerations in future DF strategic planning. The DF must have contingency capability to suit that shifting horizon. Capability development in terms of personnel, and installations to operate from, have long lead in times; they are not “light switches”.

10. The Belfast Agreement and all the positives that flowed from it are greatly welcomed. However, those who subsequently made strategic decisions for the state that resulted in the wholesale removal of state resources previously located in border regions was premature, poorly analysed and most certainly lacked strategic nous. Those regrettable decisions are particularly true in terms of GS and DF presence, but also Department of Agriculture and Customs officials. Coupled with reduced presence, “corporate knowledge” of state actors of the border with NI reduced over time; essential operational awareness is gained chiefly through long-time presence.

11. Since independence, and over time and in changing circumstances, the border with NI was always a challenge for customs, smuggling and security. Now, NI being a “third country” in EU terms, it has additional illegal emigration challenges, and should the NI Protocol become problematic, Single Market, Customs Union, Sanitary and Phytosanitary realities. All EU countries abutting “third countries” embrace these issues as Member States are required to do. Ireland does not have an exemption from those responsibilities. The border was never solely

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a security issue. The Covid pandemic has this sharply into focus, as did the Foot and Mouth disease outbreak in the UK and NI in 2001, as would an outbreak of swine or avian flu in NI. Diseases do not respect borders.

12. Prior to the 2012 Reorganisation, the 499-kilometre border, and its 291 crossing points, was overseen jointly by the Army’s 4th Western and 2nd Eastern Brigades. The former had responsibility for 263-kilometres from north Donegal to the Cavan/Monaghan border, with the remaining 236-kilometres from there to the Cooley Peninsula in County Louth the responsibly of . Now, only two DF barracks remain along this 499- kilometre frontier, Finner Camp in South Donegal and in Dundalk. With the disestablishment of the 4th Brigade in 2012, incredibly this whole frontier with NI is now overseen militarily from the 2nd Brigade Headquarters in Rathmines, . This to me, even as a layman, seems unwise and reckless in the extreme.

2012 Reorganisation Consequences in my Region, Work/Life Balance and Career Prospects

13. Prior to the 2012 Reorganisation there were five operational army units stationed in Dublin. Routine rostered duties in Dublin barracks and the daily immediate on-call reserve were undertaken by these Dublin based units. Post Reorganisation only two army operational units remain in our capital city. Operational taskings in Dublin, and “detailing” of Dublin based units to rostered DF national operations, plus to overseas deployments, have not reduced. What army forces are filling this numerical deficit for Dublin? Daily, since 2012, military personnel from Dundalk, Athlone and Donegal, in rotation, are transported to Dublin to carry out rostered daily 24-hour duties due to this deficit of numbers in Dublin. This is flabbergasting, barely believable, but true. It is certainly not environmentally friendly or cost effective. Two of the four unis from these locations providing this ongoing backup to Dublin are from the only two remaining garrisons along the border with NI. The solution might seem to station more army units in Dublin but this would in reality be politically unsustainable for Government, for Dundalk, Athlone or Donegal, or the border conundrum. Reversing the 2012 Reorganisation is THE solution.

14. Closure of two military posts in north Donegal in the noughties led to all elements of the 28th Infantry Battalion concentrating in Finner Camp in my constituency. Prior to the 2012 the 4th Brigade’s Training Centre was in Athlone. Private soldiers went to complete the required annual six months residential course for promotion to corporal. This was also where troops of all ranks from the Midlands, West and Northwest regions undertook continuing professional training courses on weapons, Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTPs), IT systems, etc. The 28th Battalion, since 2012, is now a unit of the Dublin based 2nd Brigade, so its personnel from Donegal through Sligo, Leitrim and North Roscommon now go to the 2nd Brigade’s training centre in Dublin for such courses. A six-month residential course in Dublin for private soldiers from the Inishowen/Fanad peninsulas, for instance, is punishing on meagre family budgets, and certainly not family friendly for young families and a spouse at home with young children. Factors like this negatively affects career advancement and retention.

15. Command and Control is a central requirement for military units to be operationally effective. Senior and middle ranking leaders in commissioned/non-commissioned ranks in a military unit with corporate knowledge of the areas for which units have operational responsibility is critical. Senior personnel living in or in proximity to the area of operations of a military unit is a decided bonus. One of the greatest unforeseen defects of the 2012 Reorganisation is increasingly military personnel are reluctant to put down family roots in the Midlands, West and Northwest of the country. To do so results in commuting in perpetuity. Moving house, uprooting families from intergenerational geographical locations, communities and schools, is neither appealing or attainable today. Covid and remote working solidified that reality. Military housing is a thing of the past. Not all personnel serve in single location services such as Baldonnel and Haulbowline, or in the Curagh/Newbridge axis.

16. A critical mass of appointments/career advancement opportunities was lost in 2012 in areas affected by the closure of the 4th Brigade. It was not just the loss of critical mass of appointments in Athlone which was commutable to from my constituency, but also that the Donegal based battalion now reports to Dublin, and the Galway based battalion reports to Cork. This resultant possibility of postings within brigade areas at short notice and for longer periods has increased significantly. The last locally based 28th Battalion commander was eleven years ago. This factor is now replicated in units all over the country. Commuting leadership is anathema to real “buy in”, be it in the GS or the DF. The Sergeant Mc Cabe GS whistle-blowing identified the contributory part played by commuting, frequently rotating, leadership in Bailieborough. A salutary lesson for the state and DF.

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17. Decentralisation and balanced regional development are Irish government policy for decades. Currently, the government policy in this area is termed “Project Ireland 2040; Balanced Regional Development”. The 2012 Reorganisation, the disbandment of the 4th Western Brigade, and realtering brigade affiliations of Athlone and Donegal units to Dublin flies in the face of government policy. RACO Secretary General, Commandant Conor King, in briefing the Oireachtas Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence confirmed that a significantly disproportionate number of the thousands of army personnel who have retired voluntarily in recent years have been from the disbanded units of the former 4th Western Brigade, but also, increasingly commissioned officers stationed and living in the Midlands, West and Northwest of the country. This is the retention crisis in action.

Remuneration

A permanent wage review body must immediately be established. The pay and conditions of the DF are not remotely in keeping with a level commensurate with the realities of the job and the contribution to Irish Society in a wide diversity of ways. I must point out that the terms of reference which underpin this process are curiously contradictory when it comes to remuneration and pay. It says, ‘Upon completion of the commission’s work, the Minister for Defence will consult with the Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform on the establishment of a permanent pay review body, reflecting the unique nature of military service in the context of the public Service’. It then continues on and says, ‘All recommendations by the Commission or the successor body and their implementation must be consistent with public sector pay policy’. These two sentences are completely contradictory and in fact polar opposites. The commission will fail in its work if it is bound before it starts on the limitations of existing ‘public pay policy’ which have clearly failed miserably to in any way reflect ‘the unique nature of military service in the context of the public service’. In other words, the existing policy and approach will not work for the DF and requires a flexible, new and different approach to that which has failed them so miserably in the past. If the commission is irrevocably bound by such contradiction, while it is my earnest wish for its success, it is bound to failure if the flawed terms of reference on pay are to be observed.

I thank you for taking the time to consider this submission

Is mis le mas,

______

Marc Mac Sharry TD

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