Western Balkans Stability Monitor
September 2019 Issue
Table of contents
The Breakdown of Elections 4
Albania 6 Government Stability 7 Opposition Activities 8 Regional Relations 9 Security 10 Looking Forward 11
Bosnia-Herzegovina 12 Government Stability 13 Opposition Activities 14 Regional Relations 14 Security 15 Looking Forward 16
Kosovo 17 Government Stability 18 Opposition Activities 19 Regional Relations 20 Security 22 Looking Forward 23
North Macedonia 24 Government Stability 25 Opposition Activities 27 Regional Relations 28 Security 29 Looking Forward 30
Montenegro 31 Government Stability 32 Opposition Activities 33 Regional Relations 34 Security 35 Looking Forward 37
2 Serbia 38 Government stability 39 Opposition activities 40 Regional relations 42 Security 42 Looking Forward 43
About Risk Dimensions 44 War 44 Terrorism 44 Government Instability 44 Civil Unrest 44 Ethnic Unrest 44
About 45 Contact 45
3 The Breakdown of Elections
Looking across the Western Balkans region, one of the key common drivers of instability appears to be the fact that, increasingly, elections are not doing what they should be doing – providing a framework of commonly accepted rules and institutions for how power is contested, legitimised and transferred, which is accepted by all sides in the political arena. In countries such as Albania, Montenegro, Serbia and – previously – North Macedonia, ruling political elites have perfected the art of skewing the political playing field in their own favour yet maintaining the façade of free and fair elections to such an extent that opposition parties are beginning to refuse to take part in the ‘game’. Increasingly, opposition parties and movements feel that competing for power on the terms being offered is pointless, hence their decision to resort to other, non-electoral and non-institutional, methods, of challenging those in power.
At present, Albania seems to have drifted furthest down this route. Opposition parties
th boycotted the June 30 local elections, in protest at the unfair conditions under which they were being held, while alleging that the ruling Socialists were deeply in league with organized crime. Despite the opposition boycott, the Socialist government of Edi Rama pressed on with the holding of elections. The result – an election process in which one party ran unchallenged in more than half of municipalities across Albania and won power in all municipalities. With the opposition parties having resigned their mandates in Parliament and having excluded themselves from local assemblies, they now seem set to pursue their attempt to secure the holding of (more) free and fair elections through the streets, or by appealing to international mediation.
In Serbia, the majority of opposition parties seem headed in the direction of boycotting the next Parliamentary elections, arguing that agreeing to take part in them under existing (unfree and unfair) conditions merely serves to legitimize the authoritarian rule of the Serbian Progressive Party. Boycotting the elections would, they argue, demonstrate that, to paraphrase, the emperor has no (democratic) clothes. Quite what the Serbian opposition plans to do after boycotting the elections is perhaps unclear even to them – organising street protests in order to force the government to grant (more) free and fair elections seems like something for which it has neither the organizational capabilities nor the necessary popular support. Again, there
4 seems to be an expectation that the international community will intervene to mediate between government and opposition.
Montenegro also shows signs of drifting in a similar direction. Until recently, most of the opposition parties were united in boycotting a parliamentary commission which would, in theory, work to create conditions for the free and fair holding of elections. Instead, they demanded the formation of a technical government which would create the conditions for free and fair elections, arguing that the ruling Democratic Party of Socialists was only interested in creating a façade of working towards free and fair elections. Now, part of the opposition has entered into the parliamentary commission, while most opposition parties remain firm in their boycott. The path to electoral boycott by the opposition is again coming into view.
While North Macedonia was in a similar situation a few years ago, prior to the election of the Zaev government, there the threat of opposition boycott, combined with heavy international cajoling, managed to force the holding of elections of moderately more free and fair terms, which eventually brought the opposition to power.
Yet the international community – primarily the EU, European governments and the US – do not want to be dragged into mediating the battle over electoral conditions in the rest of the region. For some time, critics argue, they have preferred the predictability of ‘stabilocratic’ regimes to the hard work of cajoling authoritarians into respecting democratic norms.
Unfortunately, it would seem that regional ‘stabilocracies’ are becoming increasingly unstable, once again requiring external attention.
5 Albania
With the passage of local elections on June 30th and opposition protests seemingly suspended over the summer, the political climate in Albania became somewhat more relaxed. However, tensions are likely to escalate again during the autumn, particularly if the opposition resumes (violent) protests. While Rama and his Socialist Party (SP) in theory now control all the municipalities in Albania and almost the entire Parliament, one-party domination of Parliament, government and local government are seriously denting the legitimacy of the ruling party.
Outlook
Trajectories 1 month 6 months 12 months
War Low Low Low
Terrorism Modest Modest Modest
Government instability Elevated Elevated Moderate
Civil Unrest Elevated Elevated Modest
Ethnic Unrest Low Low Low
Low Modest Moderate Elevated High
6 Government Stability
th A degree of calm has been restored to Albania, with the controversial June 30 local elections having passed relatively peacefully and the opposition parties - Democratic Party (PD) and Socialist Movement for Integration (LSI) – having suspended their (often violent) protests during the summer months.
On the surface, Albania’s Prime Minister Edi Rama and his Socialist Party (PS) seem more powerful than ever – they are backed by a Parliament from which opposition parties have resigned and which is now almost completely populated by MPs supportive of Rama (either
th members of the PS or ‘independents’). In the local elections of June 30 , boycotted by the opposition, the PS ran unopposed in more than half the municipalities. Not surprisingly, the PS (or its proxies) went on to win majorities and mayoral races in all 61 municipalities.
Only the office of the President of Albania, occupied by Ilir Meta, remains in the hands of
th opposition politicians. Following Meta’s attempt to cancel the June 30 election, Rama lodged a motion to remove Meta from office. With Parliament resuming its work at the beginning of September, this motion will now come onto its agenda. Rama may yet be able to secure a two-thirds majority in the Albanian Parliament for Meta’s dismissal, yet there is a bigger hurdle that he will not be able to bypass any time soon. For Meta to be dismissed from office, the Constitutional Court must rule that he has acted unconstitutionally. Yet, as a result of Albania’s prolonged judicial vetting process, the Constitutional Court has been left with only one – out of nine – judges, making it unable to hand down any rulings. There is nothing to suggest that new judges will be appointed to the Constitutional Court any time soon.
The outcome of the local elections has begun creating headaches for Rama already. In the northern city of Shkodra, the PS mayor-elect, Valdrin Pjetri, was forced to resign just a month and a half after the election, following revelations, made by the opposition PD, that he had a conviction for drug dealing in Italy. Pjetri, who had won 100% of the valid votes in the mayoral race, dismissed the conviction as banal, while Rama claimed not to have known about it.
7 Nevertheless, the episode helped to cement the perception of PS’ ties to organized crime. Exactly what happens next in the case of the Shkodra is unclear and illustrative of the institutional quicksand into which Albania is sinking – according to the constitution, the President needs to set the date of the election for a new mayor, following Pjetri’s resignation.
th Yet the President is refusing to do so, rejecting the legitimacy of the June 30 elections. Now, the Socialist-controlled Central Election Commission appears to be preparing to set a date
th itself. Meanwhile, Meta – who cancelled the June 30 elections and scheduled them for a new th date, October 13 , is insisting on local elections being held on this date across the country.
The Socialist mayor of Vora municipality, Agim Kajmaku, is also under intense pressure to resign, due to alleged criminal activities in the past. Another blow for Rama came when Vangjush Dako, the former mayor of Durres, was publicly barred from entering the US due to alleged ‘involvement in significant corruption’.
The Rama government has certainly proved itself to be highly resilient at surviving challenges to its rule and has an unprecedented degree of control over all levels of government and the legislature. Yet its position will likely prove untenable in the medium and long run. The opposition’s departure from Parliament has left Rama presiding over what looks very much like a one-party Parliament, something that will become increasingly uncomfortable for the Albanian Prime Minister. The legitimacy of the country’s local governments is indeed problematic, to say the least. Continuing accusations regarding the Socialists’ connections to organized crime will continue to dent the government’s image. To date, the prolonged political crisis had more or less wrecked Albania’s chances of opening EU accession negotiations this year.
Moving forward into the autumn, the political temperature is once again likely to rise in the country, with the opposition likely to resume its campaign for early elections on the streets. While international actors will press for dialogue between the government and opposition, it is hard to see how this will come about in the current, deeply polarized atmosphere. As a result, we maintain the government instability and civil unrest risks at elevated in the one- and six- month outlook.
8 Opposition Activities
Albania’s political opposition parties remain in a tricky position. On the one hand, their boycott of the local elections has succeeded in denting the legitimacy of these elections, while the opposition’s exit from Parliament has dented the legitimacy of the legislature, as well as the Rama government. However, they also clearly failed to prevent the holding of the local elections, while their exit from Parliament has failed to force early Parliamentary elections. The legitimacy of the Rama government is thus under strain, but the opposition has not achieved its primary goal – toppling Rama’s government - either.
More fundamentally, the opposition has now excluded itself from most representative institutions in the country, from the national Parliament down to local assemblies, and handed all institutions – except the Presidency – to the Socialists. It has few avenues to try to exert pressure on the government and press for early elections, other than the streets.
For the duration of the summer, opposition protests have been put on hold. With the summer holiday season over and politics returning to full intensity, how the opposition will try to force the government into conceding early elections, or the transitional government that it demands, remains to be seen. A return to some kind of street protests is likely, but so far these have not achieved much. The key problem for the opposition remains that, while it has been able to stage violent protests which have grabbed public attention, it has been unable to mobilise support beyond its core supporters.
Regional Relations
Albania’s relations with its neighbours have remained largely uneventful, as the country has focused inward on its own political crisis.
9 The freshly elected government in Athens, led by Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis of the centre-right New Democracy, took an early assertive stance towards Albania. In a letter to a Greek minority organization in Albania, Mitsotakis made it clear that respect for the rights of the Greek minority in Albania was a key precondition for ensuring Greek support for the opening of Albania’s EU accession negotiations.
At the beginning of July, the foreign ministers of Albania and Kosovo, Gent Vakaj and Behgjet Pacolli, signed an agreement which foresees the close coordination of their foreign policies and the creation of joint diplomatic missions. However, many observers doubted that the agreement would have any practical effect. On the other hand, it was visible that over the past month no Albanian minister has visited Kosovo, something of a rarity – analysts in Pristina believe that this is a sign of the tense personal relations between the Albanian and Kosovo Prime Ministers, Edi Rama and Ramush Haradinaj.
Relations with Turkey, or perhaps more precisely relations between Rama and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, continued their upward trajectory. During the summer, Rama was received by Erdogan in one of his summer residences in Turkey. Having returned to Albania, Rama announced that Air Albania, a joint venture between Turkish Airlines and a private Albanian company, would be opening flights to Italy. Shortly before the visit, the municipality of Tirana and Turkish diplomats inaugurated a memorial in the Albanian capital to the victims of the failed July 2016 coup in Turkey. The entire episode seemed rather strange, given that there was no public announcement that such a monument had been planned and even the actual inauguration appears to have been carried out very discretely. At the end of August, barely a month after its inauguration, the monument had been vandalised.
Security
The security situation in Albania remained calm over the previous two months. Indeed, from a security point of view, the potential resumption of violent opposition protests looks like the most
10 serious threat to peace and stability in Albania, as well as the very bitter dispute between government and opposition.
Looking Forward
● Opposition actions: With the summer period coming to a close, the opposition parties will look for ways to step up their campaign to pressure the government of Edi Rama into accepting a transitional government and free and fair elections. A resumption of street protests, potentially violent, is possible and could further destabilise the political environment in Albania.
● EU accession negotiations: Albania still hopes to get the green light for opening EU accession negotiations in October, having failed to do so in June, yet its chances of doing so seem extremely slim. If, as we expect, it does not secure approval to open accession negotiations, it will be important to watch for Rama’s reaction to such a decision.
● Judicial reforms: We expect the Socialist-dominated Parliament to forge ahead with the appointment of the new members of the Constitutional Court in December. The Court presently has only one out of nine members, the others either having resigned or been removed following the judicial vetting process. While there is a pressing need for a functional Constitutional Court to be re-instated, the legitimacy of the appointment process will be under a question mark, given the opposition’s institutional boycott.
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina
A political agreement between the leaders of the three main political parties representing Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats, signed at the beginning of August, was meant to pave the way for the formation of the Bosnian central government 10 months after elections were held. However, the deal seems to have become derailed almost immediately, with the result that the country is on the brink of an even deeper crisis than before the agreement was signed. The country continues to function, as caretaker governments in the Federation and the central state level perform their basic functions. However, political wrangling over the next few weeks will have a decisive impact on whether the political situation in the country stabilises or drastically deteriorates in the next period.
Outlook
Trajectories 1 month 6 months 12 months
War Modest Modest Modest
Terrorism Modest Modest Modest
Government instability Elevated Elevated Elevated
Civil Unrest Moderate Moderate Moderate
Ethnic Unrest Moderate Modest Modest
Low Modest Moderate Elevated Highh
12 Government Stability
At the beginning of August, the leaders of the three dominant parties in Bosnia – Bakir Izetbegovic of the Bosniak Party of Democratic Action (SDA), Milorad Dodik of the Bosnian Serb Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) and Dragan Covic of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) – signed a 12-point coalition agreement, which was to pave the way for the formation of the Bosnian government, the Council of Ministers. The apparent breakthrough was reached on August 5, with the support of Lars-Gunar Wigemark, the head of the EU Delegation in Bosnia.
Aside from the formation of the Bosnian government, the deal signed up the leaders of the main parties to a number of rather broad principles. Indeed, the most specific of the 12 principles was the last one, which stated clearly that in case the Council of Ministers was not formed within a month, the Agreement would lapse. This point was taken by some analysts and observers as an indication of the lack of trust among the Agreement’s signatories, or indeed lacking commitment that what had been agreed would be implemented.
That such scepticism was not misplaced quickly became evident, as the leaders of Bosnia’s various political parties began arguing over what had actually been agreed. Did the coalition Agreement – and various verbal agreements around it – mean that the Annual National Program (ANP), needed to activate the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP), would be approved before the formation of the Council of Ministers could proceed – as the Bosniak and Bosnian Croat members of the Bosnian Presidency, Safik Dzaferovic and Zeljko Komsic, had insisted all along - or was this not part of the Agreement, as Bosnian Serb Presidency member Milorad Dodik insisted.
In the coming days and weeks, we may find out why the August 5th coalition Agreement got derailed so quickly. As things stand, at the time of writing, several sessions of the Bosnian Presidency – called to secure the approval of the ANP and the nomination of Zoran Tegeltija as
13 the candidate for the future Chair of the Council of Ministers have failed to secure the approval of either; both processes remain blocked.
Worse yet, the derailing of the ‘breakthrough’ coalition Agreement has, paradoxically, left Bosnia on the brink of an even deeper crisis, with potentially very grave consequences. Following the failure of the August 27th Bosnian Presidency meeting to approve Zoran Tegeltija’s nomination for the Chair of the Council of Ministers (the session was cancelled), the Bosnian Serb member of the Presidency, Milorad Dodik, accused the other two members of the rotating presidency of deliberately trying to prevent Bosnian Serb representatives from assuming positions in government reserved for them under Bosnia’s complex system of ethnic power sharing and rotation. Not surprisingly, Dzaferovic and Komsic rejected such claims. For his part, Dodik has made a clear threat that, if the current situation is not resolved, Republika Srpska, the Bosnian Serb-dominated entity, will take a series of radical steps, including withdrawing from the joint Bosnian armed forces, withdrawing from the central state system of indirect taxation (VAT) and revoking the transfer of competences made from the entities to the central state over the years.
Such moves would push Bosnia into the gravest post-war crisis the country has experienced to date. Many analysts and observers fear that Dodik is not just bluffing this time around. However, for the time being, a little bit of breathing space seems to have been bought, with Dodik apparently holding off until September 5th, the date when the coalition Agreement signed at the beginning of August will formally lapse.
Opposition Activities
With no governments formed at the level of the central Bosnian state or in the Federation entity, it is still hard to group parties into those which are part of government and those which are in opposition to it. Indeed, thanks to the many levels of government in the complex Bosnian state
14 system, it is often difficult to categorize any major parties as being fully in opposition, especially in the Federation entity with its cantonal tier of government.
The situation remains clearer in the Republika Srpska entity, where a governing coalition has been formed. There, the Party of Democratic Progress (PDP) has very clearly positioned itself in opposition. The bigger Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) is also in opposition, but the once powerful party is suffering from internal disarray. Following its defeat in the October 2018 elections, the SDS was rocked by the defection of some leading figures to the block of ruling parties. It is not clear whether this haemorrhaging of party cadres to the SNSD and other ruling parties has ended yet. The party did take a step towards internal consolidation, when it elected veteran politician Mirko Sarovic as its new leader. However, Sarovic won a narrow victory over his main rival, Milan Milicevic, leading to speculation that the outcome of the leadership race might generate fresh splits in the party. That aside, arguably the bigger problem with Sarovic is that, as someone who was active in politics before the fall of Communism, he is hardly in a position to insert youthful energy into the SDS.
Sarovic has managed to generate some political ripples already – just days after being elected, he dangled the possibility that the central Bosnian government could be formed with the help of the SDS, rather than the SNSD, if some smaller parties, which are in coalition with the SNSD in the RS government, were willing to join the SDS at the central level. In reality, there is very little chance that something like this could happen. However, the mere suggestion did provoke a bitter response from the SNSD, which accused the SDS of being willing to trade Bosnian Serb interests for staying in power.
Regional Relations
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s bilateral relations with most of its neighbours remained broadly stable and quiet over the last few months, with few notable developments.
15 The (reported) words of Croatian President Kolinda Grabar Kitarovic yet again threatened to upset relations between Bosnia and Croatia when, at the end of July, the Jerusalem Post carried a report on Grabar Kitarovic’s meeting with Israeli President Reuven Rivlin. The Jerusalem Post reported that Grabar Kitarovic had told Rivlin that Bosnia had been taken over by militant Islam and was connected to Iran. While the reported comments caused uproar in Bosnia, Grabar Kitarovic denied having said anything of the sort and the Jerusalem Post eventually deleted them from the online version of the report. However, it was not the first time that the Croatian President had upset Bosnians with such rhetoric. Meanwhile, a plan by Croatian authorities to potentially build a radioactive landfill site on the very border with Bosnia, in the area of Trgovska Gora, continues to generate low-level tensions between the two countries. Environmental activists held a protest outside the Croatian Embassy in Sarajevo at the end of July – were the Croatian government to make a definitive decision on building the landfill so close to the Bosnian border, more protests can be expected.
A meeting of the South East European Cooperation Process held in Sarajevo at the beginning of July demonstrated well the rocky waters in which regional relations find themselves at the moment. Kosovo refused to attend the summit, claiming that the status-neutral invitation received from the Bosnian Presidency was humiliating; Albania decided to boycott the summit in solidarity. Bosnian (and Serbian) officials retorted that the format of the invitation was no different than usual.
Relations with Bosnia’s other neighbours remained broadly calm.
Security
Seemingly, the most important political and security issue on the Bosnian agenda is that of NATO membership and the ANP, which is holding up the formation of the country’s governments at the central level and, by extension, in the Federation. However, the issue is something of a ‘red herring’, or distraction. Whether Bosnia adopts the ANP any time soon or not, it is still unlikely to make any substantive progress towards NATO membership, as the
16 Republika Srpska entity is, at present, firmly opposed to NATO accession and committed to military neutrality. Paradoxically, the dispute over the adoption of the ANP has generated a political crisis that could become so grave as to have its own security implications. As a result, we have elevated the risk of war from low to modest in the one month outlook and the risk of civil and ethnic unrest from modest to moderate in the one month outlook.
Aside from these problems, the security situation in Bosnia remains broadly calm. In the country’s north-west corner several thousand migrants and refugees hoping to reach the EU remained stuck in a geographical bottleneck around the town of Bihac, their springboard for crossing into Croatia. Bosnian authorities remain unable to come up with an effective plan to accommodate and distribute migrants around the country, leaving local and regional authorities in areas such as Bihac largely to their own limited devices. In parallel to this, Bosnian authorities are still pondering what to do with returning fighters from Syria, along with their families. At the beginning of July, the idea of housing some of them in a reception centre close to the town of Mostar was mooted.
Looking Forward
● Central government formation: despite the ‘breakthrough’ political agreement reached on August 5, which should have paved the way for the formation of Bosnia’s central government, the Council of Ministers, the process seems to have been derailed before it even got going. This has left the country on the brink of an even deeper political crisis than before the agreement was signed. It will be important to watch in the coming days and weeks whether the agreement is put back on track, or whether the country descends into a deeper political crisis, with the RS entity trying to unpick institutions of the central state.
● Federation entity: formation of the government in the Federation entity seems a more distant prospect, though the formation of the Council of Ministers will be a stepping stone in this direction. A key bellwether for the formation of the Federation government to be
17 watched will be any sign of the question of electing the Croat member of the Bosnian Presidency being resolved in some way.
● Migrants and refugees: if the increased trend in numbers of refugees and migrants arriving is maintained, Bosnia will struggle to deal with the challenge of accommodating and caring for all of them. In this context, disputes between the different levels of government and attempts to shift responsibility could have a destabilising effect on the country.
18 Kosovo
With Kosovo Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj resigning on July 19th following an invitation to be interviewed by the Kosovo Specialist Prosecutor’s Office at the Hague, the path was opened to early Parliamentary elections in Kosovo. While increasing uncertainty in the short term, the elections carry the prospect of reducing instability risks in the medium term if a more stable governing majority can be formed, as seems likely.
Outlook
Trajectories 1 month 6 months 12 months
War Moderate Moderate Moderate
Terrorism Modest Modest Modest
Government instability Elevated Moderate Modest
Civil Unrest Modest Modest Modest
Ethnic Unrest Moderate Moderate Moderate
Low Modest Moderate Elevated High
19 Government Stability
Having defied all odds and limped on for more than a year without a clearly defined majority, the Haradinaj government is finally on its way out. However, in the end it was not brought down by the opposition parties, but by its own choosing – having received a summons to be questioned at the Kosovo Specialist Prosecutor’s Office in the Hague, Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj decided to tender his resignation on July 19th, arguing that it would not be right for him to appear in the Hague as the sitting Prime Minister of Kosovo.
In reality, Haradinaj still went to the Hague as the acting, or caretaker, Prime Minister of Kosovo, and his resignation was an attempt to appear statesmanlike and make the best of a bad situation. It was also an attempt to leverage his resignation in the best way possible to give his party a boost before the early Parliamentary elections which the government’s resignation inevitably paved the way for.
Early Parliamentary elections are now set for October 6th. An immediate problem that must be resolved before then is how the holding of elections will be financed – the Central Election Commission (CEC) has not been allocated any funds for organizing an election under the 2019 budget, as the next regularly scheduled Parliamentary election was due in 2021. It is estimated that the CEC needs around €5.5 million to cover the costs of holding the election. In all likelihood, the current (caretaker) Haradinaj government will need to use its powers to allocate funds for organizing the election. However, it is awaiting the formal opinion of the Constitutional Court on whether it can do so or not in its caretaker capacity.
While this matter awaits resolution, Kosovo’s political parties are busy cobbling together pre-election coalitions and alliances, as well as wooing voters. So far, Haradinaj’s Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) has formed a coalition with Shpend Ahmeti’s Social Democrats (PSD), a move not entirely unexpected given that the PSD had, on occasion, extended its support to the Haradinaj government. Meanwhile, Fatmir Limaj’s Social Democratic Initiative (NISMA) has formed a pre-election coalition with Behgjet Pacolli’s New Kosovo Alliance (AKR).
20
At present, there are no reliable polls available which could give a clear idea of who voters will lend their support to. While there is much room for the course of the election campaign to shape the final distribution of votes, the two biggest opposition parties – Vetevendosje (Self-Determination) and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) are likely to secure a commanding share of the votes. Indeed, the two parties had mooted a pre-election coalition of their own, yet the insistence of Self-Determination that its leader, Albin Kurti, should be the coalition’s candidate for Prime Minister appears to have scuttled any potential alliance.
In Kosovo’s electoral institutional set-up, the question of which party or coalition will have the single biggest share of votes holds an unusually important place. According to the previous rulings of the Constitutional Court, it is the party or coalition which wins the most votes which has the right to nominate a candidate for Prime Minister first and attempt to form a government. This right cannot be overlooked even if it is clear that this particular party or coalition cannot actually secure a majority in Parliament, or if an alternative Parliamentary majority has already been formed. Moreover, once the party/coalition which won the most votes nominates its candidate for Prime Minister, there is no time limit as to how long that person has to either assemble a governing majority or return the mandate to form the government, which can then be offered to someone else. Nor is there a time limit as to how long parties have to form a government before another election is held to resolve any political deadlock.
This rule has, in the past, complicated post-election government formation. To all extents and purposes, it has enabled whichever party wins the most votes (even if this is far from a majority or only marginally ahead of other parties or coalitions) to prevent the formation of a governing coalition in which it is not included, even if a majority exists in Parliament that would exclude it from government.
It is for this reason that political parties in Kosovo have an added incentive to form pre-election coalitions, so as to increase their chances of coming first in terms of votes. An LDK-Self-Determination coalition would have been almost certain to come first in the upcoming elections, perhaps even come close to securing an absolute majority. As things stand, the two
21 parties are likely to be neck-and-neck in their race for the first spot and the right to nominate the next Prime Minister. While Self-Determination’s leader Albin Kurti is its candidate for Prime Minister, LDK has, at present, put MP Vjosa Osmani forward as its candidate for the top job. The AAK-PSD coalition has put Ramush Haradinaj forward as its candidate for Prime Minister, but few observers expect Haradinaj to return to the post after the elections.
In the absence of reliable polling data, it is hard to make well-grounded predictions about who will form the next government. However, local pundits seem to be betting on an LDK-Self-Determination government being formed. Some even believe that Kosovo could get its first government which is not made up of parties led by figures who emerged from the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). In the event that the two parties are not able to secure an outright majority, Fatmir Limaj’s NISMA is seen as another potential member of the next government. In any case, we expect the next government to be more stable than the outgoing one, hence our willingness to reduce the government instability risk to moderate in the six month outlook and modest in the 12 month outlook.
In the context of future negotiations on forming Kosovo’s governing coalition, it is worth remembering that the term of Kosovo’s current President, Hashim Thaci, expires in the first half of 2021. As a result, the position of President of Kosovo, who is elected by Parliament, may also be a subject of the coalition formation negotiations.
Opposition Activities
With Kosovo preparing for Parliamentary elections, it remains to be seen which political parties will be left in opposition following the formation of the next government.
One electoral outcome being keenly discussed is the possibility that the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), which has been a part of most Kosovo governments over the last two decades, will be shut out from government. Some analysts and observers argue that most of the parties with the best chance of forming the next government are very keen to see the party forced into
22 opposition. While its coalition potential and appeal seem low at present, it would seem bold to write off the PDK just yet, not least because its former leader, Hashim Thaci, may use his leverage as President to ensure its inclusion in government.
Among the current opposition parties, the LDK finally completed its marathon internal election process at the beginning of August. The party had been expected to elect a new leader to replace the ailing Isa Mustafa, with Lutfi Haziri, Vjosa Osmani and Avdullah Hoti all seen as leading contenders. Yet in the end, the culmination of the internal election process – the leadership election – took a distinctly anticlimactic turn. Amidst fears that the election of any one of these individuals could generate a split in the party and the departure of one or more internal party factions, all the leading contenders agreed to support Isa Mustafa and withdraw from the race. Thus, Isa Mustafa was duly re-elected to lead the party on August 3rd.
Regional Relations
Kosovo’s relations with its neighbours remained largely calm and stable, with the exception of continuing tense relations with Serbia. Admittedly, the summer heat did reduce tensions somewhat, but even low intensity incidents on the ground carry the potential for an escalation in tensions. The resignation of Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj and the approach of elections may have also helped to reduce tensions, inadvertently, as international pressure on both sides to resume formal negotiations seems to have eased off. In reality, no one expects negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina to be resumed before a new government is in place in the latter. Yet few observers have any clear idea how fresh life could be breathed into the negotiations particularly if, as is likely, the next government in Pristina includes Self-Determination, which has traditionally been hostile to negotiations with Belgrade. In the meantime, the course of the Kosovo Parliamentary election campaign could raise tensions between Belgrade and Pristina – the government in Kosovo has already decided to ban foreign officials from participating in the campaign, a clear attempt to prevent Serbian officials from campaigning for Belgrade-backed Srpska Lista.
23 At the beginning of July, the foreign ministers of Albania and Kosovo, Gent Vakaj and Behgjet Pacolli, signed an agreement which foresees the close coordination of their foreign policies and the creation of joint diplomatic missions. However, many observers doubted that the agreement would have any practical effect. On the other hand, it was visible that over the past month no Albanian minister has visited Kosovo, something of a rarity – analysts in Pristina believe that this is a sign of the tense personal relations between the Albanian and Kosovo Prime Ministers, Edi Rama and Ramush Haradinaj.
Trade relations between Kosovo and North Macedonia took a slight turn for the worse on August 16th, after Kosovo imposed a ban on imports of potatoes and honey from North Macedonia. Officials in Pristina claimed that the measure was a response to tariffs imposed in June by Skopje on imports of fish products from Kosovo. Despite these developments, claims by some media that Kosovo and North Macedonia were on the brink of a trade war seemed exaggerated.
Security
The security situation in Kosovo remained calm and uneventful. Over the coming month, the conduct of the Parliamentary election campaign carries the risk of modestly destabilising the wider security situation.
Looking Forward
● Parliamentary elections: Over the next month, Kosovo will be consumed with campaigning for the October 6th Parliamentary elections. It will be important to follow the formation of pre-election coalitions, as well as the conduct of the election campaign, with the possibility of violent incidents occurring during the latter stages of the campaign and on election day itself.
24 ● Next government: Once the votes are counted, wrangling will begin over who will be able to form the next government. While the LDK and Self-Determination are widely expected to work together to form the new government, it will be important to watch which party will secure the biggest number of votes and, by extension, win the right to nominate the candidate for the next Prime Minister.
● Dialogue with Serbia: while there is strong international pressure on both Pristina and Belgrade to resume negotiations on normalising relations as quickly as possible, the composition of the next government – and in particular the inclusion of Self-Determination – could significantly complicate the resumption of negotiations.
● Kosovo Specialist Chambers: with the Special Prosecutor’s Office inviting a steady stream of ex-Kosovo Liberation Army figures to be ‘interviewed’, it will be important to watch out for the issuing of actual indictments, which could further destabilise the political and security situation in Kosovo.
25 North Macedonia
The SDSM-led government in Skopje has been shaken by the ‘Extortion affair’ in which Special Prosecutor Katica Janeva has been implicated. Although there is no evidence, at present, to suggest that senior members of the parties in government are in any way implicated, given that the Zaev government was elected on an anti-corruption ticket the fact that such an affair has happened on its watch – and that it failed to notice it unfolding – will doubtless damage popular support for the government. Despite not receiving approval for opening EU accession negotiations in June, Skopje hopes that European leaders will give it the green light in September. We believe that Skopje’s chances of securing the opening of accession negotiations hang in the balance.
Outlook
Trajectories 1 month 6 months 12 months
War Low Low Low
Terrorism Low Low Low
Government instability Moderate Moderate Modest
Civil Unrest Modest Modest Modest
Ethnic Unrest Modest Modest Modest
Low Modest Moderate Elevated High
26
Government Stability
Over the summer, North Macedonia has been rocked by the ‘Extortion affair’, which has damaged the current SDSM-led government and dented popular support for it. The affair began to gather steam earlier in the summer, when some media began reporting accusations that ruling party officials had been involved in an extortion scheme made operational by the celebrity performer-turned-businessman, Bojan Jovanovski. It moved into a higher gear when, on July 15, the regular Prosecution for Organized Crime opened a formal investigation into Jovanovski and accomplice Zoran Milevski, who were placed under arrest. The phone of Special Prosecutor Katica Janeva was also seized to check her connections to them; Janeva resigned as Special Prosecutor the same day, but later denied any abuse of office. Jovanovski and Milevski were suspected of extorting money from Macedonian businessman Orce Kamcev, allegedly taking cash from him on the promise that they would either help him avoid a jail sentence or secure a lighter sentence in cases against him being pursued by the Special Prosecution. Jovanovski and Milevski claimed to have influence over the Special Prosecution.
The entire affair then blew up at the beginning of August, when Italian newspaper La Verita published recordings of conversations between Jovanovski, Milevski, Kamcev, as well as some recordings which allegedly include Katica Janeva’s voice. Jovanovski could be heard discussing with Kamcev the latter’s release from house detention, as well as Jovanovski’s bragging about his acquaintance with PM Zoran Zaev who, he claimed, would not make any problems. Following the release of these recordings, Janeva was questioned by prosecutors on August 20th and arrested the next day.
The response of the government has been slow and disorganized. While both Prime Minister Zoran Zaev and President Stevo Pendarovski called for a quick and thorough investigation, most observers feel that the government has been more focused on damage control than ensuring that the affair is fully investigated.
27 To understand why the affair is so damaging to the Zaev government, even if there is no evidence linking it to the Extortion affair, it is important to keep in mind that the current government came to power, first and foremost, on its promise to fight the kind of corruption in which the previous VMRO-DPMNE government had been so deeply implicated. Even if the Zaev government is not implicated in the Extortion affair, it will be faulted for having failed to uncover such high level corruption in the special prosecution itself.
In a wider sense, while the Extortion affair will not boost support for the main opposition VMRO-DPMNE, it will dent support for the SDSM. By feeding a sense that ‘everyone is the same’ in the political world and that whoever is in power corruption will persist, it will help to undermine support for the SDSM. Consequently, in a relative sense, by driving supporters of the ruling party into apathy, the affair could help the opposition VMRO-DPMNE.
The only way that the SDSM can truly hope to undo much of the damage done by the Extortion affair is to ensure that a full and unobstructed investigation is carried out, with those involved prosecuted. Only in this way does the SDSM stand a chance of convincing the public that it is not seeking to protect wrongdoers coming from its own ranks. However, aside from political will, perhaps the biggest obstacle to this is the North Macedonian public prosecution and judiciary, which remains unreformed, with limited human and other capabilities and resources, staffed with individuals who were chosen primarily for their loyalty to the previous regime, rather than integrity and professionalism.
In this context, it will be important to watch the passage of a key piece of legislation, the Law on the Prosecution, which is currently being debated in the North Macedonian Parliament. The law is practically the only remaining condition which North Macedonia needs to fulfil to secure the opening of EU accession negotiations. It would also resolve the status of the Special Prosecution within the public prosecution system, making it a permanent albeit autonomous part of the prosecution system with expanded competences. However, in order to be adopted, the Law requires the support of two-thirds of MPs in Parliament, which in practice means that at least part of the VMRO-DPMNE MPs must vote in favour of it. At present, the opposition seems more committed to preventing the passage of this law.
28
For the time being, with the Zaev government trying to deal with the fallout from the Extortion affair and the hoped-for date for opening EU accession negotiations under a question mark, the one thing that seems certain is that early Parliamentary elections are very much off the table.
Opposition Activities
The opposition VMRO-DPMNE is seeking to exploit the Extortion affair as much as possible in its efforts to undermine the Zaev government. Thus, it is continuing with its claims that the affair is symptomatic of the systematic corruption of the current government. Initially, when the affair first came to light, the VMRO-DPMNE was critical of the fact that Janeva had not been arrested; following her arrest, the VMRO-DPMNE claimed that she had been arrested merely to protect Prime Minister Zoran Zaev.
Following the release of the compromising videos by La Verita in August, the VMRO-DPMNE intensified its claims that Janeva was merely the executioner of a government-backed extortion campaign running into millions of euros, while Jovanovski and Kicec were merely ‘the tentacles of the criminal octopus of the government’. All of this was followed up with a demand for early Parliamentary elections.
During the second half of August, the VMRO-DPMNE began threatening that it would organise street protests and blockades during the autumn, in protest at the government’s handling of the Extortion affair and in an effort to force its resignation and early elections. However, for the time being at least, most observers believe that the VMRO-DPMNE has neither the credibility nor the strength to organise protests which could damage the government, let alone force it to resign or destabilise the country.
With the Extortion affair still in its early stages, it is hard to build a case for organising protests around it, something that the VMRO-DPMNE will be aware of. More likely, the party will bide its time a little longer, waiting for fresh revelations and any signs that the Zaev government is
29 obstructing the investigation. If anything of the sort emerges, and if North Macedonia fails to secure a date for opening EU accession negotiations, then the opposition would be on a much more sound footing to initiate protests.
Regional Relations
North Macedonia’s relations with its neighbours remained largely calm and stable.
As expected, the new centre-right government in Athens has not taken any steps which could suggest that it plans to undo the Prespa Agreement resolving the dispute between the two countries over North Macedonia’s name. However, the Mitsotakis government has taken a notably cooler stance towards Skopje than its predecessor. While we do not expect any bilateral hostilities, it is to be expected that Athens may at some point flex its muscles in an attempt to demonstrate its patriotic credentials at home, and berate the government in Skopje over alleged violations of the Prespa Agreement.
Relations with Bulgaria remained on a broadly positive trajectory, despite some bumps and hurdles encountered earlier in the summer, primarily over the identity of Gotse Delchev, the long-dead Ottoman-era revolutionary claimed as their own by both countries. On August 1st, Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borissov visited Skopje to mark the second anniversary of a friendship treaty signed by the two countries. Borissov vowed that his country would not block Skopje’s EU accession path, but added that a joint historical commission formed by the two countries needed to wind up its work and resolve outstanding issues in October this year.
North Macedonia’s relations with Serbia remained cool, though better than usual. The decision of North Macedonian judicial authorities not to extradite ex-Kosovo Liberation Army fighter Tomor Morina to Serbia, which has issued an arrest warrant for him, generated only mild rebukes from Serbia – in the past such a move could have generated a salvo of hostile rhetoric directed at Skopje. On August 26th, the Prime Ministers of North Macedonia and Serbia – Zoran Zaev and Ana Brnabic – opened an integrated border control point at the Tabanovce border
30 crossing, which should significantly speed up the passage of people and goods between the two countries. This was followed by an official visit by Brnabic to Skopje, during which several bilateral agreements were signed.
North Macedonia and Kosovo were engaged in a trade dispute, which is unlikely to escalate dramatically (see Kosovo’s section on regional relations).
Security
The security situation in North Macedonia remained calm and uneventful. Ratification of North Macedonia’s NATO accession treaty continued among NATO member states. Eight of the 29 NATO member states still need to complete the ratification process. While this should not be a problem, there is a possibility that domestic political turmoil in countries such as Italy or the UK could delay ratification. Should everything proceed according to plan, North Macedonia could become the 30th NATO member state in December 2019.
Looking Forward
● Extortion affair: the Extortion affair has significant potential to further damage the current government in Skopje. It will be important to watch both for new revelations – particularly those that might implicate senior government and/or SDSM figures in the affair, how the judicial system handles investigation of the affair, as well as how the government handles the continuing fallout. Failure to investigate the case properly and bring those involved to trial would be wind in the sails of the opposition ahead of elections due in the second half of 2020.
● Opening of EU accession negotiations: with its hopes of getting the green light to open accession negotiations in June dashed, the SDSM still hopes to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat in October. At this point, whether North Macedonia gets approval to open accession negotiations depends much more on the outcome of internal EU haggling and
31 wrangling than what Skopje can do by then. We believe that the EU decision on whether to approve the opening of accession negotiations hangs in the balance.
● NATO membership: out of 29 NATO member states, 21 have ratified (or are in the final stages of ratifying) the accession of North Macedonia to NATO. If, as is expected, the remaining 8 complete ratification, North Macedonia hopes that it could become a full member of NATO at the military alliance’s December summit.
32 Montenegro
Montenegro has entered a period of summer calm, with much of the country preoccupied with the tourist season or its own holidays. The DPS is in the process of consolidating its own ranks ahead of a party congress due on October 15th, during which party leader Milos Djukanovic is set to be re-elected. Meanwhile, the Montenegrin opposition has embarked on internal infighting, which has taken on a distinctly personal tone. The infighting is likely to intensify, damaging the opposition and benefiting the regime.
Outlook
Trajectories 1 month 6 months 12 months
War Low Low Low
Terrorism Low Low Low
Government instability Modest Modest Modest
Civil Unrest Modest Modest Modest
Ethnic Unrest Modest Modest Modest
Low Modest Moderate Elevated High
33 Government Stability
The ruling Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) continued its internal consolidation following the string of damaging revelations made by prominent businessman Dusko Knezevic regarding corruption and illegal donations at the end of 2018 and beginning of 2019, known as the ‘Envelope affair’. In June and July, DPS leader and Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic toured Montenegro, visiting local party branches and meeting with party activists. The tour had several goals: on the one hand, Djukanovic sought to calm party activists concerned about the ongoing internal dispute between the DPS factions gathered around Djukanovic and Prime Minister Dusko Markovic respectively, while on the other hand Djukanovic also sought to demonstrate that he was very much still in charge of the party.
That Djukanovic felt the need to visit local DPS branches in order to consolidate the party and demonstrate that he remained firmly in charge was, in and of itself, a sign that something was amiss within the DPS. The party will hold a congress in late September – the date of which has not yet been set – at which Djukanovic is expected to be re-elected as party leader unchallenged. Despite the fact that internal factionalism and splits remain alive and well within the DPS, these are not expected to boil over at the congress.
Since mid-June, the Montenegrin public has also been drip-fed a series of secretly recorded conversations dating from early 2006 between then Serbia and Montenegro Ambassador to Moscow Milan Rocen, now an advisor to President Milo Djukanovic, and various figures from the political and business worlds of Montenegro and Serbia. The taped conversations are 13 years old and have not caused any major earthquakes on the Montenegrin political scene, even if some of the details contained in them, such as the language used by Rocen when referring to journalists and editors of public broadcaster RTCG, are embarrassing for Rocen. The more interesting questions are perhaps who made the recordings, wo has been leaking them and why?
34 Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic suggested that the recordings were made by the previous Serbian government, specifically referring to former President Boris Tadic and a cousin of his who is alleged to have been responsible for the recordings; Tadic himself has vehemently denied the accusations. Some media in Montenegro have floated the idea that the recordings were made by Russian intelligence agencies. Either way, one interesting line of speculation is that the recordings have been obtained and leaked by the faction around Prime Minister Dusko Markovic in order to damage Milan Rocen, one of the key figures in Djukanovic’s faction within the DPS.
When it comes to Dusko Knezevic, the estranged Montenegrin businessman remains in London and has ceased with any fresh revelations against the ruling DPS elite, in line with our belief that some kind of ‘non-aggression’ pact has been reached between Djukanovic and Knezevic. Of course, the possibility of fresh revelations should not be excluded if either side violates their mutual understanding. While investigations against Knezevic and his companies press on in Montenegro, Knezevic’s Atlas Group declared at the end of August that it would be suing the Montenegrin state for €500 million in compensation before an unnamed arbitration court because of alleged losses it had incurred and damages to its reputation.
Finally, the dust seems to have settled surrounding the draft law on religious freedom. In all likelihood, it seems that a more watered down version of the law will be adopted, which will not irritate the Serbian Orthodox Church in the way that the initial draft did, nor endanger its property in Montenegro. As a result, we have decided to decrease the ethnic unrest risk outlook to modest in the one-month period.
Opposition Activities
While the DPS has been busy consolidating its own ranks, the Montenegrin opposition parties seem to be embroiled in acrimonious internal feuding, at times using language and topics which go well beyond public decency.
35 The internal feuding on the opposition scene gained in intensity after it became apparent that an agreement had been reached between the ruling DPS and the opposition Democrats over the latter’s participation in a Parliamentary commission which has been tasked with reforming electoral conditions ahead of Parliamentary elections due by October 2020. Previously, the opposition parties as a whole had taken a firm line that they would not participate in the work of such a commission unless it was part of a package agreement involving the creation of a technical government to oversee the creation of free and fair election conditions.
The deal between DPS officials and the Democrats appears to have been brokered by EU officials in Podgorica, who are keen to initiate a dialogue between the ruling and opposition parties which will, ultimately, create the conditions for the holding of elections whose outcome will be accepted by all sides. As things stand, however, it has only aggravated splits on the opposition scene and moved Montenegro further away from the goal of creating electoral conditions which would be accepted by all sides.
Since the agreement between the DPS and the Democrats was made public, the opposition blocks grouped around the Democrats on the one hand and the more conservative Democratic Front (DF) on the other have been hurling accusations at each other. These took a turn beyond the politically acceptable when a local dispute in the opposition-run municipality of Budva resulted in a statement by the DF in which it accused a ‘gay lobby’ of hijacking part of the opposition political scene for the sake of its own interests and attacking the Front because of its adherence to traditional and family values. The homophobic statement appeared directed at the leadership of the Democrats and another small opposition party.
The feuding within the opposition parties is unlikely to be resolved any time soon. In all likelihood, they are engaged in posturing ahead of the Parliamentary elections due by October 2020, in which the rival opposition parties will, as things stand, devote more energy to fighting over opposition votes among themselves than toppling the DPS.
36 Regional Relations
Montenegro’s relations with its neighbours remained broadly stable. Relations with Serbia have, on the whole, calmed down significantly, following a rhetorical escalation during the summer regarding the proposed draft law on religious freedom, which was seen as jeopardising the interests of the Serbian Orthodox Church. However, a lingering source of tension remains the situation around Branka Milic, one of the individuals convicted in the ‘coup trial’. Milic remains holed up in the Serbian Embassy in Podgorica and neither Belgrade nor Podgorica seem to have an idea for how to resolve this situation.
Meanwhile, relations between Montenegro and Kosovo have the potential to flare up in the coming months. In September, the physical demarcation of the (much disputed) border between Kosovo and Montenegro is due to begin. This will coincide with the duration of the Parliamentary election campaign in Kosovo, making it highly likely that at least some, if not all, of the political parties in Kosovo will seek to politicise the issue.
Security
The security situation in Montenegro has remained broadly stable over the summer.
There have been no significant new developments relating to the ‘coup trial’, in which a ruling was handed down on May 9th. The High Court in Podgorica, which handed down the convictions against the 13 individuals who were on trial, has to date failed to hand written copies of the verdicts to the 13 individuals sentenced for taking part in the coup. As a result, they have not been able to lodge formal appeals against the original verdict. Another interesting development is the news that Sasa Sindjelic, the prosecution’s key witness who appeared to have turned evidence while in Serbia, has fled to Montenegro at the end of June, where he is now seeking asylum. This is one in a series of bizarre twists and turns in this case, with Sindjelic
37 now awaiting a decision on whether he will be granted asylum in Montenegro, or deported to Croatia to serve a sentence for murder.
Looking Forward
● DPS stability: with the DPS party Congress scheduled for October 15th, it will be important to watch for any signs of intensifying factional infighting within the ruling party in its approach. Djukanovic is almost certain to be re-elected party leader, but there could be tussles over other senior positions within the party hierarchy.
● Opposition infighting: Montenegro’s opposition parties seem to be headed for a period of bloody internal feuding, as one group around the Democrats appears to be willing to engage in the work of the Parliamentary commission tasked with reforming electoral conditions ahead of Parliamentary elections in late 2020, while another group gathered around the DF objects to participating in the work of any such commission unless a technical government is also formed to oversee the holding of free and fair elections. Infighting within the opposition block can be expected to become increasingly personal, harming the opposition in the long-term.
● Coup trial: the course of the appeals process in the coup case should be watched carefully, due to the potential of its outcome to destabilise the political and security situation in the country, particularly if the Appeals Court were to uphold the High Court’s verdict in full.
38 Serbia
Serbia’s government remains highly stable, despite a year marked by opposition protests calling for its resignation. The approach of Parliamentary elections – most likely to be held in the spring – will insert additional dynamism into political life, as the opposition appears headed towards boycotting the elections. Faced with the threat of an opposition boycott damaging the legitimacy of the next Parliament and government, the SNS will seek to split the opposition and co-opt individual leaders and parties into participating in the elections.
Outlook
Trajectories 1 month 6 months 12 months
War Low Low Low
Terrorism Low Low Low
Government instability Modest Modest Low
Civil Unrest Moderate Moderate Modest
Ethnic Unrest Low Low Low
Low Modest Moderate Elevated High
39 Government stability
The current Serbian government, a coalition dominated by the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) which rules in coalition with the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), the junior partner in the government, remains highly stable. While formally led by Prime Minister Ana Brnabic, who marked two years in the job on July 1st, the government remains under the firm control of Serbian President and SNS leader Aleksandar Vucic.
When it comes to internal developments within the government and ruling SNS, the summer was a period of quiet. At the end of July, some apparent tensions surfaced between Prime Minister Ana Brnabic and Nenad Popovic, Minister without portfolio and leader of the small Serbian People’s Party (SNP). In a written statement to the media, Popovic concluded that the Brussels Agreement was essentially dead and Serbia’s EU accession process was leading nowhere, hence Serbia should turn its ship gradually in a different direction – towards Russia and China. Such comments provoked an angry response from Prime Minister Brnabic, who issued a short statement saying that all government ministers were obliged to pursue commonly agreed policies, and that they were free to leave the government if they were not capable of doing so. Brnabic also added that Popovic was not responsible either for EU accession nor the Brussels Agreement.
While some observers wondered whether such spats were a sign of substantive disagreements within the government, we believe that this is very unlikely. If anything, they are a reflection of personal animosities between Brnabic and Popovic. Moreover, it seems more than likely that the public spat has been deliberately engineered with the blessing of President Aleksandar Vucic, as part of the effort to maintain the Janus-faced exterior of the Serbian government, which has its pro-EU face (represented by Brnabic) and a pro-Russian camp (in which Popovic sits).
The Serbian government received a substantial boost with the state visit of French President Emmanuel Macron to Belgrade on July 15th-16th. Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic rolled out
40 the red carpet for Macron and engaged in a charm offensive, which the French President seemed to enjoy. Vucic flattered Macron by referring to him as the most important European leader, alongside Angela Merkel. Both men made repeated references to the historically warm ties between their two countries and the fact that they had fought on the same side in two world wars, with the First World War particularly heavily referenced. Yet aside from the bilateral expressions of love and affection, there was not a great deal of substance to the visit. Macron underlined his position that the EU needed to implement internal reforms before it could engage in a fresh round of enlargement. Macron offered to host a summit between the leaders of Serbia and Kosovo – despite the fact that he referred to the two as ‘countries’, Serbian officials tried to claim that Serbia had a new ally in its battle for Kosovo in the aftermath of the visit.
Meanwhile, talk of early Parliamentary elections essentially disappeared from the Serbian political agenda. Consequently, barring any major surprises, it would appear that the country is headed towards its first regularly timed Parliamentary elections since 2012, now due in the spring of 2020.
Opposition activities
Perhaps the biggest political event of the summer was the opening of a dialogue between the ruling SNS and various opposition parties on the conduct of the next elections. The first meeting occurred on July 30th – convened by the Open Society Foundation and hosted by the Belgrade faculty of Political Sciences – and came as a surprise to most observers, given that it was not announced beforehand.
Optimists cautiously applauded the fact that government and opposition were finally sitting down to discuss opposition demands for the free and fair conduct of upcoming Parliamentary elections, hoping that the move would help to alleviate political and societal tensions. Pessimists wondered what the point of such a dialogue could be, given their assessment that organizing free and fair elections was the last thing that Vucic and the SNS were interested in.
41 To date, three rounds of discussions have been held – the first on July 30th, the second on August 9th and the latest on August 19th – covering issues ranging from the financing of election campaigns to media coverage of elections. A further two rounds of discussions were originally scheduled for September 5th and 9th, set to discuss the state of electoral rolls and the right of voters to cast their ballots without duress.
Yet the first three rounds of discussions, and perhaps even more importantly the public statements and comments made by both sides surrounding them, were so ill tempered as to jeopardise the holding of the remaining rounds of discussions. Following the August 19th meeting, the Alliance for Serbia (SZS), the main opposition grouping, announced that it would not participate in any more meetings with the ruling party. Despite a statement by David McAllister, the head of the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, that the EU was also willing to support a dialogue between the ruling party and opposition, by the end of August the SZS stated that it would give the ruling SNS until the middle of September to agree to fulfilling its demands for enabling the holding of free and fair elections. Simultaneously, the members of the Alliance were to reach a decision on whether or not to boycott the next Parliamentary elections by mid-September, arguing that if nothing had been done to create the conditions for free and fair elections six months before they were due, then it would be too late to do anything after that in time for the elections.
With several opposition parties already declaring that they would boycott the next Parliamentary elections, an overwhelming proportion of opposition parties seem to be leaning in the direction of boycott. Of course, with six months to go before election day, there is still plenty of room for the ruling SNS to try to peel away individual opposition parties and try to persuade them to take part in the upcoming elections with modest concessions.
It is clear that the SNS does not relish the prospect of a complete opposition boycott, which would seriously damage the legitimacy of the next Serbian Parliament and, consequently, the next Serbian government. International officials – primarily those from the US and EU – have also come out strongly against an opposition boycott. Whether the combined pressure and enticements of the SNS and Western diplomats manages to persuade some opposition parties
42 to take part in the elections remains to be seen. Ironically, the scenario where part of the opposition parties boycotts the elections while another – smaller – segment takes part may suit Vucic and the SNS best, as this would give the elections a bare minimum of legitimacy while delivering the SNS a thumping victory.
Regional relations
Relations between Serbia and its neighbours were mostly calm, with no notable disputes arising. For the latest developments in Serbia’s relations with Kosovo, North Macedonia and Montenegro, please see these countries regional relations entries.
Security
The security situation in Serbia remained calm and stable over the last two months. Serbia’s continued efforts to juggle between East and West were also visible in the security sphere. During the visit of French President Emmanuel Macron, the Serbian government and French arms manufacturer MBDA signed a contract for the acquisition of the Mistral 3 short-range air defence system by the Serbian side. Some military analysts observed that the missile system in question was particularly well suited to downing helicopters, such as those recently bought by neighbouring Croatia. Just two weeks later, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic attended a ceremony in the southern city of Nis to mark the arrival of 10 Russian armoured personnel carriers, donated by the Russian government. This was just part of a consignment of Russian weaponry, bought or donated, which was due to arrive in Serbia. According to Vucic, a further four combat helicopters, two transport helicopters and a number of tanks would arrive from Russia before the end of the year.
43 Looking Forward
● Electoral dialogue: two further sessions of the dialogue scheduled between the ruling SNS and opposition parties appear unlikely to be held. Yet with six months to go before Parliamentary elections, there is still time for the two sides to discuss electoral conditions and avert an opposition boycott. The willingness of US and EU mediators to get involved in mediating such a dialogue will be key in preventing an opposition boycott, as well as the willingness of the ruling SNS to make concessions to the opposition.
● Opposition unity: Opposition parties will be increasingly torn between those parties and groups wishing to declare an early election boycott and those keen to keep negotiating with the ruling SNS in the hope of securing acceptable electoral conditions with the help of (hoped for) international mediation. It will be important to keep an eye on which opposition parties take a hard line on boycotting upcoming elections and which ones show a willingness to engage in negotiations with the ruling SNS.
● Protests: the "1 of 5 million” protests are being kept alive in Belgrade, though only just. An underlying mood of dissatisfaction among opposition supporters creates fertile ground for opposition parties to try and reactivate protests across the country during the autumn. However, this will depend in part on what stance most opposition parties take on the issue of boycotting the next Parliamentary elections, as well as whether the regime makes any mistakes which provoke opposition supporters into coming out onto the streets.
44 About Risk Dimensions
War
We understand ‘war’ as the state use of armed force beyond regular policing. This category includes the risk of the state use of force in the context of inter-state war, civil war, border disputes, but also in response to terrorism or civil disorder.
Terrorism
Terrorism refers to activities, or the risk thereof, of organised groups (large or small) who are causing, or pose a credible risk of causing, death, injury, property damage, kidnapping or other forms of terror using violence (which may include shootings, assassinations, bombings, arson, beatings, etc). At risk may be individuals or assets. Motives may be wide ranging – religious, political, ideological, nationalist, ethnic, etc.
Government Instability
This category covers the risk of government collapse, protracted government instability and/or paralysis and/or deadlock and/or inability to take decisions, the risk of early elections, or even a protracted institutional or constitutional crises.
Civil Unrest
The category refers to unrest and/or disorder which is primarily political, socio-economic, labour, land/property issues, corruption or rights-based in terms of motives, or directed against a specific actor or issue. It can include mass protests, riots or strikes, whether peaceful or violent and national-level, regional or local.
Ethnic Unrest
This category refers to unrest and/or disorder which is primarily motivated by ethnic, religious or nationalist factors and/or grievances (real or imagined). It can include mass protests, riots, communal attacks or frequent physical attacks against members of a group. It can be violent or non-violent and national-level, regional or local in nature.
45 About
The Western Balkans Stability Monitor is produced by BIRN Consultancy, part of BIRN Ltd. BIRN Consultancy is an independent analysis, advisory and corporate investigation consultancy with a regional focus on the Balkans. Our mission is to help our clients better understand both the opportunities and challenges facing them in the south-east Europe. Often, our clients already have a degree of familiarity with the region. They turn to us for more detailed analysis of developments and trends or to investigate a particular problem, because our unique mix of knowledge and expertise gives us a competitive edge over others.
Contact
Address: Phone: +381 11 40 30 304 Kolarčeva 7, V floor Email: [email protected] 11000 Belgrade Website: http://consultancy.birn.eu.com/ Serbia
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